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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Supreme Court Case No. 40595
40599

vs.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual, SHARON
CUMMINGS, Personal Representative of the
ESTATE OF ROBERT M. TURNBOW; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
MCKLVEEN CHARTERED, an Idaho corporation,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an
Idaho limited liability partnership;
Defendants.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.

HONORABLE RICHARD D. GREENWOOD

JEFFREY A. THOMSON,

MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY

JACK S. GJORDING

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
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REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,
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Plaintiff-Respondent,
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RJCHARD A. RJLEY, an individual,
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HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited partnership; SHARON
CUMMINGS, Personal Representative of the
ESTATEOFROBERTM.TURNBOW;and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation,
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Defendants.
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,
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Plaintiff-Respondent,
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Supreme Court Docket No. 40595-2012
Ada County No. 2009-18868
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ORDER CONSOLIDATING APPEALS
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and
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Defendant-Appellant,
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SHARON CUMMINGS, as Personal
)
Representative of THE ESTATE OF ROBERT )
M. TURNBOW, and EBERLE, BERLIN,
)
KADING, TURNBOW & MCKLVEEN,
)
CHARTERED, an Idaho corporation,

Supreme Court Docket No. 40599-2012
Ada County No. 2009-18868
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Defendants-Appellants,
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and
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RJCHARD A. RJLEY, an individual, and
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY,

)
)

ORDER CONSOLIDATING APPEALS - Docket Nos. 40595-2012/40599-2012

000002

LLP, an Idaho limited partnership,

)
)
)

Defendants.

It appearing that these appeals should be consolidated for Clerk·s Record and

Reporter's Transcript for reasons of judicial economy; therefore. good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that appeal No. 40595 and 40599 shall be
CONSOLIDATED FOR CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT under No.
40595, but all documents filed shall bear both docket numbers.

IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare a CLERK'S
RECORD, which shall include the documents requested in the Notices of Appeal, together with a
copy of this Order.

IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Reporter shall prepare a
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT, which shall include the transcripts requested in the Notices of
Appeal.
DATED this

cc:

:ii

j/tA

day of February, 2013.

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Court Reporter
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Date: 6/14/2013
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Page 1 of 21

User: CCTHIEBJ

Case: CV-OC-2009-18868 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood
Reed J Taylor vs. Richard A Riley, etal.

Date

Code

User

10/1/2009

NCOC

CCDWONCP

New Case Filed - Other Claims

Patrick H. Owen

COMP

CCDWONCP

Complaint Filed

Patrick H. Owen

SMFI

CCDWONCP

Summons Filed

Patrick H. Owen

10/19/2009

AFOR

CCHOLMEE

(2) Affidavit Of Return 10.9.09

Patrick H. Owen

10/26/2009

AFFD

CCHOLMEE

Affidavit of Return

Patrick H. Owen

10/28/2009

ANSW

CCRANDJD

Answer (LaRue for Richard Riley and Hawley
Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP)

Patrick H. Owen

10/30/2009

MOTN

CCNELSRF

Motion for Protective Order

Patrick H. Owen

AFSM

CCNELSRF

Affidavit In Support Of Motion

Patrick H. Owen

BREF

CCNELSRF

Brief in Support of Motion for Protective Order

Patrick H. Owen

AFFD

CCDELAAA

Affidavit of Gary Babbitt in Support of Motion for
Protective Order

Patrick H. Owen

NOAP

CC HOLM EE

Notice Of Appearance (Gjording for Eberle)

Patrick H. Owen

NOTH

CCDELAAA

Notice Of Hearing on Motion for Protective Order Patrick H. Owen
( 11/18/09@ 2pm)

HRSC

CCDELAAA

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
11/18/2009 02:00 PM) For Protective Order

11/5/2009

MISC

CCSIMMSM

Joinder in the Motion for Protective Order Filed by Patrick H. Owen
Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell

11/12/2009

CHJS

CCHUNTAM

Change Assigned Judge: Self Disqualification

Mike Wetherell

DISF

CCHUNTAM

Disqualification Of Judge - Self

Mike Wetherell

NOTC

CCHUNTAM

Notice of Recusal and Reassignment

Mike Wetherell

HRVC

CCHUNTAM

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
11/18/2009 02:00 PM: Hearing Vacated For
Protective Order

Patrick H. Owen

RSPS

CC HOLM EE

Response In Opposition to Motion for Protective
Order, and Joinder, Request for Discovery and
Request for Attorney Fees and Costs

Mike Wetherell

AFFD

CCHOLMEE

Affidavit of Roderick C Bond in Opposition Motion Mike Wetherell
for Protective Order and Joinder, and in Support
of Request to Compel Depositions and Discovery
and Request for Award of Fees

CHJS

DCOATMAD

Change Assigned Judge: Self Disqualification

Timothy Hansen

DISF

DCOATMAD

Disqualification Of Judge - Self

Timothy Hansen

DCOATMAD

Notice of Reassignment

Timothy Hansen

11/2/2009

11/4/2009

11/13/2009

11/17/2009

Judge

Patrick H. Owen

AFSM

CCNELSRF

Affidavit of Richard Riley In Support Of Motion for Timothy Hansen
Protective Order

AFSM

CCNELSRF

Affidavit of John Ashby In Support Of Motion for
Protective Order

Timothy Hansen

RPLY

CCNELSRF

Reply Brief in Suppor of Motion for Protective
Order

Timothy Hansen

MODQ

CCNELSRF

Motion To Disqualify Judge w/o Cause

Timothy Hansen

ORDR

DCELLISJ

Order For Disqualification

Timothy Hansen
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Case: CV-OC-2009-18868 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood
Reed J Taylor vs. Richard A Riley, etal.

Date

Code

User

11/17/2009

CJWO

DCELLISJ

Judge
Change Assigned Judge: Disqualification W/O
Cause

Deborah Bail

DCELLISJ

Notice of Reassignment

Deborah Bail

ORDR

CCNELSRF

Notice and Order of Recusal

Deborah Bail

CJWO

CCNELSRF

Change Assigned Judge: Disqualification W/O
Cause

Darla S. Williamson

NOTC

CCNELSRF

Notice of Reassingment to Judge Darla
Williamson

Darla S. Williamson

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

Motion to Disqualify Judge Without Cause

Darla S. Williamson

11/19/2009

OB.IE

MCBIEHKJ

Objection to Motion to Disqualify Judge

Darla S. Williamson

11/24/2009

ANSW

MCBIEHKJ

Answer and Demand for Jury Trial (J Gjording for Darla S. Williamson
Eberle Berlin)
[file stamped 11/23/2009]

11/25/2009

ORDR

CCNELSRF

Notice and Order of Recusal

Darla S. Williamson

CJWO

CCl\IELSRF

Change Assigned Judge: Disqualification W/O
Cause

Cheri C. Copsey

NOTC

CCNELSRF

Notice of Reassignment to Judge Cheri C Copsey Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

CCAIVIESLC

Order of Recusal

Cheri C. Copsey

CHJS

CCAMESLC

Notice of Reassignment to Judge Greenwood

Richard D. Greenwood

ACCP

CCHOLMEE

Acceptance Of Service

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CCGARDAL

Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint

Richard D. Greenwood

HRSC

CCGARDAL

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/28/2010 03:00
PM) to amend and supplement complaint

Richard D. Greenwood

AMEN

CCLATICJ

Amended Notice of Hearing on Motion for
Protective Order (01/28/10@ 3pm}

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CCGARDAL

Motion for partial Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

NOHG

CCGARDAL

Notice Of Hearing 1.28.10 @ 3 pm

Richard D. Greenwood

NOHG

CCGARDAL

Notice Of Hearing 3. 3.10 @ 3 pm

Richard D. Greenwood

HRSC

CCGARDAL

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment 03/03/2010 03:00 PM)

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CC LAT ICJ

Defendant's Richard A Riley and Hawley Troxell
Ennis & Hawley LLP's Motion for Summary
Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

NOHG

CCLATICJ

Notice Of Hearing on Motion for Summary
Judgment (03/04/10@ 3pm}

Richard D. Greenwood

HRSC

CCLATICJ

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 03/04/201 O 03:00 PM) Defendants,
Richard A Riley and Hawley Troxell Ennis &
Hawley, LLP's Motion for Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

l\IOHG

CCTOWl\IRD

Notice Of Hearing:Telephone Conference

Richard D. Greenwood

HRSC

CCTOWNRD

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
12/14/2009 04:00 PM) Telephone Conference:
2nd Motion for Protective Order

Richard D. Greenwood

11/18/2009

11/30/2009

12/7/2009

12/11/2009
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Case: CV-OC-2009-18868 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood
Reed J Taylor vs. Richard A Riley, etal.

Date

Code

User

12/14/2009

MOTN

CCRANDJD

Motion for Protective Order

AFFD

CCRANDJD

Affidavit in Support of Motion for Protective Order Richard D. Greenwood

IVIEMO

CCRANDJD

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Protective Richard D. Greenwood
Order

HRHD

CCKENNJA

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
Richard D. Greenwood
12/14/2009 04:00 PM: Hearing Held Telephone
Conference: 2nd Motion for Protective Order

MISC

CCTOWNRD

Response in Opposition to Motion, Reponse in
Opposition to Joinder, Request for Order
Compelling Deposition, Request for Attorney
Fees and Costs

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCTOWNRD

Affidavit of Roderick Bond in Opposition to Riley
and Hawley Troxell's Second Motion for
Protective Order

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCTOWNRD

Affidavit of Reed Taylor in Opposition to Motion

Richard D. Greenwood

12/22/2009

ANSW

CCWRIGRM

Defendant Robert M Turnbows Answer and
Demand for Jury Trial

Richard D. Greenwood

12/31/2009

MOTN

CC LAT ICJ

Eberle Defendants' Motion for Protective Order

Richard D. Greenwood

AFSM

CC LAT ICJ

Affidavit of Jack S. Gjording In Support Of Motion Richard D. Greenwood
for Protective Order

MEMO

CCLATICJ

Defendants Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Protective
Order in Accordance With Rule 26(c)

Richard D. Greenwood

NOHG

CC LAT ICJ

Notice Of Hearing re Motion for Protective Order
(01/28/10@ 3 pm)

Richard D. Greenwood

NOTS

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Service

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

Defendants Richard Riley and Hawley Troxell
Ennis & Hawley LLPs Supplemental Motion for
Protective Order

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Loren C Ipsen

Richard D. Greenwood

BREF

CCWRIGRM

Brief in Support of Supplemental Motion

Richard D. Greenwood

NOTH

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Hearing (01/28/10@ 3:00pm)

Richard D. Greenwood

MISC

MCBIEHKJ

Withdrawal of Motion to Amend and Supplement
Complaint

Richard D. Greenwood

NOTS

CCMCLILI

(2) Notice Of Service

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCKELLMA

Affidavit of Gary D Babbitt in Support of Motion
For Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCKELLMA

Affidavit of Richard A Riley in Support of Motino
For Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCKELLMA

Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary Richard D. Greenwood
Judgment

MOSJ

CCKELLMA

Motion For Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

NOHG

CCKELLMA

Notice Of Hearing (03/04/2010@ 3pm)

Richard D. Greenwood

RSPN

CCWRIGRM

Response to Request for Scheduling Order

Richard D. Greenwood

1/13/2010

1/14/2010

1/15/2010

1/19/2010

Judge
Richard D. Greenwood
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Case: CV-OC-2009-18868 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood
Reed J Taylor vs. Richard A Riley, etal.

Date

Code

User

1/20/2010

RSPS

CCDWONCP

Response to Plaintiffs Request for Scheduling
Order

1/21/2010

RSPN

CCGARDAL

Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Richard D. Greenwood
Protective Order and Joinders, Request for Order
to Compel Depositions Responses Documents
and Discovery, Request for Attorney Fees and
Costs

AFFD

CCGARDAL

Affidavit of Roderick C Bond in Opposition to
Second Motion for Protective Order and in
Support of Request to Compel and Request for
Attorney Fees

RPLY

CCLATICJ

Reply Brief in Support of Supplemental Motion for Richard D. Greenwood
Protective Order and in Opposition to Request for
Order to Compel Discovery

RSPN

CCNELSRF

Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Richard D. Greenwood
Protective Order and Joinders, Request for Order
to Compel Depositions Responses Documents
and Discovery, Request for Attorney Fees and
Costs

1/26/2010

RPLY

CCWRIGRM

Defendants Turnbow and Eberle Berlins Reply
Richard D. Greenwood
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Protective
Order

1/28/2010

DCHH

TCJOHNKA

Hearing result for Motion held on 01/28/2010
03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 50 pages

2/1/2010

ORDR

TCJOHNKA

Order Granting Defendant's Richard A. Riley and Richard D. Greenwood
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP's Motion and
Supplemental Motion for Protective Order

ORDR

TCJOHNKA

Order Granting Eberle Defendants' Motion for
Protective Order

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Reed J Taylor

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Plaintiff Reed J Taylors Memorandum of Law in
Support of Motion

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

Motion for Permission to File Memorandum Over Richard D. Greenwood
25 Payges in Length

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Stanley J Tharp

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion
for Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Richard A Riley in Opposition to Reed Richard D. Greenwood
J Taylors Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

BREF

CCWRIGRM

Defendants Richard A Rileys and Hawley Troxell
Ennis & Hawley LLPs Brief in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Juqgment

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCGARDAL

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs motion
for Partial Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

1/25/2010

2/3/2010

2/4/2010

2/17/2010

Judge
Richard D. Greenwood

Richard D. Greenwood

Richard D. Greenwood
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Case: CV-OC-2009-18868 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood
Reed J Taylor vs. Richard A Riley, etal.

Date

Code

User

2/18/2010

AFFD

CCSULLJA

Affidavit of Roderick Bond in Opposition to
Richard D. Greenwood
Defendants Riley, Hawley Troxell, Turnbow,
Eberle Berlin's Motions for Summary Judgment
and in Support of Reed Taylor's Cross Motions for
Summary Judgment

2/19/2010

MOTN

CCRANDJD

Cross Motions for Summary Judgment Against
Defendants Riley Turnbow Eberle Berlin and
Hawley Troxell

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CCRANDJD

Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing Cross
Motions for Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

MISC

CCRANDJD

Statement of Facts in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCRANDJD

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment and Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCRANDJD

Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

NOHG

CCRAt\IDJD

Notice Of Hearing re Motion for Summary
Judgment and Motion to Shorten Time
(03.04.10@3pm)

Richard D. Greenwood

RPLY

CCWRIGRM

Plaintiff Reed Taylors 1) Reply in Support of His
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 2)
Supplemental Response in Opposition to
Defendants Motions for Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

AMEN

CCWRIGRM

Amended Notice of Hearing (03/26/10 @ 9:00am) Richard D. Greenwood

HRSC

CCWRIGRM

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
03/26/2010 09:00 AM) Motion for Summary
Judgment

AMEN

CCWRIGRM

Amended Notice of Hearing (03/26/1 O @ 9:00am) Richard D. Greenwood

CONT

TCJOHNKA

Continued (Motion for Summary Judgment
03/26/2010 09:00 AM) Defendants, Richard A.
Riley and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP's
Motion for Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

OB.IT

CCWRIGRM

Objection to Plaintiffs Motion to Shorten Time for
Hearing

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Memorandum in Support of Objection

Richard D. Greenwood

RSPN

CCWRIGRM

Response to Plaintiffs Motion to Shorten Time for Richard D. Greenwood
Hearing Cross Motions for Summary Judgment

AMEN

CCMCLILI

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Amended Cross Motions Richard D. Greenwood
for Summary Judgment Against Defendants
Riiey, Turnbow, Eberle Berlin & Hawley Troxell

AMEN

CCMCLILI

Amended Notice of Hearing Plaintiff Reed J.
Taylor's Amended Cross Motions for Summary
Judgment Against Defendants

Richard D. Greenwood

HRSC

CCMCLILI

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment 03/26/2010 09:00 AM) Amended
Notice

Richard D. Greenwood

2/24/2010

2/25/2010

2/26/2010

Judge

Richard D. Greenwood
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User: CCTHIEBJ

Case: CV-OC-2009-18868 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood
Reed J Taylor vs. Richard A Riley, etal.

Date

Code

User

3/3/2010

DCHH

TCJOHNKA

Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary
Richard D. Greenwood
Judgment held on 03/03/2010 03:00 PM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100 pages

3/4/2010

NOTH

CCAMESLC

Second Amended Notice of Hearing (3-26-1 O
@9am)

Richard D. Greenwood

NOTC

CC HOLM EE

Second Amended Notice of Hearing Re Motion
for Summary Judgment 3.26.10@2:00PM

Richard D. Greenwood

CONT

TCJOHt\IKA

Continued (Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment 03/26/2010 02:00 PM) Amended
Notice

Richard D. Greenwood

CONT

TCJOHNKA

Continued (Motion for Summary Judgment
03/26/2010 02:00 PM) Defendants, Richard A
Riley and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP's
Motion for Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

CONT

TCJOHNKA

Continued (Hearing Scheduled 03/26/201 O
02:00 PM) Motion for Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCSULLJA

Affidavit of James D. La Rue

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCSULLJA

Memorandum in Opposition to Amended
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCDWOl\JCP

Plaintiff Reed J Taylor's Supplemental
Richard D. Greenwood
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants'
Motions for Summary Judgment and in Support of
Cross Motions for Partial Summary Judgment
(Oral Argument Requested)

3/16/2010

MEMO

CCAMESLC

Memorandum in Opposition to Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

3/19/2010

MEMO

MCBIEHKJ

Repy Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Loren C Ipsen

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

Motion for Permission to File Memorandum Over Richard D. Greenwood
15 Pages in Length

RPLY

CCWRIGRM

Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants
Motion for Summary Judgment

OBJT

CCWRIGRM

Plaintiff Reed J Taylors 1) Objections 2) Withdraw Richard D. Greenwood
of Cross Motion for Summary Judgmebnt 3)
Reply in Support of Cross Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and 4) Supplemental
l\/lemorandum in Opposition to Defendants
Motions and in Support of Cross Motions

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Roderick C Bond

Richard D. Greenwood

3/24/2010

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of James D LaRue

Richard D. Greenwood

3/25/2010

ORDR

TCJOHNKA

Order Denying Plaintiffs Motions for Partial
Summary Judgment Against Defendants Riley,
Hawley Troxell, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin

Richard D. Greenwood

3/12/2010

3/22/2010

Judge

Richard D. Greenwood
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Case: CV-OC-2009-18868 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood
Reed J Taylor vs. Richard A Riley, etal.

Date

Code

User

3/26/2010

DCHH

TCJOHNKA

Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary
Richard D. Greenwood
Judgment held on 03/26/2010 02:00 PM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 300 pages

DCHH

TCJOHNKA

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Richard D. Greenwood
held on 03/26/2010 02:00 PM: District Court
Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 300 pages

DCHH

TCJOHNKA

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
Richard D. Greenwood
03/26/2010 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson
Number of Transcript Pqges for this hearing
estimated: Less than 300 pages

MOTN

CCGARDAL

Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Motion to Amend and
Supplement Complaint

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCGARDAL

Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to
Amend and Supplement Complaint

Richard D. Greenwood

NOHG

CCGARDAL

Notice Of Hearing 6.7.10 @4 pm

Richard D. Greenwood

HRSC

CCGARDAL

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/07/2010 04:00
PM) to Amend and Supplement Complaint

Richard D. Greenwood

ORDR

TCJOHNKA

Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

ORDR

TCJOHNKA

Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Richard D. Greenwood
Judgment on the First and Third Causes of Action
of Plaintiff's Complaint and Denying Reed J.
Taylor's Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment
on the First and Third Causes of Action of
Plaintiff's Complaint

HRSC

TCJOHNKA

Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference
08/09/2010 04:30 PM) plaintiff to initiate call

Richard D. Greenwood

CONT

TCJOHNKA

Continued (Status by Phone 06/30/2010 04: 15
PM) plaintiff to initiate call

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

TCJOHNKA

Memorandum Decision and Order Re:
Defendant's Motio for Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

ORDR

TCJOHNKA

Order Terminating Stay of Discovery

Richard D. Greenwood

NOTH

TCJOHNKA

Notice Of Hearing

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

Defendant Richard A Rileys Motion for Stay

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Supplemental Affidavit of James D La Rue

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Supplemental Affidavit of Gary D Babbitt

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Stay

Richard D. Greenwood

NOTH

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Hearing (06/07/10@ 4:00pm)

Richard D. Greenwood

HRSC

CCWRIGRM

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
0610712010 04:00 PM) Motion for Stay

Richard D. Greenwood

3/30/2010

4/21/2010

5/10/2010

5/19/2010

Judge
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Date

Code

User

5/21/2010

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

Defendants Turnbow and Eberle, Berlins Motion
for Stay

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Jack S Gjording

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Memorandum in Support of Motion

Richard D. Greenwood

NOTH

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Hearing (06/07/10@ 4:00pm)

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCHOLMEE

Memorandum in Opposition to Reed J Taylors
Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint

Richard D. Greenwood

RSPN

TCWEGEKE

Defendants Turnbow and Eberle Berlins's
Response to Plaintiffs Motion to Amend and
Supplement Complaint

Richard D. Greenwood

RSPN

CCWRIGRM

Plaintiff Reed J Taylors Response in Opposition Richard D. Greenwood
to Defendants Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlins
Motion to Stay

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Roderick C Bond

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCl\IELSRF

Reply Memorandum in Support of Eefendant
Richard A Riley's Motion to Stay

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCNELSRF

Affidavit of Ooren C lspen in Support of
Eefendant Richard A Riley's Motion to Stay

Richard D. Greenwood

RPLY

CCWRIGRM

Defendants Turnbow and Eberle, Berlins Reply in Richard D. Greenwood
Support of Motion to Stay

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Second Affidavit of Jack S Gjording

Richard D. Greenwood

JDMT

TCJOHNKA

Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

CDIS

TCJOHNKA

Civil Disposition entered for: Hawley Troxell Ennis Richard D. Greenwood
& Hawley LLP, Defendant; Taylor, Reed J,
Plaintiff. Filing date: 6/3/2010

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of James D Larue

STAT

TCJOHNKA

STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action Richard D. Greenwood

6/4/2010

REPL

CCHOLMEE

Reply in Support of Motion to Amend and
Supplement Complaint

61712010

DCHH

TCJOHNKA

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
Richard D. Greenwood
06/07/2010 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 60 pages

DCHH

TCJOHNKA

Hearing result for Motion held on 06/07/2010
04:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 60 pages

Richard D. Greenwood

6/10/2010

MEMO

TCJOHNKA

Memorandum and Order on Various Motions

Richard D. Greenwood

6/16/2010

MOTN

MCBIEHKJ

Motion for Costs and Fees

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit in Support of Motion

Richard D. Greenwood

BREF

MCBIEHKJ

Brief in Support of Motion

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

MCBIEHKJ

Memorandum of Costs and Fees

Richard D. Greenwood

5/28/2010

6/1/2010

6/2/2010

6/3/2010

Judge

Richard D. Greenwood

Richard D. Greenwood
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Date

Code

User

6/17/2010

MORE

CCMASTLW

Motion For Reconsideration

Richard D. Greenwood

AFSM

CCMASTLW

Affidavit In Support Of Motion

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCMASTLW

Memorandum in Support

Richard D. Greenwood

6/18/2010

ORDR

TCJOHNKA

Order Amending Previous Memorandum and
Order on Various Motions
[file stamped 06/17 /2010]

Richard D. Greenwood

6/30/2010

HRVC

TCJOHNKA

Hearing result for Status by Phone held on
Richard D. Greenwood
06/30/2010 04:15 PM: Hearing Vacated plaintiff
to initiate call

MOTN

CCTOWNRD

Motion to Disallow Request for Attorney's Fees
and Costs and Motion to Stay Request for Fees
and Costs

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCTOWNRD

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow
and Stay Costs

Richard D. Greenwood

AFSM

CCTOWNRD

Affidavit In Support Of Motion

Richard D. Greenwood

NOHG

CCTOWNRD

Notice Of Hearing

Richard D. Greenwood

HRSC

CCTOWNRD

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/27/2010 03:00
PIVI) Motion to Stay

Richard D. Greenwood

10/15/2010

NOTC

CCGARDAL

Notice of Vacating of the Hearings

Richard D. Greenwood

10/21/2010

HRVC

TCJOHNKA

Hearing result for Motion held on 10/27/2010
03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion to Stay

Richard D. Greenwood

11/14/2011

NOTC

CCWRIGRM

Notice of Change of Attorney (Roderick C Bond,
atty for Plaintiff Reed Taylor)

Richard D. Greenwood

11/21/2011

MOTN

CCAMESLC

Motion for Protective Order

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCAMESLC

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Protective Richard D. Greenwood
Order

MOTN

CCAMESLC

Motion to Lift Stay

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCAMESLC

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Lift Stay

Richard D. Greenwood

11/22/2011

HRSC

CCAMESLC

Notice of Hearing (Motion 12/08/2011 03:00 PM) Richard D. Greenwood
[file stamped 11/21/2011]

11/28/2011

NOTC

CCRANDJD

Notice of Association of Counsel (Michael
Gaffney for Plaintiff)

Richard D. Greenwood

ROST

CCRANDJD

Request for Scheduling Conference and
Scheduling Order

Richard D. Greenwood

12/1/2011

MISC

MCBIEHKJ

Eberle Berlins Non Opposition to Motion to Lift
Stay

Richard D. Greenwood

12/6/2011

OBJE

MCBIEHKJ

Objection to Rileys Motion for Protective Order

Richard D. Greenwood

NOTC

MCBIEHKJ

Notice of Nonopposition to Motion to Lift Stay

Richard D. Greenwood

MISC

MCBIEHKJ

Plaintiffs Joinder in Riley Motion to Lift Stay

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTl\I

CC HOLM EE

Motion to Appear Telephonically

Richard D. Greenwood

ORDR

TCJOHNKA

Order Re: Motion to Lift Stay

Richard D. Greenwood

12/12/2011

Judge
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12/12/2011

DCHH

TCJOHNKA

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Richard D. Greenwood
12/08/2011 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: Fran Morris
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 50 paages

12/15/2011

MOTN

MCBIEHKJ

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

MCBIEHKJ

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

HRSC

MCBIEHKJ

Notice of Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment 01/30/2012 03:00 PM)

Richard D. Greenwood

HRSC

MCBIEHKJ

Notice of Hearing Scheduled (Motion For
Protective Order 01/05/2012 11 :00 AM)

Richard D. Greenwood

RESP

CCNELSRF

Plf. Reed J. Taylor's Response In Oppositiion to
Defd. Richard a Riley's Motion for Protective
Order and Defd. Eberle Berlin's Non-Opposition
to Moiton

Richard D. Greenwood

REPL

CCNELSRF

Reply to Plfs Objection to Defs Riley's Motion for Richard D. Greenwood
Protective Order

AFSM

CCNELSRF

Affidavit of Loren C. lspen In Support Of Defd.
Riley's Motion for Protective Order

Richard D. Greenwood

RPLY

CCHEATJL

Reply To Plaintiff's Second Objection To
Defendant Riley's Motion For Protective Order

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CCRANDJD

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

AFSM

CCRANDJD

Affidavit In Support Of Motion

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCRANDJD

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

NOHG

CCRANDJD

Notice Of Hearing re Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (01.30.12@3pm)

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

Plaintiffs Motion to Appear Telephonically

Richard D. Greenwood

NOTC

CCDEREDL

Notice of Non-Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to
Appear Telephonically (1-5-12@ 11AM)

Richard D. Greenwood

1/4/2012

NOTC

CCDEREDL

Notice of Non-Opposition of Plaintiffs Motion to
Appear Telephonically

Richard D. Greenwood

1/5/2012

DCHH

TCJOHNKA

Hearing result for Motion For Protective Order
scheduled on 01 /05/2012 11 :00 AM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Fran Morris
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 50 pages

Richard D. Greenwood

1/17/2012

MEMO

CCMASTLW

Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Richard Riley's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCMASTLW

Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Eberle Berlin's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

12/29/2011

12/30/2011

1/3/2012

1/23/2012

Judge
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1/23/2012

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Richard D. Greenwood
Supplemental Affidavit of Richard A Riley in
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

MOTN

CCRANDJD

Motion for Permission to File Reply
Memorandum Over 15 Pages in Length

REPL

CCRANDJD

Reply in Support of Defendants Motion for Partial Richard D. Greenwood
Summary Judgment

1/30/2012

DCHH

TCJOHNKA

Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment scheduled on 01/30/2012 03:00 PM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Fran Morris
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 50 pages

Richard D. Greenwood

1/31/2012

MISC

CCNELSRF

Joinder in Defendant Riley's Moiton for Partial
Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

2/6/2012

NOTD

CCHEAT.IL

(2) Notice Of Vidoetaped Deposition

Richard D. Greenwood

2/16/2012

ROST

CCBOYIDR

Supplemental Request Duces Tecum

Richard D. Greenwood

NOTS

TCORTEJN

Notice Of Service

Richard D. Greenwood

2/23/2012

NOTS

TCORTEJN

Notice Of Service

Richard D. Greenwood

2/27/2012

NOTC

CCAMESLC

Notice Vacating Deposition of Richard A Riley

Richard D. Greenwood

3/1/2012

NODT

CCNELSRF

Amended Notice Of Videotaped Deposition
Duces Tecum of Richard A Riley

Richard D. Greenwood

3/2/2012

ORDR

TCJOHNKA

Order Permitting Reply Memorandum over 15
pages in Length

Richard D. Greenwood

3/7/2012

NOTS

CCSULLJA

Notice Of Service

Richard D. Greenwood

3/8/2012

HRSC

TCJOHNKA

Hearing Scheduled (Status by Phone
03/14/2012 04:00 PM)

Richard D. Greenwood

3/15/2012

DCHH

TCJOHNKA

Hearing result for Status by Phone scheduled on Richard D. Greenwood
03/14/2012 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: None
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: held in chambers

4/4/2012

NOCA

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Change Of Address

Richard D. Greenwood

4/5/2012

MEMO

TCJOHNKA

Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant Riley's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

4/30/2012

ORDR

TCJOHNKA

Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

5/11/2012

NOTS

CCRANDJD

Notice Of Service

Richard D. Greenwood

5/23/2012

MOTN

CCSWEECE

Motion to Amend Complaint

Richard D. Greenwood

NOHG

CCSWEECE

Notice Of Hearing

Richard D. Greenwood

HRSC

CCSWEECE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Amend
06/18/2012 03:00 PM)

Richard D. Greenwood

HRSC

TCJOHNKA

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
11/05/2012 04:15 PM) defense

Richard D. Greenwood

HRSC

TCJOHNKA

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 12/03/2012 09:00 Richard D. Greenwood
AIVI) 8 days
000014
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Code

User

5/25/2012

MOTN

CCKINGAJ

Defendant Ebererle Berlin's Motion to Compel
Plaintiffs Responses to Defendant's Discovery

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCKINGAJ

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant
Eberle Berlin's Motion to Compel Plaintiffs
Responses to Defendant's Discovery

Richard D. Greenwood

NOHG

CCKINGAJ

Notice Of Hearing RE: Defendant Eberle Berlin's Richard D. Greenwood
Motion to Compel Plaintiffs Responses to
Defendant's Discovery

HRSC

CCKINGAJ

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel
06/11/2012 03:00 PM)

Richard D. Greenwood

NOTH

TCORTEJN

Amended Notice Of Hearing Re Plaintiffs Motion
to Amend Complaint (06/18/2012 at 3pm)

Richard D. Greenwood

AMEN

TCORTEJN

Amended Motion to Amend Complaint

Richard D. Greenwood

5/30/2012

ORDR

TCJOHNKA

Order Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial

Richard D. Greenwood

6/4/2012

OBJT

CCAMESLC

Plaintff Reed J Taylor's Objection to Motion to
Compel

Richard D. Greenwood

6/6/2012

NOTS

CCWATSCL

(2) Notice Of Service

Richard D. Greenwood

6/7/2012

OPPO

CCWEEKKG

Opposition to Plaintiffs Amended Motion to
Amend Complaint

Richard D. Greenwood

6/8/2012

AMEN

CCRANDJD

Amended Notice of Hearing (6.11.12@3pm)

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CCRANDJD

Motion to Shorten Time

Richard D. Greenwood

NOTC

CCWATSCL

Notice Vacating Amended Notice of Hearing and
Withdrawal of Motion to Shorten Time

Richard D. Greenwood

AFOS

CCVIDASL

Affidavit Of Service 5.30.12

Richard D. Greenwood

HRVC

TCJOHNKA

Richard D. Greenwood
Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled
on 06/11/2012 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated and
Motion to Amend Complaint

OPPO

TCORTEJN

Defendant Eberle Berlins Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion to Amend his Complaint

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

TCORTEJN

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant
Eberle Berlins Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to
Amend Complaint

Richard D. Greenwood

6/12/2012

MOTN

CCHEAT.IL

Motion To Disqualify Without Cause (Re:
Alternate Judge)

Richard D. Greenwood

6/13/2012

NOTS

CCDEREDL

Notice Of Service

Richard D. Greenwood

6/18/2012

MEMO

MCBIEHKJ

Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of
Amended Motion to Amend Complaint

Richard D. Greenwood

DCHH

TCJOHNKA

Hearing result for Motion to Amend scheduled on Richard D. Greenwood
06/18/2012 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel<
Court Reporter: Fran Morris
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 50 pages

ORDR

TCJOHNKA

Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Amend the
Complaint

ORDR

TCJOHNKA

Order Substituting Defendant Robert M. Turnbow Richard D. Greenwood

5/29/2012

6/11/2012

7/12/2012

Judge

Richard D. Greenwood
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7/12/2012

CDIS

CCDEREDL

Civil Disposition entered for: Turnbow, Robert M,
Defendant. Filing date: 7/12/2012

Richard D. Greenwood

7/24/2012

MOTN

CCNELSRF

Defd. Eberle Berlin's Motion to Compel Plfs
Responses to Defs Second Disovery Requests

Richard D. Greenwood

AFSM

CCNELSRF

Affidavit In Support Of Motion

Richard D. Greenwood

l\JOHG

CCWEEKKG

Notice Of Hearing RE: Defendant Eberle Berlin's
Motion to Compel Plaintiffs Response to
Defendant's Second Discovery Requests

Richard D. Greenwood

HRSC

CCWEEKKG

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
Richard D. Greenwood
08/09/2012 03:00 PM) Defendant Everle Berlin's
Motion to Compel

NOTC

CCMEYEAR

Notice of Appearance (J Gjording for Sharon
Cummings)
[file stamped 08/01/2012]

Richard D. Greenwood

ANSW

CCKHAMSA

Defendant Sharon Cummings, Personal
Representative Of The Estate Of Robert M.
Turnbow's Answer And Demand For Jury Trial
(Jack S. Gjording For Defendants Sharon
Cummings, Personal Representative Of the
Estate Of Robert M. Turnbow And Eberle, Berlin,
Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered)

Richard D. Greenwood

HRVC

TCJOHNKA

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled
on 08/09/2012 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated
Defendant Everle Berlin's Motion to Compel

Richard D. Greenwood

MISC

CCWEEKKG

Joint Status Report

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CCVIDASL

Defendants Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment Third Motion for Summary Judgment
and Joinder of Defendant Riley Motion for
Summary Judgment on Res Judicata

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCVIDASL

Defendants Memorandum in Support of Renewed Richard D. Greenwood
Motion for Summary Judgment Third Motion for
Summary Judgment and Joinder of Defendant
Rileys Motion for Summary Judgment

AFFD

CCVIDASL

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants
Richard D. Greenwood
Memorandum in Support of
Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment Third
Motion for Summary Judgment and Joinder of
Defendant Rileys Motion for Summary Juqgment

NOHG

CCVIDASL

Notice Of Hearing Re Defendants Renewed
Motion for Summary Judgment and Third Motion
for Summary Judgment (9.13.12 @ 3:00 pm)

Richard D. Greenwood

HRSC

CCVIDASL

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/13/2012 03:00
PM) Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment
and Third Motion for Summary Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

STAT

CCVIDASL

STATUS CHANGED: Reopened

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CCMEYEAR

Richard A Riley's Motion for Summary Judgment Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCMEYEAR

Memorandum in Support of Richard A Riley's
Motion for Summary Judgment

7/25/2012

8/2/2012

8/8/2012

8/15/2012

Judge

Richard D. Greenwood

000016

Date: 6/14/2013

Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County

Time: 02:42 PM

ROA Report

Page 14 of 21

User: CCTHIEBJ

Case: CV-OC-2009-18868 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood
Reed J Taylor vs. Richard A Riley, etal.

Date

Code

User

8/15/2012

AFFD

CCMEYEAR

Affidavit of Loren C Ipsen

AFFD

CCMEYEAR

Affidavit of D John Ashby in Support of Motion for Richard D. Greenwood
Summary Judgment

AFFD

CCMEYEAR

Second Supplemental Affidavit of Richard A Riley Richard D. Greenwood
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

NOTH

CCMEYEAR

Notice Of Hearing Re: Richard A Riley's Motion
for Summary Judgment (09/13/2012@ 3:00 pm)

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCMEYEAR

Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel in Support of
Defendant Eberle Berlin's Motion to Compel
Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant's Second
Discovery Requests

Richard D. Greenwood

AMEN

CCMEYEAR

Amended Notice of Hearing re Defendant Eberle Richard D. Greenwood
Berlin's Motion to Compel Plaintiff's Responses to
Defendant's Second Discovery Requests
(09/12/2012@ 4:00 pm)

8/22/2012

HRSC

CCMEYEAR

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel
09/12/2012 04:00 PM)

8/30/2012

MOTN

CCWEEKKG

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Motion to Enlarge Time Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCWEEKKG

Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Motion Richard D. Greenwood
to Enlarge Time

MEMO

CCWEEKKG

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Supplemental
Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration

AFFD

CCWEEKKG

NOTH

CCWEEKKG

Notice Of Hearing ( 09/13/12 @ 3PM)

MEMO

CCWEEKKG

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Preliminary
Richard D. Greenwood
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant
Richard A Riley's Motion for Summary Judgment
and Supplemental Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Reconsideration

MEMO

CCWEEKKG

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Richard D. Greenwood
Opposition to Defendant Cummings and Eberle
Berlin's Renewed Motion for Summary Juqgment
and Supplemental Memorandum in Support of
Reed Taylor's Motion for Reconsideration

AFFD

CCWEEKKG

Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Opposition to
Richard D. Greenwood
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and
in Support of Reed's Motion for Reconsideration

MEMO

CCVIDASL

Plaintiff Reed J Taylors Memorandum of Law in
Richard D. Greenwood
Opposition to Defendants Cummints and Eberle
Berlins Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment
and Joinderto Defendant Rileys Moiton for
Summary Judgment and Supplemental
Memorandum in Support of Reed Taylors Motion
for Reconsideration

MOTN

CCVIDASL

Plaintiff Reed J Taylors Motion to Shorten Time

NOHG

CCVIDASL

Notice Of Hearing Re Plaintiffs Motion to Enlarge Richard D. Greenwood
Time (9.13.12@ 3:00 pm)
000017

8/21/2012

8/31/2012

9/4/2012

Judge
Richard D. Greenwood

Richard D. Greenwood

Richard D. Greenwood

Expert Witness Affidavit of Richard T. McDermott Richard D. Greenwood
Richard D. Greenwood

Richard D. Greenwood
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9/5/2012

MEMO

CCSWEECE

Plaintiff Reed J Taylors Memorandum of Law In
Richard D. Greenwood
Opposition to Defendant Richard A Rileys Motion
for Summary Judgment and Supplemental
Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration

AFFD

CCSWEECE

Supplemental Affidavit of Roderick C Bond

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCVIDASL

Hawley Troxells Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion for Reconsideration

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CCVIDASL

Motion for Order Shortening Time for Hearing

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CCVIDASL

Motion to Strike Expert Witness Affidavit of
Richard T McDermott

Richard D. Greenwood

NOHG

CCVIDASL

Notice Of Hearing Re Richard A Rileys Motion for Richard D. Greenwood
Order Shortenting Time for Hearing

RPLY

CCVIDASL

Reply Brief of Richard in Response to Plaintiffs
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment
[file stamped 09/06/2012]

Richard D. Greenwood

MISC

CCRANDJD

Joinder in Motion to Strike Expert Witness
Affidavit of Richard T Mcdermott and
Supplemental Memorandum of Legal Authority

Richard D. Greenwood

RPLY

CCRANDJD

Reply in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment

Richard D. Greenwood

MISC

CCMEYEAR

Defendant Richard A Riley's Expert Witness
Disclosure - Dennis Reinstein

Richard D. Greenwood

MISC

CCMEYEAR

Defendant Richard A Riley's Expert Witness
Disclosure - David G Gadda

Richard D. Greenwood

NOTS

CCMEYEAR

Notice Of Service

Richard D. Greenwood

MISC

CCPINKCN

Defendants Eberle Berlin and Sharron Lynne
Cummings' Expert Witness Disclosures

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCAMESLC

Second Supplimental Affidavit of Roderick C
Bond

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCMEYEAR

Second Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel in
Support of Defendant Eberle Berlin's Moton to
Compel Plaintiff's Responses ot Defendant's
Second Discovery

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Roderick Bond in Opposition to Motion Richard D. Greenwood
to Compel

MISC

MCBIEHKJ

Response to Motions to Strike

Richard D. Greenwood

MISC

MCBIEHKJ

Response to Motion to Compel

Richard D. Greenwood

DCHH

TCJOHNKA

Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled
Richard D. Greenwood
on 09/12/2012 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Fran Morris
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 50 pages

9/6/2012

9/7/2012

9/10/2012

9/11/2012

9/12/2012

Judge
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9/13/2012

DCHH

TCJOHNKA

Richard D. Greenwood
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
09/13/2012 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: Fran Morris
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100 pages

9/14/2012

NOTS

CCDEREDL

Notice Of Service

Richard D. Greenwood

NOTC

CCDEREDL

Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of
Reed Taylor

Richard D. Greenwood

9/27/2012

AMEN

CC BOYi DR

Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces
Tecum of Reed J Taylor

Richard D. Greenwood

9/28/2012

NOTS

CCMEYEAR

Notice Of Service

Richard D. Greenwood

10/1/2012

MOTN

CCDEREDL

Second Motion in Limine of Defendant Richard A Richard D. Greenwood
Riley

MOTN

CCDEREDL

Motion in Limine of Richard A Riley to Exclude
Testimony of Richard T McDermott and Paul A
Pederson

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCDEREDL

Affidavit of Loren Ipsen in Support of Motion in
Limine of Richard A Riley to Exclude Testimony
of Richard T McDermott and Paul A Pederson

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCDEREDL

Affidavit of Loren C Ipsen

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCDEREDL

Memorandum in Support of Second Motion in
Limine of Defendant Richard A Riley

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCDEREDL

Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine

Richard D. Greenwood

NOHG

CCDEREDL

Notice Of Hearing on the First and Second
Motions in Limine of Defendant Richard A Riley
(10-15-12@ 3PM)

Richard D. Greenwood

HRSC

CCDEREDL

Hearing Scheduled (Motion in Limine
10/15/2012 03:00 PM)

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CCWEEKKG

Defendants Eberle Berlins' and Sharron Lynne
Richard D. Greenwood
Cummings' Motion in Limine to Exclude and/or
Limit the Scope of Any Trial Testimony by Richard
McDermott and Paul Pederson

MEMO

CCWEEKKG

Memorandum

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCWEEKKG

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant
Eberle Berlin's and Sharron Lynne Cummings'
Motion in Limine to Exclude and/or Limit the
Scope of Any trial Testimony by Richard
McDermontt and Paul Pederson

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CCWEEKKG

Defendants' Eberle Berlins' and Sharron Lynne
Cummings' Motion Joinder in Defendant Riley's
Second Motion in Limine

Richard D. Greenwood

NOTH

CCWEEKKG

Notice Of Hearing ( 10/15/2012@ 3PM)

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCWEEKKG

Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCWEEKKG

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant Richard A Riley's Motion in Limine
and Cummings and Erberle Berlin's Joinder

Richard D. Greenwood

10/9/2012

Judge
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10/9/2012

MEMO

CCWEEKKG

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant Richard A Riley's Second Motion in
Limine and Cummings and Erberle Berlin's
Joinder

MEMO

CCWEEKKG

Plaintiffs Reed j. Taylor's Memorandum in
Richard D. Greenwood
Opposition to Defendant Eberle Berlin's Motion in
Limine to Exclude and/or Limit the Trial
Testimony of Richard McDermott and Paul
Pederson

10/10/2012

ORDR

TCJOHNKA

Order Re: Defants Eberle Berlin's Motion to
Compel Plaintiffs Responses to Defendant'd
Second Discovery Requests

Richard D. Greenwood

10/11/2012

REPL

CCSWEECE

Defendant Eberle Berlins And Sharron Lynne
Cummings Reply in Support of Second Motion in
Limine of Defendant Richard A Riley

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CCRANDJD

Richard A Rileys Motion to File Reply Brief in
Excess of Page Limit

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCRANDJD

Reply Memorandum in Support of Second Motion Richard D. Greenwood
in Limine of Defendant Richard A Riley

AFFD

CCRANDJD

Affidavit of Loren Ipsen

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CCRANDJD

Motion for Order Shortening Time for Hearing

Richard D. Greenwood

NOHG

CCRANDJD

Notice Of Hearing re Motion for Order Shortening Richard D. Greenwood
Time (10.15.12@3pm)

REPL

MCBIEHKJ

Reply in Support of First Motion in Limine

Richard D. Greenwood

10/12/2012

RPLY

CCHEATJL

Reply Memorandum In Support Of Motion In
Li mine

Richard D. Greenwood

10/15/2012

DCHH

TCJOHNKA

Hearing result for Motion in Limine scheduled on Richard D. Greenwood
10/15/2012 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel<
Court Reporter: Fran Morris
!\lumber of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 150 pages

10/17/2012

ORDR

TCJOHNKA

Order Shortening Time for Hearing

Richard D. Greenwood

ORDR

TCJOHNKA

Order Permitting Reply Brief Over 15 Pages in
Length

Richard D. Greenwood

OBJC

CC KHAM SA

Objection To Subpoenas And Motion For
Protective Order

Richard D. Greenwood

OBJT

CCHEATJL

Defendants Eberle Berlin's And Sharon Lynne
Cummings' Objection To Plaintiffs Subpoenas

Richard D. Greenwood

CONT

TCJOHNKA

Continued (Pretrial Conference 11/05/2012
02:30 PM) Status

Richard D. Greenwood

NOTS

CCSWEECE

Notice Of Service

Richard D. Greenwood

NOTS

CCWEEKKG

Notice Of Service of Discovery ( 10/22/12)

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CCSWEECE

Richard D. Greenwood
Motion for Order Shortening Time for Hearing
Objection to Subpoenas and Motion for Protective
Order

10/19/2012

10/22/2012

10/23/2012

Judge
Richard D. Greenwood
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10/23/2012

NOHG

CCSWEECE

Notice Of Hearing RE: Richard A Rileys Motion
for Order Shortening Time for Hearing Objection
to Subpoenas and Motion for Protective Order

Richard D. Greenwood

NOHG

CCSWEECE

Notice Of Hearing RE: Defendant Richard A
Rileys Objection to Subpoenas and Motion for
Protective Order

Richard D. Greenwood

10/24/2012

MEMO

DCTAYLl\/IE

Richard D. Greenwood
Memorandum Opinion and Order RE:
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and
Reconsideration and Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration

10/26/2012

OB.IT

CCTHIEKJ

Defendants Eberle Berlin's and Sharron Lynne
Cummings' Objection to Plaintiffs Subpoena to
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP

Richard D. Greenwood

10/30/2012

MOTN

CCMEYEAR

Defendants' Joint Motion to Vacate December 3,
2012 Trial Setting

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCMEYEAR

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants'
Motion to Vacate Trial Setting

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCl\/IEYEAR

Affidavit of James D LaRue in Support of
Richard D. Greenwood
Defendants' Motion to Vacate December 3, 2012
Trial Setting

AFFD

CCl\/IEYEAR

Affidavit of Dennis Reinstein

Richard D. Greenwood

NOTH

CCMEYEAR

Notice Of Hearing (11/14/2012@ 3:30 pm)

Richard D. Greenwood

HRSC

CCMEYEAR

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/14/2012 03:30
Pl\/I)

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CC KHAM SA

Defendant Richard A. Riley's Motion For
Richard D. Greenwood
Permission To Appeal Memorandum Opinion And
Order RE: Defendant's Motions For Summary
Judgment And Reconsideration

MEMO

CC KHAM SA

Memorandum In support Of Defendant Richard A. Richard D. Greenwood
Riley's Motion For Permission to Appeal
l\/lemorandum Opinion And Order RE:
Defendant's Motions For Summary Judgment
And Reconsideration

NOHG

CC KHAM SA

Notice Of Hearing On Motion For Stay Of
Proceedings During Processing Of Motion For
Permissive Appeal (11/14/12@ 3:30 PM)

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CC KHAM SA

Motion For Stay Of Proceedings During
Processing Of Motion For PErmission to Appeal

Richard D. Greenwood

NOHG

CC KHAM SA

Notice Of Hearing On Defendant Richard A.
Riley's Motion For Permission to Appeal
Memorandum Opinion And Order RE:
Defenadnts' Motions For Summary Judgment
And Reconsideration (11/14/12@ 3:30 PM)

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CC KHAM SA

Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Stay Of
Proceedings During Processing Of Motion For
Permission To Appeal

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CCDEREDL

Defendants Eberle Berlins and Sharron Lynne
Cummings Motion for Discovery Sanctions
against Plaintiff

Richard D. Greenwood

Judge
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10/30/2012

AFFD

CCDEREDL

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants
Eberle Berlins and Sharron Lynne Cummings
Motion for Sanctions

Richard D. Greenwood

NOHG

CCDEREDL

Notice Of Hearing re Defendants Eberle Berlins
and Sharon Lynne Cummings Motion for
Sanctions (11-14-12@ 3:30PM)

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CCDEREDL

Motion for Permission to Appeal from the Courts
Interlocutory Order

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCDEREDL

Defendants Memorandum in Support of Their
Motion for Permission to Appeal from the Courts
Interlocutory Order

Richard D. Greenwood

NOHG

CCDEREDL

Notice Of Hearing (11-14-12@ 3:30PM)

Richard D. Greenwood

NOTS

CCWEEKKG

Notice Of Service

Richard D. Greenwood

NOHG

CCKHAMSA

Notice Of Hearing (11/05/12 @2:30 PM)

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCSWEECE

Defendant Rileys Memorandum RE: The
Collectibility Rule

Richard D. Greenwood

DEWI

CCSWEECE

Defendant Rileys Witness List and Exhibit List

Richard D. Greenwood

ORJI

CCSWEECE

Defendant Richard A Rileys Requested Jury
Instructions and Special Verdict Form

Richard D. Greenwood

DCHH

TCJOHNKA

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled Richard D. Greenwood
on 11/05/2012 02:30 PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: T Fisher
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 50 pages

MISC

CCOSBODK

Plaintiffs Proposed Jury Instructions

Richard D. Greenwood

MISC

CCOSBODK

Plaintiffs Exhibit List

Richard D. Greenwood

MISC

CC OS BO DK

Plaintiffs Witness List

Richard D. Greenwood

MISC

TCJOHNKA

Palintiff's Proposed Special Verdict Form

Richard D. Greenwood

MISC

TCWEGEKE

Plaintiffs Proposed Jury Instructions

Richard D. Greenwood

HRVC

TCJOHNKA

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
12/03/2012 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 8 days

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCNELSRF

Plfs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Permissive Appeal

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion
for Protective Order

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion
for Stay of Proceedings

Richard D. Greenwood

MISC

CCWRIGRM

Defendants Eberle Berlins and Sharron Lynne
Cummings Withdrawal of Motion for Discovery
Sanctions Against Plaintiff

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CCVIDASL

Motion for Order Shortening Time for Hearing
Richard D. Greenwood
Objection to Subpoenas and Motion for Protective
Order

10/31/2012

11 /2/2012

11/5/2012

11/7/2012

Judge
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11/7/2012

NOHG

CCVIDASL

Notice Of Hearing Re Richard A Rileys Motion for Richard D. Greenwood
Order Shortening Time for Hearing Objection to
Subpoenas and Motion for Protective Order
(11.14.12@3:30 pm)

NOHG

CCVIDASL

Notice Of Hearing Re Defendant Richard A Rileys Richard D. Greenwood
Objection to Subopenas and Motion for Protective
Order (11.14.12@ 3:30 pm)

BREF

TCJOHNKA

Defendant's Eberle Berlin's and Shara Lynne
Cummings' Brief on the Collectability Rule

Richard D. Greenwood

EXHI

TCJOHNKA

Defendant's Eberle Berlin's and Sharon Lynne
Cummings' Anticipated Exhibit List

Richard D. Greenwood

WITN

TCJOHNKA

Defendants Eberle Berlins' and Sharon Lynne
Cummings' Anticipated Witness List

Richard D. Greenwood

JUID

TCJOHNKA

Defendants Eberle Berlin's and Shara Lynne
Cummings' Requested Jury Instructions

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CC KHAM SA

Motion For Protective Order And To Quash
Subpoenas Pursuant To IRCP 26(c) And IRCP
45(d)

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCKHAMSA

Affidavit Of Jolee Duclos In Support Of Motion
For Protective Order And to Quash Subpoenas

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCKHAMSA

Affidavit Of R. John Taylor In Support Of Motion
For Protective Order And To Quash Subpoenas

Richard D. Greenwood

NOHG

CCKHAMSA

Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion For Protective
Order And To Quash Subpoenas (11/14/12@
3:30 PM)

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN

CCKHAMSA

Motion to Shorten Time For Notice Required
Before Hearing

Richard D. Greenwood

NOHG

CC KHAM SA

Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion To Shorten Time
Richard D. Greenwood
For Notice Required Before Hearing (11/14/12@
3:30 PM)

NOTC

CCHEAT,IL

Notice Of Withdrawal Of Motion For Stay Of
Proceedings During Processing Of Motion For
Permission To Appeal

Richard D. Greenwood

RPLY

CCRANDJD

Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion for
Permission to Appeal

Richard D. Greenwood

MEMO

CCC HILER

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Protective Richard D. Greenwood
Order and to Quash Subpoenas

11/14/2012

DCHH

TCJOHNKA

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Richard D. Greenwood
11/14/2012 03:30 PM: District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: Fran Morris
Number of Transcript PClges for this hearing
estimated: less than 60 pages

12/3/2012

ORDR

TCJOHNKA

Order Regarding Second Motion in limine of
Defendant Richard A Riiey

Richard D. Greenwood

12/27/2012

HRSC

TCJOHNKA

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
08/28/2013 03:00 PM) in court

Richard D. Greenwood

HRSC

TCJOHNKA

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10/02/2013 09:00 Richard D. Greenwood
AM) 4 weeks

11/8/2012

11/13/2012

Judge
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1/2/2013

ORDR

TCJOHNKA

Order Denying Permissive Appeal

Richard D. Greenwood

1/7/2013

ORDR

TCJOHNKA

Order Govnering Proceedings and Setting Trial

Richard D. Greenwood

2/6/2013

NOTA

CCPINKCN

Defendant Richard A Riley's NOTICE OF
APPEAL

Richard D. Greenwood

APSC

TCWEGEKE

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Richard D. Greenwood

NOTA

CCTHIEBJ

Defendant Cummings NOTICE OF APPEAL

Richard D. Greenwood

APSC

CCTHIEBJ

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Richard D. Greenwood

HRVC

TCJOHNKA

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled
on 08/28/2013 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated in
court

Richard D. Greenwood

HRVC

TCJOHNKA

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
10/02/2013 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 4
weeks

Richard D. Greenwood

STAT

TCJOHNKA

STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action Richard D. Greenwood

APSC

CCTHIEBJ

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Richard D. Greenwood

NOTA

CCTHIEBJ

Plaintiff's NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL

Richard D. Greenwood

NOTC

CCTHIEBJ

(2) Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court
Docket No. 40595 and 40599

Richard D. Greenwood

2/20/2013

2/26/2013

6/14/2013
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By PATRICIA A DWONCH
DEPUTY

RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, VIA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
v.
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAVILEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAVILEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
ROBERT M. TURNBOVI, an individual; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOVI
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

Fee Category A.
Fee: $88.00

Defendants.
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, by and through his attorneys of record, Campbell, Bissell &
Kirby, PLLC, alleges as follows:

I.
1.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") is a resident of Lewiston, Nez Perce

County, Idaho. Reed Taylor is 72-years-old and an elderly person as defined in LC. § 48-608.
2.

Defendant Richard A. Riley ("Riley") is an individual residing in the state of

Idaho and is an attorney in the state of Idaho conducting business with and for Hawley Troxell in
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Ada County, Idaho. At all relevant times, Defendant Riley was licensed to practice law in Idaho.
3.

Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawley Troxell") is an Idaho limited

liability partnership engaged in the business of practicing law in Idaho with its principal offices
located in Boise, Ada County, Idaho.

The knowledge held and duties owed by Defendant

Richard A. Riley as asserted throughout this Complaint are imputed upon Hawley Troxell and,
consequently, Hawley Troxell owes the same duties. Hawley Troxell is vicariously liable for
certain acts and/or omissions of Defendant Riley.
4.

Defendant Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered ("Eberle

Berlin") is an Idaho corporation engaged in the business of practicing law in Idaho with its
principal offices located in Boise, Ada County, Idaho. Defendant Eberle Berlin is vicariously
liable for certain acts and/or omissions of Defendant Riley.
5.

Defendant Richard M. Turnbow ("Turnbow") is an individual residing in the state

of Idaho and is an attorney in the state of Idaho conducting business with and for Eberle Berlin in
Ada County, Idaho. Defendant Eberle Berlin is vicariously liable for the acts and/or omissions
of Defendant Turnbow. At all relevant times, Defendant Turnbow was licensed to practice law
in the state of Idaho.
6.

Damages in this action exceed $10,000 and the Defendants conduct business

and/or reside in Ada County, Idaho. Jurisdiction and venue are, therefore, appropriate in Ada
County District Court.
7.

Reed Taylor is the former majority common shareholder of AIA Services

Corporation ("AIA Services"), a closely held Idaho corporation.

Certain causes of action and

relief sought in this Complaint are based upon the time Reed Taylor was the majority
shareholder of AIA Services. Prior to the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, AIA Services'
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minority shareholders desired to acquire Reed Taylor's majority interest in AIA Services to
obtain operational control of the corporation in an effort to sell the company or effectuate a
public offering.

And, as a means for the minority shareholders to obtain their objectives,

Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow represented AIA Services in negotiating the terms,
conditions and agreements for AIA Services to purchase Reed Taylor's shares in a transaction
structured as a redemption of his shares by the corporation. At the time Reed Taylor's shares
were redeemed, Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow had extensive experience in
corporate law and in corporate transactions.
8.

Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow acted as counsel for a committee

established for board of directors of AIA Services to negotiate and approve the terms and
conditions of the corporation's redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. Reed Taylor was not on this
committee.

Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow acted general counsel for AIA

Services in the negotiation of the terms and conditions of the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares
and drafting of the redemption agreement and related agreements. Defendants Eberle Berlin and
Riley attended certain board meetings and shareholder meetings and drafted board and
shareholder resolutions pertaining to the general corporate matters and the redemption of Reed
Taylor's shares, including, without limitation, the shareholder resolutions specifically addressing
the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares.
9.

Under the terms of the stock redemption agreement between AIA Services and

Reed Taylor ("redemption agreement"), Reed Taylor would receive, among other things and
consideration, the payment of $6 Million, plus accrued interest, for his shares and receive
security interests in all of the commissions of AIA Services and all of the shares of its operating
subsidiaries. Under the terms of the redemption agreement, Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and
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Turnbow were required to deliver an opinion letter to Reed Taylor and he could terminate the
redemption agreement prior to closing if an opinion letter acceptable to him was not delivered.
10.

Reed Taylor signed the redemption agreement and related agreements (including

the security agreement and stock pledge agreement).

As required under the redemption

agreement, Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow drafted and delivered their opinion
letter to Reed Taylor approximately three weeks later in which they made substantial factual and
legal representations upon which they induced Reed Taylor to rely ("Opinion Letter"). The
Opinion Letter was specifically written to Reed Taylor, was addressed to him, referenced
"Common Stock Redemption" in the subject line, stated that it was being delivered as required
by the redemption agreement, and expressly stated that it was being provided for his benefit and
use in connection with the redemption of his shares. The Opinion Letter was a requirement prior
to closing (the closing date was over three weeks after the redemption agreement was signed).
As a result, Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow had over three weeks to take such
actions as were necessary as general counsel for AIA Services and as authors of the Opinion
Letter to ensure that the representations in the Opinion Letter were true and correct and that all
necessary shareholder consents and resolutions had been obtained. As a result of receiving
Defendants Eberle Berlin, Turnbow and Riley's Opinion Letter, the redemption transaction was
closed approximately one day after Reed Taylor received the Opinion Letter resulting in his
shares being fully redeemed by AIA Services. In addition to the redemption agreement, the
executed security agreement, $6 Million promissory note, stock pledge agreement and ancillary
agreements ("related agreements") were all part of the transaction to redeem Reed Taylor's
shares and all of the agreements were drafted and entered into by the parties for the same
purpose.
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11.

Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow delivered to Reed Taylor the

· Opinion Letter addressing factual and legal issues pertaining to the redemption of his shares.
Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow knew that Reed Taylor would rely upon their
Opinion Letter and that the Opinion Letter was a condition precedent before the redemption
transaction could be closed. The Opinion Letter is also a contract between Reed Taylor and
Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow (which became binding when Reed Taylor agreed
to sell his shares in reliance upon the Opinion Letter) and there were direct dealings between
Reed Taylor's counsel and Defendant Riley pertaining directly to drafting, issuing and delivering
the Opinion Letter. By providing the Opinion Letter knowing that Reed Taylor would rely upon
it to close the redemption, Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow knew that if Reed
Taylor relied upon the Opinion Letter and closed the transaction he would waive his right to
terminate the redemption prior to closing, thereby resulting in him waiving his right to terminate
the redemption agreement.
12.

The Opinion Letter specifically stated that facts or absence of facts were based

upon the actual knowledge of Defendants Turnbow and Riley. The knowledge of Defendants
Turnow and Riley was extensive as they acted as general counsel for AIA Services and
represented the corporation in the transaction to which the Opinion Letter addressed legal and
factual matters. They also were intimately involved with the relevant corporate governance
matters at AIA Services. To the extent that any corporate acts were improperly taken and/or not
taken by the management of AIA Services, these acts and/or omissions could have been
prevented and/or cured by Defendants Eberle Berlin, Turnbow and Riley's representation of AIA
Services.
Ill
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13.

Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow knew that Reed Taylor was relying

upon their representations and/or opinions to ensure that the redemption was authorized, that
they accurately represented facts and opinions, and that they accurately ensured the redemption
was completed in accordance with, and not in violation of, applicable Idaho laws and complied
with corporate governance requirements. Reed Taylor did in fact rely upon Defendants Eberle
Berlin, Riley and Turnbow' s legal representation and the factual and legal matters addressed in
the Opinion Letter when he closed the redemption transaction.
14.

Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow's legal representation and Opinion

Letter were all focused on the same end and aim-to provide the necessary legal representation
and opinions to Reed Taylor as required to induce him sell his shares in AIA Services in the
manner acceptable to him and to ensure that he was assured the redemption was authorized, did
not violate any laws, and that the redemption agreement and related agreements were fully
enforceable against AIA Services. Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow' s duties were
to ensure that all of the foregoing acts and related acts were properly completed to ensure the
integrity and legality of the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. Reed Taylor specifically relied
upon Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow' s legal services for the redemption and
Opinion Letter.
15.

Defendant Riley attended AIA Services' shareholder and board meetings and

drafted pertinent board resolutions and shareholder resolutions. Reed Taylor and AIA Services
relied upon Defendant Riley's legal services drafting the necessary corporate resolutions and to
ensure that the all laws and shareholder requirements were properly complied with and/or
obtained for the redemption, and that all necessary shareholder resolutions were drafted and
obtained to approve the redemption. Defendant Riley breached his duties owed to AIA Services
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and Reed Taylor to ensure all necessary and specific corporate actions were taken by AIA
Services to ensure that the redemption transaction could not be questioned in any way.
16.

Reed Taylor had contractual relations with Defendants Eberle Berlin, Turnbow

and Riley by and through a written agreement requiring Defendants Eberle Berlin, Turnbow and
Riley to issue and deliver the Opinion Letter.

Even without this contract provision, the

relationship between Defendants Eberle Berlin, Turnbow and Riley was sufficiently close to
support a finding that they owed direct duties to Reed Taylor because their legal representation
to ensure the transaction was legal and enforceable was harmonious among Reed Taylor and
AIA Services and there were no conflicts between the parties in effectuating the redemption of
Reed Taylor's shares. In addition, Defendants Eberle Berlin, Turnbow and Riley, as general
counsel for AIA Services and role in drafting corporate resolutions, were in a position to control
whether the necessary corporate resolutions, consents, and all other necessary acts were properly
obtained.

Had Defendants Eberle Berlin, Turnbow and Riley wanted to refrain from such

heightened duties and responsibilities, they should have refrained from serving in the dual role of
acting as general counsel and drafting and delivering the Opinion Letter to Reed Taylor.
Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow cannot rely upon assumptions or certifications
from others when they knew through their direct representation that such assumptions and
certifications were factually incorrect.
17.

The purpose of the Opinion Letter was to assure and represent to Reed Taylor: (a)

that no further corporate formalities were necessary to make the redemption agreement and
related agreements valid and enforceable; (b) that the redemption agreement and related
agreements were fully authorized under Idaho law and did not violate Idaho law; (c) that the
terms of the redemption agreement and related agreements (including security interests) were
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fully enforceable against AIA Services and its subsidiaries; and (d) that the redemption did not
violate some other obligation for which AIA Services was bound that could affect the
enforceability of the redemption agreement and related agreements or otherwise materially
impact AIA Services. Reed Taylor relied upon all of the foregoing representations, all of which
such representations were false, as determined by the court on June 17, 2009.
18.

Defendants

Eberle Berlin,

Turnbow

and

Riley made numerous

false

representations to Reed Taylor through the Opinion Letter, which Reed Taylor relied upon when
he agreed to sell his shares in AIA Services, including, without limitation, the following false
representations: (a) AIA Services had the full power and authority to enter into, execute, and
deliver the redemption agreement and related agreements; (b) that all necessary actions required
by the directors and shareholders of AIA Services had been taken; (c) that the redemption
agreement and related agreements constituted valid and binding obligations upon AIA Services
enforceable against it by the terms of the redemption agreement and related agreements; (d) that
the execution and delivery of the redemption agreement and related agreements would not
conflict with or violate AIA Services Articles of Incorporation; (e) that the execution and
delivery of the redemption agreement and related agreements would not violate any Idaho laws;
(f) that no consent by any person was required to authorize the execution, delivery and

performance of the redemption agreement and related agreements, except for such as have been
obtained prior to closing; (g) that Reed Taylor had a perfected first priority security interest in all
of the shares of AIA Services' subsidiaries and the commission collateral; and (h) that they had
reviewed all corporate documents of AIA Services necessary to render their factual and legal
opinions.

Reed Taylor relied upon the foregoing representations and the foregoing

representations were false as determined by the court on June 17, 2009, and Defendants Eberle
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Berlin, Riley and Turnbow knew or should have known the foregoing representations were false.
19.

Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow also expressly represented that the

Opinion Letter was furnished by them to Reed Taylor for his benefit for use in connection with
the redemption agreement and related agreements and the transactions contemplated by the
agreements.

Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow further represented their

understanding that Reed Taylor would rely upon the Opinion Letter when they represented that
the Opinion Letter could not be relied upon by anyone other than Reed Taylor. Reed Taylor had
the contractual right to approve the form of the Opinion Letter, thereby creating a further special
relationship between him and Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow.
20.

In addition, Reed Taylor was a direct intended beneficiary of Defendant Eberle

Berlin, Riley and Turnbow' s representation of AIA Services, legal services provided to obtain
and approve the necessary shareholder and board resolutions, and legal services as the authors,
issuers and deliverers of the Opinion Letter (and the parties with knowledge whether the facts
relied upon by the Opinion Letter were in fact true). As a result, the Defendants Eberle Berlin,
Riley and Turnbow also owed Reed Taylor special third-party beneficiary duties and special
obligations and duties because their services and Opinion Letter were provided unquestionably
for the benefit of Reed Taylor and these duties were in accord with, and not in conflict with, their
duties and obligations owed to AIA Services, Reed Taylor as the majority shareholder of AIA
Services, and the other shareholders.
21.

After the transaction to redeem Reed Taylor's shares was closed, Defendants

Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow remained general counsel for AIA Services. As a result,
Defendant Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow owed a duty to Reed Taylor to ensure all corporate
action was taken to ensure the Opinion Letter was correct and that the representations and
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warranties contained in the redemption agreement and related agreements were true and correct.
Defendants Eberle Berlin, Turnbow and Riley controlled whether certain false representations
made in the Opinion Letter could have been cured before closing and/or to take necessary actions
to ensure the accuracy of such representations. If they could not ensure the Opinion Letter was
correct and that their legal services were not provided with the required duty of care, they owed
Reed Taylor a duty to advise him that the redemption was not authorized and violated Idaho law.
22.

When litigation occurred between Reed Taylor and AIA Services over the

collection of the $6 Million Note and claims under related agreements (and claims against other
defendants based upon corporate malfeasance, fraud, conversion, etc.) ("Litigation"), Hawley
Troxell elected to represent AIA Services and the other interested and conflicted defendants
through joint representation agreements and common interest or joint defense agreements.
Despite Reed Taylor's demands to not represent the parties, Defendant Hawley Troxell elected to
remain as counsel solely for its own benefit and/or to cover up its acts and/or omissions, and to
receive significant payments for attorneys' fees. Defendant Hawley Troxell did in fact receive
hundreds of thousands of dollars in compensation litigating against Reed Taylor and in direct
conflict with and adverse to the representations and warranties contained in the Opinion Letter.
23.

On June 17, 2009, a court ruled in the Litigation that the redemption of Reed

Taylor's shares violated Idaho law and, therefore, the redemption agreement and related
agreements were illegal contracts, which such ar ments were asse
though Defendant Riley owed obligations and duties to Reed Taylor. In the court's opinion, it
found that Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow' s Opinion Letter was incorrect. As a
result of this ruling in the Litigation, a debt of over $8.5 Million owed to Reed Taylor by AIA
Services was held to be unenforceable through the written redemption agreement and related
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agreements, which the Opinion Letter had expressly stated were enforceable and did not violate
any laws, among other representations and omissions. As a result of the Litigation, Reed Taylor
has also been damaged in excess of $500,000 for attorneys' fees and costs incurred by him in the
Litigation. As such, June 17, 2009, the date the court ruled the redemption agreement and
related agreements were illegal and unenforceable, is the date all of Reed Taylor's causes of
action in this Complaint accrued and became actionable.
24.

Astonishingly, Defendant Riley's firm, Hawley Troxell, actually represented AIA

Services in the Litigation and argued that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares was illegal and
the redemption agreements were unenforceable, even though Defendant Riley had issued and
delivered the Opinion Letter to Reed Taylor with various representations of fact and law,
including, without limitation, that the redemption did not violate any laws, that all necessary
consents had been obtained, and that the redemption agreements were enforceable.

The

Litigation involved legal and factual issues based upon the same transaction documents
negotiated and approved by Defendant Riley to redeem Reed Taylor's shares and the redemption
agreement, related agreements and later amended agreements. Notwithstanding the obvious
conflicts of interest, Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell undertook interests adverse to those
of Reed Taylor and AIA Services. Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell had duties to not
represent parties whose interests were adverse to their client AIA Services and Defendant Riley's
former client and/or third-party beneficiary Reed Taylor, particularly for the sole purpose of
protecting the interests of the guilty insiders fraudulently and tortiously transferred millions of
dollars of AIA Services funds, assets and trade secrets-the amount of which would have been
sufficient to pay most, if not all, of the over $6 Million owed to Reed Taylor for the redemption
of his shares.
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25.

Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell's conduct undertaking the representation of

AIA Services in litigation against the Opinion Letter and Defendant Riley's refusal to testify as a
witness at a deposition were unconscionable, vexatious, malicious and intentionally undertaken.
Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell had a vested interest in making such arguments because
they had assisted and/or aided and abetted others in unlawfully taking and/or covering up the
unlawful transfer of millions of dollars from AIA Services and its subsidiaries, money that could
have been used to satisfy the debt to Reed Taylor. Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell's
intentional, vexatious, malicious, and unconscionable conduct is further evidenced by the fact
that Reed Taylor moved to disqualify Hawley Troxell in the Litigation.

Instead of

acknowledging its substantial material conflicts of interest, Hawley Troxell vehemently opposed
the disqualification and prevailed on the issue thereby proving their unconscionable, vexatious
and malicious intent. They did so without fairly and honestly representing the facts to the court.
26.

Based upon public policy concerns alone, it would be unconscionable for

Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell to argue against and represent others against the
representations, opinions and legal services Defendant Riley provided to AIA Services and Reed
Taylor, which such services, factual assertions and opinions Reed Taylor relied upon and was an
intended beneficiary.

Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell should have withdrawn from

representing the corporation based upon the Opinion Letter alone, in addition to their obligations
and duties created through their representation and third-party beneficiary relationship with Reed
Taylor. Instead, Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell elected to undertake the unconscionable,
wantonly, vexatious and malicious conduct referenced above and in this Complaint.
27.

Despite Reed Taylor's request to depose certain individuals and for Defendant

Eberle Berlin to intervene in the Litigation to support the Opinion Letter, Defendants Eberle
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Berlin and Turnbow refused to do so. Instead, they allowed Defendants Hawley Troxell and
Riley engage in legal representation and assert arguments, which were adverse to their
representations, duties and obligations to Reed Taylor and their former client AIA Services.
28.

Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell owed duties (including duties of loyalty) to

Reed Taylor to not argue against or contradict the terms of the Opinion Letter. Defendant
Riley's duties owed to Reed Taylor were also acknowledged by him after the Opinion Letter was
issued and delivered to Reed Taylor. Defendant Riley owed a duty to Reed Taylor to either force
Hawley Troxell to withdraw from representing AIA Services or he should have left the firm of
Hawley Troxell.

Defendant Riley chose neither and instead undertook the unconscionable,

malicious, wanton, vexatious and intentional conduct described in this Complaint and
participated in the Litigation by submitting an Affidavit and by reviewing and monitoring the
Litigation. In addition, Defendant Riley has profited by Defendant Hawley Troxell's purported
representation in the Litigation by and through him being a partner in Hawley Troxell and their
receipt of hundreds of thousands of dollars in attorneys' fees and costs litigating the validity and
legality of the redemption agreement and related agreements, which such conduct is agam
unconscionable, malicious, wanton, and vexatious.
29.

Shortly before the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, an independent appraiser

valued AIA Services at over $19 Million and Reed Taylor owned a controlling interest of
approximately 60% of the common shares in AIA Services. After the redemption of Reed
Taylor's shares, AIA Services generated over $65 Million in revenues and the minority
shareholders obtained the majority control of AIA Services and its $65 Million+ in revenues.
Meanwhile, Reed Taylor has never been paid the over $9 Million in principal, interest and other
costs which were promised to him under the redemption agreement and related agreements.
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30.

Reed Taylor's malpractice claims against Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and

Turnbow include derivative claims for malpractice. Reed Taylor was a shareholder of AIA
Services at the time of the derivative malpractice claims and demand would be futile on the
present purported board of director of AIA Services.

Reed Taylor is the only shareholder

entitled to the damages recovered because they pertain directly to the money owed to him and his
former majority interest ownership in the common shares of AIA Services, which such interest
has now been fraudulently extinguished. The present purported board of AIA Services is not
properly seated or elected, and, even if properly seated and/or elected, the board of directors all
have conflicts of interest (including, without limitation, by way of being interested parties in
millions of dollars in corporate malfeasance and unlawful transactions, and through maintaining
control over AIA Services' revenues and their shareholder interests in the corporation through
asserting that Reed Taylor's redemption was illegal) thereby resulting any an derivative demand
being futile. The present purported board members of AIA Services are comprised of three
members, John Taylor and Connie Taylor (who are both licensed attorneys who have violated
number rules of ethics and failed to operate AIA Services properly) and James Beck. All three
board members own significant interests in CropUSA, a corporation where millions of dollars of
AIA Services assets, funds and trade secrets have been unlawfully transferred. Reed Taylor's
ex-wife, is a preferred shareholder of AIA Services who is required to have a seat on the board of
AIA Services until all of her shares are redeemed, but AIA Services, by and through Hawley
Troxell, has refused to honor those obligations and she has not been paid as required.

In

addition, AIA Services is not holding annual shareholder meetings and the purported board of
directors are not complying with conflict of interest provisions in the company's Bylaws or
holding proper meetings. Finally, the present purported board of directors constitute the majority
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ownership of the shares in CropUSA (i.e., James Beck, John Taylor and Connie Taylor), which
such corporation has been represented by Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell. The purported
board members would never pursue claims against Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell, who
has assisted in covering up their wrongful conduct and wrongful conduct of other interested and
conflicted insiders. All of these individuals have a vested interest in not paying Reed Taylor,
ensuring that his former majority interest in AIA Services is taken from him, and/or arguing that
the redemption agreement and related agreements are illegal, all so as to avoid liability for their
unlawful acts and all of these interested and conflicted purported directors and officers would
never pursue claims against the Defendants.
31.

In addition, the present purported management of AIA Services is aligned against

Reed Taylor and defends a course of conduct upon which he attacks (i.e., the present purported
management wants the redemption agreement and related agreements to be found illegal to avoid
liability for millions of dollars in corporate malfeasance damages). As a result, the present
purported board of AIA Services is not disinterested and not independent and they would never
pursue litigation against the Defendants because they have a vested interest in never pursuing
such claims and never having all of the facts become common knowledge.
32.

In addition, because the Opinion Letter was provided to Reed Taylor at the

request from AIA Services and issued directly to Reed Taylor with the express intent to rely
upon the Opinion Letter, Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow are estopped from
denying the attorney-client relationship with Reed Taylor.
33.

But for Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Tumbow's breach of duties,

negligence, negligent misrepresentations, and malpractice, the redemption agreement and related
agreements would never have been ruled to be illegal and unenforceable in the Litigation thereby

COMPLAINT- 15

000039

directly and/or proximately causing damages to Reed Taylor under the causes of action and relief
set forth below.

II. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION-NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTIONS
34.

Reed Taylor re-alleges and incorporates by reference all facts asserted in this

Complaint into this cause of action to the extent necessary to support this cause of action and any
relief requested by this cause of action.
35.

The Opinion Letter specifically stated that it was being furnished by Defendants

Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow for Reed Taylor's use and benefit in connection with the
redemption agreement and related agreements, along with the transactions contemplated by these
agreements. The Opinion Letter was specifically also based upon the personal knowledge of
Defendants Riley and Turnbow.
36.

In connection with the Opinion Letter, Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and

Turnbow; (a) were aware that their Opinion Letter would be relied upon by Reed Taylor and that
he in fact relied upon the Opinion Letter; (b) authored, issued and delivered their Opinion Letter
directly to Reed Taylor to induce him to sell his shares in AIA Services; (c) knew that the
Opinion Letter was required by Reed Taylor to close the transaction for the redemption of his
shares as evidenced by the provision in the redemption agreement requiring the Opinion Letter to
be issued and delivered in a form acceptable to Reed Taylor; (d) knew that AIA Services had
directed them to author, issue and deliver the Opinion Letter to Reed Taylor and they knew that
they were acting as general counsel for AIA Services and had knowledge of all aspects of the
corporation; (e) the Opinion Letter contained misrepresentations as asserted in this Complaint,
including, without limitation, the misrepresentations set forth in Paragraphs 17-18 above; and (t)
their representations which Reed Taylor relied upon were in fact false.
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Berlin, Riley and Turnbow also omitted material facts from the Opinion Letter, including that the
specific and required corporate acts had not been in fact taken to ensure the redemption was
legal.
37.

As a direct and/or proximate result of Reed Taylor's reliance upon Defendants

Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow's false representations and/or their omissions of material fact,
Reed Taylor has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at or before trial.
III. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION-NEGLIGENCE/MALPRACTICE

38.

Reed Taylor re-alleges and incorporates by reference all necessary facts asserted

in this Complaint into this cause of action to the extent necessary to support this cause of action
and any relief requested by this cause of action.
39.

Reed Taylor had an attorney-client relationship with Defendants Eberle Berlin,

Riley and Turnbow by and through an express contract provision. Defendants Eberle Berlin,
Riley and Turnbow provided the Opinion Letter expressly stating that it was for Reed Taylor's
benefit and reliance. The parties to the redemption agreement and related agreements had no
conflicts of interest by and through Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow' s legal
representation which was to effectuate the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares on terms and
conditions acceptable to him and to ensure that the agreements were enforceable and did not
violate any laws thereby also invoking the doctrine of equitable subrogation.
40.

As general counsel for AIA Services, the authors of various corporate resolutions,

the counsel for entering into the redemption agreement and related agreements, and the attorneys
providing Reed Taylor with an Opinion Letter stating the transaction was legal and the
redemption agreement and related agreements were enforceable (among other representations),
Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow owed a duty to Reed Taylor as a beneficiary of the
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agreements to ensure that they were properly drafted, that all corporate acts and consents had
been obtained and that the redemption agreement and related agreements were enforceable,
among other duties. Reed Taylor is a third-party beneficiary of such legal representation by and
through the ends and means of Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow' s representation
was to effectuate the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares in a manner acceptable to him, with
security interests acceptable to him, and by providing him assurances that the transaction was
legal and the redemption agreement and related agreements were enforceable.
41.

As the attorneys for AIA Services in the redemption transaction, general counsel

to AIA Services, and the authors of the Opinion Letter, Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and
Turnbow had a duty to Reed Taylor and AIA Services to ensure all necessary corporate
governance acts were obtained and to ensure that the representations and/or warranties provided
in the Opinion Letter were correct. As the author of various corporate resolutions pertaining to
the redemption, Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow owed Reed Taylor and AIA
Services duties of care to ensure all such acts were properly and timely completed. They had the
ability and control to determine and affect the accuracy of the Opinion Letter.
42.

Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow owed AIA Services (i.e., the

corporation wanted legal and enforceable documents) and Reed Taylor a duty of care to provide,
including, but not limited to, reasonable, prudent, skillful, ethical, unconflicted, loyal and
professional legal advice in keeping with the standard of care in the legal profession and as owed
to AIA Services and Reed Taylor, by and through direct, third-party and/or Opinion Letter
representation and advice (referred to herein and above as "duty of care").
43.

Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow breached their duty of care owed to

AIA Services and Reed Taylor thereby damaging Reed Taylor, including, without limitation,
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there duty of care in providing the Opinion Letter to Reed Taylor, providing false and/or wrong
representations and opinions in the Opinion Letter to Reed Taylor, failing to ensure all necessary
shareholder approvals and/or consents were obtained to the extent required by Idaho law, and by
not advising Reed Taylor that the redemption was not legal, among other breached duties set
forth or contemplated in this Complaint.
44.

There is a causal connection between the Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and

Tumbow's failure to perform their duties and/or breach of their duties of care owed to AIA
Services and Reed Taylor and the damages incurred by Reed Taylor. The court's finding that the
redemption agreements and related agreements were illegal and unenforceable has resulted in a
direct and causal connection to Reed Taylor losing millions of dollars and for him being
defrauded of his majority interest in AIA Services.

Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and

Tumbow's breached duties were also the proximate cause of Reed Taylor's damages.
45.

Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Tumbow's acts constitute professional

negligence, malpractice, negligence and/or negligent issuance of an opinion letter; and such acts,
conduct and/or omissions have directly and/or proximately damaged Reed Taylor, in an amount
to be proven at or before trial.
46.

Reed Taylor's malpractice claims include derivative claims and a derivative

demand is not required because it would be futile as AIA Services directors are all conflicted,
disinterested and not properly elected or seated as set forth in Paragraphs 30-31 above. Because
Reed Taylor is the shareholder harmed by such conduct, he is entitled to all damages recovered
and is also asserting direct claims for malpractice. To the extent that he recovers any damages
for which there is a question of ownership under his derivative malpractice claims, he will
deposit such funds with the court pending a determination of their rightful owners.
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IV. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION-CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT VIOLATIONS
47.

Reed Taylor re-alleges and incorporates by reference all necessary facts asserted

in this Complaint into this cause of action to the extent necessary to support this cause of action
and any relief requested by this cause of action.
48.

Reed Taylor and the Defendants are all persons as defined by LC. § 48-602(1).

Defendants' practice of law and/or the rendering of legal services (including the Opinion Letter)
constitutes services as defined by LC. § 48-602(7). Reed Taylor's shares in AIA Services were
certificated goods as defined by LC. § 48-602(6). Reed Taylor is an elder person (72-years-old)
who, as a result of Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell's actions, lost over 25% of his monthly
income and 25% of the funds and/or assets set aside by Reed Taylor for his retirement as defined
by LC. § 48-608.
49.

Reed Taylor purchased services from Defendant Riley by and through the

redemption agreement which required Defendant Rile to provide Reed Taylor the Opinion
Letter, Reed Taylor was the known direct beneficiary of services provided by Defendant Riley,
and/or its attorneys are members of the Idaho State Bar through which AIA Services and/or Reed
Taylor has contracted for services through trade and commerce. Defendant Riley's fiduciary
duties owed to Reed Taylor and AIA Services are imputed upon Hawley Troxell and all of its
attorneys.
50.

Defendant Riley misled, deceived and/or confused Reed Taylor on issues of fact

and law (and omitted material facts) pertaining to the legality of the redemption of his shares and
the enforceability of the redemption agreement and related agreements, among other issues of
fact and law. Then, after deceiving, misleading and/or confusing Reed Taylor into believing that
the redemption of his shares was legal and the redemption agreement and related agreements
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were enforceable (among other representations), Defendant Riley, by and through his law firm,
Defendant Hawley Troxell, successfully argued and asserted that the redemption of Reed
Taylor's shares violated Idaho law, was an illegal contract, and that the redemption agreements
and related agreements were unenforceable. Then Defendant Riley refused to be deposed to
explain his actions and he and Hawley Troxell successfully persuaded the court to not permit his
deposition to explain his Opinion Letter. Such conduct is unconscionable.
51.

Simply put, Defendant Riley induced Reed Taylor to sell his shares based upon

representations made in the Opinion Letter and through his legal services provided in connection
with the redemption agreement and then unconscionably and inappropriately asserted the
redemption was illegal through Defendant Hawley Troxell, knowing that he owed fiduciary
duties to Reed Taylor.

Such conduct violates LC. § 48-603, et seq., and constitutes

unconscionable conduct in trade and commerce as provided under LC. § 48-603(18).
Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell' s acts have a direct impact on consumers and the integrity
of the legal system, and constitute unfair methods and practices and violations of LC. § 48-601,
et seq.
52.

Defendant Riley has falsely represented that his services and Opinion Letter have

been provided to a particular standard when in fact his services have not met the appropriate
standards (including the standard of care) in violation of LC. § 48-603(7).

Instead of

acknowledging that Defendants Riley's services did not meet the appropriate standards,
Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell engaged in a course of conduct that directly attacked the
Opinion Letter and Riley's legal services and representations. Defendant Riley has engaged in
acts and/or practices that have been misleading, false and/or deceptive to Reed Taylor (including,
without limitation, the false representations made to Reed Taylor in Paragraphs 17-18) in
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violation of LC. § 48-603(17). Based upon all of the allegations asserted and/or contemplated in
this Complaint, Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell have also violated other applicable
provisions of LC.§ 48-603 and/or LC.§ 48-601, et seq.
53.

Defendant Riley and Hawley Troxell's acts constitute violations of the Idaho

Consumer Protection Act (LC. § 48-601, et seq.). Reed Taylor is entitled to damages, treble
damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees and costs and/or such other requested relief as a
result of Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell's acts as provided LC. § 48-601, et seq.
Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell's violations or the unlawful acts of attorneys (including
attorneys as adversaries) are not any of the exceptions as set forth in LC. § 48-605.
V. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION-BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES

54.

Reed Taylor re-alleges and incorporates by reference all necessary facts asserted

in this Complaint into this cause of action to the extent necessary to support this cause of action
and any relief requested by this cause of action.
55.

Defendants Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin owed Reed Taylor fiduciary duties

as the majority shareholder of AIA Services, the Chairman of the Board of AIA Services, the
Chief Executive Officer of AIA Services, and the direct intended third-party beneficiary of the
legal representation pertaining to the redemption of his shares and the recipient of the Opinion
Letter expressly drafted for his reliance. They also owed additional fiduciary duties by the fact
that Defendants Eberle Berlin, Turnbow and Riley provided the Opinion Letter at the request of
AIA Services.
56.

Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow also owed Reed Taylor fiduciary

duties and duties of good faith and fair dealing by and through the issuance of the Opinion Letter
to Reed Taylor and their third-party beneficiary representation obligations, which induced Reed
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Taylor to sell his shares in AIA Services.

Defendant Riley, and, consequently, Defendant

Hawley Troxell owed Reed Taylor fiduciaries duties (including, without limitation, the duty of
loyalty) to not make arguments which are contrary to the Opinion Letter and to not undertake
any representations which were adverse to the Opinion Letter or Reed Taylor, which pertain in
any way to the redemption of his shares or the redemption agreement and related agreements.
Defendants have engaged in a course of self-dealing, deception and/or misrepresentations which
go beyond the mere allegations of negligence.
57.

Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow owed Reed Taylor fiduciary duties

as the third-party beneficiary of their legal services, including, without limitation, the legal
services provided as general counsel for AIA Services, the legal services drafting corporate
resolutions for AIA Services, and the legal services drafting and delivering the Opinion Letter.
Defendant Riley's fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor is imputed to Defendant Hawley Troxell
and Defendant Hawley Troxell is liable for Riley's acts and/or omissions. Defendants Eberle
Berlin, Riley and Turnbow owed Reed Taylor fiduciary duties from the Opinion Letter because it
was provided to legally advise Reed Taylor and effectuate his reliance upon such legal advice.

58.

Despite a contractual requirement, when Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and

Turnbow prepared the Opinion Letter at the direction of AIA Services addressed to a third-party,
Reed Taylor, and which expressly invited Reed Taylor's reliance upon the Opinion Letter, a
legal representation relationship was entered into and created.

59.

Defendant Riley, and, consequently, Defendant Hawley Troxell, breached their

fiduciary duties and duties of good faith and fair dealing owed to Reed Taylor when they
asserted arguments contrary to the Opinion Letter and engaged in representation adverse to the
Opinion Letter and the legal representation provided for the redemption agreement and related
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agreements, which such arguments and adverse representations are a direct violation of fiduciary
duties owed to Reed Taylor, including the duty ofloyalty.
60.

As a direct and/or proximate result of Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley, Turnbow

and Hawley Troxell's breached fiduciary duties, Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount to
be proven at the time of trial or on summary judgment.
61.

Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley, Turnbow and Hawley Troxell's acts and/or

omissions constitute the breach of fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor thereby directly and/or
proximately causing damages to Reed Taylor in an amount to be proven at or before trial.
VI.

62.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION-FRAUD/CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD

Reed Taylor re-alleges and incorporates by reference all necessary facts asserted

in this Complaint into this cause of action to the extent necessary to support this cause of action
and any relief requested by this cause of action.
63.

Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow acted as general counsel for AIA

Services for the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, acted as counsel for the independent
committee for the board of directors established to negotiate the terms of the redemption of Reed
Taylor's shares, drafted and approved all board and shareholder resolutions pertaining to the
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, and authored and delivered the Opinion Letter to Reed
Taylor which made numerous representations of fact and law to Reed Taylor. Defendants Eberle
Berlin, Riley and Turnbow provided opinions to Reed Taylor which they were aware were
incompatible with the fact upon which such opinions were based.
64.

Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow made material statements of fact

and law as set forth in this Complaint and omitted material facts, including, without limitation
the representations set forth in Paragraphs 17-18 above; the foregoing statements were false;
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Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow had knowledge of the falsity of the foregoing
statements; they intended to induce Reed Taylor to rely upon the foregoing statements; Reed
Taylor was ignorant of the falsity of the foregoing statements; Reed Taylor relied on the
foregoing statements; and Reed Taylor was consequently and proximately injured. Defendants
Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow's acts and/or omissions constitute fraud, including, without
limitation, the omission of the fact that the shareholders of AIA Services had not voted on and
approved the necessary specific written resolution for the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares.
65.

Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow owed duties of care and fiduciary

duties to Reed Taylor. Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow made material statements
of fact and law as set forth in this Complaint and omitted material facts, including, without
limitation the representations set forth in Paragraphs 17-18 above; the foregoing statements were
false; Reed Taylor was ignorant of the falsity of the foregoing statements; Reed Taylor relied on
the foregoing statements; and Reed Taylor was consequently and proximately injured.
Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow's acts and/or omissions constitute constructive
fraud, including, without limitation, the omission of the fact that the shareholders of AIA
Services had not voted on and approved the required written shareholder resolution, as
determined by the court in the Litigation.
66.

As a direct and/or proximate result of Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and

Turnbow's fraud and/or constructive fraud, Reed Taylor has incurred damages in the amount to
be proven at or before trial. Their actions also constitute a fraudulent scheme to deprive Reed
Taylor of his majority interest in AIA Services by assisting the minority shareholders in
effectuating a corporate buyback through written agreements drafted and approved by
Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow, which such agreements have now been held to be
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unenforceable by the court and it refused to give him his shares back, including, without
limitation, by and through the acts of Defendant Riley's firm, Defendant Hawley Troxell.

VII.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Reed Taylor prays for the following relief:
1.

For a judgment against Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow, jointly and

severally, in an amount to be proven at or before trial, plus pre and post judgment interest;
2.

For judgment against Defendant Hawley Troxell in an amount to be proven at or

before trial, plus pre and post judgment interest;
3.

For a judgment against Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell, jointly and

severally, for treble damages in the amount to be proven at or before trial pursuant to LC. § 48608(2) and for other damages and/or relief provided under LC. § 48-608 or LC.§ 48-601 et seq.;
4.

For an award of attorneys fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to Idaho

Law, including, without limitation, LC.§ 48-608, LC.§ 12-120 and/or LC. § 12-121; and
5.

For such other relief as may be sought at or before trial by Reed Taylor that the

Court deems just and equitable.

VIII. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1.

Reed Taylor demands a trial by jury of not less than twelve (12) on all claims and

damages so triable.
DATED this 30th day of September, 2009.
BYPLLC
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James D. LaRue, ISB #1780
Loren C. Ipsen, ISB #1767
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844

J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By CARLY LATIMORE
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendants, Richard A. Riley
and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,
v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; ROBERT M.
TURNBOW, an individual; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

Case No. CV-OC-0918868
DEFENDANTS RICHARD A. RILEY'S
AND HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS &
HAWLEY, LLP'S ANSWER TO
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

Defendants.
COME NOW Defendants, Richard A. Riley and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP
(referred to as "Riley," "Hawley Troxell," and collectively referred to as "Riley/Hawley
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Troxell"), by and through their counsel of record, Elam & Burke P.A., and for their Answer to
Plaintiff's Complaint for Damages ("Complaint"), admit, deny, and allege as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim against Riley/Hawley Troxell upon which
relief can be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
Riley/Hawley Troxell deny each and every allegation contained in Plaintiff's Complaint
not specifically admitted herein.
THIRD DEFENSE
1.

In answer to paragraph 1 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell admit

that Plaintiff is a resident of Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho, but lack sufficient information
and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining factual and legal allegations
contained therein, and therefore deny same.
2.

In answer to paragraph 2 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell admit the

allegations contained therein.
3.

In answer to paragraph 3 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell admit

that Hawley Troxell is an Idaho LLP engaged in the business of practicing law in Idaho with its
principal offices located in Boise, Ada County, Idaho. Riley/Hawley Troxell deny the remaining
allegations contained in paragraph 3.
4.

The allegations contained in paragraph 4 of Plaintiff's Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell and thus no response appears required. To the extent

DEFENDANTS RICHARD A. RILEY'S AND HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS &
HAWLEY, LLP'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES - 2

000052

a response is required, Riley/Hawley Troxell lack sufficient information and knowledge to form a
belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore deny same.
5.

The allegations contained in paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell and thus no response appears required. To the extent
a response is required, Riley/Hawley Troxell lack sufficient information and knowledge to form a
belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore deny same.
6.

In answer to paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell admit

that they conduct business and/or reside in Ada County, Idaho, but deny the remaining
allegations contained therein.
7.

In answer to paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell admit

that in the past Plaintiff was the majority shareholder of AIA Services Corporation, an Idaho
corporation; admit that Riley, through his then affiliation with Eberle Berlin, was an outside
counsel for AIA Services and was involved in negotiating and drafting some of the
documentation concerning the purchase and redemption of Plaintiffs stock in AIA Services;
admit that Riley had experience in corporate law and transactions, but lack sufficient information
and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations contained therein, and
therefore deny same.
8.

In answer to paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell admit

that Riley acted as an outside counsel for AIA Services in negotiating and drafting the
redemption agreement and related agreements; admit that Riley attended some board meetings
and participated in the drafting of board resolutions pertaining to general corporate matters and
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the redemption of Plaintiffs shares. Riley/Hawley Troxell deny the remaining allegations
contained in paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs Complaint. To the extent that allegations contained in
paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell,
Riley/Hawley Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
9.

In Answer to paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell state that

the stock redemption agreement and related documents speak for themselves.
10.

In answer to paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell admit

that Plaintiff signed the redemption agreement and related documents; admit that Riley
participated in the drafting and delivery of an opinion letter addressed to Plaintiff which was
delivered at closing of the redemption transaction, and admit that the documents referenced in
paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs Complaint speak for themselves. Riley/Hawley Troxell deny the
remaining allegations contained in paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs Complaint. To the extent that
allegations contained in paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than
Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other
parties.
11.

In answer to paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell admit

that the opinion letter was delivered to Plaintiff and/or his counsel in satisfaction of a condition
precedent to Plaintiffs obligation to close the transaction, and admit that the documents
referenced in paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs Complaint speak for themselves. Riley/Hawley Troxell
deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs Complaint. To the extent
that allegations contained in paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other
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than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other
parties.
12.

In answer to paragraph 12 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell admit

that, as an outside counsel for AIA Services, Riley had knowledge concerning those AIA
Services matters referred to Eberle Berlin as to which Riley devoted substantial attention, and
admit that the documents referenced in paragraph 12 of Plaintiff's Complaint speak for
themselves. Riley/Hawley Troxell deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 12 of
Plaintiff's Complaint. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 12 of Plaintiff's
Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley Troxell make
no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
13.

In answer to paragraph 13 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein. To the extent that allegations contained in Paragraph 13 of
Plaintiff's Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley
Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
14.

In answer to paragraph 14 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 14 of
Plaintiff's Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley
Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
15.

In answer to paragraph 15 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell admit

that Riley attended some AIA Services board meetings; admit that Riley drafted some board
resolutions; but deny the remaining allegations contained therein.
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16.

In answer to paragraph 16 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 16 of
Plaintiff's Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley
Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
17.

In answer to paragraph 17 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell admit

that said document speaks for itself and deny the remaining allegations contained therein.
18.

In answer to paragraph 18 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 18 of
Plaintiff's Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley
Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
19.

In answer to paragraph 19 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 19 of
Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley
Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
20.

In answer to paragraph 20 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 20 of
Plaintiff's Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley
Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
21.

In answer to paragraph 21 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell admit

that Riley acted as an outside counsel to AIA Services on certain matters referred to Riley by
AIA Services after 1995, but deny the remaining allegations contained therein. To the extent that
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allegations contained in paragraph 21 of Plaintiff's Complaint are directed at parties other than
Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other
parties.
22.

In answer to paragraph 22 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell admit

that Hawley Troxell was retained to represent AIA Services and its subsidiary AIA Insurance,
Inc. and its affiliate Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. in the underlying litigation initiated by
Plaintiff; admit the existence of a joint defense agreement among the defendants in the
underlying litigation; admit Hawley Troxell's receipt of attorney fees for legal services provided
to its clients in the underlying litigation; but deny the remaining allegations contained therein.
23.

In answer to paragraph 23 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell admit

that on June 17, 2009, the Court in the underlying litigation initiated by Plaintiff in Nez Perce
County issued an Opinion and Order and admit that said Opinion and Order speaks for itself.
Riley/Hawley Troxell deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 23 of Plaintiff's
Complaint.
24.

In answer to paragraph 24 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell admit

that Hawley Troxell represented AIA Services and its subsidiary AIA Insurance, Inc. and its
affiliate Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. in the underlying litigation initiated by Plaintiff in
Nez Perce County; admit that the interests of Riley/Hawley Troxell's clients are adverse to the
interests of Plaintiff; but deny the remaining allegations contained therein.
25.

In Answer to paragraph 25 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell admit

that Hawley Troxell opposed Plaintiff's efforts to disqualify Hawley Troxell from representation
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of AIA Services in the underlying litigation; admit that the Court denied Plaintiff's motion to
disqualify Hawley Troxell from such representation; but deny the remaining allegations
contained therein. Riley/Hawley Troxell specifically deny that they unfairly or dishonestly
represented any facts to the Court.
26.

In answer to paragraph 26 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein.
27.

In answer to paragraph 27 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 27 of
Plaintiff's Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley
Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
28.

In answer to paragraph 28 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein.
29.

In answer to paragraph 29 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell lack

sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained
therein, and therefore deny same.
30.

In answer to paragraph 30 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein.
31.

In answer to paragraph 31 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein.
32.

In answer to paragraph 32 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein.
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33.

In answer to paragraph 33 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein.
34.

In answer to paragraph 34 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell restate

their responses to paragraphs I through 33 as if fully set forth herein.
35.

In answer to paragraph 35 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell state

that the Opinion letter speaks for itself as to its contents and all assumptions, qualifications and
other limitations stated therein. Riley/Hawley Troxell deny the remaining allegations contained
in paragraph 35 of Plaintiffs Complaint. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph
35 of Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley
Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
36.

In answer to paragraph 36 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 36 of
Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley
Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
37.

In answer to paragraph 37 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 27 of
Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley
Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
38.

In answer to paragraph 38 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell restate

their responses to paragraphs 1 through 37 as if fully set forth herein.
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39.

In answer to paragraph 39 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 39 of
Plaintiff's Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley
Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
40.

In answer to paragraph 40 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 40 of
Plaintiff's Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley
Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
41.

In Answer to paragraph 41 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 41 of
Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley
Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
42.

In answer to paragraph 42 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 42 of
Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley
Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
43.

In answer to paragraph 43 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 43 of
Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley
Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
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44.

In answer to paragraph 44 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 44 of
Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley
Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
45.

In answer to paragraph 45 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 45 of
Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley
Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
46.

In answer to paragraph 46 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 46 of
Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley
Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
47.

In answer to paragraph 47 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell restate

their responses to paragraphs 1 through 46 as if fully set forth herein.
48.

In answer to paragraph 48 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein.
49.

In answer to paragraph 49 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein.
50.

In answer to paragraph 50 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein.
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51.

In answer to paragraph 51 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein.
52.

In answer to paragraph 52 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein.
53.

In answer to paragraph 53 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein.
54.

In answer to paragraph 54 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell restate

their responses to paragraphs 1 through 53 as if fully set forth herein.
55.

In answer to paragraph 55 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 55 of
Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley
Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
56.

In answer to paragraph 56 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 56 of
Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley
Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
57.

In Answer to paragraph 57 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 57 of
Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley
Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
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58.

In answer to paragraph 58 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 58 of
Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley
Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
59.

In answer to paragraph 59 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein.
60.

In answer to paragraph 60 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 60 of
Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley
Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
61.

In answer to paragraph 61 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 61 of
Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley
Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
62.

In answer to paragraph 62 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell restate

their responses to paragraphs 1 through 61 as if fully set forth herein.
63.

In answer to paragraph 63 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell admit

that Riley, through his then affiliation with Eberle Berlin, acted as an outside counsel for AIA
Services in negotiating and drafting the redemption agreement and related agreements; admit that
Riley attended some board meetings and participated in the drafting of board resolutions
pertaining to general corporate matters and the redemption of Plaintiffs shares; but deny the
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remaining allegations contained therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 63
of Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Riley/Hawley Troxell, Riley/Hawley
Troxell make no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
64.

In answer to paragraph 64 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein.
65.

In answer to paragraph 65 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein.
66.

In answer to paragraph 66 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Riley/Hawley Troxell deny

the allegations contained therein.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendants are entitled to a litigation privilege which bars Plaintiffs claims in their
entirety.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

By his conduct and actions, Plaintiff has waived some or all of the claims and/or
allegations against Riley/Hawley Troxell.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

By his conduct and actions, Plaintiff is estopped from asserting some or all of the claims
and/or allegations against Riley/Hawley Troxell.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiff has failed to mitigate his damages sought in his Complaint.
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FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff has failed to state with particularity all averments of fraud/constructive fraud as
required by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Certain of Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statutes of limitation including Idaho Code
Sections 5-218(4), 5-219(4), and 48-619.
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
There is an existing final judgment deciding the same causes of action as are set forth in
Plaintiff's Complaint, and/or causes of action which might have been asserted, between the same
parties to this action, rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and thus Plaintiff's Complaint
against Riley/Hawley Troxell is barred by application of res judicata.
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from alleging the causes of action in the present matter
because the facts underlying said causes of action were determined in a prior action by a court of
competent jurisdiction.
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
That the negligence/fault of Reed J. Taylor was equal to or greater than the
negligence/fault of Riley/Hawley Troxell, if any, and that said Plaintiff's negligence/fault was the
sole, direct and proximate cause of any damages and/or injuries claimed by Plaintiff.
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TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

If Plaintiff sustained or incurred any damages, the same were caused in whole or in part
by the acts or omissions of persons or entities other than Defendants Riley/Hawley Troxell, over
whom these Defendants had no control or by the superceding intervention of causes outside of
these Defendants' control.
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
During all material times and specific to the transaction referenced in Plaintiff's
Complaint, Plaintiff was represented by counsel of his own choosing.
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff's claims present no justiciable controversy.
RESERVATION
Riley/Hawley Troxell reserve the right, after discovery, to amend this Answer to add
additional affirmative defenses supported by the facts, and a failure to include all such defenses
in this Answer shall not be deemed a waiver of any right to further amend this Answer.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
Riley/Hawley Troxell hereby requests that they be awarded their attorney fees and costs
incurred herein pursuant to Section 12-121 of the Idaho Code, and Rules 11 and 54 of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure.
WHEREFORE, having fully answered the Complaint on file herein, Riley/Hawley
Troxell prays as follows:
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1.

That the Complaint herein be dismissed with prejudice, and that Plaintiff take

nothing thereby;
2.

That Riley/Hawley Troxell be awarded their attorney fees and costs incurred

herein; and
3.

For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable.

DATED this d8._ day of October, 2009.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By:~~
J~s >LaRUe, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants, Richard A. Riley and
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of October, 2009, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, Washington 99201

./ U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(509) 455-7111
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By E. HOLMES

Jack S. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
Julianne S. Hall, ISB No. 8076
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208)336-9777
Facsimile: (208)336-9177

DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendant Eberle, Berlin, Kading,
Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
ROBERT M. TURNBOW, an individual; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0918868

DEFENDANT EBERLE, BERLIN,
KADING, TURNBOW &
MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED'S
ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR
JURY TRIAL

~~~~~~~~~~~-)

COMES NOW, Defendant Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered
(hereinafter "Eberle Berlin"), by and through its undersigned counsel of record, Gjording &
Fouser, PLLC, and in answer to the Plaintiff's Complaint on file herein, answers, alleges and
states as follows.
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INTRODUCTION

The following defenses are not stated separately as to each claim for relief or allegation
of the Plaintiff. Nevertheless, the following defenses are applicable, where appropriate, to any
and all of Plaintiffs claims for relief. In asserting the following defenses, Defendant does not
admit that the burden of proving the allegations or denials contained in the defenses are upon
Defendant but, to the contrary, asserts that by reason of said denials, and by reason of relevant
statutory and judicial authority, the burden of proving the facts relevant to many of the defenses
and the burden of proving the inverse of the allegations contained in many of the defenses is
upon Plaintiff. Moreover, Defendant does not admit, in asserting any defense, any responsibility
or liability on the part of it but, to the contrary, specifically denies any and all allegations of
responsibility and liability contained in Plaintiffs Complaint.
FIRST DEFENSE

Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE

This answering Defendant denies each and every allegation of Plaintiffs Complaint not
herein expressly and specifically admitted.
1.

In answer to paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin admits that

Plaintiff is a resident of Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho. In further response, Eberle Berlin
asserts that some of these allegations call for legal conclusions, that the language of the Idaho
Code speaks for itself and Eberle Berlin lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a
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belief as to the truth of the remaining factual and legal allegations contained therein, and
therefore denies the same.
2.

The allegations contained in paragraph 2 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Eberle Berlin and thus no response appears required.

To the extent a

response is required, Eberle Berlin lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
3.

The allegations contained in paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Eberle Berlin and thus no response appears required.

To the extent a

response is required, Eberle Berlin lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
4.

In answer to paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin admits that

Eberle Berlin is an Idaho corporation engaged in the business of practicing law in Idaho with its
principal offices located in Boise, Ada County, Idaho.

Eberle Berlin denies the remaining

allegations contained in paragraph 4.
5.

In answer to paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin admits that

Turnbow is an individual residing in the state of Idaho and is an attorney in the state of Idaho
conducting business with and for Eberle Berlin in Ada County, Idaho. Eberle Berlin admits that
at all relevant times, Turnbow was and is licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho. In further
response, Eberle Berlin denies the remaining allegations contained therein.

DEFENDANT EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW & MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED'S
ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL, P. 3
000070

6.

In answer to paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin admits that it

conducts business and/or reside in Ada County, Idaho, but denies the remaining allegations
contained therein.
7.

In answer to paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin admits that it,

through its then affiliation with Riley, was involved in the drafting and delivery of an Opinion
letter addressed to Plaintiff at the direction of AIA Services. Eberle Berlin admits it acted as
outside counsel for AIA Services. At all relevant times, Eberle Berlin admits it had experience
in corporate law and corporate transactions. With regard to the remaining allegations, Eberle
Berlin denies the same or lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the
truth of the remaining factual and legal allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the
same.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs Complaint are

directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no response for or on behalf of
the other parties.
8.

In answer to paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin admits that it,

through its then affiliation with Riley, was involved in the drafting and delivery of an Opinion
letter addressed to Plaintiff at the direction of AIA Services. Eberle Berlin admits it acted as
outside counsel for AIA Services. With regard to the remaining allegations, Eberle Berlin denies
the same. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs Complaint are
directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no response for or on behalf of
the other parties.
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9.

In Answer to paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin states that the

stock redemption agreement and related documents speak for themselves. With regard to the
remaining allegations, Eberle Berlin denies the same.
10.

In answer to paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin admits that it,

through their then affiliation with Riley, was involved in the drafting of an Opinion letter
addressed to Plaintiff which was delivered at closing of the redemption transaction at the
direction of AIA Services, and that the documents referenced in paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs
Complaint speak for themselves. With regard to the remaining allegations, Eberle Berlin denies
the same. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs Complaint are
directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no response for or on behalf of
the other parties.
11.

In answer to paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin admits that an

Opinion letter was delivered to Plaintiff in satisfaction of a condition precedent to Plaintiffs
obligation to close the transaction and admits that the documents referenced in paragraph 11 of
Plaintiffs Complaint speak for themselves.

Eberle Berlin denies the remaining allegations

contained in paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs Complaint. To the extent that allegations contained in
paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle
Berlin makes no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
12.

In answer to paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin admits that it,

through their then affiliation with Riley, was involved in the drafting of an Opinion letter
addressed to Plaintiff and that the documents referenced in paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs Complaint
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speak for themselves. Eberle Berlin denies the remaining allegations contained therein. To the
extent that allegations contained in paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties
other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
13.

In answer to paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 13 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no
response for or on behalf of the other parties.
14.

In answer to paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 14 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no
response for or on behalf of the other parties.
15.

The allegations contained in paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Eberle Berlin and thus no response appears required. To the extent a
response is required, Eberle Berlin lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
16.

In answer to paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 16 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no
response for or on behalf of the other parties.
17.

In answer to paragraph 17 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin states that said

documents speak for themselves and denies the remaining allegations contained therein.
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18.

In answer to paragraph 18 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Eberle Berlin denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 18 of

Plaintiff's Complaint are directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no
response for or on behalf of the other parties.
19.

In answer to paragraph 19 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Eberle Berlin states that the

referenced documents speaks for themselves and denies the remaining allegations contained
therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 19 of Plaintiff's Complaint are
directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no response for or on behalf of
the other parties.
20.

In answer to paragraph 20 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Eberle Berlin states that the

referenced documents speaks for themselves and denies the allegations contained therein. To the
extent that allegations contained in paragraph 20 of Plaintiff's Complaint are directed at parties
other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
21.

In answer to paragraph 21 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Eberle Berlin admits it

continued to provide legal services to AIA Services after the transaction to redeem Reed Taylor's
shares closed. With regard to the remaining allegations, Eberle Berlin denies the same. To the
extent that allegations contained in paragraph 21 of Plaintiff's Complaint are directed at parties
other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
22.

The allegations contained in paragraph 22 of Plaintiff's Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Eberle Berlin and thus no response appears required. To the extent a
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response is required, Eberle Berlin lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
23.

In answer to paragraph 23 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin admits that on

June 17, 2009, the Court in the underlying litigation initiated by Plaintiff in Nez Perce County
issued an Opinion and Order and admits that said Opinion and Order speaks for itself. Eberle
Berlin denies the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 23 of Plaintifrs Complaint. To
the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 23 of Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at
parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no response for or on behalf of the other
parties.
24.

The allegations contained in paragraph 24 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Eberle Berlin and thus no response appears required. To the extent a
response is required, Eberle Berlin lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
25.

The allegations contained in paragraph 25 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Eberle Berlin and thus no response appears required. To the extent a
response is required, Eberle Berlin lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
26.

The allegations contained in paragraph 26 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Eberle Berlin and thus no response appears required. To the extent a
response is required, Eberle Berlin lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
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27.

In answer to paragraph 27 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Eberle Berlin admits that

Reed Taylor requested Eberle Berlin intervene in the Litigation and that Eberle Berlin did not
intervene in the Litigation. Eberle Berlin denies the remaining allegations contained therein. To
the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 27 of Plaintiff's Complaint are directed at
parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no response for or on behalf of the other
parties.
28.

In answer to paragraph 28 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Eberle Berlin was not a party

m the Litigation and declined to become involved.
allegations contained therein.

Eberle Berlin denies the remaining

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 28 of

Plaintiff's Complaint are directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no
response for or on behalf of the other parties.
29.

In answer to paragraph 29 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Eberle Berlin lacks sufficient

information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein,
and therefore denies the same.
30.

In answer to paragraph 30 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Eberle Berlin denies Reed

Taylor's allegation that his malpractice claims against Eberle Berlin include derivative claims for
malpractice. With regard to the remaining allegations, Eberle Berlin lacks sufficient information
and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore
denies the same. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 30 of Plaintiff's Complaint
are directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no response for or on behalf
of the other parties.
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31.

In answer to paragraph 31 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin lacks sufficient

information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein,
and therefore denies the same.
32.

In answer to paragraph 32 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin denies the

allegations contained therein.
33.

In answer to paragraph 33 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin denies the

allegations contained therein.
34.

In answer to paragraph 34 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin restates its

responses to paragraphs 1 through 33 as if fully set forth herein.
35.

In answer to paragraph 35 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin states that the

Opinion letter speaks for itself as to its contents and all assumptions, qualifications and other
limitations stated therein. Eberle Berlin denies the remaining allegations contained in paragraph
35 of Plaintiffs Complaint.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 35 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no
response for or on behalf of the other parties.
36.

In answer to paragraph 36 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin admits that it,

through its then affiliation with Riley, was involved in the drafting of an Opinion letter addressed
to Plaintiff which was delivered at closing of the redemption transaction at the direction of AIA
Services.

Eberle Berlin further states that the documents referenced in paragraph 36 of

Plaintiffs Complaint speak for themselves. With regard to the remaining allegations, Eberle
Berlin denies the same. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 36 of Plaintiffs
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Complaint are directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no response for
or on behalf of the other parties.
37.

In answer to paragraph 37 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 37 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no
response for or on behalf of the other parties.
38.

In answer to paragraph 38 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin restates its

responses to paragraphs 1through37 as if fully set forth herein.
39.

In answer to paragraph 39 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin denies that Reed

Taylor had an attorney-client relationship with Eberle Berlin by and through an express contract
provision. Eberle Berlin admits that it, through their then affiliation with Riley, was involved in
the drafting of an Opinion letter addressed to Plaintiff which was delivered at closing of the
redemption transaction at the direction of AIA Services. Eberle Berlin further states that the
Opinion letter and documents referenced in paragraph 39 speak for themselves as to the contents
and assumptions, qualifications and other limitations stated therein.

With regard to the

remaining allegations, Eberle Berlin denies the same. To the extent that allegations contained in
paragraph 39 of Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle
Berlin makes no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
40.

In answer to paragraph 40 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin admits that it,

through its then affiliation with Riley, was involved in the drafting of an Opinion letter addressed
to Plaintiff which was delivered at closing of the redemption transaction at the direction of AJA
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Services.

Eberle Berlin further states that the Opinion letter and documents referenced in

paragraph 40 speak for themselves as to the contents and assumptions, qualifications and other
limitations stated therein. With regard to the remaining allegations, Eberle Berlin denies the
same. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 40 of Plaintiffs Complaint are
directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no response for or on behalf of
the other parties.
41.

In Answer to paragraph 41 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin admits only

that it, through its then affiliation with Riley, was involved in the drafting of an Opinion letter
addressed to Plaintiff which was delivered at closing of the redemption transaction at the
direction of AIA Services. With regard to the remaining allegations, Eberle Berlin denies the
same. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 41 of Plaintiffs Complaint are
directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no response for or on behalf of
the other parties.
42.

In answer to paragraph 42 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin denies all the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 42 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no
response for or on behalf of the other parties.
43.

In answer to paragraph 43 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 43 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no
response for or on behalf of the other parties.
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44.

In answer to paragraph 44 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin denies the

allegations contained therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 44 of
Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no
response for or on behalf of the other parties.
45.

In answer to paragraph 45 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin denies the

allegations contained therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 45 of
Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no
response for or on behalf of the other parties.
46.

In answer to paragraph 46 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 46 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no
response for or on behalf of the other parties.
47.

In answer to paragraph 47 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin restates its

responses to paragraphs 1 through 46 as if fully set forth herein.
48.

In answer to paragraph 48 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin asserts that

some of these allegations call for legal conclusions, that the language of Idaho Code speaks for
itself and Eberle Berlin lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the
truth of the remaining factual and legal allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the
same. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 48 of Plaintiffs Complaint are
directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no response for or on behalf of
the other parties.
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49.

The allegations contained in paragraph 49 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Eberle Berlin and thus no response appears required.

To the extent a

response is required, Eberle Berlin lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
50.

The allegations contained in paragraph 50 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Eberle Berlin and thus no response appears required. To the extent a
response is required, Eberle Berlin lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
51.

The allegations contained in paragraph 51 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Eberle Berlin and thus no response appears required. To the extent a
response is required, Eberle Berlin lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
52.

The allegations contained in paragraph 52 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Eberle Berlin and thus no response appears required. To the extent a
response is required, Eberle Berlin lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
53.

The allegations contained in paragraph 53 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Eberle Berlin and thus no response appears required. To the extent a
response is required, Eberle Berlin lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
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54.

In answer to paragraph 54 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin restates its

responses to paragraphs 1 through 53 as if fully set forth herein.
55.

In answer to paragraph 55 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 55 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no
response for or on behalf of the other parties.
56.

In answer to paragraph 56 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 56 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no
response for or on behalf of the other parties.
57.

In Answer to paragraph 57 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 57 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no
response for or on behalf of the other parties.
58.

In answer to paragraph 58 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin admits that

Eberle Berlin, through their then affiliation with Riley, was involved in the drafting and delivery
of an Opinion letter addressed to Plaintiff at the direction of AIA Services. Eberle Berlin states
that the Opinion letter speaks for itself as to its contents and all assumptions, qualifications and
other limitations stated therein.
allegations contained therein.

In further response, Eberle Berlin denies the remaining

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 58 of
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Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no
response for or on behalf of the other parties.
59.

The allegations contained in paragraph 59 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Eberle Berlin and thus no response appears required.

To the extent a

response is required, Eberle Berlin lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
60.

In answer to paragraph 60 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 60 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no
response for or on behalf of the other parties.
61.

In answer to paragraph 61 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 61 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no
response for or on behalf of the other parties.
62.

In answer to paragraph 62 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin restates its

responses to paragraphs 1 through 61 as if fully set forth herein.
63.

In answer to paragraph 63 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin admits that

Eberle Berlin, through their then affiliation with Riley, was involved in the drafting and delivery
of an Opinion letter addressed to Plaintiff at the direction of AIA Services. Eberle Berlin states
that the Opinion letter speaks for itself as to its contents and all assumptions, qualifications and
other limitations stated therein.

In further response, Eberle Berlin denies the remaining
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allegations contained in therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 63 of
Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no
response for or on behalf of the other parties.
64.

In answer to paragraph 64 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 64 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no
response for or on behalf of the other parties.
65.

In answer to paragraph 65 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 65 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no
response for or on behalf of the other parties.
66.

In answer to paragraph 66 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Eberle Berlin denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 66 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin makes no
response for or on behalf of the other parties.
67.

In response to Plaintiffs Prayer for Relief, Eberle Berlin denies allegations 1

through 5.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendants are entitled to a litigation privilege which bars Plaintiffs claims in their
entirety.
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SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

By his conduct and actions, Plaintiff has waived some or all of the claims and/or
allegations against Eberle Berlin.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

By his conduct and actions, Plaintiff is estopped from asserting some or all of the claims
and/or allegations against Eberle Berlin.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiff has failed to mitigate his damages sought in his Complaint.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiff has failed to state with particularity all averments of fraud or constructive fraud
as required by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Certain of Plaintiffs claims are barred by the statutes of limitation including Idaho Code
Sections 5-218(4), 5-219(4), and 48-619.
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims against Defendant are barred by the doctrine of laches.
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

That the negligence or fault of Reed J. Taylor was equal to or greater than the negligence
or fault of Eberle Berlin, if any, and that said Plaintiffs negligence or fault was the sole, direct
and proximate cause of any damages and/or injuries claimed by Plaintiff.
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NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
If Plaintiff sustained or incurred any damages, the same were caused in whole or in part

by the acts or omissions of persons or entities other than Defendant Eberle Berlin, over whom
this Defendant had no control or by the superseding intervention of causes outside of this
Defendant's control.
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

During all material times and specific to the transaction referenced m Plaintiff's
Complaint, Plaintiff was represented by counsel of his own choosing.
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiff's claims present no justiciable controversy.
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiff's claims are based under the doctrine of unclean hands.
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The opinion letter was restricted and limited pursuant to its own terms.
FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiff's cause of action is not ripe for controversy given the fact that there is pending a
case before the Idaho Supreme Court that is directly related.
FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiff's claims against the Defendant are barred based on lack of privity.
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SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

There was no casual connection between the opinion lytter and Plaintiff's claimed
damages.
RESERVATION OF RIGHTS

Discovery has not yet commenced, the result of which may reveal additional answers
and/or defenses to this Defendant.

Defendant reserves the right to amend this Answer if

appropriate.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES

As a result of the filing of the Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant has been required to
retain legal counsel to defend the said action and is entitled to recover its attorney fees, pursuant
to the provisions contained in Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-121 and Rules 11 and 54 of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Defendant demands a jury trial on all issues pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure.
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WHEREFORE, having fully and completely answered the Plaintiffs Complaint herein,
this answering Defendant prays as follows:
1.

That Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed in its entirety, and that Plaintiff takes

nothing thereby;
2.

That Defendant recover reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred herein; and

3.

That this Court grant such other and further relief as it deems just and proper.

DATED this

z~ day of November, 2009.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

z3

tel_
day of November, 2009, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Roderick C. Bond
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, VVA 99201

.kl

James D. LaRue
ELAM BURKE
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701-1539

~

D
D
D

D
D
D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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James D. LaRue ISB #1780
Loren C. Ipsen ISB #1767
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
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DEC 0 7 2009
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
ByE.HOLMES
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendants, Richard A. Riley
and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,
v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; ROBERT M.
TURNBOW, an individual; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

Case No. CV-OC-0918868
DEFENDANTS RICHARD A. RILEY AND
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.
Defendants, Richard A. Riley ("Riley'') and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP
("Hawley Troxell"), by and through their attorneys of record, Elam & Burke, P.A., move this
Court for an order granting summary judgment against all claims asserted by Plaintiff against

DEFENDANTS RICHARD A. RILEY AND HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

000090

Riley and Hawley Troxell, pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, on the
grounds and for the reasons that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Riley and
Hawley Troxell are entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw.
This motion is made and based upon the files and records in this action together with
Memorandum in Support of Riley and Hawley Troxell's Motion for Summary Judgment, the
Affidavit of Gary D. Babbitt and the Affidavit of Richard A. Riley filed concurrently herewith.
DATED this _2_ day of December, 2009.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By:~~~'=
Jarlr(; D. LaRue, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants, Richard A. Riley and
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP

DEFENDANTS RICHARD A. RILEY AND HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2

000091

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __J_ day of December, 2009, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the
manner indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC

7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, Washington 99201
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
..r- Facsimile Transmission
(509) 455-7111
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
...-- Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-9177
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DEC 2 2 2009
J. DAVID NAVAi-mo. Cimh
!3y E. I IO'.JJiES
C''_:pi1yy

Jack S. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
Julianne S. Hall, ISB No. 8076
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208)336-9777
Facsimile: (208)336-9177

Attorneys for Defendants Robert M. Turnbow and
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
ROBERT M. TURNBOW, an individual; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0918868

DEFENDANT ROBERT M.
TURNBOW'S ANSWER AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

COMES NOW, Defendant Robert M. Turnbow (hereinafter "Turnbow"), by and through
the undersigned counsel of record, Gjording & Fouser, PLLC, and in answer to the Plaintiffs
Complaint on file herein, answers, alleges and states as follows.
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INTRODUCTION

The following defenses are not stated separately as to each claim for relief or allegation
of the Plaintiff. Nevertheless, the following defenses are applicable, where appropriate, to any
and all of Plaintiffs claims for relief. In asserting the following defenses, Defendant does not
admit that the burden of proving the allegations or denials contained in the defenses are upon
Defendant but, to the contrary, asserts that by reason of said denials, and by reason of relevant
statutory and judicial authority, the burden of proving the facts relevant to many of the defenses
and the burden of proving the inverse of the allegations contained in many of the defenses is
upon Plaintiff. Moreover, Defendant does not admit, in asserting any defense, any responsibility
or liability on the part of him but, to the contrary, specifically denies any and all allegations of
responsibility and liability contained in Plaintiffs Complaint.
FIRST DEFENSE

Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE

This answering Defendant denies each and every allegation of Plaintiffs Complaint not
herein expressly and specifically admitted.
1.

In answer to paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow admits that Plaintiff

is a resident of Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho. In further response, Turnbow asserts that
some of these allegations call for legal conclusions, that the language of the Idaho Code speaks
for itself and Turnbow lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth
of the remaining factual and legal allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
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2.

The allegations contained in paragraph 2 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Turnbow and thus no response appears required. To the extent a response is
required, Turnbow lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
3.

The allegations contained in paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Turnbow and thus no response appears required. To the extent a response is
required, Turnbow lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
4.

In answer to paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow admits that Eberle

Berlin is an Idaho corporation engaged in the business of practicing law in Idaho with its
principal offices located in Boise, Ada County, Idaho. Turnbow denies the remaining allegations
contained in paragraph 4.
5.

In answer to paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow admits that Turnbow

is an individual residing in the state of Idaho and is an attorney in the state of Idaho conducting
business with and for Turnbow in Ada County, Idaho. Turnbow admits that at all relevant times,
Turnbow was and is licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho. In further response, Turnbow
denies the remaining allegations contained therein.
6.

In answer to paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow admits that he

conducts business and/or resides in Ada County, Idaho, but denies the remaining allegations
contained therein.
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7.

In answer to paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow admits that he,

through his then affiliation with Riley, was involved in the drafting and delivery of an Opinion
letter addressed to Plaintiff at the direction of AIA Services. Turnbow admits he acted as outside
counsel for AIA Services. At all relevant times, Turnbow admits he had experience in corporate
law and corporate transactions. With regard to the remaining allegations, Turnbow denies the
same or lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of the
remaining factual and legal allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same. To the
extent that allegations contained in paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties
other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
8.

In answer to paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow admits that he,

through his then affiliation with Riley, was involved in the drafting and delivery of an Opinion
letter addressed to Plaintiff at the direction of AIA Services. Turnbow admits he acted as outside
counsel for AIA Services. With regard to the remaining allegations, Turnbow denies the same.
To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at
parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
9.

In Answer to paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow states that the stock

redemption agreement and related documents speak for themselves.

With regard to the

remaining allegations, Turnbow denies the same.
10.

In answer to paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow admits that he,

through his then affiliation with Riley, was involved in the drafting of an Opinion letter
addressed to Plaintiff which was delivered at closing of the redemption transaction at the
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direction of AJA Services, and that the documents referenced in paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs
Complaint speak for themselves. With regard to the remaining allegations, Turnbow denies the
same. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs Complaint are
directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for or on behalf of the other
parties.
11.

In answer to paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow admits that an

Opinion letter was delivered to Plaintiff in satisfaction of a condition precedent to Plaintiffs
obligation to close the transaction and admits that the documents referenced in paragraph 11 of
Plaintiffs Complaint speak for themselves. Turnbow denies the remaining allegations contained
in paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs Complaint. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph
11 of Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no
response for or on behalf of the other parties.
12.

In answer to paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow admits that he,

through his then affiliation with Riley, was involved in the drafting of an Opinion letter
addressed to Plaintiff and that the documents referenced in paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs Complaint
speak for themselves. Turnbow denies the remaining allegations contained therein. To the
extent that allegations contained in paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties
other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
13.

In answer to paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 13 of
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Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for
or on behalf of the other parties.
14.

In answer to paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 14 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for
or on behalf of the other parties.
15.

The allegations contained in paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than and thus no response appears required. To the extent a response is required,
Turnbow lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
16.

In answer to paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 16 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for
or on behalf of the other parties.
17.

In answer to paragraph 17 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow states that said

documents speak for themselves and denies the remaining allegations contained therein.
18.

In answer to paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 18 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for
or on behalf of the other parties.
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19.

In answer to paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow states that the

referenced documents speaks for themselves and denies the remaining allegations contained
therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs Complaint are
directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for or on behalf of the other
parties.
20.

In answer to paragraph 20 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow states that the

referenced documents speaks for themselves and denies the allegations contained therein. To the
extent that allegations contained in paragraph 20 of Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties
other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
21.

In answer to paragraph 21 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow admits he continued

to provide legal services to AIA Services after the transaction to redeem Reed Taylor's shares
closed. With regard to the remaining allegations, Turnbow denies the same. To the extent that
allegations contained in paragraph 21 of Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than
Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
22.

The allegations contained in paragraph 22 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Turnbow and thus no response appears required. To the extent a response is
required, Turnbow lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
23.

In answer to paragraph 23 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow admits that on June

17, 2009, the Court in the underlying litigation initiated by Plaintiff in Nez Perce County issued
an Opinion and Order and admits that said Opinion and Order speaks for itself. Turnbow denies
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the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 23 of Plaintiffs Complaint. To the extent that
allegations contained in paragraph 23 of Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than
Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
24.

The allegations contained in paragraph 24 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Turnbow and thus no response appears required. To the extent a response is
required, Turnbow lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
25.

The allegations contained in paragraph 25 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Turnbow and thus no response appears required. To the extent a response is
required, Turnbow lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
26.

The allegations contained in paragraph 26 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Turnbow and thus no response appears required. To the extent a response is
required, Turnbow lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
27.

In answer to paragraph 27 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow admits that Reed

Taylor requested Turnbow intervene in the Litigation and that Turnbow did not intervene in the
Litigation. Turnbow denies the remaining allegations contained therein. To the extent that
allegations contained in paragraph 27 of Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than
Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
28.

In answer to paragraph 28 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow was not a party in
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the Litigation and declined to become involved. Turnbow denies the remaining allegations
contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 28 of Plaintiffs

Complaint are directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
29.

In answer to paragraph 29 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow lacks sufficient

information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein,
and therefore denies the same.
30.

In answer to paragraph 30 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow denies Reed

Taylor's allegation that his malpractice claims against Turnbow include derivative claims for
malpractice. With regard to the remaining allegations, Turnbow lacks sufficient information and
knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore
denies the same.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 30 of Plaintiffs

Complaint are directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
31.

In answer to paragraph 31 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow lacks sufficient

information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein,
and therefore denies the same.
32.

In answer to paragraph 32 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow denies the

allegations contained therein.
33.

In answer to paragraph 33 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow denies the

allegations contained therein.
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34.

In answer to paragraph 34 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow restates his

responses to paragraphs 1 through 33 as if fully set forth herein.
35.

In answer to paragraph 35 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow states that the

Opinion letter speaks for itself as to its contents and all assumptions, qualifications and other
limitations stated therein. Turnbow denies the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 35
of Plaintiffs Complaint. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 35 of Plaintiffs
Complaint are directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
36.

In answer to paragraph 36 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow admits that he,

through his then affiliation with Riley, was involved in the drafting of an Opinion letter
addressed to Plaintiff which was delivered at closing of the redemption transaction at the
direction of AIA Services. Turnbow further states that the documents referenced in paragraph 36
of Plaintiffs Complaint speak for themselves.

With regard to the remaining allegations,

Turnbow denies the same. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 36 of Plaintiffs
Complaint are directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
37.

In answer to paragraph 37 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 37 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for
or on behalf of the other parties.
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38.

In answer to paragraph 38 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow restates his

responses to paragraphs 1through37 as if fully set forth herein.
39.

In answer to paragraph 39 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow denies that Reed

Taylor had an attorney-client relationship with Turnbow by and through an express contract
provision. Turnbow admits that he, through his then affiliation with Riley, was involved in the
drafting of an Opinion letter addressed to Plaintiff which was delivered at closing of the
redemption transaction at the direction of AIA Services. Turnbow further states that the Opinion
letter and documents referenced in paragraph 39 speak for themselves as to the contents and
assumptions, qualifications and other limitations stated therein. With regard to the remaining
allegations, Turnbow denies the same. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 39
of Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response
for or on behalf of the other parties.
40.

In answer to paragraph 40 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow admits that he,

through his then affiliation with Riley, was involved in the drafting of an Opinion letter
addressed to Plaintiff which was delivered at closing of the redemption transaction at the
direction of AIA Services.

Turnbow further states that the Opinion letter and documents

referenced in paragraph 40 speak for themselves as to the contents and assumptions,
qualifications and other limitations stated therein. With regard to the remaining allegations,
Turnbow denies the same. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 40 of Plaintiffs
Complaint are directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
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41.

In Answer to paragraph 41 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow admits only that he,

through his then affiliation with Riley, was involved in the drafting of an Opinion letter
addressed to Plaintiff which was delivered at closing of the redemption transaction at the
direction of AIA Services. With regard to the remaining allegations, Turnbow denies the same.
To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 41 of Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at
parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
42.

In answer to paragraph 42 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow denies all the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 42 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for
or on behalf of the other parties.
43.

In answer to paragraph 43 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow denies the

allegations contained therein.. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 43 of
Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for
or on behalf of the other parties.
44.

In answer to paragraph 44 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 44 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for
or on behalf of the other parties.
45.

In answer to paragraph 45 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 45 of
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Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for
or on behalf of the other parties.
46.

In answer to paragraph 46 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in 'paragraph 46 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for
or on behalf of the other parties.
47.

In answer to paragraph 47 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow restates his

responses to paragraphs 1 through 46 as if fully set forth herein.
48.

In answer to paragraph 48 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow asserts that some of

these allegations call for legal conclusions, that the language of Idaho Code speaks for itself and
Turnbow lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of the
remaining factual and legal allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same. To the
extent that allegations contained in paragraph 48 of Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties
other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
49.

The allegations contained in paragraph 49 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Turnbow and thus no response appears required. To the extent a response is
required, Turnbow lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
50.

The allegations contained in paragraph 50 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Turnbow and thus no response appears required. To the extent a response is
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required, Turnbow lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
51.

The allegations contained in paragraph 51 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Turnbow and thus no response appears required. To the extent a response is
required, lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
52.

The allegations contained in paragraph 52 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Turnbow and thus no response appears required. To the extent a response is
required, Turnbow lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
53.

The allegations contained in paragraph 53 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Turnbow and thus no response appears required. To the extent a response is
required, Turnbow lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
54.

In answer to paragraph 54 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow restates his

responses to paragraphs 1 through 53 as if fully set forth herein.
55.

In answer to paragraph 55 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 55 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for
or on behalf of the other parties.
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56.

In answer to paragraph 56 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 56 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for
or on behalf of the other parties.
57.

In Answer to paragraph 57 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 57 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for
or on behalf of the other parties.
58.

In answer to paragraph 58 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow admits that he,

through his then affiliation with Riley, was involved in the drafting and delivery of an Opinion
letter addressed to Plaintiff at the direction of AIA Services. Turnbow states that the Opinion
letter speaks for itself as to its contents and all assumptions, qualifications and other limitations
stated therein. In further response, Turnbow denies the remaining allegations contained therein.
To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 58 of Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at
parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
59.

The allegations contained in paragraph 59 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Turnbow and thus no response appears required. To the extent a response is
required, Turnbow lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
60.

In answer to paragraph 60 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations .contained in paragraph 60 of
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Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for
or on behalf of the other parties.
61.

In answer to paragraph 61 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 61 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for
or on behalf of the other parties.
62.

In answer to paragraph 62 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow restates his

responses to paragraphs 1 through 61 as if fully set forth herein.
63.

In answer to paragraph 63 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow admits that he,

through his then affiliation with Riley, was involved in the drafting and delivery of an Opinion
letter addressed to Plaintiff at the direction of AIA Services. Turnbow states that the Opinion
letter speaks for itself as to its contents and all assumptions, qualifications and other limitations
stated therein.

In further response, Turnbow denies the remaining allegations contained in

therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 63 of Plaintiffs Complaint are
directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for or on behalf of the other
parties.
64.

In answer to paragraph 64 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 64 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for
or on behalf of the other parties.
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65.

In answer to paragraph 65 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 65 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for
or on behalf of the other parties.
66.

In answer to paragraph 66 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Turnbow denies the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 66 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Turnbow, Turnbow makes no response for
or on behalf of the other parties.
67.

In response to Plaintiffs Prayer for Relief, Turnbow denies allegations 1 through

5.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendants are entitled to a litigation privilege which bars Plaintiffs claims in their
entirety.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
By his conduct and actions, Plaintiff has waived some or all of the claims and/or
allegations against Turnbow.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
By his conduct and actions, Plaintiff is estopped from asserting some or all of the claims
and/or allegations against Turnbow.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff has failed to mitigate his damages sought in his Complaint.
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FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiff has failed to state with particularity all averments of fraud or constructive fraud
as required by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Certain of Plaintiffs claims are barred by the statutes of limitation including Idaho Code
Sections 5-218(4), 5-219(4), and 48-619.
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims against Defendant are barred by the doctrine of laches.
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

That the negligence or fault of Reed J. Taylor was equal to or greater than the negligence
or fault of Turnbow, if any, and that said Plaintiff's negligence or fault was the sole, direct and
proximate cause of any damages and/or injuries claimed by Plaintiff.
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

If Plaintiff sustained or incurred any damages, the same were caused in whole or in part

by the acts or omissions of persons or entities other than Defendant Turnbow, over whom this
Defendant had no control or by the superseding intervention of causes outside of this
Defendant's control.
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

During all material times and specific to the transaction referenced m Plaintiff's
Complaint, Plaintiff was represented by counsel of his own choosing.
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ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims present no justiciable controversy.
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims are based under the doctrine of unclean hands.
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The opinion letter was restricted and limited pursuant to its own terms.
FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs cause of action is not ripe for controversy given the fact that there is pending a
case before the Idaho Supreme Court that is directly related.
FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims against the Defendant are barred based on lack of privity.
SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

There was no casual connection between the opinion letter and Plaintiffs claimed
damages.
RESERVATION OF RIGHTS

Discovery has not yet commenced, the result of which may reveal additional answers
and/or defenses to this Defendant.

Defendant reserves the right to amend this Answer if

appropriate.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES

As a result of the filing of the Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant has been required to
retain legal counsel to defend the said action and is entitled to recover his attorney fees, pursuant
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to the provisions contained in Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-121 and Rules 11 and 54 of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Defendant demands a jury trial on all issues pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure.
WHEREFORE, having fully and completely answered the Plaintiffs Complaint herein,
this answering Defendant prays as follows:
1.

That Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed in its entirety, and that Plaintiff takes

nothing thereby;
2.

That Defendant recover reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred herein; and

3.

That this Court grant such other and further relief as it deems just and proper.

DATED this

2Z. ~day of December, 2009.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

'22

~

day of December, 2009, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Roderick C. Bond
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, VIA 99201
James D. LaRue
ELAM BURKE
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P .0. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701-1539

.-t1
D
D
D

-s
D
D
D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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James D. LaRue, ISB #1780
Loren C. Ipsen, ISB #1767
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
File No. 7082-0013

aAN 15 20lfl
·

J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By KATHY J. BIEHL
, DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendants, Richard A. Riley
and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No. CV-OC-0918868

Plaintiff,
v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; ROBERT M.
TURNBOW, an individual; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW & .
McKLVEEN,CHARTERED,anidaho
corporation;

AFFIDAVIT OF GARY D. BABBITT IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) SS.

County of Ada

)

GARY D. BABBITT, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says:
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1.

I am of counsel with the firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawley

Troxell"), a defendant in the above entitled action.
2.

I am over 18 years of age, competent to testify regarding the matters set forth in

this affidavit, and am one the attorneys who represented AIA Services Corporation ("AIA") and
AIA Insurance, Inc., in regard to the case of Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al., Case No.
CV 07-00208, in the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State ofldaho, Nez
Perce County (the "AIA litigation"). As such, I am familiar with the files and records in the AIA
litigation and make this affidavit based upon my personal knowledge.
3.

Reed J. Taylor filed suit on January 29, 2007, against AIA, its wholly-owned

subsidiary, AIA Insurance, Inc. ("AIA Insurance"), and several individuals, including R. John
Taylor, the brother of Reed J. Taylor. Michael E. McNichols of Clements, Brown & McNichols
initially appeared in behalf of AIA, AIA Insurance and R. John Taylor. After obtaining a
restraining order to enjoin Reed J. Taylor from interference with the operations of AIA and AIA
Insurance 1, Mr. McNichols withdrew from representation of AIA and AIA Insurance, and
Hawley Troxell substituted in as defense counsel in the AIA litigation for those two companies.
Mr. McNichols continued as defense counsel for R. John Taylor in the AIA litigation. 2

1

See Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
and Motion for Restraining Order in the AIA litigation, the pertinent portion of which is attached hereto as Exhibit
A.
2

The history of the disputes leading up to the AIA litigation and continuing during the course of that
litigation, as told from the parties' perspectives, are summarized in PlaintiffReed Taylor's Amended Motion to
Disqualify the Attorneys and Law Firms ofHawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP; Clements Brown & McNichols,
P.A.; and Quarles and Brady, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B, and AJA 's Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion to Disqualify Counsel, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C.
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4.

I have acted as lead defense counsel for AIA and AIA Services in the AIA

litigation and have communicated from time to time with other Hawley Troxell attorneys,
including Richard A. Riley, relative to that litigation.
5.

Mr. Taylor3 made various claims of damages in the AIA litigation arising out of or

connected with the redemption of his stock in AIA 4 and amended his pleadings a number of
times. In his Fifth Amended Complaint, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit E, he
alleged, among other things, that AIA failed to pay the balance of a promissory note in the
principal amount of six million dollars (the "$6MM Note") which matured on August l,
2005.

(if 2.26, F(fth Amended Complaint, if 2.26, AIA litigation). He further alleged that: (1)

AIA was in default for failing to appoint him to its board of directors or file a bond(~ 2.18); (2)
AIA loaned money to affiliates in violation of a Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement

(~

2.19); (3) AIA became insolvent (if 2.21); and (4) AIA failed to make payments on the $6MM
Note at certain times (if 2.24).
6.

Jonathan D. Hally of the law firm of Clark and Feeney initially appeared as

counsel for defendants Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck in the AJA litigation, and

3

To avoid confusion, all references to "Mr. Taylor" in this Affidavit are to Reed J. Taylor unless the
context clearly indicates otherwise.
4

He claimed he began incurring damages immediately upon execution and delivery of the 1995 Stock
Redemption Agreement because he gave up his right to control the business and successor management allegedly
harmed the business. See Affidavit ofReed J. Taylor in Opposition to Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motion.for
Summary Judgment, a copy of the pertinent portion of which is attached hereto as Exhibit D, where he asserted,
"Almost 14 years have gone by since I sold my shares in AIA Services in 1995. John Taylor, James Beck and
Michael Cashman have controlled AIA Services and its subsidiaries since my shares were redeemed in 1995 and
there is nothing that could be done to replace the lost time. I have been deprived of my right to request to have my
shares returned because over 13 years has transpired and AIA Services business has been depleted under the
management of John Taylor."

AFFIDAVIT OF GARY D. BABBITT - 3
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on April 16, 2008, filed an Answer of Defendants Connie Taylor, James Beck. and Corrine
Beck's to

Plaint~ff's

Fifth Amended Complaint, Demand.for Jury Trial and Counterclaim, a copy

of which is attached hereto as Exhibit F. That pleading raised as the Fifteenth Affirmative
Defense and Sixteenth Affirmative Defense the contention that the redemption of Mr. Taylor's
stock in AIA was illegal and unenforceable. The pertinent portions of the Answer ofDefendants
Connie Taylor, James Beck, and Corrine Beck's to

Plaint~ff's F~fih

Amended Complaint,

Demand.for Jury Trial and Counterclaim assert as follows:
Fifteenth Affirmative Defense
Plainti ff s claims against these Defendants are barred because the 199 5
Stock Redemption Agreement, the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure
Agreement and the other related agreements arc void as in violation of former
Idaho Code§ 30-1-46 (superseded in 1997 by Idaho Code§ 30-1-640). Idaho
Code § 3 0-1-46 provided that a corporation could redeem its shares (or make
other distributions) only out of the corporation's capital surplus. The statute
further prohibited shareholder distributions "when the corporation is insolvent or
when such distribution would render the corporation insolvent."
Sixteenth Affirmative Defense
At the time the parties entered into the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement,
AIA Services did not have any capital surplus with which to redeem Plaintiffs
common stock, AIA had an accumulated deficit, and/or said transaction rendered
AIA Services insolvent. The 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, the 1996 Stock
Redemption Restructure Agreement and the related agreements are, therefore, illegal
and void. Therefore, this Court should decline to enforce the illegal and void
agreements, including the $6 Million Note. In the alternative, the agreements should
be rescinded.
7.

Thus, the illegality defense was raised in the AIA litigation not later than April 16,

2008. On April 16, 2008, defendants Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck, through their
attorneys, Clark and Feeney, also filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (a copy of which
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is attached hereto as Exhibit G) in the AIA litigation on the ground that the redemption of Mr.
Taylor's stock in AIA violated Idaho law and was illegal and unenforceable, supported by a

Memorandum in Support of Motion.for Partial Summary Judgment (a copy of which is attached
hereto as Exhibit H).
8.

On April 21, 2008, AIA served a Motion to Amend Amended Answer, Affirmative

Defenses and Counterclaim to Fifth Amended Complaint, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit I, in the AIA Litigation. In that motion, AIA also sought to add the defense that the
redemption of Mr. Taylor's stock was illegal and void. Specifically, AIA moved to add a nineteenth
affirmative defense which alleged as follows:
NINETEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims against these Defendants are barred because the 1995 Stock
Redemption Agreement, the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement and the
other related agreements are void as in violation of former Idaho Code § 30-1-46
(superseded in 1997 by Idaho Code§ 30-1-640). Idaho Code§ 30-1-46 provided that
a corporation could redeem its shares (or make other distributions) only out of the
corporation's capital surplus. The statute further prohibited shareholder distributions
"when the corporation is insolvent or when such distribution would render the
corporation insolvent."
At the time the parties entered into the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, AIA
Services did not have any capital surplus with which to redeem Plaintiffs common
stock, AIA had an accumulated deficit, and/or said transaction rendered AIA Services
insolvent. The 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, the 1996 Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement and the related agreements are, therefore, illegal and void.
The Court should decline to enforce the illegal and void agreements, including the
$6 Million Note. In the alternative, the agreements should be rescinded.
9.

Partial Summary Judgment was ultimately granted in the AIA litigation on the basis

of the illegality defense, dismissing Mr. Taylor's complaint as amended. A copy of the Opinion and
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Order on Plaint(ff's Motion for Rule 56(/) Continuance, Plaintiff's and Defendants' Motions to
Strike Expert Affidavits; Defendants' Motion for Partial Summmy Judgment; Intervenor's Motion
for Reconsideration in the AIA litigation is attached hereto as Exhibit J.

10.

Counsel for Mr. Taylor moved for reconsideration, and the District Court for Nez

Perce County entered its Opinion and Order on Plaint(ff's Motion for Reconsideration and
Clar(fication of Court's Grant of Partial Summary Judgment;

Clar~fication

of Ruling on Motions

to Strike; Alternative Motion for Rule 54(b) Cert(fication; Motion.for Order to Protect Property and
for Stay on August 13, 2009, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit K.

11.

Mr. Taylor appealed the dismissal of his complaint, as amended, to the Idaho

Supreme Court, where it is pending as Docket No. 36916-2009, Idaho Supreme Court.
12.

During the course of the AJA litigation, Reed Taylor, through his counsel, made

various accusations and imputations of impropriety concerning opposing counsel. For example, by
email dated August 5, 2008, from Mr. Taylor's counsel to me and other defense counsel, a copy of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit L allegations of wrongdoing and threats of a lawsuit were made.
Mr. Taylor's attorney wrote, "Explain to Mr. Clark how Richard Riley issued an opinion letter to
Reed and you are now trying to disingenuously argue the $8.6 Million is not owed to him." Mr.
Taylor's attorney continued, "Explain to Mr. Clark that even if the illegality argument had merit,
Donna Taylor and Reed Taylor would be suing Hawley Troxell (and Richard Riley) in such an
instance regardless of any circumstances."
13.

By letter dated July 21, 2008, from counsel for Reed Taylor to the Board of Directors

of AIA, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit M, Mr. Taylor made allegations that Hawley
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Troxell and the firm of Clements, Brown and McNichols had committed a number of wrongful acts,
including malpractice, breach of fiduciary duties, and assisting in the commission of fraud. Among
the "claims and/or causes of action" asserted by counsel for Mr. Taylor in the letter dated July 21,
2008, was item 26:
Representing AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance in making inappropriate arguments
(including alleged illegality of the debt to Reed) knowing that such arguments were
counter to AIA Services' obligations to Reed and Donna and knowing that Richard
Riley was a witness who provided a legal opinion counter to such arguments; ...
14.

Mr. Taylor filed a Complaint.for Damages in the District Court of the Second Judicial

District of the State of Idaho, Nez Perce County, against Hawley Troxell and a number of attorneys
employed by that firm, including myself, on August 18, 2008 (the "Hawley Troxell Litigation No.
1"). Attached hereto as Exhibit N is a copy of that Complaint.for Damages.
15.

Mr. Taylor also filed lawsuit against Mr. McNichols and Clements, Brown and

McNichols (the "McNichols Litigation"). A copy of the Complaint for Damages against Mr.
McNichols, et al., is attached hereto as Exhibit 0.
16.

In the Hawley Troxell Litigation No. 1, Mr. Taylor moved on October 15, 2008, to

amend his complaint.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Pis a copy of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Motion

and Memorandum ofLaw to Amend Complaint in that litigation, with a copy of the proposed First
Amended Complaint for Damages attached thereto. Notably, the First Amended Complaint for
Damages sought to allege a cause of action against Hawley Troxell and Richard A. Riley for fraud.
Paragraph 92 of the proposed First Amended Complaint.for Damages alleged:
As a former attorney for Reed Taylor and the attorney who provided an
opinion letter to Reed Taylor, defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by
and through an opinion letter that was based on Riley's personal knowledge
AFFIDAVIT OF GARY D. BABBITT - 7
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(representing such facts as the transaction being fully legal and authorized by the
corporations), which further invokes personal liability to Riley. Reed Taylor had a
right to rely on Riley's representations and justifiably relied on such representations.
Riley breached his duties when he asserted that the transaction was illegal. Although
Reed Taylor believes the transaction was legal and supported by applicable law,
Riley's actions have breached his duties to Reed Taylor and caused Reed Taylor to
incur damages from the payment of attorneys' fees and costs and lost possession of
property and funds because of AIA Insurance being wrongfully withheld from Reed
Taylor. As a result of Riley's acts and/or omissions (which constitute fraud), Reed
Taylor has been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.
17.

The defendants in both the Hawley Troxell Litigation No. 1 and the McNichols

Litigation brought motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. After hearing on the motions, the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Nez
Perce County, entered judgment dismissing the complaints with prejudice and denying Mr. Taylor's
motions to amend. Attached hereto as Exhibit Q is a copy of the Opinion and Order on Defendants'

Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint in Hawley Troxell Litigation No. 1.
Attached hereto as Exhibit R a copy of the Opinion and Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

and Plaint~ff's Motion to Amend Complaint in the McNichols Litigation.
18.

Not only did the District Court forNezPerceCountydismiss Mr. Taylor's complaints

against Hawley Troxell et al. and Mr. Nichols et al., with prejudice the Court awarded attorney's
fees to the defendants. In the Hawley Troxell Litigation No. 1, the Court found as follows:
"The Court finds the claims alleged by the Plaintiff in his Complaint and his
proposed Amended Complaint were frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation
in law or fact. Therefore, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 and Rule 54(e)(l) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure the Court finds Defendants are entitled to a
reasonable award of attorney fees and cost. In addition, the Court finds a reasonable
award of attorney fees is also warranted under Idaho Code§ 30-1-746(2) and (3) and
Idaho Code§ 48-608(5) for the cost of defending against the two claims in Plaintiff's
proposed Amended Complaint.''
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Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Award ofAttorney's Fees and Costs, Case No. CV
08-1765 in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County, p. 10, a copy of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit S.
19.

In the McNichols Litigation, the Court found:

"Finally, the Court reached the determination that each of Plaintiff's claims
were brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation only
after finding each asserted claim was fatally flawed legally and factually."

Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motionfor Award ofAttorney Fees and Costs, Case No. CV 081763 in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County, p. 5, a copy of which
is attached hereto as Exhibit T.
20.

The Court reiterated in the Hawley Troxell No. 1 Litigation that, " ... each of

Plaintiffs claims were brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation ...
[and] each asserted claim was fatally flawed legally and factually." Opinion and Order on

Defendants' Motionfor Reconsideration and Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, Case No. CV
08-1765 in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County, p. 5, a copy of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit U.
21.

In the final Judgment entered in the Hawley Troxell No. 1 Litigation, attorney's fees

were assessed against Mr. Taylor pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-121, 30-1-746(2) and (3), and 48608(5). Judgment, Case No. CV 08-01765 in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Nez
Perce County, p. 2, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit V.
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22.

Mr. Taylor filed an appeal of the Judgment against him in Hawley Troxell Litigation

No. 1. See Amended Notice ofAppeal, Case No. CV 08-01765 in the District Court of the Second
Judicial District, Nez Perce County, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit W. That appeal is
pending.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /~ day of January, 2010, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner indicated
below:
Roderick C. Bond
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, Washington 99201
Jack S. Gj ording
Gjording & Fouser, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

......- U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(509) 455-7111
,r

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-9177

J~LaRue
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•
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,
v.

•

)
)
)
)
)
)

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho )
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC.; an
)
)
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN" TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
)
community property comprised thereof,
)
BRJAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
)
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single perso:_,
)
)
Defendants.
)

CASE NO. CV07-00208
OPINION AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION.FOR
RECONSIDERATION, MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION,
AND MOTION FOR
RESTRAINING ORDER

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.)

This matter is before the Court on the following Motions filed by the Plaintiff: ( 1) Motion
for Reconsideration; (2) Motion for Preliminary Injunction; and, (3) Motion for Restraining
Order. Hearings on the motions were held March 29, 2007. Defendants AIA Services
Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and R. John Taylor were represented by attorney Michael E.
McNichols. Plaintiff Reed Taylor was represented by attorneys Paul R. Cressman, Jr. and
Roderick C. Bond. The Court, having read the motions, briefs, and affidavits submitted by the
Taylor v. AIA Services, et al.
Opinion & Order on 7t's Motions for Reconsideration,
Preliminary Injunction & Restraining Order

EXHIBIT A
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•

paiiies, having heard oral arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the matter, hereby
renders its decision.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
AIA Insurance Inc. is a business under the umbrella of AIA Services Corporation.
Plaintiff Reed Taylor founded the business. Eventually the Plaintiff's brother, Defendant R.
John Taylor, joined the business and together, the brothers developed the parent company into a
holding for numerous diversified insurance businesses. In 1995, Plaintiff Reed Taylor decided to
retire. In order to effectuate his retirement, Reed Taylor and AIA Services, along with counsel
for the respective parties, entered into a stock redemption agreement. The agreement included a
promissory note payable to Reed Taylor in the amount of $6,000,000.00 plus interest, which was
executed on August 1, 1995. 1 In 1996, the agreement was amended and the parties executed an
Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement and an Amended and Restated Security

•

Agreement.

2

Some ten years later, in a letter dated December 12, 2006, Plaintiff Reed Taylor's
attorney notified Defendant John Taylor and AIA Services Corporation that AIA Services was in
default under several sections of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, including but not
limited to failure to pay the $6 million promissory note. 3 The letter further notified the
Defendants that Plaintiff intended to exercise his right to vote the redeemed shares pursuant to a
reversion of voting rights upon default as provided for in the Pledge Agreement. Included in the
letter was Plaintiffs demand for a special meeting of the shareholders for the purpose of electing
a new board of directors, with the special meeting to occur on December 26, 2006. Plaintiff's
demand for a December 26, 2006 special shareholder's meeting was rejected.
1

Plaintifrs Exhibit "A".
Plaintiff's Exhibit "C" and Exhibit "E".
3
Plaintiff's Exhibit "F".
2

Taylor v. AIA Services, et al.
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On January 29, 2007, Plaintiff Reed Taylor filed the above-entitled action seeking
•

recovery of amounts owed under the Promissory Note4, but making no claim seeking
enforcement of other terms of the parties' written agreements. On an unknown date, Plaintiff
made a second demand for a special shareholder's meeting to occur on February 5, 2007.
Plaintiffs second demand for a special shareholder's meeting was denied by the Board's
secretary, JoLee Duclos, in a letter dated February 1, 2007. 5 On February 5, 2007, Plaintiff filed
an Amended Complaint adding as Defendants Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos and asserting
several additional claims. 6
On February 22, 2007, Plaintiff Reed Taylor executed a Consent in Lieu of Special
Meeting of Shareholders of AIA Insurance, Inc., in which Plaintiff removed the current AIA
board members and elected himself, Reed Taylor, the sole board member. 7 At 3 :00 a.m. on

•

Sunday, February 25, 2007, Plaintiff Reed Taylor went to the business offices of AIA Services
Corporation along with a locksmith and security personnel hired by the Plaintiff, and changed
the locks on certain doors within the building housing AIA Insurance. 8 However, the activity
caused an alarm system to go off and police arrived on scene. The police determined the matter
was civil in nature, the old locks were put back in place and both parties had a representative
remain at the premises.
On Monday morning, February 26, 2007, Defendants John Taylor and AIA Services
Corporation filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. Later the same day, Plaintiff filed
an Emergency Motion (1) to Enforce Shareholder Vote and Board of Directors Resolution, (2) to

4

Plaintiffs Complaint asserted claims for breach of contract and constructive trust.
Plaintiffs Exhibit "H".
6
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint added claims for fraudulent transfer, fraudulent misrepresentation, conversion, alto
ego, equitable indemnification, account stated/monies due, unjust enrichment and director liability .
7
Plaintiffs Exhibit "K".
8
The building houses other business as well that lease space from AIA Services Corporation.
5

••

Taylor v. AL4 Services, et al.
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•

Confirm Tennination of Counsel for AIA Insurance Inc. along with affidavits and a Motion for
Order to Shorten Time. The Court took up the motions of the parties on the afternoon of
February 26, 2007 and entered a Temporary Restraining Order against the Plaintiff and granted
Plaintiffs Motion to Shorten Time. The Court then set a hearing on March 1, 2007 for
Defendant's motion for preliminary injunction and the Plaintiff's pending motion.
At the March 1, 2007 hearing, the Court informed the parties that, after reviewing the
flurry of pleadings and other documents filed over the three days, including several binders
worth of exhibits, the Court had determined it would not hear the Plaintiff's lengthy and complex
motion upon the grounds stated in open Court. The Court then proceeded on the preliminary
injunction hearing only.
On March 8, 2007, the Court entered its Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for

•

Preliminary Injunction. The Court granted the Defendants' Motion for preliminary injunction
after finding the risk of irreparable harm to all of the parties, including the Plaintiff, of sufficient
significance to merit granting the motion until the complex legal issues asserted by the Plaintiff
could be determined on the merits.
On March 6, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. On March 12,
2007, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Opinion and Order entering a
preliminary injunction against the Plaintiff. On March 22, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Second
Amended Complaint asserting a claim for enforcement of rights. 9 On March 28, 2007, Plaintiff
filed a Motion for Restraining Order.

9

Plaintifrs Second Amended Complaint incorrectly lists two of his claims as his "seventh;' claim, causing his total
number of claims to be incorrectly reflected as ten claims rather than eleven. Plaintifrs most recent claim is based
on his assertion that he became the sole stockholder upon nonpayment of the promissory note and, therefore, he
seeks enforcement of his asserted rights as sole shareholder.
Taylor v. AJA Services, et al.

Opinion & Order on n's Motions for Reconsideration,
Preliminary Injunction & Restraining Order

4
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RODERICK C. BOND (Pro Hae Vice)
NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331
SMlTH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
508 Eighth Street
Le.,,,'iston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
MICHAELS. BISSELL, !SB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, WA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-07-00208

V.

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an Idaho
corporation; R. JOlIN TAYLOR and CONNIE
TAYLOR, individually and the community
property c-0mprised thereof; BRYAN
FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE DUCI ,OS,
a single person; CROPUSA1NSl1R.ANOL.
AGENCY, INC., an Idaho Corporation; and
JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK,
individually and the community property
comprised thereof;

PLAINTIFF REED TAYLOR'S
A.\1ENDED MOTION TO
DISQUALIFY THE ATTORNEYS
AND LAW FIRMS OF HAWLEY
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP;
CLEMENTS, BROWN &
MCNICHOLS, P.A.; AND QUARLES
&BRA[)Yl.l.P

Defendants.

~

~

t:=

000129

l'.!'j

PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION TO DISQUALIFY - J

I. INTRODUCTION
This Motion to Disqualify involves monwnental irreconcilable and nonconsentable
conflicts of interest which should be eliminated by disqualifying the responsible Attorneys
before further proceedings in this action. Moreover, disqualification is warranted and necessary
to ensure fairness to Reed Taylor in prosecuting his claims, uphold the integrity of the legal
system, prevent the appearance of impropriety, and prevent appeals by Reed Taylor or any of the
defendants based upon the unwaivable conflicts of interest Consequently, the Court should
resolve the conflicts now by disqualifying the Attorneys and order the affected defendants to
retain new, separate and independent counsel in this action.

II. RELIEF REQUESTED
Plaintiff Recd J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") moves the Court to disqualify the attorneys and
law firms of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawley Troxell"), Clements, Brown &
McNichols, P.A. ("Clements, Brown & McNichols"), and Quarles & Brady LLP ("Quarles &

Brady"). All of the foregoing attorneys and firms are referred to collectively as "Attorneys".
III. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON
Reed Taylor's Motion to Disqualify is based upon the Court's File; Reed Taylor's
Motion to Disqualify; the Affidavit of Peter Jarvis ("Jarvis Aff."), the Affidavit ofW.H. Knight

("Knight Aff."), Jr.; the Affidavit of Steve Calandrillo ("C11l11ndrillo Aff."); the Ailidavit of
Recd J. Taylor; the Affidavit of Donna J. Taylor; the Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond ("Bond

Aff."); the Supplemental Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond ("Supp. Bond Aff."); the Affidavit of
Paul Pederson ("Pederson Aff."); the Second Supplemental Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond ("2"d

Supp. Bond Aff."); and the Exhibits to the Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction held
on March l, 2007 ("Hearing").
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IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On July 22, 1995, Reed Taylor agreed to sell his shares back to AIA Services for
consideration that included a $6,000,000 promissory note ("$6M Note"). See Bond Aff., Ex. 1;
Bond AIT., p. 3

iMI 6-7;

Af1idavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. A; Hearing Ex. A, Z,

AA & AB. John Taylor personally urged the shareholders of AIA Services to approve the
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. C. In
connection with the redemption of Recd Taylor's shares, John Taylor became CEO and entered
into an Executive Officer's Agreement, which contained non-compete and non-solicitation
provisions (i.e., it was a breach of John Taylor's employment agreement to form and operate
CropUSA as a separate entity and to transfer AIA Insurance's long-term employees to CropUSA,
among other breaches). See Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 45.
The law firm of Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen provided Reed Taylor an
opinion letter regarding various opinions and warranties pertaining to AIA Services' redemption
of Reed Taylor's shares, including that the transaction was legal, had received the required
approvals from shareholders and was binding on AIA Services. See Bond Aff., Ex. 2, p. 2,, 3;
p. 3,

~

3. The opinion letter expressly stated that it was based in part on the knowledge of

Richard A. Riley, who is now an attorney with Hawley Troxell. See Bond Aff., Ex. 2, p. 2, 12.
In 1996, AJA Services defaulted on its obligations to Reed Taylor and, consequently, the
agreements were restructured. See Bond Aff., Ex. 3-5. However, Reed Taylor still maintained a
security interest in all of the commissions and related receivables of AIA Services and AIA
Insurance, the stock of AIA Insurance remained pledged to him, and he maintained the same
irrevocable power-of-attorney to vote the shares coupled with an interest. See Bond Aff., Ex. 45. In addition, Reed Taylor had a security interest in all of the shares of The Universe and the
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other subsidiaries of AIA Services and all cash and non-cash distributions related in any way to
those shares, i.e., the $1.2 Million Mortgage AIA Services obtained from the estate of The
Universe that was later pledged to CropUSA. See Bond Aff., Ex. 4, pp. 1-2; Bond Aff., Ex. 32.
During all relevant time periods, Reed Taylor has maintained a perfected security interest
in the commissions and related receivables of AIA Services and AIA Insurance. See Affidavit of

Roderick C. Bond in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order dated
March 28, 2007, Ex. 2. As indicated by the testimony of John Taylor, Hawley Troxell, with full
knowledge of AIA Services' obligations to Reed Taylor (i.e., Richard Riley represented AIA in
drafting the redemption agreements and \Vas required to received notices of default), represented
CropUSA and assisted in various transactions. See 2•d Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 32 and 46.

Fraudulent Transfer Of Sl.5 Million To CropusA Apd "Fixing" The Books
In August 2004, AIA Insurance allegedly "repurchased" Preferred C Shares in AJA
Services (its parent corporation) from CropUSA for $1,510,693.

See Bond Aff., Ex. 36.

CropUSA recognized a gain of $1,489,000 on the alleged sale (even the auditors called the
transaction "additional paid in capital"), which indicates that CropUSA was carrying the shares
on its firumcial statement at a value of $21,693 (likely the true value of the shares-essentially
worthless). See Bond Aff., Ex. 36; 2•d Supp. Bond Aff:, Ex. 54, p. 2.
According to the testimony of JoLee Duclos (an officer and board member of both AIA
Services and CropUSA at the time of the transaction (See 2nd Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 47-48)), Ms.
Duclos allegedly relied only upon the audited financial statements of AIA Insurance as a basis to
approve the alleged $1.5 Million stock "repurchase," yet the purported audited financial
statement that she allegedly relied upon was not issued until over 6 months after the time of the
alleged "repurchase" in August 2004 (thereby making it impossible for her to rely on the
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auditor's report as she had alleged earlier in her deposition). See Supp. Bond AfT., Ex. 44, p.

122-126; see also Affidavit of Donna Taylor, p. 2,

~

2. Even CropUSA's purported board

meeting minutes that were drafted months after the alleged transaction admit ''the marketability
of the shares to a third party would be problematic." See 2nd Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 55; Supp.
Bond Aff, Ex. 44.
The notes of AIA's former CFO, Marcus McNabb, specifically detail "fixing" AIA's
books and his notes reference certain meetings with John Taylor or JoLee Duclos being present
discussing "fixing" the books, hardly the type of notes a person would take with no concern
about the appropriateness of a transaction. See 2nd Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 56. In addition, on
October 9, 2004, John Taylor sent an email to Marcus McNabb stating that the "Services
preferred [CJ stock is to be cancelled" thereby confirming the true intent of the alleged stock
"repurchase." See 2nd Supp. Bond AfI, Ex. 56; Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 36. At his deposition, John
Taylor even admitted that had Reed Taylor placed AIA Services in default in 2004, the Preferred

C Shares allegedly repurchased for $1.5 Million would have been worthless. See 2"d Supp. Bond
Aff., Ex. 46, pp. 520-521.
The alleged $1.5 Million stock "repurchase" occurred at a time which AIA Services was
not current with payments to Reed Taylor and was.inappropriately funded with money in which
Reed Taylor held a valid and perfected security interest. See Hearing, Ex. AJ; Affidavit of
Roderick C. Bond in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order dated
March 28, 2007, Ex. 2.

R«-1l's S6M Note Matures; Haw!eyTroxeU Agd Quarles & Brady Issue Unlawful Opinions
Reed Taylor's $6M Note matured on August 1, 2005, and was not timely paid. See Bond
Aff., Ex. l, 6 and 13; Hearing Ex. AJ. On October 27, 2006, Hawley Troxell and Quarles &
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Brady issued opinion letters to Lancelot Investors Fund, L.P. representing that AIA Insurance
had the authority to guarantee CropUSA's $15 Million line-of-credit. See Bond Aff, Ex. 18 and
35. The $15 Million loan was signed by John Taylor on behalf of CropUSA and JoLee Duclos
on behalf of AIA Insurance, as guarantor. See Hearing, Ex. R. However, AIA Insurance's
guarantee of the $15 Million loan was expressly prohibited by the Articles of Amendment to the
Anicles of Incorporation of AIA Services. See Bond Aff., Ex. 19. AJA Insurance's guarantee of
the $15 Million loan was also in violation of the Bylaws of AIA Services and AIA Insurance
because, among other things, the directors were all interested parties through their ownership of
shares in CropUSA. See Bond Aff., Ex. 9 and 20-22.
Reed

Pro~ides

A Notice Of Default And Settlement Discussions Take Place

On December 12, 2006, Reed Taylor provided AlA Services with a notice of default of
its obligations to timely pay the $6M Note, among other obligations such as the requirement to
maintain Reed Taylor as a member of the board of AIA Services (the notice was also provided to
Richard Riley as required by the notice provision in the agreements). See Bond Aff., Ex. 4, p.
12; Bond Aff., Ex. 6. On December 21, 2006, John Taylor admitted that "Reed Taylor has a
security interest in AIA Insurance, Inc. and may have the right to take the actions outiined ... "

See Hearing, Ex. AE. On January 3, 2007, John Taylor admitted that if settlement negotiations
failed that he "fully recognize[d] that [Reed] Taylor may take actions he deems appropriate,
including calling a special shareholder meeting." See Hearing, Ex. AF.
No~~thstanding

AJA Services' defaults and subsequent failure to cure, in Janwuy 2007,

R~ed Taylor and John Taylor (on behalf of all three corporations) entered into settlement

negotiations with the corporations and AIA and John Taylor were all represented by James
Gatziolis and Quarles & Brady. See Bond Aff., Ex. 17. When settlement negotiations failed,
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Reed Taylor filed suit against John Taylor, AIA Services and AIA Insurance on January 29,
2007. See Bond Aff., p. 6,, 15.
On February 1, 2007, AJA Services sent a letter to Reed Taylor (which was drafted by
Quarles & Brady and signed by JoLcc Duclos) advising him that AIA Services would not honor
its contractual obligations. See Bond Aff., Ex. 22, p. 6; Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 44, pp. 203-04. On
February 2, 2007, Recd Taylor provided the board of AIA Insurance written demand to recover
all services and expenses from CropUSA. See Bond Aff., Ex. 11.
On February 5, 2007, Reed Taylor filed his First Amended Complaint, which named

additional defendants and asserted claims against John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Bryan Freeman,
and JoLee Duclos for fraud, fraudulent conveyance, breaches of fiduciary duties, conversion,
director liability, and alter-ego, among other claims. See Bond Aff., Ex. 8.
Reed Votes The Shares Of AIA Insurance Pursuant To His Rights And I.C. § 30-1-722
Because all of AIA Insurance's shares were pledged to Reed Taylor as collater<li, a
shareholder meeting was not necessary for him to vote the shares since he was granted an
irrevocable power of attorney coupled with an interest to vote the shares as required by LC. § 301-722. See Bond Aft:, Ex. 4, p. 7, § 6, Ex. 4, p. JI, § l 1.2(a). In addition, AIA Services' failure
to timely cure the defaults after receiving Reed Taylor's notice of default on December 12, 2006,
resulted in AIA Services' right to vote the shares of AIA Insurance "cease[d] and terminate[d]"
aud the right

to

vote the shares were vested "solely and exclusively in [Reed Taylor]." Bond

Aff., Ex. 4, p. 7, § 6 (the failure to pay within 10 days of the December 12, 2006, notice of
default constitutes a default under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement (Id. at p. 8, § 7(a))).
On February 22, 2007, Reed Taylor exercised his contractual rights (which included an
irrevocable power of attorney coupled with an interest) and voted the shares of AIA Insurance
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thereby removing John Taylor, JoLee Duclos, and Bryan Freeman as directors and appointing
himself as the sole director of AIA Insurance. See Bond Aff., Ex. 4 and 7. After appointing
himself as the sole director of AIA Insurance, Reed Taylor removed all of the officers of AIA
Insurance (including John Taylor) and elected himself as the sole officer of AJA Insurance on
February 22, 2007. See Bond Aff., Ex. 7.

Reed Moves Io Disqualify Mike McNicholsAnd Clen!ents. Bwyn & ..McNichols
On February 25, 2007, Reed Taylor advised Clements, Brown & McNichols of his vote
of the shares of AIA Insurance and that 1'.1r. McNichols was not authorized to represent AIA
lnsurance. See Bond Aff., Ex. 23. On February 26, 2007, Reed Taylor filed and served his
Emergency Motion, wherein he also moved for the disqualification of Michael McNichols and
Clements, Brown & McNichols. See Bond Aff., Ex. 24. On February 28, 2007, Reed Taylor
filed and served additional case law and arguments to support his request for the disqualification
of Mr. McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNichols. See Bond Aff., Ex. 25.
At the hearing in which Reed Taylor had requested the disqualification of Clements,
Brown & McNichols, the Court concluded that conflicts of interest were issues for the Idaho
State Bar to resolve. See Bond Aff., p. 26, 1 66; Court File. Consequently, Reed Taylor did not
move for the disqualification of any other Attorneys until now. See Bond Aff., p. 26, ml 66-67.

John Taylor Send§ A I,etter Io Sharehol5'ers Ming AJW!'l!Ylll OfThe Payment Of Fees
On March 16, 2007, John Taylor sent a letter to the shareholders of AIA Services in an
apparent attempt to obtain shareholder approval for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs for
the individual defendants. See Bond Aff., Ex. 12. John Taylor did not disclose the facts and
claims alleged in Reed Taylor's First Amended Complaint (i.e., make full disclosure), did not
attach a copy of Reed Taylor's most recent Complaint, did not seek approval of any joint retainer
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or joint defense agreements, and did not obtain votes only from disinterested shareholders
(assuming full disclosure was made). See Bond AfI, Ex. 12.
No other correspondence has been sent to AIA Services' shareholders since the letter
purportedly seeking the authorization to pay attorney fees dated March 16, 2007. See Bond Aff.,
Ex. 12; Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 44, pp. 28-29. In addition, the defendants did not obtain consent
from Reed Taylor (a secured party and only person with authority to act on behalf of AIA
Insurance) or Donna Taylor (the person holding the shares with the highest priority, even over
John Taylor). See Affidavit of Reed Taylor; Affidavit of Donna Taylor; Bond Atl, Ex. 3-5.

Ree!I Obtains Partial Summary Judgment On AIA §eryim' Defaults: Confirms His Vote
On November 15, 2007, Recd Taylor moved for partial summary judgment on AIA
Services' default of the $6M Note and Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. See Bond Aff., Ex.
13.

On February 8, 2008, the Court granted Reed Taylor's Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment. See Bond Aff., Ex. 14. AIA Services' Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for
Permissive Appeal were both denied by the Court and Idaho Supreme Court, respectively. See
Bond Aff., p. 8,

~

20; Court File. The finding of the defaults confirmed that Reed Taylor's

February 22, 2007, vote of the shares of AIA ·Insurance was appropriate and warranted. See
Bond Aff., Ex. 4 and 7.

Conflicts Of Interest. Inappropriate Hoard Meetlys, And Warnings To Attorneys
In March 2008, the purported boards of AJA Services and AIA Insurance held a joint
board meeting wherein lawyers from all of the Attorneys' firms were present. See Supp. Bond
Aff., Ex. 44, pp. 40-46. One of the purposes of the purported meeting was to direct Jonathan
Hally and Clark and Feeney to file a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Reed Taylor.

See Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 44, pp. 40-46. No resolution has been drafted for this meeting. See
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Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 44, p. 43, 11. 1-10. The purported board unanimously voted to have
Jonathan Hally and Clark and Feeney file a motion for partial summary judgment against Reed
Taylor on the alleged illegality of the redemption. See Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 44, p. 44, 11. 1-20.
Jonathan Hally filed Connie Taylor and James Beck's purported Motion for Partial
•...J

Summary Judgment against Reed Taylor on April 16, 2008. See Bond Aff., p. 17,, 48. The
Motion was not supported by applicable case law and was not applicable to the facts in this case,
and even if filed in good faith, implicates Richard Riley and Hawley Troxell as v;itnesses. See
Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008; Bond Aff., pp. 17-18, ,, 48-49; Bond Aff., Ex. 2.
When Jonathan Hally and Clark and Feeney filed the motion for partial summary
judgment against their own client Recd Taylor, Reed Taylor's counsel contacted the Idaho State
Bar and provided a factual background of the case, without providing any names of the
Attorneys or parties involved. See Bond Aff., p. 26,

ii 67.

The Idaho State Bar advised Reed

Taylor's counsel that the issue of disqualification was an issue for the Court. See Bond Aff., p.
26,, 67. As a result of the guidance given to Reed Taylor's counsel from the Idaho State Bar,
Reed Taylor elected to pursue the disqualification of the attorneys. See Bond Aff., p. 26, , 67.
However, Reed Taylor's counsel maintained the objections to the legal representation of the
defendants throughout the action. See e.g.. Bond Aff., Ex. 27 and 29.
On August 3, 2008, Reed Taylor's counsel sent one of many emails regarding conflicts of
interest and the associated ramification to the· Attorneys:
We have difficult jobs as attorneys. I know how easy it is to overlook things or make
mistakes. However, I have repeatedly advised all of you in writing, through telephone

conferences and/or in person of the various conflicts. Ewn after all my warnings. you
have all continued on with the conflicts to the detriment of AIA Services and AIA
InfilWl!lee. I avologize for this email. but aaain. l am simplv !!tQ£eeding @Ii my client has
directed. He will not continue to allow vou all to assist in the decimation of the
companies and their remaining assets.
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We have been directed tg commepce drafting Motions to disgyalify yow respective

firms. l wanted to gjve each of you an smportynity to withdraw before I file the Motiomi.

Not only will the motions be embarrassing, but Reed will view the time and resources
expended and any related damages as damages he may seek from your respective firms.
My hope is that you all will simply acknowledge mistakes were made and do the right
thing and withdraw from this case. If you still have doubts, I direct you IQ. review RPC
1.7 and u;i. among others. not 19 mention the case law. and RPCs on assisting. in
fraudulent acts .. ..I have advised you time ·@!.ld time aaa>n tJW AJA Insur;µice should have
separate counsel.. .

See Bond Aff., Ex. 22, p. 4-5 (pages are not numbered) (emphasis added). There has been no
intentional delay in moving for disqualification. See Bond Aff., pp. 26-27, 'iii 66-70; Bond Ail.,
Ex. 24-25; Court File.
On Augw.1 7, 2008, the purported boards of AIA Services held a joint board meeting
wherein they accepted John Taylor's resignation from the 40l(k) Plan (presumably to make the
appearance that he is not involved in the intervention by the Plan), inappropriately have
interested directors authorize the payment of John Taylor's attorneys' fees and costs in his
lawsuit with Donna Taylor, and stated that the Cowt had approved the corporations' use of a
pending $800,000 settlement to pay attorneys' fees, among other issues. 1 See Bond Aff., Ex. 41.
On August 14, 2007, CropUSA was also named as a defendant in this action. See Bond
Aff., p. 8, ~ 23; Cowt File.

In addition to claims against CropUSA, Reed Taylor's Fifth

Amended Complaint alleges additional claims and remedies against John Taylor, JoLee Duclos,
Bryan Freeman, Connie Taylor and James Beck relating to the significant corporate malfeasance
and waste that has taken place at AIA Services

and AIA Insurance.

See Bond Aft'., Ex. 15.

ill
If/

' This settlement conslitutes one of the final significant assets of AJA Services and AJA Insurance, and, as with the
$1.2 Million Mortgage, are expected to be improperly utilized to pay the Attorneys and for the individual defendants
so as to ensure no money remains by the time this action proceeds to trial.
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AlA's Present Condition And John Taylor As The Person Making A}I Of The Decisions
AIA Insurance's business prospects are bleak as most of the commissions it receives are
likely to only last for another 2 years since AlA Insurance has not been issuing new policies for
years. See Affidavit of Reed Taylor, pp. 2-3,, 4; Bond Aff., p. 11,, 30; 200 Supp. Bond Aff.,
Ex. 46. This was confirmed by James Gatziolis. See Affidavit of Reed Taylor, pp. 2-3,, 4. All
of AIA Insurance's employees have been transferred to CropUSA, while the Attorneys have
represented otherwise to the Court. See Affidavit of Reed Taylor, p. 2,

'J 2; 2•d Supp. Bond Aff.,

Ex. 46, pp. 161, 241-242. Throughout this case, the Attorneys have inappropriately argued that
AlA Insurance would be irreparably damages if Reed Taylor took control, all the while they
knew that the company was being operated improperly and for the benefit of John Taylor and
other interested defendants and parties. See Court File; Bond AfI., Ex. 42; Supp. Bond Aff., Ex.
44; 200 Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 46; Pederson Aff.
Although both Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor have contractual obligations to be on the
board of AIA Services W1til their respective indebtedness is paid in full, the Attorneys and
defendants have failed to honor the obligations (See 2•d Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 47), let alone
provide notice to either Reed Taylor or Donna Taylor of any board meetings. See Affidavit of
Reed Taylor, p. 2,

~

3; Affidavit of Donna Taylor, p. 2. AIA Services has now ceased all

payment5 to Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor without obtaining permission from the Court. See
Affidavit of Reed Taylor, p. 2-3, it 4; Affidavit of Donna Taylor, p. 2, 'If 3; Court File.
Tn 2001, John and Connie Taylor purchased a parking lot that AIA was required to
maintain W1der the terms of its lease for the purchase price of $6,500, which was paid in cash
through the use of AIA's line-of-credit. See Pederson Aff., p. 9, , 11. After John and Connie
Taylor's inappropriate purchase of the parking lot, they increased the rent on the parking lot from
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$3,500 to $15,000 per year and even pre-paid the rent at the end of2006 for the 2007 calendar
year (a total of $30,000 was paid to John Taylor in December 2006). 2 See Pederson Aff., p. 9 if
11.

In December 2006 (after Reed Taylor provided notice of default), AIA Insurance

inappropriately 1rdl1Sferred a $95,000 account receivable to CropUSA for funds owed to it by
_1

Pacific Empire Radio Corporation. See 2•d Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 58; Pederson Aff.
In his deposition taken on January 28-30, 2008, John Taylor testified when asked who
made the decisions for the litigation on behalf of the corporations: "I make those decisions in
consultation with the attorneys." See Bond Aff., Ex. 42, p. 88, IL 14-25. The fact that John
Taylor inappropriately directs the litigation in this matter was also confirmed by JoLee Duclos
(the Secretary of AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and CropUSA and the author of virtually all the
board meeting minutes that have been produced in this action), when she testified that John
Taylor makes all of the decisions for the corporations with the attorneys. See Supp. Bond Aff.,
Ex. 44, p. 23, 11. 6-17. When questioned about the appropriateness of certain transactions, John
Taylor testified that he makes the decision whether a transaction is "appropriate" and that he
"ultimately makc[s] the decisions for these companies." See Bond Aff., Ex. 42, p. 470, ll. 1-21.

John Taylor further testified that disinterested board approval was not "necessary" for AIA
Insurance's guarantee of CropUSA's $15 Million line-of-credit. See 2•d Supp. Bond Aff., Ex.
46, p. 541.
According to JoLee Duclos, the Secretary of AIA Services and AIA Insurance, it has
been "several years" since AIA Services has had a shareholder meeting, other than the purported
"special" meeting to allegedly approve the paymeni of attorney fees for present and past
2

Like the $95,000 owed to AIA Insurance by Pacific Empire Radio Corporation, John Taylor and the other
individuals were transferring assets in anticipation of the possible transition in control of AIA Insurance to Reed
Taylor as a result of his notice of default dated December 12, 2006.
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-.

directors. See Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 44, p. 34, II. 2-7; Bond Afl, Ex. 12. JoLee Duclos also
acknowledged that AIA Services didn't even send financial information or notices of shareholder
meetings to shareholders. See Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 44, p. 36, II. 4-9.

All of the above has

occurred during times in which AIA Services is and has been insolvent. See Hearing, Ex. W, X,

AJ, AQ, AR, AS and AT.
General Background On CropUSA
AlA Services began selling crop insurance through its subsidiary formed under the name
"AlA Crop Insurance, Inc." See

z•d Supp. Bond AIT., Ex. 51.

In ;UA's business plan drafted in

2000, AJA represented to Reed Taylor and others that "AJA, through its new subsidiary, AIA
Crop Insurance, Inc., will begin providing a line of multi-peril crop insurance at the request of
the farm associations." See 2•d Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 51 (this document has never been produced
in discovery). Jn 2000, the corporation's name was later changed to CropUSA. See 2•d Supp.
Bond Aff., Ex. 50. Although no AJA documents have been produced referring to CropUSA as
being a subsidiary of AJA, the board meeting minutes of CropUSA dated January 10, 2001,
specifically stated that "AJA Services Corporation has declined to continue to operate the
company as a subsidiary of AJA and wants the Company lo be independent." See 2•d Supp.
Bond Aff., Ex. 52, p. I. These minutes were drafted by JoLee Duclos. Id. at 2.
CropUSA was formed and operated using AJA Insurance's funds, employees, and assets.

See Bond Aff., p. 10, "I 28; Pederson AIT;

z•d Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 46.

Although AIA Insurance

funded CropUSA, JoLee Duclos, the long-time corporate Secretary of AJA Services and AIA
Insurance, acknowledged that shareholder approval was not obtained to make CropUSA a
separate entity.

See Supp. Bond Atf., Ex. 44, p. 79, II. 1-14. Although John Taylor had

represented that CropUSA was being developed by AJA Insurance, John Taylor, Connie Taylor,

000142

PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION TO DISQUALIFY - 14

James Beck and Michael Cashman became the majority holders of the outstanding shares of
CropUSA, while AIA and Reed Taylor owned nothing in the entity. See Bond Alf., p. 10, , 28;
Bond Aff., Ex. 9; 2nd Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 51 and 59.
Although shareholder or creditor approval was never obtained to operate CropUSA as a
separate entity, CropUSA has been referred to as the "exit strategy" for certain shareholders of
AJA Services. See Bond Aff., pp. 10-11,, 28; Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 44, p. 79, IL 1-14; z•d Supp.
Bond Aff., Ex. 46 and 53. In one of the exit strategy letters to select preferred shareholders (&e

2nd Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 53 & 59), John Taylor stated the following:
Over the lal!t few years. AJA 's management and directors have been looking for wavs to
create an exit s\rn.tegy for your investment in A!A- We had originally planned on taking
A IA public, but it is unlikely in the foreseeable future ...

With Crop USA. we believe there is a bettsr opportunity for a clearly defined exit
strategy. Once the company reaches its goal of $100 million in crop insurance premiums,
management believes that Crop USA v,,;ll have a potential to be acquired or become fully
traded.
AJA has been working on a project and market strategy referred to as Crop USA. Crop
USA was created by AIA as a property and casualty insurance to members of sponsoring
agricultural associations, such as the wheat growers, soybean growers, etc. that are
already affiliated with AJA ...

2°d Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 53 (emphasis added). This "exit strategy" letter and the subsequent
"exchange" of certain AIA Services Series C Preferred Shares were never approved by Reed
Taylor, Donna Taylor or the innocent minority shareholders of AIA Services. See 2•d Supp.
Bond Aff., Ex. 46. This letter clearly evidences the fuel that CropUSA came from AIA. Id.
John Taylor acknowledged that expenses were not properly allocated between AIA and
CropUSA, including such expenses as electricity, which was never allocated at all. See Bond
Aft:, Ex. 42, p. 294 and 296. Although postage costs exceeded tens of thousands of dollars per
year at AIA, postage expenses were never allocated to CropUSA WJti! 2005 or 2006. See 2nd
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Supp. Bond AfI, Ex. 46, p. 166. Other expenses were allocated unfairly through an alleged
Administrative Agreement that was never authorized by the board of AJA Services or A !A
Insurance. See 2"d Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 46 and 57. In addition, the salaries subject to the
alleged Administrative Agreement were never allocated through any arms-length or legitimate
means. See 2°d Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 46, p. 165.
AJA Insurance presently has no employees, as they have all been transferred to
CropUSA. See 2nd Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 46, p. 161, 241-242. Although CropUSA and AIA
allegedly allocate cost~ for salaries (See 2•d Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 57), John Taylor testified that
there was not a specific method used for allocating salaries. See 2•d Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 46, p.

165. Although it has been consistently one of the largest expenses at A!A for many years, John
Taylor's salary was never allocated to CropUSA, even though John Taylor admitting to spending
approximately one-half his time working for CropUSA. See 2nd Supp. Bond AtI, Ex. 46, pp.

520-521; Hearing Testimony.
From 2001 through 2006, over $2 Million dollars of "related party" transactions have
been identified that were not arms-length transactions. See Pederson Aff., pp. 8-1 O; 2•d Supp.
Bond Aff., Ex. 46. Since its incorporation, John Taylor has been on the board of CropUSA and
also on the boards of ALA Services and AIA Insurance. See 2•d Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 4 7-48.
JoLee Duclos has also been a board member and the Secreiary of AJA Services, AIA Insurance
and CropUSA for many years. Id.
AIA Services and AIA Insur.mce should be pursuing claims against CropUSA, John
Taylor, Connie Taylor, Jolee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, James Beck and Michael Cashman,
among others. See Bond Aff., p. 11, "j 30; Pederson Aff.; Jarvis Aff; Knight Aff.; Calandrillo
Aff; Reed Taylor's Fifth Amended Complaint. All of the above took place during times in
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which Hawley Troxell represented both AIA and CropUSA. See 2•d Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 46,
pp. 516-519.

Gelleral Background Ou The Involvement Of Clements, Brown & MeNichols
After Reed Taylor filed suit, Michael McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNichols
purportedly formally appeared in this action on behalf of fohn Taylor, AlA Services and AIA
Insurance. See Bond Aff., p. 15, ~ 40; Court File. On February 22, 2007, Reed Taylor voted the
shares of AIA Insurance and appointed himself as the sole officer and director of the company.
See Bond Aff., Ex. 7. On February 25, 2007, Reed Taylor objected to Mr. McNichols' joint

representation, advised Mr. McNichols that he was not authorized to represent AIA Insurance,
and demanded the return of funds in which Reed Taylor held a security interest. See Bond Aff.,

Ex.23.
On March 27, 2007, Reed Taylor's counsel advised Mr. McNichols that his actions were
"a continuation of the ongoing conflicts of interest and associated legal ramifications pertaining
to [Mr. McNichols'] representation of AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and John Taylor." See
Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
dated March 28, 2007, Ex. l.
On March 28, 2007, Mike McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNichols moved to
withdraw from representing AIA Services and AIA Insurance and continue representing John
Taylor. See Bond Aff., Ex. 26. In Mr. McNichols' Motion to Withdraw, he attempted to brush
the obvious significant irreconcilable conflicts aside by arguing:
... while there is no current or reasonably anticipated conflict of interest between the
corporations and John Taylor, there is a possible future conflict between them and they
have agreed that Michael E. McNichols should continue to represent John Taylor but no
longer represent the corporations."
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See Bond Aff, Ex. 26, pp. 1-2. Mr. McNichols did not indicate whether he obtained the required
written infonned consent, let alone whether he obtained the require-0 consent from the
appropriate authorized and disinterested representatives of the corporations. See Bond Aff., Ex.
26, pp. 1-2; Bond Aff., Ex. 7.
On September 20, 2007, Mike McNichols submitted a response in opposition to Reed
Taylor's motion to amend his complaint to add additional parties and claims against the
corporations, individuals and Michael Cashman, even though Mr. McNichols was purportedly
only representing John Taylor. See Bond Aff., Ex .. 31. As a result of Mr. McNichols and
Clements, Brown & McNichols' arguments (and Hawley Troxell), the Court denied Reed
Taylor's Motion to Amend and refused to name Michael Cashman. See Bond Aff.; Court File.

On July 21, 2008, Reed Taylor's counsel, Michael S. Bissell, sent a letter to the purported
boards of AIA Services and AIA Insurance demanding that the boards take action against the
attorneys and law firm of Clements, Brown & McNichols for various ethical violations,
malpractice, various claims and torts. See Bond Alf., Ex. 16.
General Background On The Involvement Of Quarles & Brady
Jn 2006, Quarles & Brady represented AIA Insurance and CropUSA in obtaining a $I 5
Million loan for CropUSA and inappropriately provided an opinion letter for the transaction. See
Bond Aff., Ex. 18. The $15 Million loan was signed by John Taylor on behalf ofCropUSA and
JoLce Duclos on behalf of the guarantor A!A Insurance. See Hearing, Ex. R. AIA Insurance's
guarantee of the loan was a violation of AIA Services' articles of incorporation, a violation of
AlA Insurance's Bylaws and a violation of AIA Services' Bylaws. See Bond Aff., Ex. 19-21.
During settlement negotiations prior to the date Reed Taylor filed his Complaint in this
action in January 2007, James Gatziolis and Quarles & Brady purportedly represented AlA
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Services and AIA Insurance. See Bond Aff., 17.

On January 18, 2007, James Gatziolis of

Quarles & Brady emailed a settlement proposal to Reed Taylor's counsel wherein he stated
"please find a revised proposed term sheet representing AIA's latest offer to resolve the
controversies between AJA and Reed Taylor." See Bond Aff., Ex. 17.
On January 26, 2007, James Gatziolis responded via email to a counter offer made by
Reed Taylor's counsel wherein Mr. Gatziolis confirmed that an alleged advisory board of
CropUSA (comprised of the major shareholders of both AIA Services and CropUSA) will
"deliberate in person to adequately consider all of the elements of your proposal. .. the board has
unofficially directed the activities of AJA [Insurance], Inc. as well so it is most appropriate for
them to consider your proposal." See Bond Aff., Ex. 22, p. 10 (pages are not numbered).
After settlement discussions failed, on February l, 2007, JoLee Duclos executed a letter
on behalf of AJA Insurance denying Reed Taylor the right to exercise his contractual rights,
which such letter was drafted by Quarles & Brady, as indicated by the Quarles & Brady
document stamp at the bottom of the letter.

See Bond Aff., Ex. 22, p. 6 (pages are not

numbered); Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 44. The February 1, 2007, letter was sent to Reed Taylor's
counsel via email from James Gatziolis 011 the same day. See Bond Aff, Ex. 22, p. 7 (pages are
not numbered). ln the same email, James Gatziolis advised Reed Taylor's counsel that "[t]here
will be no meeting of the stockholders of AJA on Monday, February 5, 2007 ... " See Bond Aff.,
Ex. 22, p. 7 (pages are not numbered).
On February l, 2007, James Gatziolis emailed Reed Taylor's counsel and proposed that
Mike McNichols accept service on behalf of all the defendants. See Bond Aff., Ex. 22, p. 8
(pages arc not numbered).

In a response email, Jan1es Gatziolis expressly stated that "[Mr.

McNichols] and [Mr. Gatziolis] would both continue to counsel the company" (meaning AIA),
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even though Mr. McNichols and his firm would formally appear. See Bond Aff., Ex. 22, p. 8
(pages are not numbered).
After CroplJSA was named as a defendant, James Gatziolis, Charles Harper and Quarles
& Brady formally appeared in this action on behalf of CropUSA, through a Pro Hae Vice

admission through Hawley Troxell. See Bond Aff., p. 14,

i!

37; Court File. Like Hawley

Troxell, Quarles & Brady also represented AIA Ii1surance and CropUSA pertaining to
CropUSA' s $15 Million line-of-credit and inappropriately warranted through an opinion letter
that AIA Insurance had the authority to guarantee CropUSA's loan. See Bond Aff., Ex. 28.
Neither Reed Taylor nor Donna Taylor consented to Quarles & Brady's representation of AIA
Services and AIA Insurance. See Affidavit of Reed Taylor; Affidavit of Donna Taylor.
On June 13, 2008, James Gatziolis sent Reed Taylor's counsel a settlement proposal. See
Bond Aff., Ex. 37. Although the terms of the proposal arc inadmissible to establish liability,
they arc significant to establish additional conflicts of interest as the Attorneys specifically
requested "uncon.<iitional releases for each and every defendant, and each of def1;ndant's
counsel..." in the first sentence of the offer.
numbered) (emphasis added).

See Bond Aff., Ex. 37, p. 2 (pages are not

Under Se1-1ion 3 of the· settlement offer, the Attorneys also

requested that ".AIA Insurance would deliver rekl!!le§ to all defendants and d.;:fendants' couQ!it,:l."

See Bond Aff., Ex. 37, p. 2 (pages are not numbered) (emphasis added). Reed Taylor's counsel
was instructed to deal exclusively with James Gatziolis during these settlement discussions. See
Bond Aff., p. 30, i! 76 (wherein the Attorneys are implicitly acknowledging their legal exposure
and setting forth a new conflict of interest for all of the Attorneys because their interests arc no
longer I 00% behind their clients, but are instead aligned to represent their own interests too}.

Ill
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On July 21, 2008, Reed Taylor's counsel, Michael S. Bissell, sent a letter to the purported
boards of AIA Services and AIA Insurance demanding that the boards take action against the
attorneys and law firm of Quarles & Brady for various ethical violations, malpractice, various
claims and torts. See Bond Aff., Ex. 16.
.,,...;

On August 4, 2008, Reed Taylor's counsel received an email from Charles Harper of
Quarles & Brady stating: " ... Quarles & Brady and its attorneys have filed an appearance only on
behalf of CropUSA. We do not represent AIA Services or AIA Insurance in this litigation." See
Bond Aff., Ex. 22, p. 4 (pages are not numbered). However, after an exchange of subsequent
emails with Reed Taylor's counsel, it appears that the issue was cleared up when Reed Taylor's
counsel reminded Mr. Harper of his firm's "direct representation of AJA in this action" and
provided documentation demonstrating the same. See Bond Aff., Ex. 22.
General Background On The Involvement Of Hawley Troxell
In 2001, Hawley Troxell was retained by CropUSA to be its adviser and handle SEC
matters. See 2"J Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 52, p. 2. Richard Riley and Hawley Troxell represented
both AJA and CropUSA throughout the years leading up to this action and after the
commencement of this action. See 2"d Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 46; Bond Aff., Ex. 42.
On October 27, 2006, Hawley Troxell represented both AIA Insurance and CropUSA
pertaining to a $15 Million line-of-credit and provided an inappropriate opinion letter warranting
the guarantee of the loan by AJA Insurance was perinissible. See Bond Aff., Ex. 35. AIA
Insurance's guarantee of the loan was a violation of AJA Services' articles of incorporation, a
violation of AIA Insurance's Bylaws and a violation of AIA Services' Bylaws. See Bond Aff.,
Ex. I 9-21. According to the testimony of John Taylor, Richard Riley of Hawley Troxell has
represented both AJA and CropUSA at various times. See 2•d Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 46, pp. 516-
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519.
On April 30, 2007, John Taylor, Connie Taylor and James Beck pwportedly held a Joint
Meeting of the Boards of AJA St-TVices and AIA Insurance. See Bond Aff., Ex. I 0. At the
purported joint meeting, the boards approved a joint defense agreement, joint retainer agreement,
and the payment of $5,000 to each director for every quarter of service on the board, i.e.,
$20,000 per year. See Bond Aff., Ex. I 0.
On May 2, 2007, Hawley Troxell was pwportedly retained to represent AJA Services and
AJA Insunmce in place of Mr. McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNichols (although Mr.
Babbitt acknowledged that contact had been made prior to May 2). See Bond AiI, Ex. 29, p. 4
(pages are not numbered).

Gary Babbitt, D. John Ashby, and Hawley Troxell formally

purportedly appeared in this action on behalf of AJA Services and AJA Insurance. See Bond
Aff., pp. 18-19, ~ 51; Court File; Bond Aff., Ex. 7.
In 2007, Gary Babbitt, D. John Ashby, and Hawley Troxell also formally appeared in this
action on behalf of CropUSA. See Bond Aff., p. 19, , 52. Later, James Gatziolis, Charles
Harper and Quarles & Brady appeared on behalf of CropUSA Pro Hae Vice, through Hawley
Troxell. See Bond Aff., p. 19, , 52.

The purported boards or shareholders of AJA Services or

AIA Insurance did not consent to the joint representation of CropUSA, neither did Reed Taylor
or Donna Taylor. See e.g., Bond Aff., Ex. 10; Affidavit of Reed Taylor; Affidavit of Donna
Taylor. On May 11, 2007, Reed Taylor's counsel sent a lener to Gary Babbitt stating in part:
This letter confirms that you advised me that AJA Insurance and AIA Services do llQ!
have claims against John Taylor. I am surprised at your position in this regard as you are
exposing your firm to claims from shareholders and other parties, including Reed Taylor.
As the co\l!)Sel fw the CQ!PQratioQS. WI! have q guty to bring e!ajms for the benefit of the
~ons. their shareholders and their creditors in light.of insolvency. Furthermore, il:
is inapptQpriate for John Taylor
the litjgation on bebalf of the corporation in
l.i&bt of the substantial claims already alleged against him, l amfur!her sU!]2rised that you

mmt
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w011!d not req.u.ire direction and consent from a disinterested board of directors prior to
your representation of both corporations ... A careful review of the pleadings, briefs, oral
testimony and hearing exhibits clearly demonstrates that the corporations have been
operated for years for the benefit of John Taylor and o1hers to the detriment of Reed
Taylor and other creditors.
In addition, all of 1he outstanding shares of AJA Insurance are pledged to Reed Taylor. If
and when Reed is permitted to exercise his rights under 1he various agreements and/or
Idaho law, AJA Insurance will be bringing claims against John Taylor, Bryan Freeman,
and JoLee Duclos. Your firm will also be exposed to claims from Reed Taylor at that
time. We will no!. permit this issue to go µpaddressed.
See Bond Aff., Ex. 29, p. 2 (emphasis in original and added).
On September 20, 2007, Gary Babbitt, D. John Ashby and Hawley Troxell submitted a
response in opposition to Reed Taylor's motion to amend his complaint to add additional parties
and claims, even though 1hcy were purportedly only representing 1he interests of the
corporations. See Bond Aff., Ex. 30. Hawley Troxell's arguments (and Clements, Brown &
McNichols) persuaded 1he Court to deny naming Mike Cashman (a person intimately involved in
1he corporate malfeasance and the recipient of a substantial number of shares in CropUSA) as a
defendant and deny the additional other new claims, when Hawley Troxell (and Clements,
Brown & McNichols) should have been joining Reed Taylor's motion. See Bond Aff., pp. 1920,

,I 53; Ex. 30,

Mr. Cashman is shareholder ofAIA Services and became a large shareholder

of CropUSA 1hrough an elaborate scheme wherein certain "select" shareholders (and no
creditors) were permitted to exit 1heir investment in AIA Services. See e.g., Bond Aff., Ex. 9; 2•d
Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 53 and 59.
Throughout this action, l lawley Troxell has not represented the interests of AIA
Insurance and AJA Services. See Bond Aff., pp. 19-20, , 53; pp. 22-23,

'If 60; Court File.

Richard Riley and Patrick Collins are two lav;yers at Hawley Troxell known to represent AIA
Insurance and CropUSA in various transactions, including AIA Insurance's guarantee of
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CroplJSA's $15 Million loan. See BondAff., Ex. 35.
Without knowledge of this inappropriate pledge, Reed Taylor's counsel moved the Court
to enter a preliminary injunction to protect a $1.2 Million Mortgage recently obtained by AIA
Services in a settlement. See Bond Aff., p. 23, ,- 61; Bond Aff., Ex. 32. The $1.2 Mortgage was
titled inAIA Services' name only, even though AIA Insurance paid "part or all" of the attorneys'
foes and costs for the litigation and the Mortgage was a distribution of the estate of The Universe
(another subsidiary pledged to Reed Taylor). See Bond Aff., Ex. 42, p. 32, II. 1-24; p. 34, II. 118; Bond Aff, Ex. 4, pp. 1-2.
Gary Babbitt, D. John Ashby and Hawley Troxell failed to disclose to the Court the fact
that $1.2 Million Mortgage had been pledged to CropUSA at the hearing on Reed Taylor's
Motion for Preliminary Injunction. See Bond Aff., p. 23, 161; Court File. Neither Reed Taylor
nor his counsel was provided copies of the pledge of the $1.2 Million Mortgage until April 17,
2008, despite discovery requests seeking such documents. 3 See Bond Aff., Ex. 32; p. 24,

ii 62

Patrick Collins of Hawley Troxell is listed as the person to return the recorded document. See
Bond Aff., Ex. 32.
In September 2007, Patrick Collins of Hawley Troxell drafted or assisted in the drafting

of documents to pledge AIA Services' $1.2 Million Mortgage to CropUSA for the payment of
attorney fees and costs. See Bond Aff., Ex. 32. According to the testimony of John Taylor, Dick
Riley also assisted in the pledging of the $1.2 Million Mortgage to CropUSA. See Supp. Bond
Aff., Ex. 42, p. 250. The purported loan carried an interest rate of 15% and was secured by the
$1.2 Million Mortgage. See Bond Aff., Ex. 32. Hawley Troxell represented both AIA Services

1

The documents pertaining to the $1.2 Million Mongage and its pledge lo Crop USA were only ultimately provided
to Reed Taylor's counsel because of Mr. McNichols' good faith and persistence.
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and CropUSA in the transaction. See Bond Aff., Ex. 42, p. 250; 2•d Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 46.
On December 18, 2007, Reed Taylor's counsel requested proof that A!A Insurance's
guarantee ofCropUSA's $15 Million loan was tenninated., See Bond Aff., Ex. 33. Gary Babbitt
and Hawley Troxell responded by stating that if Reed Taylor took action to rescind the
guarantee, then Reed Taylor would be sued for tortious interference. See Bond Ail, Ex. 33.
On July 21, 2008, Reed Taylor's counsel, Michael S. Bissell, sent a letter to the purported
boards of A1A Services and AIA Insurance demanding that the boards take action against the
attorneys and law finn of Hawley Troxell for various ethical violations, malpractice, various
claims and torts.

See Bond Aff., Ex. 16.

In response, Hawley Troxell retained its own

independent counsel, who, on July 31, 2008, inquired about the allegations made in Mr. Bissell's
demand letter. See Bond Aff., Ex. 34.
Gary Babbitt, D. John Ashby and Hawley Troxell have been asserting arguments against
Reed Taylor (including the alleged illegality argument) with full knowledge that such arguments
are counter to an opinion letter issued on behalf of AIA Services to Reed Taylor, which was
based upon knowledge held by Richard Riley, who is also an attorney with Hawley Troxell. See
Bond AJT., Ex. 2, p. 2, ,I 2; Court File. Gary Babbitt, D. John Ashby and Hawley Troxell have
also participated in ceasing all payments to Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor without pennission
from the Court. See Affidavit of Reed Taylor; Affidavit of Donna Taylor; Court File.
Lawsuits Auinst Certain Attorneys And Pegdiog L!wspits Against Others

On August 18, 2008, Reed Taylor, through his counsel, Michael S. Bissell, filed nonfrivolous and non-derivative lawsuits against Hawley Troxell and Clement, Brown &
McNichols, which such lawsuits include claims for aiding and abetting, tortious interference, and
conversion, among other claims relating to attorneys exceeding their scope of representation.
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See Bond Aff., Ex. 38-39. Reed Taylor has also retained Michael S. Bissell to file non-frivolous
and non-derivative lawsuits against Clark and Feeney and Quarles & Brady for related claims.
See Bond Aff., pp. 31-32, 'U 80. These lawsuits are not bl!Scd upon litigation strategy. See Bond
Aff., p. 27, 'U 68; p. 32, 'U 81.
As indicated by the expert testimony of Peter R. Jarvis, Reed Taylor's non-frivolous
claims against the Attorneys are one additional reason (of many reasons) why the Attorneys
should withdraw or be disqualified.

See Jarvis Aff., pp. 5-6,

'U 4; p. 7, if 5(d). As a result, the

Attorneys have a vested interest in remaining as counsel to "skew" the litigation to protect their
interests. See Jarvis Aff., pp. 5-6, 'U 4; p. 7, ~I S(d).

It ls Impossible For The Attomm To Obtain The Re9uire4 Waivers
111e litigation in this matter is, and has been, directed by John Taylor, who is an
interested party by way of the individual claims asserted against him by Reed Taylor, the owner
of CropUSA shares. Uie recipient of inappropriate transfers, and a party breaching the terms of
his employment contract, among other issues and claims. See Bond AfI, Ex. 9, 15 and 42; Supp.
Bond Aff., Ex. 44, p. 23, Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 45. Likewise. the remaining purported board
members of AIA

S~TVices

and A!A Insurance, ColUlie Taylor and James Beck, are interested

parties by way of their ownership of CropUSA shares, the individual claims asserted against
them, and the wrongful recipients of funds from AIA Insurance, among other irreconcilable
conflicts. See Bond Aff., Ex. 9 and 15; Court File.
On April 29, 2008, JoLee Duclos, the Secretary of AJA Services and A!A Insurance,
testified that she cannot even recall when the corporations last had an annual shareholder
meeting. See Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 44, p. 29-31.

John Taylor testified that he makes the

decisions and disinterested approval is not "necessary." See Bond Af£, Ex. 44; 2"d Supp. Bond
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Aff., Ex. 46.
AIA Services owes Reed Taylor over $8,500,000 and is insolvent. See Bond Aff., Ex.
15; Hearing Ex. W, X, AJ, AQ, AR, AS and AT. Reed Taylor is the pledgee of all of the
outstanding shares of AJA Insurance, the sole person with authority to vote the shares of AJA
Insurance, the only legitimate p.:rson with authority to make any decisions at AJA Insurance by
way of AIA Services' defaults and his prior vote of the shares, and he has not, and will not,
consent to any joint representation of AIA Insurdllce or AIA Services (as the major creditor of an
insolvent corporation) with any other defendant, nor will he consent to any joint defense or joint
retainer agreements. 4 See Affidavit of Reed Taylor, p. 4, ifif 7-10; Bond Aff, Ex. 7.
Donna Taylor, the holder of all the Series A Preferred Shares in AIA Services, has
priority over all common shareholders to the remaining assets of AIA Services. See Affidavit of
Donna Taylor, p. 2,

if 2.

Donna Taylor has not, and will not, consent to the joint representation

of AJA Services, CropUSA, Jolm Taylor and other defendants in this action, nor will she consent
to any joint defense or joint retainer agreements. Affidavit of Donna Taylor, p.3, ifif 4-9.

The Attorneys Should Be Disqualified ·
According to the expert testimony of Peter R. Jarvis, an ethics expert and author of the
ethics treatise The Law of Lawyering and chapters in the Washington and Oregon Ethics
Deskbooks, all of the Attorneys should be disqualified. See Jarvis Aff., pp. 5-11,

ifif 4-5. Mr.

Jarvis also opined, among other things, that "the Law Firms are likely to want to skew the
litigation away from their own conduct, or any potential advice of counsel defense, to shiil

' The fact that all of AJA Insurance's shares were pledged tv Reed Taylor and he voted the shares on February 22,
2007, naming himself as the sole officer and director of the company required separate counsel to be appointed for
AIA Insurance with strict instructions to safeguard the company and its assets, and to not take any directions or
instructions from John Taylor or other interested parties (knowing that duties were owed to Reed Taylor and
anything less than handing over control of the company to him would likely result in additional liability).
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liability from themselves to one or more of the defendants." See Jarvis Aff., p. 7,,; S(d). Mr.
Jarvis also opined that the "defenses mounted by AIA Services and AJA Insurance in this case
would thus appear to have little or nothing to do with the protection of the interests of AIA
Services and AJA Insurance and much if not everything to do with the defense of John Taylor
and other individual defendants ... " See Jarvis

Atr., p. 9, 'U 5(i).

Mr. Jarvis further opined that

RPC 3.7 would likely be implicated because any one of more of the Attorneys could be forced to
testify against their client and "confidentiality and conflict of interest considerations under Idaho
RPC 1.6 through 1.10 and RPC 1.13" are implicated even if none of the Attorneys are ever
forced to testify against their client. See Jarvis Aff., p. 6,,; 4(b). Finally, Mr. Jarvis also makes
other substantiated opinions regarding the need to disqualify the Attorneys, without even
addressing all of the conflicts and issues set forth in Reed Taylor's Motion to Disqualify. See
Jarvis Aff., pp. 4-11.
Mr. Jarvis' opinion that the Attorneys should be disqualified is also supported by the
expert testimony of Steve Calandrillo (a contracts and secured transactions professor of law) and
W.H. Knight, Jr. (former in house counsel to a $1.3 Billion Bank, former Dean of University of
Washington School of Law, and contracts and commercial law professor), both of whom also
opine that Reed Taylor has the contractual right to take possession of AIA Insurance, the
contractual right to sell the shares of AIA Insurance, and that Reed Taylor is entitled to
possession of the commissions and related receivables of AIA Services and A!A Insurance. See
Bond AiT., Ex. 3-5; Calandrillo Aff.; Knight Aff.
Donna Taylor (the Series A Preferred Shareholder of AIA Services who has priority over
all other preferred and common shareholders of AIA Services and who is entitled to, and not
receiving, a seat on AIA Services' board) and Reed Taylor (the pledge of AIA Insurance's stock
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and the most significant creditor of AlA Services, who is also entitled to, and not receiving, a
seat on AIA Services board) have also specifically requested that the Attorneys be disqualified.

See Affidavit of Donna Taylor, p. 2, ~ 2; p. 3, ~ 9; Affidavit of Reed Taylor, p. 4, if 10.

V. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT
A.

Standard For Disqualification.

"The decision to grant or to deny a motion to disqualify counsel is within the discretion
of the trial court." Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho 692, 696, 819 P.2d 110 (Ct. App. 1991). "!he
remedies available to both clients and non-clients for an attorney's breached duties are
specifically addressed in The Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers:
For a lawyer's breach of duty owed to the lawyer's client or to a nonclient, judicial
remedies may be available through judgment or order entered in accordance with the
standards applicable to the remedy awarded, including standards concerning limitation of
remedies. Judicial remedies include the following:
(8) disqualifying a lawyer from a representatio~... ,
(11) dismissing a claim or defense of a litigant represented by the laV1yer ...

See Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers, § 6 (2000); Hall v. A Corp., 453 F.2d 1375
(2ndCir. 1972).
When an ethical conflict sufficiently impacts the just and lawful determination of claims

in a lawsuit, the court has a "plain duty to act." FMC Technologies, Inc. v. Edwards, 420
F.Supp.2d 1153, 1157 (W.D. WA. 2006). Jn other words, a court may disqualify counsel on its
own motion where sufficient grounds exist. Jn re California Canners and Growers, 74 B.R. 336,
347 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
When a motion to disqualify comes from an opposing party, the motion should be
viewed with caution. Weaver 120 Idaho at 697. Even if a plaintiff does not hold any special
contractual rights or is owed special duties, a plaintiff has standing to disqualify opposing
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counsel. Crown v. Hawkins Co., Ltd., 128 Idaho 114, 122-23, 910 P.2d 786 (Ct. App. 1996)
(denying motion to disqualify, but acknowledging standing to disqualify opposing counsel);
Eugster v. City of Spokane, 110 Wn.App. 212, 39 P.3d 380, 388 (2002). However, any doubts
should generally be resolved in favor of disqualification. Cronin v. District Court, l 05 Nev. 635,
781P.2d1150, 1153 (Nev. 1989).
Once representation has commenced, a lav.'Yer.shall withdraw from the representation of
a client if "the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or the
law." RPC 1.16(a)(a). If a court finds that significant risk makes a pending action adverse to the
interests of a party, then the court has no discretion to deny a motion to disqualify. National
Medical Enterprises, Inc. v. Godbey, 924 S.W.2d 123, 133 (Tx. 1996) (emphasis added).
Any delay in filing a motion to disqualify does not result in a waiver when a party fails to
demonstrate a clear intention to relinquish the right to challenge a representation. Nevada Yellow
Cab Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Clark, 152 P.3d 737 (Nev. 2007}.

In Weaver, the Idaho Court of Appeals explained the guiding principles regarding
disqualification:
The moving party has the burden of establishing grounds for disqualification. '!be goal
of the court should be to shape a remedy which will assure fairness to the parties and the
integrity of the judicial process. Whenever possible, courts should endeavor to reach a
solution that is least burdensome to the client.
Weaver, 120 Idaho ai 697 (internal citations omitted).
Here, the Attorneys have violated RPC 1.6 through I.I 0 and RPC I. 13 (and others), and
they should be disqualified in this action. Moreover, other specific grounds necessary to support
Reed Taylor's Motion to Disqualify are set forth below, each of which on its own are sufficient

to require the disqualification of the applicable Attorneys. Reed Taylor has not delayed in
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bringing this motion and has repeatedly advised the Attorneys that action would be taken
because of lhc various conflicts, which have only been exacerbated by the Attorneys over the
course of this action.

B.

All Of The Attorneys Should Be Disqualified.
1. The Disqualifications Of All Attorneys Are Warranted To Prevent
Appeals By One Or More Of The Defendants And Reed Taylor.

Final judgments may be set aside or new trial ordered simply on lhe grounds that the
attorney undertook the improper representation of more than one defendant. See e.g., Navaro v.
Jomar Real Estate Corp., 646 N.Y.S.2d 805 (N.Y. App. 1996); Dunton v. Suffolk County, 729
F .2d 903, 910 (2nd Cir. 1984) (holding that the improper simultaneous representation of multiple
parties required a new trial).
In Dunton, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ordered a new trial because of conflicts

of interest and explained the significance of the improper simultaneous representation of multiple
parties:
"lbere are at least two reasons why a court should satisfy itself that no conflict exists or at
least provide notice to the affected party if one does. First, a court is under a continuing
obligation to supervise the members of its Bar. Second, trial courts have a duty 'to
exercise that degree of control required by the facts and circumstances of each case to
assure the litigants of a fair trial.'
.. .In holding that the trial court had a duty to inform [the defondant) of the conflict, we in
no way excuse the conduct of the other attorneys here. Attorneys are officers of the
court, and are obligated to adhere to all disciplinary rules and to report incidents of which
they have unprivileged knowledge involvi~g violations of a disciplinary rule ...
Dunton, 729 F.2d at 909 (internal citations omitted).
"Ibus, it is in the interests of all the parties to this case to ensure conflict-free
representation and fairness by disqualifying the Attorneys. The Attorneys should be disqualified
to ensure that the trial in this action is fair to all parties and does not result in a reversal from an
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any appeals made by Reed Taylor or any of the defendants based upon the irreconcilable and
unwaivable conflicts of interest, including, without limitation, the conflicts of interest and ethical
dilemmas set forth below.

2. The Attorneys Of Hawley Troxell And Quarles & Brady Must Be
Disqualified Because They Have Violated RPC 1. 7.
Idaho's Rules of Professional Conduct provide as follows, with respect to conflicts
between current clients:
RULE 1.7 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: CURRENT CLIENTS
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of
interest exists if:
(I) the representation of one client ·will be directly adverse to another client; or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former
client or a third person or by the personal interests of the lawyer, including
family and domestic relationships.
RPC 1.7. If the representation of one client will be adverse to the other or if an attorney's
representation of a client may be limited by the att<;>rney' s responsibility to another client, a
concurrent conflict of interest exists. RPC 1. 7(a). "Ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to
withdraw from representing all of the clients if the common representation fails." RPC I. 7,
Comment 29. "Moreover, because the lawyer is required to be impartial between commonly
represented clients, representation of multiple clients is improper when it is unlikely that
impartiality can be maintained." RPC 1.7, Comment 29.
In other words, when a party has conflicting interests "antagonistic" to other defendants
who could assert claims against the party, the continued representation of all the parties requires
disqualification. Alcantara v. Mendez, 756 N.Y.S.2d 90, 303 A.D.2d 337, 338 (N.Y. 2003)
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(when the pecuniary interests of one party conflicts with the other, continued representation
violates the rules of ethics).
Here, there can be no waiver or no joint representation because each of the defendant's
interests are irreconcilably divergent and in direct conflict.

To date, the Attorneys have

inappropriately represented the common interests of John Taylor and other interested parties, to
the detriment of AJA Services and ArA Insurance, and consequently, Reed Taylor and Donna
Taylor. In violation of RPC 1.7, the Attorneys have engaged in the common representation of
preventing Reed Taylor from exercising his contractual rights and disregarding AJA Services and
AIA Insurance's valid claims against CropUSA, John Taylor, Michael Cashman, James Beck,
JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman and Connie Taylor, which only benefits these interested parties.
The Attorneys are not and cannot represent the interests of each client as required. There
can be no benefit to AL\ Services, who should be pursuing claims against John Taylor, Connie
Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, and CropUSA. There
can be no benefit to AJA Insurance because it too should be pursing claims against the foregoing
parties, its parent corporation and others, let alone the fact that Reed Taylor voted the shares of
AIA Insurance and has the express contractual right to control it now. There can be no benefit
from all of the defendants participating in an alleged joint defonse agreement when they all have
irreconcilable and unwaivable conflicts of interest. There can be no benefit for the individual
defendants to be subjected to additional claims that flow from the inappropriate simultaneous
representation by the Attorneys.
Ill

Ill
ill
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3. Because Of The Hot Potato Doctrine, All Of The Attorneys Must
Withdraw From Representing CropUSA, AIA Services And AIA
InsurllDce.
An attorney may not represent interests adverse to former clients. RPC 1.9.

With

respect to RPC 1.9, courts have adopted the "Hot Potato Doctrine" which states:
Generally, a lawyer may not drop one client so that he may continue to represent a more
favored one. The weight of authority holds,. .. that once the lawyers find themselves
n;pfll§Cllting client$ with adye.rse interests. they generally may not drop one client in
order to represent the other. preferred client. In other words, a lawyer may not \!nl~
current client like a "hot potato" in order to tum the client into a former client as a means
of curing the simultaneous representation of adverse interests. As one commentator
explained, CQU!'!l! hl!ve agreed that. where a lawyer ha3 tgminajed represelll!tion of 11
client for the purpose of ketlJ?ing a more important client happy, eowisel will be treated !IS
if he is still the client's present attorney for purposes of detemrining whether
disqualification is warranted.

Flying J. Inc. v. 1'.4 Operating Corp., WL 648545 •4 (D. Utah 2008) (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis added); see also GATX!Airlog Co. v Evergreen Inter'/ Airlines, Inc., 8 F.Supp.2d 1182
(N.D. Cal. 1998); El Camino Resources, Ltd. v. Huntington Nat. Bank, WL 2710807 (W.D.
Mich. 2007).
Here, the Attorneys must all withdraw because they cannot drop the representation of any
one or more of the defendants to remain counsel for another defendant.

Moreover, it is

impossible for the Attorneys to ever obtain the required written informed consent for the reasons
set forth in this Motion, and even if such consents were obtainable from the authorized parties,
they should not be pem1itted because they are unwaivable.

4. Michael McNichols And Clements, Brown & McNichols Must Be
Disqualified Because They Violated The Hot Potato Doctrine By
Dropping AIA Services And AIA Insnrance As Purported Clients To
Keep John Taylor As A Client.
Under ihe same legal authority in Section 3 above, Michael McNichols and Clements,
Brown & McNichols is precluded from representing John Taylor in this action and the action
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brought by Donna Taylor.
Here, Mr. McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNichols inappropriately dropped AJA
Services and AJA Insurance like hot potatoes and could not have received the required waivers,
and they must withdraw from representing all parties or they should be disqualified. See Jarvis
Affidavit.

5. John Taylor's Interests Are Materially Adverse To The Interests Of
Michael McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNicbols' Former Clients
AIA Services And AIA Insurance.
A lawyer may not represent another client in the same or a substantially related matter in
which that client's interests are materially adverse to the interest of the former client. RPC 1.9.
"When an attorney engages in a conflict of interest on the same matter, her or she is in a
position to act on the confidential information learned from the relationship with the first client,
whether or not that information is actually disclosed or acted upon in advising the new client."

Damron v. Herzog, 67 F.3d 211, 215 (9th Cir. 1995).
Here, Mr. McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNichols arc representing John Taylor
in direct conflict ~ith the interests of AlA Services and AIA Insurance, both of whom are former
purported clients.

Moreover, Mr. McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNichols are also

representing John Taylor in a separate lawsuit brought by Donna Taylor, which is based upon the
same fraudulent acts.

In doing so, l\-ir. McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNichols are

prejudicing AIA Services and AL.\ Insurance and their representation will likely have
ramifications against claims the corporations will bring against John Taylor and others at such
time as disinterested and authorized persons become involved.

Ill
Ill
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'•

6. The Attorneys Of Hawley Troxell And Quarles & Brady Must Be
Disqualified Because They Have Failed To Adhere To The Highest
Degree Of Undivided Loyalty Owed To Each Corporation.
An attorneys' duty of undivided loyalty to a client is set forth under RPC 1.7. "[W]here

a lawyer represents parties whose interests c-0nilict as to the particular subject matter, the
likelihood of prejudice to one party may be so great that misconduct will be found despite
disclosure and consent." Kelly v. Greason, 23 N.Y.2d 368, 244 N.E.2d 456, 462 (N.Y. 1968).
"The primary value at stake in cases of simultaneous or dual representation is the attorney's
duty-and

the

client's

legitimate

expectation-of-loyalty,

rather

than

confidentiality.

Representation adverse to a present client must be measured no so much against the similarities
in litigation, as against the duty of undivided loyalty.'.' Forrest v. Baeza, 58 Cal.App.4'h 65, 74,
67 Cal.Rptr.2d 857 (Cal. 1997). "If a conflict arises after the representation has been undertaken,
the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from the representation ... " RPC 1.7, Comment 4.
Disqualification is warranted because it is impossible for Hawley Troxell and Quarles &
Brady to simultaneously represent the interests of Crop USA, AJA Services and AIA Insurance,
while al the same time giving each corporation their undivided loyalty. Likewise, Clements,
Brown & McNichols owes an undivided duty of loyalty to AIA Services and AJA Insurance.
Undivided loyalty is particularly important in this case since all of the shares of AIA Insurance
are pledged to Reed Taylor (and he should be in control of AJA Insurance), AlA Services is
insolvent and owes its duties to iLs creditors, and both AIA Services and AJA Insurance should

be pursuing claims against CropUSA, John Taylor, James Beck, Connie Taylor, Michael
Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman and others.

ill
ill
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7. The Attorneys Should Be Disqualified Because They Have Breached
Their Fiduciary Dnties Owed To Reed Taylor.
Under Idaho Jaw, when a corporation becomes insolvent, its assets are held in trust for
the benefit of the corporation's creditors. See e.g., Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho
266, 651 P.2d 1299 (1977). Attorneys may not engage in legal representations that affect the
attorney's responsibilities to third parties. RPC I .7(a)(2).
Here, Reed Taylor is the beneficiary of the assets of the insolvent AJA Services, which

are required to be held in trust for Reed Taylor. The Attorneys have purportedly represented or
are purportedly representing AJA Services and AJA Insurance l either directly or through an
improper joint defense agreement) knowing that their actions are detrimemal to the beneficiary
of AJA Services' limited remaining assets. As former and/or present counsel for AIA Services,
the Attorneys owe the beneficiary of AJA Services' limited remaining assets, Reed Taylor,
fiduciary duties to preserve the assets by not representing the interests of John Taylor and other
individuals. The Attorneys have breached and are breaching their fiduciary duties owed to Reed
Taylor through their improper and unauthorized representation of AJA Services and AJA
Insurance, which is further compounded by their other ethical violations.

8. The Attorneys Of Hawley Troxell And Quarles & Brady Must Be
Disqualified Because The Confidential Information Obtained From All
Three Corporations Cannot Be Protected.
"A particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness of common

representation is the effect on client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege."
RPC 1.7, Comment 30.

This ethical principal of confidentiality and the requirement to

disqualify attorneys to prevent the release of confidential information also applies to non-clients
through joint defense agreements. See e.g., National Medical Enterprises, inc. v. Godbey, 924
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S.W.2d 123, 132 (Tx. 1996) ("an attorney's knowledge of a non-client's confidential information
that he has promised to preserve is imputed to other attorneys at the same firm.").
AIA Insurance should be under the possession and control of Reed Taylor. AIA Services
and AIA Insurance have confidential information that should be protected from CropUSA, John
Taylor and others. All three corporations have diverging interests and these diverging interests
will inevitably be at issue, whether in other lawsuits, a bankruptcy filing, a petition for receiver,
the relinquishment of AJA Insurance to Reed Taylor, or such other possible pending events.
To make matters worse, John Taylor, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, Connie Taylor and
James Beck are all parties to a joint defense agreement with AIA Insurance, AIA Services and
CropUSA. Thus, it is impossible for the Attorneys to properly keep and protect each client's
confidential information, particularly when such extreme diverging interests exist between the
parties to the "Joint Defense Agreement."

9. The Attorneys Should Be Disqualified Because The Conflicts Between
Crop USA, AIA Services And AIA Insurance Are Nonconsentablc.
"[S]ome conflicts are nonconsentable, meaning that the lawyer involved cannot properly
ask for such an agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent. When
representing more than one client, the question of consentability must be resolved as to each
client." RPC 1.7, Comment 14.
Here, the conflicts between CropUSA, AIA Services and AIA Insurance are so
irreconcilable that such conflicts are nonconsentable under RPC 1.7.

For example, AIA

Insurance should be suing CropUSA, John Taylor and others to recover the $1.5 Million that was
fraudulently/inappropriately conveyed in 2004. Similarly, AIA lnsUiance should be pursuing
claims against CropUSA, John Taylor and others for the millions of dollars of unallocated,
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wider-allocated, and uncollected funds and assets that were wrongfully transferred to CropUSA.
AJA Services should be porsing the same claims as the parent corporation of AIA Insurance.
Both corporations should be pursuing claims against the Attorneys. These conflicts, and others,
are irreconcilable, nonwaivable, and nonconsentable, which require the disqualification of the

...,;

Attorneys.

10. The Attorneys Of Hawley Troxell, Clements, Brown & McNichols And
Quarles & Brady Must Be Disqualified Because They Are Witnesses.
"A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a
necessary witness ... " RPC 3.7.
Here, the Attorneys are witnesses to (including, but not limited to) the following: (l)
inappropriate and improper board meetings (including participation of meetings that violate the
Articles of Formation and Bylaws of AJA Services and/or AIA Insurance); (2) improper and
insufficienl disclosure to shareholders as required by law and the bylaws; (3) inappropriate
opinion letters to lenders and auditors that have facilitated and/or covered up acts of fraud,
breaches of fiduciary duties, conspiracy to defraud creditors and other unlawful acts; (4)
inappropriate defense agreements and join retainers; (5) transfers of funds, assets, and resources
from AIA Insurance and/or AIA Services to CropUSA and others; (6) the opinion letter issued to
Reed Taylor (e.g., Richard Riley would be forced to testify against his client AJA Services and
implicate damages for himself and his firm for providing the opinion to Reed Taylor); (7)
improper actions taken by the boards of AJA Services and AIA Insurance when they were
purportedly representing the organizations; (8) aiding and abetting of John Taylor and others of
acts of unauthorized representation, fraud, breaches of fiduciary duties, conspiracy, and
conversion (among other claims); (9) the conspiracy to prevent valid claims from being porsued
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..

against certain individual defendants and interested parties (e.g., arguing against naming Mike
Cashman as a defondant and not pursuing valid claims against him, when the Attorneys knew
that he was the beneficiary of many fraudulent trdIISactions); (10) the titling and pledging of AIA
Services' $1.2 Million Mortgage (John Taylor acknowledged that AJA Insurance's funds were
utilized to pay for the legal costs that resulted in obtaining the Mortgage and that the Mortgage
was derived from the estate of The Universe, in all of which Recd Taylor had a security interest);
(11) acceptance of the payment of attorneys fees and costs in violation of the rules of
professional conduct (no proper shareholder approval, no shareholder approval at all for James
Beck and Connie Taylor, boards not properly seated, etc.); (12) improperly restraining Reed
Taylor, when they knew he had the contractual rights and that the corporations were not being
operated properly; and (13) acts to intentionally refuse to represent the best interests of AIA
Insurance and AIA Services (regardless of whether Reed Taylor was owed any funds or not). 5
11. The ,\.ttorneys Of Hawley Troxell And Quarles & Brady Must Be
Disqualified Because They Were Never Retained Or Employed By Duly
Authorized Representatives Of AJA Services And AJA Insurance.
"A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting
through its duly authorized constituents." RPC l.13(a).
When a managing officer has been validly removed, he has no authority to institute legal
proceedings in the name of the corporation. American Center for Education, Inc. v. Cavnar, 145
CaLRptr. 736, (1978) (citing Templeman v. Grant, 75 Colo. 519, 534-35, 227 P. 555 (Colo.
1924) ("It is also true that neither the plaintiff Templeman nor the former directors ... had any
5

Moreover, Peter Jarvis succinctly opined that the likelihood of the Attorneys being witnesses was real, but that at
the minimum ''confidentiality and conflict of imerest considerations under Idaho RPC 1.6 through 1.10 and RPC
l.13" arc implicated even if the Attorneys were never forced to testify against their client. See Jarvis Alf, p. 6, 1
4(b).
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right or authority to assume to be officers of the ... corporation, or to institute legal proceedings in
the court ... in the name of the corporation.")); U.S. v. Wolf, 352 F.Supp.2d 1195 (W.D. Okla.
2004) (the court is not bound to defer to the parties' representations as to their authority to hire
counsel); Safeway Ins. Co. v. Spinak, 641 N.E.2d 834 (Ill.App. 1994) (holding that the
unauthorized filing of a lawsuit constituted a cause of action and subjected the attorneys to
exemplary damages).
With full knowledge of the Attorneys and individual defendants, the Attorneys in this
action have not been duly retained by AJA Services or AJA Insurance. Reed Taylor and Donna
Taylor have not been members of the board of AJA Services as required. Moreover, on February
22, 2007, Reed Taylor voted the shares of AJA Insurance and Reed Taylor is AIA Insurance's
only authorized officer and director. See Bond Aff., Ex. 7. John Taylor, Connie Taylor and
James Beck have not been duly appointed to the board of AJA Services or AJA Insurance, they
have not been re-elected through a proper shareholder meeting, and they all have acted
inappropriately and in an unauthorized manner in protecting John Taylor and thwarting Reed
Taylor from exercising his contractual rights. Moreover, John Taylor and Connie Taylor are
both licensed attorneys who have full knowledge of the obligations to properly operate a
corpomtion and who may properly authorize the representation of a corpomtion.

12. Assuming The Attorneys Are Authorized To Represent The
Corporations, The Attorneys Of Hawley Troxell And Quarles & Brady
Should Be Disqualified Because They Have Failed To Proceed In The
Best Interests Of AIA Services And AIA Insurance.
RPC I.13(b) expressly states that a lawyer is required to proceed in the bests interests of
the corporation:

Ill
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If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated
with the organi7.ation is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter
related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or
a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and this is likely
to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is
reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization ...

_:

RPC l.l 3(b) (emphasis added).
Here, the Attorneys have not proceeded in the best interests of AJA Services and AIA
Insurance as required by RPC Ll3(b) or seek guidance from disinterested constituents or the
Court. The Attorneys have full knowledge of improper transfers of assets, full knowledge of
inappropriate loan guarantees, full knowledge that the board of AIA Services is breaching their
fiduciary duties, full knowledge that John Taylor is directing the litigation to his interests and
other interested party's interests only, full knowledge that AJA Insurance is pledged to Reed
Taylor and he has voted the shares pursuant to his rights and Idaho law, and full knowledge that
they have been assisting the individual defendants breach fiduciary duties and commit other
torts. The Attorneys have utterly failed in their duties to AJA Services and AJA Insurance.
Instead, the Attorneys are inappropriately representing the interests of John Taylor, Connie
Taylor, James Beck, Mike Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, CropUSA and others.

13. Assuming The Attorneys Were Authorized To Represent The
Corporations, All Of The Attorneys Should Be Disqualified Because None
Of Them Received The Required Informed Consent From The
Appropriate Representative Of AIA Services And AIA Insurance.
A consent to dual representation required by RPC 1. 7 mandates that "the consent shall be
given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is to be
represented, or by the shareholders." RPC l.13(g).
,

The Attorneys have entered into a joint defense agreement representing the interests of
John Taylor, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, Connie Taylor, and James Beck (and likely other
.'
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.

unnamed individuals who have been responsible or taken part in the corporate malfeasance and
general conspiracy), while disregarding the interests of the corporations. Under RCP 1.13(g),
authorization for such a representation is required by the shareholders or other disinterested
parties. However, all of the Attorneys failed to obtain shareholder or disinterested party consent
of the joint representation, joint defense and joint retainer as required by the Rules of
Professional Conduct, let alone the required consent from Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor.

14. It Is Impossible For Any Of The Attorneys From Hawley Troxell,
Quarles & Brady Or Clements, Brown & McNichols To Obtain The
Required Informed Consent.
"[I]n some circumstances multiple representation may be permissible if both clients are
fully informed of potential conflict and the parties consent to the representation. This consent
rationale seems peculiarly inaoplicable to a derivative action, because the cm;poration must
c-0nsent !hrough the directors. who. as in

the

oresent case. are the individual

defendants."

Forrest v. Baeza, 58 Cal.App.4'h 65, 76, 6i Cal.Rptr.2d 857 (Cal. 1997) citing Opinion 842,
Association of the City of New York Committee on Professional Ethics (Jan. 4, 1960) (emphasis
added).
Here, this action involves a creditor of an insolvent corporation and stock pledgee, Reed
Taylor, pursuing claims against the directors of AIA Services and purported directors of AIA
Insurance for fraud, breaches of fiduciary duties, conversion, conspiracy and other claims
involving corporate malfeasance. Moreover, Reed Taylor's claims are significant in nature (i.e.,
not business judgment rule claims) and he is the only authorized person to act on behalf of AIA
Insurance after he voted the shares on February 22, 2007. Notwithstanding Reed Taylor's vote,
the individual defendants are interested by way of their common ownership in CropUSA, their
common goals of preventing Reed Taylor and innocent shareholders from discovering and
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pursuing claims relating to the significant fraud and corporate malfeasance that has transpired at
AIA Services and AIA Insurance, and the common goal of preventing Reed Taylor and others
from exercising their contractual rights. Hawley Troxell and Quarles & Brady and individual
defendants have a vested interest in keeping the truth from Reed Taylor and the Court, and
accomplishing these acts without authority from AIA Services or AIA Insurance.
Similarly, appropriate informed consent could not have been obtained for Clements,
Brown & McNichols to withdraw from representing AJA Service and AIA Insurance because the
presumed waivers would have been given by unauthorized parties and/or interested parties who
were defendants and who should have been the subject of claims by the corporations.

15. The Attorneys Could Not Have Obtained The Required Conflict Waiver
Because AIA Services Is Insolvent.
The fiduciary duty owed to creditors of a bankrupt (or in this case insolvent) client
constrains a lawyer's ability to waive conflicts of interest. In re Running Hor.ve, L.L.C., 371 B.R.
446, 453 (E.D. Cal. 2007). A lawyer may not enter into a representation that affects the lawyer's
representation ofa third party. RPC 1.7(aX2).
Here, AIA Services is and has been insolvent. Although this matter is not in Bankruptcy
Court (likely because John Taylor and the other individuals do not want their actions and
transactions scrutinized by a bankruptcy trustee), the same principals apply because of AIA
Services' insolvency and the requirement to protect the interests of the creditors. Therefore,
Reed Taylor's consent would have been required to waive any conflicts of interest associated
with multiple representations. However, the Attorneys failed to obtain the required waivers from
Reed Taylor.

Ill
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16. The Questions Of Obtaining The Appropriate Waivers For The
Atttoroeys Are Not Even Reached Because The Diverging Interests
Between John Taylor, AIA Insurance, AIA Services And CropUSA Are
Irreconcilable And Unwaivable.
"If a lawyer reasonably believes representation of a client will be adversely affected by
the concurrent representation of another client, the question of waiver is not reached." State v.

Rooks, 130 Wn.App. 787, 125 P.3d 192, 198 (2005); see also RPC 1.8. Even if a waiver is
lawfully obtained after full disclosure, the actual conflicts of interest and potential conflicts of
interest prevents the " ... Court from accepting any waiver which may be given by [the
defendant] ... " U.S. v. Edwards, 39 F.Supp.2d 716, 746 (M.D. La. 1999); see also Restatement
(I'hird) of The Law Governing Lawyers, § 122 (2000) ("Notwithstanding the informed consent
of each affected client or former client, a lawyer may not represent a client if.. .in the
circumstances, it is not reasonably likely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate
representation to one or more of the clients.").
Here, the interests of all three corporations

are irreconcilably divergent and there is no

possible way that the Attorneys could have reasonably believed that the interests of the
corporations would not be adversely affected by joint representation. Moreover, Reed Taylor
had voted the shares of AIA Insurance and the individual defendants who consented to any joint
representation were all interested parties. Thus, any purported waivers ai·e invalid because they
should never have been executed as the representation was not appropriate or properly
authorized. Finally, even if authorized, disqualification is warranted because any waiver would

be impermissible because of the actual conflicts and serious conflicts of interest in this action.

Ill
Ill
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17. No Proper Informed Consent Was Obt-.iined By Any Of The Attorneys
From Donna Taylor, Reed Taylor, Or Disinterested Officers, Directors
Or Shareholders.
Any conflict of interest in representing a majority shareholder and corporation in
litigation brought by a minority shareholder was not waived, where only the majority shareholder
approved the conflict waiver. Williams v. Stanford, 971 So.2d 722, 730 (Fla. 2008).
Michael McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNichols represented AJA Services, AJA
Insurance and John Taylor without obtaining consent from the minority shareholders of AIA
Services, the Preferred A Shareholder Donna Taylor, or Reed Taylor, the only person authorized
to vote the shares of AIA Insurance. Mr. McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNichols knew
that Donna Taylor had not been paid (and that her shares had priority over any other shareholder)
and knew that Reed Taylor had not been paid and had voted his shares. When Mr. McNichols
withdrew to only represent John Taylor, he was again required to have consent from the
foregoing parties.

However, Mr. McNichols failed to obtain the required consent and is

inappropriately representing John Taylor.
Similarly, Gary Babbitt, D. John Ashby and Hawley Troxell are and have been
inappropriately representing the interests of John Taylor and AJA Services, AIA Insurance and
CroplJSA-all of which have irreconcilable diverging conflicts of interest.

Any joint

representation required the consent of Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor, which Hawley Troxell
failed to obtain.
Finally, Quarles & Brady represented AJA Insurance in providing the improper opinion
letter to CropUSA's lender, represented AJA attempting to settle the case, and has acted as the
"lead" counsel in subsequent settlement discussions. Moreover, Quarles & Brady is admitted to
this case through Hawley Troxell, which creates a new set of conflicts by way of Hawley
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Troxell's conflicts. See Jarvis Aff.

18. The Attorneys Must Be Disqualified Because They Have Aided Each
Other In Violating Their Duties Of Loyalty Owed To Their Respective
Clients And Former Clients.
Even if there is no evidence that a replacement attorney received confidential
information, the attorney must be disqualified if such attorney aids in the violation of an
impermissible conflict of interest. In re California Canners and Growers, 74 B.R. 336, 347
(N.D. Cal. 1987) (citing Funds of Funds. Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 233 (2nd
Cir. 1977) (disqualification was ordered for both the referring firm and referee firm)).
Here, the Attorneys have assisted each other in violating duties of loyalty owed to their
respective clients. Under this same rationale, both the referring attorneys and referee attorneys
must be disqualified and the Court should order that the Attorneys have no involvement in
referring the defendants to new counsel.

19. The Attorneys Cannot Rely Upon The Improper Instructions From John
Taylor To Perpetrate A Fraud Against Reed Taylor, AlA Insurance, AIA
Services, And It's Innocent Shareholders.
"[A]n attorney may not hide behind a client's instructions in order to perpetrate a fraud
against a third party." The Florida Bar v. Feige, 596 So.2d 433, 435 (Fla. 1992).
Here, the Attorneys have full knowledge that John Taylor is directly or indirectly
controlling the litigation in this action. The Attorneys have full knowledge that John Taylor has
not been operating AIA Services or AIA Insurance for the benefit of its shareholders or creditors
in light of insolvency, yet the Attorneys have taken instructions from R. John Taylor in violation
of the Rules of Professional Conduct and failed to notify disinterested parties or shareholders of
the improper acts ofR. John Taylor. The Attorneys have full knowledge that their clients' acts
(and R. John Taylor) are defrauding Recd Taylor and the innocent shareholders of AIA Services
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(to the extent that they have any claims after the moneys owed to Reed Taylor are paid in full).

20. The Joint Defense Agreement And Joint Retainer Agreement Entered
Into By The Defendants Violate }3thical Rules For The Conflicting
Attorneys Violate Public Policy And Are Unenforceable.
Contracts that violate ethical rules violate public policy and are wienforceable. Evans &
Luptak, PLC v. Lizza, 251 Mich.App. 187, 650 N.W.2d 364, 370 (Mich. 2002).
Herc, AJA Insurance and AIA Services allegedly entered into a Joint Defense Agreement
and Joint Retainer Agreement purportedly drafted by Hawley Troxell. See Bond Aff., Ex. 10
Goint meeting minutes of the pwported boards of AIA Services and AIA Insurance approval a
Joint Defonse and Retainer). Presumably, CropUSA was also made a party to the Joint Defense
and Joint Retainer Agreement, however, this information has not been provided. However, these
"Joint" agreements violate ethical rules, were never authorized, and are unenforceable, as are the
purported waivers that the Attorneys will presumably argue are obtained in such agreements.
Finally, the Court should not permit the defendants to enter into joint defense agreements in the
future.

21. Assuming Representation Was Permissible By The Attorneys, They
Should Be Disqnalified Because They Arc Prevented From Jointly
Defending The Corporations And The Individual Defendants In This
Case.
Conflicts of interest pertaining to the joint representation of one or more organizations
and one or my constituents of the organizations are not permissible:
[A] lawyer may not represent both an organization and a director, officer, employee,
shareholder ... or other individual or organization associated with the organization if there
is a substantial risk that the lawyer's representation of either would be materially and
adversely affected by the lawyer's duties to the other.
Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers, § 131 (2008).

Ill

000176

PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION TO DISQUALIFY - 48

Courts and commentators have consistently stated that an attorney cannot represent an
officer or director and the corporation when allegations of fraud are made against the officer or
director. Law of Corp. Officers & Dir.: Indemn. & Ins. § 4:5 (2006) ("An attorney may not
represent both the board of directors and the corporation where the directors are alleged to have
committed fraud."); Forrest v. Baeza, 58 Cal. App. 4th 65, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 857 (!st Dist. 1997)
(An attorney may not represent both corporation and directors in a shareholder suit where the

directors are alleged to have committed fraud.); Musheno v. Gensemer, 897 F. Supp. 833 (M.D.

Pa. 1995) (An attorney representing a corporation and its board of directors in a shareholder suit
would be disqualified from representing a corporation, where the complaint alleged fraud and
self-dealing by directors, revealing a clear divergence of interests between a corporation and its
directors).
Thus, the Attorneys may not directly, or indirectly through any joint defense agreement,
represent the interests of John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee
Duclos, Bryan Freeman, AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CroplJSA and any other interested
organization or individual defendant, particularly those parties with, or who should have, claims
of corporate malfeasance against them. By analogy, the Attorneys may also not represent the
interests of CropUSA, AIA Services and AIA Insurance because Reed Taylor's Fifth Amended
Complaint (and all the evidence above) demonstrates that AIA Services and AIA Insurance
should be pursuing claims against CroplJSA and the responsible individuals.

22. As The Pledgee Of AIA Insurance And The Only Person Authorized To
Vote Its Shares, Reed Taylor Has Not And Will Not Consent To The
Joint Representation Of AIA Insurance And Any Other Defendant.
Informed written consent is required for any joint representation.

RPC I. 7.

Disqualification of any attorney from subsequent representation is for the benefit of the fonner
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client and protects the client's feeling ofloyalty owed by the attorney, and can only be waived by
the client. Prospective Investment and Trading Co., Ltd. v. ORK Corp., 60 P.3d 520, 525 (Okla.
2002).
Here, Reed Taylor is the only person with the authority to waive any conflicts or consent
to the waiver of any conflicts pertaining to the joint representation of AJA Insurance. Reed
Taylor has not consented and will not consent to AL'i. Insurance being represented jointly with
any other defendant in this action by Clements, Brown & McNichols, Hawley Troxell or Quarles
& Brady.

See also Affidavit of Donna Taylor (who also does not consent as the priority

shareholder of AJA Services).

23. The Attomeys' Representation Results In Violations Of The Rules Of
Professional Conduct, Which Requires Their Withdrawal Or
Disqualification.
Once representation has commenced, a lawyer shall withdraw from the representation of
a client if "the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or the
law." RPC l.16(a)(a).
Here, in addition to the violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct outlined in this
Motion (any of which require withdrawal or disqualification), the Attorneys are aiding and
abetting John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, CropUSA and
other interested parties in the commission of breaches of fiduciary duties, fraud, fraudulent
conveyances, conspiracy, and other claims and/or offenses violation ofRPC 1.16. Consequently,
the Attorneys should v.ithdraw or be disqualified.
Thus, for any one or more of the reasons set forth above and any one or more violations
of the Rules of Professional Conduct identified or reasonably contemplated by this Motion, the
Attorneys should be disqualified.
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24. As A Matter Of Law, The Attorneys Should Be Disqualified Because
Their Representation ls Fraught With Potential Conflicts.
A lawyer should be disqualified for potential conflicts of interest associated with the
representation of multiple parties, which may be decided as a matter of law. Blecher & Collins,

P.C. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1442, 1454 (D.C. Cal. 1994) ("Even if an actual
conflict of interest did not arise, the multiple representation was fraught with potential
conflict. .. and [the law firm] fails to present any evidence that at the time the airlines retained it,
their interests were so perfectly aligned that no potential conflicts of interest existed.").
For all of the reasons set forth in this Motion, the Attorneys will face all of the issues
raised in this Motion once again if and when Reed Taylor takes control of AIA Insurance. For
example, even if Reed Taylor did not take control of AIA Insurance until after a full trial, he
would be entitled to pursue all of the claims and contlicts on behalf of AIA Insurance, including,
making any appeals and claims pertaining to conflicts of interest and improper legal
representation. For these reasons and others, disqualification and the relinquishment of AIA
Insurance to Reed Taylor is required to re-align the parties in this action and prevent further
litigation and appeals.
Moreover, while the defendants are attempting to make the appearance that their
representations are aligned, the likelihood of a future conflict of interest occurring in the joint
defense of tl1e defendants also presents a basis for disqualification now, rather than later.

25. The Self-Interests Of The Attorneys Require Their Disqualification.
A lawyer may not engage in a representation that serves his or her self interests and limits
the representation of one or more clients. RPC J.7(a)(2); see also Hendry v. Pelland, 73 F.3d
397, 403 (C.A.D.C. 1996) (simultaneously representing multiple parties in violation of the rules
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of ethics constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty).
Herc, the Attorneys have engaged in simultaneously representing multiple defendants in
violation of RPC 1. 7 and other rules of ethics, seemingly for the sole purpose of earning fees that
they may be required to disgorge later.

Similarly, the Attorneys appear to be refusing to
,I

withdraw because of their fear of claims by Reed Taylor or their o"'n clients.
26. Disqualification
Impropriety.

Is

Required

Because

Of The

Appearance

Of

The appearance of impropriety is a basis to disqualify opposing counsel. Weaver. 120
Idaho 692 (Ct. App. 1991). In Weaver, the Idaho Court of Appeals explained a four-part test to
determine whether an appearance of impropriety alone will give a party standing to interfere with
an adverse party's choice of counsel:
(I) Whether the motion is being made for the purposes of harassing the defendant, (2)
Whether the party bringing the motion will be damaged in some way if the motion is not
granted, (3) Whether there are any alternative solutions, or is the proposed solution the
least damaging under the circumstances, and (4) Whether the possibility of public
suspicion will outweigh any benefits that might accrue to continued representation.

Weaver, 120 Idaho at 698 (emphasis added). "The existence of an appearance of impropriety
should be determined from the perspective of a reasonable layperson." Clinard v. Blackwod, 46
S.W.3d 177, 187 (Tenn. 2001).
Here, the disqualification of the Attorneys is warranted because Reed Taylor is not
bringing the motion for harassment purposes, he will be damaged further if the motion is not
granted, there are no alternative solutions as the conflicts are irreconcilable, and the public would
be highly suspicious of any continued representation (particularly when the conflicts involve
corporations with shares held by the public). See Affidavit of Reed Taylor, p. 3, 'l[ 5; Jarvis Aff.
Based upon the perspective of a lay person (or any other person for that matter), the fairness to
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Reed Taylor and the significance of maintaining the integrity of the judicial system require the
law firms to be disqualified for any one or more of the reasons set forth in this Motion.
Moreover, the Attorneys are defendants in other lawsuits that involve claims of aiding
and abetting of the breach of fiduciary duties, fraud, conversion and other claims relating to the
Attorneys' exceeding their scope of representation, which are supported at least in part by the
same documents and subject matter of this lawsuit.

Significantly, the disqualification of the

Attorneys is also warranted because they are also witnesses (see Section 12 above).

27. For Any One Or More Of The Reasons Articulated Above, The Court
Should Disqualify The Attorneys By Its Own Motion.
A court has the power to disqualify an attorney through its own motion. In re California

Canners and Growers, 74 B.R. 336, 347 (N.D. Cal. 1987); see also FMC Technologies, Inc. v.
Edwards, 420 F.Supp.2d 1153, 1157 (W.D. WA. 2006) (courts have a "plain duty to act").
Here, the Court could also disqualify the Attorneys by its own motion under any one or
more of the reasons set forth above or such other basis as the Court may deem ·wirrranted.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated above, the Court should disqualify the Attorneys and law
firms of Hawley Troxell, Quarles & Brady and Clements, Brown & McNichols to resolve the
substantial unauthorized, irreconcilable, nonconsentable, and unwaivable c-0nflicts of interest
among the defendants and the Attorneys.
In addition, the Court should enter an order requiring each corporation under the control

of the individual defendants to retain separate counsel and not participate in any defense or "joint
defense agreements" with John Taylor or other interested parties. Finally, the Court should order
that the Attorneys have no participation in referring any of the defendants to new counsel.
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DATED: This 24'h day of September, 2008.

By:4~
:>
~

rickC. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Michael S. Bissell
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
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CERTlflCATE OF SERYICE
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct
copy of Amended Notice of Hearing and Reed Taylor's Amended Motion to Disqualify the
Attorneys and Law Firms of Hawley Troxell, Quarles & Brady and Clements, Bro"'n &
McNichols on the following parties via the methods indicated below:

David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Attorney for Defendants JoLee Duclos and
Bryan Freeman

Via:
(
(
(
(

)
)
)
)

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for R. John Taylor

(
(
(
(

)
)
)
)

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Faesimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
David R. Risley
Randall, Blake & Cox
1106 Idaho St.
Lewiston, ID 8350 I
Attorney for Connie Taylor, James Beck and
Corrine Beck

(
(
(
(

}
}
)
)

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
.
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
Gary D. Babbitt
D. John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
Attorneys for AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and
Crop USA Insurance Agency

(
(
(
(

)
)
)
)

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)
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Via:

James J. Gatziolis
Charles E. Harper
Quarles & Brady LLP
Citigroup Center, 500 West Madison Street
Suite 3700
Chicago, IL 60661-2511
Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance Agency
Charles A. Brown
Attorney at Law
324 Main Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneys for AJA Services 40l(k) Plan

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)
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Gaty D . Babbitt, ISB No. 1486
D . John Ashby, ISB No. 7228
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P. O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: (208) 344-6000
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829
Email: gdb@hteb. com
j ash@hteh. com

Attorneys for AIA Se1vices Co1poration,
AIA Inswance, Inc., and CropUSA
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single per~on,
Plaintiff;
vs.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corpotation; AIA INSURANCE, INC . , an
Idaho co1po1ation; R JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE
DUCWS, a single per~on; CROP USA
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC . , an Idaho
Corpo1ation; and JAMES BECK and
CORRlNE BECK, individually and the
community propeity comp1ised thereof~
Defendants.

)
)
)
}
)

)
)
)
)
}
)
)
)
}
)
)

Case No. CV-07-00208
AIA'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO
DISQUALIFY COUNSEL

}

)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~).

)

AIA SERVICES CORPORAIION, an Idaho
corporation; and AIA INSURANCE, INC , an
Idaho corporation,
Counterclaimants,
vs .

)
)
)
)
)
)

AIA'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL
40005 0006 1309816 2
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EXHIBIT C

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,

)
)

Counterdefendant..
)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~>

AIA Services Cotporation and AIA Insurance, Inc . (collectively, "AIA''), by and through
their counsel ofrecord, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP (''Hawley Troxell"), submit this
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff'Reed Taylor's Motion to Disqualify the Attorneys and
Law Films of Hawley Irnxell Ennis & Hawley LLP; Clements, Brown & McNichols, PA.; and
Quarles & Brady LLP ("DQ Motion'').. This Memorandum is supported by the Affidavits of
John A Strait, .JoLee Duclos, Gary D. Babbitt, Richard A Riley and Patrick V. Collins, and the
Exhibits thereto.

AIA'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL
400050006 13098162
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I. INTRODUCTION
After sixteen months oftlueats to disqualify Hawley Troxell, Plaintiff has finally filed a
Motion to Disqualify Hawley Troxell (as well as all other defense counsel except David Gittins),
but not before first: (1) threatening to file a separate malpractice action against Hawley Troxell
and to deliver a copy of the complaint to the Idaho State Bar if the law firm did not voluntarily
withd.Iaw (Affidavit of Gary D.. Babbitt ["Babbitt Aff "] Exs. 3 and 4); (2) as a precursor to
commencement of a supposedly dexivative malpractice action against Hawley Troxell, engaging
co-counsel to deliver to the directors of'Hawley Troxell's clients, AIA Services Cozporation and
AIA Insurance, a demand that the corporations sue their lawyers (Affidavit of Roderick C.. Bond
in Support of Reed Taylor's Motion to Disqualify, etc. ["Bond Aff.'1 Ex. 16); and (3) filing a
separate lawsuit alleging supposedly direct claims against Hawley Troxell related to its defense
of the AIA entities in this litigation (Bond Aff Ex. 38) Plaintiffs motion to disqualify counsel
is one manifestation of a concerted scheme to manufacture conflicts of interest between Hawley
Troxell and its clients in order to gain an unfair and unconscionable advantage in this litigation.
It is an abuse of the judicial process and the spirit of Rules 3. 1, 3..4 and 4 4 of the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct..
Hawley Troxell undertook its representation of Defendants AIA Services Corporation
and its wholly-owned subsidiary, AIA Insurance, Inc., and later agreed to act as local counsel fo1
Defendant Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc based on its assessment that these Defendants
share a common interest in ptesenting a united front to oppose Plaintiffs claims and the relief he
seeks against all of them, jointly and sever·ally, and in.controlling litigation costs that AIA is
obligated to advance to the individual Defendants. Hawley Troxell's clients have a common

AIA'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL - 1
40005 0006' 1309816 2

000190

interest in defending against the shotgun claims Plaintiff has asse1ted indisc1iminantly against
them and have common defenses to most, if not all, of these claims .
Disqualification at this late date would result in severe prejudice to the co1porate
Defendants and the possible loss ofmetitorious defenses. It would be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, for the cotporate Defendants to hire new counsel. Moreover, any new counsel, even
separate counsel for each co1p01ate Defendant, would face the prospect of being sued if Plaintiff
did not consent to theil' appointment.
For the reasons articulated in the Affidavit of John A Sttait and in this Memorandum,
there is no basis whatsoever for disqualification of Hawley Troxell under the circumstances ofits
representation of the corporate Defendants in this case. In patticular (but without limitation):
o

Plaintiff's motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell is untimely and brought at this
late time for tactical purposes .

o

Reed Taylor is not a creditor, but a fotmer shareholder to whom redemption
payments are 1estricted by statute and AIA Setvices' aiticles of incorporation.

o

Hawley Troxell represents only the corporate Defendants and not, either directly
or indirectly through the Joint Defense Agreement, any of the individual Director
Defendants .

o

All claims between or among the Defendants have been tolled and preserved
pending the outcome of the defense of this case.
·

o

The Defendants share a common inteiest in defending Plaintiffs claim.
Accordingly, the Defendants ai·e legally entitled to enter into the joint defense
agreement; and Hawley Troxell's participation in the agreement does not violate
any applicable legal or ethical mies

Plaintiffs Amended Motion to Disqualify Hawley Troxell should be dismissed.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff appears to be using the DQ Motion as a fotum for repeating his allegations
against the Defendants, rathei· than focusing on issues relating to counsel's role. As a result,
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Plaintiffs motion to disqualify counsel and the supporting Bond Affidavitl are replete with
inaccwate allegations of unproven (and unprovable) "fact", intermixed with unsubstantiated
opinions and enoneous legal conclusions of Plaintiff's counsel, many or most of which aie
irrelevant to Plaintiff's motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell. Insofar as relevant to Plaintiff's
allegations in this case, Hawley Troxell's role has been limited to representation of the corporate
Defendants in the defense of Plaintiff's lawsuit, issuing an opinion letter that had no effect on
Plaintiff's alleged rights, and documenting a transaction that merely permitted AIA Services to
pay its legal bills without impairing Plaintiff's alleged secwity interest in certain collateral.
The following recitation of facts is limited to those facts pertinent to the motion to
disqualify Hawley Troxell. That this Memorandum does not address ceitain of Plaintiff's or his
counsel's allegations of fact or conclusions of law should not be construed as tacit admission of
their accwacy or correctness.

A.

1995 And 1996 AIA Se1vices Stock Redemption T1·ansactions.
The original Stock Redemption Agreement between AIA Services and Reed Taylor was

signed as ofJuly 22, 1995. Section 2 ..5 of the Agreement contemplated that the $1.5 million cash
Downpayment would be deliver·ed at Closing.. Howevei, AIA Services did not have the cash
available for that pwpose; and the patties executed an Addendwn to Stock Redemption
Agreement, also as of July 22, 1995, providing for a short term Downpayrnent Note in the

1

Mr. Bond's Affidavit is fraught with supposed "facts" of which he cannot possibly have personal
knowledge, as well as opinions and conclusions of law not properly includable in an affidavit As a
direct result, the opinions proffered by Plaintiff's experts, being expressly based on Mr. Bond's
Affidavit and discussions with Mr. Bond concerning his opinions about the case, are entitled to little
weight because their conclusions are premised on enoneous assumptions
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amount of $1.5 million payable within 90 days of the execution of the Addendum Closing
occuned on or about August 15, 1995.
At the time of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement between AIA Services and Reed

1 aylor, AIA Se1vices hoped to raise in excess of $7 million through a private placement of its
Series B preferred stock and wauants This anticipated private placement and the stock
redemption agreement with Reed were submitted to the shareholders ofAIA Services for
approval and were approved at a shareholder meeting held in March 1995. Affidavit ofJoLee
Duclos ("Duclos Aff.") Bxs. 1, 2 and 3..
In connection with the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, in which Reed Taylor was
represented by a Seattle law firm (Caimcross Hempelmann), the law firm of Eberle Berlin
Kading Tmnbow & McKlveen, Chtd ("Eberle Ber·lin") rendered an opinion dated August 15,

1995 addressed to Reed Taylor" Bond Aff:. Ex. 2 . At that time, Richard A. Riley, now a lawyer
with Hawley Troxell, was a shareholder of Eberle Berlin and worked on the AIA Services stock
redemption transaction The opinion was given by the law firm, not by any individual attorney
in the firm. Affidavit of Richard A Riley (''Riley Aff") ,-2.
The anticipated private placement of Sezies B preferred stock and wan·ants to raise
capital was unsuccessful; and AIA Services was unable to pay the Downpayment Note when due
or to make payments on the $6 million note. Duclos Aft' Ex . 4. In Aptil and June 1996, Reed
Taylor gave AIA Services formal written notice of default, including failW'e to pay the
Downpayment Note or to pay the interest on the $6M Note Bond Aff Ex. 3 41[ D The entire
transaction was restructured as of .July 1, 1996; and the 1996 Stock Redemption RestmctUI'e
Agreement and related agreements replaced and superseded the 1995 Stock Redemption
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Agreement and related agreements in their entirety. Bond Aff Ex. 3 1 G. Eberle Berlin did not
render an opinion in connection with the restructured 1996 obligations . Riley Aff 13..

B.

1999-2000: Or·ganization Of' CmpUSA.
According to the records of the Idaho Secretary of State, Crop USA Insurance Agency,

Inc. ("CropUSA'') was 01iginally inco1porated under the name AIA Crop Inswance, Inc . in
November 1999. Hawley Trnxell was not engaged to rendei~ and did not provide, any legal
services or othei· assistance in connection with the fo1mation, ownership structw·e, govemance or
strut up of CropUSA. In pazticular (but without limitation) Hawley T10xell was not engaged to
provide, and did not provide, any advice 01 othei· legal seivices or other assistance concerning
the issuance of CrnpUSA common stock to the AIA Services Corpo1ation Series C Prefened
Stockholders. Hawley Troxell was first engaged by CropUSA, in February 2001, to provide
legal se1vices in connection with a proposed Regulation A offeiing ofCropUSA stock. At no
time has Hawley Troxell been engaged to provide any advice or other legal services, and at no
time has Hawley Troxell provided any legal advice or other legal services, to AIA Services, AIA
Insurance, CropUSA or any othei· person concerning the allocation of or accounting for salazies,
other expenses, employees, assets or other· resow·ces between or among AIA Seivices, AIA
Insurance and/or CropUSA.. Riley Aff. W6, 7.
C.

2001 Pal'ldng Lot Pur·chase.

The DQ Motion (p. 12) references transactions involving a parking lot purchased by John
and Connie Taylor.. Hawley Troxell was not engaged to provide and did not provide any legal
seivices or other assistance to John or Connie Taylor, AIA Seivices, AIA Inswance, CropUSA
or any other pei'Son in connection with any facet of this ttansaction. Riley Aff. 18.
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D.

2004 AIA Insunnce Purchase Of AIA Services Stock Fr·om Crop USA.

The DQ Motion (p. 4) references an August 2004 transaction in which AIA Insurance
purchased from CropUSA shares of Series C Prefeued Stock of AIA Services Corporation for
I

$1,510,693 . Hawley Troxell was not engaged to provide and did not provide any legal services
or other· assistance to AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA or any other person in connection
with any facet of this transaction. In pmticular (but without limitation), Hawley Troxell was not
engaged to advise any person in connection with the sow·ce of funding for the pmchase, the
effect (if any) of Reed's secwity interest in the commissions emned by AIA Insw·ance, or the
accounting for this transaction.. Riley Aff. if 9.

E.

Radio Station Tr·ansactions.
The DQ Motion {p. 13) references transactions involving Pacific Empire Radio

Cotporation Hawley Troxell was not engaged to provide and did not provide any legal setvices
or other assistance to AJA Services, AIA Insw·ance, CropUSA or any other per'Son in connection
with any facet of any transaction involving Pacific Empire Radio Corporation. Riley Aff. ir 10
F.

2006 Hawley Troxell Opinion On Surge Loan To CropUSA.

The DQ Motion (pp . 5-6) references an opinion given by Hawley Troxell in connection
with an October· 2006 loan to CropUSA by an umelated lender, Sw·ge Capital (referenced in the
opinion letter· as Lancelot Investors Fund).. Bond Aff. Ex . 35.. Hawley Troxell was engaged by
CropUSA to provide the local counsel opinion ofbonower's counsel. Hawley Troxell did not
provide legal services to CropUSA or AJA Inswance in connection with the negotiation or
documentation of the loan. Affidavit of Patrick V. Collins ("Collins Aft:."), 2. Hawley Troxell
was retained as local Idaho counsel solely for pwposes of opining on Idaho law issues that could
not be addressed by Quarles & Brady, counsel for CropUSA. Id.
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The Surge loan documents included guarantees of the debt by AIA Inswance, Inc and
John Taylor. AIA Services Corporation was not a party to the loan.. In the opinion letter, Hawley
Troxell opined that the execution, delivery and performance of the AIA Insurance guaranty were
duly authorized.. The due authorization opinion was based in part on certified copies of
resolutions adopted by the AIA lnsW'ance, Inc . Board of Directors.. The AIA Insw·ance board
resolutions authorizing its guar·antee were drafted by the lender's counsel, not Hawley Troxell;
were adopted by the AIA Inswance Board of Directors without involvement by Hawley Troxell;
and were delivered to Hawley Troxell for the film's reliance in giving the opinion. See Collins
Aff 11.
The DQ Motion (p. 21) alleges that the AIA lnsW'ance guaranty was expressly prohibited
by the Articles oflncmporation ofAIA Se1vices Co1poration. (Significantly, Plaintiff's motion
does not - and could not - allege that the guaranty was prohibited by the mticles of incotporation
of AIA Insurance..) The reference to AIA Services' Articles of Incorporation likely relates to
Section 4.2 . 9(c) of the Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation (Bond Aff. Ex. 19) in
which AIA Services covenants, for the benefit ofthe holder of the Series A Prefefl'ed Stock,
Donna Taylor, that AIA Services will not, and will not permit any subsidimy to, gum·anty any
Indebtedness (subject to inapplicable exceptions). There is no comparable provision in the
mticles of incorporation of AIA Insurance (Babbitt Aff Ex . lB), which Hawley Troxell
reviewed in connection with the opinion. Because AIA Services Corporation was not a pmty to
the Surge loan transaction, the legal opinion sought by the lender did not seek any legal opinions
regmding AIA Services Corporation and, ther·efore, Hawley Iroxell did not review the articles of
incorporation of AIA Services in prepming the opinion. Collins Aff

14.
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In August 2008, the Surge loan lender assigned its tights as lender to Hudson Inswance
Company; and Hudson subsequentlypw·chased assets ofCropUSA and assumed CropUSA's
obligations as bo1rowe1 under the Surge loan. Babbitt Aff. Exs . 11 and 12. As a result, Hudson
is both lender and borI"Ower, thereby discharging the Swge loan and extinguishing the guarantee
by AIA Insw·ance. AIA Inswance was never called upon to pay one cent under its guarantee.

G.

Other· "Related Party" Transactions.
The DQ Motion (at 16) references "related party" transactions identified in the Affidavit

of Paul E. Pederson. Othet than the legal opinion of bonowei" s local counsel provided to the
lender on behalf of CropUSA in connection with the Sw-ge loan desc1ibed above, Hawley
I roxell was not engaged to provide and did not prnvide any advice 01 other legal se1vices or
other assistance to AIA Setvices, AIA Insw·ance, CropUSA or any other person in connection
with any of the transactions identified in paiagraph 11 of the Pederson Affidavit Riley Aff.

H.

2007 Limited Scope Engagements Of' Hawley Troxell To Defend AIA Entities And
CropUSA.
The law fum of Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. initially appeared in this case for

AIA Setvices, AIA Insw·ance and John Taylor.. Aftei· obtaining a temporary restraining order to
enjoin Reed ftom his wee hour attempt to take possession of the companies' offices and from
intetfeting with the opetation of the companies' business, Clements, Brown & McNichols
withdrew from representation of the two AIA entities pursuant to Comt order dated April 13,
2007 .

1..

2007 Initial Engagement OfHawley T1oxell By AIA.. In connection with Hawley

Iroxell's agreement to unde1take the representation ofAIA Setvices and AIA Inswance, Hawley
Troxell entei·ed into a written engagement/conflict waivei· agreement with AIA Seivices and AIA
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Insurance; obtained conflict waivers from all of the other Defendants (as well as CropUSA
which, although not then named as a Defendant, was identified in Reed's complaint as a
participant in t:Iansactions that Reed contends we1e improper); and required that each Defendant
execute a standstill and tolling agreement which tolled and preserved any possible claims that
might be brought against that Defendant by any other Defendant. In addition, the boards of
directors of AIA Services and AJA Insurance reviewed and approved the engagement/conflict
waivet letter· agreement and the standstill and tolling agreements at a meeting on April 30, 2007 .
Babbitt Aff. 1 8; Bond Aff. Ex . 10.
In connection with Hawley Troxell's appearance in the case, Defendants' counsel
proposed to their respective clients a Joint Defense Agreement among the Defendants. Babbitt
Aff. 1 9.. At the Aptil 30, 2007 meeting, the AIA Services and AIA Insw·ance boards of directors
approved the corporations' participation in the Joint Defense Agreement, as well as execution of
the related standstill and tolling agreements.. See Bond Aff:. Ex. 10.. Each of the Defendants did
in fact sign a standstill and tolling agreement and the Joint Defense Agreement. Babbitt Aff. 1 9 .

2.

Sub.sequent Engagement Of Hawley Tmxell As Local Counsel For CropUSA .

Later in 2007, Reed filed an amended complaint naming CropUSA, Connie Taylor, and Jim and
Conine Beck as Defendants.. As an accommodation to CropUSA and its counsel, Quarles &
Biady, Hawley Troxell agreed to serve as CropUSA's local counsel and filed a motion for
limited admission of Quarles & Brady pro hac vice. In connection with the addition of the newly
named Defendants and Hawley Troxell's agreement to serve as local counsel for CropUSA, all
of the Representation Agreements were revised to reflect the additional defendants - Connie
Taylor and .Jim and Conine Beck, in addition to CropUSA- named in Reed's amended
complaint. Effective as of November 1, 2007, Hawley Troxell enter·ed into an
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engagement/conflict waiver letter agreement with CropUSA agieeing to seive as local counsel
with Quailes & Brady as lead counsel; AIA Seivices and AJA Insurance signed an amended
engagement/conflict waivei· letter agreement; and all of the Defendants entered into an Amended
and Restated Standstill and Tolling Agreement and an Amended Joint Defense Agreement.
Babbitt Aft:. if 8
3..

Rep,.esentation Agreements Hawley Troxell's representation of its clients in this

case is based on (i) infotmed written conflict waivers by the three cotporations and by each of
the individual Defendants, (ii) standstill and tolling agreements between and among the three
corporate Defendants and all of the individual Defendants, thereby presetving all claims between
or among the Defendants pending the outcome of this case, and (iii) a joint defense agi·eement
These documents ai·e collectively rnfei·enced in this Memorandum as the "Representation
Agi·eements". 2

I.

2007 Distribution Of Building Mor1gage By ULIC To AJA Services.
In 1993, The Univei·se Life Insurance Company (''ULIC''), a wholly-owned subsidiaiy of

AIA Services, sold the Lewis Claik Plaza office building (the old Lewis Claik Hotel in
Lewiston) to Washington Bank Propeities . See documents included in Bond Aff Ex 32 . The
purchase price included a note payable by Washington Bank Properties secured by a deed of
tiust on the building. Id Title to the note and deed oftmst, sometimes referenced by the paities
in this litigation as the "Mortgage", was vested by operation oflaw in the ULIC Liquidator when
the insurei· was placed in liquidation. Idaho Code § 41-3.318(1 ).. During the liquidation

2

The Reptesentation Agreements constitute attorney-client and joint defense privileged
communications. To protect the applicable ptivileges, AJA has filed a motion requesting that the
Comt issue an order permitting AIA to file the Representation Agreements undeI' seal for in camera
inspection.
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pmceedings, AIA Services and the Liquidator negotiated settlement of certain claims against one
another. The settlement included mutual releases and the distribution of the note and deed of
trust to AIA Services, ULIC's parent company. See documents included in Bond Aff Ex. 32 .
Hawley Troxell worked with the ULIC Liquidator to document the settlement agreement and to
prepare the assignments of the note and deed of tiust and related documents necessary to tiansfer·
the Mortgage in accordance with the settlement agreement. Riley Aff , 13.
In the Amended and Restated Pledge Agreement dated as of .July 1, 1996 ("Pledge

Agreement"), AIA Services granted Reed a secmity interest in the ULIC stock owned by AIA
Se1vices and in all noncash dividends and other property distributed in respect of the ULIC
shares. Bond Aff. Ex 4.. Neither the Pledge Agr·eernent nor the Idaho Unifmm Commercial
Code entitles Reed to any dividend or distribution in respect of the pledged ULIC shares,
including (without limitation) the Mmtgage, unless and until Reed forecloses on the ULIC shares
in accordance with the UCC. In pledging the note and deed of trust, AIA Services did not
pwport to extinguish any properly perfected seem ity interest Plaintiff may have had. Rather, if
Reed has a valid and perfected secmity interest in the Mmtgage (as apparently asse1ted by
Plaintiff), that secmity inter·est would continue to encumber· the Mottgage notwithstanding the

assignment of the Mo1tgage by AIA Services to CropUSA for security pmposes
J.

AIA's Contr·actual Obligation To Advance Defense Costs To The Individual
Defendants.
I..

IBCA and Bylaws Obligate AJA to Advance Litigation Expenses. The AIA

Inswance, Inc. bylaw provisions on indemnification and expense advances appear in Article XI
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of the Bylaws of Al.A Inc.3 adopted .Janumy 5th 1988 . Bond Aft'. Ex. 20 . 4 Section 1Ll of the
Bylaws provides that "[t]he c01po1ation shall indemnify the directors and executive officers of
the co1po1ation to the full extent pennitted by the Idaho Business Cmporation Act, as the same
exists or may hereafter be amended ..... " Accordingly, the scope ofpennissible indemnification
and expense advances is govemed by the cuuent statutes, Idaho Code§§ 30-1-850 to 30-1-859.
Idaho Code§ 30-1-858(1) provides, in peitinent part:
"A co1potation may, by a provision in its ... bylaws ... , obligate
itself in advance of the act or omission giving iise to a proceeding
to ..... advance funds to pay for or reimburse expenses in accordance
with section 30-1-853(3) ...... Any such obligat01y provision shall

be deemed to satisfy the requirements for authorization referred to
in section 30-1-853(3) .... Any such provision that obligates the
corporation to provide indemnification to the fullest extent
permitted by law 'Jhall be deemed to obligate the corporation to
advance funds to pay for 01 reimburse expenses .... to the fullest
extent pe1mitted by law, unless the provision specifically provides
otheiwise." (Emphasis added)
By Section 11. l of the Bylaws, AIA 1!1surance, Inc. has obligated itself in advance to indeinnify
its directors and executive officers to the full extent pe1mitted by law and thei·eby, pursuant to
Idaho Code§ 30-1-858(1), has obligated itself to pay or reimburse all litigation expenses
incuued by the co1poration's present or fo1mer directors and officers who m·e Defendants in this
case . Fmther, Section 11.5 of the AIA Insmance Bylaws expressly p1ovides that "[t]he

corporation shall advance, ptior to the final disposition of any proceeding, promptly following
request therefor, all expenses incuned by any director;

officer~

or employee or other agent ofthe

corporation ... upon receipt of an undertaking by or on behalf of such person to repay [the

3

AJA lnswance, Inc . was otiginally incorpornted under the name A.I.A., Inc.

4

Aiticle XI of the New Restated Bylaws of AIA Services Corporation contains essentially the same
provisions as the AIA Insurance Bylaws. See Bond Aff Ex 21.

AIA'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL - 12
40005 00061309816 2

000201

advances] if it should ultimately be dete1mined that such person is not entitled to be indemnified
under this Aiticle XI or othetwise." (Emphasis added. ) Each of the individual defendants bas
executed and delivered the required unde1taking.. Duclos Aff Ex. 8.
Accordingly, AIA Insurance is obligated by its Bylaws and Idaho Code§ 30-1-858(1) to
advance litigation expenses to the Defendants in this case In addition, pw·suant to Idaho Code

§ 30-1-858(1 ), Bylaws Section 11. l is deemed by statutory fiat to satisfy the auth01ization
requirement ofldaho Code§ 30-1-853(3).
Note also that Section 11 6 (Enforcement) of the AIA Inswance Bylaws provides that all
tights to indemnification and expenses under Article XI are contractual tights and are
enforceable against the corporation by its directors and officers; Section 11..8 (Survival of
Rights) provides that the rights conferred by Aiticle XI continue as to any person (such as JoLee
Duclos and B1yan Freeman) who ceases to be a di1ect0l' 01 officer· of the corporation;
Section 11.9 (Amendments) provides that repeal or modification of Article XI is prospective
only and shall not affect tights in effect at the time of the alleged occun·ence of the act or
omission to act that is the cause of the proceeding against any agent of the corp01ation; and
Section 11 . 10 (Savings Clause) provides that, in the event of invalidity of any provision in
Article XI of the Bylaws, the co1poration shall nevertheless indemnify each director and officer
to the full extent permitted by any valid provision of Article XI 01 other· applicable law. Section
11.9 in patticular, and all of these provisions read together, make it clear that indemnification
and expense advance rights of a director or officer of the cmporation vest at the time of the
occuuence of the alleged act or omission that resulted in the litigation filed against the
requesting patty.
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In the Cowt's May 31, 2007 Order, the Cowt rejected Reed's motion for a temporary
restraining order enjoining AIA Insurance from expending its resow·ces to pay legal fees
incw1·ed by defendants Tohn Taylor, Btyan Freeman and JoLee Duclos in defense of Reed's suit
The cowt held:
Idaho's statutoty scheme specifically provides for payment
oflegal fees reasonably incw1ed by a co1porate director, who is a
patty to an action because of the individual's status as a director, to
be paid by the corporation if the statuto1y requi1ements are met.
The Comt's record in the above-entitled matter reflects I.C.. § 30-1853 has been met by Defendants John Taylor, Bryan Freeman and
JoLee Duclos[] .
2.

AJA Se1vice.s Sha1eholder App1oval Of Expense Advances. In Mat:'Ch 2007, AIA

Se1vices solicited and obtained shareholder approval of the advance of litigation expenses
incmred by the individual Defendants in defense of Reed's lawsuit. See Bond A.fl Ex . 12. Reed
contends that AIA wrongfully obtained shar:eholder consent without full disclosm·e or vote of
only disinterested shareholders.5 DQ Motion (at pp . 9). To the extent Reed may be assetting
this argument as a basis for disqualifying Hawley Troxell, it is wholly inelevant: Hawley
Troxell was not asked to advise, and did not advise, AIA Se1vices in connection with its
solicitation of the vote of AJA Services shareholders in Mar'Ch 2007 to approve the advance of
litigation expenses to the individual Defendants, or the disclosUI'e made to the shar:·eholdeis by
the cotporation. Babbitt A:ff., 13 . Accordingly, the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of

5

This argument is legally incouect: There exists no legal obligation requiting AIA Setvices or its
directors to obtain shareholder approval of the expense advances . Idaho Code§§ 30-1-861 and
30-1-863 provide a safe harbor if a director's conflicting interest transaction is approved by the
disinterested shareholdez·s aftet disclosure of the material facts; but failw·e to obtain such a vote is not
wrongful. Fmthet" as discussed in the text above, the authorization required by Idaho Code § 30-1853(3) is satisfied by the Bylaw provisions obligating the cmporation to advance defense costs .
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shareholder approval as a safe harbor for advancement of litigation expenses is irrelevant to
Reed's disqualification motion.
Reed conectly observes that AIA Seivices and AIA Insur·ance did not obtain the consent
of Reed Taylor or Donna Taylor for the advance of litigation expenses to the individual
Defendants.. DQ Motion p. 9.. But Reed Taylor is not a shareholder of either AIA entity; Donna
is not a shareholder ofAIA Insw-ance: and Donna's Seiies A Prefeired Stock in AIA Services
Cmporation is non-voting. See Section 4.2 . 8 ofAIA Services Corporation's Amended and
Restated Articles of Incorporation Bond Aff. Ex. 19.

K.

2007 Documentation Of' Cl'opUSA Loan To AJA Services.
In Septembei 2007, AIA Services Corporation arranged to borrow up to $500,000 from

CropUSA. The loan is secur·ed by the assignment to CropUSA, for security purposes, of an asset
of AIA Services Cotporation - the promissory note payable by Washington Bank Properties and
seemed by a deed of trnst on One Lewis Clark Plaza. Hawley Troxell did not have any role in
negotiating or determining the te1ms of the loan anangement but iather acted as scrivener to
document the loan teims as agreed by AIA Seivices Corporation and CropUSA Collins Aff.

,5.

III. DISQUALIFICATION STANDARDS
The p1inciples governing the Cowt's consideration of a motion by one party to disqualify
the attorneys for the opposing party are most recently summarized in Crown v Hawkins Co. , 128
Idaho 114, 122, 910 P .2d 786, 794 (Ct.. App. 1996). As the party moving for disqualification of
counsel, Reed Taylor has the bwden of establishing grounds for the disqualification.. Crown v.

Hawkins Co. at 794 Though the decision to grant or deny a motion to disqualify counsel is
within the discretion of the tiial Court, the Court's goal should be to shape a remedy that will
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assw·e fairness to the parties and the integrity of the judicial process Id. at 795. "Whenever
possible, courts should endeavor to reach a solution that is least burdensome to the client." Id
(affitming the trial cowt's determination that the prejudice to the client ofremoving his counsel
shortly bef01e the ttial date "outweighed any potential ethical violation'').. The cost of separate
representation is one of the factors that may be considered when detennining whether common
representation is in the client's inte1est Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct ("IRCP") Rule 1.7,
cmt. 19 .
Fwther, as is the case here, "[w]here the motion to disqualify comes not from a client or
former client of the attorney, but from an opposing paity, the motion should be reviewed with
caution." Id. Disqualification motions brought by an opposing paity ai·e disfavored because they
ai·e "often made for tactical reasons, may result in unnecessary delay, and inteifere with a party's
right to employ counsel ofits choice." Cohen v Acorn Intemational. LTD., 921 F. Supp 1062,
1063-64. (S D.N..Y. 1995) ''For these reasons, a high standard of proof is required of those·
seeking disqualificatiol!." Id. Out of"'concem about 'tactical use of disqualification motions' to
haiass opposing counsel," courts act with caution in conside1ing motions to disqualify.

Richardson-Menell, Inc v. Koller, 472 U.S 424, 436 (1985); see alS'O id. at 441 (Brennan, J. ,
concuning) (''The tactical use of attorney-misconduct disqualification motions is a deeply
distwhing phenomenon in modem civil litigation.")
Mo1eover, "[a] motion to disqualify [an attorney] is of equitable natw·e, and a paity
making the motion should do so with reasonable diligence and promptness aftei· the facts have
become known." Schneider v. Cuny, 106 Idaho 264, 266, 678 P .2d 56, 58 (Ct. App 1984). A
failure to act promptly wairants denial of the motion.. Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho 692, 698,
819 P.2d 110, 116 (Ct. App 1991). A motion to disqualify should be filed with pIOmptness and

AIA'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL - 16
40005 0006 1309816 2

000205

reasonable diligence; and a failw-e to act promptly can warrant denial of the motion.. Crown, 128
Idaho at 123, 910 P..2d at 795

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Reed Taylor· Waived Any Right To Seek Disqualification By Delaying His Motion
To Disqualify For Sixteen Months.
Idaho courts have consistently held that "a motion to disqualify opposing counsel should

be filed at the onset of the litigation, or with promptness and reasonable diligence once the facts
upon which the motion is based have become known." Weaver, 120 Idaho at 698; Crown, 128
Idaho at 123..6 A failure to act promptly war1ants denial ofthe motion.. Crown, 128 Idaho at

123 . A motion to disqualify counsel is "propeily denied on basis of waiver alone, where
movants had reason to know of existence of basis for potential disqualification several years
before filing the motion. " Weaver, 120 Idaho at 698 {citation omitted). The rationale behind the
promptness tequirement is to "prevent a litigant from using the motion as a tool to deprive bis
opponent of counsel of his choice after completing substantial preparation of the case . "

Transmark, US A., Inc. v. State, Dept ofins., 631 So.2d 1112, 1116 (Fla App. 1994); see also
Central Milk Producer:s Coop v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F . 2d 988, 992 {8th Cir. 1978)
('•This court will not allow a litigant to delay filing a motion to disqualify in order to use the

6

Reed Taylor cites Nevada Yellow Cab Corp v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Cowt ex l'el. County ofCla1k,
152 P.Jd 737 (Nev. 2007), for the proposition that there is no waiver when a party fai1s to
demonstrate a clear intention to relinquish the right to challenge representation. That Nevada case is
contrary to the timeliness requirement adopted by the Idaho Supr·eme Cowt. Mmeover, the facts in
Nevada Yellow Cab Corp. are easily distinguishable There, the parties agreed to mediate a case after
the alleged conflict of interest was identified. The party seeking disqualification ''postponed any
motion for disqualification, while stating that it reserved its tight to file such a motion if mediation
failed" Id. at 740 . Then, "[w]hen mediation failed, ICW promptly filed its motion . " Id. No simila1
facts exist here.
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motion later as a tool to deprive his opponent of counsel of his choice after substantial
pteparation of a case has been completed '').
Cowts consider a vm:iety of factors in detemrining whether a pmty has waived the tight
to seek disqualification, including (1) the length of the delay in b1inging a motion to disqualify;
(2) when the movant lemned of the conflict; (3) whether the movant was represented by counsel
dming the delay; (4) why the delay occwred, and in pmticulm· whether the motion was delayed
for tactical tea.sons; and (5) whether disqualification would result in prejudice to the nomnoving
party. Employers Ins . of Wausau v. Albert D Seeno Const Co., 692 F Supp 1150, 1165 (ND.
Cal. 1988). Here, each of these factors weighs strongly in favor ofwaivet and denial of the
motion to disqualify.

1.

Reed Taylor Waited Over Sixteen Months To Bring This Motion To Disqualify.

The first two factors listed above- the "length of the delay in b1inging a motion to disqualify''
and "when the movant lemned of the conflict" - weigh heavily in favor of denying the motion to
disqualify. In detetmining whether a party has waived any tight to seek the disqualification of
anothei· pm:ty's counsel, Idaho cowts place heavy emphasis on the length of delay in btinging the
motion . See, e. g., Schneider, 106 Idaho at 266 (cowt declined to review district coutt's refusal to
grant motion to disqualify counsel in pmt because of the moving patty's delay- from June 1980
to Octobet· 27, 1980-in b1inging the motion to disqualify); Weaver, 120 Idaho at 698 (noting
that a thirteen month delay in b1inging the motion to disqualify suppo1ted the trial cowt's denial
of the motion to disqualify); see also Exterior Systems, Inc . v Noble Composites, Inc . , 210
F . Supp 2d 1062, 1077 (ND. Ind. 2002) (fmding waiver where movant sent a lettei· objecting to
opposing counsel's conflict ofintei·est, but waited until twelve months latet· to file a motion to
disqualify) .
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Here, the delay in bringing the motion to disqualify is excessive. Reed Taylor and his
counsel have been aware of the alleged conflicts of interest for over sixteen months. Hawley
Troxell appeared on behalf of AIA Seivices and AIA Insurance on May 7, 2007.. The ve1y same
facts that Reed Taylor now relies upon to support his allegations of conflict of interest existed
when Hawley Troxell appeared in this case. Not only did the same facts exist, but Reed 1 aylor' s
counsel was keenly aware of the alleged conflicts . Indeed, he has been vaguely accusing Hawley
Troxell of alleged conflicts of intei·est since the vety inception of this litigation. By way of
example, in a recent email from Mr.. Bond to AIA's counsel, Gaty Babbitt, Mr. Bond lectured:
..... I have repeatedly advised all of you in Wiiting, through
telephone confei·ences and/or in pei"Son of the vatious conflicts.
Even after all my warnings, you have all continued on with the
conflicts to the detiiment of AIA Services and AIA Inswance ..... I
advised you all time and time again that AJA Insurance should
have separate counsel.

See Babbitt Aff. Ex . 6; .see also id. Ex . 4 ("All I have ever done is advised eveiyone of all
applicable conflicts . . . . I warned you and watned you, and all you did was ignore me").
Mr. Bond began raising nonspecific conflict of interest accusations in May 2007:
You of all people should know how often I complained about your
ethical violations over and ove1 again.. I am forwarding you my
email and attached letter· of May 11, 2007, yes, over· 1 year· and
2 months ago .... Does greed blind you that much?

Id. at Ex . 5 (July 27, 2008 email); see also id at Ex. 3 (July 17, 2008 email asserting: "I recall
sending you a clear· and concise letter [regarding conflicts] when you first appear·ed in this case,
which you ignored. ").
Thus, it is abundantly clear that Reed Taylor and his counsel have been accusing Hawley
Troxell of conflicts of interest since May 2007, yet they waited ovei· sixteen months to bring a
motion to disqualify which, for the first time, pwpmts to specifically identify disqualifying
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conflicts of interest. By sitting on his hands for over sixteen months, Plaintiff has waived any
1ight to seek disqualification of AIA' s counsel.. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that much
shorter delays constitute waiver. See Schneide,., 106 Idaho at 266 (four month delay supports
finding of waiver); Weave,., 120 Idaho at 698 (thirteen month delay in bringing the motion to
disqualify supported the trial court's denial of the motion to disqualify) .
2..

Reed Tayl01 Has Been Represented At All Times By Counsel. In detennining

whether a motion to disqualify is timely, courts also consider ''whether the movant was
represented by counsel during the delay." Employers ln.s of Wausau v. Albert D. Seeno Const.

Co , 692 F..Supp. 1150, 1165 (ND. Cal 1988) Heie, Reed Taylor has been represented by Rod
Bond at all times, plus several consecutive sets of co-counsel. Any one of Reed Taylor's counsel
could have brought a motion to disqualify sixteen months ago if they really believed theie wei·e
grounds for such a motion .

.3..

This Belated Motion To Dfaqualify Has Been Brought For Tactical Reasons.. The

United States Supreme Court has wamed that motions to disqualify brought by an opposing paity
should be considered with caution out of "concern about tactical use of disqualification motions
to harass opposing counsel." Richardson-Menell, 472 US. at 436 It is abundantly cleai· tliat
Reed Taylor has embarked in an impropei· mission to obtain a litigation advantage by
disqualifying all opposing counsel in this case.

If this motion to disqualify were anything othei· t1ian a litigation tactic, it would have been
brought sixteen months ago - not now after Hawley Troxell has spent tlie last sixteen months
defending AIA and prepaiing for trial. The impropei· litigation tactic is fwther evidenced by (i)
the fact tliat Reed Taylor seeks to disqualify not only Hawley Troxell, but also counsel for each
of his other litigation opponents; (ii) the recently seived deiivative demand that AIA bring suit
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against its own counsel for "aiding and abetting"; and (iii) his separate direct lawsuits recently
filed against AIA's counsel.. It is significant that the Plaintiffs' motion to disqualify counsel
contends that defense counsel should be disqualified because of the conflicts between counsel
and client engendered simply by Reed Taylor having made the derivative claims and having filed
the direct lawsuits.. See DQ Motion p. 50. A clearer example of manufacturing a conflict to gain
an advantage in this underlying litigation can hardly be imagined
Reed Taylor's counsel has asserted many times throughout the course of this litigation
that Reed Taylor has considered bringing claims against Hawley Troxell and the other law firms
representing the defendants in this case. In a July 11, 2008 letter, Rod Bond made a settlement
demand.. In connection with the settlement demand, Rod Bond announced that, unless the case
settled within days, Reed Taylor would be bringing suit against the law firms representing the
vmious defendants in this case. See Babbitt Aff. Ex. 2 (".. . . if this case is not 1esolved in a
timely manner (days not weeks), then other lawsuits will be filed again8t numerous other
defendants'').7 Mr Bond then conceded that "I do not believe that this [the lawsuits against the
law fiuns] will be productive, but Reed Taylor· makes the decisions . " Id. (emphasis added).
In other words, because Reed Taylor "makes the decisions," counsel would bring suit against the

vaiious law fnms even though he questioned the merit of such lawsuits.
It became immediately apparent that the purpose behind serving the derivative demand
was to pit client against counsel in an attempt to remove all defense counsel from the case. A

7

While the letter does not explicitly state that the "other lawsuits" would be brought against the law
firms, the context of the letter makes clear that Rod Bond was refening to litigation that would be
brought against Hawley Troxell and the other law fums Mr. Bond had been telling Hawley I roxell
for months that Reed intended to bting claims against the vm:ious law firms. More tellingly, Reed
Taylor served his derivative demand that AIA bting suit against the law firms shottly after the .July
11, 2008 letter.
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few days after receiving the above-described letter, AIA's counsel contacted Reed Taylor's
counsel for a list of available dates for Reed Taylor's deposition.. Mr. Bond responded by
asserting that he would not allow Hawley Troxell to depose Reed Taylor because of the so-called
conflict manufactured by the de1ivative demand:
Mike Bissell's fhm will be filing suit against you, John Ashby,
Dick Riley and Hawley T10xell in the coming days for aiding and
abetting and violations ofvai:ious 1ules of professional conduct,
among other claims . Reed intends to also fotwai:d copies of the
Complaint to the bar association. In light of these pending events,
please advise me if your furn intends to remain as counsel on this
case.. Sony to be so direct, but it does not make sense for me to set
up depositions when you will probably not be involved much
longer.
Babbitt Aff. Ex . J. The threat to fo1wai:d copies of the Complaint to the bar association for
possible disciplinai:y action, which was clearly intended to induce counsel to withdraw
voluntai:ily, is a violation of the spitit if not the letter ofIR.C . P. 4.4: "In representing a client, a
lawyer shall not: (4) threaten to present criminal chatges in order to obtain an advantage in a
civil matter·." When Hawley Troxell declined to abdicate its obligations to its clients, the
threatened suit was indeed filed by Mr. Bissell. Bond A:ff. Ex. 38.. That the pmpose of the
sepai:ate aiding and abetting suit is to obtain a tactical advantage in this case is cleai:ly
demonstrated by the DQ Motion (p . 25-26), in which Plaintiff assezts that the mere pendency of
the sepai:ate claims against Hawley Troxell is "one additional reason ... why the Attorneys
should withdraw or be disqualified. "
Finally, the fact that Reed Taylor's motion is no more than a litigation tactic was b1ought
out in the July 24, 2008 heating on AIA's motion for a stay pending AIA's inquiry into the
derivative demand . At that heating, Mr. Bond stated that that Reed Taylor would seek to
disqualify and/or sue all the remaining defense counsel in the case. He followed up that

AIA'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL - 22
40005 0008 1309818 2

000211

statement, however, with the assertion that Reed Taylor would consent to Hawley I roxell' s
continued representation of AIA if Hawley Troxell would post an $8 5 Million bond with the
Court. This statement makes clear that Reed Taylor is not concerned with supposed violations of
ethics mies but rather with his own pecuniaiy interests .
It is clear from the timing of this motion and the communications from Reed Taylor's

counsel that this motion is part of a scheme by Plaintiff and his counsel to manufacture conflicts
of interest between attorneys and clients on which to predicate Plaintiffs motion to disqualify
Defendants' counsel, to dep1ive the defendants of the counsel of their choice, and to obtain an
unfair advantage in this case.
4.

AJA Would Be Seve1ely Prejudiced By Disqualification

Of Its Counsel While it

would obviously serve Reed Taylor's personal interests to force each of his litigation opponents
to find new counsel at this late state of the litigation, Reed Taylor has not proffered any evidence
that he would be prejudiced if his motion to disqualify is denied Conversely, the defendants will
be sever·ely prejudiced if they are deptived of their' tight to counsel of their' choosing. Idaho
cowts have expressed a st10ng reluctance to prejudice a party by disqualifying their counsel at a
late stage in the litigation, especially based on so-called conflicts that existed for a long period of
time before the filing of the motion.. For example, in

Weaver~

the Idaho Cowt of Appeals found

that the moving party had waived any light to disqualify opposing counsel for failing to file the
motion "with promptness and reasonable diligence once the facts upon which the motion is based
have become known." Weaver, 120 Idaho at 698.. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
explained:
Given that discove1y was well underway and that motions for
summary judgment were pending, the district court concluded that
any possible prejudice to the pattnership was fat· outweighed by the
possible prejudice to Weaver or Lupher of having to obtain new
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counsel if the motion were granted. The comt also concluded that,
in light of the relatively advanced nature of the proceedings,
allowing Decker and Hollifield to continue their representation,
while keeping their clients as sepaiate as possible, was the least
damaging alternative under the circumstances.
Id..

The fact that this motion is brought at this late stage demonstrates the prejudice that AJA
and the other defendants would suffer if their counsel were disqualified. In Mr. Bond's own
words, he has pointed out the alleged conflicts to counsel ":from day one" of this litigation.
Babbitt Aff. Ex. 8. Since "day one", AJA's counsel has spent sixteen months reviewing
documents, interviewing witnesses, conducting motion practice and discovery and prepaiing for
trial.. As the Court is keenly aware (having had to read and rnle upon the m)'Iiad motions filed in
this case), this case has turned out to be a complex and fact-laden morass . AJA has incuned
substantial attomey's fees for legal services perfotmed by Hawley Troxell. If Reed's motion is
granted, AIA (and each of the other· defendants) would face the extreme prejudice of having to
retain and educate new counsel on the procedmal history and complex legal issues . Forcing each
defendant to retain new counsel would require new counsel to get up to speed on this case,
increase attomeys' fees substantially and significantly delay the trial in this matter.
As a practical matter, requiring AJA Inswance, AJA Services, CropUSA and John Taylor
to each retain new and sepai·ate counsel would be extremely expensive and may not be feasible .
Reed Taylor has now brought a ditect lawsuit against Hawley Troxell and other counsel and he is
now attempting to bring a derivative lawsuit against all defense counsel in the case, based in pait
on counsel's mere acceptance of attomey's fees . It would be naive to believe that all of the
vaiious defendants will be able to find new (much less qualified) attorneys who ai·e willing to
step into the mine-field that this litigation has become. Why would any right-minded lawyer
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agree to represent a defendant in this litigation if that attorney will immediately be sued for
accepting attorney's fees for the representation, 8 especially now that Reed Taylor is taking the
position that no law furn could represent either AIA Insurance or AIA Services without
obtaining the consent of Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor? See Section N G..3 .
In summaty, the Cowt should conclude that Reed Taylor has waived any right to seek
disqualification of counsel by waiting sixteen months before filing his motion to disqualify.

B.

Defendants Have a Common Inter·est Privilege and Ar·e Entitled to Enter· Into a
Joint Defense Agr·eement.
L

IRE .502(b) and Common Interest P1ivilege. The Idaho Rules of Evidence

specifically provide for a common interest privilege, otherwise known as a joint defense
p1ivilege. Rule of Evidence 502(b)(3) provides that "[a] client has a p1ivilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for
the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client which were
made ..... among clients, their representatives, their lawyers, or their lawye1s' representatives, in
any combination, concerning a matter of common interest, but not including communications
solely among clients or their representatives when no lawyer is a party to the communication "
The official comment to Evidence Rule 502(b)(3) explains that it is "intended to p1ovide
that when clients who shat·e a common interest in a legal matter ar·e represented by different
lawyers they can communicate with each other in an effoit to develop a joint strategy or
otherwise advance their interests . " The official comment further explains the iationale for the

8

Indeed, Mr. Bond has already threatened suit against the newest attorney to appear in this litigation,
David Risley, if he accepts fees advanced by AIA Insurance or AIA Services. See Babbitt Aff. Ex 10
("If you don't want to have Reed Taylor pursue claims against your [sic] and your firm. I recommend
that you not accept payment of any funds that have been derived directly or indirectly from AIA
Services 01 AIA Insurance or any of their assets in which Reed Taylor has a secwity interest..").
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privilege as follows: "[P]ersons who share a common interest in litigation should be able to
communicate with their respective attorneys and with each other to more effectively prosecute or
defend their claims." Id. (quoting In Re.: Grand Ju1y Subpoenas, 902 F 2d 244, 249 (4th Cir.
1990)) .
.Joint defense agreements, like the one entered into among the Defendants in this case, are
a common practice in cases where multiple defendants share a common adversary. See, e. g.,

Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapo & Jepsen Ins. Se1vices, Inc., 870 N.E.2d 1105, 1108 (Mass . 2007)
(recognizing the "longstanding use and validity ofjoint defense agreements, an exception to
waiver of the attorney-client privilege under the common interest doctrine. ").. The courts do not
impose strict limitations on when parties may enter into joint defense agreements.. fustead, the
only requirement is that the parties have a common interest in the litigation.. "Where defendants
allege a common interest that is no more than a joint effott to establish a common litigation
defense strategy, the requisite common interest is among the easiest to establish. " Id. at 1113 .
Such defendants need only prove that "(1) the communications were made in the comse of a
joint defense effort, (2) the statements were designed to further the effmt, and (3) the ptivilege
has not been waived." Id.

2..

The Co-Defendants Share Common Inte1ests in the Joint Defense ofReed's

Claims. Plaintiffs claims themselves make it self-evident that the Co-Defendants in this case
share common interests in the defense of those claims. The complaint alleges various
"inappropriate" transactions between or among the Defendants, such as AJA fusUI"ance's
pwchase of AJA Services Series C Prefetl'ed Stock from CropUSA for $1 . 5 million, the parking
lot and radio station transactions between John Taylor and AIA, and the other "related party"
ttansactlons identified in the Affidavit of Paul E. Pederson. fu each case, two or more
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Defendants are involved in the transaction. Accordingly, the successful defense against Reed's
claim of improptiety by one party to a transaction necessaiily absolves the other paity or paities
to the transaction Those parties clearly have a common interest in cooperating with one another
to defeat Reed's claims.
Fmther, Plaintiff has painted the Defendants with the same broad btush, seeking the same
relief against all Defendants without distinguishing among them Based on alter-ego and
conspiracy allegations in the Fifth Amended Complaint (''F AC"), Plaintiff prays for judgment
against all of the Defendants, jointly and severally, for all sums owed to him under the
promissory note and for all contract and tort damages in an amount to be proved at trial. FAC
1113.2, 13.3, 14.11, 14..12. For example, FAC 113.2 expressly alleges what is implicit in the
prior iterations of his complaint, i.e, the claim that all of the Defendants have engaged in a civil
conspiracy. One element that must be proved to establish a civil conspiracy is that there is an
agreement among the Defendants to accomplish an unlawful objective or to accomplish a lawful
objective in an unlawful manner. McPheters v.. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 395, 64 P.3d 317, 321
(2003).. If a conspiracy is established, each co-conspirator is liable for the acts of each other coconspirator. Dalqui.st v. Mattson, 40 Idaho 378, 390, 233 P. 883, 887 (1925).. Obviously, each
Defendant shares with each other Defendant a common interest in 1efuting Reed's allegations of
the fonnation of such an agreement and/or the commission of any act by any other· Defendant
that could give rise to such joint liability; and all Defendants are benefited if any of them is
successful in that regard.

In addition, the injunctive relief Plaintiff seeks, if granted, would, among other things,
limit the corpo1ate Defendants' ability to use or transfer funds and assets, and to bonow money.
Plaintiff also seeks to enjoin the Defendants from negotiating any substantive contracts without
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his approval or permission from the cowt. [FAC, pma. 14.2(f), (g), (h), and (k)] The
Defendants have a common interest in defending against these and other claims Plaintiff has
asserted against them; and they shme common defenses to most, if not all, of these claims.
The Defendants also share a common interest in coordinating the defense in 01der to
eliminate duplication of counsel's efforts on behalf of their respective clients and thereby to
mitigate the attorney fees which, as discussed in Section ILJ above, AIA Se1vices and AIA
Insmance m·e obligated to advance to the individual Defendants .
3..

Propriety of Joint Defense Agreement. Plaintiff alleges that the Joint Defense

Agreement is "inappropriate" because AIA should, according to Plaintiff~ be suing the other
Defendants . See, e..g, item# 16 in Mr. Bissell's July 21, 2008 dezivative demand lettez· (Bond
Aff Ex . 16), As noted by Professor Strait, this m·gument puts the cart before the horse (Strait
Aff Sections VIl AJ, VIlE .2 and VII .F 2); and it would deny the Defendants the right to defend
themselves against Reed's claims.. The fact that potential advezsity between co-defendants in the
futut·e may be foreseeable does not prevent the co-defendants from entedng into a joint defense
agreement to pursue their common interest in defending claims by a third patty.. See In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated November 26, 1974, 406 F. Supp. 381, 392 (S.D..N.Y. 1975).

That case involved the exchange of information among counsel and tazgets of an SEC
investigation, including counsel for a co1p01ation and counsel for certain individuals. The
government claimed that the interests of ceztain of the pmticipants in the conference were
diver·gent because the company might have a claim against one of the individual participants,
who was its fo1mez· officer and director.. The coutt nonetheless found the common legal inter·est
p1ivilege applicable, stating that even if an action by the company against its fo1mer officer were
foreseeable, "[t]hat alone would not have prevented [the] shazing [of] confidential info1mation
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for the purpose of a joint defense against the immediate SEC action. .. . That a joint defense may
be made by somewhat unsteady bedfellows does not in itself negate the existence or viability of
the joint defense." Id.
Thus, Reed Taylor's assertion that Defendants me not pennitted to enter· into a joint
defense agreement because ofpurpo1tedly diverging interests is not suppmted by the law. 9 In
fact, the Official Comment to Idaho Rule of Evidence 502(b)(3) itself recognizes that the joint
defense p1ivilege ''will survive a later falling-out among the patties," thus recognizing that
patties with potentially diverging interest can take advantage of the joint defense p1ivilege. See

al.so Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F .2d 770, 787-88 (3rd Cir. 1985) ("Communications to an
attorney to establish a common defense strategy m·e privileged even though the attomey
represents another client with some adverse interests."); US. v. McPartlin, 595 F. 2d 1321,
1336 (7th Cir. 1979) (noting that the 'joint-interest ptivilege is not limited to situations in which

the positions of the pmties are compatible in all respects''); Gallagher v. Office of Attorney

General, 787 A..2d 777 (Md. App . 2001) ("The divergence of the pmties' interests over· the
course of litigation does not necessatily negate the applicability of the common interest mle. '') .
Professor Strait concludes that Hawley Troxell is representing the AIA entities under an
appropriate .Joint Defense Agreement, Standstill Agreement, and limited scope ofrep1esentation
related to litigation only. Strait Afl. Section III .2. Further, he opines: "Under Idaho RPC 1.2,
Hawley Ttoxell may, after full discussion with the AIA entities and with Crop, undertake such a

9

Plaintiff cites Evans & Luptak, PLC v. Lizza, 650 N .W .2d 364, 3 70 (Mich. 2002), for the proposition
that contracts that violate ethical mles violate public policy and are not enforceable. See DQ Motion
p. 48. That case, however, simply held that a fee agreement that violated ethical rules was
unenfOl'ceable. The case has no application here because the joint defense agreement does not violate
any ethical rules.
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joint representation with an approp1iately limited scope ofrepiesentation to the common claims
as authorized by the control groups and consistent with their autho1ity to defend against Reed's
claims." Strait AfI Section VIl..B .3
Defendants' ability to present a unified defense to Plaintiffs claims minimizes
duplication and legal expense.. Joint defense will not result in a loss of any claims the corporate
Defendants may have against one another or against the individual Defendants because all such
claims have been expressly preserved by tolling agreements . It is in Plaintiffs interest to divide
and conquer by insisting that each cmporate Defendant have separate counsel and that the
Defendants assert claims against one another.. It is not, however, in the co1porate Defendants'
interest to hite separate counsel to pursue claims against one another while, at the same time,
defending against Plaintiff's claims . It would defeat their ability to provide a unified and
consistent defense, divert their attention from the principal object of defeating Plaintiffs claims,
and result in additional expense they can ill afford.
4..

Joint Defense Is Not Joint Representation. Reed and his attorneys apparently

labor under the misapprehension that the Joint Defense Agreement is a joint repr-e.sentation
agreement, rather than a joint defense agreement.. I 0 Based on this mischaracterization of the
Joint Defense Agreement, Plaintiff contends that Hawley Troxell must be disqualified because
the fitm is representing, either directly or indirectly through the Joint Defense Agreement, the
interests of John Taylor and the other individual Defendants in addition to the interests of the
corporate Defendants. See, e g., DQ Motion at pp. 42 (alleged joint 1ep1esentation without
info1med consent of authmized representatives of AJA), 46 (lack of informed consent by Reed

10 Plaintiff's expert, Peter Jarvis, is similarly mistaken. See, e g, Jarvis Aff, 5 j.

AIA'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL - 30
40005 0006 1309816 2

000219

and Donna Taylor to joint 1ep1~entation), 48-50 (alleged imptoperjoint representation, duectly
or indirectly thrnugh a joint defense agreement, of the corporations and their directors/officers,
without Reed's consent) .
Plaintiff makes a si1nilar argument, again premised on the erroneous concept that the
Joint Defense Agreement results in joint 1ep1esentation, that Hawley Troxell must be
disqualified because a lawyer cannot represent both an 01ganization and a director or officer in a
fraud action against them. DQ Motion p. 48-49.. Plaintiff argues that ''the Attorneys may not
directly, or indllectly through any joint defense agreement, 1ep1esent the interests of John
Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, AIA Services, AIA Inswance, CropUSA and any other·
interested party or individual defendant with claims of co1porate malfeasance against him or
her".." Id. p . 49 (emphasis added. ).. To the contrary, Hawley Troxell has not ever undertaken the
1epresentation of any of the individual Defendants in this litigation, either directly or through the
Joint Defense Agreement; and each of the individual Defendants has at all times been
represented by his/her own independent counsel in this litigation. Babbitt Aff. , 11.
The fact that the parties have entered into a joint defense agr·eement does not mean that
Hawley Troxell represents any of the individual direct01 Defendants. As explained recently by
oneCou1t:
A joint defense agr·eement is not synonymous with common
rep1esentation. While common representation creates an attomeyclient relationship between common counsel and each defendant
being represented by them, a joint defense agreement is a
mechanism designed to provide confidentiality for
communications made dwingjoint defense strategy sessions. See
United States v. Almeida, 341F3d1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2003)
(citing Wilson P. Abmham Const. Co1p. v. Atmco Steel C01p., 559
F..2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Schwimme1; 892
F..2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989)). Each defendant, however, retains
his own attorney, and the duty of loyalty only extends from each
attorney to the defendant which he represents. Id.
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Beras v. U.S., 2007 WL 195352, 2 (S . D..N.Y. 2007); see also US v Almeida, 341F.3d1318,

132.3 (11th Cir. 2003) ("A duty ofloyalty, however, does not exist [as a result of a joint defense
agreement] and it is therefore improper to conclude that all of the attorneys in the joint defense
strategy session represent all of the participating defendants.").

S.

Reed Enoneously A.s.se1t.s That Hawley T10xell Must Be Disqualified Pursuant To

IRPC I. 6 Because OfInability To P,otect Confidential Information Received From Each Client
Plaintiff argues that Hawley Troxell should be disqualified because the joint defense agreement
among the Defendants permits sharing of othezwise confidential infozmation, making it
"impossible for the Attorneys to properly keep and protect each client's confidential information
......" DQ Motion p . 38 11 IRCP 16 (a) provides that "a lawyer shall not reveal infotmation
relating to 1epresentation of a client unless the client gives infoxmed consent .... ". If Reed's
argument were given credence, it would be a disqualifying violation of Rule 1. 6(a) to enter into
any joint defense agreement because, by the veiy nature and purpose of the agreement,
codefendants shar·e otheiwise confidential information and waive any confidentiality as among
themselves .
To the contrary, the courts acknowledge the common interest privilege of codefendants to

share information, coordinate discoveiy and motion practice and contain costs . .Joint defense
agreements ar·e widely utilized and accepted, notwithstanding that each of the participants
waives, as to each othei participant, privilege and confidentiality of shar·ed information. See
Sections IV.B.1-4. above.

11 Ihe absmdity of Reed's concem with preseivation of confidentiality of each client's info1mation is
manifested by his contention that, when he takes control of AIA Jnsm·ance, he will have access to the
info1mation shared by other Defendants undei· the Joint Defense Agreement, thereby making it easier
for him to pursue the alleged claims against those othei· Defendants. See DQ Motion pp. 38, 51.
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Fmther, Rule 1 .6(a) does not prohibit shm:ing of information among co-defendants who
have given infotmed consent, whether those co-defendants are represented by the same counsel
in a joint representation or by different counsel pm"Suant to a joint defense agreement. Each of
Hawley Troxell's clients made an inf01med decision and gave inf01med consent to proceed with
the joint representation, in pait because of the need to keep defense costs in check. The informed
decision to shm:e information among Hawley Troxell's clients is a matter for their discretion and
business judgment. Strait Aft. Section Vil. D. 2 ("Under RPC 1.6, each client, if properly
informed of the risks, has a complete authority to waive confidentiality ...., . This is a proper and
valid decision for an infmmed client to make as to whether 01 not to participate in such a joint
defense agreement.").
C.

AIA's Attorneys Have No Duty to Plaintiff' and Have Neither· Right Nor Power to
Take Action Independently of Their' Clients.

Reed and his attorneys have confused the duties of defense counsel with the duties of
their clients, asserting without citation to any authority that counsel have duties to Reed, in his
capacity as a creditor of AIA Se1vices and as a pledgee of AIA Insmance, Inc . stock. Plaintiff'
asserts that: "AIA Services is insolvent and .... the duties of [Hawley Troxell's] representation
are to Reed in light of the insolvency to protect AIA' s assets" Babbitt Aff Ex . 8.. Plaintiff also
contends that Hawley Troxell owes a duty of loyalty to Reed in his capacities as a c1editor of
AIA Se1vices and as a pledgee of the stock of AIA Insmance.. See, e.g., DQ Motion p 37
'

("[T]he Attorneys owe the beneficiaiy of AIA Services' limited remaining assets, Reed Taylor,
fiduciary duties to presetve the assets by not representing the inter·ests of.John Taylor and other·
individuals.")
Those contentions ar·e simply wrong. Hawley Troxell's obligation as lawyel'S for AIA
Services and AIA Insmance runs to the corporations, which include the following "authorized
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constituents": directors, officers, shareholders and employees. See IR.CP 1.13 and cmt l.
Neither the law nor the IRCP requil'e Hawley Troxell, as lawyers, to prefer either a creditor or a
pledgee over the recognized constituencies of the corporate clients (for example, the common
shareholders of AIA Services, whose investments are wmth less to the extent AIA Services is
obligated to Reed). If Reed's assertion were true, it would be a complete perversion of the
adversarial system on which our jurisprudence is based.
Plaintiff's counsel also makes the outlandish argument that AIA' s lawyers owe Reed a
duty to take action, independent of their clients, to protect Reed's interests. In his May 11, 2007
letter (quoted in DQ Motion p . 22), Bond states: "As the counsel for the corporations, [Hawley
Troxell has] a duty to b1ing claims for the benefit of the corpomtions, their shareholders and their
creditors in light of insolvency." DQ Motion p . 22; Bond Aff. Ex 29. This argument
misperceives the roles of attorneys.. Lawyers serve as advisors and advocates. See Preamble to
the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct cmt 2:
"As a rep1esentative of clients, a lawyer· performs vaiious
functions.. As advisot, a lawyer provides a client with an informed
understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations and
explains their ptactical implications. As advocate, a lawye1
zealously asseits the client's position under the mies of the
adversary system..... "
As lawyers, Hawley Troxell cannot ''bring claims for the benefit of the corporations" At most,
Hawley Tmxell can advise the AIA boards of their duties; and Hawley Troxell ensured, as a
condition of representation of the cmporate Defendants, that each of the co1porate Defendants
and all of the individual Defendants signed a standstill and tolling agreement presezving all
claims among the Defendants pending the outcome of Reed's lawsuit.
Defense counsel have no obligation to prove Reed's case for him. See IR.CP l .13(d),
which ptovides that the lawyer's obligation under IR.CP l .13(c) to report up the laddez· to the
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organization's "highest authmity'' (i.e., the boaid of ditectors, in the case of a co1poration) that
an officer or employee "is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to
the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation oflaw
that reasonably might be itnputed to the organization" and to reveal otheiwise confidential
info1mation to the extent the lawyer 1easonably believes necessaiy to prevent substantial injmy
to the mganization "shall not apply with respect to infmmation relating to a lawyer's
representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation oflaw, or to defend the
organization .... against a claitn aiising out of an alleged violation of law." Comment 8 observes
that this rule "is necessary in order to enable organizational clients to enjoy the full benefits of
legal counsel in conducting an investigation or defending against a claitn." Reed's theory that
AIA Services and AJA fusurance should be suing the other Defendants would emasculate this

•

fundamental p1inciple of ow legal system.
The argument that Hawley Troxell is obligated to take action to p1otect Reed's interests
also misperceives the scope of the furn's engagements by the corporate Defendants . Hawley
Troxell has not served as outside general counsel with oversight and comprehensive knowledge
of AIA's or CropUSA's activities. Hawley Troxell's previous representation of those entities
was limited to specific matters refened to the furn from time to time. Hawley Troxell has never
exercised internal supe1vision of the legal or other affaii's of any of these entities; and the fum' s
farniliaiit,y with their businesses, owner·ship, governance, employees, operations, accounting and
other· matters is accordingly litnited to info1mation received in connection with matters as to
which it was specifically engaged and as to which it devoted substantive attention. fu patticulai·
(but without litnitation), Hawley Troxell was not consulted in connection with the alleged selfdealing transactions alleged in Reed's complaint or any of the "related party'' transactions
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identified in the Affidavit of Paul E.. Pederson other than the legal opinion ofbonower's local
counsel provided to the lender on behalf of CropUSA in connection with the Surge loan in late
2006.. Riley Aff ,, 5, 11 .

The film's engagement for the pwpose of defending this lawsuit brought by Reed Taylor
is similarly limited in scope to the specific matter for which the furn has been retained.. Hawley
Troxell has not been asked to advise, and has not advised, the AIA entities or CropUSA in
connection with potential claims against one another or against the individual Defendants, in
light of insolvency or othe1wise, as such advice is not necessruy to the furn' s representation of
the cmporate Defendants in common defense of the allegations in Reed's complaint. As opined
by Professor Strait: "Under Idaho RPC L2, Hawley T1oxell may, after full discussion with the
AIA entities and with Crop, undertake such a joint representation with an approptiately limited

scope ofrepresentation to the common claims as autho1ized by the control groups and consistent
with their autho1ity to defend against Reed's claims . " Strait Aff. Section VII.B..3 .
Attorneys engaged to defend a client are not expected to detezmine the outcome of the
case before undeztaking the defense.. Reed assetts that the lawyers have knowingly advanced
frivolous arguments in opposition to Reed's obviously true and indefensible allegations. See
Complaint filed in Civ. No. CVOS-01765 (Bond Aff. Ex. 38 at,, 32, 36 and 53).. To the
contrruy, Hawley I mxell has had a reasonable belief~ at the time of accepting the AIA
engagement and at all times thez·eaftez·, that valid defenses to Reed's note exist. Babbitt Aff
, 12.
D.

Hawley Trnxell's Repr·esentation Of AIA Ser·vices, AJA Insur·ance And CropUSA
Does Not Violate IRPC 1.7.
Rule 1.7 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct ("IRCP'') provides:
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(a)
Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not
represent a client if the representation involves a concwrent
conflict of interest. A concwrent conflict of interest exists if:
( 1)
the representation of one client will be directly
adver·se to another client; or

(2)
ther·e is a significant risk that the representation of
one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another· client, a former· client or a third person
or by the per'Sonal interests of the lawyer·, including family and
domestic relationships.

(b)
Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of
interest under· paragraph (a), a lawyer· may represent a client if:
(1)
the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer· will
be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each
affected client;

(2)

the representation is not prohibited by law;

(3)
the representation does not involve the asse1tion of
a claim by one client against another· client represented by the
lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal;
and
(4)
each affected client gives informed consent,
confirmed in writing
Throughout his DQ Motion, Plaintiff contends that Hawley Troxell has violated this Rule in its
representation of the three co1porate Defendants See sections 2, 6, 8, 9, 13-18, 22 and 25 of the
DQ Motion For the following reasons, these contentions are wrong
1.

The Representation Ag1eements Eliminate A~y Direct Adversity Between

Defendants During This Litigation . A concwr·ent conflict of interest exists if the representation
of one client will be directly adverse to another· client IRCP 1.7 (a)(l). There is no direct
adversity between or among Hawley Troxell's clients for the purposes of this litigation, however,
because they are all co-defendants and share common inter·ests in defending against Reed's
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claims in this litigation and because they agreed to toll all claims between or among them. See
Section N.B..2 above; Strait Aff Sections ill. 2 and VIIBJ (''There is no l .7(a)(l) adversity
which has not been reserved and tolled or which is outside the cmrent scope ofrepresentation of
Hawley Troxell. RPC l . 7(a)(l) simply does not apply to the current scope ofHawleyTroxell's
litigation counsel common defense representation under the agreements . ")..
A concurrent conflict also exists under IRCP l .7(a)(2) if"there is a significant iisk that
the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibility
to another client . . . " Therefore, a conflict of interest might arise when an attorney
simultaneously represents two parties in litigation, such as codefendants .
However', even if a lawyer represents codefendants that might have adverse interests in
future litigation, ther·e is no conflict of interest when an attomey represents "two clients (a) for
their joint purpose, (b) to accomplish a common end result, and (c) to implement their joint plan .

. . . " See Buehle1 v. Sba1dellati, 34 Cal App.4th 1527, 1540 (1995). Jn Buehler, the attorney was
aware that the two clients had some concerns regarding the structm·e of their partnership
agreement, but was hired solely to determine whether the agreement complied with California
law. Id. at 1534. The attorney informed the clients that he could represent them to this extent,
but could not represent either of them if the dealings between the two became adversarial. Id
The attorney further claiified that he could not paiticipate in any negotiation of one partner
contrary to the other Id. Because the attorney limited his representation to the extent that the
two paitnei·s shared common goals in the attorney's simultaneous representation, their inter·ests
were not adve1se.. Id. at 1540.
AIA submits that the Representation Agreements between and among Hawley Troxell
and its clients, as well as the other· Defendants, assure that Hawley Troxell's representation of the
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corpotate Defendants is limited to their common interests in defending Reed's complaint, so that
even if there is any concurrent conflict of interest among the cotpoiate Defendants, that conflict
can be waived under IR.PC l .7(b).
2.

Reed Erroneous'y Contends That "Ineconcilable" Or "Nonwaivable" Conflicts

Oflnterest Require That Hawley Troxell Be Disqualified From Representing Any ofthe
Corporate Defendants. Plaintiffs DQ Motion and the Affidavit ofhis expert, Peter Jmvis,
contain vague and unexplained assertions that unspecified conflicts of inter·est among the
corporate Defendants are "irreconcilable", "unconsentable" or "not waivable" Reed generalizes
that ''there can be no joint representation because each of the defendant's inter·ests are
irreconcilably divergent and m·e in direct conflict." DQ Motion p. 33 . Citing IRPC 1.7 cmt 14
that some conflicts are unconsentable, but without identifying any such conflicts, Plaintiff
concludes that "the conflicts between Hawley Troxell's clients m·e so irreconcilable that such
conflicts are nonconsentable under RPC 1.7" Id. p. 38 Again without elucidation, Reed
reiterates his contention that ''the interests of all three corporations m·e ineconcilably divergent
and ther·e is no possible way that Hawley Troxell .... could have reasonably believed that the
interest of the corporations would not be adversely affected byjoint representation." Id p. 45.

See also Jarvis Affidavit ,, 4.a., 5 .c . , 5 .d.
Neither Plaintiffs counsel nor Mr. Jmvis bothers to info1m the Comt or opposing counsel

(i) what ar·e the standm'Cls for detennining whether a concm1·ent conflict is waivable or nonwaivable, (ii) what conflicts plaintiff pe1ceives to be non-waivable, or (iii) why such conflicts
supposedly cannot be waived. Their· conclusory declarations m·e unaccompanied by
identification of any paJticular· alleged conflict or any explanation of why such conflict is
"irreconcilable" rather than being waivable with informed consent of each client confitmed in
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wtiting, as was obtained in this case by Hawley Troxell in accordance with IRPC 1.7(b)(4). See,
e. g.., .Jmvis Aff. 4lf 5. c.

Non-waivable Conflicts. Under Rule l .7(b), concmrent conflicts of interest cannot be
waived through informed client consent: (i) if the representation is prohibited by applicable law;
or (ii) if the representation involves a claim by one client against another client represented by
the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before the tribunal - i.e., when the clients
are directly adverse in the same proceeding. IRCP l .7(b)(2), (3) and cmts 16, 17.. Selfevidently, neither of these two situations exists in the present case.
Waivable Conflicts. Absent a legal prohibition or direct adversity in the same
proceeding, the representation ofcodefendants with similm· interests in litigation is proper if the
requirements ofRule L7(a)(2), (b)(l) and (4) m·e met. IRCP 1 7 cmt 23 states:
Paragi:aph (b)(3) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the
same litigation, regardless of the clients' consent. On the other
hand, simultaneous representation of parties whose interests in
litigation may conflict, such as coplaintiffs or codefendants, is
govemed by patagi:aph (a)(2).
Rule L7(a)(2) provides that a concwrent conflict ofinterest exists if"there is a significant risk
that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer·' s
responsibilities to another client ... "12 However, Rule l . 7(b) provides that, even if a
concurrent conflict of inter·est exists, the lawyer· may nevertheless represent two or more
codefendants if, under Rule l .7(b)(l) and (4), the lawyer· reasonably believes that the lawyer will
be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client, and each

12 As discussed above, the Representation Agreements assure that Hawley Troxell's representation of
the corporate Defendants is limited to their common interests in defending Reed's complaint, so that
there is no significant Iisk under Rule L7(a)(2) and therefore no concwrent conflict of interest..
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affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.. See IRCP cmt. 23 ("[C]ommon
representation of persons having similar interests in litigation is proper if the requirements of
paragraph (b) are met.").
Generally, a lawyer can represent multiple pmties ''where the clients ar·e generally
aligned in interest even though there is some difference in interest among them . " IR.CP 1.7, cmt..
28 (addressing nonlitigation conflicts). Client consent is sufficient to waive both actual and
potential conflicts of interest if the lawyer can 1easonably conclude that the lawyer is able to
provide competent and diligent representation IPRC 17(b)(l); see Zador Corp. v. Kwan, 31
Cal.App..4th 1285, 1295 (1995). A client can give informed consent as long as the client is
aware of the circumstances and the "reasonably foieseeable ways that the conflict could have
adverse effects on the interests of that client" IR.CP 1..7 cmt 18..
Informed Conflict Waivers Obtained. Before undettaking joint representation ofAIA
Seivices and AJA Insurance in May 2007, and before proposing that the co-Defendants enter into
a .Joint Defense Agreement, Hawley Tmxell carefully considered whether such representation
could be undettaken in accordance with the applicable Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and
concluded that, with carefully designed disclosures, infmmed consents to waive conflicts, and
tolling agreements among the Defendants, such representation and joint defense auangement are
proper. Based on that consideration, and on the conflict waivers and tolling agreements among
the Defendants included in the Representation Agreements, Hawley Troxell reasonably believed
that the film would be able to provide competent and diligent representation to both AIA
Services and AIA Insurance. Babbitt Aff. iii! 8-12. In addition, Hawley Troxell reasonably.
believed, and continues to reasonably believe, that viable defenses to Plaintiff's claims exist.
Babbitt Ail:. , 12.. See, e g., Section N .D..4 of this Memorandum.
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Reed,s motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell under IRCP 1. 7 is misinfotmed and
misguided. Even if there exist concmrent conflicts of interest among the three co1porate
defendants, Hawley Troxell,s representation of its clients in this case is based on the informed
consent of the fum,s clients and the lawyers' 1easonable belief that, under the circumstances
detailed in Section IV .B 2 above, the lawyeis in this furn are able to provide competent and
diligent representation to each affected client as required by Rule 1..7(b)(2). Those
circumstances include the Representation Agreements, particularly (i) wtitten conflict waivers by
the three co1po1ations and by each of the individual Defendants in acco1dance with Rule
L7(b)(4) and (ii) standstill and tolling agreements between and among the three co1porate
Defendants and all of the individual Defendants, thereby preserving all claims between or among
the Defendants pending the outcome of this case.13
Plaintiff's counsel's mantra is that Hawley Troxell should not have represented both AIA
Sezvices Corporation and AIA Insw·ance, Inc. See, e. g . , Babbitt Aft:. Ex . 6 (Mr. Bond's August
3, 2008 email assezting "I have advised you all time and time again that AIA Inswance should
have separate counsel.") Hawley Troxell cai·efully considered this question before unde1taking
joint representation of AIA Services and AIA lnsUiance and concluded that, under· the
cit'cumstances, such joint representation is proper under the applicable Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct. Babbitt Aff., 12 . Even if there exists a concwrent conflict of interest

13 It is clear that plaintiff's expeit, Peter Ja1vis, is unaware of the existence of the Representation
Agreements and did not take them into account in reaching his opinions See Jarvis Aff. if 4 a (The
Law Finns "are laboring under severe conflicts of interest that either have not been waived or are
nonwaivable. "); 115.d. ("It does not appear that any, let alone all, of these conflicts can be and have
effectively been waived by disinterested individuals ")
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between the AIA entities, IRCP 1 7(b) provides that the conflict is waivable if- as is the case
here - each affected client gives info1med consent, confiimed in wziting.
IRPC 1 .2(c), relating to limited representations, provides an approp1iate way of analyzing
whether Hawley Troxell' s joint representation of the corporate Defendants is permissible in light
of the claims the corporate Defendants may have against one another. See Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers§ 121, Comment c (iii) ("Some conflicts can be eliminated by an
agreement limiting the scope of the lawyer's representation if the limitation can be given effect
without rendering the remaining repiesentation objectively inadequate'') (citations omitted); N.Y
City Bar Formal Opinion 2001-3 at 2-3 (decided under New York's ver·sion of the Model Code)
("representation may be limited to eliminate adversity and avoid a conflict of interest");

Indianapolis PodiatTy, P.C v. Eftoyrruon, 720 N. E.2d 376, 380-81 (Ind App. 1999) (because
law firm limited the scope of its engagement, there was no direct conflict of interest)..
The requirements for limiting a representation are similar to those that exist for obtaining
a waiver of a concwrent conflict of interest. Under Rule 1. 2(c), there is both a reasonableness
test (the limitation must be reasonable under the circumstances), and a client consent requirement
(the client must give info1med consent). Hawley Ttoxell limited its engagement by AIA to
representation ofits clients in Reed's lawsuit and its engagement by CropUSA to local counsel
1epresentation in this suit; and all claims between or among the corporate Defendants and/or the
individual Defendants have been preserved by tolling agreements . Fmther, each of the
Defendants gave informed consent to the representation. Under these circumstances, the limited
representation was reasonable, and in fact necessaiy, to enable the corporate Defendants to
defend themselves against Reed's claims According to Professor Strait: "Under· Idaho RPC 1.2,
Hawley Troxell may, after full discussion with the AIA entities and with Crop, undeitake such a
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joint repiesentation with an approp1iately limited scope ofrepresentation to the common claims
as authotized by the control groups and consistent with their authotity to defend against Reed's
claims."
Plaintiff asserts that Hawley Troxell must be disqualified in order ''to enswe fairness to
Reed Taylor in prosecuting his claims, and uphold the integrity of the legal system". While
Plaintiff has taken issue with Hawley Troxell's defense of the co1po1ate Defendants- alleging,
for example, that the attorneys are making ''inappropriate" arguments and implying lack of good
faith 01 reasonable basis in fact (DQ Motion p 10, 12, 25, 39-40, 46), Plaintiff has made no
showing whatsoever that replacing AIA's counsel and/or obtaining separate counsel for AIA
Services and AIA Insw·ance would in any way change the fairness or unfairness of the defense or
the ability of Reed Taylor to prosecute his claims.
For example, if sepmate counsel had been obtained for AIA Insw·ance, would they have
played any different role than Hawley Troxell? Reed presumably would contend that sepmate
counsel would have b1ought claims against AIA Services and the individual Defendants for
alleged self-dealing tiansactions But this argument suffe1s from the same defects as above,
including the fact that the same directors and officers manage both the pm·ent company and its
wholly-owned subsidiary; those directors and officers m·e Defendants in this lawsuit; and any
attomeys for AIA Inswance - whether Hawley Troxell or other· counsel -- me entitled, pwsuant
to IRCP 1..13(a), to rely on those directo1s and officers for direction in the conduct of the
litigation. See Section N.F of this Memorandum below. The likelihood that such management
ofAIA lnswance would direct sepmate counsel to sue themselves is remote.
Fairness or integrity ofjudicial p1ocess ar·e not Plaintiffs real concerns. Rather, the crux
of Reed's argument is that Plaintiffs claims m·e so self-evident that the Defendants should not be
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pemritted to defend against Plaintiff's claims.. Instead, Reed contends that Defendants and theil'
counsel should take him at his word that his claims are unassailable, that Plaintiff and his
attorneys are entitled to act as judge and jmy, that Defendants have no 1ight to defend against the
claims, that counsel has no tight to serve as an advocate for the Defendants, and that AIA
Seivices and AIA lnsUI"ance should now be suing the othei· Defendants rathei· than defending
against Reed's claims. See, e g, Bond's May 11, 2007 lettei· (Bond Aff Ex. 29) ("A careful
review of the pleadings, b1iefs, oral testimony and hearing exhibits clearly demonstrates that the
corporations have been operated for years for the benefit of John Taylor and others to the
detriment of Reed Taylor and other credit01s.'1; DQ Motion p . 33. Reed and his counsel have
characterized any defense 1aised by Defendants' counsel as fiivolous and as aiding and abetting
allegedly wrongful actions of other Defendants . DQ Motion p. 25; Bond Aff Ex . 38.
Professor Strait has char·actetized Plaintiff's prenrise as absmd. See Strait Aff. Section

VII.A .1 . ("The heart of the motion to disqualify is the claim, repeated in multiple foims and
multiple times, that the control group of AIA Services, AIA Insw·ance and Crop are all conflicted
because they have been named in Reed Taylor's suit and, therefore, cannot take a position with
regard to Reed Taylor's claims.. That position is abswd '1; see also Str·ait Aff. Section VII..E .1,
in which Professor Strait observes: ''Under [Reed's] theo1y, no Bomd could oppose his claims
since he has named every Board member and, therefore, undei· his theoiy (unique and absmd),
the conflicted Bomd members cannot act on behalf of a closely-held coiporation .... to oppose his
theodes assei:ted in his Complaint.. Any counsel who cooperates with such a Bomd and allows
themselves to be hired as litigation counsel is thet·efore a co-bad actor.. Accordingly, no
litigation counsel, whether representing one or more of the entities jointly or solely, could take
an adverse position to Reed's claims on behalf of the entity."
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In addition, Reed chose to sue AIA Insurance, Inc., making AIA Insurance a Defendant
and giving it and its parent company a common interest in a joint defense against a "hostile
takeover". Cf Strait Aff. Section VII . E.l . Reed did NOT attempt to assert derivative claims on
behalf of AIA Insurance against AJA Services and/or the individual Defendants, in which case
AIA Insurance would have been a plaintiff~ rather than a Defendant, and would have been
represented by Plaintiff's counsel rather than Hawley Troxell This bed is of Reed's and his cocounsels' own making
3..

Reed Enoneou.sly Contends That Hawley Troxell Cannot Represent The Three

Corporations Without Breaching The Attorneys' Duty OfLoyalty To Each Client. In the
conclusory manner that permeates the DQ Motion, Reed asse1ts that "it is impossible for Hawley

1 roxell ..... to simultaneously represent the interest of CropUSA, AIA Se1vices and AIA
Insurance, while at the same time giving each cmporation their undivided loyalty'' as required by
IRCP 1. 7.. DQ Motion p. 36. For the same 1easons detailed above, Hawley Troxell reasonably
believes, based on the Representation Agreements, that the three co1po1ations shaze a common
interest in defending against Reed's Complaint, that the clients' interests are aligned for that
pmpose, and that the tolling agreements which preseive claims inter se the Defendants removes
any direct advet:'Sity that would pwpo1tedly make it "impossible" for Hawley Troxell to give
each co1poration its undivided loyalty in the context of the defense of the limited engagement to
defend the corporate Defendants against Reed's claims in this litigation.

4..

Plaintiffls Not A Creditor But Rather A Redeemed Shareholder Subject To

Statutory Payment Restrictions Because OfAIA Services 'Insolvency. Plaintiff contends that
Hawley Troxell has not represented the interests of AIA Insw·ance and AIA Seivices (Amended
Motion at p. 23), by which Plaintiff apparently means that Hawley Troxell has not represented

AIA'S MEMORANDUM 1N OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL - 46
40005 0006 1309816 2

000235

Reed Taylor's interests as a creditor ofAIA Se1vices and a pledgee ofAIA Insurance stock. The
motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell, both directly and by reference to the separate lawsuit that
Plaintiff has filed against the furn, alleges that the attorneys' conduct of the defense of this case
has been "inapprop1iate" and that Hawley Troxell has aided and abetted the Defendants in
tottious conduct See, e.g., Bond Aff. Ex. 381132, 36, 53; DQ Motion p . 25, SO. To the extent
Plaintiff seeks disqualification of counsel on this basis, AIA inco1porates by reference the
Memorandum In Suppott ofl.R.C.P. Rule 12{b)(6) Motion to Dismiss filed and pending for
heating in Case No. CVOS-01765. Babbitt Aff Ex. 13.

In a similm· vein, Plaintiff complains that Hawley Troxell patticipated in ceasing all
payments to Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor.. Again, this assertion impeimissibly conflates
counsel with client. See Section IV.C above.
More significant, however, is the fact - as explained below - that AJA Setvices
Cmpozation cannot legally pay Reed Taylor because, as Plaintiff himself alleges, AIA Services

has been insolvent DQ Motion p . 43.. Undet· the Idaho Business Co1poration Act, redemption
of a common shareholder like Reed Taylor is illegal, and the redemption obligations m·e void and
unenforceable, to the extent AIA Se1vices was insolvent or would be 1endei·ed insolvent by the
redemption obligation. Idaho Code§ 30-1-6 (as in effect piior to .July 1, 1997) provided: "A
corporation shall have the tight to pw·chase ... or otherwise acquire .. its own shm·es, but
purchases of its own shat es, whethe1· direct or indirect, shall be made only to the extent of
unreseived and unrestricted eamed surplus available thei·efor, and, .... with the affitmative vote
of the holders of a majmity of all shat es entitled to vote thei·eon, to the extent of unresetved and
unrestricted capital swplus available thei·efor. . . . No purchaJe ofor payment for its own shares

shall be made at a time when the corporation is insolvent 01 when such purchase or payment

AIA'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSIDON TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL - 47
40005000613098162

000236

would make it insolvent" (Emphasis added. ) Idaho Code§ 30-1-46 similarly provided: "The

bomd of directors of a cotporation may . . distribute to its shareholders out of capital SUiplus of
the corporation a pottion of its assets, in cash or prc)peity, subject to the following provisions:
(a) No such distribution shall be made at a time when the corporation is insolvent or when .such

di.st1 ibution would render the corporation insolvent. .... " (Emphasis added..)
It is cmcial to recognize that Reed Taylor is NOT a credito1 who loaned funds to AIA

Seivices, but rather is a f01mer shareholder. The common stock inteiest being 1edeemed fi:om
Reed is on a pm· with the intei·est of the other common shareholders. Especially as the
contfolling shmeholder of AIA Services at the time of the Stock Redemption Agreement in

1995, Reed cannot simply leap into a prefeired position as a creditor, to the detriment of the

other common shar·eholders
In granting pmtial summmy judgment that AIA Setvices' note payable to Reed is

cw1'Clltly in default, the Court relied on cases involving creditors.. Howevet', AIA Se1vices is not
a bonower; and Reed Taylor is not a lender. Rather, he was a common shm·eholdet· whose
interests were redeemed His zights as a redeemed shmeholder are subject to the restrictions in
the Idaho Business Co1poration Act on a cotporation' s right to redeem its own shm·es,
resttictions that me designed to prohibit a shareholder from 1e-chmacte1izing his common equity
interest in the corporation to a creditor's interest with pri01ity ovei· all othei· shareholdets . See
Idaho Code§§ 30-1-6 and 30-1-46 as in effect in 1995 and 1996. Those statut01y rules are
designed to prevent exactly what Reed Taylor is attempting to do in this litigation.
Reed admits that, at least since 2001, AIA Se1vices has been insolvent. See DQ Motion
p . 44; ~ 12 of Reed's Complaint against Hawley Troxell in Civ. No. CV 08-01'765 Defendants
contend that AIA Services was also insolvent in 1995 and 1996 Consequently, under Idaho
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Code§§ 30-1-6 and 30-1-46, the redemption agreement is void and unenforceable; and, as a
matter of law, Reed is not a creditor entitled to any special duties or remedies because of AIA
Setvices' insolvency.

5.

Acceptance Of Fees For Legal Services Does Not Breach The Lawyer'.s Duty Of'

Loyalty. The DQ Motion (pp 40, 52) alleges that the attorneys' "sole pmpose" in multiple
representation is to eam fees, constituting self-intei·est in violation ofIRCP l .7(a)(2)) This view
cannot be countenanced.

It is well settled that a conflict of interest requi1ing disqualification undet Model Rule 1 7
does not exist merely because an attorney may be personally interested in the outcome of the
litigation. Lowe v. Expetian, 328 F Supp 2d 1122, 1129 (D . Kansas 2004); Main Events Ptod.,

LLC v Lacy, 220 F. Supp. 2d 353, 358 (D.N.J. 2002).. In Lowe, the comt recognized that many
attomeys have :financial intei·ests in the outcome of litigation, such as attorneys that enter into
contingency fee auangements with their clients.. Lowe, 328 F. Supp 2d at 1129. Contingency
fee atrangements necessaiily mean that the attorney has a pe1sonal intetest in the outcome of the
litigation because their payment is premised on their client's recovety. Id. However, this
personal intetest in receiving a payment has been deemed ethical and would not wairant
disqualification.. Id.
Fmthet·, the exatnples set forth undei· IR.PC l . 7(a)(2) do not considet· the receipt of
attorneys' fees to be a personal intei·est for pmposes of that IUle Rather, the lawyer has an
impetmissible ''petsonal interest" only when the Iawyet·'s interests have an adve1se effect on the
representation of the client. See IR.PC 1 7, cmt 10. The exatnples set forth in that comment
include personal intetests such as discussions conceming possible employment with opposing
counsel or "refetring clients to an enterp1ise in which the lawyei· has an undisclosed financial
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interest." Id. Other potential conflicts based on a lawyer's personal interest deal with the
lawyer's personal relationship, such as when the lawyers representing adve1se clients are related
by blood, maniage or other domestic relationship, or entedng a business transaction with the
client or acquiiing an interest advetse to a client. IRPC l . 7(a)(2) cmt 11; JR.PC 1. 8.
The examples set fo1th in the IRCP and the cases addressing petsonal conflicts of interest
support the conclusion that an attorney's intetest in fees does not create a conflict of interest
under IR.PC L7(a)(2) . An intet·est in receiving fees for legal seivices performed is ethical; and
the acceptance of such fees is not an action that is contrary to the interest of a client, Theiefore,
the mere acceptance of fees for legal seivices cannot constitute a personal conflict of intetest
under IRPC l .7(a)(2). Ifit wei·e, Mr. Bond and Mr.. Bissell would also have an IRPC l .7(a)(2)
conflict.
Fmther, Professor Strait notes that ''the AIA entities may enter into transactions designed
to assure adequate financing to fulfill the entities' obligations to indemnify and defend against
Reed's claims since Reed has sued directors individually undei· the bylaws of the respective
co1porations . " Strait Aff. Section VllB .3. Accordingly, Hawley Troxell did not breach any
duty ofloyalty to AIA by drafting documentation of the loan by CropUSA to AIA Services. See
Section II I above.

E.

The "Hot Potato" Doctrine Has No Application to Hawley TI"oxell.
Citing IRPC 1. 9 (Duties to Formei· Clients), Plaintiff seeks disqualification of all

attorneys "because they cannot drop the 1ep1esentation of any one or more of the defendants to
reinain counsel for another defendant." DQ Motion p . 34 . Because joint representation of the
corporate Defendants by Hawley Troxell is appropriate under the circumstances of this case, the
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furn has no intention of dropping representation of any of its clients in 01der to represent another
prefe1red client. The ''hot potato" doctiine has no relevance to Hawley Troxell .

F.

Hawley Trnxell's Conduct Of This Case Is Dil'ected By AIA's Authorized
Constituents Under· IRCP 1.1.3 And Idaho Code§ 30-1-801.
Reed complains that Hawley Troxell knows that John 1 aylor is directing the litigation in

his own interests and alleges that the lawyers are not proceeding in the best interest of the
cozporation as required by IRCP l..13(b) See DQ Motion (at pp. 40-42, 47-48) . Similarly, in a
May 11, 2007 letter (Bond Aff. Ex. 29), Plaintiff's counsel asseits that "it is inappropriate for
.John Taylor to direct litigation on behalf of the corpoiation in light of the substantial claims
already alleged against him."
Under IRCP 1..13 as applied to the circumstances of this case, this argument cannot be
countenanced.. Hawley Troxell is autho1ized and cfuected by both the Idaho Business
Co1poration Act and the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct to represent AIA Seivices
Cmpoiation and AIA Insurance, Inc. through their duly authorized constituents - i e , the board
of directors and the duly appointed officers of the corpozations.
IRCP 1. 13(a) confums that a lawyer employed 01 retained by an organization "represents
the organization acting through its authoiized constituents".. Comment 1 states that officers,
directors, employees and shareholdeis are "constituents" of the corporate organizational client.
John Taylor is the chief executive officer and president of the two corporations, duly appointed
by the respective boards of directors As such, John Taylor is an auth01ized "constituent" of the
AIA entities, as are the boards of directors of the two co1porations. Further, the boards have
taken an active role in directing Hawley Troxell in this litigation. As IRCP Rule 1..13 comment 5
makes clear, in a cotporation "[t]he organization's highest authority to whom a matter may be
referred ordinarily will be the board of directors" or, under certain circumstances, "the
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independent directors of the corporation" This Rule is consistent with Idaho co1porate law See
Idaho Code§ 30-1-801(2) ("All coiporate powe1s shall be exercised by or under the autho1ity of;
and the business and affairs of the co1poration managed by or under the direction of; its boaid of
~:wJ'ectors
" ' ' '") '

Other than the ludicrous suggestions (DQ Motion at pp. 42-47, 49-50) that Plaintiff
himself is the only "disinterested" person entitled to choose counsel for the AJA entities, waive
conflicts, app1ove joint representation of the AlA entities, app1ove the joint defense agreement
and dll·ect the defense, 14 it is unclear who Reed thinks should be dllecting the AIA defense.. As
a practical matter, who else is there to dll·ect the defense of this case besides the Defendant
directo1s and officers of the co1potations? With Reed suing newly appointed directors (i e,
Connie Taylor and Jim Beck) and the companies not having directors and officers insurance,
there is no realistic possibility of finding independent di1ectors to direct the litigation. See
Minutes of the August 7, 2008 meeting of the AIA boaids of directors (Bond Afl Ex . 41 }.
Professor Strait observes: ..Under· [Reed's] theory, no Boaid could oppose his claims since he

has named every Boaid member and, therefore, under his theory (unique and abswd), the
conflicted Boaid members cannot act on behalf of a closely-held corporation .... to oppose his
theories asserted in his Complaint." Strait Aff. Section VII.E..L
Reed's paitial quotation ofIRCP Ll3(b) is misleading (DQ Motion pp. 41-42): He
quotes only the first sentence of the Rule, which provides that ..the lawye1 shall proceed as is
reasonably necessary in the best inter·est of the corporation'' if the lawyer knows that an officer or
employee is engaged in action that is a violation of a legal obligation to the corporation or a

14 See Section N.G.3 below.
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violation of law that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization." However, he
omits the second sentence, which explains that the lawyer notmally should repo1t such conduct
up-the·laddet ''to higher autho1ity in the organization, including, ifwauanted by the
circumstances, to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization .... " Rule I .7
acknowledges the fundamental principle of cotporate law that the boatds of directors of AIA
Services and AIA Insurance m·e the highest authmities in those organizations. IRCP Rule 1.13
cmt 5. Where, as here, the directors themselves m·e the persons accused of malfeasance, there is
no higher authority which could direct Hawley Troxell in defense of Reed's claims.
From his misconceived argument that interested directors cannot direct the defense
against his claims, Reed contends that AIA Services and AIA Insw·ance should somehow have
found disinterested directors to give direction to defense counsel.. However, IRCP Rule 1. 13
does not distinguish between intetested and disinterested directors or officers, or between inside
and independent directors or officers. The fact is that, in this case, Reed's own actions have
resulted in every director and officer of AIA Services and AIA Insw·ance being "interested"
because they are all being sued by Reed. Absent independent directors or officets, there's no
independent person to direct the defense
In a related but equally misconceived argument, Reed contends (DQ Motion at pp . 47.;48)
that ..the Attorneys have taken instructions fi:om R .John Taylor in violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct and failed to notify disinterested patties or shareholders of the impropet·
acts ofR.. John Taylor." To the contrary, IRCP 1.13(d) expressly negates any obligation to
reveal confidential info1mation to any person other than the organization's highest authority (in
this case, the corporations' boards of directors) where the lawyer's representation relates to the
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investigation of an alleged violation of law or the defense of the organization against a claim
arising out of an alleged violation of law. As stated in Comment 7:
Paragraph (d) makes clear· that the authority of a lawyer to disclose
information relating to a representation in circumstances desc1ibed
in paragraph (c) does not apply with respect to information
relating to a lawyer's engagement by an organization to investigate
an alleged violation oflaw or to defend the organization ... against
a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law. This is necessm:y
in order to enable organizational clients to enjoy the full benefits of
legal counsel in conducting an investigation or defending against a
claim.
The gravamen of Reed's complaint in this litigation is that the corporations, through their
directors and officets, have engaged in violations oflaw Reed's claims bting IR.CP l .7(d)
directly into play. IR.CP 1 7 is clearly not violated by any alleged failure by Hawley T10xell to
reveal to "disinterested patties or shat·eholders" othe1wise confidential information concerning
alleged misconduct by the Defendants.
G.

Reed Erroneously Contends That It Is Impossible For Hawley Troxell To Have
Obtained Requir'ed Consents.
l.

Hawley Troxel/'s Rep1esentation Agreements Were Approved By the AJA Boards,

Which Are the Corporations' Highest Autho1ity Undet /RPG 1.13. Mr. Bond's May 11, 2007
letter (Bond Aff Ex. 29) states: "I am surprised that you would not require direction and consent
:from a disinterested bom:d of directo1·s p1ior to your· representation of both corporations because
of the substantial claims alleged against John Taylor." As a matter of fact, Hawley Troxell
ensured that the AIA Services and AIA Insur·ance bom:ds approved the Representation
Agreements in connection with the fum's appearance for the two corporations. At the time
Hawley T10xell was retained, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman had resigned as directors.. AIA
Se1vices and AIA Insurance re-constituted their boa.t'ds and approved engagement of Hawley
Troxell pursuant to the Representation Agreements. Connie Taylor and Jim Beck wer·e added to
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the boards with the intention that they sezve as independent directors precisely because of the
potential conflict between the corporations and .John Taylor given Reed's allegations of selfdealing by John. (At that time, Jim Beck was not a defendant. Connie had been sued, but only
with respect to her community pmperty intez·est as .John's fmmer spouse; and John Hally filed a
motion to dismiss her in that capacity. Aftez· Connie joined the AIA boards, Reed then sued her
as a dfrector, and the motion to dismiss was mooted.) Before Connie and Jim were named as
defendants by amended complaint, the two boards approved the Representation Agreements .

2..

Independent Shareholder Approval ofHaw/ey Troxel/ 's Engagement By AJA Is

Not Required.. Plaintiff contends that disintez·ested shareholdez approval is required to authorize

Hawley Troxell 's engagement by the AIA entities and to authoxize the joint defense agr·eement
among the Defendants . Babbitt Afl. Ex . 8 (Bond's August 5, 2008 email: "[N]o 'true'
independent shareholdez· approval was ever obtained for your representation, let alone any full
and fair disclosure."); DQ Motion pp. 8-9 (John Taylor "did not seek approval of any joint
retainer or joint defense agreements, and did not obtain votes only from disinterested
shar·eholders .....").. This contention is unsupportable .
The representation of AJA Sezvices and AIA Insurance by Hawley Troxell, as well as the
conflict waiver letters, the standstill and tolling agreements and the joint defense agreement,
were approved by the AIA Sezvices and AIA Insurance boards . Contrary to Reed's assumption,
there is no obligation to obtain disinterested shar·eholder approval of such representation. Idaho
Code Sections 30-1-861, -863 provide a safe harbor if a director's conflicting interest transaction
is approved by the disintez·ested shareholders; but failure to obtain such a vote is not wmngful.
Also, Hawley Troxell had no involvement in AIA Sezvices' solicitation of the vote ofAIA
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Se1vices shaI"eholders to approve the advance of litigation expenses to the individual defendants .

See Babbitt Aff'. 1 13
Plaintiff argues that all of the Attomeys should be disqualified because they "failed to
obtain shareholde1 or disinterested patty consent of the joint representation, joint defense and
joint retainer as required by the Rules of Professional Conduct." DQ Motion p . 43 . This
argument is based on two fundamental euors: First, it is premised on the mistaken assumption

(id. p . 42) that a joint defense agreement is equivalent to "dual iepresentation" under RPC 1.7
and l . 13(g).· This etroneous assumption is dispelled in Section IV.B.4 of this Memo1andum.
Second, Plaintiff cites IRPC l . 13(g) for the supposed p1oposition that "the consent shall
be given by an approp1iate official of the organization other than the individual who is to be
'represented, or by the shaI'eholders'', incmrectly implying that Rule 1 .13(g) 1equires shareholder
approval of the lawyers' representation of the cmporation if the directo1s and officers ai·e also
being sued. Id. This reliance on IRCP l 13(g) is misplaced, as Reed has quoted only a portion
of the Rule out of context and thereby misrepresented its limited scope and pwpose. IRCP
1 .13(g) provides, in full:
A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of
its directo1s, officers, employees, membe1s, shateholder or other
constituents, subject to the provision of Rule 1.7. If the
organization's consent to the dual representation is required by
Rule 1 .7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of
the organization other than the individual who is to be represented,
or by the shareholders.
Under RPC l .13(g). if an attorney were representing a co1poration, and if the co1poration's
consent to dual representation of a director or officer were required by RPC 1. 7, autho1ization to
undertake dual representation might requite wtitten consent "given by an approp1iate official of
the organization othex· than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shai·eholders . "
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However, IRCP 1. 13(g) does not pmpoxt to address the question of who is entitled to engage the
attorneys for the cotporation itself In this case, the Rule is inapplicable because no attorney of
1ecord represents both a c01poration and any individual director/officer Defendant; and in
patticular, Hawley Troxell has not undertaken the representation of any of the individual
Defendant directors or officers of its co1po1ation clients.. Babbitt Aff. 1 11 Hawley Troxell
represents only AJA Services, AIA Insmance and (as local counsel) CropUSA. Because Hawley
Troxell does not represent any of the individual Director Defendants, IRPC 1.13(g) is not
implicated.
3.

Hawley T10xell 's Rep1esentation Of/ts Clients Does Not Require Reed Tay/01 's

Consent. Reed Taylor asserts throughout his DQ Motion that Hawley Troxell must be

disqualified because Reed Taylor and/or Donna Taylor have not consented to Hawley Troxell's
rep1esentation of AIA Seivices and AIA lnsUI'ance, and that Reed is the only person with
authoxity to waive conflicts of interest.. See DQ Motion, pp. 9, 41, 46, 50.. This argument is
premised on the proposition that Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor ate entitled to seats on the AIA
Services Boatd of Directors (see id., p. 41) and that Reed Taylor is entitled to immediate
possession of AIA InsUI'ance (see id., p. 50).. As an initial matter, the question of whether Reed
Taylor and/or Donna Taylor are entitled to a seat on the AIA Services Board of Directors is a
disputed issue which has not yet been addressed in this litigation.
More impo1tantly, Reed Taylor's ai:gument that he is entitled to decide which law fitm(s)
will represent AIA Seivices and AIA Insm·ance in this litigation is inimical to the very natm·e of
the adversai:y comt system. Reed Taylor cannot possibly be entitled to chose who will represent
the parties that he has sued in this litigation. If Reed Taylor is entitled to make the decision, then
AIA Services and AIA Insurance would be without counsel: Reed Taylor has repeatedly
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asserted in this litigation that it is improper for any attorney to accept attorney's fees from AIA
Sei:vices or AIA Insw·ance, because any funds used to pay attorney's fees should instead be paid
to Reed Taylor. Further, Plaintiff would not consent to any counsel that did not agree with his
position.. Thus, Reed Taylor would not consent to any law furn defending AIA Services and
AIA Inswance against his claims, leaving both companies without legal assistance in defending
themselves in this litigation.

B.

The Possibility That A Hawley Tl'O:x:ell Attorney Might Be A Witness Concerning
Cer·tain Matten Does Not RequiI'e Disqualification of the Firm Under· IRCP .3.7.
1

Disqualification of the Entire Firm Is Unwananted. Reed apparently seeks

disqualification of the entire Hawley Troxell law furn, pursuant to IRPC 3 . 7, because Mr. Riley
is allegedly a witness in connection with an opinion given by his fo1mei:· furn, Eberle Berlin, in
1995 . 15 DQ Motion pp. 39-40. IRPC 3. 7, which is identical to the Amei:ican Bar Association's

Model Rule of Professional Conduct (''Model Rule") 3 . 7, provides (in pertinent paI1):
(a)

A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the
lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless:

.........
Disqualification of the lawyer would work
substantial hardship on the client.

(3)
(b)

A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which anothei:·
lawyer in the lawyer's furn is likely to be called as a
witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or
Rule 1.9.

As a preliminary matter, note the express equitable exception to the application of Rule
3. 7: The lawyer, or in this case the entire fum of Hawley Troxell, should not be disqualified

15 Contnuy to the assertion in the DQ Motion (p . 28), Plaintiffs expert expressly disclaimed any
opinion based on IRCP 3 .7 See Jarvis Affidavit, 4.b.("I therefore do not base my opinion on
attomey-witness considerations .... ").
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from acting as AIA's advocate at a tiial, even if a lawyer in the film is likely to be a necessaty
witness, if disqualification of the film would work substantial ha.tdship on the client See Section
A 4 above, addressing the ptejudice to AJA if Reed's motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell is
granted.
Plaintiff's counsel argues that ''Richatd Riley issued an opinion letter to Reed and
[Hawley Ttoxell is] now tying [sic] to disingenuously argue the $8 .5 Million is not owed to
him'', refening to the 1995 Eberle Berlin opinion on enfo1ceability of the 1995 stock redemption
agreement. Babbitt Aff. Ex . 8.. Plaintiff appm·ently believes that Mr. Riley would testify
adversely to AIA Services, based on the 1995 opinion, that AJA Se1vices was not insolvent at the
time and that the stock redemption agreement between Reed Taylor and AIA Services was not
unlawful. Comment 6 to IRCP 3 7 1ecognizes a conflict of interest if there is a substantial
conflict between the testimony of the client and that of the lawyer· who appears as an advocate
for the client at trial .
However, Plaintiff has not shown why Mr. Riley is necessai:ily a witness to any relevant
facts; and there is no basis in the record for suggesting that Mr. Riley's testimony will conflict
with the interests of Hawley Troxell's clients 16 As discussed below, the 1995 Eberle Berlin
opinion is not in any way dispositive of (or even relevant to) the question whether· AIA Se1vices
Corporntion was insolvent at the time of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement or the 1996
Stock Restructuring Agreement or whether, as a consequence of such insolvency, the redemption

16 For example, the enforceability opinion is expressly qualified by the usual bankruptcy/insolvency
exception See Bond Aff. Ex 2 (Opinion #2).
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note and stock pledge agreement are illegal and void under the Idaho Business Co1poration
Act..17
The application of fo1mer Idaho Code § 30-1-6 is a question of law for the Comt.. Even if
Mr Riley could be required to state his personal legal opinion concerning the meaning or
application of the statute, that testimony would not be either relevant or admissible.. Fmther, the
financial condition ofAIA Services is an issue of fact which is best detennined from AIA's
financial 1ecords.

Plaintiff~

who was the majoiity stockholder at the time the 1995 Redemption

Agreement was executed, was aware of AIA's financial condition; and there are financial
statements and other records from which the solvency or insolvency of AIA Services can be
determined
If in fact the corporation was insolvent at the time of the 1995 Stock Redemption

Agreement and/or the 1996 Stock Redemption RestmctUI·e Agreement, the redemption is
unlawful undei Idaho Code § 30-1-6 and void regardless whether or not the 1995 Eberle Berlin
opinion was cmrect and regardless whether Mr. Riley might be a witness.. The existence of the
Eberle Berlin opinion that the 1995 agreement is enforceable does not negate the efficacy of the
illegality defense if in fact the company was insolvent and the Agreement (including both the
redemption note and the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement) therefore void.

17 As a fallback position, Plaintiff's counsel threatens that, "even if the illegality argument had meiit,

Donna I aylor and Reed I aylo1 would be suing Hawley I roxell (and Richard Riley) in such an
instance regardless of any circumstances . " Babbitt Afl. Ex. 8. See also DQ Motion p. 39 subif (6).
Ihe assertion that there could be any claim against Hawley Troxell for an opinion given by Eberle
Berlin in 1995 is frivolous. Fwther, the opinion was not rendered byRicha1dRiley or any other
Eberle Berlin lawyei, but rather by the firm itself Riley Aff if 2.. Even if Reed may have a
malpractice claim against Mr. Riley and his fmmer firm if the opinion was negligently given and the
claim is not time-ba1red, this possibility does not creates a conflict of intei·est that would prevent
Hawley Tl'oxell from continuing to represent AIA.
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More impottantly, even if Mr. Riley were a necessary witness and therefore pursuant to
mPC 1.7(a) could not act as a tzial advocate for the film's clients18, Hawley Troxell would not
be disqualified under m.PC 3. 7.. The issues of disqualification of a lawyer-witness to act as an
advocate at trial and the disqualification of the lawyer's law fi1m are addressed separately under
JRCP 1.7(a) and (b), respectively. The Rule does not automatically extend the tiial lawyerwitness prohibition to the partners and associates of a testifying lawyer who does not act as an
advocate for the client at trial . Rather, subsection (b) specifically allows a lawyer-litigator to act
as an advocate at ttial even where it is likely that the litigator's colleague in the furn will be a
witness, unless Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9 precludes the litigator from doing so. As stated in Comment
7 to both JRCP 3 7 and Model Rule 3. 7:
Paragraph (b) provides that a lawyer is not disqualified from
seiving as an advocate because a lawyer with whom the lawyer is
associated in a furn is precluded from doing so by paragraph (a).
If~ however, the testifying lawyer would also be disqualified by
Rule 1. 7 or Rule 1. 9 from representing the client in the mattei·,
other lawyers in the film will be precluded from representing the
client by Rule 1 .l 0 unless the client gives informed consent under
the conditions stated in Rule 1. 7.
Thus, unless Mr. Riley is disqualified by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1 9, there is no requirement that any of

the Hawley Troxell lawyers who have appeared in this case be disqualified from representing
AIA Seivices Co1poration as trial advocates in this case.. Moreover, comment 7 makes it cleat

that, even ifit is assumed that the testifying lawyer would be disqualified undei· IRPC 1.7 or 1.9,
other lawyers in the film may act as tiial advocates, notwithstanding m.PC 1 .10, with the
info1med consent of the client..

18 Mr. Riley has not appeared in this action and will not se1ve as an advocate for AIA Services
Corporation at trial in this case . 1herefore, disqualifying him from acting as an advocate at the tiial
in this case pursuant to IRCP 3 .7(a) is unnecessaiy
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In any event, neither Rule 1. 7 nor Rule 1 .9 is applicable in this situation. Other than the

''hot potato" argument (which, as explained in Section IV.E above, does not apply to Hawley
Troxell), Plaintiff's motion to disqualify counsel contains no reference to Rule 1.9 (dealing with
duties to fotmer clients) in connection with Hawley Troxell's role as counsel in this case.
Rather, Reed contends that Hawley Troxell should be disqualified under Rule 1 .7. However, for
the reasons discussed in Section IV D of this Memorandum, that contention must fail..
Accordingly, in the absence of disqualification under either Rule 1. 7 or Rule 1. 9, the fact that
Mr. Riley might be a witness does not preclude other Hawley Troxell attorneys fiom serving as
trial advocates for the co1porate Defendants .
Courts addressing the issue since the promulgation of Model Rule 3 7 have consistently
concluded that there is no requirement that an entire law :film be disqualified because one or
more ofits lawyers will be witnesses . See e. g, Ayu.s v . Total Renal Cate, Inc, 48 F. Supp . 2d 714,
717-19 (S ..D. Tex . 1999) (attorney's firm not disqualified because attomeywill be a witness);
Hatter v University ojlndianapolis, 5 F .Supp 2d 657, 667 n.4 (S . D Ind 1998)(attomeys in

same furn not disqualified because attorney in furn will testify); Brown v. Daniel, 180 F RD.
298, 301-02 (D.S.C 1998)(in light of drastic natme of disqualification, Rule 3. 7 (b) does not
require disqualification of the entire fitm even though the pm:tner will be a necessary witness);
Kubin v. Miller, 801 F. Supp. 1101, 1113-14 (S.DNY 1992)(imputing disqualification to fellow

members of lawyer-witness' firm is extremely harsh and should be limited to special
circumstances); Ramsay v. Boeing Welfare Bene.fit Plan, 662 F. Supp . 968, 970-71 (D . Kan
1987) (Rule 3. 7(b) precluded disqualification of law furn).
2.

Coutts Disfavot Attempts To Transfotm Opposing Attomeys Into Witnesses.

Plaintiff seeks disqualification of the entire Hawley Troxell law :fum pmsuant to IRCP 3 .7 based
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on the asse1tion that all of the named attorneys are witnesses to one or more of vaiious actions
taken dwing the cow·se of rep1esenting AIA in this litigation that Reed alleges to be wrongful,
aiding and abetting, conspiracy to prevent Reed ftom exercising his contractual rights, etc. See
DQ Motion pp. 39-40. Plaintiff lists 13 topics on which Hawley Troxell attorneys are
supposedly witnesses (most of which deal with the veiy arguments being asseited by counsel in
this litigation or transactions in which Hawley Troxell was not even involved).. DQ Motion pp.
39-40.. The topics listed by Plaintiff aie not topics on which any Hawley Troxell attorney could
ever be deposed, much less on which a Hawley Troxell attorney could ever be required to testify
at trial.
Cowts geneially refuse attempts to depose opposing counsel, both on p1ivilege grounds
and also as too dismptive of the litigation process and the attorney-client relationship. The longaccepted standaid for whethei· attorneys involved in the case can be deposed was set by the
Eighth Circuit in Shelton v . Ame1ican Motors Co1p . , 805 F . 2d 1323, 1327 (8th Cir. 1986). 19 In
that case, a paity sought to depose in-house counsel of its opponent to deteimine whethei·
document production was complete.. The appellate comt refused to pe1mit the deposition, stating
that such attempts are disfavored because:
Taking the deposition of opposing counsel not only disrupts the
adversarial system and loweis the standards of the profession, but

19 Neither the Idaho coUits nor the Ninth Circuit have addressed whether they would apply the Shelton
factors when determining whether an attomey could be deposed. See DiLon1enzo v Co$tco
Wholesale Co1p . 243 FR.D. 413, 415 (W.D. Wash. 2007) . However, the district courts in the Ninth
Citcuit have applied the factors in these circumstances . See, e g, id.; Lloyd Lifestyle Ltd. v. Soa1ing
Helmet Corp , No . C06-0349C, 2006 WL 753243, at *2 (W.D Wash. March 23, 2006) (unpublished);
Am. Cas. Co. v. Kreiger, 160 F.R.D 583, 589 (S ..D. Cal. 1995). Additionally, the Idaho Banktuptcy
cowt also applied the Shelton facto1s when it encountered this issue See In re Wiggins, No. 9940458, 2000 WL 33712300, at *2 (Bankr. D. Idaho Ap1il l0, 2000).. Jn fact, most courts that have
addressed this issue have followed Shelton.. Id.
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it also adds to the ah·eady burdensome time and costs of litigation.
It is not hard to imagine additional delays to resolve wo1k-product
and attorney-client objections, as well as delays to resolve
collateral issues raised by the attorney's testimony. Finally, the
practice of deposing counsel detracts from the quality of client
representation. Counsel should be free to devote his or her time
and efforts to preparing the client's case without fear of being
interrogated by his or· her opponent "
The cowt identified the following factors to be used in determining whether to permit an
opposing attomey to be deposed: (1) No other means exist to obtain the infmmation; (2) The
information sought is relevant and non-privileged; and (3) the information is crucial to the
preparation of the case. Reed lists thiiteen matters in which the individual named attorneys have
allegedly been involved and as to which he contends "the Attorneys are witnesses . " But Plaintiff
makes no showing why testimony of Hawley Troxell attorneys would be necessary or proper
with respect to any of these matters, or what ielevant, non-privileged information the attorneys
might provide, or why any non-privileged information could not be obtained from other persons
or through other means of discovery.
The potential disruption to the judicial process may be illustrated by putting the shoe on
the other foot: If Reed's ar·gument-i..e. , that attomeys should be disqualified because they ar·e
witnesses to meetings and other actions occw1ing during their representation of their client- is
given credence, then AIA could file a counter'Claim against Reed and his counsel for abuse of
process though the concoction of their multi-faceted scheme to manufacture conflicts on which
to base Plaintiffs' motion to disqualify counsel. Under· Plaintiff's theory, Roderick Bond and
Michael Bissell would be subject to disqualification under IR.PC 3.7 because they are witnesses
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to their "inappmpriate" and conspiiatoiial meetings between themselves and with Reed to plan
their scheme.20
I.

Ther·e Is No Appeannce Of' Impr·opl'iety In Hawley Troxell's Representation Of
The Three Cor·por·ate Defendants.

Plaintiff contends that Hawley Troxell's representation of the cmporate Defendants has
the appearance of impropriety. DQ Motion pp. 52-53. While mouthing the words, Plaintiff has
failed to demonstrate any appearance of impropriety under the pertinent tests.
The Cowt should apply the fom-pmt test the Idaho cowts have developed "to determine
whether an appemance of improptiety alone will give a party standing to interfere with an
adverse party's choice of counsel." Fo.ster v.. Traul, 145 Idaho 24, 32, 175 P. 3d 186, 194 (2007).
Under that test, the Cowt considers the following factors:
(1) Whether· the motion is being made for the purposes of
harassing the defendant,

(2) Whether the party bringing the motion will be damaged
in some way if the motion is not granted,
(3) Whether there m·e any alternative solutions, or is the
proposed solution the least damaging possible under the
circumstances, and

(4) Whether the possibility of public suspicion will
outweigh any benefits that might accrue to continued
representation.

20 Plaintiff even goes so far as to assett that Hawley I mxell should be disqualified because Hawley
1roxell attorneys are witnesses to the vexy a.tguments they have made in this litigation. See, e g., DQ
Motion pp. 3940 (asserting that Hawley Troxell "Attorneys are witnesses to ... arguing against
naming Mike Cashman as a defendant ... [and] improperly restraining Reed Taylor, when they knew
he had the contractual 1ights and that the corporations were not being operating properly." This
assertion demonstl'ates the absut'dity of Plaintiffs argument. As a pa.tticipant in heatings on these
matters, Mr. Bond is a "witness" to those arguments as well and, under Plaintiff's theo1y, would also
be disqualified undet· IRPC 3 .7.
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Id at 32-33, 175 P .3d at 194-95 . Each factor favors allowing Hawley Troxell to continue to
represent the three corporate Defendants in this action.
First, the combination of PlaintifP s deiivative demand that the boards of directors of AIA
Services and AIA Insurance sue the co1porations' attorneys, the threats by Plaintiff to file a
malpractice action against AIA's counsel and to furnish a copy of the complaint to the Idaho
State Bar, and Plaintiff's actual filing of that separate lawsuit against AIA's attorneys
demonstrates that Plaintiffs motion to disqualify counsel is part of a scheme to har·ass AIA and
gain for Plaintiff an unfair tactical advantage in this litigation by manufacturing a basis to seek
Hawley Troxell's disqualification Plaintiff's own brief constitutes unequivocal evidence of this
scheme: He contends that disqualification of Hawley Troxell should be based on the mere filing
of his separate lawsuit against Hawley Troxell, involving claims of aiding and abetting of the
breach of fiducia.ty duties, fraud, convei"Sion and othei· claims which m·e supported by the same
documents and subject matter of this lawsuit. DQ Motion p. 53 . Given that Plaintiff~ who
Hawley Troxell has never represented and is not a cunent or former client of the film, is the de
facto source of the disqualification effo1t, the Court should be waty of the increased risk that
mischiefis afoot. See Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho at 697 .
Second, Plaintiff fails to explain, in any meaningful way, either· (i) how he has already
been damaged as a result of any alleged conflicts of interest between Hawley Troxell's clients, or
(ii) how he would be damaged in the future if Hawley Troxell is not disqualified. Even ifAIA
Insurance had had sepa.tate counsel from AIA Seivices and CropUSA, the same directors and
officers would still be directing the defense of AIA Insurance. There would be no difference in
the direction given to counsel in the conduct of the defense against Reed's claims. The only
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practical consequence of separate representation of AJA Inswance would be the additional fees
and costs incmred by yet another set of attorneys
Ihird, given Plaintiff's failure to identify any legitimate risk of prejudice by Hawley
Troxell' s continued representation of the corporate Defendants, the least damaging alternative to
disqualification is to confitm the right of those Defendants to engage counsel oftheil choosing
and allow the representation to continue.
Fomth, none ofthe corporate defendants is a public company; and this dispute is not of
public significance.. Hawley Troxell' s continued 1·ep1esentation of the corporate Defendants will
not arouse public suspicion about the integrity of the legal process . Discontinuing AJA's tight
to the counsel ofits choice, however, will impose on AJA the needless cost and inconvenience of
changing counsel.
V. CONCLUSION

The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct guide lawyers, among other ways, in deciding
whether representing a client is ethical and not in bteach of a duty to another cuIIent 01 fotmer
client. Hawley Troxell has taken its obligations under the Rules seiiously.. At the inception of
its engagement as defense counsel for AJA, the fum reviewed and analyzed the pettinent Rules
and reached the consideied decision that it ethically can represent its clients in this action. Had
Hawley Troxell reached a contraty decision, the fum would not have undeztak:en the
representation in the first place, or would have withdtawn voluntatily had conflicts ai:ising during
the representation required it .
The Rules' preamble expresses a cautionai:y note wotth remembering hez·e: "[T]he
pmpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural
weapons." See Foster v Traul, 145 Idaho 24, 32, 175 P. 3d 186, 194 (2007) (quoting IR.P . C
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pmbl. ~ 20 with approval).. In other words, opposing parties may "misuse[ ]'' the Rules "as a
technique for harassment." Weaver v Milla1d, 120 Idaho 692, 697, 819 P . 2d 110, 115 (Ct. App .
1991). Because paities have a fundamental tight to choose their own counsel, disqualifying a
pmty' s chosen counsel at the request of an opposing patty is a "drastic" step. Arkansas Valley
State Bank v . Phillips, 171 P.Jd 899, 911 (Okla. 2007); In Te Estate of W1ight, 881 N E..2d 362,

366 (Ill. Ct. App. 2007) Not swpdsingly, then, "motions to disqualify at·e generally
disfavored." Foster, 145 Idaho at 33, 175 P..3d at 195 . Cowts ate particularly wmy of motions
to disqualify that come ''not from a client or former client of the attomey, but from an opposing
paity." Weave1, 120 Idaho at 697, 819 P2d at 115. By all appearances, Plaintiff's DQ Motion is
a gambit in a concerted scheme to gain an unfair advantage for Plaintiff in this litigation.
It is also impmtant to note that disqualification is not mandatoty even if the
representation creates a technical violation of one of the Rules .

Foste1~

145 Idaho at 33, 175

P .3d at 195. Instead, disqualification is watranted only if necessaty to "assure fairness to the
patties and the integdty of the judicial process"; and a comt considering a motion to disqualify
"should endeavor to reach a solution that is least burdensome to the client" Id. at 32, 175 P 3d
at 194 (quoting Weaver, 120 Idaho at 697, 819 P 2d at 115).
Plaintiff contends that Hawley Troxell should be disqualified (i) to ensw·e faimess to
Reed Taylor in prosecuting his claims, but fails to explain how substituting new counsel would
in any way change the way in which Plainti:trs counsel presents their case or in which the
Defendants would defend those claims; (ii) to uphold the integiity of the legal system, again
without explaining how representation of the corporate Defendants by Hawley Troxell has been
conducted other than in confmmity with the rules of the judicial process and the obligation to
zealously represent the firm's clients within the bounds of the law; and/or (iii) to prevent the
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appearance ofimpropiiety, which as shown above does not exist in this case. Just as Plaintiffs
whole case assumes that his claims are indefensible and that Defendants and counsel should bow
to his superior wisdom and analysis, Plaintiff's motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell is similarly
predicated on his opinion that nonwaivable conflicts of interest exist Assetting over and over
again that ''irreconcilable and nonconsentable conflicts of interest'' exist does not make it so.. To
the contrary, as demonsttated above, the supposed conflicts of inteiest between or among the
Defendants ar·e waivable and have been waived pursuant to informed consent of all Defendants
obtained in accordance with IRCP 1.7; and none of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct
have been violated by Hawley Troxell under the cizcwnstances under which the furn undertook
to represent the co1porate Defendants in this case.
Plaintiffbear'S the burden of proving his charge that grounds exist for disqualifying
Hawley Troxell. Id. A1A respectfully submits that Plaintiff has failed to bear that burden, that
Plaintiff's motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell must be denied, and that fees and costs should be
assessed against Plaintiff and his co-counsel.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS /U_ day of October, 2008.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

Attomeys for AIA Seivices Co1po1ation,
A1A Insmance, fuc .., and CropUSA
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this -1f2.. day of October, 2008, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing AIA'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO
DISQUALIFY COUNSEL by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the
following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
508 Eighth Stteet
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

_ _ U.S . Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy

Michael S . Bissell
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC
416 Symons Building
7 South Howmd Stieet
Spokane, WA 99201
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
&./Email

David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.0 Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
[Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman]

_ _ U S, Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Deliver·ed
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
___,£Email

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Ielecopy
VEmail

David R. Risley
Randall, Black & Cox, PLLC
P0Box446
Lewiston, ID 83501

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
__ . J'elecopy
_--;;;r_P
Email

~Email
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James J. Gatziolis
Chm:1es E. Haiper
QUARLES & BRADY LLP
500 West Madison Street, Suite 3700
Chicago, Illinois 60661-2511
[Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance]

_ _ U..S Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
_L_Email

C~.

Ga:ry D. Babbitt

D-~

I,
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RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane,\VA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Case No.: CV-07-00208
Plaintiff,

v.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and
CORRINE BECK, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;

AFFIDAVIT OF REED J. TAYLOR IN
OPPOSITION TO CONNIE TAYLOR AND
JAMES BECK'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF REED J. TAYLOR- 1
EXHIBITD
000261

had thousands of members who purchase insurance from AIA. As of July 22, 1995, I
value these contractual relationships at $5,000,000. I believe this same $5,000,000 value
existed on July 1, 1996.
7.

Almost 14 years have gone by since I sold my shares in AIA Services in

1995. John Taylor, James Beck, and Michael Cashman have controlled AJA Services
and its subsidiaries since my shares were redeemed in 1995 and there is nothing that
could be done to replace the lost time. I have been deprived of my right to request to
have my shares returned because over 13 years has transpired and AIA Services business
has been substantially depleted under the management of John Taylor. I would also point
out that CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. has received millions of dollars from AIA
Insurance and/or AIA Services. Finally, John Taylor has been paid significant salaries
amounting to over $2,000,000 since I left my employment with AIA Services and sold
my shares. I would also point out that AIA Services and Subsidiaries sales decreased
under John Taylor's management and AIA Services has no marketable proprietary health
product to sell. Since I left, John Taylor has stated time and time again that AIA would
obtain a new proprietary health product, but he has never done so. Thirteen years cannot
be returned to me.
DATED: This

9th

day of April, 2009.

AFFIDAVIT OF REED J. TAYLOR - 5

000262

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 9th day of April, 2009.

Residing at: G(J.rUL. S, b11
My commission expires:

¥?.f/20¥
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RODERICK C. BOND
NED A. CANNON, ISB #2331
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
508 8th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

.Of Jl!E DIST. COURT

o.'iANEASH
DEPUTY

i
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DIS1RICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

i

;.

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-07-00208

v.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
Idaho corporation; AIA INSURANCE,
INC., an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN

FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT

TAYLOil and CONNIE Tt\\'LOR,

'mdiVidually"~Ad the··communitypro~cy:
~p~prl~ed:thereof; BRY;A.N.FIWE:MAN'.

'tfs'irigle:,per~on; JOLEE· D.tlCLOS,·a~it1gle

pl'rso.11~ CROP lJS~ .lNS'QR.t\NE!B
A'.GENCY, .INC., ;:an Idaho CC>rj)Q.r~Qn;.:·apd
JAMES BEGK;aP,d CQRRINE.BEGK,

individually and the coi:rulil,lllify pr.operty
cdinjltised tnereof;
Defendants.
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor submits this Fifth Amended Complaint against the Defendants
alleging as follows:
FIFTII AMENDED COMPLAINT - 1
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I. PARTIES. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.1

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed") is a single person and a resident of Lewiston,

Nez Perce Cowity, Idaho.
1.2

Defendant AIA Services Corporation ("AIA Services") is an Idaho corporation

with its principal place of business located in Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho.
1.3

Defendant AJA Insurance, Inc. ("AIA Insurance") is an Idaho corporation with

its principal place of business is located in Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho. AJA Insurance
is a wholly owned subsidiary of AIA Services.
1.4

Defendant Connie Taylor ("Connie") is a single person residing in Lewiston, Nez

Perce County, Idaho.

.i

1.5

Defendants R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor, were husband and wife witil on or

about December 16, 2005 (collectively "John"), and at all relevant times were residents of
Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho. All references to "John" are for acts, omissions, claims,
causes of action, damages, and/or liabilities that accrued on or before December 16, 2005, are

for

John individually, and were also performed on behalf of R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor's
marital community (which benefited from R. John Taylor's acts and/or omissions) as to divided
and undivided commWlity property. All references to "John" for acts, omission, claims, causes
of action, damages, and/or liabilities that accrued after December 16, 2005, are for John
individually and pertain to Connie as to their divided and undivided community property,
including, without limitation, community property in which Reed is requesting to be awarded.
1.6

Defendant JoLee Duclos ("Duclos") is a single person residing in Clarkston,

Washington.
Ill
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1. 7

Defendant Bryan Freeman ("Freeman") is a single person residing in Lewiston,

Nez Perce County, Idaho.

1.8

Defendant Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. ("Crop USA") is an Idaho

corporation, with its principal place of business located in Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho.
1.9

Defendant James Beck and Corrine Beck (individually and collectively "Beck'')

are residents of the state of Minnesota. All references to "Beck" are for acts, omissions, claims,
causes of action, damages, and/or liabilities that accrued are for James Beck individually, and
were also perfonned on behalf of James Beck and Corrine Beck's marital community (which
benefited from James Beck's acts and/or omissions) and pertain to Corrine Beck as to damages,
acts and/or omissions on behalf of their community and as to all community property, including,
without limita1ion, community property Reed is seeking to be awarded.

• .i

1.10

The District Court has jurisdiction over this matter under I.C. § 1-705.

1.11

Venue is proper in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Nez Perce

County pursuant to l.C. § 5-404.

Il.FACTUALBACKGROUND
2.1

I

1:

John, was at all relevant times, an officer and director of AIA Services, AIA

Insurance, and Crop USA. During the certain relevant times in which John was a director and
officer of AIA Insurance, AIA Services and Crop USA, he owed fiduciary duties to Reed as the
single largest creditor of AIA Insurance and AIA Services.

John and Connie are the majority

shareholders in AIA Services and own approximately 40% of the outstanding shares of Crop
USA, specifically 4,645 ,000 shares as of July 31, 2006.
2.2

R. John Taylor and Connie were divorced through an Interlocutory Decree filed

on December 16, 2005, under which only a portion of their community assets were divided and
FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT - 3

000266

f

•.

other property remained undivided. This action includes, but is not limited to, acts, omissions,
transactions, debts, claims, and/or causes of action which accrued prior to R. John Taylor and
Connie's dissolution. All references to "John" in this Complaint are for, but not limited to,
claims, causes of action, breaches of duties, fraud, acts, omissions and liabilities incurred by R.
John Taylor on behalf of the marital community of R. John Taylor and Connie, together with
their community property, whether divided or not through the effective date of their dissolution
decree entered on or about December 16, 2005. Reed is requesting and entitled to be awarded
shares of stock and property jointly owned by R. John Taylor and Connie.
2.3

After the effective date of R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor's decree of

dissolution, all references to "John" in this Complaint are for claims, breaches of duties, acts,
omissions and/or liabilities incurred by John individually. One of the reasons Connie is named

•

as a party in this action for her liabilities and/or derivative liability by virtue of her marriage to
John and her interest in the community property of the marriage (including all divided and
undivided comm.unity property of their marriage for which Reed is requesting to be awarded
through a constructive trust) all of which is subject to liability for the allegations in this
Complaint of the acts, breaches of duties, claims, omissions, and conduct of John on and prior to
December 16, 2005.
2.4

During the certain relevant times that Connie was a director of AJA Insurance and

AIA Services, she owed fiduciary duties to Reed as the single largest creditor of AIA Services.
Connie is also individually liable for all claims, breaches of duties, acts, omissions and/or
liabilities during certain relevant times in which she was a member of the board of directors of
AIA Services and AJA Insurance.
Ill

;

i
i~
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2.5

Duclos is, and was at certain relevant times, an officer and director of AIA

Services, AJA Insurance, and Crop USA. Duclos is a shareholder in AIA Services and Crop
USA. During the certain relevant times that Duclos was a director and officer of AJA Insurance
and AJA Services, she owed fiduciary duties to Reed as the single largest creditor of AJA
Services.
2.6

Freeman is, and was at certain relevant times, a director and/or officer of AJA

Services, AJA Insurance, and Crop USA. Freeman is a shareholder in AIA Services and Crop
USA. During the certain relevant times that Freeman was a director of AIA Insurance and AIA
Services, he owed fiduciary duties to Reed as the single largest creditor of AJA Services.
2.7

Crop USA was formed and operated using AIA Services and AIA Insurance's

assets, funds, employees, office space, trade secrets, business relationships, equipment, good

•

will, reputation, financial wherewithal (including loan guarantees), and other assets. But for AJA
Insurance's assets, trade secrets, reputation and relationships, Crop USA would never have been
fonned and operated. Since Crop USA's formation, funds were inappropriately loaned and/or
transferred back and forth from AIA Services and/or AJA Insurance to and from Crop USA and
other entities partially owned by John and/or Connie.
!.

2.8

John and Connie own approximately 40% of Crop USA, which also remained

undivided community property at the time Reed filed his original Complaint.
2.9

.-

Beck is a shareholder in AJA Services and Crop USA and acquired Crop USA

shares from the inappropriate and/or unlawful conversation of their Preferred C Shares of AJA
Services to shares of Crop USA. During the certain relevant times that Beck was a member of
the board of directors boards of AJA Insurance, AJA Services and/or Crop USA, he owed
fiduciary duties to Reed as the single largest creditor of the corporations. During certain relevant

..· .
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times, Beck was a member of the boards for Crop USA, AIA Insurance, and/or AJA Services and
directed, consented, approved and/or acquiesced in inappropriate and/or unlawful corporate
activities at AJA Insurance, AJA Services and/or Crop USA.
2.10

Reed was the founder and majority shareholder of AJA Services. In 1995, John

desired to redeem Reed's 613,494 shares of common stock in AJA Services through a stock
redemption agreement Upon the closing of the transaction of AJA Services' redemption of
Reed's shares, John became the majority shareholder in AJA Services.
2.11

AJA Insurance, a subsidiary of AJA Services, is wholly owned by AJA Services

and where virtually all of AJA Services' revenues are derived and was the basis for security

interests provided to Reed. AJA Insurance is lessee of the office building located at 111 Main

.i

Street, Lewiston, Idaho.
2.12

On or about July 22, 1995, AIA Service!! and Reed entered into a Stock

Redemption Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement. Under the terms of
the Stock Redemption Agreement and related agreements, AIA Services agreed to execute
promissory note to timely pay Reed $1,500,000 Million in 90 days ("Down Payment Note") and
$6,000,000, plus accrued interest due and payable monthly at the rate of

8~%

per annum

("Promissory Note").
2.13

The Promissory Note was executed by John on behalf of AJA Services on or

about August l, 1995. Under the terms of the Promissory Note, AIA Services was required to
timely pay all accrued interest monthly to Reed and the principal amount of $6,000,000, plus all
accrued but unpaid interest was due and payable on August 1, 2005. Donna Taylor, the holder
of the Series A Preferred Shares in AIA Services, subordinated all of her rights to payment of the
redemption of her shares in favor of Reed. Through the date of Reed's Complaint, AJA Services

••
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had not timely and properly paid all sums owed to Donna Taylor.
2.14

Under the terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement, AJA Services and AIA

Insurance also agreed to contemporaneously execute a Security Agreement and Stock Pledge
Agreement, among other agreements and documents. The Stock Redemption Agreement, Stock
Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement were all either authorized by the Board of Directors
of AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance and/or approved by a shareholder vote.
2.1 S

When AIA Services was unable to comply with the Stock Redemption

Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement, John, on behalf of AIA Services
and AIA Insurance, entered into negotiations with Reed regarding restructuring the obligations.
In 1996, AIA Services, AIA Insurance and Reed agreed to modify the Stock Redemption

.)

Agreement and executed the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement

('~Restructure

Agreemenf'). Contemporaneously with the execution of the Restructure Agreement, the parties
executed the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement ("Amended Stock Pledge
Agreemenf') and Amended and Restated Security Agreement ("Amended Security
Agreemenf').
2.16

Under the terms of the Restructure Agreement, the terms of the Promissory Note

remained unchanged and were not modified (including the $6,000,000 principal amount, due

L

date, and required monthly interest payments). Under the terms of the Amended Security

I

i
i

Agreement, Reed received a security interest in all of AIA Services and AIA Insurance's

I

'

commissions and related services (and all proceeds thereof), and AJA Services and AIA
Insurance were required to have a Lock Box for all commissions for the protection and benefit of
Reed.

••

Ill
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2.17

Under the terms of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, AJA ~s pledged

all of the outstanding shares in AJA Insurance to Reed as partial security for AIA Services'
indebtedness to Reed under the Promissory Note, Restructure Agreement, and Amended Security
Agreement. Under the terms of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, AIA Services' failure to
timely pay Reed interest or principal under the Promissory Note or the Down Payment Note
constituted an Event of Default. In an Event of Default for failure to timely pay interest or
principal under the Promissory Note, AIA Services' insolvency, or AJA Services' failure to
maintain the required Lock Box (among other Events of Default), AIA Services' right to vote the
pledged shares of AIA Insurance ceased and terminated and vested exclusively in Reed.
2.18

Under the terms of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, AJA Services and/or

AIA Insurance owed Reed continuing contractual obligations, including, without limitation, the
•

obligation that Reed was required to be a member of the board of directors of AIA Services until
Reed was paid in full or sufficient security was posted to ensure the payment of the Promissory
Note. AIA Services never posted bonds or other security for the payment of the Promissory
Note. AIA Services, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck have intentionally refused to
appoint Reed to the Board of AIA Services as required and/or unilaterally created new conditions

upon which Reed's appointment would be based. A new right to be a member of the board of
AIA Services is created every year as directors are required to be elected yearly under the
Bylaws of AIA Services. Despite Reed's demands and AIA Services' continuing contractual
obligations to keep Reed on the board of directors, AIA Services, John, Duclos, Freeman,
Connie, and/or Beck have refused to appoint Reed to the Board of Directors of AIA Services as
required. Because Reed has not been on the Board of AIA Services as required, all actions taken

.,

by AIA Services' board were not properly authorized and, therefore, not ratified by AIA
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Services; and such acts are the personal actions of John, Duclos, Freeman, Comrie, and/or Beck
during their tenure on the board of AIA Services.
2.19

Under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, AIA Services had continuing

contractual obligations to not loan money to any affiliate other than a wholly owned subsidiary.
AIA Services has loaned money on countless occasions to and/or lent other services, office space
or benefits to affiliates and other parties in violation of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement,
and such loans or benefits were made during times in which John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie,
and/or Beck were board members of AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance. In addition, the
Amended Articles of Incorporation of AIA Services prevents it or any of its subsidiaries
(including, without limitation, AIA Insurance), from guaranteeing the loans of any other entity

•

that is not a wholly owned subsidiary of AIA Services.
2.20

)

The Promissory Note required monthly interest payments with an acceleration

clause if payments were not timely or properly made to Reed. The acceleration clause requires
written notice from Reed to AIA Services of default and AIA Services would be entitled to a five
day opportunity to cure before Reed could exercise his rights under the Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement or Amended Security Agreement.

The obligations owed to Reed under the

Promissory Note are independent of any other obligations owed by the Defendants and secured
by the Restructure Agreement, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement and Amended Security
Agreement.
2.21

During relevant times, the fair-market value of AIA Services and AIA Insmance

was less than the aggregate amount of their total debts, which constitutes AIA Services and AIA
Insurance's insolvency. During relevant times, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance were unable
to pay their debts as they became due (including, without limitation, debts to Reed and Donna

•
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Taylor), which also constitutes AIA Services insolvency and AJA Insurance's insolvency.
2.22

During all relevant times, Reed was the largest and most significant creditor of

AIA Services. Because AIA Services has failed to timely and properly pay creditors as required
during certain relevant times and/or was insolvent, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck
owed fiduciary duties to creditors, specifically Reed because of his status as AIA Services'
largest and most significant creditor.
2.23

The value of AIA Services and AIA Insurance's assets (including, without

limitation, if both corporations are sold and/or their assets independently sold) at the time Reed
filed his original Complaint was insufficient to pay Reed the $6,000,000, plus prejudgment
interest in excess of $2,000,000 owed to him. The value of AIA Services and AIA Insurance's
assets (including if both corporations are sold) for at least 7 years of time preceding the time
Reed filed his original Complaint was insufficient to pay Reed the $6,000,000 principal, plus
prejudgment interest owed to him.
2.24

During certain relevant times, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance were in default

of various provisions of the agreements with Reed, insolvent and/or unable to timely pay its
debts to Reed and/or other creditors, including Donna Taylor. During certain relevant times,
AIA Services has failed to comply with the terms of the Promissory Note.
2.25

Instead of paying Reed as required, AIA Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA,

John, Duclos, Connie, Beck, and/or Freeman utilized funds that Reed had a security interest in to
make investments in, transfer assets to, or loan money to, or provide services on behalf of Crop
USA, John and/or entities operated and/or partially owned by John, Connie, Beck, Freeman,
Duclos, and/or one or more of the other Defendants.
Ill
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2.26

On or about December 12, 2006, Reed provided AIA Services written notice of

default under various provisions of the Restructure Agreement, Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement, and Amended Security Agreement, including, without limitation, AIA Services'
failure to pay principal and interest due under the Promissory Note, failure to maintain the Lock
Box, loaning money to non-wholly owned subsidiaries (including guaranteeing the $15 Million
revolving line-of-credit for Crop USA), failure to provide all required financial information, and
other defaults as set forth in the notice. AJA Services and AIA Insurance have failed to timely
cure the defaults and all applicable cure periods have expired. As of the date of this Complaint,
the principal owed to Reed under the Promissory Note of $6,000,000, plus accrued interest of
over $2,000,000 had not been paid in full as required.

.)

2.27

Prior to Reed's Notice of Default dated December 12, 2006, Reed had never

accelerated any of the indebtedness due under the Promissory Note. Even though AIA Services
and AIA Insurance failed to cure the defaults specifically set forth in Reed's Notice of Default
dated December 12, 2006, AIA Services continued to make partial and inconsistent interest
payments (including the payment of certain employees and other services on behalf of Reed)
before and after the date of Reed's original Complaint. All amounts due under the Promissory
Note are secured by the remedies available under the Promissory Note, Restructure Agreement,
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement and Amended Security Agreement.
2.28

Despite Reed's demands, AIA Services, AIA Insurance, John, Freeman, Duclos,

Connie, and/or Beck have failed to comply and/or as officers and/or directors to ensure that AIA
Services and AIA Insurance complies with the obligations owed to Reed under the terms of the
Promissory Note, Restructure Agreement, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, and Amended

.,

Security Agreement. Under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, the right to vote all of AIA
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Insurance's shares ceased and terminated for AIA Services and became vested in Reed when
AIA Services failed to timely pay the required monthly interest payments due under the
Promissory Note and its subsequent failure to pay the $6,000,000 principal due under the
Promissory Note on August 1, 2005 (and other breaches set forth in this Complaint). AIA
Services was in default and had failed to cure such defaults before Reed demanded to exercise
his right to bold a special shareholder meeting to vote the shares to appoint a new board of
directors for AIA Insurance.
2.29

On December 12, 2006, Reed timely provided notice of his demand for a special

shareholder meeting of AIA Insurance for the purpose of removing and appointing new board
members on December 26, 2006. AIA Services, AIA Insurance, John, Duclos, and/or Freeman
(and the other Defendants if applicable) refused to comply with Reed's demand for a special

•

shareholder meeting by representing that AIA Insurance's offices were closed on December 26,
2006.
2.30

Through a letter dated January 3, 2007, John acknowledged Reed's right to call a

shareholder meeting under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement when he stated "I fully
recognize that [Reed] Taylor may take actions he deems appropriate, including calling a special
shareholders meeting."
2.31

On or about January 25, 2007, Reed hand delivered another demand for a special

shareholder meeting for the removal and appointment of the board of directors for February 5,
2007, pursuant to his rights under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement Through a letter from
Duclos, AIA Insurance refused Reed's request and denied that he had the right to call a meeting
to vote the AIA shares. Despite Reed's demands, AIA Insurance refused to hold a special
shareholder meeting.

.

""
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2.32

Despite Reed's demands, AJA Services and AIA Insurance failed to cure the

numerous Defaults under the terms of the Promissory Note, Restructure Agreement, Amended
Stock Pledge Agreement and Amended Security Agreement, among other obligations (as
described above). Through the date of this Complaint, AIA Services and AIA Insurance's
Defaults were not timely cmed and they remained in default of the foregoing Agreements.
2.33

On February 22, 2007, Reed exercised his right to vote the pledged shares by

executing a Consent in Lieu of Special Shareholder Meeting of AIA Insurance removing John,
Duclos and Freeman from the Board of Directors and appointed himself the sole Board Member,
pursuant to his right to vote the pledged shares under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement
Because AIA Services' right to vote the pledged shares had ceased and terminated when it
became in Default and failed to timely cure such Defaults, the right to vote the pledged shares in

•

AlA Insurance vested exclusively in Reed and he exercised his right to vote the pledged shares
pursuant to the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement and the Articles of Incorporation of AJA
Insurance. Because the shares pledged to Reed account for all the outstanding shares of AJA
Insurance, Reed had the authority to waive the notice requirement, notice period, and the
formality of holding a shareholder meeting as he was the only party authorized to vote any shares
of AIA Insurance. Because Reed appointed himself as the sole director of AIA Insurance, he had
the exclusive authority to appoint himself as the officers of AIA Insurance through a Consent in
Lieu of a Board Meeting.
2.34

In the weeks leading up to the filing of this action, Reed discovered that mol'e

than one transfer of assets occurred during the time in which AIA Services had failed to service

its debt to Reed. In 2004, AIA Insurance paid $1,510,693 to purchase Series C Preferred Shares
in AIA Services from Crop USA.

This transaction inappropriately, unlawfully, and/or
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fraudulently transferred $1,510,693 of AIA Insurance's funds to Crop USA when such funds
should have been tendered to Reed or been retained to benefit AIA Insurance. This $1,510,693
transfer occurred at a time in which AIA Services was insolvent. This $1,510,693 transfer also
occurred at the same time that AIA Services' 40l(k) Plan (the "Plan") held over $750,000 in
Preferred C Shares in AIA Services. No shares were purchased or redeemed from the Plan, even
though John and Duclos were the Co-Trustees of the Plan at the time of the transfer. This
transaction constitutes the fraudulent transfer of funds from AIA Insurance to Crop USA.
2.35

Reed also discovered that John and Connie had purchased a parking lot for $8,000

and later entered into a lease agreement with AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance to lease the
parking lot from John and Connie for $1,250 per month. This transaction was also the fraudulent
transfer of funds to John and Connie, when such funds should have been paid to Reed during a
time in which AIA Services was unable to service its debt to Reed and was otherwise insolvent.
John and Connie also inappropriately paid lump sums for rent before such inappropriate rent was
due. The parking lot is not utilized by AIA Insurance or AIA Services. Such acts and/or
transfers have occurred during John, Freeman, Duclos, Connie, and/or Beck's tenure as members
of the boards of AJA Insurance and/or AIA Services.
2.36

Based upon the above-referenced acts, transfers and transactions, together with

transactions referenced in the notes to AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance's financial statements,
there are other unauthorized and inappropriate transfers, loans, payments, advances and other
actions which occurred during times AIA Services defaults and inability to timely pay Reed and
at times in which AIA Services was insolvent. Forensic accounting and further scrutiny of AIA
Insurance and/or AIA Services' books and records will reveal additional improper, unlawful
and/or fraudulent transfers, transactions and the like that directly and/or indirectly benefited the
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individual Defendants, Crop USA and/or entities partially owned by John.
2.37

During times in which John, Freeman, Duclos, Connie, and/or Beck owed Reed

fiduciary duties, they have used AIA Services and AIA Insurance as their personal somce of
funds and/or assets, including, without limitation, acts in which John has transferred assets to his
name; taken advances that John never paid back; transferred assets, resources, and/or funds to
Crop USA, Sound Insurance and/or other entities partially owned or controlled by John and/or
the other individual Defendants; entered into transactions which constitute a violation of AIA
Insurance and/or AIA Services' Articles of Incorporation; made transfers and/or entered into
transactions which benefited them; and provided services for entities partially owned by them
without such actions being arms-length transactions. The above acts occurred when John,
Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck were directors and/or officers of AIA Services, AIA
Insurance and/or Crop USA. All of the above acts occurred during certain relevant times in
which AIA Services was not current with payments of interest and/or principal owed to Reed
under the Promissory Note and when AIA Services was insolvent.
2.38

On February 22, 2007 (after executing the Consent in Lieu of Special Shareholder

Meeting), Reed executed a Consent in Lieu of Board Meeting to terminate all officers, terminate
the employment of John, authorize the change of locks, and take such other actions deemed
appropriate. When Reed attempted to take action in accordance with the Consents described
above, the Defendants refused to abide by the Consents.
2.39

During certain relevant times that John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck

were directors of AIA Services and AIA Insurance, they failed make proper corporate

governance decisions and failed to take appropriate legal action on behalf of AIA Insurance
and/or AJA Services to protect Reed's interests. During the relevant times that John, Duclos,

FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT-15

000278

Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck were directors and/or officers of AIA Services and AIA
Insurance, they breached their :fiduciary duties owed to Reed.
2.40

Sometime after filing Reed's original Complaint, Freeman and Duclos resigned as

members of the board of directors of AIA Insurance and AIA Services. John, in breach of his
fiduciary duties owed to Reed and in violation of Reed's right to vote the shares and prior vote of
the pledge shares in AIA Insurance, appointed himself, Connie and Beck to the board of AJA
Insurance. John also appointed himse~ Connie and Beck to the board of AIA Services in breach
of his fiduciary duties owed to Reed. These appointments were conflicts of interest and breaches
of John's fiduciary duties owed to Reed and the appointed Defendants' acceptance of such
appointments was a further breach of duties owed to Reed. Finally, Beck, John and Connie
approved inappropriate payments to the directors of AJA Services and AJA Insurance, which

•

such payments must all be disgorged and awarded to Reed.
2.41

During certain relevant times that John, Connie and Beck were directors of AIA

Services and AIA Insurance, they failed to take appropriate legal action on behalf of AIA
Insurance and AIA Services. During certain relevant times that John, Connie and Beck were
directors of AIA Services and AJA Insurance, they breached their fiduciary duties owed to Reed.
2.42

Reed has a valid and perfected security interest in all commissions from sale of

insurance and related services received by or on behalf of, or payable to, AIA Insurance and AJA
Services, proceeds thereof and interest thereon. Reed demanded th.at no funds which he had a
security interest in and/or which should be paid to him could be used to pay the legal fees of any
of the individual Defendants.

Despite Reed's demands, the Defendants have unlawfully,

improperly and inappropriately diverted funds to the individual Defendants for their attorneys'
fees and costs, and the Defendants have unlawfully and/or inappropriately accepted such
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payments.

Because all of AIA Services' revenues are derived from AIA Insurance's

..

commissions and related services that Reed has a valid security interest in, such payments also
constitute an illegal and/or unauthorized dividend from AIA Insurance to AJA Services,
conversion, fraud and fraudulent conveyances.
2.43

Prior to the filing of Reed's original Complaint and without Reed's knowledge or

consent, John paid a debt he owed to AIA Services in the amount of $307,271 by transferring
said indebtedness to Reed's Promissory Note. Such payment constitutes fraud (as set forth
below) and John later moved the debt back to Reed's Promissory Note.
2.44

Pacific Empire Holdings Corporation d/b/a Sound Insurance has been operating

through AJA Services and/or AIA Insurance and with funds, assets, rent, and/or services

.•

provided by AIA Services and/or AJA Insurance for free or at rates below fair-market-value

,,

during certain relevant times that John, Freeman, Duclos, Connie, and/or Beck owed fiduciary
duties to Reed. Since the filing of Reed's Original Complaint, Crop USA purchased Sound
Insurance from John and/or other unknown parties. The Defendants' operation of Sound
Insurance and subsequent sale constitutes breaches of fiduciary duties, conversion, fraud and/or a

i

fraudulent conveyance.
2.45

Global Travel was a tenant in AIA Insurance's office building located in

Lewiston, Idaho. Since the filing of Reed's original Complaint, Global Travel has relocated as a
tenant in an office building owned by John. Such actions are a breach of John Duclos, Freeman,
Connie, and Beck's fiduciary duties owe~ to Reed, fraud and/or a fraudulent conveyance.
2.46

Through a letter dated February 27, 2001, John represented to Reed (individually

I

and on behalf of the corporations) that AIA Services and/or AJA Insurance was developing a
new crop insmance program through a new company called Crop USA. Reed relied on AIA
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Services, AIA Insurance and John's representations that AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance
were the owners of Crop USA and developing Crop USA, when AIA Services, AIA Insurance
and John's representations were false in that Crop USA was never owned by AIA Insurance or
AIA Services, but instead owned by John, Connie, Duclos, Beck, Freeman, and others. By
John's own admission, Crop USA should have been a subsidiary of AIA Services or AIA
Insurance but for certain liabilities.
2.47

John made representations to Reed and Donna Taylor that he would not be taking

a salary in certain year(s). Reed relied on John's false representation when he did not accelerate
payments due to him or place AIA Services in default, and in late 2006 or early 2007 learned that

!.

John bad in fact taken a salary during the respective times to Reed's detriment.
2.48

I

.,

John, Beck, Duclos, and/or Freeman made representations and/or omitted material

facts to Reed through letters and financial statements that AIA Services and AIA Insurance were

I

being operated for the benefit of AIA Services and AJA Insurance. AIA Services and AJA
Insurance made representations and/or omitted material facts to Reed through correspondence
and their financial statements that they were being operated for the benefit of AIA Insurance and

AIA Services. Reed relied on John, Beck, Duclos and/or Freeman's false representations and/or
omissions of material facts when in fact AIA Services and AIA Insurance were not being
operated for the benefit of the corporations, but instead were being operated for the benefit of
John, Freeman, Duclos, Crop USA, Sound Insurance, Beck, and other entities controlled or
partially owned by John and/or Connie. As directors, Freeman, John, Duclos, and/or Beck also
I

made the false representations and/or omitted material facts by and through the corporations'
fmancial statements.

.I

Ill
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2.49

John, Freeman, Duclos, and/or Beck breached their fiduciary duties owed to Reed

when AIA Insurance inappropriately and/or fraudulently guaranteed a $15,000,000 loan for Crop
USA. This guarantee is also a violation of AIA Services' Amended Articles of Incorporation,
AIA Services and AIA Insurance's Bylaws, and the terms of the Amended Stock Pledge

Agreement. AIA Insurance received no benefit from this loan and received no consideration.
2.50

After the inappropriate and :fraudulent transfer of $1,510,693 to Crop USA

described above, the wrongful transfer was misrepresented on the financial statements of AIA
Insurance as an investment with a value of approximately $1,500,000,

wh~n

the "investment"

was worthless. John, Duclos, Beck and/or Freeman were aware, or should have been aware, of
this false fact as AIA Services was insolvent.

.)

2.51

Reed believes that there are other acts, fraud, breaches of fiduciary duties,

wrongful transfers and/or fraudulent transactions that he will itemize and detail through future
amended complaints upon completion of discovery and/or at trial.

By and tqrough this

paragraph, the Defendants should be placed on notice that Reed intends to recover every dollar
of funds, assets, services, loans, barters and the like that were taken, utilized and/or transferred
from AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance through fraud, constructive fraud, breaches of fiduciary
duties, :fraudulent conveyances, and any other causes of action set forth below.
2.52

The unity and commonality of the ownership, officers and/or directors of AIA
I,

i

Services, AIA Insurance and/or Crop USA is such that the separate personalities of the
corporations and the individuals no longer exist. Equity should prevent the acts and omissions
from being solely those of AIA Services, AIA Insurance and/or Crop USA. As a result of the
commonality of ownership and governance, unlawful acts, conduct, omissions, fraud, failure to
observe corporate governance, and breaches of fiduciary duties as set forth in this Complaint,
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AIA Insurance, AJA Services and/or Crop USA are the alter-egos of John, Duclos, Freeman,
Connie, and/or Beck and such corporate veils should be pierced thereby imposing personal
liability on John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or Beck.
2.53

AIA Services, AIA Insurance, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck

unlawfully provided Crop USA, Sound Insurance, and/or other entities with free or reduced rent,
labor, funds, services, resources, and/or other assets without any and/or fair compensation to the
detriment of AIA Services, AIA Insurance and Reed. John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or
Beck entered into or approved transactions that were not fair for AIA Services or AIA Insurance,
transactions that were not entered into in good faith, transactions that involved self-dealing, and
transactions that involved any one or more of the interested individual Defendants in violation of
applicable conflicts of interest procedures and/or proper corporate governance.

•

2.54

During certain relevant times, John utilized AIA Services, AIA Insurance and/or

Crop USA as a means to pay personal bills, obtain loans, and obtain reimbursements for
"alleged" expenses he incurred on behalf of AIA Services, AJA Insurance and/or Crop USA.
However, many of the expenses for food, lodging and travel were inappropriately charged to
AIA Services and/or AJA Insurance. This is further evidenced by the fact that John failed to

remit and/or fully complete fonns required by AIA Services and AIA Insurance for employees to
be reimbursed.
2.55

From August I, 1995, through the present time, John owed obligations and duties

to AJA Services and Reed (including, without limitation, obligation to not compete and
confidentiality) through the Executive Officer's Agreement between John and AJA Services
dated August 1, 1995. John has breached the forgoing obligations, which such breaches also
constitute breaches of John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck's :fiduciary duties owed to
i'

•
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Reed. AIA Insurance and Reed are also third party beneficiaries of John's Executive Officer's
Agreement and entitled to damages from the Defendants for such breached obligations.
2.56

AIA Insurance and AIA Services could have been operated with a substantially

lower number of employees than presently employed and with reduced overhead and costs. The
Defendants have represented that Crop USA (and other parties) have been reimbursing AIA
Services and/or AIA Insurance for all employee labor, expenses, costs, assets, and services
utilized for Crop USA' s benefit, when such representations are false. The Defendants have
failed to disclose material facts that AIA Services and AIA Insurance employees, expenses,
costs, assets, and services have also been utilized for the benefit of John, Connie, and entities
partially owned by John and/or Connie without them paying AIA Services or AIA Insurance.

2.57

The Defendants have represented through board resolutions, private placement

memorandum, correspondence, agreements, and/or other transactions that AIA Services and/or
AIA Insurance have benefited from transactions with Crop USA (including, without limitation,
Crop USA's $15 Million line of credit and the repurchase of the Series C Preferred Shares of
AIA Services), which the Defendants knew that such transactions were not beneficial to AIA
Services and/or AIA Insurance. In fact, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance did not benefit from
such false representations and Reed's collateral was also impaired.
2.58

The Defendants have engaged in the improper and/or unlawful activities of

utilizing AIA Services and AIA Insurance for their benefit and/or for the benefit of themselves
and/or entities partially owned by one or more of the individual Defendants to the detriment of
Reed.
2.59

Should any part or one or more of the following causes of action or relief be

denied at or before trial, such allegations and requested relief are incorporated by reference here

•
I
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to support other causes of action and/or requested relief.
ill. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION-BREACHES OF CONTRACT

3.1

R;eed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim and/or the relief sought under this
cause of action.
3.2

The Defendants owed Reed obligations and/or continuing contractual obligations

to timely pay him and comply with specific terms, conditions, covenants, warranties and the like
required by the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Am.ended Security
Agreement, and Restructure Agreement.
3.3

AIA Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA, John, Freeman, Duclos, Beck, and/or

Connie's acts, omissions and failure to pay Reed the amounts owed and comply with continuing
contractual obligations under the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement,
Amended Security Agreement and Restructure Agreement constitute a breach of their
contractual obligations owed to Reed (whether or not any of the foregoing agreements were
orally modified as alleged by the Defendants or not).
3.4

As a result of AIA Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA, John, Freeman, Duclos,

Beck, and/or Connie's acts and/or omissions which constitute breaches of their contractual
obligations, Reed has suffered and is entitled to damages of $6,000,000, plus accrued interest in
an amount to be determined at trial, jointly and severally or to be allocated between the

defendants as the evidence and claims show at trial.

As set forth in this Complaint, the

Defendants are jointly and severally liable for all claims and damages flowing from the various
breaches by and through the legal theories set forth in this Complaint. In addition, Reed is
entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs as under the Promissory Note, Amended Stock

•
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Pledge Agreement, l.C. § 12-120 and/or I.C. § 12-121.

IV. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION-FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS/CONVEYANCES
4.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim and/or the relief sought under this
cause of action.
4.2

The Defendants' actions constitute fraudulent transfers and/or conveyances under

l.C. § 55-901, et seq. and/or the common law doctrine of Fraudulent Transfers/Conveyances.
4.3

As a result of John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck's participation,

consent, approval and/or acquiescence of the fraudulent transfers and/or as direct recipients
and/or indirect recipients (also by and through their ownership of shares in the recipient
corporations) of the fraudulent transfers, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck are
•

personally liable for all fraudulent transfers, plus accrued interest, in an amount to be proved at
trial. All fraudulent transfers should be avoided and/or rescinded to the extent possible and/or all
assets placed in a constructive trust for the benefit of Reed and such assets awarded to Reed.
4.4

John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, Beck, and/or Crop USA and other entities

controlled or partially owned by John or the Defendants are and/or were the recipients of various
fraudulent transfers from AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance, and should be required to return
all funds to Reed, rescind all transactions; and John, Connie, Freeman, Duclos, and/or Beck's
ownership interests in Crop USA and such other entities should be placed in a constructive trust
for the benefit of Reed and such shares and/or ownership awarded to him.
Ill
Ill
Ill

•
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V. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION-MISREPRESENTATIONS/FRAUD
(Fraud, Constructive Fraud, and/or Shareholder, Officer Director Fraud)
5.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim and/or remedy sought under this
cause of action.
5.2

AIA Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA, Beck, Freeman, Connie, Duclos,

and/or John made, ratified, acquiesced, and/or consented to statements of fact and/or omitted
material statements of fact, including, without limitation, those facts and/or omissions of fact set
forth in Paragraphs 2.23, 2.36, 2.44-2.49 and 2.51 above; such statements of fact were false or
omitted material facts; such false statements or omitted facts were material; AJA Services, AIA
Insurance, Crop USA, Beck, Freeman, Duclos, Connie and/or John knew or should have known
the falsity of such statements; AJA Services, AIA Insurance Crop USA, Beck, Freeman, Duclos,
and/or John intended to induce reliance; Reed was ignorant to the falsity of such statements
and/or omissions; and Reed relied on such statements and/or omissions; Reed had a right to rely
on such false statements and/or omissions.
5.3

By and through the Defendants' fraudulent acts and/or omissions, including,

without limitation, the allegations set forth in this Complaint and as specifically alleged in
Paragraphs 2.22, 2.25, 2.34, 2.35, 2.37, 2.40, 2.43-2.49, 2.53, 2.54, 2.57 and 2.58 above, AIA
Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA, John, Freeman, Duclos, Connie, and/or Beck's acts and/or
omissions constitute fraud, constructive fraud (e.g., the Defendants owed Reed fiduciary duties,
duties to maintain AIA Insurance's assets to protect Reed, and other duties contemplated by the
,.

parties and/or referenced in this Complaint, and the Defendants breached such duties), and/or
shareholder/officer/director fraud (e.g., the siphoning off of corporate assets to the individual
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Defendants' gain and to the detriment of Reed), including, without limitation, the less stringent
means of proving fraud as set forth in Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 561 P.2d
1299 (1977) (and other law relating to shareholder, officer and/or director fraud), and Reed is
entitled to recover all damages attributable to such fraud. Under the theory discussed in Smith v.

Great Basin Grain Co. (and other cases), AIA Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA, John,
Freeman, Duclos, Connie, and/or Beck are liable for all funds, assets, and services that were
unlawfully and/or inappropriately transferred and/or utilized directly and/or indirectly to their
benefit during their tenure as officers, directors, and/or shareholders in AIA Services, AIA
Insurance, and/or Crop USA.

5.4

As a consequential and/or proximate result of AIA Services, AIA Insurance, Crop

USA, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck's fraud (including, without limitation, any

•

one or more of the types of fraud listed above), Reed has suffered and is entitled to recover all
damages from the Defendants, jointly and severally.
VI. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION-CONVERSION

6.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim and/or remedy sought under this
cause of action.
6.2

AIA Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA, John, Duclos, Connie, Freeman, and/or
!1

Beck's (including, without limitation, as officers and/or members of the boards) conduct and/or
consent to such conduct constitutes the willful interference with Reed's property and money
which should have been paid to him or been held for bis benefit (including, without limitation,
money in which Reed had a valid and perfected security interest, e.g., whether through UCC
filings and/or through security interests and/or rights in the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement),

•
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without lawful justification, which deprived Reed of the possession of such money and/or
property. Crop USA, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, Beck and/or entities controlled or partially
owned by John were recipients of the converted assets, funds, labor, and/or services (including
for any attorneys' fees and costs paid by AJA Services and/or AJA Insurance for any of the
individual Defendants).
6.3

As a result of the AIA Services, AJA Insurance, Crop USA, John, Duclos,

Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck's unlawful acts, conduct, and interference with Reed's valid and
perfected security interests and other rights, Reed has been damaged and is entitled to damages
proven at trial.
i

I

9,

VII. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION-ALTER EGO/PIERCING CORPORATE VAIL
(A Cause of Action and/or Remedy)

7.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim under th.is cause of action and/or
requested relief.
7.2

Reed also specifically re-alleges and incorporates Paragraph 2.52 above.

7.3

AJA Insurance, AIA Services, and Crop USA have been operated, organized and

controlled, and their affairs are so conducted that they are the instrumentality, agency, and/or
conduit of one another and for John, Beck, Duclos, Freeman and/or Connie to their benefit and
Reed's detriment.
7.4

Because of the lack of proper corporate governance; common officers, directors,

and shareholders; lack of capitalization; fraud; overreaching; breaches of good faith and fair
dealing; and the other unlawful and/or inappropriate acts and/or omissions of AJA Insurance,
AJA Services, Crop USA, John, Duclos, Freeman, Beck, and Connie, the corporate veils of AIA

•
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Services, AIA Insurance and Crop USA should be pierced thereby holding AIA Services, AJA
Insurance, Crop USA, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck jointly and severally liable
for all of Reed's damages that lie in tort or contract (including, without limitation, the sums due
under the Promissory Note) as equity requires such action.
7.5

In addition and/or in the alternative, because of the common ownership, common

governance, fraud, conversion, breached duties, unlawful acts, improper acts and/or omissions of
John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck, the corporations AIA Services and Crop USA
should be liable for all of Reed's damages under the theory of reverse piercing of the corporate
veil.
VIII. SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION-CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
(A Cause of Action and/or as Remedies)

8.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim and/or remedy sought under this
cause of action.
8.2

Reed has a valid security interest in AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance's

commissions and all of the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance, among other security interests.
The boards of AIA Services and AIA Insurance owed Reed fiduciary duties to Reed. AJA
Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck :fraudulently,
wrongfully and/or improperly used funds, transferred assets and/or provided services (which
should have been paid to Reed or benefited AIA Services and/or AJA Insurance) for investments,
personal use, inappropriate transactions, loans, advances, self-dealing, and/or other wrongful,
fraudulent and/or inappropriate purposes (including, without limitation, approving, consenting,
and/or acquiescing in such activities and the failure to take appropriate action).
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AIA Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or

8.3

Beck's acts and/or omissions resulted in Crop USA, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or
Beck's acquisition of money, securities and/or services which should have been paid to Reed or
retain by AIA Insurance but for their fraud, deepening insolvency, civil conspiracy,
misrepresentation(s), bad faith, self-dealing, fraudulent conveyances, breached fiduciary duties,
and/or overreaching activities; and AIA Services, Crop USA, John, Duclos, Freeman, Beck
and/or other entities' retention of the money, investments, securities and property would be
unjust.
Reed requests the imposition of a constructive trust for his benefit to recover the

8.4

proceeds of all from the Defendants' fraud, fraudulent conveyances, breaches of fiduciary duties,
overreaching, conspiracy, deepening insolvency (as a remedy only), improper, self-dealing,
•

wrongful and/or inappropriate transfers, acts and/or omissions.

IX. SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION-DIRECTOR LIABILITY
(A Cause of Action and/or a Remedy)
9 .1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim and/or remedy sought under this
cause of action.
9.2

John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck are personally liable for all relevant

breached fiduciary duties, deepening insolvency, wrongful acts, improper acts, omissions,
overreaching transactions, fraud, civil conspiracy, faithless :fiduciary activities, loans, advances,
improper loan guarantees and/or fraudulent conveyances which occurred during their tenure as a
member of the board of directors of AIA Service, Crop USA and/or AIA Insurance.

Ill
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9.3

Because John, Duclos and Freeman were both directors and officers during

certain relevant times, they owed Reed even more elevated fiduciary duties. John, Duclos, and
Freeman breached their elevated fiduciary duties owed to Reed.

9.4

During the relevant times that John, Connie, Beck, Freeman and/or Duclos were

members of boards of AIA Insurance, AIA Services, and/or Crop USA, they each should be held
personally liable for all Reed's damages in contract and tort.
X•. EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
(A Cause of Action and/or as Remedies)

10.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim and/or remedy sought under this
cause of action.

•

10.2

Under the Am.ended Stock Pledge Agreement, Am.ended Security Agreement, and

Restructure Agreement, Reed is entitled to vote the pledged shares of AIA Insurance (and all
ancillary rights, including, without limitation, to vote the shares to remove the board and take all
actions related in any way to his right to vote the pledged shares), sell the shares of AIA
Insurance at public or private sale, judicially sell the pledged shares in AIA Insurance, entitled to
timely receive audited financial statements and financial information, and/or seize all of the AIA
Insurance and AIA Services' commissions in the required Lock Box. When AIA Services
became in Default, it lost its right to vote the pledged shares of AIA Insurance and the right
vested exclusively in Reed.
10.3

Despite Reed's demands for the Defendants to comply with the provisions in the

Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security Agreement and
Restructure Agreement, AIA Services, AIA Insurance, the Defendants have refused to comply.
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Reed is entitled to the relief afforded to him or reasonably contemplated under the foregoing
agreements and such other rights, remedies and/or relief as may be available under Idaho Code,
including, without limitation, any action, relief and/or order authorized under I.C. § 30-1-701 et

seq. and/or l.C. § 28-9-101 et seq. (including the sale of the pledged shares, protection of
security interest, seizure of security, and any other available remedy).
10.4

As a direct or proximate result of the Defendants' acts and/or omissions, Reed has

suffered and is entitled

to

an award of attorneys' fees and costs incurred, at or before trial, in

enforcing any provision of the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended
Security Agreement, and/or Restructure Agreement for relief sought before or at trial.
i'

XI. NINm CAUSE OF ACTION-BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIBS

11.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim and/or remedy sought under this
cause of action.
11.2

During certain relevant times, John, Connie, Beck, Duclos,, and/or Freeman owes

and/or owed Reed fiduciary duties, including, without limitation, because of his status as the
largest creditor of AIA Services, AIA Insurance and/or Crop USA; and because AIA Services
and/or AIA Insurance were insolvent as described in this Complaint. The individual Defendants'
fiduciary duties include, without limitation, the duties of care and loyalty to Reed. During the
relevant times that John, Freeman and Duclos acted as both a director and an officer of AIA
Insurance, AIA Services and/or Crop USA, they owed even more elevated fiduciary duties to
Reed as the single largest creditor of AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance.
11.3

John, Connie, Beck, Duclos, and/or Freeman breached their :fiduciary duties owed

to Reed, including, without limitation, when they failed to operate AIA Services and AIA

•
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Insurance for the benefit of Reed. John, Connie, Beck, Duclos, and/or Freeman breached their
fiduciary duties when they failed to take legal action against past and/or present officers and/or
directors of AIA Services and AIA Insurance, and when they prevented Reed from taking any
action he deemed appropriate under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security
Agreement and/or Restructure Agreement.
11.4

As a result of John, Connie, Beck, Duclos, and/or Freeman's breaches of their

fiduciary duties owed to Reed, they are individually liable to Reed for all damages he suffered
and/or deemed the product of their breached fiduciary duties, including without limitation, all
damages attributable to inappropriate transfers of assets and/or services, inappropriate use of
assets and/or services, inappropriate payment of salaries, the failure to pursue claims against

••

other past and/or present officers and directors, inappropriate guarantee of loans, all claims in
this Complaint, and such other wrongful acts and/or omissions that Reed may demonstrate at

I

trial.

XII. TENTH CA:USE :OFACI'ION~BREA:CH·OF IM:BLIED C.OvENANTS.;"()F
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
12.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim and/or remedy sought under this
cause of action.
12.2

There is an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing between the parties in

the performance and enforcement of the terms and conditions of the Promissory Note, Amended
Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security Agreement and Restructure Agreement. This duty
embraces, among other things, an implied obligation that AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and their
directors and officers, specifically, Defendants Duclos, Freeman, John, Connie, and/or Beck
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shall not do anything to injure or destroy Reed's rights to receive the benefits of the Promissory
Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Am.ended Security Agreement and/or Restructure
Agreement. The Defendants have breached their obligations of good faith and fair dealing owed
to Reed when they, among other things, intentionally injured and/or destroyed Reed rights.
12.3

As a result of the Defendants' acts and/or omissions, Recd has suffered and is

entitled to dam.ages in the amount to be proven at trial, including, with.out limitation, all dam.ages
incurred since the Defendants have refused to abide by the terms and oonditions of the

Promissory Note, Restructure Agreement, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement and/or Amended
Security.Agreement .In addition, Reed is entitled to recover all dam.ages incurred after his vote
of the piedged shares under because of the individual Defendants' interference with Reed's
contractual rights.

·,~,,
'.

.·

)

.
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. :mt ELEVENm CAUSE OF t\CTION~.CONSPIRACY
.

..
•

13. l

I
I

'

(A Cause ot Action and/or Remedyf
•

'

<

.

•

Reed··. re-alleges and incorporates each. and evecy. allegation contained· in other

pm~phs of this. Complaint necessary to support every claim and/or remedy sought under this ..
cause of action.
. 13.2 • AIA Sorvicea, AIA Insurance, Crop US~ John, Connie, Duclos, Freeman, and/or
Beck engaged in a pattern of behavior and/or agreement to ·accomplish an unlawful objective
and/or to accomplish a lawful objective in an unlawful manner. AIA Services, AIA Insurance,
Crop USA, John, Connie, Duclos, Freeman, and/or Beck's acts, omissions, and/or acquiescence
constitute civil conspiracy.
13.3

As a result of AIA Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA, John, Connie, Duclos,

Freeman, and/or Beck's wrongful and unlawful acts and/or acquiescence, they should all be held
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jointly and severally liable for all of Reed's damages in this action.
XIV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Without waiving any claims, rights and/or remedies under any of the above-referenced
agreements and/or Idaho Code as a secured party, Reed respectfully requests the following relief:
14.1

For a judgment against AJA Services for the principal of $6,000,000, plus accrued

pre-judgment interest, in the total amount to be proven at or before trial.
14.2

Reed requests a preliminary and pennanent injunction against the Defendants as

follows (any one or more of the following at or before trial):
(a) Enjoining any of the Defendants from interfering with the actions taken
pursuant to the February 22, 2007, Consent in Lieu of Special Meeting of

•.

Shareholders of AJA Insurance and the actions taken pursuant to the February
22, 2007, Consent in Lieu of Meeting of Board of Directors of AIA Insurance.
)

(b) Enjoining any of the Defendants from preventing Reed from exercising his

right under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement to vote the pledged shares
in AJA Insurance and taking any ancillary actions which relate in any way to
voting the pledged shares, including, without limitation, removing the board
of directors of AIA Insurance and appointing a revised board and such other
actions he deems appropriate in his sole discretion as the exclusive person
entitled to vote all the outstanding shares of AJA Insurance.
(c) Requiring the Defendants to timely and promptly provide Reed with all
financial infonnation required under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement.
(d) Enjoining John and any of the other individual Defendants from entering the
offices of AJA Insurance, if necessary

•
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(e) Enjoining the Defendants and any entity owned, partially owned or operated
by any one or more of them from interfering with, disturbing, and transferring
any of AJA Services, AIA insurance and Crop USA's customers, trade secrets,
contracts, agreements and business.
(t) Enjoining the Defendants from utilizing, transferring or disposing of any

funds, assets, property, labor, facilities or services of AIA Insurance, AIA
Services and/or Crop USA for any other person, entity or business, unless
such transactions are arms-length and payment is received by AIA Insurance,
AJA Services and/or Crop USA prior to providing such funds, assets, labor,
facilities or services (e.g., no free use or credit arrangements for such
activities).
(g) Enjoining the Defendants from disposing of, using, transferring or utilizing
any of the funds, assets (including, without limitation, mortgages) and/or
property received from AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and/or Crop USA from
the lawsuit entitled. In re: Universe Liguidator Grain Growers Trust. et al. v.
Idaho Department of Insurance a/k/a GGMIT suit, all other lawsuits, litigation
and disputes in which AJA Services, AJA Insurance and/or Crop USA obtains
any financial gain. All funds, assets and/or property from the foregoing should
be held in trust until further notice from the Court.
(h) Enjoining the Defendants from negotiating or entering into any loans, credit

arrangements, credit facilities, or borrowing any funds under any loan, line-ofcredit, credit facility, open account and the like for which AIA Insurance or
AJA Services is a guarantor or a signatory, unless utilized for the exclusive

•
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benefit of AIA Insurance to provide funding for AIA Insurance and approved
by Reed or such other party appointed by Reed or the Court.

(i) Enjoining the Defendants from destroying, altering, deleting, purging, and/or
removing any documents (including drafts, proposals, electronic files, email,
back-up media and the like), property, computers and the like from AIA
Insurance, AIA Services and Crop USA's offices.
0) Enjoining the Defendants from advancing or lending any funds, assets or

services to John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, Beck, or AIA Services without
first obtaining written consent from Reed or permission from the Court.
(le) Enjoining the Defendants from entering into or negotiating any substantive

contracts or agreements without first obtaining approval from Reed or
permission from the Court.
(1) Enjoining the Defendants from holding, calling or participating in any
shareholder meetings, board meeting, and/or executing any Consents in Lieu
of the foregoing without permitting Reed to vote the pledged shares or take
such other action permitted to him as the holder of the right to vote all
outstanding shares of AIA Insurance.
(m)Enjoining the Defendants from using or transferring any funds, assets, or
services of AIA Insurance for the purpose of providing any retainers or
payments for the legal services for John, Freeman, Duclos, Connie, and/or
Beck.
(n) Enjoining John from being paid compensation for work not performed for

AIA Insurance and/or AIA Services.

John's time expended for Crop USA

•'
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and any other entities partially or wholly owned by him shall be paid by the
appropriate entity and not AIA Insurance, AJA Services, but by the entity for
which John perfonned the work.
{o) Eajoining the Defendants from paying any of the members of the board of
directors of AIA Services or AIA Insurance unreasonable compensation for
serving on the board of directors of AIA Services or AJA Insurance.
(p) Enjoining the Defendants requiring AIA Insurance, AIA Services and Crop

USA to accurately and properly itemize every employee's daily time sheet to
reflect the number of hours of work perfonned for AIA Services, AIA
Insurance, Crop USA and any other entities or persons.
(q) Enjoining the Defendants from such other actions as may be reasonably

contemplated from this Complaint, the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement,
the Amended Security Agreement, the Restructure Agreement and/or which
would otherwise protect Reed's interests and to prevent further deepening of
the insolvency at AIA Services.
(r) Enjoining John, Beck, Freeman, Duclos, and/or Connie from appointing any
directors for Crop USA, AIA Services and AIA Insurance.
(s) Invalidating the appointment of Connie and Beck from the Boards of AIA
Services and AIA Insurance.
14.3

Enjoining the Defendants from transferring, encumbering or otherwise disposing

of any improperly and/or fraudulently obtained and/or transferred assets under I.C. § 55-916, et

seq. and/or other applicable legal authority.
Ill

•
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14.4

For the imposition of a constructive trust for the benefit of Reed and awarding to

Reed all shares of common and/or preferred shares in Crop USA owned and/or held by John,
Connie, Freeman, Duclos, and Beck and for all ancillary actions necessary to transfer said shares
to Reed.
14.5

For the imposition of a constructive trust for the benefit of Reed and awarding to

Reed that certain real property located in Nez Perce County and owed by John and Connie that
was purchased from the Cam.as Praire RailNet, Inc., recorded under instrument number 672508

in Nez Perce County

~d

all rental proceeds paid from AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance to

John and Connie.
14.6

For a prejudgment writ of attachment against certain assets, funds and/or property

of AIA Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA and any other assets, funds and/or property of any of
•

the other Defendants shown to be the proceeds or result of any or all of the Defendants'
wrongful, unlawful, fraudulent and/or inappropriate acts and/or omissions.
14.7

For an order and/or judgment permitting Reed to sell the pledged shares of AIA

Insurance at public or private sale or, in the alternative, judicially. In the event the pledged
shares of AIA Insurance are sold (whether or not Reed is the high bidder), for a deficiency
judgment against the Defendants for all amounts exceeding the amount received and/or credited
from the sale, including, without limitation, all damages, attorneys' fees and costs incurred by
Reed in this action. In the event Reed elects to purchase or otherwise obtain the shares of AIA
Insurance, he hereby requests that only relief necessary for him to carry out his rights as owner
of the shares of AIA Insurance.
14.8

For a judgment against the Defendants and/or the $200,000 bond posted for the

preliminary injunction against Reed for all damages, attorneys' fees, costs and expenses incurred

•
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by Reed from being wrongfully enjoined, plus judgment against the Defendants for all amounts
exceeding the $200,000 bond.
14.9

For judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, for all damages

incurred by Reed as a result of the Defendants' breaches of implied duties of good faith and fair
dealing, conversion, deepening insolvency, breaches of fiduciary duties and other claims,
including, without limitation, pre and post filing damages that include, but are not limited to: all
pay to present directors and officers, damages for the compensation and benefits paid to all
employees paid by AIA Services or AIA Insurance that would not have been needed, lost
tenants, misuse of assets and labor, and all other items detailed at trial.
14.10 For an order compelling an audit of AIA Services, AIA Insurance and Crop USA.
14.11 For a declaratory judgment or order requiring specific perfonnance of AIA
•

Services and/or AIA Insurance's obligations, covenants, warranties and/or other rights granted to
Reed under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security Agreement, Promissory
Note and/or Restructure Agreement.

14.12 For judgment that AIA Insurance, AIA Services and Crop USA have been
operated as the alter-egos of John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or Beck, and their corporate
veils should be pierced thereby imposing personal liability on all of the individual and corporate
Defendants, jointly and severally, for all of Reed's damages and sums owed to him under the
Promissory Note in an amount to be proven at trial.
14.13 For judgment that Crop USA is the alter-ego of AIA Insurance and AIA Services
and all the foregoing corporations for all of Reed's damages and sums owed to him in both
contract and tort in an amount to be proven at trial.
14.14 For a declaratory judgment and/or order enforcing the February 22, 2007, Consent

•

FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT - 38

000301

in Lieu of Special Meeting of Shareholders of AJA Insurance and the actions taken pursuant to
the February 22, 2007, Consent in Lieu of Meeting of Board of Directors of AIA Insurance.
14.15 For a judgment for damages and attorneys' fees incurred by Reed as a result of
being wrongfully enjoined by the Defendants.
14.16 For such other relief that Reed may request before or at trial to enforce his rights
under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security Agreement, and/or Restructure
Agreement, including, without limitation, any action or order authorized under J.C. § 30-1-701 et

seq. and/or I.C. § 28-9-101 et seq.
14.17 For judgment, order and/or declaratory relief as may be necessary for Reed to
effectuate any and all rights and remedies under I.C. § 28-9-101 et seq., including, without

•
i

limitation, the sale of the pledged shares, protection of security interest, seizure of security,
return of funds protected by his security interest (e.g., attorneys fees paid for individual directors,
etc.) and any other available remedy.
14.18 For the avoidance/rescission of the improper and/or fraudulent transactions,
transfers of funds, assets and/or services from AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance to John, Beck,
Freeman, Connie, Duclos, Crop USA, and any entity partially owned by John, and/or any other
party who received such transfers under I.C. § 55-916, et seq. and/or other applicable legal
authority.
14.19 For judgment against John and Connie for $307,271, plus accrued interest, for the
money he owed AIA Services which was improperly paid by inappropriately transferring his
indebtedness to Reed's Promissory Note and then backing out the transaction in 2006 or 2007,
and awarding this account receivable from AIA Services to Reed.

Ill

•
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14.20 For judgment against Connie to the fullest extent of her liability by virtue of her
marriage to John and/or his acts during their marriage, and her interest in the community
property in an amount to be proven at the time of trial, plus prejudgment interest.
14.21 For judgment against Connie individually for an amount to be proven at trial, plus
pre-judgment interest.
14.22 For a judgment against John (both individually and through his marriage to
Connie) in an amount to be proven at trial, plus prejudgment interest.
14.23 For judgment against John, Connie, Duclos, Freeman, and Beck, jointly and
severally, for all funds, assets, services, property and/or any other benefit fraudulently
transferred, converted and/or fraudulently conveyed, and which such transferred thing of value
may not be avoided, rescinded and/or paid to Reed.
14.24 For judgment against Crop USA for all sums and the fair market value of all
services, labor, funds, and assets wrongfully, fraudulently, and/or inappropriately transferred,
converted and/or conveyed, directly or indirectly, from AIA Insurance and/or AIA Services.
14.25 For judgment against John, Duclos, Connie, Freeman, and Beck, jointly and
severally, for amounts owed to Reed in an amount to be proven at the time of trial because AIA
Services and AIA Insurance are alter egos of John, Duclos, Freeman, and Beck.
14.26 For judgment against John, Connie, Duclos, Freeman, and Beck disgorging all
salaries, compensation (including payments of fees for being board members and/or advisory
board members), benefits, assets, stock (including, without limitation, shares held directly or
indirectly in Crop USA) and other il1-gotten gains as a result of the breaches of their fiduciary
duties, fraudulent transfers, unlawful acts, fraud and/or other causes of action.
Ill
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14.27 For the imposition of a constructive trust for the benefit of Reed and awarding to
Reed all funds, investments, loans, advances, securities, property, transactions, services and/or
self-dealing which were converted or :fraudulently, wrongfully, unlawfully and/or improperly
made for the benefit of Duclos, Freeman, John, Beck, Connie and/or other parties or entities
controlled and/or partially owned by any of them as may be requested at trial.
14.28 For the imposition of a constructive trust for the benefit of Reed and awarding to
Reed all securities, stock, options and the like transferred, together with all proceeds thereof,
converted, sold or awarded or acquired by John and/or Connie from AIA Services, AIA
Insurance and/or Crop USA, including, without limitation, shares (and proceeds thereof) and/or
funds, and/or distributions received in or from Pacific Empire Holdings Corporation, Pacific
Empire Radio Corporation, and Pacific Empire Communications Corporation.

•

14.29 For the imposition of a constructive trust for the benefit of Reed and awarding to
Reed all shares and options of AIA Services and Crop USA acquired by the Defendants during
their employment and/or when they were officers and/or members of the boards of AIA
Insurance, AIA Services, and/or Crop USA.
14.30 For the disgorgement of all salary, bonuses, compensation (including all
compensation and benefits received as directors), stock options, benefits, reimbursements (all
proper, improper and/or undocumented reimbursements for travel, meals, lodging, etc.) an~ any
other payments and/or assets received by John, Connie, Beck, Duclos, and Freeman and award
all such funds and assets to Reed.
14.31 For a judgment against John, Freeman, Duclos, Connie and Beck, jointly and
severally, for all damages resulting from the breaches of their fiduciary duties owed to Reed
during the periods of time of their relevant tenures as directors of AIA Insurance and AIA
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Services, in an amount to be proven at trial.
14.32 For a declaratory judgment imposing personal liability on the individual
Defendants and Crop USA for all loans guaranteed by AIA Services or AIA Insurance.
14.33 For an award of Reed's attorneys' fees and costs from all of the Defendants,

jointly and severally, under the Promissory Note, A.mended Stock Pledge Agreement, LC. § 12120, l.C. § 12-121 and/or as may be available under equity and law.
14.34 For judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, for all damages in tort

and contract proven by Reed at trial based upon one or more of the following: civil conspiracy,
fraud (any type, including misrepresentations), fraudulent conveyances, conversion, breaches of
contract, alter-ego, breaches of fiduciary duties, deepening insolvency, breaches of implied
duties of good faith and fair dealing, specific performance of any of Reed's rights under contract
or law.
14.35 John, Connie, Beck, Duclos, and Freeman's wrongful, self-serving, fraudulent,

deepening insolvency, conspiracy, inappropriate and unlawful acts and/or omissions as described
in this Complaint constitute that of "faithless fiduciaries." Accordingly, all salary, compensation

(including all compensation and benefits received as directors), stock options, benefits,
reimbursements (all proper, improper and/or undocumented reimbursements for travel, meals,
lodging, etc.) and any other payments and/or assets received by John, Connie, Beck, Duclos,
and/or Freeman should be disgorged and awarded to Reed.
14.36 AIA Services and AJA Insurance have alleged that Reed agreed to orally modify

the terms of the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security
Agreement and Restructure Agreement, which such allegations Reed expressly denies. If the
Defendants are able to prove that such an oral modification exists at or before trial, AJA
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Services, AIA Insurance and Crop USA are in breach of such orally modified agreements and
Reed is entitled to the damages and relief set forth in this Complaint.
14.37 Reed incorporates by reference into this Section all allegations and requested
relief set forth in the above causes of action and/or remedies. Should any of the causes of action
fail at or before trial, all of such allegations are incorporated by reference into this Section as

requested relief and/or as support for Reed's requested relief.
14.38 Reed expressly reserves the right to amend this Complaint upon the completion of
discovery and/or present causes of action and remedies which conform to the evidence at the
time of trial.
14.39 For judgment against the Defendants and/or such relief for all claims and causes

I

I

•

of action which conform to the evidence obtained through discovery and/or forensic accounting.
14.40 For such other relief as Reed may request before or at the time of trial and/or that
the Court may find just, equitable, or warranted before or at the time of trial.
14.41 The Defendants are placed on notice that future amendments to this Complaint
will be likely and Reed reserves the right to do so, particularly based upon the Defendants'
intentional refusal to respond to Reed's discovery requests.
Ill
Ill
Ill
Ill
Ill
Ill

•
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14.42 The Defendant:s are placed on notice that Reed may likely move the Court in the
future to permit him to request an award of punitive damages against the Defendants at trial.
DATED this 1st day ofFebruary, 2008.
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC

I

~

i

I

~
I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct
copy of Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Fifth Amended Complaint on the following parties via the
methods indicated below:
David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Attorney for Defendants JoLee Duclos and
Bryan Freeman

Via:

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered

( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)
Via:

.,I

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for R. John Taylor

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)
Via:

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for Connie Taylor, James Beck and
Corrine Beck

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered

( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)
Via:

Gary D. Babbitt
D. John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
Attorneys for AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and
Crop USA Insurance Agency

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)
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James J. Gatziolis
Charles E. Harper
Quarles & Brady LLP
Citigroup Center, 500 West Madison Street
Suite 3700
Cbicago,IL 60661-2511
Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance Agency

Via:
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment) ·

Signed this 1•t day of February, 2008, at Lewiston, Idaho.

' ·17
{)

.

I

•

•
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FILED

AT3 So O'CLOCK (Jrn

APR 1 6 2008
1

2
3

4
5

6

JONATHAN D. HALLY
CLARK and FEENEY
Attorneys for Defendants, Connie Taylor,
James Beck, and-Corrine Beck
The Train Station, Suite 201
13th and Main Streets
P. 0. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208)743-9516
ISB# 4979

7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

8
9

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,

10
Plaintiff,
11

)
)

)

Idaho~

12

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
13 corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an Idaho)
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE)
14 TAYLOR, individually and the community property)
comprised thereof; BRYAN FREEMAN, a single)
15 person; JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person; CROP)
USA INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho)
16
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and CORRINE)
1 7 BECK, individually and the community property)
comprised thereof,
)
18

CONNIE W. TAYLOR and JAMES BECK,
Counterclaimants,

21

vs.

22
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
23
24

ANSWER OF DEFENDANTS,
CONNIE TAYLOR, JAMES BECK,
AND CORRINE BECK'S TO
PLAINTIFF'S FIFTH AMENDED
COMPLAINT, DEMAND FOR JURY
TRIAL AND COUNTERCLAIM

)

Defendants.

19

20

Case No. CV-07-00208

)

vs.

Counterdefendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

25

()
''.:Ci/

26

ANSWER OF DEFENDANTS, CONNIE TAYLOR,
I
JAMES BECK AND CORRINE BECK
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY,
LEWISTON. JDAHO 83501

EXHIBIT F
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COME NOW the Defendants, CONNIE TAYLOR, JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK

()
.

in the above-entitled action and answer the Plaintiffs Fifth Amended Complaint as follows:
1

1.

2

3

Complaint not specifically admitted herein.

4
5

These Defendants deny each and every allegation in Plaintiffs Fifth Amended

2.

These Defendants admit the allegations contained within paragraphs I. I, 1.2, 1.3 and

3.

With regard to paragraph 1.5, these Defendants admit R. John Taylor and Connie

1.4.

6

7
8
9
10
11
12

Taylor were husband and wife until on or about December 16, 2005, and that said persons were
residents of Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho. These Defendants deny the remaining allegations
of said paragraph and any inferences of wrongdoing contained therein.
4.

These Defendants admit the allegations contained within paragraphs 1.6, 1.7 and 1.8.

5.

With regard to paragraph 1.9, these Defendants admit that James Beck and Corrine

13

Beck are residents of the State of Minnesota and deny the remaining allegations of said paragraph
14
15
16

17
18

and any inferences of wrongdoing contained therein.
6.

These Defendants admit the allegations contained in Paragra::ihs 1.10 and I .11 of the

Complaint.
7.

With regard to paragraph 2.1, these Defendants admit that R. John Taylor was an

19

officer and director of AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and Crop USA and that Connie Taylor and R.
20

21
22

John Taylor own shares in AIA Services and Crop USA. These Defendants are without sufficient
knowledge to admit or deny the remaining allegations and, therefore, deny the same.

23
24
25

c)

26
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8.

With regard to paragraph 2.2, these Defendants admit that Connie Taylor, and R.

John Taylor, were divorced through an Interlocutory Decree filed on December 16, 2005, and deny
1

2
3
4

5

the remaining allegations contained therein.

9.

Paragraph 2.3 contains mere commentary such that Defendants are not required to

answer said paragraph. To the extent an answer is deemed required, these Defendants deny any
allegations contained within said paragraph including any inferences of wrongdoing.

6

I 0.

These Defendants deny the allegations contained within paragraph 2.4.

11.

With regard to paragraph 2.5, these Defendant admit that JoLee Duclos was an officer

7
8
9

10
11
12

and director of AJA Services, AJA Insurance, and Crop USA and that Duclos is a shareholder in
Crop USA and deny the remaining allegations contained therein.

12.

With regard to paragraph 2.6, these Defendants admit that Bryan Freeman was a

director of AIA Services, AIA Insurance ,and Crop USA and is a shareholder in Crop USA, and deny

13
the remaining allegations contained therein.

14
15

13.

With regard to paragraph 2.7, these Defendants are without sufficient knowledge to

16

admit or deny the allegations set forth in the first two sentences of said paragraph and, therefore deny

17

the same. Defendants deny the remaining allegations contained within said paragraph.

18
19

14.

These Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 2.8 of the Complaint.

15.

With regard to paragraph 2.9, these Defendants admit that Defendant, James Beck,

20
21

is a shareholder in AIA Services and Crop USA and that James Beck is, and at certain other times

22

was, a member of the Board of Directors of AJA Insurance and AIA Services, and deny the

23

remaining allegations contained therein.

24

25

(j
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"
16.

With regard to paragraph 2.10, these Defendants admit the first and third sentences

and in answering said paragraph, allege that in 1995 Reed Taylor desired to retire and have AIA
1

2

3
4

5

Services redeem his stock, and deny the remaining allegations contained in said paragraph.

17.

With regard to paragraph 2.11, these Defendants admit that AIA Insurance is a wholly

owned subsidiary of AIA Services and that AIA Insurance is a lessee of the office building located
at 111 Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho, and deny the remaining allegations contained within said

6

paragraph.
7
8

9

10
11
12

ra
\!JjJ1

18.

With regard to paragraph 2.12, these Defendants assert that the documents speak for

themselves.
19.

With regard to paragraph 2.13, these Defendants allege that the documents speak for

themselves and are without sufficient information to admit or deny the remaining allegations and
therefor deny the same.

13

20.

With regard to 2.14, these Defendants allege that the documents speak for themselves

14

15
16
17

18
19

and, are without sufficient information to admit or deny the remaining allegations and therefore deny
the same.

21.

With regard to paragraph 2.15, these Defendants admit that in 1996 AIA Services

and Plaintiff agreed to modify the Stock Redemption Agreement and executed the Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement, an Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement and an Amended and

20

Restated Security Agreement. These Defendants further assert that the documents speak for
21
22

23
24
25
26

themselves and deny the remaining allegations.
22.

With regard to paragraphs 2.16, these Defendants allege that the documents speak for

themselves and deny the remaining allegations.
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23.

(j

With regard to paragraphs 2. I 7, these Defendants allege that the documents speak for

themselves and deny the remaining allegations.
1

24.

2

With regard to paragraph 2. I 8, these Defendants allege that the Amended Stock

3

Pledge Agreement speaks for itself. Further, these Defendants are without sufficient information to

4

admit or deny those allegations that are specifically directed at other Defendants and therefore deny

5

the same. These Defendants deny the remaining allegations.

6

25.

With regard to paragraph 2.19, these Defendants allege that the documents speak for

7

B

themselves and deny the remaining allegations.

26.

9

1O

themselves and deny the remaining allegations contained therein.

11
12

With regard to paragraph 2.20, these Defendants allege that the documents speak for

27.

With regard to paragraph 2.21, these Defendants are without sufficient information

to admit or deny the allegations contained therein and, therefore, deny the same.

13
28.

With regard to paragraph 2.22, these Defendants admit that Plaintiff was the largest

14
15
16
17
18

19

creditor of AIA Services during certain relevant times and deny all other allegations contained
therein.
29.

With regard to paragraph 2.23 and 2.24, these Defendants are without sufficient

information to admit or deny the allegations contained therein and, therefore, deny the same.
30.

These Defendants deny the allegations contained within paragraphs 2.25.

31.

With regard to paragraph 2.26, these Defendants admit that Plaintiff claimed that AIA

20

21
22

23
24

25
26

Services was in default but deny the remaining allegations contained in said paragraph.
32.

With regard to paragraph 2.27, these Defendants are without sufficient information

to admit or deny the allegations contained therein and, therefore, deny the same.
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33.

With regard to paragraph 2.28, these Defendants deny the allegations contained

34.

With regard to paragraph 2.29, these Defendants are without sufficient information

therein.
1

2
3
4

5

6

to admit or deny the allegations contained therein and, therefore, deny the same.
35.

With regard to paragraphs 2.30, and 2.31, these Defendants are without sufficient

information to admit or deny the allegations contained therein and therefore deny the same.
36.

These Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 2.32.

37.

With regard to paragraph 2.33, these Defendants admit Plaintiff executed a Consent

7

8

9

in Lieu of Special Shareholder Meeting of AIA insurance and deny the remaining allegations

1O

contained therein.

11

38.

12

With regard to paragraph 2.34, these Defendants admit that AIA Insurance paid

$1,5 l 0,693 to purchase Series C Preferred Shares in AIA Services from Crop USA and admit that

13

AIA Services' 401(k) Plan held Preferred C shares.

These Defendants deny the remaining

14
15
16
17
18
19

allegations contained within said paragraph.
39.

With regard to paragraph 2.35, these Defendants adr1it that R. John Taylor purchased

a parking lot and these Defendants deny the remaining allegations contained within said paragraph.
40.

These Defendants deny the allegations contained within paragraphs 2.36 and 2.37.

41.

With regard to paragraph 2.3 8, these Defendants are without sufficient information

20

to admit or deny the allegations contained therein and therefore deny the same.
21

.•
'~:·~·,.·

(,.

22

42.

23

Complaint.

These Defendants deny the allegations the contained within paragraph 2.39 of the

24

25
26
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43.

( ·~
\.Y

With regard to paragraph 2.40, these Defendants admit that Defendants Freeman and

..

Duclos resigned as members of the Board of Directors of AIA Insurance and AIA Services and that
1
2

3
4
5

6

Defendants Connie Taylor and James Beck were appointed to the Board of AIA Insurance and AIA
Services. These Defendants deny the remaining allegations contained within said paragraph.
44.

These Defendants deny the allegations contained with paragraphs 2.41.

45.

With regard to paragraph 2.42, these Defendants admit that Plaintiff made a demand

that certain funds not be used to pay the leal fees of any of the individual Defendants and deny the

7

8
9

10
11

•

12

remaining allegations within said paragraph.
46.

With regard to paragraph 2.43, these Defendants are without sufficient knowledge

to admit or deny the allegations contained therein and therefore deny the same.
47.

With regard to paragraph 2.44, these Defendants admit that Crop USA purchased

Sound Insurance and deny the remaining allegations contained within said paragraph .

13
48.

With regard to paragraph 2.45, these Defendants admit that Global Travel was a

14
15

16

17
18
19

tenant in AIA Insurance's office building located in Lewiston, Idaho, and deny the remaining
allegations contained therein.

49.

With regard to paragraph 2.46, these Defendants are without sufficient knowledge

to adinit or deny the allegations contained therein and therefore deny the same.
50.

These Defendants are without sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the allegations

20
21

22

ct

contained within paragraph 2.4 7 and therefore deny the same.
51.

In answering paragraph 2.48, these Defendants allege that AIA Services and AIA

23

Insurance operated for the benefit of AIA Services and AIA Insurance, respectively and deny the

24

remaining allegations contained within said paragraph.

25
26
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52.

These Defendants deny the allegations contained within paragraphs 2.49 and 2.50.

53.

With regard to paragraph 2.51, these Defendants lack sufficient information to admit

1
2

3

or deny the allegations as to what Reed believes and therefore deny the same and further deny the
remaining allegations contained within said paragraph.

4

5
6

54.

These Defendants deny the allegations contained within paragraphs 2.52 and 2.53.

55.

With regard to paragraph 2.54, these Defendants are without sufficient knowledge

to admit or deny the allegations contained therein and therefore deny the same.

7

56.

With regard to paragraph 2.55, these Defendants assert that the Executive Officer's

8

•·

9

10
11

...

"

II;'~

Agreement speaks for itself and deny the remaining allegations contained within said paragraph.

12

57.

These Defendants deny the allegations contained within paragraphs 2.56, 2.57 and

58.

With regard to paragraph 2.59, said paragraph fails to assert any allegations against

2.58.

13

these Defendants which require an answer.
:~

14

15
16

17
18

19

59.

With regard to paragraph 3.1, these Defendants re-allege and incorporate each and

every admission and denial set forth above.

60.

These Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.

61.

With regard to paragraph 4.1, these Defendants re-allege and incorporate each and

every admission and denial set forth above.

20
21
22
23

24

62.

These Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.

63.

With regard to paragraph 5.1, these Defendants re-allege and incorporate each and

every admission and denial set forth above.

64.

These Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4.
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65.

With regard to paragraph 6.1, these Defendants re-allege and incorporate each and

every admission and denial set forth above.
1

2
3

4
5
6

66.

These Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 6.2 and 6.3.

67.

With regard to paragraph 7.1, these Defendants re-allege and incorporate each and

every admission and denial set forth above.
68.

With regard to paragraph 7.2, these Defendants reaffirm their response to the

allegations contained within paragraph 2.52.

7

,.,,

69.

These Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5.

70.

With regard to paragraph 8.1, these Defendants re-allege and incorporate each and

8
9

.-

1 O every admission and denial set forth above.

11
12

•

71.

These Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4.

72 .

With regard to paragraph 9.1, these Defendants re-allege and incorporate each and

13

every admission and denial set forth above.

14
15
16
17
18
19

73.

These Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 9.2, 9.3 and 9.4.

74.

With regard to paragraph I 0.1, these Defendants re-allege and incorporate each and

every admission and denial set forth above.
75.

These Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 10.2, 10.3 and I 0.4.'

76.

With regard to paragraph 11.1, these Defendants re-allege and incorporate each and

20

21

every admission and denial set forth above.

22

77.

These Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 11.2, 11.3 and 11.4.

23

78.

With regard to paragraph 12 .1, these Defendants re-allege and incorporate by

24

reference their answers and denials set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Answer.
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ct
'<1

79.

These Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 12.2 and 12.3.

80.

With regard to paragraph 13.1, these Defendants re-allege and incorporate by

1
2

3

reference their answers and denials set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Answer.
81.

4
5
6

These Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 13 .2 and 13 .3.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
By pleading certain defenses as "affirmative defenses," these Defendants do not intend to
suggest that they have the burden of proof for any such defense. Furthermore, as the answering

7

Defendants have not had the opportunity to fully conduct discovery in this case and by failing to raise
8

9

10

amend their answer to include additional affirmative defenses.

11

First Affirmative Defense

12

Cl

an affirmative defense do not intend to waive any such defense and specifically reserve the right to

At all times, Defendants Taylor and Beck, properly discharged their duties in good faith and

13
with the due care that persons in like positions would reasonably believe appropriate under similar

14
15
16

circumstances.

Second Affirmative Defense

17

On July 1, 1996, Plaintiff, AIA Services Corporation and Donna J. Taylor, entered into a

18

Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement, which provides that no principal payments may be made

19

by AIA Services Corporation to Plaintiff until the entire redemption price due to Donna Taylor is

20

paid in full. The redemption price due to Donna Taylor has not been paid in full. Therefore, no

21
22

principal payments are due to Plaintiff.

23
24

(I

25
26
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:.zfJ5ird Affirmative Defense
·~

At different times since the written agreements were executed, Plaintiff and some Defendants
1

2

have orally modified the written agreements. The modifications include, without limitation, an

3

agreement that the interest payable to Plaintiff from AIA Services would be paid in installments of

4

$15,000.00 per month (together with the assumption of responsibility for other expenses.) AIA

5

Services has paid Plaintiff the sum of$15,000.00 per month and has assumed responsibility for the

6

other agreed expenses in accordance with the modified agreements since they were entered into and

7 .

Plaintiff has accepted those payments. None of these Defendants are in default of the modified
8
9

agreements with Plaintiff.

Fourth Affirmative Defense

10
11

•
'

12

The Plaintiffs claims are barred by applicable statutes of limitation, including Idaho Code
Sections 5-216, 5-218, 5-224, 5-237, and 55-918 .

13

Fifth Affirmative Defense

'

14
15

Plaintiff's claims are barred under the Doctrines of Estoppel and Waiver.

16

Sixth Affirmative Defense

17

Plaintiffs claims are barred by the Doctrine of Laches.

18
19

Seventh Affirmative Defense
Plaintiffs claims are barred by the Doctrine of Unclean Hands.

20

Eighth Affirmative Defense
21
22

One or more of Plaintiff's causes of action fail to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.

24

25

\126

ANSWER OF DEFENDANTS, CONNIE TAYLOR,
JAMES BECK AND CORRINE BECK
11
LAW OFFICES Of'

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON, IDAHO 63501

000320

Ninth Affirmative Defense

Cl

Plaintiffs claims in his Third Cause of Action fail to assert matters with the particularity of
1
2

Rule 9(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

Tenth Affirmative Defense

3
4

To the extent the Plaintiff is attempting to state a claim for a shareholder's derivative action,

5

Plaintiffs claims are barred because Plaintiff failed to provide the notice required by Idaho Code

6

Section 30-1-742.
7

Eleventh Affirmative Defense
8

9

•
.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor voluntarily relinquished and waived events of default under the

10

Amended Security Agreement and Amended Pledge Agreement, including but not limited to, default

11

or breaches arising from or relating to financial statements, board memberships, or insolvencies or

12

bankruptcies .

13

Twelfth Affirmative Defense
14
15

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor voluntarily relinquished the payment provision of this 1996

16

Promissory and accepted a modified monthly interest payment of $25,000 and future payment of

17

principal upon placement of $60,000,000 in new business evidenced by his conduct, words and

18

19

acqmesces.

Thirteenth Affirmative Defense

20

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor is estopped from claiming a default or breach of the Amended Pledge
21
22
23

Agreement or the Amended Security Agreement, including but not limited to alleged defaults related
to or arising from financial statements, board membership, or insolvency or bankruptcy, as it would

24

25
26
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be unconscionable to allow Reed J. Taylor to assert such rights to default based on his prior positions

Cl
.

and conduct.

.

1

JF'ourteentlrn Affirmative Defense

2

3

Plaintiff has failed to join an indispensable party, Donna Taylor.

Fifteenth Affirmative Defense

4

5
6

Plaintiffs claims against these Defendants are barred because the 1995 Stock Redemption
Agreement, the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement and the other related agreements

7

are void as in violation of former Idaho Code § 30-1-46 (superseded in 1997 by Idaho Code § 30-18
9

640). Idaho Code § 30-1-46 provided that a corporation could redeem its shares (or make other

1 O distributions) only out of the corporation's capital surplus. The statute further prohibited shareholder
11

12

•

distributions "when the corporation is insolvent or when such distribution would render the
corporation insolvent."

13

.

Sixteenth Affirmative Defense

14
15
16

At the time the parties entered into the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, AIA Services

17

did not have any capital surplus with which to redeem Plaintiffs common stock, AIA had an

18

accumulated deficit, and/or said transaction rendered AIA Services insolvent. The 1995 Stock

19

Redemption Agreement, the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement and the related

20

agreements are, therefore, illegal and void. Therefore, this Court should decline to enforce the illegal

21
and void agreements, including the $6 Million Note. In the alternative, the agreements should be

22
23

rescinded.

24

Cl

25
26
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COUNTERCLAIM
COME NOW, Defendants/Counterclaimants Connie Taylor and James Beck and for cause
1

2

3

of action against Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, allege, plead and complain as follows:

1.

Since April 30, 2007 Connie Taylor and James Beck were appointed to the Board of

4

Directors for AIA Services Corporation and AJA Insurance, Inc., and each continue

5

to be on said Boards of Directors.

6

2.

Connie Taylor is a single person residing in Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho.

3.

James Beck is a married person and is a resident of Minnesota.

9

4.

Reed Taylor is a single person and resides in Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho.

10

5.

AIA

7

8

11

•

12

Services Corporation ("AIA Services") is an Idaho corporation with its

principal place of business located in Lewiston, Nez Perce County Idaho.

6.

AIA Insurance, Inc. ("AIA Insurance") is an Idaho corporation with its principal

13
place of business being located in Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho.

AIA

14

Insurance is a wholly owned subsidiary of AIA Services.

15
16

7.

AIA Insurance. He owned 613,494 shares of common stock in AIA Services.

17

18

19

In 1995 Reed Taylor was a member of the Board of Directors for AIA Services and

8.

On or about July 22, 1995, AIA Services and Reed Taylor entered into a Stock
Redemption Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement through

20

which AIA Services redeemed Reed Taylor's 613,494 shares of AIA Services
21
22
23

Common Stock. Under these Agreements, Reed Taylor was to receive, among other
things, (a) $1,500,000.00 payable at closing; (b) $6,000,000.00 payable pursuant to

24

25
26
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(.

terms of a promissory note; and, (c) elimination of approximately $570,000.00 in

,)~.

debt that Reed Taylor owed to AIA Services.
1

2

9.

In 1996 AIA Services and Reed Taylor modified the Stock Redemption Agreement

3

and executed a Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement, an Amended and Restated

4

Stock Pledge Agreement, and Amended and Restated Security Agreement. (" 1996

5

Agreements"). On information and belief, Counterclaimants allege that the 1996

6

Agreements were further modified by Reed Taylor and AIA Services.

7
8

10.

Agreement and Security Agreement ("1995 Agreements"), Reed Taylor was a

9
10
11

At the time of the execution of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, Stock Pledge

member of the Board of Directors for both AIA Services and AIA Insurance.
11.

12

At the time the 1995 Agreements were entered into, AIA Services did not have
sufficient capital surplus to redeem Reed Taylor's shares of AIA Services common

13

stock and had an accumulated deficit.

14
15

12.

The 1995 Agreements rendered AIA Services insolvent.

16

13.

As of December 31, 1994, AIA Services had total assets of $6,052,465 and total

17
18

liabilities of $5,001,738.
14.

As of December 31, 1995, AIA Services had total assets of $3,342, 152 and total

19
liabilities of $18,655,370.
20
21

22

15.

As of December 31, 1996, AIA Services had total assets of $2,856,836 and total
liabilities of $16, 113, 178.

23

24
25
26
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16.

As a result of the financial status of AIA Services at the time the 1995 Agreements
were entered into, said Agreements violated Idaho Code Section 30-1-46 as well as

1

Idaho common law and as such were illegal.

2

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

3
4

5

6

17.

The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated by reference and restated as if set forth in

18.

Defendants/Counterclaimants seek an Order declaring the following:

full.

7

(a)

8

9

and related agreements were illegal, void and unenforceable;
(b)

10
11

•
.

12

that the 1995 Redemption Agreement, Promissory Note, Security Agreement

that as a result of the illegality of the 1995 Agreements, all subsequent

agreements which modified and/or revised the I 995 Agreements are also illegal, void and
unenforceable; or, in the alternative,

13

.

(c)

for _an

Order rescinding

the

1995

Agreements

and

subsequent

14
15

revisions/modifications thereto, and, thereby requiring Reed Taylor to reimburse AIA Services all

16

funds paid to him and benefits he received under the ~ 995 Agreements and subsequent revisions

17

thereto and, after full reimbursement has been rendered, for the return of the AIA Services common

18
19

stock to Reed Taylor.
WHEREFORE, these Defendants and Counterclaimants pray as follows:

20
21

I.

Amended Complaint;

22
23.

24

ct

25
26

That Plaintiff's claims be denied and Plaintiff take nothing by way of his Fifth

2.

For judgment in favor of Counterclaimants and against Plaintiff/Counterdefandant
on the counterclaim.
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3.

For an Order declaring the I 995 Redemption Agreement and related Agreements set
forth in the Counterclaim are illegal, void, and unenforceable.

1
2

4.

all subsequent revised agreements.

3

4
5

For an Order rescinding the 1995 Redemption Agreement, Security Agreements and

5.

For costs and attorney fees.

6.

For such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper under the circumstances

6

of this lawsuit.
7

8
9

Dated this

/6

day of April, 2008.
CLARK AND FEENEY

10
11

. Hally, a member of the firm
ttomeys for Defendants Connie Taylor,
James Beck, and Corrine Beck .

12

•

13
14
15
16
17

18

19
20

21
22
23
24

r:•

\!Ill

25
26
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•

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

.

.

Defendants demand a jury trial of all issues in this cause and will not stipulate to a jury of
1

2
3

less than twelve ( 12).
DA TED on this /

b

day of April, 2008.

4

CLARK and FEENEY

5

n D. Hally, a me her of the firm
ttomeys for Defendants Connie Taylor,
James Beck, and Corrine Beck.

6
7

8

9 STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Nez Perce

)

) SS.

10
11

Connie W. Taylor, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:

12

That she is one of the Defendant's herein; that she has read the foregoing instrument, knows
13 the contents thereof and the facts stated therein are true-tolh~ best ofhis/h~r
ledge, infonnation
1
and belief.
14
.. I
.··

15

Connie W. Taylor

16

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this/[pffJ.ay of April 2008.

17
18
19

Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho
Residing at
I
, therein.
My commission expires: (/
J

20

21
22
23

24

ra
V6'

25
26
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the_& day of April, 2008, J caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

2
3

4

5
6

7

a
9

10
11
12

•

13
14
15
16

17
18
19

20

Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith and Cannon
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneys for Reed Taylor
James J. Gatziolis
Charles E. Harper
QUARLES & BRADY LLP
500 West Madison Street, Suite 3700
Chicago, Illinois 60661-2511
Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance

Michael McNichols
Clements, Brown & McNichols
321 13 ih Street
PO Box 1510
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneys for R. John Taylor
David A. Gittins
Law Offices of David A. Gittins
843 7m Street
PO Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
/..ttorneysfor Duclos and Freeman
Gary D. Babbitt
D. John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, rD 83701-1617
Attorneys for AJA Services and AJA Insurance

%
0
D

D

~

a
D
D
D
.18(

A!_
D
D
D

~

~
D
D
D

~

~
D
0
D
~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 746-8421
E-mai I: rod@,scblega/. comj
ned@.scblegal.com,·
/egalservices@clearwire.net
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (312) 715-5155
E-mail charper@quarles.com;
iig(wouarles. com
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 746-0753
E-mai I mmcnichols@clbrmc.com
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (509) 758-3576
E-mail david@gittin.rlaw.com
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 342-3829
E-mail gdb@hteh.com; jash@hteh.com

21
22

23
24

.6
25
2
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•
'

1
2

Dean Wullenwaber
Wullenwaber Law Firm
703 81h St.
Lewiston, ID 8350 I
Attorney for Reed Taylor

gJ.-

0

0
D

fat

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)
Email dwlawfirm@cableone.net

3

4

5
6
7

8
9

10
11
12
13
14

15
16

17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24

r<•

'4111

25
26
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1

2

3
4

5
6

JONATHAN D. HALLY
CLARK and FEENEY
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Taylor,
James Beck and Corrine Beck.
The Train Station, Suite 20 I
13th and Main Streets
P. 0. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208)743-9516
ISB# 4979

7
8

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

9

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

10

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,

11

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

12

vs.

13

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an Idaho)
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE)
TAYLOR, individually and the community property)
comprised thereof; BRYAN FREEMAN, a sing!~
person; JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person; CROP)
USA INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho)
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and CORRINE)
BECK, individually and the community property)
comprised thereof,
)

14
15
16

17
18

Idaho~

19
20

Defendants.
CONNIE W. TAYLOR and JAMES BECK,

21

Counterclaimants,
22

vs.

23

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,

24

Counterdefendant.

Case No. CV-07-00208

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)

25

26

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

000330
EXHIBITG

.

1

COME NOW defendants/counterclaimants Connie Taylor and James Beck, by and through

2

their undersigned attorney of record, and pl,lrsuant to I.R.C.P. 56(a) and (b), do hereby move this

3

Court for partial summary judgment and order that the relevant Stock Redemption Agreement is

4

illegal.

5
6

This motion is made upon the pleadings and records of the above-entitled action and upon

7

the Affidavit of Connie Taylor and the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary

8

Judgment filed concurrently herewith.

9

10

Oral argument is requested.
DATED this / ( day of April, 2008.

11

CLARK and FEENEY
12
13

14
15

By:.......::::::~~~~~~-----

Jon
. Hally, an me er of the firm
ttomeys for Defendants/Counterlaimants
Connie Taylor and James Beck

J5

17
18

19
20

21
22
23
24

ct

25
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

(f

1

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _L{_ day of April, 2008, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

2

3
4

5
6

7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20

Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith and Cannon
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneys/or Reed Taylor

X!.
0
0
0

x

James J. Gatziolis
Charles E. Harper
QUARLES & BRADY LLP
500 West Madison Street, Suite 3 700
Chicago, Illinois 60661-251 l
Allorneys for Crop USA Insurance

;t

Michael McNichols
Clements, Brown & McN ichols
321 J3 1h Street
PO Box 1510
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneys for R. John Taylor

~
0
0

David A. Gittins
Law Offices of David A. Gittins
843 7rh Street

PO Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Allorneys Jo• Duclos and Freeman
Gary D. Babbitt
D. John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite I 000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Attorneys for A/A Services and A/A Insurance

0
0

0
,f!['

0

,a_
~

0

d
0
~

x0
0
0
J(t

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 746-8421
E-mail: rod@schleeal.com;
ned@schlecal.com;
legalservicel@!;.learwire.net
·U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (312) 715-5155
E-mail chare,er:@JJ.uarles.com;
[jg(@guarles.com
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 746-0753
E-mail nim.cnichols<@J:lbrmc.com
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (509) 758-3576
E-mail david@glttinslaw.com
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 342-3829
E-mail cdh@hteh.com; jash@bteh.com

21
22
23
24

25

Gt
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•

(.

Dean Wullenwaber
Wullenwaber Law Firm
1
2

703 81h St.

Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for Reed Taylor

JR
D
D
D
)&..

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)
Email dwlawfirm@cableone.net

3
4

5

6
7
8

9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25

(I

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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1'
2

3

4
5

6

d&TTYI~

JONATHAN D. HALLY
CLARK and FEENEY
Attorneys for Defendants, Connie Taylor,
James Beck, and Corrine Beck
The Train Station, Suite 201
13th and Main Streets
P. 0. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208)743-9516
ISB#4979

PA·

0 WEEI<S

7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

B
9

10
11

12
13
14
15
16

17

18
19

20

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Idaho~

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an Idaho)
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE)
TAYLOR, individually and the community)
property comprised thereof; BRYAN FREEMAN>)
a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS, a single)
person; CROP USA INSURANCE AGENCY>)
fNC., an Idaho Corporation; and JAMES BECK)
and CORRINE BECK, individually and the)
community property comprised thereof,
)
)
Defendants.
)
CONNIE W. TAYLOR and JAMES BECK,
Counterclaimants,

21

vs.
22

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
23
24

ct
;,,

.:!,

)
)
)
)

Counterdefendant.

Case No. CV-07-00208
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

25
26

MEMO IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

EXHIBITH

000334

INTRODUCTION
1

2

Defendants/Counterclaimants Connie Taylor and James Beck became members of the
Board of Directors for AIA Services in April 2007 and were subsequently named as Defendants

3 in the above-entitled lawsuit.

The lawsuit, in turn, stems from a redemption agreement entered

4

into between Reed Taylor and AJA Services.

5

Services") redeemed Reed Taylor's shares of AIA Services Common Stock. As part of the

6

In 1995, AIA Services Corporation ("AJA

redemption, the parties entered into a Stock Redemption Agreement and other related

7

agreements. The Redemption and related agreements were later modified. At the time the 1995
8

9

Agreements were entered into, AIA Services was in poor financial condition and held no capital

10 surplus. Accordingly, the 1995 Redemption Agreement was illegal and, therefore, void and

•
.
.

11

unenforceable since it was in violation of former Idaho Code Section 30-1-46 unless the

12

purchase was from a corporation's capital surplus.

13
14

These Defendants/Counterclaimants seek partial summary judgment, requesting this
Court rule that the 1995 Redemption Agreement and related agreements as well as all

15

modifications thereto are illegal as a matter of law.
16

FACTS

17

18

Reed Taylor was the founder and majority shareholder of AIA Services.

19 Amended

Complaint,~

See Fifth

2.10. As of 1995, Reed was serving as the president of AIA Services,

2 O and was on its Board of Directors. Thus, Reed had intimate knowledge of the financial state of

21
22

the company and he had access to AIA Service's financial statements.

In his capacity as

president and member of AIA's Board of Directors, Reed owed fiduciary duties to AIA Services.

23

AIA Services' consolidated financial statements establish that AIA Services was experiencing
24
25

financial difficulty in I 994 and 1995. See Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Connie Taylor filed
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concurrently herewith.

As of December 31, 1994, AJA Services had net assets of only

$1,050,727. Id. at pp. 3-4.
1

2

On July 22, 1995, in the midst of these financial difficulties, AIA Services and Reed

3

Taylor entered into a Stock Redemption Agreement, through which AIA Services redeemed

4

Reed's 613,494 shares of AIA Services Common Stock.

5

previously filed with the court. Under the terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement, Reed was

6

Redemption Agreement has been

to receive, among other things, (a) $1,500,000 payable by cashier's check at closing (the "Down

7

Payment Note"); (b) $6,000,000 payable pursuant to the terms of a promissory note (the
8
9
10

"$6,000,000 Note");and (c) elimination of approximately $570,000 in debt that Reed owed to
AIA Services's debt to AlA Services.

11

As of December 31, 1995, after entering into the Stock Redemption Agreement, AIA

12

Services' total liabilities (including its liability to Reed Taylor) exceeded its total assets by over

13

$15 million. See id, Ex. A, pp. 3-4.

14

As set forth in detail below, AIA Services did not have any capital surplus to redeem

15

Reed Taylor's common stock in AJA Services. Instead, AIA Services was operating under a
16

17

deficit, and increased that deficit when it redeemed Reed Taylor's common shares.

This

18

redemption of Reed Taylor's shares when AIA Services did not have any capital surplus was in

19

direct violation of an Idaho statute restricting corporations from purchasing their own stock.

2O

Thus, the entire transaction was illegal and void.

21

22

The illegality of the Stock Redemption

Agreement makes the related $6,000,000 Note unenforceable.

STAND ARD OF REVIEW

23

Under Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may be granted summary
24
25
26

judgment as a matter of law if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with
MEMO IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

3
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83601

000336

Cl

the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Yoakum v.

'

'

1

Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 129 Idaho 171, 175, 923 P.2d 416; 420 (1996). The record,

2

however, must be construed in the light most favorable to the nonrnoving party drawing all

3

inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Yoakum, 129 Idaho at 175, 923 P.2d at 420.

4

On a motion for summary judgment, the burden is upon the moving party to prove the

5

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Once the party moving for summary judgment

6

establishes an absence of genuine issue, the burden shifts to the norunoving party to make a

7

showing of the existence of a genuine issue of material . fact on elements challenged by the
B
9

moving party. State v. Shama Resources Ltd. Partnership, 127 Idaho 267, 270, 899 P.2d 977,

10

980 (1995). The nonrnoving party must respond to the sununa.ry judgment motion with specific

11

facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Bare assertions that an issue of fact exists, in face

12

of particular facts alleged by the movant, are not sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact.

13

Cates v. Albertson's Inc., 126 Idaho 1030, 1033, 895 P.2d 1223, 1226 (1995).

14

ARGUMENT

15

1.

The 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement Was Illegal as a Matter of Law.

16

17

The Idaho Code strictly limits the circumstances under which a corporation can

18

repurchase its own stock or make other distributions to shareholders. The statute in effect as of

19

1995 was Idaho Code § 30-1-46 (superseded in 1997 by Idaho Code § 30-1-640), which

20

provided in relevant part:

21
22

23
24

25
2 6.

The board of directors of a corporation may, from time to time, distribute to its
shareholders out of capital swplus of the corporation a portion of its assets, in
cash or property, subject to the following provisions:
(a) No such distribution shall be made at a time when the c01:poration is insolvent
or when such distribution would render the corporation insolvent.
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(d) No such distribution shall be made to the holders of any class of shares which
would reduce the remaining net assets of the corporation below the aggregate
preferential amount payable in event of involuntary liquidation to the holders of
shares having preferential rights to the assets of the corporation in the event of
liquidation.

.

1

2
3
4

Id

5

The courts in other states have consistently held statutes similar to former Idaho Code
6
7

§ 30-1-46 to prohibit a corporation from purchasing its own shares, except when such purchase

8

can be made from capital surplus. See, e.g.. Naples Awning & Glass, Inc. v. Cirou, 358 So.2d

9

211, 214 (Fla. App. 1978) ("We conclude that under the 1973 statute a stock purchase agreement

1 O which at time of execution would require payment of an amount for the stock in excess of the
11

corporation's 'surplus of its assets over its liabilities including capital' is void"); American

12

Heritage Inv. Corp. v. Illinois Nat. Bank of Springfield, 386 N.E.2d 905, 908-910 (Ill. App.
13
14
15

1979) (concluding that a stock redemption agreement was illegal and void because the stock
redemption agreement was in violation of a specific statute prohibiting the purchase of shares

16

when the corporation lacks sufficient capital surplus to do so); Baird v. McDaniel Printing Co.,

17

153 S.W.2d 135 (Tenn. App. 1941) (concluding that a promissory note executed in connection

18

with a stock redemption agreement in violation of a statute prohibiting a stock redemption

19

without sufficient capital surplus was void and unenforceable, and holding that the corporation

20

was entitled tO recover the amount already paid pursuant to the promissory note); McGinley v.
21

22

Massey, 71 Md.App. 352, 356, 525 A.2d 1076, 1078 (Md. App. 1987) (stock redemption

23

agreement unenforceable when the corporation was insolvent because "[s]uch contracts when

24

executed by a corporation are illegal and not merely ultra vires."); In re Trimble Co., 339 F.2d

25

838, 845 (3rd Cir. 1964) (stock redemption agreement is unenforceable where made in violation

26
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of a statute because it is "not merely ultra vires but illegal and void," and "[a]n illegal contract
may be defended against and avoided by any of the parties thereto") (citations omitted); Stevens
1
2

v. Boyes Hot Springs Co., 298 P. 508, 509 (Cal. App. 1931) (concluding that a promissory note

3

given in connection with an illegal stock redemption agreement is unenforceable and that the

4

corporation is entitled to the return of payments already made pursuant to the note).

5
6

Although there do not appear to be any Idaho .cases applying the statute in effect as_ of
1995, the common law prohibition against purchasing a corporation's shares when the

7

corporation is insolvent, or when such a purchase would render the corporation insolvent, has
8
9

been recognized on multiple occasions by the Idaho courts. See, e.g., La Voy Supply Co. v.

10

Young, 84 Idaho 120, 127, 369 P.2d 45, 49 (1962) ("Idaho follows the rule that an insolvent

11

corporation may not repurchase its stock."); White v. Lorimer's City Dye Works, 269 P. 90, 90

12

(Idaho 1928) ("A contract by a corporation to repurchase its capital stock is not enforceable

13

against the corporation while insolvent."); Brown v. T.B. Reed & Co., 174 P. 136, 138 (Idaho

14

1918) ("While there is a conflict in the authorities as to the capacity of a corporation to purchase

15

its own stock, the rule appears to be universal that such a purchase is void if made while the
16
17

corporation is insolvent.").

18

Notably, the rule in Idaho regarding a corporation's ability to purchase its stock from a

19

shareholder has changed several times. The Idaho cases cited above recite the common law rule

20

that a corporation cannot repurchase its stock while the corporation is insolvent. This ruie was

21
22

codified in 1979 by Idaho Code § 30-1-46, although stated in the more technical terms that a
corporation could only repurchase its shares "out of capital surplus of the corporation." In

23

addition to the capital surplus requirement, the repurchase could not be made "at a time when the
24

25
·1;.'!\t
:~.'.'•.·..':·•

(.

"

26

corporation is insolvent or when such distribution would render the corporation insolvent." Id.
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Then, in 1997, Idaho Code § 30-1-46 was superseded by Idaho Code § 30-1-640, which
1

2

eliminated the capital surplus requirement and adopted a solvency test.
In this case, the statute in effect as of 1995 applies. See In re Lake Country Investments,

3

255 B.R. 588, 600 (Bkrtcy. D. Idaho 2000) (applying the savings provision in LC. § 30-1-1703

4

to determine that former Idaho Code § 30-1-46 applies to a 1996 stock redemption agreement

5

because it was executed prior to the July 1, 1997 effective date of LC. § 30-1-640)1 Thus, the

6

Stock Redemption Agreement is void if AIA Services did not have $7,500,000 in capital

7

surplus2 in 1995 needed to redeem Reed's common stock.
8
9

It is indisputable that as of July 22, 1995, AIA Services did not have sufficient capital

10

surplus to redeem Reed Taylor's common stock. In fact, AIA Services did not have any capital

11

surplus and, instead, had a deficit. "Capital Surplus" is defined as ''the entire surplus of a

12

corporation other than its earned surplus." See former LC. § 30-l-2(m). "Surplus" is defined as

13
14

"the excess of the net assets of a corporation over its stated capital." Id. at 3 O- l-2(k). "Net
assets" is defined as "the amount by which the total assets of a corporation exceed the total debts

15
of the corporation." Id at 30-l-2(i). Thus, the "stated capital" is a component of the "net

16
17
18

assets.'' It is clear from AIA's audited Consolidated Financial Statements that AIA did not have
sufficient capital surplus to redeem Reed Taylor's common shares.

19

As of December 31, 1994, AIA had total assets of $6,052,465 and total liabilities of

20

$5,001,738. See Connie Taylor Aff., Ex. A, pp. 3-4. Thus, AIA services had a capital surplus

21

of less than $1,050,727. As of December 31, 1995, after redeeming Reed's common stock, AIA

22
23

1For the Court's convenience, copies of the applicable former and current statutes are attached
hereto as Exhibits 1 and 2.

24
25

ct

26

2For the technical definition of"capital surplus," see former Idaho Code§ 30-1-2, which is
attached hereto as Exhibit 3.
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had total assets of $3,342,152 and total liabilities of $18,655,370 (including the liability to

.

Reed). Id Thus, AIA had a negative capital surplus. As of December 31, 1996 (i.e., after the
1
2

1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement), AIA had total assets of $2,856,836 and total

3

liabilities of $16, 113, 178 (including the liability to Reed). Id at Ex. B, pp. 3-4. It is clear that at

4

no time between 1994 and 1996 did AJA services have sufficient capital surplus (if any at all)

5

with which to redeem Reed Taylor's shares as required by Idaho Code§ 30-1-46. Therefore, the

6

Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal as in violation of Idaho Code § 30-1-46.

7

A contract that is in violation of a statute or otherwise prohibited by law is illegal. Barry
8

9

v. Pacific West Const. Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 832, 103 P.3d 440, 445 (2004); See also l 7A Am.Jur.

10

2d Contracts Section 251 ( 1991 ). The law is well settled in Idaho that illegal contracts are void

11

and cannot be enforced. Barry v. Pacific West Const. Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 103 P.3d 440 (2004);

12

Zollinger v. Carrol, 137 Idaho 397, 49 P.3d 402 (2002); Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 944

13

P.2d 698 (1997); Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 924 P.2d 607 (1996). "A party to an illegal

14

contract cannot ask the Court to have his illegal objects carried out, as the law will not aid either

15

party to an illegal agreement but leaves the parties where it finds them. Quiring, 130 Idaho at
16
17

568, 944 P.2d at 703. "In Idaho a court may not only raise the issue of whether a contract is

18

illegal sua sponte, but it has a duty to raise the issue of illegality whether pled or otherwise at

19

any stage in the litigation stream." Hyta v. Finley, 137 Idaho 755, 758, 53 P.3d 338, 341

20

(2002)(intemal citations omitted.)

21

In Kunz v. Lobo Lodge, Inc., 133 Idaho 608, 611-12, 990 P.2d 1219, 1222-1223 (Ct.

22

App. 1999), the parties entered into a lease agreement for purposes of maintaining billboards in
23
24
25
26

violation of a city ordinance. When one party filed suit to enforce the lease agreement, the Court
dismissed the action, refusing to enforce an illegal contract.
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(

"[c]ontracts to do acts forbidden by law are void and cannot be enforced" because "a contract

'.'.:".

:-'4,~"

'·'~~

which is made for the purpose of furthering any matter or thing prohibited by statute ... is void."
1
2

Id at 611 (citations omitted).

"This rule applies to every contract which is founded on a

3

transaction malum in se, or which is prohibited by statute, on the ground of public policy." Id.

4

(citations omitted).

5

regardless of the ignorance of the parties. Id. ("[W]here a statute intends to prohibit an act, it

6

The court explained that illegal contract are always unenforceable,

must be held that its violation is illegal, without regard to the reason of the inhibition . . . or to

7

the ignorance of the parties as to the prohibiting statute."). The Court reiterated the rule of
8
9

unenforceability of an illegal contract as follows:
No principle of law is better settled than that a party to an illegal
contract cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal
objects carried out; . . . the law in short will not aid either party to
an illegal contract; it leaves the parties where it finds them. The
general rule is the same at law and in equity, and whether the
contract is executory or executed.

10
11

12

13
14

Id (quoting Hancock v. Elkington, 67 Idaho 542, 186 P.2d 494 (1947)). There is no material

15

issue of fact as to whether the Stock Redemption Agreement was in violation of I.C. § 30-1-46.

16

Therefore, a partial summary judgment order should be entered declari?1g that the Stock

17

Redemption Agreement was illegal, void and unenforceable.

18

2.

20

Defendants/Counterclaimants Seek Only A Partial Summary Judgment
Determination That The Stock Redemption Agreement is Illegal and
Unenforceable

21

In moving for partial summary judgment, the undersigned seek only a partial summary

22

judgment determination that the Stock Redemption Agreement is illegal and unenforceable. A

19

23

finding of illegality and unenforceability will lead to other issues to be addressed later, including

24

whether the 'entire transaction should or can be rescinded, requiring Reed Taylor to return all
25

26
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benefits received under the agreements and, in tum, have his stock returned, and other remedies

'

1

issues. Those issues should be resolved at a later time.

2

CONCLUSION

3
4

AJA Services did not have any capital surplus available to purchase Reed's common

5

stock. Thus, as a matter of law, the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement was an illegal contract

6

that is void and unenforceable. A summary judgment order should be entered finding that the

7

1995 Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal and that the related $6,000,000 Note is void and

8

unenforceable.
9

10

DATED THIS

g_ day of

April,

2008.

11
12

CLARK AND FEENEY

13
14

BY

15

JON
ND. HALLY, ATTORNEYS FOR
ONNIE W. TAYLOR, JAMES BECK AND
CORRINE BECK

16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24
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Gary D. Babbitt ISB No.. 1486
D . .John Ashby ISB No. 7228
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P .0.. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: (208) 344-6000
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829
Email: gdb@hteh. com
j ash@hteh com
Attorneys for AIA Services Corporation,
AIA Insurance, Inc , and CropUSA
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND TUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STAIE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

•

REED J TAYLOR, a single person,

)

vs.

)
)
)
)

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE IAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC , an Idaho
Corporation; and .JAMES BECK and
CORRINE BECK, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff;

Defendants .

Case No . CV-07-00208
MOTION TO AMEND AMENDED
ANSWER, AFFIRMATNE DEFENSES
AND COUNTERCLAIM TO FIFTH
AMENDED COMPLAINT

)
)
)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho )
corporation; and AIA INSURANCE, INC , an )
)

MOTION IO AMEND AMENDED ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND
COUNTERCLAIM TO FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT - 1

EXHIBIT I
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Idaho corporation,
Counterclaimants,
VS.

REED .J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Counterdefendant

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)

)
COME NOW the Defendants AJA Services Co1poration and AJA Inswance Inc., by and
through their counsel ofreco1d Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, and hereby respectfully
move this Cou1t for an 01der amending the Defendants' Answer and Counterclaims to Plaintiffs
Fifth Amended Complaint, and file a Second Amended Answer, Affumative Defenses, and
Counterclaims pu1suant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a-c) in the following particulars:
Defendants move the CoUit to enter its Order allowing the amendment of the Defendants'

•

Amended Answer to the Plaintiffs Fifth Amended Complaint by adding a Nineteenth Defense
and a Seventh Counterclaim which states:

NINETEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs claims against these Defendants are barred because the
1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, the 1996 Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement and the other related agreements are void
as in violation of former Idaho Code§ 30-1-46 (superseded in
1997 by Idaho Code§ 30-1-640). Idaho Code§ 30-1-46 provided
that a c01poration could redeem its shares (or make other
distributions) only out of the corporation's capital surplus . The
statute fwthe1 prohibited shar·eholder distributions "when the
co1poration is insolvent or when such distribution would render the
corporation insolvent "
At the time the parties entered into the 1995 Stock Redemption
Agreement, AIA Services did not have any capital surplus with
which to redeem Plaintiffs common stock, AIA had an
accumulated deficit, and/or said transaction rendered AIA Services
insolvent The 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, the 1996

.\• .· .
,
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•
.

Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement and the related
agreements are, therefore, illegal and void
The Court should decline to enforce the illegal and void
agreements, including the $6 Million Note In the alternative, the
agreements should be rescinded.

SEVENTH COUNTERCLAIM
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
1.

Reed J. Taylor was the founder and majority shareholder of AIA Services, Inc.

(Services),
2..

In 1994 and 1995 until July Reed J Taylor was the chief executive officer of

Services.
3.

•

Reed J. I aylor was also a member of the Board of Directors of Services in 1994

through 1996
4

In 1995 Reed J . Taylor executed a Stock Redemption Agreement and related

Agr·eements (1995 Agr·eements) for the purchase of all of Reed J.. Taylor's stock for over
$7,000,000 in cash, elimination of debt, and airplanes The 1995 Agreement was restructured in
1996 with the execution of a 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement and related
agr·eements (hereafter 1996 Agreement) . The 1995 Agr·eement and 1996 Agreement are
collectively referred to as the "Redemption Agr·eements . "
5..

In 1995 and 1996 Services did not have any capital surplus and was operating at a

6

Idaho Code 30-1-46 (in effect in 1995 and 1996) provided:

deficit

The board of directors of a corporation may, from time to time,
distribute to its shareholders out of capital surplus of the
corpozation a portion ofits assets, in cash or property, subject to
the following provisions:
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(a)
No such distribution shall be made at a time when the
corporation is insolvent or when such distribution would render the
comoration insolvent.
(d)
No such distribution shall be made to the holders of any
class of shares which would reduce the remaining net assets of the
corporation below the aggregate preferential amount payable in
event of involuntmy liquidation to the holders of shares having
preferential rights to the assets ofthe corporation in the event of
liquidation.
7..

The Redemption Agreements violate and contravene Idaho Code 30-1-46 then in

effect in 1995 and 1996.

8..

Defendants seek a declaratory judgment pursuant to l.C. 10-1201 et seq declaring

the Redemption Agreements void and unenforceable and/or the Redemption Agreements
rescinded
A true and correct copy of AIA Services Corporation's and AIA Insmance's Second
•

Amended Answer to Plaintiff's Fifth Amended Complaint, Counterclaim and Demand for Jury
Trial is attached as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Gary D. Babbitt filed herewith. The grounds for
this motion are that justice requires that Defendants be permitted to plead their defenses in
response to the Plaintiff's Fifth Amended Complaint Furthermore, the amendment will conform
to the proof that is contained in the exhibits which are of record before the Court at the present
time Fmthermore, the Defendants move the Court to enter· an order that the amended pleading
relate back to the time of filing the Complaint.
This motion is based upon the pleadings, the entire file of the Court and the affidavit filed
in support hereof A Notice of Hearing on this motion is being filed concurrently herewith
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DA TED THIS

-2.j_ day of April, 2008
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

c-·l.

'~~

Gary D. Babbitt ISB No. 1486
Attorneys for AIA Services Co1poration,
AIA Insurance, Inc . , and CropUSA

•

\.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day ofAptil, 2008, I caused to be se1ved a true
copy of the foregoing MOTION IO AMEND AMENDED ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES AND COUNTERCLA™ TO FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT by the method
indicated below, and add1essed to each of the following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

•

__ U S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Ove1night Mail
_ _ Telecopy
~Email

Dean Wullenwaber
WULLENWABER LAW FIRM
P . 0 Box452
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Ptepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail

David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A Gittins
P 0. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
[Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Pt·epaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
___iL"Email

Michael E. McNichols
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OFT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
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.........., . _. ,_,. __

ICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
UNTY OF NEZ PERCE
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV07-00208

)

v.

)
)
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho )

coiporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof,
BRIAN FRBEMAN, a single person; JOLEE
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC .• an Idaho
corporation; and JAMES BECK and
CORRINE BECK, individually and the
comm.unity property comprised thereof,

;
·}

l
~

Defendants.

~

)
)
)
)

)
)
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OPINION AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RULE S6(f) CONTINUANCE;
PLAINTIFF'S AND DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONS TO STRIKE EXPERT
AFFIDAVITS; DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT; lNTERVENOR'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

)
)

)
)
)
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4
"\
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CONNIE W. TAYLOR and JAMES BECK, )

I

'

.\

Counterclaimants,

v.
REED J. TAYLOR. a single person.
Counterdefendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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This matter is before the Court on: (1) Plaintiff's Motion for Rule S6(f) Continuance;
(2) Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Co.nnie Taylor, James Beck and

Corrine Beck; (3) Motion for ~nsideration filed by Intervenor 40l(k) Plan; and (4) various
Motions to Strike Expert Witness Affidavits. Defendants AIA Corporations, John Taylor and
Intervenor 401 (k) Plan filed joinder in the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. A hearing on
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was held on April 23, 2009 and a hearing on
Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 56(f) Continuance was held on May 14, 2009. Plaintiff Reed Taylor

was represented by attorneys Michael S. Bissell and Roderick C. Bond. Defendants AIA
Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. were represented by attorney Gary D. Babbitt.
Defendant R. John Taylor was represented by attorney Michael B. McNichols. Defendants
Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck were represented by attorney David R. Risley.
Defendants Jalee Duclos and Bryan Freeman were represented by attorney David A. Gittens.
Intervenor401(k) Profit ShaJ:ing Plan was represented by attorney Charles A. Brown. The
Court, having read the motions, briefs, and affidavits submitted by the parties, having considered
only those affidavits or portions thereof that are relevant and admissible, having heard oral
arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its Opinion.

FACTUALANDPROCEDlJRALBACK.GROYND
The above-entitled matter was filed January 29, 2007. Since its inception, this case has
regularly been before the Court on numerous motions filed by the parties. As a result, the
underlying facts of the case have been articulated by the Court in several written Opinions over
the course of the proceedings. Therefore, rather than repeat facts already articulated in prior
opinions, the Court will note only those facts specifically relevant to the motions to be decided.

TaylOI' ,,, AU ct al.
Opinion & Order on :Plaintiff's Rule S6(f) Motion
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In March 1995, Resolutions 2.1 and 2.2, adopting and approving the purchase of AIA
shares owned by Reed Taylor were passed by a majority of AT.A shareholders. 1 The payment
tenns included a $1.5 million promissory note payable in July 1996 and a $6 million promissory
2

note payable in 2005. By July 1995, negotiations reached final agreement and on July 18, 1995,
a majority vote approved the purchase ofReed Taylor's 613,494 shares and Agreement
documents were executed July 22, 1995.3 However, by April 1996, AIA was in default on
several terms relative to the stock redemption agreement.4 After some negotiations, the payment

tenns were restructured and, on July 1, 1996, a Stock Redemption Restructuring Agreement was
executed.
It is the non-payment of the $6 million Promissory Note, along with other terms in the
1995 agreement and 1996 restructured payment terms, that resulted in the filing of the aboveentitled lawsuit. Defendants now assert the redemption of Reed Taylor's AIA shares in 1995

was an illegal and unenforceable agreement.
!Al PLAINTIFF'S RULE 57ffi MOTION
The decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance is within the solUld discretion of
the court and will not be disturbed absent the showing of an abuse of discretion. Gunter v.

Murphy's Lounge, LLC., 141 Idaho 16, 105 P.3d 676 (2005). Plaintiff seeks a continuance
pursuant to l.R.C.P. 56(f), which reads:

Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a

1 See Bxbibit A to the Affidavit of JoLee Duclos filed December 29, 2008

[Bates stamp AIA0025233 and
AIA0025241 -AIA002S242].
2
Numerous other terms were included ln the agreement but are not relevant to thls analysis.
3
See Exhibit B to the Affidavit of JoLee Duclos filed December 29, 2008 [Bates stamp AIA002SS07 and
AIA002S516 -AIA002S.5 l 7].
4
See Exlubit I to the Affidavit of JoLee Duclos tiled December 29, 2008.
Taylor"· .4U et al.
Opinion & Order on Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) Motion
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continuance to permit affidavit.s to be obtained or depositions to be taken or
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
Defendants' pending motion asserts the 1995 agreement between Plaintiff Reed Taylor
and AIA was unlawful as it violated then existing statutory law. Plaintiff contends that before he
can sufficiently defend against Defendants' assertion, he needs to conduct additional discovery.
Since the inception of this case more than two years ago, Plaintiff has aggressively conducted
discovery and, by his own admission, has obtained boxes and boxes of documents relative to the
issues raised in his Complaint, although still not all the discovery requested. The Court
recogniies Defendants' motion brings into question the financial status of AIA as it existed in
l 99S. However, Defendants' motion was filed in April 2008, more than one year ago, during
which time discovery has been ongoing. s Plaintiff has failed to direct the Court to any particular
information or document relevant to the 1995 financial status of AIA that has been denied to him
through the discovery process. Plaintiff merely contends in general, without any specificity, that
the Defendants are likely hiding i:aforma.tion even though the record indicates Defendant A1A
has provided Plaintiff with reasonable opportunity to inspect all 1995 and 1996 financial

information still within the possession of AIA.6
Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden as required by Rule 56(f). His request for a
continuance in order to conduct additional discovery is based on mere speculation and on
presumptions unsupported by fact or law, despite Plaintiff's voluminous tilings. Discovery in
the instant matter has been actively and aggressively conducted by the Plaintiff since the filing of

the Complaint over two years ago and during the year since Defendants filed their motion for
I

i

..1
l

partial summary judgment. Plaintiffhas provided the Court with no reasonable basis to believe
5

In January 2009, the Court entered an order limiting discovery to the Summary Judgment issues pending hearing
and decision on the motion.
6
Bxhibit l to the Afiidavit of Rod Bond in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Rule S6(t) Continuance, filed April 22,
200!).
Taylor v. AU, et aL
Opinion & Order on Plaintitrs Ruic S6(f) Motion
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additional discovery will produce new or relevant infonnation not previously disclosed and such
discovery would only come at substantial additional cost to all parties with attendant delay in
pending proceedings. Therefore, the Court denies Plainti:tfs motion for continuance pursuant to
Rule S6(f).
CB> MOTIONS TO STRIKE EXPERT AFFIDAVIIS
Plaintiff's Motion to Strike seeks to strike in its entirety the Expert Witness Affidavit of
Drew Voth filed by Intervenor AIA 40 l (K) Plan and the Expert Witness Affidavit of Kenneth
Hooper filed by Defendants/Counterclaimants Connie Taylor and James Beck. Intervenor
401 (K) Plan filed a Motion to Strike portions of the Expert Witness Affidavit of Paul Pederson
filed by Plaintiff. The Court.finds there are inadmissible statements in each of the Affidavits

filed in support of and in opposition to the respective motions for Partial Summary Judgment.
The Court will, therefore, disregard those portions of the Affidavits it finds inadmissible and will

consider only those portions it finds admissible.
(C) DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY ruDOMBNT

Under I.R.C.P. S6(c), summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings. depositions, and admissions on tile, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 11 The party seeking
summary judgment faces the burden of proving the absence of material facts
Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994), but if "a party
moves for summary judgment on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact
exists with regard to an element of the non-moving party's case, the non-moving
party must establish the existence of an issue of fact regarding that element."
Farm Credit Banlc ofSpokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 273, 869 P.2d 1365,
1368 (1994). In other words, the non-moving party must "make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id (internal quotations
omitted).
Moreover, the non-moving party cannot withstand summary judgment when
there is only a "slight doubt as to the facts," as "there must be sufficient evidence
upon which a jury could reasonably return a verdict resisting the motion."
TiZJ!l°' v. ..4.IA, tt al.
Opinion & Order on Plaintlft's lute 5d(:f) Motion
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Ha1pols v. State, 131Idaho437, 439, 958 P.2d 594, 596 (1998). Finally, "[a]ll
disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party and
all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn
favor oftb.e non-moving party." Bear Island Watet Association, Inc. v. Brown,
125 Idaho 717, 721, 874 P.2d 528, 532 (1994).

in

BMC West Corporation v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 890, 893, 174 P.3d 399 (2007).
In April 2008, Defendants Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck filed a Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment, asserting the 1995 stock redemption agreement and 1996 stock
redemption restructure agreement between Reed Taylor and AIA were unlawful as the agreement
violated l.C. § 30~1-6 as it existed in 1995and19967• However, due to the extremely
contentious nature of this case, the motion remained pending while a number of other motions

I'
·i
J

'

t

l

were addressed by the Court, including a motion to intervene tiled by the AIA 401{k) Profit
Sharing Plan(" 40l(k) Plan''). The Court granted the 40l(k) Plan's motion to inteivene and.

thereafter, Defendants AIA, John Taylor, and the 401(k) Plan filed Joinder in the Motion for
Partial SlllllilWY Judgment. Extensive briefing and affidavits were filed by the parties and,

approximately one year after filing. the Defendants' motion was heard by the Court.
In 1995, l.C. § 30-1-6 read in relevant part:

A corporation shall have the right to purchase, take, receive or otherwise
acquire, hold, own, pledge, transfer or otherwise dispose of its own shares, but
purchases of its own shares, whether direct or indirect, shall be made only to the
extent of unreserved and unres1rlcted earned S'Ulplus available therefore, and, if
the articles of incorporation so permit or with the affirmative vote of the holders
of a majority of all shares entitled to vote thereon, to the extent of unreserved and
unrestricted capital surplus available therefore.

No purchase of or payment for its own shares shall be made at a time when the
corporation is insolvent or when such purchase or payment would make it
insolvent.

J
·l

-1

·j

Idaho Code § 30-1-6 (1995).

·1
~~
I

''

7

Idaho Code§ 30-1-6 was repealed in 1997.

.(

:li

Tayl01' v. AJA, "' aL
Opinion & Order on Plaintiff's Rule S6(t) Motion
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The Defendants' motion, along with Plaintiff's opposition, place but two questions before
the Court: (1) In 1995 and 1996, did AlA have earned surplus to the extent of the stock purchase
agreement between Reed Taylor and AIA and, (2) if there was insufficient earned surplus, was
there an a:ffinnative vote of the majority shareholders to use capital surplus for the stock
purchase to th.e extent that capital smplus was available. Ji the answer to both questions is no,
then the 1995 stock purchase agreement and the 1996 restructured agreement entered into

between Reed Taylor andAIA violated l.C. § 30-1-6 as itthen existed.8
The illegality of a contract [ ] can be raised at any stage in litigation. The Court
has the duty to raise the issue of illegality sua sponte. Morrison v. Young, 136

Idaho 316, 318, 32P.3d1116, 1118 (2001); Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560,
566, 944 P.2d 695, 701 (1997). Whether a contract is illegal is a question of law
for the court to determine :from all the facts and circumstances of each case.
Morrison, 136 Idaho at 318, 32 P.3d at 1118; Q1.1iring, 130 Idaho at 566, 944
P.2d at 701 (citing Stearns v. Williams, 72 ldaho 276, 283, 240 P.2d 833. 840
(1952)). NJ. illegal contract is one that rests on illegal consideration consisting
of any act or forbearance which is contrary to law or public policy. Quiring, 130
Idaho at 566, 944 P.2d at 701 (citations omitted). The general rule is that a
contract prohibited by law is illegal and unenforceable. Jd.; Williams v. Cont'/
Life & Acc. Co., 100 Idaho 71, 73, 593 P.2d 708, 710 (1979); Whitney v. Cont'/
Life and Acc. Co.• 89 Idaho 96, 105, 403 P.2d 573, 579 (1965). A contract
"which is made for the purpose of .furthering any matter or thing prohibited by
statute ... is void. 11 Kunz v. Lobo Lodge, Inc., 133 Idaho 608, 611, 990 P.2d
1219, 1222 (CtApp.1999) (quoting Porter v. Canyon County Farmers' Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 45 Idaho 522, 525, 263 P. 632, 633 (1928)). This rule applies on
the ground of public policy to every contract which is founded on a transaction
prohibited by statute. Id. (citing Porter, 45 Idaho at 525, 263 P. 632, 633 (1928)
(citations omitted)). The Idaho Court of Appeals has suggested that "where a
statute intends to prob.t'bit an act, it must be held that its violation is illegal,
without regard to the reason of the inhibition ... or to the ignorance of the parties
as to the prohibiting statute." Id. (quoting 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 251
(1991)).

Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6-7, 56 P.3d 765 (2002).

1

AIA's 1996 financial status was discussed in briefing and in discovery requests. Owing oral arguments, howcvet,
counsel for the parties treated the 1995 financial. status of AIA as key to vvhcther the stock redemption violated LC.
§ 30-1.6. lhe Court agrees that it is the 1995 financial fieures Thai: are critical to the analysis, as the 1996
restructming of the a;reement did not involve the redemption of any additional shares, but rather was morcly a
restructming of payment tenns for the redemption that had already occurred in 1995.
Ta:ylr»"V. A/A, "al.
Opinion & Orde.r on Plaintift"s Rule S6(1) Motion
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Defendants and Plaintiff employed the assistance of experts· to review audited financial
statements and address the eamed suiplus question raised by Defendants' motion. Plaintiff filed
the affidavit of accountant Paul Pederson. Defendants Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine

Beck filed the affidavit of accountant Kenneth Hooper. The 401 (k) Plan filed the affidavit of
accountant Drew Voth. Without exception, each of the accountants, including Plaintiff's ex.pert,
found Al.A had no earned surplus in the years 1995 and 1996, but instead had an earned deficit
During oral arguments, counsel for Plaintiff conceded that the earned surplus numbers for AIA

in 1995 and 1996 were in the negative and that no amount of accounting adjustment of numbers
would tum the eamed deficit into an earned surplus sufficient to cover the $7.S million debt
incurred to Reed Taylor. Nevertheless, Plaintiff's counsel argued that the language of the statute
requires the Court to look not only at earned surplus in 1995 but also at the 1995 capital surplus.
The portion ofl.C. § 30-1-6 that limits a coxporation's redemption of its own shares
based on its eamed smplus or capital surplus is an issue of first impression in ldaho.9 It is
Plaintiff's position that when the majority of shareholders voted in favor of purchasing Reed
Taylor's AIA shares pursuant to the negotiated agreement, that vote constituted an affirmative
vote to draw on capital surplus in addition to earned surplus for the purchase. The Court finds
Plaintiff's reading of the statute overly broad and inconsistent with statutory construction. The
relevant portions of the statute read:
A corporation shall have the right to purchase ... its own shares ... to the extent
of ... earned surplus available ... and, with the affirmative vote of the holders
of a majority of all shares entitled to vote, ... to the extent of ... capital surplus
available

9

Idaho's Supreme Court has previously addressed the .impact of I.C. § .3 0-1.fi where a coxporation was insolvent at
the time it redeemed its own shares, but the limitation based on earned SUiplus or capital surplus has not been
previously addressed by Idaho's Appellate Courts.
Taylor v. AU et al.
Opinion & Order on Plainilif's R.ule Sei(f) Motion
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If, under the statute, a mere affirmative vote to purchase shares als·o meant the shares
could be purchased to the extent of earned stUplus and capital sUiplus, the statute ~uld not have
distinguished the two sources, but would have merely stated that a co:iporation may purchase its
own shares to the extent of earned and capital surplus. However, it is not so worded. Under the
language ofl.C, § 30-1-6, the Court finds that, in order for a corporation to draw upon its capital
surplus to purchase its own shares, a majority of shares entitled to vote must affinnatively vote
not only to purchase the shares, but must specifically authorize the use of capital surplus for the
purchase. Plaintiff, despite being the majority shareholder at the time, has provided no evidence

that such a vote was taken and, as a result, has produced no evidence that there was an
a:ffirmative vote to draw on capital surplus for the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. Neither
the approved resolutions nor the agreements themselves identified earned surplus or capital
surplus as the source of funds for the redemption of the shares.
The Court can reach but one result- the 1995 stock redemption agreement entered into
between Reed Taylor and AIA violated I.e. § 30-1-6 as it existed in 1995 and, therefore, the
contract between the parties is illegal and unenforceable. Plaintiff, however, contends that, even
if the Court finds the 1995 contract illegal, it should find it enforceable.
Plaintiff first asserts that all of the Defendants, as well as the Intervenor 401(lc) Plan,
lack standing to assert an illegality defense. It is generally accepted that "stock repurchase
statutes are designed to protect creditors and minority stockholders from corporate
mismanagement ofassets." 10 Minnelusa Companyv. A.G. Andrikopoulos, 929 P.2d 1321, 1323
(Colo.1996), Because neither the 401 (k) Plan nor any of the Defendants were a creditor of AIA
when the agre~ment was entered into, standing to challenie the legality of the contract is
10

On page 9 of the Intervenor 40 l(lc) Plan's Supplemental Brief in Support of Motton to Intervene filed December
29, 2008, tho Plan noted its understandiDg that stock repll{Chase statutes are designed to protect creditors and
minority stockholders.
Taylor v. AU. et al.
Opinion &. Order on Plaintiff's :Rule 56(f) Motion
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contingent upon being a shareholder when the contract was entered into. The 401(k) Plan, by its
own admission. was not a stockholder until Mareh 1996 when AIA exchanged $565,000.00 of
401 (k) Plan funds for AIA Preferred C Stock. 11 The Plan, therefore, is without standing to assert
an illegality defense to an agreement entered into before the Plan was a shareholder. 12
Defendants James and Corrine Beck are also with.out standing to assert the defense as there is no
evidence in the record that the Becks were shareholders at the time of the agreement. 13 Under
the law in Idaho, AIA is also without standing to assert the defense. "A corporation itself cannot
have a stock repurchase declared illegal .... '' La Voy Supply Company v. Young, 84 Idaho 120,
127, 369 P.2d 4S (1962). Lastly, Connie Taylor and John Taylor are without standing. At the
time the stock redemption agreement was entered into, Connie Taylor and John Taylor were
husband and wife and owned shares as community property. John Taylor, as a board member of

AJA in 1995, was intimately involved in the negotiations to redeem Reed Taylor's shares and
voted, for the community, in the affirmative on the question of whether AIA should enter into the
1995 st.ock redemption agreement 14 Shareholders who consent and approve of a corporation's
redemption of shares cannot be beard to complain of the purchase. La Voy Supply Company v.

Young, 84 Idaho 120, 127, 369 P.2d 45 (1962).
The Court, having found those asserting the illegality defense to be without standing to
assert the defense, must now determine the impact, if any, that I.e. § 30-1-6 has on the aboveentitled matter. In 2002, quoting from its earlier opinion in Qutrtng v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560,
11
Pa.,e11 ofJnte111enor's Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion to Intervene filed December 29, 2008 and
Exhibit I to the Affidavit of 1olee K. Duclos in Support of Supplemental Brief re; Motion to Intervene tiled
December 29, 2008.
12
The Court is not persuaded by the 40 l(k) Plan's SJ1U¥1ent that it ha.s standing because it was a shareholder In
1996 when the payment tenns of the 1995 ap-eement WBJe restructured.
13 The parties agree that the Becks' conditioned their purchase of AJA shares on the redemption of Reed Taylor>s
shares occurrlng first
14 Tb.ere is no dispute that Comrie Taylor and John Taylor were husband and wife in 1995, held AlA shares as
community property and that John Taylor voted the community shares in the affirmative to redeem R.eed Taylor's

shares.

Taylor 'II. AU st al.
Opinion & Order on Plaintiff's Rule S6(f) Motion
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944 P.2d 695 (1997), Idaho's Supreme Court unambiguously stated that a court in Idaho has a
duty to raise the issue of illegality at any stage of the litigation regardless of whether it is pled.
Hyta v. Finley, 137 Idaho 755, 757-758, 53 P.3d 338 (2002). This Court cannot simply ignore
the knowledge it now possesses. In 1995, when AJA redeemed the shares owned by Reed Taylor
it did so in violation of LC. § 30-1-6. "A contract prohibited by law is illegal and hence
unenforceable,» Quiring, 130 Idaho at 566, citing Miller, 129 Idaho at 351. Of the exceptions
to the illegality doctrine recognized by Idaho's appellate courts, only one is relevant to the

instant matter.
Courts on occasion, however, apply an exception to the illegality doctrine where
both parties concur in the illegal act, but the parties are not equally at fault by
reason of that fact that one party commits fraud, or th.ere is duress, oppression, or
undue influence over the other. See, e.g., Nat'/ Bank & Loan Co. v. Petrie, 189
U.S. 423, 23 S.Ct. 512, 47 L.Ed. 879 (1903) (agreement induced by fraud); In re
Resorts lnt'l, Inc., 181F.3d505, 512 (3rd Cir.1999); Singleton v. Foreman, 435
F.2d 962, 969 (5th Cir.1970); Gorringe v. Reed~ 23 Utah 120, 63 P. 902, 905-06
(1901). In such a situation the courts have allowed the less guilty party to
recover. Some courts that have adopted this exception foeus on the existence or
nonexistence of confidential relations between the parties. See Novak v. Nowak,
216 lnd. 673, 25 N.E.2d 993 (1940); Rogers v. Samples, 207 Ky. 150, 268 S.W.
799 (1925).

Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 9, 56P.3d 765 (2002).
In the instant matter, while Plaintiff has asserted claims for fraud in the management of
AIA over the thirteen plus years since his shares were redeemed, he has not asserted any fraud,
duress, oppression or undue influence relative to the negotiations or events that resulted in
Plaintiff and AlA entering into the stock redemption agreement or the subsequent restructuring.
Plaintiff was the founder of AIA, was intimately familiar with the company, knew or should
have known its financial status, and was represented by counsel during the negotiations that
resulted in the stock redemption agreement It cannot be said that Plaintiff was less sophisticated
than others involved in the negotiations or was at any disadvantage that would rise to the level of
Taylor v. AL4. et al.
Opinion&: Order on PlaintUf's Rule S6(f) Motion
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fraud on the part of the other parties to the agreement. is Therefore, under the current law in
Idaho, the Court is unable to .find any exception to the illegality doctrine that can be applied to

the case at hand. If the fraud exception is to be expanded, or if additional exceptions are to be
carved out, that must be done by a higher court, not by this one.
Next, Plaintiff asserts any claim based on the illegality doctrine is barred by the statute of

limitatiom. The Court is not persuaded. A con1ract that is illegal is unenforceable and a court
must leave the parties where it finds them. Id. The Court recognizes the inherent inequity that

results when parties wait over thirteen years to challenge the legality of an agreement, remaining
silent as long as a benefit is flowing to them and becoming 'righteous' only when it comes time
to pay the consideration promised, and after a court has round the promissory note portion of the
agreement in default. Nevertheless, the passage of time alone does not alter the character of a
contract that is illegal and unenforceable into one that is enforceable.

Finally, Plaintiff contends the Court should apply rules of equity to enforce the
agreement. "If a contract is illegal and void, the court will leave the parties as it finds them and
refuse to enforce the contract. The contract cannot be treated as valid by invoking waiver or
estoppel.,, Wernecke v. St. Maries Jotnt School District, 2009 WL 982690 (April 14, 2009).
Equity is reserved to those who have clean hands. Kirkman v. Stoker, 134 Idaho 541, 6 P.3d 397
(2000). Given.the pre and post litigation conduct of the most heavily invested parties, it is
difficult to identify any party with totally clean hands. Plaintiff has not, however, shown any
party acted with unclean hands in the negotiations and agreement that resulted in the redemption

15

Plaintiff relies heavlly on an August lS, 1995 opinion letter from Richard Riley, an attorney then with the Boise
law firm of Eberle, Berlin, Kading. Turnbow and McKlveen, Chartered, who acted as general counsel for AJA in
connection with the stock redemption agreement between AlA and Reed Taylor. Jn his letter, attorney Riley offered
the opinion that the stock redemption agreement "did not conflict with or violate . . law, rule or regulation" without
making specific reference to or discussing I.C. § 30-1-6. Seo Bxhlbit 6 to the Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond filed
April 22, 2009. By this ruling today, the Court finds the attorney opinion incorrect.
Tay/"' v. AIA., at at.
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of Plaintift's AJA shares. The agreement was reached only after extensive negotiations
involving a number of attorneys, including counsel representing Plaintiff, and there has been no
showing that Plaintiff sold his shares other than voluntarily. There is no question that all parties,

including Plaintif(, either ignored or failed to consider I.C. § 30-lw6. There is also no reason to
doubt that all parties, including the Plaintiff, sought to benefit from the business agreement. That
is simply the free market system at work and is not, without more, evidence of unclean hands.

The Court has considered all the arguments put forth by Plaintiff in his briefing and oral

arguments. However, except for those arguments discussed above, the Court will not address
any additional arguments as the Court finds they are irrelevant to the issue or have become moot
given the above analysis.
ID) INTERYENOR'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER PRIOR RULING

The illegality doctrine requires a court to leave the parties where a court finds them. For
that reason, Intervenor's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's ruling on the promissory note

is denied and the Court 1s previous analysis stands, The ruling therefore remains, for what it may
be worth, even if only as an issue on appeal.

CONCLUSION

The Defendants and Intervenor are without standing to assert the illegality doctrine
relative to the 1995 stock redemption agreement between Plaintiff Reed Taylor and AIA.

However, it is the duty of the Court to address the illegality of the agreement once the Court has
knowledge that such illegality may exist. In 1995, Idaho Code prohibited a corporation from

purchasing its own shares unless the corporation had earned surplus to the extent of the purchase
or, upon the affirmative vote of a majority of shareholders, the co1poration had capital SUiplus or

TaplOI' v. AJ.4., 1t al.
Opinion & Order on Plaintiff's Ruic 56(f) Mo~on
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a combination of earned surplus and capital surplus to the extent of the purchase. In 1995, the
earned surplus of AIA was in the negative and there has been no evidence presented to the Court

that there was an affirmative vote of the majority of shareholders that capital surplus could be
looked to for the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. Therefore, the 1995 stock redemption
agreement was entered in violation of Idaho code, making the agreement illegal and
unenforceable. Following the law in Idaho, the Court must apply the illegality doctrine, denying
enforcement of the contract and leaving the parties where the Court finds them.
Being acutely aware of the complexities of this case and the significant impact of this
ruling on Plaintiff's claims, the Court would entertain a request for Rule 54 certification.

ORDER
The Motion for Rule 56(£) Continuance filed by Plaintiff is hereby DENIED.

Motions to Strike Expert Affidavits are hereby DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.
The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Coxmie Taylor, James
Beek and Corrine Beck is hereby GRANTED.
The Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's prior ruling on the promissory notei filed
by Intervenor 40l{k) Plan, is hereby DENIED.

Dllled this

Taylor v. .4JA, •t al
Opinion & Order on PlaJntiff' s Rule '6{f) Motion
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)
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BRIAN FREEMAN, a sin&ie person; JOLEE
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA
lNSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho
corporation; and JAMES BECK and
CORRINE BECK, individually and the:
community property comprised thereo~
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This 111Atter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and
Clarification of the Court's Orant of Partial Summary Judgment, Clarification of Ruling on
Motions to Strike, Alternative Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification, Motion for Order to Protect
Property and Motion to Stay. A hearing on the Motion was held on July 23, 2009. Plaintiff
Reed Taylor was represented by attomcy Rodericlc C. Bond. Defendants AIA Services

Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc, were represented by attorney Gary D. Babbitt. Defendant
R. John Taylor was represented by attorney Michael E. McNichols. Defendants Connie Taylor,
James Beck and Conine Beck were represented by attorney David R. Risley. Defendants Jolee
Duclos and Bzyan Freeman we.re represented by attorney David A. Gittens. Intervenor 401 (le)
Profit Shazing Plan was represented by attomey Charles A. Brown. The Court, having read the
motion, briefs, and affidavits submitted by the parties, having heard oral arguments of counsel
and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its Opinion.

BACKGROUND
In 1995, Reed Taylor and AIA Coxporation entered into a stock redemption agreement

wherein AIA purchased all of Reed Taylor's stock in the corporation. Reed, as the founder of
the corporation, was the majority stockholder. The stock redemption agreement included a
number of tenns, among them that Reed Taylor would receive a SS million promissory note
payable in ten (1 O) years. The agreement was restructured in 1996 for reasons not relevant to the
instant analysis. Approximately three years after the promissory note was due but remained
unpaid, Reed Taylor brought the above-entitled action. To date, numerous motions have been
brought before the Court in the matter, including a motion for partial summary judgment filed by
Defendants Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beek, joined by the remaining Defendants.
Ttzylor v. AU er al.
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The Muliun 1:1:111c!'ted tile 1995 Agreement was 'tm.lawtW. and therefore uncmforlll!abk 1W.llar tl.le
illeplity doctJinc, u tM npement violated I.e. § 30-1-6 aa it existed in 1995. In June 2009,

1bi11 CourL ~awlw .L>ef'eudauts' partial summary jl1dgmenr mnr:inn. The CuurL fulWll uo.iie of the

Demndants had ~to 111lse me tllegality duc1Ji11.c but 1J1at. under Id~ we law, the Court
had n duty tn rntr.e and ~116 tbe issue .rua spontt =cl to dctcrmiM wfiet.het" the apmnent ·wu

tnLcn:'1 it1 oo.w:ravcntiou of Idaho Code, 1CJldcrlng it mw!i.tl 1111ll LM1.e1Jlorcnbl~. Pldntiffrww
JXtows tho Court tn reconsider its ru.li?ll·

ST.A.NT>ABD ON MUIIUN lfOkBECQNSIPE~

A muliuu fw· 111Cousidcration pu:sumt 1o I.R.C.J>. 11(o.)(2)(B) allows the inoving party to
bJ·jug new facts to the attention of the courl, buL Lluos .iiot c~ the motion to inr.l11tl"' new facts.
"In onr \iew. tb c:~c: h&w applying Rule 1l (a)(2)(B) per1"irR n rartY to pnmml .uow evidence

wlMW a .010ticn is brought tmder Tllnt nile, hut doetl nul r•l/Uifl that~ motion be accompnnied

by new t.Vil'IP.nce." .TnhnJun v. Lambros, ·143 Idaho 468, 472, 147 P3d 100 (C~.App.lUUfJ). lf

new fw.:IK aie tb.e basil of the motion, it is thL'l lmTden nfthe moving plrly to direct the counto
any new facts the moVDD.t cuntlwl.lli wa.1:~w l'cconaide:ration of'thc co11n' An1ling.

lAJn order granting summary judement is an inLcrlwutoiy order and subject to
rccoosi.deratian pum111nt tn T.R.C.P. ll(a)(J)(li). Idaho Ftrrt Narl. Banh. Dn.vtd
Steed & .Amin.,., 121 ldahu 3S6, 361, 825 P.2cl 79. 84 (1992). Sc.-.('.i:md, when
rcvJew1ng a muli1JI& !Ur .reconsidcratioa. the distr!et eourt. "shauld tikil inlu
.accuunL iw,y ucw facm prcscmed by the mo'fing pony tmat bettt un Iha co1'JeCtl•••
of the interlocutory ordtt. The butdf.Tl i~ on the muvil.lg p~ to brin~ the trial
,w,rt1s attention to tlie new facts." Caaur d~411n1 Mtnlng Co. "II. Jrtm Nari. Rank,
118 Jdnho R12, 823, 800 P.2d 102G. 1037 (1990); .r•1 also Dm>id .r:t~d &
"41uL·11., lnu., 121 ldaho at ;)61, 825 I' .2d 11t 84 (nfo.1 onurt diould b.va
cu&.lder:ed lffidavi.t submitted. with molion for 1tti::unmdclaticiliJ.
J'ucl:t.ttv.

Vt.r.t~

144Td:!ho161, 166, lSK .l'.3d9'.37 (2007).
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ANALYSIS

(A) PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS FOR RECONSIDERATION
Plaintiff first contends the Court should find the agreement enforceable based on theories
of ratification, consent and/or acquiescence. Plaintiff contends the shareholders voted to redeem
Reed Taylor's shares and therefore cannot now challenge 1he agreement as unlawful. Plaintiff's
argmnents, while not without merit, are without basis on motion for reconsideration as the Court
clearly stated in its Opinion and Order that none of the Defendants had st.anding to challenge the
agreement as unlawful. Rather, the Court found that once it possessed the knowledge that the
ageement violated Idaho Code as it existed in 1995, undcx Idaho case law the Court had a duty
to apply the illegality doctrine, find the agreement unenforeeable, and leave the parties where the

Court found them. The question is not one of standing, but only whether the stock red.emption
a&reem.ent violated Idaho Code, making the agreement unlawful and unenforceable. Plaintiff's
reliance on Philips Petroleum Co. v. Rock Creek Mineral Co., 449 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. I 971) is
misplaced as the statutory requirements for the transfer of corporate assets was met in that case,
making it distinguishable from the case at hand.

Plaintiff fwther contends that a shareholder vote to redeem Reed Taylor's shares implied
shareholder consent to draw from capital surplus for the purchase. The Court does not read the
1995 version ofI.C. § 30-1-6 so broadly. The statute provides for the redemption of shares "only
to the extent of unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus available therefore, and, ... with the
affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of all shares entitled to vote thereon, to the extent of
unreserved and unrestricted capital surplus available". I.C. § 30-1~6. In 1995, when the
shareholders of AIA voted to redeem Reed Taylors shares, the corporation had insufficient
earned surplus for the purchase, yet no vote to draw from capital surplus was obtained from
Taylor v. AU, •t al.
Opinion & Order on Motion !or 'Reconsideration and
Rule S4(b) Ccitification
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shareholders as required by statute. Neither the redemption agreement itself nor the resolution
designated the source of funds for the future promissory note payment. Such a substantial
obligation cannot be incurred by implication.
Plaintiff's second contention is that, even if unlawful, the agreement should be enforced
as Reed Taylor was justifiably ignorant of the illegality of the agreement. The Court is not
persuaded by Plaintitf's efforts to paint himself as an innocent and nai'Ve party. Reed Taylor was
the founder of AIA and, at the time the agreeme:o:t was entered into, the majority shareholder.
Reed Taylor was in a position to have intimate knowledge of the cozporation's financial status.
This is not a case where the parties to the agreement were not in pari delicto, as asserted by
Plaintiff. IfReed Taylor was uninfonned as to the financial status of his corporation, that was a
voluntary choice on his part and is insufficient to make him an innocent party to the agreement.
In further support of his claim of justifiable ignorance, Plaintiff conten& he was deceived

by counsel for the corporation. In a letter dated August IS, 1995, counsel for AlA stated that, to
the best of his knowledge, the stock redemption agreement violated no law or regulation. Reed
Taylor was represented by a Washington attorney throughout the negotiations for, and entry into,
the stock redemption agreement As such, Reed Taylot was not in an inferior position or at a
disadvantage as he had independent legal counsel to advise him regarding the statutory
requirements for corporate redemption of shares.
Plaintiff's third argument is that J.C. § 30-1-6 does not prohibit a corporation from
purchasing its own shares. Plaintiff's statement is correct, but inc::omplete. As it existed in 1995,
l.C. § 30-1-6 allowed a cotporation to purchase it owns shares as long as the purchase price did
not exceed the corporation's unreseived and unrestricted earned surplus available and, with the
affirmati-ve vote of the holders of a majority of all shares entitled to vote, to the extent of

Taylorv. AJA, etot.
Opinion & Order on Motion for Reconsideration and
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unreserved and unrestricted capital surplus available. The statute did not provide blanket
approval for a corporation to purchase its own shares but conditioned that purchase. In the
inst.ant case, AIA had no eamed surplus by which to redeem Reed Taylor's shares nor did it have
the affirmative approval of the majority of shareholders to draw on capital surplus for the

redemption of Reed's shares. Thezefore, the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares violated the
statute.

Plaintiff's fourth argument for the enforceability of the agreement is a claim of
constructive fraud. Plaintiff bases his claim on the opinion letter from corporate counsel stating
that, to the best of counsel's knowledge, the stock redemption agreement violated no laws or
regulations and on the representations of John Taylor as a corporate director that no laws or
regulations were violated by the agreement. To prove fraud, including constructive fraud, a
claimant must show a false statement of fact on which the hearer relied. Country Cove

D1velopment, Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595 (ISO P.3d 288 (2006). The stat.ements by corporate
counsel and others that the stock redemption agreement did not violate any laws or regulations

were offered as opinion, not fact "Opinions and predictions C8l1!10t form the basis of a fraud
claim because they do not speak to matters of fact." Id. at 601. Counsel for AIA expressed an
opinion that no statute was violated by the stock redemption agreement, an opinion currently
postulated to the Court by Plaintiff. SUch an opinion was no more a statement of fact when
expressed by coxporate counsel in 1995 than it is now when asserted by Plaintiff. It is, simply,
an opinion based on one's interpretation of law and cannot fonn the basis for a :fraud claim.
(Bl PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RULINGS
Plaintiff contends the Court did not address whether the Defendants and 40 I (k) Plan are
intended beneficiaries ofl.C. § 30-1-6. The Court finds it did address the issue, albeit in an

Taylor v. AM. ~t al.
Opinion & Order on Motion for R.cc:onsidetatlon and
Rulo 54(b) Certification
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indirect manner. The Court first noted that in general, courts have held that stock repurchase
statutes are designed to protect creditors and minority shareholders, a position consistently
asserted by Plaintiff. The Court then noted that neither the Defendants nor the 401 (k) Plan were

creditors of AIA in 1995 and, therefore, the question to be answered was whether Defendants or
the 40l(k) Plan were shareholders in 1995. The court found the 401(k) Plan was not a
shareholder in 1996. The Court then looked to tho Defendants to determine who, if any, of the
Defendants were shareholders in 1995. Clearly, given that stock repurchase statutes are
generally held to protect only creditors and minority shareholders, any of the Defendants that
were minority shareholders in July 1995 would be intended beneficiaries ofl.C. § 30-1-6. The
Court finds no additional analysis necessary relative to this issue.

!

Next, Plaintiff contends the Court neglected to address the issue of whether JoLee Duclos

!

j
l

i

and Brian Freeman, in their capacity as individual Defendants, have standing to challenge the

)

stock redemption agreement as unlawful. The Court recognizes it failed to address the standing

question in regards to Ms. Duclos and Mr. Freeman. After reviewing the record, the Court has
found no evidence that Ms. Duclos or Mr. Freeman were shareholders in 1995 and, therefore,
they are without standing to challenge the stock redemption agreement as unlawful.
Finally, Plaintiff requests that the Court address those arguments asserted by Plaintiff' that
the Court ruled were moot given the Court's finding that the agreement violated I.C. § 30-1-6.

The Court finds now, as it did in its earlier Opinion, that many of the arguments put forth by
Plaintiff need not be addressed at this time. Therefore, the Court declines Plaintiff's invitation to
expand the Court's opinion and ruling beyond that necessary to determine the issues that were
before it.

Tt1.1IO'l'll. AJA, eta!.
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(C) REQUEST FOR SPECIFIC RULINGS ON MOTIONS TO STRIKE

On Febtuary 12, 2009, Defendants Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck filed an

Affidavit ofKemieth E. Hooper in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment. On the same
date, Intervenor 401 {le) Plan filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Affidavit of
Drew B. Voth in support of the motion. Mr, Hooper and Mr. Voth are certified public
accountants whose affidavits were filed in an effort to establish that, in July 1995, AIA bad no
earned swplus from which it could redeem Reed Taylor's shares. On March 3, 2009, Plaintiff

filed an Expert Affidavit of Paul E. Pederson in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Partial

.
)

I
li
J

Summary Judgment. 1 Mr. Pederson. like Mr. Hooper and Mr. Voth, is a certified public

accountant who reviewed the audited financial statements and attempted to reconstruct the

1

financial status of AIA in July 1995 in order to dctennine the amount of earned surplus held by

~

AIA at the time the agreement was finalized.

I

l

Motions to strike each of the expert affidavits, or portions thereof, were filed by various
parties. The Court heard oral arguments on the motions on March 12, 2009. The Court
incorporated its niling on the Motions to Strike in its June 2009 Opinion and Order on
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. However, in ruling on the motions, the
Court merely stated it found inadmissible statements in each of the affidavits and, therefore, the
Court would disregard those portions it found inadmissible. Plaintiff now seeks a more detailed
ruling on the Motions to Strike.
Attached to the Affidavit of Kenneth E. Hooper was a report prepared by him in which he

provided his expert analysis and opinion regarding the financial status of AIA in 1995. The
Court, after reviewing the report for admissible statements, considered the follow portions of the
1

On April 9, 2009, Plaintiff filed an Amended and .Restated Affidavii of Expert Paul B. Perdarson. However, the
Court did not consider the April 9, 2009 affidavit u k was not tunely flled.
Taylor w. AU., 11 al.
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report: (a) Mr. Hoooper's qualifications; (b) the scope of his assignment; (c) Mr. Hooper's
opinion that AJA had a negative earned smplus as of July 22, 1995 and July 1, 1996, as stated in
the first paragraph on page 4 of Hooper's report. All portions of the report not specifically listed
above were found to contain inadmissible or ill'clcvant statements and were not considered by
the Court ill ruling on the motion for partial summary judgment.
The Court considered the following portions of the affidavit of Drew Voth filed by
Intervenor 40l(k) Plan: (a) paragraphs 1 and 2; (b) paragraph 4; (c) paragraph 8; and (d)
paragraph 11. All portions of the affidavit not specifically listed abov~ were found to contain
inadmissible or irrelevant statements and were not considered by the Court in tuling on the
motion for partial summary judgment.

In response to the expert affidavits of Kenneth Hooper and Drew Voth, Plaintiff filed the
expert affidavit of Paul E. Pederson. The Court considered only paragraphs 1 through S plus the
chart shown at page 6 of the Pederson affidavit All portions of the affidavit not specifically

listed above were found to contain inadmissible or :irrelevant statements and were not considered
by the Court in ruling on the motion for partial summary judgment
(D)

RBOUEST FQR RULE S4Cbl CERTIFICATION
The Court finds this matter ripe for appeal on certam of Plaintiff's claims. Therefore, the

Court will enter an appropriate judgment setting forth those claims that are final as a result of the
Cotnt's grant of Defendants' partial summary judgment.
CE) REQUEST FOR ORDER PROTECTING PROPERTY
Plaintiff moves the Court for an extensive order to protect corporate assets and property
pending appeal in the matter. Plaintiff has provided the Court with no legal basis for the Court to

enter such an extensive order. Therefore, the Court declines.

Taylor v. .4L4, 1t al.
Opinion & Order on Motion for Roc:onsidcration and
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MOTION TO FILE SIXTH AMENDED COMPLAJNT
The parties are in agreement that Rule 54(b) certification is appropriate in order for

Plaintiff to appeal the Court's ruling on Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
Under Idaho Appellate Rule 13, an automatic stay of proceedings will go into effect upon the
tiling of the appeal. The Court finds that to proceed with a hearing for and possible filing of
Plaintiff's Sixth Amended Com.plaint when an appeal and stay is anticipated by the parties would
be contrary to the goal of judicial economy and efficiency and would unduly add to the cost of

the litigation for all parties.

ORPER
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's grant of Defendants' Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment is he.reby DENIED.
Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Protect Property is hereby DENIED.
Plaintiff's request to hear his Motion to file a Sixth Amended Complaint is, at this time,

hereby DENIED.
Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification is hereby GRANTED.

Dated this -13_ day of August 2009.
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Richard Riley
From:

Roderick C. Bond [rod@scblegal.com]

Sent:

Tuesday, August 05, 2008 10:09 PM

To:

Gary Babbitt; John Ashby; Gatziolis, James J.; charper@quarles.com; mmcnichols@clbrmc.com

Cc:

rjt@lewistondsl.com; Mike Bissell; Jack R. Little

Subject: Taylor v. AIA Services, et al.
Gary:
Thank you for your letter dated August 5, 2008. This is my final response to this issue. I understand your desire
for me to point out every violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, however, we have gone over this issue
time and time again. My client does not want me to waste his time and money doing your job for you. Simply
put, it is your obligation to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct and to ensure that you are complying
with them. Reed has given all of the lawyers an opportunity to bow out gracefully. No one is apparently
accepting the offer. You will have a full opportunity to respond to the violations raised in Reed's pending motion
to disqualify. You will also have an opportunity to have distinguished attorneys or ethics people also file counter
affidavits. I wish you luck finding them. I can say that of all the attorneys that I have discussed the facts of this
case with, not one, YES NOT ONE, have said that you and the other attorneys on this case are correct. In fact,
all of them cannot understand what you are doing, as I have told you from day one. As a courtesy to you and the
others, I will forward you the affidavits and motions when they are completed, however, they will be filed on the
first day available regardless of your response or any promise to withdraw. If Reed goes to the trouble to pay for
the pleadings to be drafted, they will be filed. Of course, you are also free to contest the motion. Even if the
Court denies Reed's Motion for some reason, we will seek immediate appellate review .

•

With respect to the alleged pending investigation, if any, I really wonder how truly independent it could possibly
be. If you, any attorney from your firm, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Mike Cashman, or any of the
other attorneys involved in this action are involved with the investigation or the selection of the person, the
investigation will not be viewed as legitimate. If you wanted it to be legitimate, you would be asking us for names
of people Reed would consent to making such investigations and the person would be spending significant time
with me going over documents and legal issues. I just want to be clear on this issue from Reed's perspective.
The violations in this case for you and the others are "no brainers." Again, you only need to read RPCs 1. 7 and
1.13, the Fifth Amended Complaint, and the documents in your files and the court's file. I could go on and on, and
there are other RPCs implicated. I don't even need to touch on the lack of candor and other violations.
Again, forward this email to Merlyn Clark and ask his opinion. I know that my partner Ned Cannon, Jerry Smith
and Jack Little have a great deal of respect for him (as do I, simply because of their respect and admiration-as I
have never met him).

•

In fact, I challenge you to just ask Merlyn Clark to read the 5th Amended CoJ11plaint. Tell Mr. Clark the honest
facts of everything that has transpired on this case since your involvement. Show Mr. Clark this email. Show Mr.
Clark Hawley Troxell's opinion letter to Lancelot stating that AIA Insurance was authorized to guarantee the loan
for Crop USA (in violation of AIA Services' Articles of Incorporation and a fraudulent act in general}, then explain
to him how the balance is $10M, that the loan is in technical default and that AIA Insurance will not be paying the
loan if Reed takes control and that Lancelot would likely have claims against Hawley Troxell at that time (should it
elect). Explain to Mr. c:ark how Richard Riley and the other lawyer at your firm assisted AIA Services in pledging
its sole significant remaining asset to Crop USA (and assisted in having the Mortgage issued only to AIA Services
when AIA Insurance should have at the minimum been Vt owner). Explain to Mr. Clark the details of the Joint
Defense Agreement a/k/a the aiding and abetting agreement. ~xplain to Mr. Clark how Richard Riley issued an_
opinion letter to Reed and you are now tyin to disin enuousl ar ue the $8.5 Miiiion ls not owed to him. Explain
o r. ar ow o n ay or an t e ot ers rau ulently conveyed 1.5 M to Crop USA and you have been
defending the conveyance on baseless arguments, i.e., an appraisal done exclusively for the purposes of valuing
shares for a 401 (k) ... shares that everyone knows were truly worthless then and are worthless now. Explain to
Mr. Clark that even if the illegality argument had merit, Donna Taylor and Reed Taylor would be suing Hawley
Troxell (and Richard Riley) in such an instance regardless of any circumstances. Explain to Mr. Clark how Reed
and Donna Taylor and the disinterested shareholders have been getting screwed so that you can stay on as
counsel. Explain how AIA Services is insolvent and that the duties of your representation are to Reed in light of
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the insolvency to protect AIA's assets (you can still make your lame waiver arguments, but still protect the
assets). Explain to Mr. Clark how you continued to represent all of the corporations and take directions from John
Taylor and other interested parties when you knew the assets, employees and money were being looted from
AIA. Allow Mr. Clark to review all the documents in your possession, including the alleged privilege information
that Reed will likely never see. Explain to Mr. Clark how the Court has already found that AIA Services is in
default and that when Reed takes over AIA Insurance he will be asking to see all the files and to speak with all the
attorneys at your firm. Explain to Mr. Clark how no "true" independent shareholder approval was ever obtained
for your representation, let alone any full and fair disclosure. Explain to Mr. Clark how under your guidance AIA
has stopped paying Reed and Donna Taylor, when they are the only people possibly entitled to the remaining
assets of AIA. Explain to Mr. Clark all of the various transactions and alleged waivers that I presume are
contained in the Joint Defense Agreement that were never obtained through separate counsel for each
corporation nor were obtained by independent parties or shareholders. Explain to Mr. Clark how up through
John's last deposition, AIA was footing the bill for Crop USA's defense and the individual directors, who all should
be getting sued by AIA. Explain to Mr. Clark how AIA should be suing John and others, but is not to the detriment
of Reed and Donna Taylor. Finally, explain to Mr. Clark how Hawley Troxell has now retained counsel for itself
and you, which creates a new conflict of interest as you and your clients now have diverging interests. I could go
on and on, but you have plenty of information on hand (including significant information we have never seen and
the information detailed above). I feel confident that Mr. Clark would ask what the world you were thinking after
only reading a few of the above points.
In closing, IT IS NOT MY OBLIGATION TO POINT OUT TO YOU YOUR ETHICAL VIOLATIONS, IT IS YOU
AND YOUR FIRMS' DUTIES. You have no legitimate arguments to make (even the disingenuous alleged
illegality argument won't save you, think about it). You know it, so you are trying to figure out a graceful way out.
The only problem was that your graceful way out was in May 2007 when I sent you the letter first detailing some
of your problems. Not only did you ignore that letter and other warnings, but you proceeded to go further and
represent Crop USA. You were blinded by greed and ignored my warnings for reasons only known to you, John
Ashy and the others (and when I say you, I mean all of law firms on your side, except for Mr. Gittins). Now you
know I was right, but it is too late. However, the ball is still in your court (and the other attorneys in this action) to
finally step up to the plate and acknowledge your ethical problems. The next writing you will see from me or this
office regarding this issue will be Reed's Motion and the supporting affidavits. I will not be responding further.

•

Again, I am sorry to have to be so blunt, but there is no other way to handles this issue. Put yourself if Reed's
position. How would you feel? I am only the messenger. .. the same messenger you and the other attorneys (not
Mr. Gittins' firm) on this case have been ignoring for the past 16+ months. Thank you.
BTW, you might want to forward this email to your attorney as it would probably be helpful for him.
Rod

By: Roderick C. Bond
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
508 Eighth St.
Lewiston, ID 83501
Tel: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
rpg.@_s.G.t>Jeg~J •.@.m
This email and any attachments may contain confidential and/or legally privileged information, which only the
authorized recipient may receive and/or view. If you are not an intended recipient, please promptly delete this
message and contact the sender at the above address. Thank you .

•
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Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC
Arcomeys & Counselors ac law
-----------------Michael S. Bissell • Licensed in WA. ID & AK

Richard D. Campbell • Licensed in WA, ID & MT
PattickJ. Kirby • Licensed in WA & ID

July 21. 2008

Via Certified Mail and
Regular Mail

Board of Directors
AIA Sezvices Corporation, Inc. and AIA Insurance. Inc.
111 Main Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Re:

Demand of Donna Taylor and Reed Taylor Pursuant to Idaho Code 30-1-·742

Dear Boazd Members of AIA Se1vices Corporation and AIA Insurance Inc.:
As you know, this furn represents Donna J. Taylor ("Donna"), the Series A Prefeued
Shareholder in AIA Sezvices Co:rporation ("AIA Sezvices"), and Reed Taylor ("Reedj, the
pledgee of AIA Insurance, Inc. ("AIA Insmance") and creditor of AIA Services who is owed
over $8.5 Million.

•

Donna and Reed hereby make demand upon the Board of Directors of AIA Services and
AIA Insurance pursuant to Idaho Code 30-1-742 to take the action described herein.
Specifically, demand is made that said entities immediately take action against the law fums of
Hawley Trnxell Ennis & Hawley; Clements, Brown & McNichols; Quarles & Brady; together
with the responsible attomeys of said fums (and any other firms which have wrongfully
represented the entities) for violating applicable Rules of Prnfessional Conduct, malpractice,
breach of fiduciary duties, and aiding and abetting. including, without limitation,- all acts related
to or involving the following claims and/or causes of action:
1. Wrnngfully simultaneously representing Cxop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.
C'Ctop USA") and AJA Services and AlA Inswance, while knowing these entities
had divergent .interests;

2. Ta1cing action against the best interests of AIA Setvices and/or AJA Insurance;
3.. Assisting in the commission of .fraud and/or illegal activities;
4. Wmngfully allowing interested directms and other interested parties to direct
litigation in light of substantial claims against them;
5. Issuing inappropriate opinion letters to Jendeis and auditors;

6. Failing to recover moneys and/or stock in Crop USA;
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7. Preventing claims from being made against p1esent and past directors, including,
without limitation, R. John Taylo1, Michael Cashman, James Beck and Connie
Taylo1;
8. Failing to take action against Czop USA to recover funds owed;
9. Failing to take action against responsible present and past directoI's for violating
the co1porate opportunity docttine by permitting Crop USA to become a sepatate
compan,y fi'om AIA;

10. Failing to take action against interested dfrectors and parties who took part in
:fraud, conspiracy and otbei illegal activities, including, without limitation, R.
John Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman and Connie Taylor;
11. Breaching :fiduciaiy duties (including the duty of loyalty) owed to AIA Seivices
and AIA Insurance;

•

12. Aiding and abetting R. John Taylor, Tames Beck, Michael Cashman, Connie
Taylor, CI·op US~ and other interested parties who participated in the
misappropriation of assets. opportunities, and funds of AIA Services and AIA
Insu11mce (including the $1.5 Million wrongfully transfei:red from AlA lnswance
to Crop USA);

13. Not ensuring that sepai:ate counsel was retained for AIA Sezvices;
14. Not enswing that sepal'ate counsel was retained for AI.A Inswancc knowing that ]t
was pledged to Reed;
15. Assisting in illegal loan guarantees by AJA Sezvices and/or AJA Inswance;
16. Wrongfully entering into a Joint Defense Agzeement knowing that such an
agreement was inappropriate in light of the significant claims AIA Services and
AIA Insutance have against interested individuals and C10p USA;
17. Wmngfully obtaining shareholder consent to pay the attorneys' fees of past and
present directors of AJA Seivices and AIA Insurance without full disclosure or
obtaining votes only fiom disinterested shareholders;
18. Permitting Michael McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNichols to remain as
counsel for R. John Taylor in violation of their dufy of loyalty to AIA Services
and AJA Insurance;
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19. Assisting in pledging the assets of AIA Sexvices and AJA Insurance to Crop USA
fol the payment of attorneys' fees and costs of intex·ested parties and othex·s;
20. Permitting the business and employees of AlA Insurance and AJA Smvices to be
detrimentally effected by the actions of interested parties (e.g.., transferring AIA
lnsmance's employees to Clop USA);
21. Failing to take action against R .John Taylor and Connie Taylm for the significant
breaches ofR. John TayloI"'s employment agreement with AJA Sezvices;
22. Failing to comply with contractual obligations owed to Reed and Donna;

23. Failing to recover inapprop1iate salades, advances, loans, benefits, and
compensation paid to R. John Taylor, Connie Taylor" Tames Beck and others;
24. Assisting in, and failing to take action peitaining to, the improper allocation
expenses, labor, rent and other expenditures inappropriately utilized for the
benefit of Crop USA

•

25 . Accepting payments of attomeys' fees in violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct;
26. Representing AJA Smvices and/or AJA Insm·ance in making inappropiiate
arguments (including alleged illegality of the debt to Reed) knowing that such
arguments were counter to AIA Services' obligations to Reed and Donna and
.knowing that Richard Riley was a witness who provided a legal opinion counter
to such arguments; and
27. Accepting payment of attorneys' fees and costs which should have been allocated
to otb.ei pal'ties, including. without limitation, fees and costs that should have been
paid by CI'Op USA, R. John Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman and Connie
Taylor.
Based upon the above wrongful acts (and othezs 1easonably contemplated from the above
acts and other acts known only to insidexs at AIA Services and/or AJA Insmancc), demand is
made upon you to initiate legal action against the abovc-refez·enced law finns and lawyezs to
tecover all applicable damages and to require a disgo1gement of all attorneys' fees and costs paid
to them, including, without limitation, for all inapprop1iate tzansactions and the litigation
involving Reed and/or Donna. Based upon the fo1egoing demand is also made foI' action against
R. John Taylor, Michael Cashman, James Beck, Connie Taylor, Crop USA and all other
responsible parties for the 1ecovery of damages and the disgo1gement of all compensation and
attorneys' fees and costs paid to or on thek behalf:
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Please note that I have sent a copy of this notice to present counsel for AIA Services and
A1A lnsUiance, and trust that they will ensure copies of this Notice are pzovided to all bomd
members and shareholders. I wouJd appreciate it if you wQuld let me know as soon as possible
whether AIA Services and/or AlA Insw·ance will be taking any of the requested action. The
fail me to respond or to immediately take action shall be construed as a rejection of the demands
made by tltls letter.
Nothing herein should be considered or relied upon as a waiver of Donna and Reed's
right to take immediate action on behalf of AIA Services and/or AIA Insmance due to exigent
circumstances.

Vezy truly yours,

PLLC

•

MSB:!IUlb
cc: Gary Babbitt (via email)
D.. John Ashby (via cmlliJ}
James Clatdolls (via email)
Charle5 Harper (via email)
Michael McN"icbols (via email)
David Gittins {via email}
Jon Hally (via omail)
Rod&:rick Bond {via mnall)
Reed Taylor {via 1:111111)
Donna Taylor (via n:gular mail)
0..\13 lllnadct 072101.doc
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MICHAEL S. BISSELL. ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, VIA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF Tiffi SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
CaseNo.:
Plaintiff:

cvtt8 -G17 65

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

v.
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
GARY D. BABBI'IT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY 'IROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES 1-X,
unknown individuals;

Category: A.I.
Fee: $88.00

Defendants.
.,

Reed J. Taylor, by and through his atto1'7feys of~ord, CAMPBELL, BISSELL &
KIRBY, PLLC, alleges as follows (all applicable facts alleged below are incorporated by

reference into each cause of action as necessary to support each such cause of action):
I. PARTIES

1.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor is a resident of Lewiston, Nez Perce County,

Idaho. Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor is an elderly person as defined in J.C. § 48-608.
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2.

Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawley Troxell9') is an

Idaho limited liability partnership in the business of practicing law. Hawley Troxell is
'•

vicariously liable for the acts of the individual Defendants.
3.

Defendant Gary D. Babbitt is an individual residing in the state of Idaho

and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley Troxell.
4.

Defendant D. John Ashby is an individual residing in the state of Idaho

and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley Troxell.
5.

Defendant Patrick V. Collins is an individual residing in the state of Idaho

and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley Troxell.
6.

Defendant Richard A. Riley is an individual residing in the state of Idaho

and is an attorney in the state ofldaho with and for Hawley Troxell.
7.

Jane Does I-X are unknown individuals who are and/or were attorneys that

participated in the tortious acts and conduct alleged against the above known defendants
with and for Hawley Troxell.
U. JURISDICTION. VENUE AND CLAIMS

8.

The Defendants transacted business through the practice of law in Nez

Perce County, Idaho, and have an expectation of being '.nained as defendants in Nez Perce
County, Idaho.

The Defendants committed tortious acts and/or assisted in the

commission of tortious acts in Nez Perce County, Idaho. The Defendants' tortious acts
and/or assistance have inflicted damages upon a resident ofNez Perce County, Idaho.
9.

Damages in this action exceed $10,000.

Jurisdiction and venue are,

therefore, appropriate in Nez Perce County Oistrict Court.
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10.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Complaint is not a derivative action. Plaintiff

Reed J. Taylor is the pledgee of all of the shares of AIA Insurance, Inc., the only
shareholder of AIA Insurance, Inc. by way of holding all of its shares as collateral, and
the largest creditor of AIA Services Corporation (Reed J. Taylor is owed over $8,500,000
and AIA Services Corporation is insolvent).

AIA Services Corporation and AJA

Insurance, Inc. 's value and net assets are insufficient to pay the over $8,500,000, plus
interest and attorneys' fees and costs, owed to Reed J. Taylor. Therefore, Plaintiff Reed
J. Taylor is entitled to bring certain claims directly against the Defendants for certain

damages.

ID. FACTS
11.

At all material times, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor was owed over $6,000,000

by AJA Services Corporation through a promissory note dated August 1, 1995. Plaintiff

Reed J. Taylor is presently owed over $8,500,000 by AIA Services Corporation. At all
material times, the Defendants had full knowledge of AIA Services Corporation's debt
and contractual obligations owed to Reed J. Taylor.
12.

AJA Services Corporation was

.in default of the $6,000,000 promissory

note when it failed to pay the note when it mafured on August I, 2005. Although
unnecessary since the $6,000,000 promissory note matured on August l, 2005, demand
for payment was properly served upon AIA Services Corporation by Plaintiff Reed J.
Taylor on December 12, 2006, a copy of which was also provided to Defendant Richard
A. Riley pursuant to the notice provisions of the agreements. AIA Services Corporation
was insolvent in 2001, and has continued to be insolvent from said date.
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13.

Since 1996, as security for the over $8,500,000 owed by AJA Services

Corporation, Plaintiff Recd J. Taylor was granted and possessed a security interest in all
of the stock of AIA Insurance, Inc. and all of the commissions and related receivables of
AIA Insurance, Inc. and AIA Services Corporation. Pursuant to the Amended and
Restated Stock Pledge Agreement dated July l,' 1996, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor had the
contractual right upon default of AIA Services Corporation to vote the stock of AIA
Insurance, Inc., and take operational control of AIA Insurance, Inc. Plaintiff Reed J.
Taylor's right to vote the stock of AIA Insurance was also perfected through AIA
Services Corporation's irrevocable power of attorney granted to Reed J. Taylor that was
coupled with an interest as required by I.C § 30-1-722.
14.

On February 22, 2007, Reed f Taylor voted the stock of AIA Insurance,

Inc. and attempted to take control of it pursuant to his contractual rights as provided
under the law, the contract documents, and I.C. § 30-1-722. However, the interested
directors of AIA Insurance, Inc. (including R. John Taylor) by and through the

Defendants intentionally assisted in breaching the terms of the Amended and Restated
Stock Pledge Agreement and refused to acknowledge Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's valid vote
of the stock of AIA Insurance, Inc. and refused to surrender control as required. The
Defendants further engaged in inappropriate conduct in assisting interested parties
(including R. John Taylor) in obtaining and/or maintaining a restraining order and
preliminary injunction against Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, when the Defendants knew there
was no legitimate legal basis to do so, that doing so' was an intentional violation and
tortious interference with Reed J. Taylor's contractual rights, and that the assets and
funds of AIA Insurance, Inc. were being misappropriated and/or not safeguarded.
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15.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor has a pending civil action against AJA Services

Corporation, AIA lnsurance, Inc., Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor, and
others for claims of fraud, fraudulent conveyance, civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches
of fiduciary duties and other claims under Nez Perce County Case No. CV-07-00208
("Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al. 'j, and therein Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

obtained an order of partial summary judgment for AJA Services Corporation's default of
the $6,000,000 promissory note and corresponding default of the Amended and Restated
Stock Pledge Agreement. By way of this partial summary judgment and/or his prior vote
of the stock, Reed J. Taylor would and should be in actual control of AIA Insurance, Inc.
but for the actions and R. John Taylor, which Defendants, with full knowledge of Reed J.

Taylor's rights, facilitated and aided and abetted to the detriment of AJA Services
Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and Reed J. Taylor.
16.

With the Defendants .full knowledge, Reed J. Taylor's claims asserted in

Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al. included claims for breaches of fiduciary duty,

conspiracy, fraudulent conveyance, and fraud perpetrated by R. John Taylor and others
(including Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.), including but not limited to claims that R.
John Taylor had wrongfully transferred over $1,500,000 of AIA Insurance, Inc. 's cash to
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., for no consideration and had transferred
approximately $700,000 of the assets of AJA Insurance, Inc. to Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc. for no consideration. R. John Taylor was at all material times also

~

interested director, officer and shareholder of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. Also
included in the civil action were other claims that R. John Taylor and others had engaged
in self-dealing and/or fraudulent transactions with AIA Services Corporation and/or AlA
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Insurance, Inc. to the detriment of the corporations and Reed J. Taylor, and for the
personal benefit of R. John Taylor and other interested parties (including Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc.).
17.

In 2007, Defendants appeared in the civil action, Taylor v. A/A Services

Corporation, et al., and assumed legal representation of two distinct clients, AIA
Services Corporation, a corporation, and AIA Insurance, Inc., a corporation, and also
represented the interests of R. John Taylor, an individual, and other interested parties
(including Connie Taylor, James Beck and Michael Caslunan). At all material times
John Taylor was an interested CEO and director of AIA Services Corporation and AIA

Insurance, Inc. and an interested majority shareholder of AIA Services Corporation. The
civil action clearly alleged acts of fraud, civil conspiracy, conversion, and breaches of
fiduciary duty perpetrated by R. John Taylor and others against AIA Services

Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc., and such acts having damaged and continuing to
cause damages to the corporations, their shareholders and creditors. In violation of the
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care, the Defendants. undertook to
represent the three named clients A1A Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., each having irreconcilable conflicts of interest with
the other.
18.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's attorney, Roderick C. Bond, advised the

Defendants in May 2007, that it was not appropriate for the Defendants to represent AIA
Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc., and/or to take direction from R. John
Taylor because of various conflicts of interest and the fact that R. John Taylor was an

interested party. Despite the warning and demandS made by Reed J. Taylor's attorney,

COMPLAINT - 6

000388

Roderick C. Bond, the Defendants also appeared and represented Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc., which was created additional conflicts of interest, resulted in a breach of
the Defendants' fiduciary duties (including the duty

of loyalty) owed to AIA Services

Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc., and was a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct and their duty of care.
19.

The Defendants inappropriately entered into and/or participated in a Joint

Defense Agreement(s) knowing that AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc.,
Crop USA Insurance, Inc., R John Taylor and other named and unnamed individuals in
Taylor v. .A.IA. Services Corporation, et al. had clear irreconcilable conflicting and

diverging interests in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and duty of care, and
to the detriment AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and Reed J. Taylor. In

Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al., a Joint Defense Agreements was not

permissible or appropriate because it would perpetuate fraud, conspiracy, aiding and
abetting, and other causes of action, was entered into without obtaining infonned consent
from disinterested representatives of the corporations, and the Joint Defense Agreement

was also independently not appropriate or permitted when certain parties to a joint
defense agreement should be asserting claims against other parties to the agreement. The
Joint Defense Agreement(s) in question have assisted in others (including R. John Taylor
and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) to perpetrate and/or hide acts of fraud, fraudulent
conveyances, civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and other claims,
while also assisting the Defendants in inappropriately obtaining payment of fees and
costs in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct 8nd their duty of care.
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20.

The Defendants assisted AIA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc.,

Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R John Taylor, and others in entering into various
inappropriate agreements and transactions which were in violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct and their duty of care, were not in the best interests of the
corporations, not authorized by disinterested parties, constituted fraud and/or the
inappropriate transfer of assets and funds belonging to· AIA Services Corporation and/or
AIA Insurance, Inc., were not arms-length transactions, and/or were done so without
requiring AIA Services Corporation, AJA Insurance, Inc. and/or Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc. to retain separate independent counsel that were retained by separate
independent uninterested parties.

21.

As attorneys for AIA Services Corporation, an entity, the Defendants

owed duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care,
and under the law to the corporation and its shareholders to preserve and protect the
assets and businesses of the corporation, and since AIA Services Corporation was
insolvent, to its creditors including Reed J. Taylor.
Corporation, and in light of the claims made against

As attorney for AIA Services

R.

John Taylor and others by the

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, the Defendants owed a duty to their entity client not to assume
representation of the interests of R. John Taylor, individually and/or through a Joint

Defense Agreement, or with any other interested parties.
22.

As attorneys for AIA Insurance, Inc., an entity, the Defendants owed

duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care and the
law to the corporation and its shareholders including a creditor pledgee of the

...

corporation's stock, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, with contractual rights to vote the shares and
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assume control and who had exercised his contractual rights and had voted the shares but
whose rights were breached and rejected by interested directors and others who were in
control of the corporation including R. John Taylor. As attorneys for AIA Insurance, Inc.
and in light of the claims made against R. John Taylor and others by the Plaintiff Reed J.

Taylor, the Defendants owed a duty to their entity client not to assume representation of
the interests of R. John Taylor, individually and/or through any Joint Defense Agreement,
and/or of other interested parties (including Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., Connie
Taylor, James Beck and Michael Cashman).
23.

As attorneys representing the interests of R. John Taylor through a Joint

Defense Agreement, the Defendants owed their duties first and foremost to AIA Services
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct, duty of care and/or the law. As attorneys for R. John Taylor by and through
taking directions and/or accepting decisions made by him knowing that he was interested
and should have claims asserted against him, and fu light of the claims against R. John
Taylor by the Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, the Defendants owed a duty to their corporate
clients not to assume representation of the interests of R. John Taylor, Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc. or other interested parties. The Defendants failed to notify or
obtain appropriate informed consents or approvals from appropriate parties or
disinterested shareholders in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the
Defendants' duty of care, and the Bylaws and Articles.of Formation of the corporations,
all to the detriment of Reed J. Taylor. The Defendants inappropriately participated in a

Joint Defense Agreement.
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24.

As

present and/or former attorneys' for AJA Services Corporation and/or

AJA Insurance, Inc. (individually or through any Joint Defense Agreement) the
Defendants owed duties of loyalty to the corporations and could not represent R. John
Taylor or Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. in Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al.
or represent or assist R. John Taylor in Donna Taylor v. R. John Taylor because the

Defendants' loyalty belongs exclusively to AJA Services Corporation and/or AJA
Insurance, Inc.

Furthermore, the Defendants could in no way represent Crop USA

Insurance Agency. Inc. or participate in any joint defense of Crop USA Insurance

Agency, Inc. or other interested parties (such as R. John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James
Beck, and/or Michael Cashman) as AIA Services Corporation and/or AJA Insurance, Inc.
should have been asserting claims against Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., each other,
and other interested and uninterested parties.
25.

Defendants represented, and continue to represent, the interests ofR. John

Taylor (individually and/or through a Joint Defense Agreement) and with full knowledge
that R. John Taylor is an interested party and director of AIA Services Corporation and
AIA Insurance, Inc. and is personally inappropriately conducting and controlling the
course of litigation involving the Defendants'

clien~,

AIA Services Corporation and AJA

Insurance, Inc., while also inappropriately representing Crop USA Insurance Agency,
Inc. to the detriment of the corporations and Reed J. Taylor.
26.

During the course of the civil action after March 28, 2007, the Defendants

have coordinated and participated with Quarles & Brady LLP, the law firm that has
represented AIA Services and AIA Services Corporation before and throughout litigation,
,
and Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A., the law fmn that formerly represented AJA
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Service Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. in Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al.
During the course of the civil action after March 28, 2007, R. John Taylor and others
have further engaged in inappropriate and/or wrongful transactions involving themselves,
AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc .• and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.,
which transactions have occurred with Defendants knowledge and/or assistance, and to
the detriment of AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and Plaintiff Reed J.
Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee.
27.

Defendants are liable to Reed J. Taylor for an amount to be proven at trial

because the Defendants have provided substantial assistance and/or aided and abetted R.
John Taylor, AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., Crop USA Insurance

Agency, Inc., and/or other interested parties in acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances,
conversion, civil conspiracy, and breaches of fiduciary duties.

The acts of fraud,

fraudulent conveyances, civil conspiracy, conversion, and breaches of fiduciary duties
include, but are not limited to: 1) While purporting to represent AIA Insurance, Inc. and
AIA Services Corporation, the Defendants assisted and/or aided and abetted R. John
Taylor in the tortious interference with the assertion of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's
contractual rights to control and operate AJA Insurance, Inc., which has proximately
caused damages to Reed J. Taylor; 2) While purporting to represent AIA Services
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc., the Defendants inappropriately assisted and/or
aided and abetted R. John Taylor and other interested parties to engage in tortious
transactions involving R. John Taylor, AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc.,
and/or Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., which such transactions have been to the
detriment of AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and Reed J. Taylor, and
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proximately caused damages to Reed J. Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee; and 3)
While representing R. John Taylor, individually or through a Joint Defense Agreement,
the Defendants have had full knowledge that their client is an interested party and

..

director of AIA Services Corporation, AJA Insurance, Inc., and Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc., and is personally conducting and controlling the course of litigation
involving the Defendants' former clients, AIA Services Corporation and AJA Insurance,
Inc., and Defendants have assisted and/or aided and abetted R. John Taylor and others
(including, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) and has coordinated and participated with
the Hawley Troxell and Quarles & Brady in R. John Taylor's engaging in tortious
transactions involving himself, AIA Services Corporation, AJA Insurance, Inc., and Ctop
USA Insurance Agency, Inc., which transactions have been to the detriment of AIA
Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. and proximately caused damages to Reed
J. Taylor as a creditor and stock pledgee.

28.

In connection with the Defendants' inappropriate representation and/or

joint defense of R. John Taylor, AIA Serviees C~rporation, AJA Insurance, Inc., Crop
USA Insurance Agency, Inc., and other interested parties (including Connie Taylor,
James Beck, and Michael Cashman) the Defendants accepted payments of attorneys fees
and costs believed to exceed $500,000 in violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct, their duty of care, and as participating and/or assisting in inappropriate
corporate acts and the aiding and abetting of others.
29.

Over the course of the litigation in Reed J. Taylor v. AJA Services

Corporation, et al., Reed J. Taylor's attorney in that action, Roderick C. Bond of Smith,

.. ..

Cannon & Bond PLLC, advised the Defendants on numerous occasions that their conduct
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violated Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care, was inappropriate, and
constituted the aiding and abetting of other interested and uninterested parties (including
R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.), among other potential legal

claims against them.

In early 2007, Mr. Bond advised the Defendants that their

inappropriate actions would result in claims being filed against them by Reed J. Taylor.

Mr. Bond reiterated these warnings orally and in writing on numerous occasions. Despite
Mr. Bond's warnings, the Defendants conduct persisted thereby further damaging Reed J.

Taylor. The Defendants disregard of Mr. Bond's warnings can only be construed as
intentional improper acts to assist R. John Taylor and other interested parties to the
de1riment of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor.
30.

The Defendants wrongfully assisted R. John Taylor and other interested

parties in operating Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. with the funds, assets, employees,
trade secrets and other things of value inappropriately obtained from AIA Services
Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc., and by assisting R. John Taylor and other
interested parties (including Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) in preventing claims
from being asserted and prosecuted against them. The Defendants wrongfully assisted

and/or failed to prevent interested parties (including R. John Taylor) in transferring the
long-term employees of AIA Insurance, Inc. to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., while
at the same time representing to the Court in Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation that the
corporations were being operated properly and/or failing to advise the Court of the
inappropriate acts and transactions. All the while the Defendants were aware of and/or
assisted in the inappropriate payment of salaries, benefits, compensation, and director

fees of $20,000 per year when AIA Services Corporation was insolvent.
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31.

Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made personally and through his

attorney Roderick C. Bond) that the Defendants take action to protect the assets and
funds of AlA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. and recover funds and assets

from R. John Taylor, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. and other interested and
uninterested parties for the benefit of the corporations and Reed J. Taylor, the Defendants
refused to act in accordance with the Rules of Profession Conduct, their duty of care, and
the law. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made through his attorney Roderick C.
Bond) that interests of the minority disinterested shareholders be considered and/or
protected because of the wrongful acts of R. John Taylor and other interested parties, the
Defendants refused to act and failed to fully and properly disclose all pertinent facts to
the disinterested shareholders and request their votes.
32.

In various motions, responses arid affidavits submitted to the court in

Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al., the Defendants made arguments that did not
benefit AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., or Reed J. Taylor,
inappropriately made other arguments preventing valid claims from being asserted
against R. John Taylor, James Beck, Connie Taylor, Michael Cashman, and other
interested and uninterested parties, and failed to take action against responsible parties
(including R. John Taylor, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., Connie Taylor, James
Beck, Michael Cashman, Lancelot Investors Fund, and others).

In the instance of

Michael Cashman, the Defendants successfully argued to the Court in Taylor v. AIA

Services Corporation, et al. that Mr. Cashman should not be named as an individual
when the Defendants should have been taking action against Mr. Cashman and others.
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33.

Despite Reed J. Taylor,s demands (made through his attorney Roderick C.

Bond) that disinterested directors and/or parties must direct the litigation on behalf of the
corporations, the Defendants refused and permitted and/or assisted R. John Taylor and
other interested parties to direct the litigation to the detriment of the corporations and
Reed J. Taylor. Despite Reed J. Taylor,s de~ands (made through his attorney Roderick
C. Bond) that action be taken to terminate AIA Insurance, Inc.'s improper guarantee of a
$15,000,000 line-of-credit for Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., the Defendants refused
to act, failed to inform or fully disclose to disinterested parties or shareholders the
existence of such inappropriate loan guarantees, and threatened to take legal action
against Reed J. Taylor if he tried to rescind or terminate the improper guarantee (since
Defendant Oary D. Babbitt's threat, the balance o( the loan has increased by over
•,

$5 ,500,000 to over $10,500,000).
34.

1

The Defendants' conduct has violated Idaho Rules of Professional

Conduct and their duty of care, which require the Defendants to disgorge all attorneys'
fees and costs paid to them in Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al. and for other
related and/or unrelated legal services. Despite Reed

J: Taylor's demands (made through

his attorney Roderick C. Bond) to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct and
their duty of care, the Defendants refused to do so.
35.

Through the acts of the Defendants, the value of AIA Insurance, Inc. and

the assets of AIA Seivices Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. have plummeted in
value, the corporations' value and assets have been impaired, and/or the assets and funds
have been transferred to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. Through the acts of the
1

The $15,000,000 loan subject to the guarantee is believed to be in technical default Damages for any loss
from the guarantee would accrue upon the time of the loss or threatened litigation by the lender and,
accordingly, would be additional damages asserted against the Defendants attbat time.

COMPLAINT - 15

000397

Defendants, ownership of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. was vested and has
remained vested in interested parties (including R. John Taylor), while the major creditor
Reed J. Taylor and minority shareholders were left with nothing. Despite Reed J.
Taylor's demands (through his attorney Roderick C. Bond) that action should also be
taken for the interests of the innocent minority shareholders and creditors, the Defendants
have refused to take action and inappropriately assisted the interested parties (including
R. John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck and Michael Cashman).

36.

Despite the Defendants having made several legal arguments that lacked

merit, lacked good faith and/or were not grounded in facts, the Defendants provided a
settlement offer to Reed J. Taylor in Taylor v. AJA. Services Corporation. et al., which
included a provision that he release all claims against the Defendants as a condition of the
settlement. The inclusion of such a provision was a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct and Defendants' duty of care.

The Defendants also refused to make any

provisions for disinterested minority shareholders of AIA Services .Corporation as
requested by Reed J. Taylor.
37.

The Defendants.have assisted in the inappropriate acts of R. John Taylor

.

and other interested parties in stopping all payments to Reed J. Taylor and Donna J.
Taylor, Reed J. Taylor,s former wife and the holder of all outstanding Preferred A Shares
of AIA Services Corporation. Like Reed J. Taylor, Donna J. Taylor is required to be a
member of the board of directors of AIA Services. Corporation. Like Reed J. Taylor, the
Defendants have assisted R. John Taylor and other interested parties in preventing Reed
J. Taylor and Donna J. Taylor from being members of the board of directors of AlA
Services Corporation, which has further far reaching ramifications and results in
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additional damages against the Defendants.
38.

With full knowledge of AIA Services Corporation's obligations to ensure

that Reed J. Taylor and Donna J. Taylor are members of AIA Services Corporation's
board until they were paid in full, the Defendants proceeded to attend and participate in

inappropriate board meetings and/or take inappropriate action based upon board meetings
held by interested directors without Reed J. '.faylor or Donna J. Taylor being present and
without providing them the opportunity to be present, which further results in all such
meetings and decisions being null and void, and the Defendants being liable for the
associated damages.
39.

The Defendants represented AIA Services Corporation and AIA

Insurance, Inc. in litigation with the state of Idaho. The litigation was funded by AIA
Insurance, Inc. by and through commission in which Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor held a

.

security interest of which the Defendants had full knowledge.

The litigation was

resolved, however, instead of titling the $1,200,000 Mortgage that was received as
settlement in the name of AIA Insurance, Inc., the Defendants titled the mortgage only in
the name of AIA Services Corporation in an inappropriate scheme to keep the mortgage
from AIA Insurance, Inc. and Reed J. Taylor. The Defendants then inappropriately
represented AJA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc. by drafting documents to assist in the inappropriate pledge of the
$1,200,000 Mortgage to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. to facilitate the payment of
the Defendants' services in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of
care, and the law. The Defendants assisted and/or failed to prevent and/or notify
disinterested parties or the Court that AIA Services Corporation had inappropriately
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pledged its sole remaining other significant asset, the $1,200,000 mortgage, to Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc. to facilitate the payment of$500,000 for the Defendants' services
in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care, and the law.

40.

The Defendants omitted and/or misrepresented material facts to the Court

in Taylor v. AIA Services Corporation, et al. to the detriment of Reed J. Taylor. In
several instances, the Defendants persuaded the Court to take action that was not in the

best interests of the corporations or Reed J. Taylor, to the detriment of the corporations
and Reed J. Taylor (including consenting to the issuance of only a $200,000 bond when

the Defendants knew that the corporations were not being operated properly or their
assets safeguarded).
41.

The Defendants have inappropriately assisted R. John Taylor and other

interested parties in misallocating and not allocating expenses and/or services provided
and borne by AJA Insurance, Inc. and/or AJA Services Corporation for the benefit of

Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor and other interested parties. Upon
information and belief, the Defendants have assisted in issuing inappropriate opinion
letters to auditors of AJA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and/or Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc. to assist R. John Taylor and other interested parties in transferring
and utilizing the assets, employees, labor, funds and resources of AJA Insurance, Inc.
and/or AIA Services Corporation for the benefit of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc
while providing no or little consideration in return.
42.

The Defendants had full knowledge of R. John Taylor's Executive

Officer's Agreement, which, upon information and belief, was drafted by Defendant
Richard A. Riley. Regardless, Defendant Richard A. Riley had full knowledge of the
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existence and terms of R. John Taylor's Exec~ve Officer's Agreement with AIA
Services Corporation.

Even though R. John Taylor has breached the terms of his

employment contract with AIA Services Corporation by competing against AIA Services
Corporation through Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. (and violating the corporate
opportunity doctrine), by soliciting employees of AJA Insurance, Inc., and other
inappropriate actions, the Defendants have intentionally refused to act in the best interests
of AJA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., their shareholders, and/or Reed J.
Taylor, to the detriment of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor.
43.

The Defendants assisted in inappropriately transferring and retaining

funds, assets and property to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. to defraud AIA Services

Corporation's creditor Reed J. Taylor (including, without limitation, over $95,000 owed
by Pacific Empire Radio Corporation to AIA Insurance, Inc., assistance in transfening
shares of the Pacific Empire Radio Corporation to R. John Taylor, and failing to collect
the over $300,000 owed by R. John Taylor) by not reporting such acts to disinterested
parties or other appropriate parties as required by the Rules of Professional Conduct and
their duty of care.
44.

In April 2007, the Defendants permitted and/or assisted interested parties

in holding a joint board meeting of AJA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc.

with full knowledge that Reed J. Taylor and Donna J. Taylor were being intentionally
denied their right to be on the board of AIA Services Corporation and participating in
such meetings (Donna Taylor has subordinated her right to payment in favor of Reed J.
Taylor). At the meeting held in April 2007, the Defendants permitted and/or assisted R.
John Taylor to appoint Connie Taylor and James Beck to the boards of AIA Services
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Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. knowing that they were interested parties who AJA
Services Corporation and/or AJA Insurance, Inc. should be pursuing claims against, that
they inappropriately held shares in Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., that they were
inappropriately being paid $20,000 per year to attend the board meeting of an insolvent
corporation, and that they did not meet the required st~dards necessary to be members of
such boards as set forth under the corporations' bylaws. The Defendants inappropriately
pennitted and/or assisted two interested parties, Connie Taylor and James Beck, to
approve and/or consent to a Joint Retainer and Joint Defense Agreement with Hawley
Troxell and others, which also facilitated the inappropriate joint legal representations of
interested parties with conflicting irreconcilable interests and the payment of attomeys'
fees and costs to various attorneys in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and
their duty of care.
45.

Despite demands to the contrary, the Defendants continued to take

instructions and/or directives from the unauthorized boards (or R. John Taylor) of AIA
Services Corporation and/or AJA Insurance, Inc. knowiilg that the boards are not properly
seated and are comprised of interested parties (including R. John Taylor) with significant
claims that should be asserted against them in violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, their duty of care, and/or the law.
IV. FIRST CAUSES OF ACTIONS
46.

The Defendants have damaged Reed J. Taylor by aiding and abetting

and/or assisting others (including R. John Taylor

and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.)

in the commission oftortious acts.

.· .
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47.

The Defendants committed tortious acts in concert with others (including

R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) and/or pursuant to a common
design or civil conspiracy with others (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc.).

48.

The Defendants knew that the conduct of others (including R. John Taylor

and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) constituted breach of duties and gave substantial
assistance and/or encouragement to others (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc.) in breaching said duties.

The Defendants' conduct also

constitutes the assistance of interested parties (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc.) with the tortious interference of AIA Services Corporation and
Reed J. Taylor's contractual rights, which such contractual rights the Defendants had
intimate knowledge.
49.

The Defendants gave substantial assistance to others (including R. John

Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) in committing and/or accomplishing
tortious conduct and/or acts, and the Defendants' conduct, separately considered,
constitutes the breaches of duties owed to the corporations and/or Reed J. Taylor.
50.

The Defendants conduct constitutes aiding and abetting of others

(including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) and/or constitutes the
conduct of a contributing tortfeasors, and such conduct has damaged Plaintiff Reed J.
Taylor in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.
V. SECOND CAUSES OF ACTIONS
51.

...

Reed J. Taylor holds and has held a valid and perfected security interest in

all of the commissions and related receivables of AIA Services Corporation and AIA
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Insurance, Inc.
All of the shares of AIA Insurance, Inc. were pledged to Reed J. Taylor as

52.

collateral for the over $8,500,000 owed to him by AIA Services Corporation. By way of
this pledge and his prior vote of the stock in February 2007, Reed J. Taylor is entitled to
possession and control of all of the assets of AIA Insurance, Inc.
53.

The Defendants were fully aware of Reed J. Taylor's rights to property in

which he held a security interest and was pledged to him as collateral. In fact, Defendant ·
Richard A. Riley represented AIA Services Corporation in the redemption of Reed J.
Taylor's shares and the drafting of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement
and other applicable agreements. Defendants were responsible for issuing opinion letters
relating to the transaction, which include various applicable representations and

warranties. Defendants are now asserting arguments counter to the representations made
in the opinion letter drafted by Defendants by and through Defendant Richard A. Riley.

Defendants also assisted in the commission of torts by R. John Taylor, Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc., and other interested parties by representing the corporations in
various inappropriate transactions.
54.

The Defendants have received substantial payments believed to exceed

$500,000 for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs, which such payments the
Defendants bad no lawful right to possess or retain and were received in violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care.
55.

The Defendants also knew that the disinterested minority shareholders of

AIA Services Corporation (innocent shareholders) were never advised of the significant
claims against the interested parties (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance
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Agency, Inc.) and the significant misappropriation of the corporations• assets, but

provided legal services on behalf of the interested parties and accepted payment from
AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. In connection with the payment of
attorneys' fees and costs to other named parties in Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et
al., the Defendants failed to obtain the necessary approvals from Reed J. Taylor or other

disinterested parties to the detriment of the corporations and Reed J. Taylor.

The·

Defendants also assisted in the inappropriate titling and pledging of a $1.2 Million
Mortgage owned by AJA Services Corporation to facilitate the payment of funds to them.

The Defendants have also accepted the payment of services for attorneys' fees and costs
rendered for Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., which were paid by the money and/or
assets of AIA Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc.
56.

The Defendants' conduct constitutes the willful interference with property

and money belonging to AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc. and/or Reed J.
Taylor and/or which such property and money should be under the possession and/or
control of Reed J. Taylor. as the person entitled to such money and property as a creditor
and pledgee. The Defendants deprived Reed J. Taylor possession of such property and

money. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands, the Defendants have refused to return such
property and money.
57.

The Defendants' conduct constitutes conversion and such conduct has

damaged Reed J. Taylor in an amount to proven at trial or on summary judgment.
VI. THIRD CAUSES OF ACTIONS

58.

The Defendants' conduct has been unconscionable. The have engaged in

acts, conduct, and representations that were false, misleading, deceptive and/or

~
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violation of I.C. § 48-601, et seq. The Defendants' acts, omission, representations and
conduct constitute unfair and/or deceptive acts and/or practices in trade pertaining to the
practice of law pursuant to I.C. § 48-601, et seq.
59.

The Defendants' actions have resulted in the loss of over 25% of Reed J.

Taylor's retirement funds and/or such other harm as set forth under I.C. § 48-608(2)(a).
As such, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor is entitled damages, which such amount is also subject
to treble damages pursuant to r.c. § 48-608.
VII. FOURm CAUSES OF ACTIONS

60.

AIA Services Corporation is a trustee of Reed J. Taylor in light of its

insolvency and the fact that it owes Reed J. Taylor over $8,500,000. At the very least,
AIA Insurance, Inc. is a trustee of Reed J. Taylor because all of its shares are pledged to
Reed J. Taylor and he voted the shares in February 2007 naming himself the sole director
and officer of AIA Insurance, Inc.
61.

The Defendants' clients were trustees and/or fiduciaries performing

similar functions for a non-client, Reed J. Taylor. The Defendants knew that their
appropriate actions were necessary with respect to the representation of AIA Services
Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. to take action to prevent and/or rectify the
breaches of fiduciary duties owed by AIA Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance,
Inc. to Reed J. Taylor when such breaches were crimes and/or fraud and/or the
Defendants assisted and/or are assisting in the breaches. Reed J. Taylor was not able to
protect his rights because of the Defendants' actions and the Defendants' obligations to
AIA Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. would not be significantly
impaired because the best interests of all the foregoing is to collect sums owed by others
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and recover damages for the improper tortious conduct of others (including R. John
Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.);
62.

The Defendants owed AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc.

and/or Reed J. Taylor a duty of care to provide, including, but not limited to, reasonable,
prudent, ethical, unconflicted, loyal and professional legal advice and legal representation
in keeping with the standard of care in the legal profession and as owed to the
corporations (referred to herein and above as "duty of c~"). The Defendants breached
their duty of care as a result of their acts and/or omissions thereby damaging the

corporations and Reed J. Taylor, to the detriment of Reed J. Taylor.
63.

The Defendants breached their fiduciary duties owed to AIA Services

Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and/or Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, including, without
limitation. the duties of care and loyalty.
64.

The Defendants' acts constitute professional negligence and/or breach of

the Defendants' fiduciary duties, and such conduct has damaged the corporations and
Reed J. Taylor, in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.

Vlll. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor demands a trial by jury of not less than twelve

(12) on all claims and damages so triable.
IX. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor prays for the following relief:

1.

For a judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, for $10,500,000

in damages ($3,500,000 in actual damages and $7,000,000 in treble damages), the exact

.

.

amount of which will be proven at trial and/or on summary judgment, plus an award of
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pre-judgment and post-judgment interest;
2.

For a judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, for treble

damages of $7,000,000, the exact amount to be proven at trial pursuant to I.C. § 48608(2);

3.

For a judgment requiring the disgorgement of the payments of all

attorneys' fees and costs paid to the Defendants by AIA Services Corporation and/or AIA
Insurance, Inc.;
_;

4.

For judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, for additional

dam.ages as provided under I.C. § 48-608;
5.

For such other relief as may be available to Reed J. Taylor pursuant to I.C.

§ 48-601, et seq. or the law, including, without limitation, obtaining a preliminary

injunction to restrain the Defendants from undertaking further representation;
6.

For an award of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's attorneys fees and costs

incurred in this action pursuant to Idaho Law, including, without limitation, I.C. § 48-

608, I.C. § 12-120 and/or I.C. § 12-121; and
7.

For such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

t

DATED thi~ day of August, 2008.

.

CAMPBELL, BISSELL &

YPLLC
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MICHAEL S. BISSELL, lSB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, VIA 99201
Tel: (509) 455· 7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TilE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.:
Plaintiff,

CV8 8 • 01 7 6 3

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

v.
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

MICHAELE. MCNICHOLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS, BROWN & MCNICHOLS,
P.A., an Idaho professional corporation; JANE
DOES 1-V, unknown individuals;

Category: A.1.
Fee: $88.00

Defendants.
Reed J. Taylor, by and through his attorneys of record, CAMPBELL, BISSELL &
KIRBY, PLLC, alleges as follows (all applicable facts alleged below are incorporated by
reference into each cause of action as necessary to suppprt each such cause of action):

I. PARTIES
1.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor is a resident of Lewiston, Nez Perce County,

Idaho. Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor is an elderly person as defined in I.C. § 48-608.
2.

Defendant Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. ("Clements Brown") is

an Idaho professional corporation in the business of practicing law. Clements Brown is
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vicariously liable for the acts of the individual Defendants.
3.

Defendant Michael E. McNichols is an individual residing in the state of

Idaho and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Clements
Brown.
4.

Jane Does 1-V are unknown individuals who are and/or were attorneys that

participated in the tortious acts and conduct alleged against the above known defendants.
II. JURISDICTION. VENUE AND CLAIMS

5.

The Defendants transacted business through the practice of Jaw in Nez

Perce County, Idaho, and have an expectation of being named as defendants in Nez Perce
County, Idaho.

The Defendants committed tortious acts and/or assisted in the

commission of tortious acts in Nez Perce County, fdaho. The Defendants' tortious acts
and/or assistance have inflicted damages upon a resident of Nez Perce CoWlty, Idaho.
6.

Damages in this action exceed $10,000.

Jurisdiction and venue are,

therefore, appropriate in Nez Perce County District Court.
7.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Complaint is not a derivative action. Plaintiff

Reed J. Taylor is the pledgee of all of the shares of AIA Insurance, Inc., the only
shareholder of AIA Insurance, Inc. by way of holding all of its shares as collateral, and
the largest creditor of AJA Services Corporation (Reed J. Taylor is owed over $8,500,000
and AIA Services Corporation is insolvent).

AIA Services Corporation and AIA

fnsurance, Inc. 's value and net assets are insufficient to pay the over $8,500,000, plus
interest and attorneys' fees and costs, owed to Reed J. Taylor. Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor is
entitled to bring certain claims directly against the Defendants for certain damages.

COMPLAINT - 2

000410

III. FACTS

8.

At all material times, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor was owed over $6,000,000

by AJA Services Corporation through a promissory note dated August 11 1995. Plaintiff
Reed J. Taylor is presently owed over $8,500,000 by AJA Services Corporation. At all
material times, the Defendants had full knowledge of AIA Services Corporation's debt
and contractual obligations owed to Reed J. Taylor.

9.

AJA Services Corporation was in default of the $6,000,000 promissory

note when it failed to pay the note when it matured on August l, 2005. Although
unnecessary since the $6,000,000 promissory note matured. on August 1, 2005, demand
for payment was properly served upon AIA Services Corporation by Plaintiff Reed J.

Taylor on December 12, 2006. AJA Services Corporation was insolvent in 2001, and has
continued to be insolvent from said date.
10.

Since 1996, as security for the over $8,500,000 owed by AJA Services

Corporation, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor was granted and possessed a security interest in all
of the stock of AJA Insurance, Inc. and all of the commissions and related receivables of
AJA Insurance, Inc. and AJA Services Corporation. Pursuant to the Amended and
Restated Stock Pledge Agreement dated July l, 1996, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor had the
contractual right upon default of AJA Services Corporation to vote the stock of AJA
Insurance, Inc., and take operational control of AIA Insurance, Inc. Plaintiff Reed J.
Taylor's right to vote the stock of AIA Insi.irance was also perfected through AIA
Services Corporation's irrevocable power of attorney gcanted to Reed J. Taylor that was
coupled with an interest as required by I.C § 30-1-722.

COMPLAINT - 3

000411

11.

On February 22, 2007, Reed J. Taylor voted the stock of AIA Insurance,

Inc. and attempted to take control of it pursuant to his contractual rights as provided
under the law, the contract documents, and I.C. § 30-1-722. However, the interested
directors of AIA Insurance, Inc. (including R. John Taylor) by and through the
Defendants intentionaUy assisted in breaching the terms of the Amended and Restated
Stock Pledge Agreement and refused to acknowledge Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's valid vote
of the stock of AIA Insurance, Inc. and refused to surrender control as required. The
Defendants further engaged in inappropriate conduct in assisting interested parties
(including R. John Taylor) in obtaining and/or maintaining a restraining order and
preliminary injunction against Plaintiff Reed J, Taylor, when the Defendants knew there
was no legitimate legal basis to do so, that doing so was an intentional violation and
tortious interference with Reed J. Taylor's contractual rights, and that the assets and
funds of AIA Insurance, Inc. were being misappropriated and/or not safeguarded.
12.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor has a pending civil action against AIA Services

Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor, and
others for claims of fraud, fraudulent conveyance, civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches
of fiduciary duties and other claims under Nez Perce County Case No. CV-07-00208
("Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al.'1; and therein Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

obtained an order of partial summary judgment for AIA Services Corporation's default of
the $6,000,000 promissory note and corresponding default of the Amended and Restated

Stock Pledge Agreement By way of this partial summary judgment and/or his prior vote
of the stock, Reed J. Taylor would and should be in actual control of AIA Insurance, Inc.
but for the actions and R. John Taylor, which Defendants, with full knowledge of Reed J.
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Taylor's rights, facilitated and aided and abetted to the detriment of AIA Services
Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and Reed J. Taylor.
13.

In 2007, Defendants appeared in the civil action, Taylor v. AJA Services

Corporation, et al., and assumed the direct legal representation of three distinct clients,
AIA Services Corporation, a corporation, AJA Insurance, Inc., a corporation, and John
Taylor, an individual, and indirect legal representation of other interested parties
(including Connie Taylor, James Beck and Michael Cashman). At all material times R.
John Taylor was an interested CEO and director of AIA Services Corporation and AIA
Insurance, Inc. and an interested majority shareholder of AJA Services Corporation. The
civil action clearly alleged acts of fraud, civil conspiracy, conversion, and breaches of
fiduciary duty perpetrated by R. John Taylor and others against AJA Services
Corporation and AJA Insurance, Inc., and such acts having damaged and continuing to
cause damages to the corporations, their shareholders and creditors. In violation of the
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and Defendants' duty of care, the Defendants
undertook to represent the three named clients, each having irreconcilable conflicts of
interest with the others.

14.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's attorney, Roderick C. Bond, advised the

Defendants in early 2007, that it was a violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct and duty of care to represent AJA Services Corporation. AJA Insurance, Inc.,
and R. John Taylor because of various conflicts of interest. On March 28, 2007, the
Defendants finally recognized the violation and withdrew from representing AIA
Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. Although the Defendants should have
withdrawn from representing R. John Taylor, AJA Services Corporation and AJA
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Insurance, Inc. in Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al., the Defendants committed a
further violation of the Idaho Rules of Professioniµ

~onduct

and their duty of care by

terminating the representation of the corporations and continuing to represent R. John
Taylor, which was a breach of their duty of ·loyalty to the corporations. Defendants'
actions constitute a violation of the "hot potato" doctrine.

15.

The Defendants inappropriately entered into and/or participated in a Joint

Defense Agreement(s) knowing that AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc.,
Crop USA Insurance, Inc., R. John Taylor and other named and unnamed individuals in

Taylor v. A/A Services Corporation, et al. had clear irreconcilable conflicting and
diverging interests in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Defendants'
duty of care, and to the detriment AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and
Reed J. Taylor. In Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al., a Joint Defense Agreement
was not permissible or appropriate because it would perpetuate fraud, conspiracy, aiding
and abetting, and other causes of action, was entered into without obtaining informed
consent from disinterested representatives of the corporations, and the Joint Defense
Agreement was also independently not appropriate or permitted when certain parties to a
joint defense agreement should be asserting claims against other parties to the agreement.
The Joint Defense Agreement(s) in question have assisted in others (including R. John
Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) to perpetrate and/or hide acts of fraud,
fraudulent conveyances, civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and
other claims, while also assisting the Defendants in inappropriately obtaining payment of
fees and costs in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care.
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16.

The Defendants assisted AJA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc.,

Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor, and others in taking action that was
not in the best interests of the corporations, not authorized by disinterested parties, and/or
done so without requiring AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and/or Crop
USA Insurance Agency, Inc. to retain separate independent counsel that were retained by
separate independent uninterested parties.
17.

As attorneys for AIA Services Corporation, an entity, the Defendants

owed duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care,
and the law to the corporation and its shareholders to preserve and protect the assets and
businesses of the corporation, and since AIA Services Corporation was insolvent, to its
creditors including Reed J. Taylor. As attorney for AIA Services Corporation, and in
light of the claims made against R. John Taylor and others by the Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor,
the Defendants owed a duty to their entity client not to asswne representation of the
interests of R. John Taylor, individually and/or through a Joint Defense Agreement, or
with any other interested parties.
18.

As attorneys for AIA Insurance, Inc., the corporation, the Defendants

owed duties as provide<t by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care,
and the law to the corporation and its shareholders including a creditor pledgee of the
corporation's stock, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, with contractual rights to vote the shares and
assume control and who had exercised his contractual rights and had voted the shares but
whose rights were breached and rejected by interested directors and others who were in
control of the corporation including R. John Taylor. As attorneys for AIA Insurance, Inc.
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and in light of the claims made against R. John Taylor and others by the Plaintiff Reed J.
Taylor, the Defendants owed a duty to their corporate client not to assume representation
of the interests of R. John Taylor, individually and/or through any Joint Defense
Agreement, and/or of other interested parties (including Crop USA Insurance Agency,
Inc.).
19.

As attorneys for R. John Taylor, individually and through any Joint

Defense Agreement, the Defendants owed their duties first and foremost to A1A Services
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct and their duty of care. As attorneys for R. John Taylor by and through taking
directions and/or accepting decisions made by him knowing that he was interested and
should have claims asserted against him, and in light of the claims against R. John Taylor
by the Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, the Defendants owed a duty to their corporation clients
not to assume representation of any party other than that of the interests of AIA Services
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc.

The Defendants failed to notify or obtain

appropriate infonned consents or approvals from appropriate parties or disinterested
shareholders in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care, and the
Bylaws and Articles of Fonnation of the corporations, all to the detriment of Reed J.
Taylor. The Defendants inappropriately participated in the Joint Defense Agreement.
20.

As fonner attorneys' for AIA Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance,

Inc., the Defendants owed duties of loyalty to the corporations and could not represent R.
John Taylor in Taylor v. AIA Services Corporation, et al., represent the interests of other
interested parties because the Defendants' loyalty belongs also with AIA Services
Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. Furthermore, the Defendants could in no way
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represent the interests of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. or participate in any joint
defense of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. or other interested parties (such as R. John
Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, and/or Michael Cashman) as AIA Services
Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. should have been asserting claims against Crop
USA Insurance Agency, Inc., each other, and other interested parties.
21.

Defendants represented, and continues to represent, R. John Taylor

(individually and through any Joint Defense Agreement) and with full knowledge that R.
John Taylor is an interested party and director of AIA Services Corporation and AIA

Insurance, Inc. and is personally inappropriately conducting and controlling the course of
litigation involving the Defendants' former clients, AIA Services Corporation and AIA
Insurance, Inc., to the detriment of Defendants' fonner clients, AIA Services Corporation
and AIA Insurance, Inc.
22.

During the course of the civil action after March 28, 2007, the Defendants

have coordinated and participated with Quarles & Brady LLP, the law firm that has
represented AJA Services and AIA Services Corporation before and throughout litigation,
and Hawley Troxell, the law finn that asswned the representation of AIA Service
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. from the Defendants (and later the inappropriate
representation of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.). During the course of the civil
action after March 28, 2007, R. John Taylor and others have further engaged in
inappropriate and/or wrongful transactions involving themselves, AIA Services
Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., which
transactions have occurred with Defendants knowledge and/or assistance, and to the
detriment of AJA Services Corporation, AIA Inshrance~ Inc., and Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
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as creditor and stock pledgee.
23.

Defendants are liable to Reed J. Taylor ~or an amount to be proven at trial

because the Defendants have provided substantial assistance and/or aided and abetted R.
John Taylor, AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc., and other interested parties in acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances,
conversion, civil conspiracy, and breaches of fiduciary duties.

The acts of fraud,

fraudulent conveyances, conversion, civil conspiracy, and breaches of fiduciary duties
include, but are not limited to: 1) While purporting to represent AIA Insurance, Inc. and
AIA Services Corporation, the Defendants assisted and/or aided and abetted R. John
Taylor in the tortious interference with the assertion of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's
contractual rights to control and operate AIA Insurance, Inc., which has proximately
caused damages to Reed J. Taylor; 2) While purporting to represent AIA Services
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc., the Defendants inappropriately assisted and/or
aided and abetted R. John Taylor and other interested paities to engage in tortious

transactions involving R. John Taylor, AlA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc.,
and/or Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., which such transactions have been to the
detriment of AIA Services Corporation, ATA Insurance, Inc., and Reed J. Taylor, and
proximately caused damages to Reed J. Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee; and 3)
While representing R. John Taylor, individually and through a Joint Defense Agreement,
the Defendants have had fulJ knowledge that their client is an interested party and

director of AIA Services Corporation, AJA Insurance, Inc., and Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc., and is personally conducting and controlling the course of litigation
involving the Defendants' former cJients, AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance,
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Inc., and Defendants have assisted and/or aided and abetted R. John Taylor and others
(including, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) and has coordinated and participated with
the Hawley Troxell and Quarles & Brady in R. John Taylor's engaging in tortious
transactions involving himself, AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and Crop
USA Insurance Agency, Inc., which transactions have been to the detriment of AIA
Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. and proximately caused damages to Reed
J. Taylor as a creditor and stock pledgee.
24.

In connection with the Defendants' inappropriate representation and/or

joint defense of R John Taylor, AJA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., Crop
USA Insurance Agency, Inc., and other interested parties, the Defendants accepted
payments of attorneys fees and costs believ~ to exceed $100,000 in violation of the
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care, and as participating and/or
assisting in inappropriate corporate acts and the aiding and abetting of others.
25.

Over the course of the litigation in Reed J. Taylor v. AJA Services

Corporation, et al., Reed J. Taylor's attorney in that action, Roderick C. Bond of Smith,

Cannon & Bond PLLC, advised the DefendantS on numerous occasions that their conduct
violated Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care, was inappropriate,
and constituted the aiding and abetting of other interested and uninterested parties
(including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.), among other potential
legal claims against them. In early 2007, Mr. Bond advised the Defendants that their
inappropriate actions would result in claims being filed against them by Reed J. Taylor.
Mr. Bond reiterated these warnings orally and in writing on numerous occasions. Despite
Mr. Bond's warnings, the Defendants conduct persisted thereby further damaging Reed J.
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Taylor. The Defendants disregard of Mr. Bond's warnings can only be construed as
intentional improper acts to assist R. John Taylor and other interested parties to the
detriment of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor and others.

26.

The Defendants wrongfully assisted R. John Taylor and other interested

parties in operating Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. with the funds, assets, employees,
trade secrets and other things of value inappropriately obtained from AJA Services
Corporation and/or AJA Insurance, Inc., and by assisting R John Taylor and other
interested parties (including Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) in preventing claims
from being asserted and prosecuted against them. The Defendants wrongfully assisted
and/or failed to prevent interested parties (including R. John Taylor) in transferring the
long~tenn

employees of AIA Insurance, Inc. to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., while

at the same time representing to the Court in Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation that the

corporations were being operated properly and/or failing to advise the Court of the
inappropriate acts and transactions. All the while the Defendants were aware of and/or
assisted in the inappropriate payment of salaries, benefits, compensation, and director
fees of $20,000 per year when AJA Services Corporation was insolvent.
27.

Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made personally and through his

attorney Roderick C. Bond) that the Defendants take action to protect the assets and
funds of AIA Services Corporation and AJA Insurance, Inc. and recover funds and assets
from R. John Taylor, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. and other interested and
uninterested parties for the benefit of the corporations and Reed J. Taylor, the Defendants
refused to act in accordance with the Rules of Profession Conduct, their duty of care, and
the law. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made through his attorney Roderick C.
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Bond) that interests of the minority disinterested shareholders be considered and/or
protected because of the wrongful acts of R. John Taylor and other interested parties, the
Defendants refused to act and failed to fully and properly disclose all pertinent facts to
the disinterested shareholders and request their votes.
28.

In various motions, responses and affidavits submitted to the court in

Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al., the Defendants made arguments that did not
benefit AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., or Reed J. Taylor,
inappropriately made other arguments preventing valid claims from being asserted
against R. John Taylor, James Beck, Connie Taylor, Michael Cashman, and other
interested and uninterested parties, and failed to take action against responsible parties
(including R. John Taylor, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., Connie Taylor, James
Beck, Michael Cashman, Lancelot Investors Fund, and others).

In the instance of

Michael Cashman, the Defendants successfully argued to the Court in Taylor v. AJA

Services Corporation, et al. that Mr. Cashman should not be named as an individual
when the Defendants should have been taking action against Mr. Cashman and others.
29.

Despite Reed J. Tayl9r's demands (made through his attorney Roderick C.

Bond) that disinterested directors and/or parties must direct the litigation on behalf of the
corporations, the Defendants refused and permitted and/or assisted R. John Taylor and
other interested parties to direct the litigation to the detriment of the corporations and
Reed J. Taylor. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made through his attorney Roderick
C. Bond) that action be taken to terminate AIA Insurance, Inc.'s improper guarantee of a
$15,000,000 line-of-credit for Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., the Defendants refused

to act, failed to inform or fully disclose to disinterested parties or shareholders the
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existence of such inappropriate loan guarantees.
30.

The Defendants' conduct has violated Idaho Rules of Professional

Conduct and their duty of care, which require the Defendants to disgorge all attorneys'
fees and costs paid to them in Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al. and other related

..

and unrelated legal representations. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made through his
attorney Roderick C. Bond) to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct and their
duty of care, the Defendants refused to do so.
31.

Through the acts of the Defendants, the 'value of AIA Insurance, Inc. and

the assets of AIA Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. have plummeted in
value, the cOiporations' value and ~sets have been impaired, and/or the assets and funds
have been transferred to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. Through the acts of the
Defendants, ownership of Crop USA ·Insurance Agency, Inc. has remained vested in
interested parties (including R. John Taylor), while the major creditor Reed J. Taylor and
minority shareholders have been left with nothing. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands
(through his attorney Roderick C. Bond) that action should also be taken for the interests
of the innocent minority shareholders and creditors, the Defendants have refused to take
action and inappropriately assisted the interested parties (including R. John Taylor,
Connie Taylor, James Beck and Michael Cashman).
32.

Despite the Defendants having made several legal arguments that lacked

merit, lacked good faith and/or were not grounded in facts, the Defendants provided a
settlement offer to Reed J. Taylor in Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al., which
included a provision that he release all claims against the Defendants as a condition of the
settlement. The inclusion of such a provision was a violation of the Rules of Professional
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Conduct and Defendants' duty of care.

The Defendants also refused to make any

provisions for disinterested minority shareholders of AIA Services Corporation as
requested by Reed J. Taylor.
33.

The Defendants have assisted in the inappropriate acts of R. John Taylor

and other interested parties in stopping all payments to Reed J. Taylor and Donna J.
Taylor, Reed J. Taylor's former wife and the holder of all outstanding Preferred A Shares
of AJA Services Corporation. Like Reed J. Taylor, Donna J. Taylor is required to be a
member of the board of directors of AIA Services Corporation. Like Reed J. Taylor, the
Defendants have assisted R. John Taylor and other interested parties in preventing Reed

J. Taylor and Donna J. Taylor from being members of the board of directors of AIA
Services Corporation, which has further far reaching ramifications and results in
additional damages against the Defendants.
34.

With full knowledge of AIA Services Corporation's obligations to ensure

that Reed J. Taylor and Donna J. Taylor are members of its board until they were paid in
full, the Defendants proceeded to attend and participate in inappropriate board meetings
and take inappropriate action based upon bo.ard meetings held by interested directors
without Reed J. Taylor or Donna J. Taylor being present, which results in all such
meetings and decisions being null and void, and the Defendants being liable for the
associated damages.
35.

The Defendants assisted and/or failed to prevent and/or notify

disinterested parties that AIA Services Corporation had inappropriately pledged its sole
remaining other significant asset, the $1,200,000 mortgage, to Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc. to facilitate the payment of the Defendants' services in violation of the
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Rules of Professional Conduct and the law.

36.

The Defendants omitted and/or misrepresented material facts to the Court

in Taylor v. A/A Servicei Corporation, et al. to the detriment of Reed J. Taylor. In
several instances, the Defendants persuaded the Court to take action that was not in the
best interests of the corporations or Reed J. Taylor, to the detriment

of the corporations

and Reed J. Taylor (including consenting to the issuance of only a $200,000 bond when
the Defendants knew that the coiporations were not being operated properly or their
assets safeguarded).

37.

The Defendants have inappropriately assisted R. John Taylor and other

interested parties in misallocating and not allocating expenses and/or

~ervices

provided

and borne by AJA Insurance, Inc. and/or AIA Services· Corporation for the benefit of
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor and other interested parties.
38.

The Defendants had fu]) knowledge of R. John Taylor's Executive

Officer's Agreement.

Even though ~- John Taylor has breached the terms of his

employment contract with AIA Services' Corporation by competing against AIA Services
Corporation through Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. (and violating the corporate
opportunity doctrine), by soliciting employees of AIA Insurance, Inc., and other
inappropriate actions, the Defendants intentionally refused to act in the best interests of
AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., their shareholders, and/or Reed J. Taylor.

39.

The Defendants assisted in inappropriately transferring and retaining

funds, assets and property to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. to defraud AIA Services
Corporation's creditor Reed J. Taylor (including, without limitation, over $95,000 owed

by Pacific Empire Radio CoCporation to AIA Insurance, Inc., assistance in transferring
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shares of the Pacific Empire Radio Corporation to R. John Taylor, and failing to co11ect
the over $300,000 owed by R. John Taylor) by not reporting such acts to disinterested
parties or other appropriate parties. as required by the Rules of Professional Conduct.
40.

In April 2007, the Defendants permitted and/or assisted interested parties

in holding a joint board meeting of AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc.
with full knowledge that Reed J. Taylor and Donna J. Taylor were being intentionally

denied their right to be on the board of AIA Services Corporation and participating in
such meetings {Donna Taylor has subordinated her right to payment in favor of Reed J.
Taylor). At the meeting held in April 2007, the Defendants pennitted and/or assisted R.
John Taylor to appoint Connie Taylor and James Beck to the boards of AIA Services

Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. knowing that they were interested parties who AIA
Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. should be pursuing claims against, that
they inappropriately held shares in Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., that they were
inappropriately being paid $20,000 per year to attend the board meeting of an insolvent
corporation, and that they did not meet the required standards necessary to be members of
such boards as set forth under the corporations' bylaws. The Defendants inappropriately
permitted and/or assisted two interested parties, Connie Taylor and James Beck, to

approve and/or consent to a Joint Retainer and Joint Defense Agreement with Hawley
Troxell and others, which also facilitated the inappropriate joint legal representations of
interested parties with conflicting irreconcilable interests and the payment of attorneys'
fees and costs to various attorneys in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and
their duty of care.
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41.

Despite demands to the contrary, the Defendants continued to take

instructions and/or directives from the unauthorized boards (or R. John Taylor) of AIA
Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, In.c. kl;towing that the boards arc not properly
seated and are comprised of interested parties (including R. John Taylor) with significant
claims that should be asserted against them in violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct and the law.
IV. FIRST CAUSES OF ACTIONS
42.

The Defendants have damaged Reed J. Taylor by aiding and abetting

and/or assisting others (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.)
in the commission oftortious acts.
43.

The Defendants committed tortious acts in concert with others (including

R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) and/or pursuant to a common

design or civil conspiracy with others (including R: John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc.). The Defendants' conduct ·also constitutes the assistance of interested
parties (including R. John Taylor) with ,the tortious interference of AIA Services
Corporation and Reed J. Taylor's contractual rights, which such contractual rights the
Defendants had intimate knowledge.
44.

The Defendants knew that the conduct of others (including R. John Taylor

and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) constituted breach of duties and gave substantial
assistance and/or encouragement to others (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc.) in breaching said duties.
45.

The Defendants gave substantial assistance to others (including R. John

Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) in committing and/or accomplishing
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tortious conduct and/or acts, and the Defendants' conduct, separately considered,
constitutes the breaches of duties owed to the corporations and/or Reed J. Taylor.
46.

The Defendants conduct constitutes aiding and abetting of others

(including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) and/or constitutes the
conduct of a contributing tortfeasors, and such conduct has damaged

~laintiff

Reed J.

Taylor in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.
V. SECOND CAUSES OF ACTIONS
47.

Reed J. Taylor holds and has held a valid and perfected security interest in

all of the commissions and related receivables of AIA Seivices Corporation and AIA
Insurance, Inc.
48.

All of the shares of AIA Insurance, Inc. were pledged to Reed J. Taylor as ·

collateral for the over $8,500,000 owed to him by AIA Services Corporation. By way of
this pledge and his prior vote of the stock in February 2007, Reed J. Taylor is entitled to
possession and control of all of the assets of AJA Insurance, Inc.
49.

The Defendants were fully aware of ~eed J. Taylor's rights to property in

which he held a security interest and was pledged t,o ·him as collateral.
50.

The Defendants have received substantiaJ payments believed to exceed

$100,000 for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs, which were payments the
Defendants had no lawful right to possess or retain and were received in violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct.
52.

The Defendants also knew that the disinterested minority shareholders of

AIA Services Corporation (innocent shareholders) were never advised of the significant
claims against the interested parties (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance
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Agency, Inc.) and the significant misappropriation :of the corporations' assets, but
provided legal services on behalf of the interested parties and accepted payment from
AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. Jn connection with the payment of
attorneys' fees and costs to other named parties in Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et
al., the Defendants failed to obtain the necessary approvals from Reed J. Taylor or other

disinterested parties to the detriment of the corporations and Reed J. Taylor.
53.

The Defendants' conduct constitutes the willful interference with property

and money belonging to AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and/or Reed J.
Taylor and/or which such property and money should be under the possession and/or
control of Reed J. Taylor, as the person entitled to such money and property as a creditor
and pledgee. The Defendants deprived Reed J. Taylor possession of such property and
money. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands, the Defendants have refused to return such
property and money.
54.

The Defendants' conduct constitutes conversion and such conduct has

damaged Reed J. Taylor in an amount to proven at trial or on summary judgment.
VI. THIRD CAUSES OF ACTIONS
55.

The Defendants' conduct has been unconscionable. The have engaged in

acts, conduct, and representations that were false, misleading, deceptive and/or a
violation of J.C. § 48-601, et seq. The Defendants' acts, omission, representations and
conduct constitute unfair and/or deceptive acts and/or practices in trade pertaining to the
practice of law pursuant to l.C. § 48-601, et seq.
56.

The Defendants' actions have resulted in the loss of over 25% of Reed J.

Taylor's retirement funds and/or such other hann as set forth under I.C. § 48-608(2)(a).
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As such, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor is entitled damages, which such amount is also subject
to treble damages pursuant to l.C. § 48-608.
VII. FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTIONS

57.

AIA Services Corporation is a trustee of Reed J. Taylor in light of its

insolvency and the fact that it owes Reed J. Taylor over $8,500,000. At the very least,
AIA Insurance, Inc. is a trustee of Reed J. Taylor because all of its shares are pledged to
Reed J. Taylor and he voted the shares in February 2007 naming himself the sole director
and officer of AIA Insurance, Inc.

58.

The Defendants' clients were trustees and/or fiduciaries performing

similar functions for a non-client, Reed J. Taylor. The Defendants knew that their
appropriate actions were necessary with respect to the representation of AIA Services
Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. to take action to prevent and/or rectify the
breaches of fiduciary duties owed by AIA Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance,
Inc. to Reed J. Taylor when such breaches were crimes and/or fraud and/or the
Defendants assisted and/or are assisting in the breaches. Reed J, Taylor was not able to
protect his rights because of the Defendants' actions and the Defendants' obligations to
AIA Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. would not be significantly
impaired because the best interests of all the foregoing is to collect swns owed by others
and recover damages for the improper tortious conduct of others (including R. John
Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.).
59.

The Defendants owed AIA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc.

and/or Reed J. Taylor a duty of care to provide, including but not limited to, reasonable,
prudent, ethical, unconflicted, loyal and professional legal advice and legal representation
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in keeping with the standard of care in the legal profession and as owed to the
corporations (referred to herein and above as "duty of care"). The Defendants breached
their duty of care as a result of their acts and/or omissions thereby damaging the
corporations and Reed J. Taylor, to the detriment of Reed J. Taylor.
60.

The Defendants breached their fiduciary duties owed to AIA Services

Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and/or Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, including, without
limitation, the duties of care and loyalty.
61.

The Defendants, acts constitute professional negligence and/or breach of

the Defendants' fiduciary duties, and such conduct bas damaged Reed J. Taylor in an
amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.
VIIl. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

1.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor demands a trial by jury of not less than twelve

(12) on all claims and damages so triable.
IX. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor prays for the following relief:
1.

For a judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, for $6,000,000

in damages ($2,000,000 in actual damages and $4,000,000 in treble damages), the exact
amount of which will be proven at trial and/or on summary judgment, plus an award of
pre-judgment and post-judgment i1;1terest;
2.

For a judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, for treble

damages of $4,000,000, the exact .amount to be proven at trial pursuant to I.C. § 48608(2);
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3.

For a judgment requiring the disgorgement of the payments of all

attorneys' fees and costs paid to the Defendants by AJA Services Corporation and/or AJA

Insurance, Inc.;
4.

For judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, for additional

damages as provided under I.C. § 48-608;
5.

For such other relief as may be available to Reed J. Taylor pursuant to LC.

§ 48-601, et seq. or the law, including, without limitation, obtaining a preliminary

injunction to restrain the Defendants from undertaking further representation;

6.

For an award of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's attorneys fees and costs

incurred in this action pursuant to Idaho Law, including, without limitation, LC. § 48608, J.C.§ 12-120 and/or J.C.§ 12-121; and
7.

For such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

DATED this /b'1ay of August, 2008.

CAMPBELL, BISSELL &

By:•e:!_~~~~~~----~

Michael S. Bissell
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
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MICHAEL s. BISSELL, ISB No. 57BJ:~···' ., ' ··- · . ", .. '..~.,.-.-~~s
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC ~~r;;·fyk-_.\.,:'~··"'"·
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, VIA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OE IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CVOS-01765

Plaintiff,

•

v.
PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S

GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X,
unknown individuals;

MOTION AND MEMORANDUM OF
LAW TO .AMEND COMPLAINT

Defendants.
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") moves the Court for an Order to Amend
and Supplement his Complaint in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A
I. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON
This Motion and Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion, the attached Exhibit

A, and the Court's file.

EXHIBITP

PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM OF
LAVI TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 1
000432

IT. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT
"[A] party may amend a pleading only by leave of the court ... and leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires ... " I.R.C.P. 15(a). Similarly, a party may move to
supplement a "pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have
happened since the date of the pleading sough to be supplemented ... " I.R.C.P. 15(d).
"Great liberty should be shown in allowing amendments to pleadings in furtherance of
justice between parties." Smith v. Shinn, 82 Idaho 141, 149, 350 P.2d 348 (1960).
Here, Reed Taylor is moving the Court to amend his Complaint in the form
attached hereto as Exhibit A. The purpose of the amendment is to: (1) clarify and
expand the claims and causes of action; and (2) add derivative claims.
Justice requires that Reed Taylor be permitted to file his Amended Complaint.
DATED this

Jstta.y of October, 2008.

Data\1315\1322\mtn.amend complaint.doc

PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM OF
LAW TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

•

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /~day of October, 2008, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document with attachment to the
following:

- - HAND DELIVERY

, / U.S. MAIL
- - OVERNIGHT MAIL
TRANSMISSION
-/ - FAX
EMAIL (.pdf attachment)

James D. LaRue
Elam & Burke, PA
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83 704

PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM OF
LAW TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 3
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•
MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, VIA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Reed Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual, who is
bringing this action on behalf of himself and
on behalf of the creditors and/or shareholders
of AJA Services Corporation and AJA
Insurance, Inc.;

Case No.: CVOS-01765

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR
DAMAGES
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Plaintiff,

v.
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; HA VILEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HA VILEY LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X,
unknown individuals;
Hawle Troxell.

I. FACTS
1.

Reed Taylor, by and through his attorneys of record, CAMPBELL,

BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC, alleges as follows (all allegations and claims asserted below
are incorporated by reference into each cause of action, remedy and/or requested relief to

EXHIBIT
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 1
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. I

the extent necessary to support each such cause of action, remedy and/or requested
relief):
2.

Reed Taylor ("Reed Taylor") is a resident of Lewiston, Nez Perce County,

Idaho. Reed Taylor is bringing this action on behalf of himself individually and on
behalf of all shareholders and creditors of AJA Services Corporation ("AJA Services")
and AJA Insurance, Inc. ("AJA Insurance"). Reed Taylor is an elderly person as defined
in J.C. § 48-608.
3.

Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP ("Hawley Troxell") is an Idaho

limited liability partnership in the business of practicing law.

Hawley Troxell is

vicariously liable for the acts of the individual Hawley Troxell. Hawley Troxell has
purportedly acted as counsel for AJA Services, AJA Insurance and CropUSA Insurance
Agency, Inc. ("CropUSA").
4.

Defendant Gary D. Babbitt ("Babbitt") is an individual residing in the

state of Idaho and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley
Troxell.
5.

Defendant D. John Ashby ("Ashby") is an individual residing in the state

of Idaho and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley
Troxell.
6.

Defendant Patrick V. Collins ("Collins") is an individual residing in the

state of Idaho and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley
Troxell.
7.

Defendant Richard A. Riley ("Riley") is an individual residing in the state

of Idaho and is an attorney in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley Troxell.
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8.

•

•

Jane Does I-X are unknown individuals who are and/or were attorneys that

participated in the tortious acts and conduct alleged against the above known Hawley
Troxell with and for Hawley Troxell who are also responsible for the claims and
damages. (All of the Defendants are collectively referred to as "Hawley Troxell" or "its"
or "Defendants").
9.

Hawley Troxell transacted business through the practice of law in Nez

Perce County, Idaho, and have an expectation of being named as defendants in Nez Perce
County, Idaho. Hawley Troxell committed tortious acts, exceeded the scope of any
purported representation, and/or assisted in the commission of tortious acts in Nez Perce
County, Idaho. Hawley Troxell's tortious acts and/or assistance have inflicted damages
upon a resident of Nez Perce County, Idaho.
10.

Damages in this action exceed $10,000.

Jurisdiction and venue are,

therefore, appropriate in Nez Perce County District Court. To the extent that there are any
conflicts or discrepancies alleged in this Complaint, they are to be construed as
alternative relief, claims, remedies and damages being sought against Hawley Troxell
(i.e., if Hawley Troxell had authority to represent AIA Services or AIA Insurance, then it
still committed certain torts and breached duties).

However, no allegations in this

Complaint should be construed as any admission by Reed Taylor or any of the
corporations that Hawley Troxell ever had authority to represent AIA Services or AIA
Insurance.
11.

AIA Services is a closely held Idaho corporation. AIA Insurance is a

closely held Idaho corporation. The present purported officers and directors of AIA
Insurance and AIA Services (R. John Taylor "John Taylor", Connie Taylor, James Beck,
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•

•

JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman) are interested parties by way of their tortious acts and
ownership of shares in CropUSA. Thus, a direct action for certain claims is appropriate
because, among other reasons set forth in this Complaint, any funds recovered should not
be placed in the hands of the foregoing parties.
12.

AJA Services has pledged all of the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance

that it owns to Reed Taylor pursuant to a $6 Million Promissory Note dated August 1,
1995, the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement, the Amended and Restated
Security Agreement, the Restructure Redemption Agreement, and Series A Preferred
Shareholder Agreement (all of the foregoing, ancillary documents and related documents
are collectively referred to as the "Redemption Agreements").
13.

At all relevant times of the transactions and causes of action set forth in

this Complaint, Reed Taylor was the sole pledgee of all of AJA Insurance's outstanding
shares and the only secured creditors of AIA Services and AIA Insurance entitled to the
commissions and related receivables received by the corporations and all proceeds related
thereto. As a stock pledgee and the sole stock pledgee of AJA Insurance's shares, Reed
Taylor is entitled to bring derivative and/or direct claims as a shareholder since a pledgee
is entitled to all of the rights and protections of a shareholder, in addition to the individual
rights to protect collateral. As the sole pledgee of all shares of AJA Insurance, Reed
Taylor is entitled to recover and possess all funds, damages and/or property recovered
from all direct and derivative causes of action.
14.

As a creditor of the insolvent AIA Services owed over $8,500,000 and a

secured creditor of the insolvent AIA Services, Reed Taylor is entitled to bring derivative
and/or direct claims against responsible parties in the place of, or on behalf of, AJA
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•

Services. Reed Taylor is the only person entitled to the recovery of funds, damages, and
the like because of being (a) the only creditor with a security interest in AIA Insurance;
(b) the only creditor with a security interest in all past, present and future commissions
and related receivables of AJA Services and AIA Insurance; (c) the only creditor with a
security interest in all of the shares of AJA Services' subsidiaries and all dividends and
distributions related to such shares, including, without limitation the $1.2 Million
Mortgage received from the estate of The Universe; (d) a long standing creditor with
substantial contractual rights, which such rights and amounts owed to Reed Taylor were
specifically detailed in the financial statements of AIA Services since 1995, thereby
placing other creditors on notice of his superior claims; (e) the only person with priority
over all assets, funds and claims of AJA Services by way of the Subordination Agreement
with Donna Taylor; and (f) the creditor who is owed over $8,500,000.
15.

To the extent that any bona-fide creditor or shareholders come forward

with any interests superior to Reed Taylor or to the extent that any dispute may arise
between Reed Taylor and other creditors, Reed Taylor will, without waiving any legal
rights or remedies as a pledgee, creditor and secured creditor, either (a) pay the
creditor(s) in his sole discretion; (b) seek a determination under the law of the priority or
rights to any payments or funds; (c) deposit the subject funds and/or property with the
Court for a determination of priority or rightful possession pursuant to an interpleader
action; or (d) take such other reasonable actions as necessary under the law.
16.

Although Hawley Troxell, John Taylor, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman,

Connie Taylor and James Beck are inappropriately and fraudulently asserting that Reed
Taylor has no rights because his redemption was allegedly illegal (which Reed Taylor
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•

denies and the applicable law does not support) in an attempt to avoid the causes of
action, claims, remedies and damages being pursued against them for mi$appropriating
the assets, funds, services and opportunities of AJA Service and/or AIA In~urance, Reed
Taylor will move the Court to deposit all funds and property recovered from Hawley
Troxell until the illegality issue has either been withdrawn, voluntarily dismissed, or a
determination has been made by the Court in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al. The evidence
will show that the redemption was not illegal and that Hawley Troxell and the other
parties (including John Taylor and JoLee Duclos' alleged

intervention~

are simply

attempting to find any way to delay and/or thwart Reed Taylor's valid righlts and causes
of action, and fraudulently avoid all of their unlawful acts and years of misappropriation
of AJA Services and/or AJA Insurance's assets, funds, services and/or opportunities.
17.

AJA Services' financial condition far exceeds the "zone of insolvency'' as

Reed Taylor is owed over $9,000,000 and the present fair-market value of AJA Services'
assets are $6,000,000, less than the amount owed Reed Taylor. But for the unlawful
actions of John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos,
Bryan Freeman and other parties to protect their own interests, AJA Services should be in
bankruptcy under close scrutiny of a trustee. Hawley Troxell has full knowledge of
intimate details of the inappropriate and/or unlawful transfer of millions of dollars of AJA
Services and/or AJA Insurance's assets, funds and services to CropUSA, John Taylor and
other parties.
18.

On July 21, 2008, Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor served a derivative

demand letter upon the purported board of directors of AJA Services and AJA Insurance
to take various actions, including specified actions against Hawley Troxell, John Taylor,
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•

Michael Cashman, James Beck and all responsible parties for various tortious acts and
the recovery of misappropriated assets, funds, services and/or compensation.

Reed

Taylor has also made other written demands upon the purported boards of AIA Services
and AIA Insurance to take action, and no actions have been taken. Reed Taylor has also
made substantial non-frivolous claims against the responsible parties in Taylor v. AJA

Services, et al., but no actions have been taken as a result of the claims or allegations.
However, the purported boards of AIA Services and AIA Insurance have failed to act and
have failed to conduct the corporations in a responsible manner consistent with the law.
19.

The purported relevant past and present board members and officers of

AIA Insurance and AJA Services have failed to conduct shareholder meetings, failed to
properly disclose facts and transactions to the shareholders, and have continued to do so
even after Complaints were filed and with the full knowledge of Hawley Troxell. The
past and present responsible board members and officers have never advised the
shareholders or creditors of the misappropriation of corporate assets, funds, opportunities,
services and claims which should be pursued.
20.

Because of the fact that the relevant past and present purported board

members of AIA Services and AJA Insurance have a vested interest in not pursing claims
against themselves or the attorneys that have unlawfully assisted them and have utterly
and completely failed to do so, Reed Taylor believes that he and Donna Taylor will be
the only parties to pursue the valid claims because the claims will never be pursued by
the parties currently purported to manage AIA Services and AIA Insurance. This action
is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the state ofldaho which it would
otherwise not have.
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21.

•

•

Although Reed Taylor is the only authorized director and officer of AIA

Insurance and that the actions of AJA Services' board of directors is not authorized, Reed
Taylor is pursuing claims under this Complaint as though the directors were not
authorized to act and, to the extent that the boards were authorized, then the actions were
unlawful, inappropriate and exceeded the scope of any agency act on behalf of AJA
Services and AJA Insurance.
22.

Hawley Troxell's acts, omissions, and torts alleged in this Complaint

exceed any purported attorney-client relationship and are not protected by any litigition
privilege or immunities. Hawley Troxell's purported legal representation was never
authorized by the proper boards of AJA Services or AJA Insurance. Any purported
waivers Hawley Troxell has obtained were not received by authorized and/or
disinterested representatives of AJA Services and AJA Insurance, and were not
authorized.
23.

To the extent that Hawley Troxell obtained any waivers or consents, its

purported legal representation exceeded the scope of any representation that was in the
best interests of AJA Services or AIA Insurance. By taking direction from John Taylor,
Connie Taylor and/or James Beck, Hawley Troxell knew that any purported
representation was not, and could not, be in the best interests of AJA Services or AJA
Insurance thereby exceeding any scope of purported representation.
24.

AJA Services and AJA Insurance's purported agents, boards and/or

officers, in which Hawley Troxell allegedly relied upon, exceeded the scope of all proper
acts as agents, board members and officers of AJA Services and AIA Insurance, which
further resulted in Hawley Troxell's acts exceeding the scope of any authorized legal
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•

and/or attorney-client representation. All of the actions of Hawley Troxell, John Taylor,
Connie Taylor and James Beck were outside of the scope of their authorized acts and
duties.
25.

Reed Taylor's Complaint is comprised of thtee types of claims: (a) those

claims and damages personal and individual to Reed Taylor; (b) those claims and
damages that are personal to Reed Taylor and AJA Services and/or AIA Insurance, but
which are being brought by Reed Taylor directly against Hawley Troxell; and (c) those
claims that are owned only by AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance, but which are being
prosecuted by Reed Taylor derivatively on behalf of AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance.
26.

In addition, Reed Taylor will also pursue claims that are derivatively

being prosecuted on behalf of AIA Insurance directly on behalf of AIA Insurance should
he gain control of the company in the near future. To the extent that funds and/or
property is recovered that exceed the amounts owed to Reed Taylor, he will deposit such
funds and/or property with the Court for the distribution to innocent shareholders of AIA
Services.
27.

Hawley Troxell is not, and has never been, authorized to represent AIA

Insurance or AIA Services in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al. Hawley Troxell is not, and
has not, represented the interests of AIA Insurance or AJA Services, but instead has
represented the interests of John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman,
Jolee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, CropUSA and other interested parties.
28.

As the only authorized officer and board member of AJA Insurance, Reed

Taylor, has not and will not authorize or consent to Hawley Troxell as being attorneys for
AIA Insurance or representing the company in any fashion. As a person who is required

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 9
000443

•

to be a member of the board of AIA Services, Reed Taylor has not and will not authorize
Hawley Troxell to represent AIA Services.

Thus, Hawley Troxell has no scope of

representation because it is unlawfully representing AIA Services and AIA Insurance.
29.

Reed Taylor is the pledgee of all of the shares of AIA Insurance, the only

shareholder of AJA Insurance by way of holding all of its shares as collateral, the only
officer and director of AIA Insurance, and by far the largest and only secured creditor of
AIA Services (Reed Taylor is owed over $8,500,000 and AIA Services is insolvent).
AIA Services and AJA Insurance's value and net assets are insufficient to pay the over
$8,500,000, plus interest and attorneys' fees and costs, owed to Reed Taylor. Therefore,
Reed Taylor is entitled to bring certain claims directly against Hawley Troxell for certain
damages.
30.

At all material times, Reed Taylor was owed over $6,000,000 by AIA

Services through a promissory note dated August 1, 1995.

Reed Taylor is presently

owed over $8,500,000 by AIA Services. At all material times, Hawley Troxell had full
knowledge of AJA Services' debt and contractual obligations owed to Reed Taylor.
31.

AIA Services defaulted on the terms of the $6,000,000 promissory note

when it failed to pay the promissory note upon maturity on August 1, 2005. Although a
formal demand was unnecessary since the $6,000,000 promissory note matured on
August 1, 2005, demand for payment was properly served upon AIA Services by Reed
Taylor on December 12, 2006, a copy of which was also provided to Defendant Riley at
the law firm of Eberle Berlin pursuant to the notice provisions of the Redemption
Agreements. AIA Services was insolvent in 2001, and has continued to be insolvent
from said date.
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32.

•

•

Since 1996, as security for the over $8,500,000 owed by AJA Services,

Reed Taylor was granted and possessed a security interest in all of the stock of AJA
Insurance and all of the commissions and related receivables of AJA Insurance and AIA
Services. Pursuant to. the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement dated July 1,
1996, Reed Taylor had the contractual right upon default of AJA Services to vote the
stock of AJA Insurance, and take operational control of AIA Insurance. Reed Taylor's
right to vote the stock of AJA Insurance was also perfected through AJA Services'
irrevocable power of attorney granted to Reed Taylor that was coupled with an interest as
required by I.C § 30-1-722.
33.

On February 22, 2007, Reed Taylor voted the stock of AJA Insurance and

attempted to take control of it pursuant to his contractual rights as provided under the
law, the contract documents, and J.C. § 30-1-722. However, the interested directors of
AJA Insurance (including John Taylor) by and through Hawley Troxell intentionally
assisted in breaching the terms of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement
and refused to acknowledge Reed Taylor's valid vote of the stock of AIA Insurance and
refused to surrender control as required.
34.

Hawley Troxell further engaged in inappropriate conduct in assisting

interested parties (including John Taylor) in obtaining and/or maintaining a restraining
order and preliminary injunction against Reed Taylor, when Hawley Troxell knew there
was no legitimate legal basis to do so, that doing so was an intentional violation and
tortious interference with Reed Taylor's contractual rights, and that the assets and funds
of AJA Insurance were being misappropriated and/or not safeguarded.
35.

Reed Taylor has a pending civil action against AJA Services, AJA
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Insurance, CropUSA, John Taylor, and others for claims of fraud, fraudulent conveyance,
civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and other claims under Nez
Perce County Case No. CV-07-00208 ("Taylor v. AJA Services, et al."), and therein Reed
Taylor obtained an order of partial summary judgment for AIA Services' default of the
$6,000,000 promissory note and corresponding default of the Amended and Restated
Stock Pledge Agreement. By way of this partial summary judgment and/or his prior vote
of the stock, Reed Taylor would and should be in actual control of AIA Insurance but for
the actions of John Taylor, which Hawley Troxell, with full knowledge of Reed Taylor's
rights, facilitated and aided and abetted to the detriment of AIA Services, AIA Insurance
and Reed Taylor.
36.

With Hawley Troxell's full knowledge, Reed Taylor's claims asserted in

Taylor v. AJA Services, et al. included claims for breaches of fiduciary duty, conspiracy,

fraudulent conveyance,

and fraud perpetrated by John Taylor and others (including

CropUSA), including but not limited to claims that John Taylor had wrongfully
transferred over $1,500,000 of AIA Insurance's cash to CropUSA, for no consideration
and had transferred approximately $700,000 of the assets of AIA Insurance to CropUSA
for no consideration. John Taylor was at all times material also an interested director,
officer and shareholder of CropUSA. Also included in the civil action were other claims
that John Taylor and others had engaged in self-dealing and/or fraudulent transactions
with AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance to the detriment of the corporations and Reed
Taylor, and for the personal benefit of John Taylor and other interested parties (including
CropUSA).

Ill
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37.

•

In 2007, Hawley Troxell appeared in the civil action, Taylor v. AJA

Services, et al., and assumed legal representation of two distinct clients, AIA Services, a

corporation, and AIA Insurance, a corporation, and also represented the interests of John
Taylor, an individual, and other interested parties (including Connie Taylor, James Beck
and Michael Cashman). At all material times John Taylor was an interested purported
CEO and director of AIA Services and AIA Insurance and an interested majority
shareholder of AIA Services.

The civil action clearly alleged acts of fraud, civil

conspiracy, conversion, and breaches of fiduciary duty perpetrated by John Taylor and
others against AJA Services and AIA Insurance, and such acts having damaged and
continuing to cause damages to the corporations, their shareholders and creditors. In
violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care, Hawley
Troxell undertook to represent the three named clients AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and
CropUSA, which such entities had no true common interests and each having
irreconcilable conflicts of interest with the other.
38.

In May 2007, Reed Taylor's attorney advised Hawley Troxell that it was

not appropriate for Hawley Troxell to represent AJA Services and AIA Insurance, and/or
to take direction from John Taylor because of various conflicts of interest and the fact
that John Taylor was an interested party with substantial claims against him. Despite the
warning and demands made by Reed Taylor's attorney, Hawley Troxell also appeared
and represented CropUSA, which created additional conflicts of interest, resulted in a
breach of Hawley Troxell's fiduciary duties (including the duty of loyalty) owed to AJA
Services and AIA Insurance, and was a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
and their duty of care.
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39.

•

Hawley Troxell inappropriately entered into and/or participated in a Joint

Defense Agreement(s) knowing that AJA Services, AJA Insurance, CropUSA Insurance,
Inc., John Taylor and other named and unnamed individuals in Taylor v. AJA Services, et
al. had clear irreconcilable conflicting and diverging interests in violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct and duty of care, and to the detriment AIA Services, AIA Insurance
and Reed Taylor. In Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., a Joint Defense Agreement was not
permissible or appropriate because it would perpetuate fraud, conspiracy, aiding and
abetting, and other causes of action, was entered into without obtaining informed consent
from disinterested representatives of the corporations, and the Joint Defense Agreement
was also independently not appropriate or permitted when certain parties to a joint
defense agreement should be asserting claims against other parties to the agreement.
40.

The Joint Defense Agreement(s) facilitated by Hawley Troxell has

assisted in others (including John Taylor, James Beck, Connie Taylor, Michael Cashman
and CropUSA) to perpetrate and/or hide acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances;
conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and other claims, while also assisting Hawley
Troxell in inappropriately and unlawfully obtaining payment of fees and costs for its
services and in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Hawley Troxell' s duty
of care.
41.

Hawley Troxell assisted AJA Services, AJA Insurance, CropUSA, John

Taylor, and others in entering into various inappropriate agreements and transactions
which were in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and its duty of care, were
not in the best interests of the corporations, not authorized by disinterested parties,
constituted fraud and/or the inappropriate transfer of assets and funds belonging to AIA
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Services and/or AIA Insurance, were not arms-length transactions, and/or were done so
without requiring AIA Services, AIA Insurance and/or CropUSA to retain separate
independent counsel that were retained by separate independent uninterested parties.
42.

As the purported attorneys for AIA Services, an entity, Hawley Troxell

owed duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, and
under the law to the corporation and its shareholders to preserve and protect the assets
and businesses of the corporation, and since AIA Services was insolvent, to its creditors
including Reed Taylor. As attorney for AIA Services, and in light of the claims made
against John Taylor and others by Reed Taylor, Hawley Troxell owed a duty to its entity
client not to assume representation of the interests of John Taylor, individually and/or
through a Joint Defense Agreement, or with any other interested parties.
43.

As the purported attorneys for AIA Insurance, an entity, Hawley Troxell

owed duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care and
the law to the corporation and its shareholders including a creditor pledgee of the
corporation's stock, Reed Taylor, with contractual rights to vote the shares and assume
control and who had exercised his contractual rights and had voted the shares but whose
rights were breached and rejected by interested directors and others who were in control
of the corporation including John Taylor. As attorneys for AIA Insurance and in light of
the claims made against John Taylor and others by the Reed Taylor, Hawley Troxell
owed a duty to its entity client not to assume representation of the interests of John
Taylor, individually and/or through any Joint Defense Agreement, and/or of other
interested parties (including CropUSA, Connie Taylor, James Beck and Michael
Cashman).
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•

As attorneys representing the interests of John Taylor through a Joint

Defense Agreement, Hawley Troxell owed its duties first and foremost to its purported
clients AIA Services and AJA Insurance as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional
Cond~ct,

duty of care and/or the law. As attorneys for John Taylor by and through taking

directions and/or accepting decisions made by him knowing that he was interested and
should have claims asserted against him, and in light of the claims against John Taylor by
the Reed Taylor, Hawley Troxell owed a duty to its purported corporate clients not to
assume representation of the interests of John Taylor, CropUSA or other interested
parties.

Hawley Troxell failed to notify or obtain appropriate informed consents or

approvals from appropriate parties or disinterested shareholders in violation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct, Hawley Troxell's duty of care, and the Bylaws and Articles of
Formation of the corporations, all to the detriment of Reed Taylor.
45.

As the purported attorneys for AJA Services and/or AJA Insurance

(individually or through any Joint Defense Agreement) Hawley Troxell owed duties of
loyalty to the corporations and could not represent John Taylor or CropUSA in Taylor v.
AJA Services, et al., or represent or assist John Taylor in Donna J. Taylor v. R. John
Taylor because Hawley Troxell's loyalty belongs exclusively to AIA Services and/or
AJA Insurance. Furthermore, Hawley Troxell could in no way represent CropUSA or
participate in any joint defense of CropUSA or other interested parties (such as John
Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, and/or Michael Cashman) as AJA Services and/or
AJA Insurance should have been asserting claims against CropUSA, each other, and other
interested and uninterested parties.
46.

Hawley Troxell represented, and continue to represent, the interests of
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John Taylor (individually and/or through a Joint Defense Agreement) and with full
knowledge that John Taylor is an interested party and director of AJA Services and AJA
Insurance and is personally inappropriately conducting and controlling the course of
litigation involving Hawley Troxell's clients, AJA Services and AIA Insurance, while
also inappropriately representing CropUSA to the detriment of the corporations and Reed
Taylor.
47.

During the course of the civil action after March 28, 2007, Hawley Troxell

has coordinated and participated with Quarles & Brady LLP ("Quarles Brady"), the law

firm that has represented AJA Services and AIA Services before and throughout
litigation, and Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. ("Clements Brown"), the law firm
that formerly purportedly represented AIA Service and AJA Insurance in Taylor v. AJA

Services, et al. During the course of the civil action after March 28, 2007, John Taylor
and others have further engaged in inappropriate and/or wrongful transactions involving
themselves, AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and CropUSA, which transactions have
occurred with Hawley Troxell's knowledge and/or assistance, and to the detriment of
AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and Reed Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee.
48.

Hawley Troxell are liable to Reed Taylor for an amount to be proven at

trial because Hawley Troxell has encouraged, conspired with, provided substantial
assistance to, and/or aided and abetted John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael
Cashman, Bryan Freeman, JoLee Duclos, AJA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA,
and/or other interested parties in the commission acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances,
conversion, tortious interference, breaches of fiduciary duties, and other unlawful acts.
The acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances, tortious interference, conversion, and breaches
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of fiduciary duties include, but are not limited to: I) While purporting to represent AIA
Insurance and AIA Services, Hawley Troxell assisted and/or aided and abetted John
Taylor in the tortious interference with the assertion of Reed Taylor's contractual rights
to control and operate AIA Jnsurance, which has proximately caused damages to Reed
Taylor; 2) While purporting to represent AIA Services and AIA Insurance, Hawley
Troxell inappropriately assisted and/or aided and abetted John Taylor and other interested
parties to engage in tortious transactions involving John Taylor, AIA Services, AIA
Insurance, and/or CropUSA, which such transactions have been to the detriment of AIA
Services, AIA Insurance, and Reed Taylor, and proximately caused damages to Reed
Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee; and 3) While representing John Taylor, individually
or through a Joint Defense Agreement, Hawley Troxell has had full knowledge that its
client is an interested party and director of AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and CropUSA,
and is personally conducting and controlling the course of litigation involving Hawley
Troxell's former clients, AIA Services and AIA Insurance, and Hawley Troxell has
assisted and/or aided and abetted John Taylor and others (including, CropUSA) and has
coordinated and participated with Hawley Troxell and Quarles & Brady in John Taylor's
engaging in tortious transactions involving himself, AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and
CropUSA, which transactions have been to the detriment of AIA Services and AIA
Insurance and proximately caused damages to Reed Taylor as a creditor and stock
pledgee.
49.

In connection with Hawley Troxell's inappropriate representation and/or

joint defense of John Taylor, AJA Services, AJA Insurance, CropUSA, and other
interested parties (including Connie Taylor, James Beck, and Michael Cashman) Hawley
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Troxell accepted payments of attorneys fees and costs believed to exceed $500,000 in
violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, and as participating
and/or assisting in inappropriate corporate acts and the aiding and abetting of others.
50.

Over the course of the litigation in Reed Taylor v. AJA Services, et al.,

Reed Taylor's attorney in that action, Roderick C. Bond of Smith, Cannon & Bond
PLLC, advised Hawley Troxell on numerous occasions that its conduct violated Idaho
Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, was inappropriate, and constituted the
aiding and abetting of other interested and uninterested parties (including John Taylor
and CropUSA), among other potential legal claims against them. In early 2007, Reed
Taylor's counsel advised Hawley Troxell that its inappropriate actions would result in
claims being filed against them by Reed Taylor. Reed Taylor's counsel reiterated these
warnings orally and in writing on numerous occasions. Despite the warnings from Reed
Taylor's counsel, Hawley Troxell conduct persisted thereby further damaging Reed
Taylor. Hawley Troxell's disregard of Mr. Bond's warnings can only be construed as
intentional improper acts to assist John Taylor and other interested parties to the
detriment of Reed Taylor.
51.

Hawley Troxell wrongfully assisted John Taylor and other interested

parties in operating CropUSA with the funds, assets, employees, trade secrets and other
things of value inappropriately obtained from AIA Services and/or AJA Insurance, and
by assisting John Taylor and other interested parties (including CropUSA) in preventing
claims from being asserted and prosecuted against them. Hawley Troxell wrongfully
assisted and/or failed to prevent interested parties (including John Taylor) in transferring
the long-term employees of AIA Insurance to CropUSA, while at the same time
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representing to the Court in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., that the corporations were
being operated properly and/or failing to advise the Court of the inappropriate acts and
transactions.

All the while Hawley Troxell was aware of and/or assisted in the

inappropriate payment of salaries, benefits, compensation, and director fees of $20,000
per year when AIA Services was insolvent.
52.

Despite Reed Taylor's demands that Hawley Troxell take action to protect

the assets and funds of AIA Services and AJA Insurance and recover funds and assets
from John Taylor, CropUSA and other interested and uninterested parties for the benefit
of the corporations and Reed Taylor, Hawley Troxell refused to act in accordance with
the Rules of Profession Conduct, its duty of care, and the law. Despite Reed Taylor's
demands that interests of the minority disinterested shareholders be considered and/or
protected because of the wrongful acts of John Taylor and other interested parties,
Hawley Troxell refused to act and failed to fully and properly disclose all pertinent facts
to the disinterested shareholders and request their votes.
53.

In various motions, responses and affidavits submitted to the court in

Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., Hawley Troxell made arguments that did not benefit AIA
Services, AJA Insurance, or Reed Taylor, inappropriately made other arguments
preventing valid claims from being asserted against John Taylor, James Beck, Connie
Taylor, Michael Cashman, and other interested and uninterested parties, and failed to take
action against responsible parties (including John Taylor, CropUSA, Connie Taylor,
James Beck, Michael Cashman, Lancelot Investors Fund, and others). In the instance of
Michael Cashman, Hawley Troxell successfully argued to the Court in Taylor v. AJA
Services, et al., that Mr. Cashman should not be named as an individual when Hawley
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Troxell should have been taking action against Mr. Cashman and others.
54.

Despite Reed Taylor's demands that disinterested directors and/or parties

· must direct the litigation on behalf of the corporations, Hawley Troxell refused and
permitted and/or assisted John Taylor and other interested parties to direct the litigation
to the detriment of the corporations and Reed Taylor. Despite Reed Taylor's demands
that action be taken to terminate AIA Insurance's improper guarantee of a $15,000,000
line-of-credit for CropUSA, Hawley Troxell refused to act, failed to inform or fully
disclose to disinterested parties or shareholders the existence of such inappropriate loan
guarantees, and threatened to take legal action against Reed Taylor if he tried to rescind
or terminate the improper guarantee (since Defendant Gary D. Babbitt's threat, the
balance of the loan increased by over $5,500,000 to over $10,500,000).
55.

Hawley Troxell's conduct has violated Idaho Rules of Professional

Conduct and its duty of care, which require Hawley Troxell to disgorge all attorneys' fees
and costs paid to them in Taylor v. AIA Services, et al., and for other related and/or
unrelated legal services. Despite Reed Taylor's demands to comply with the Rules of
Professional Conduct and its duty of care, Hawley Troxell refused to do so.
56.

Through the acts of Hawley Troxell, the value of AJA Insurance and the

assets of AIA Services and/or AJA Insurance have plummeted in value, the corporations'
value and assets have been impaired, and/or the assets and funds have been transferred to
Crop USA. Through the acts of Hawley Troxell, ownership of CropUSA was vested and
has remained vested in interested parties (including John Taylor), while the major
creditor Reed Taylor and minority shareholders were left with nothing. Despite Reed
Taylor's demands that action should also be taken for the interests of the innocent
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minority shareholders and creditors, Hawley Troxell has refused to take action and
inappropriately assisted the interested parties (including John Taylor, Connie Taylor,
James Beck and Michael Cashman).
57.

Despite Hawley Troxell having made several legal arguments that lacked

merit, lacked good faith and/or were not grounded in facts, Hawley Troxell provided a
settlement offer to Reed Taylor in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., which included a
provision that he release all claims against Hawley Troxell as a condition of the
settlement. The inclusion of such a provision was a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct and Hawley Troxell' s duty of care. Hawley Troxell also refused to make any
provisions for disinterested minority shareholders of AJA Services as requested by Reed
Taylor.
58.

Hawley Troxell has assisted in the inappropriate acts of John Taylor and

other interested parties in stopping all payments to Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor, Reed
Taylor's former· wife and the holder of all outstanding Preferred A Shares of AIA
Services. Like Reed Taylor, Donna Taylor is required to be a member of the board of
directors of AJA Services. Like Reed Taylor, Hawley Troxell has assisted John Taylor
and other interested parties in preventing Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor from being
members of the board of directors of AIA Services, which has further far reaching
ramifications and results in additional damages against Hawley Troxell.
59.

With full knowledge of AIA Services' obligations to ensure that Reed

Taylor and Donna Taylor are members of AIA Services' board until they were paid in
full, Hawley Troxell proceeded to attend and participate in inappropriate board meetings
and/or take inappropriate action based upon board meetings held by interested directors
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without Reed Taylor or Donna Taylor being present and without providing them with
their right to be present, which further results in all such meetings and decisions being
null and void, and Hawley Troxell being liable for the associated damages for
substantially participating in such actions.
60.

Hawley Troxell represented AJA Services and AJA Insurance in litigation

with the state of Idaho. The litigation was funded by AJA Insurance by and through
commissions in which Reed Taylor held a security interest of which Hawley Troxell had
full knowledge.

The litigation was resolved, however, and instead of titling the

$1,200,000 Mortgage that was received as settlement in the name of AJA Insurance,
Hawley Troxell titled the mortgage only in the name of AJA Services in an inappropriate
scheme to keep the mortgage from AJA Insurance and Reed Taylor (Reed Taylor is also
entitled to possession of the Mortgage because it is a distribution from the The Universe,
which is another subsidiary pledged to Reed Taylor).
61.

Hawley Troxell inappropriately purportedly represented AJA Services,

AJA Insurance and CropUSA by drafting documents to assist in the inappropriate pledge

of the $1,200,000 Mortgage to CropUSA to facilitate the payment of Hawley Troxell's
services in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, and the law.
Hawley Troxell assisted and/or failed to prevent and/or notify disinterested parties or the
Court that AJA Services had inappropriately pledged its sole remaining other significant
asset, the $1,200,000 mortgage, to CropUSA to facilitate the payment of $500,000 for
Hawley Troxell' s services in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of
care, and the law.
62.

Hawley Troxell omitted and/or misrepresented material facts to the Court
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in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., to the detriment of Reed Taylor. In several instances,
Hawley Troxell persuaded the Court to take action that was not in the best interests of the
corporations or Reed Taylor, to the detriment of the corporations and Reed Taylor
(including consenting to the issuance of only a $200,000 bond when Hawley Troxell
knew that the corporations were not being operated properly or their assets safeguarded).
63.

Hawley Troxell has inappropriately assisted John Taylor and other

interested parties in misallocating and not allocating expenses and/or services provided
and borne by AIA Insurance and/or AlA Services for the benefit of CropUSA, John
Taylor and other interested parties. Upon information and belief, Hawley Troxell has
assisted in issuing inappropriate opinion letters to auditors of AJA Services, AJA
Insurance and/or CropUSA to assist John Taylor and other interested parties in
transferring and utilizing the assets, employees, labor, funds and resources of AJA
Insurance and/or AJA Services for the benefit of CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc while
providing little or no consideration in return.
64.

Hawley Troxell had full knowledge of John Taylor's Executive Officer's

Agreement, which, upon information and belief, was drafted by Defendant Richard A.
Riley. Regardless, Defendant Richard A. Riley had full knowledge of the existence and
terms of John Taylor's Executive Officer's Agreement with AJA Services. Even though

John Taylor has breached the terms of his employment contract with AJA Services by
competing against AIA Services through CropUSA (and violating the corporate
opportunity doctrine), by soliciting employees of AJA Insurance, and other inappropriate
actions, Hawley Troxell has intentionally refused to act in the best interests of AIA
Services, AJA Insurance, their shareholders, and/or Reed Taylor, to the detriment of Reed
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Taylor.
65.

Hawley Troxell assisted in inappropriately transferring and retaining

funds, assets and property to CropUSA to defraud AJA Services' creditor Reed Taylor
(including, without .limitation, over $95,000 owed by Pacific Empire Radio Corporation
to AJA Insurance, assistance in transferring shares of the Pacific Empire Radio
Corporation to John Taylor, and failing to collect the over $300,000 owed by John
Taylor) by not reporting such acts to disinterested parties or other appropriate parties as
required by the Rules of Professional Conduct and its duty of care.
66.

In April 2007, Hawley Troxell permitted and/or assisted interested parties

in holding a joint board meeting of AIA Services and AIA Insurance with full knowledge
that Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor were being intentionally denied their right to be on
the board of AIA Services and participating in such meetings (Donna Taylor has
subordinated her right to payment in favor of Reed Taylor). At the meeting held in April
2007, Hawley Troxell permitted and/or assisted John Taylor to appoint Connie Taylor
and James Beck to the boards of AIA Services and AIA Insurance knowing that they
were interested parties who AJA Services and/or AIA Insurance should be pursuing
claims against, that they inappropriately held shares in CropUSA, that they were
inappropriately being paid $20,000 per year to attend the board meeting of an insolvent
corporation, and that they did not meet the required standards necessary to be members of
such boards as set forth under the corporations' bylaws.
67.

Hawley Troxell inappropriately permitted and/or assisted two interested

parties, Connie Taylor and James Beck, to approve and/or consent to a Joint Retainer and
Joint Defense Agreement with Hawley Troxell and others, which also facilitated the
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inappropriate joint legal representations of interested parties with conflicting
irreconcilable interests and the payment of attorneys' fees and costs to various attorneys
in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and its duty of care.
68. ·

Hawley Troxell has been fully aware of Reed Taylor's rights to property

in which he held a security interest and was pledged to him as collateral.

In fact,

Defendant Richard A. Riley represented AIA Services in the redemption of Reed
Taylor's shares and the drafting of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement
and other applicable agreements. Hawley Troxell was responsible for issuing opinion
letters relating to the transaction, which include various applicable representations and
warranties. Hawley Troxell is now asserting arguments counter to the representations
made in the opinion letter drafted by Hawley Troxell by and through Defendant Richard
A. Riley.

Hawley Troxell also assisted in the commission of torts by John Taylor,

CropUSA, and other interested parties by representing the corporations in various
inappropriate transactions.
69.

Hawley Troxell also knew that the disinterested minority shareholders of

AIA Services (innocent shareholders) were never advised of the significant claims
against the interested parties (including John Taylor and CropUSA) and the significant
misappropriation of the corporations' assets, but provided legal services on behalf of the
interested parties and accepted payment from AIA Services and AIA Insurance.

In

connection with the payment of attorneys' fees and costs to other named parties in Taylor

v. AL4 Services, et al., Hawley Troxell failed to obtain the necessary approvals from Reed
Taylor or other disinterested parties to the detriment of AIA Services, AIA Insurance
and/or Reed Taylor.
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70.

)

Despite demands to the contrary, Hawley Troxell continued to take

instructions and/or directives from the unauthorized boards (or John Taylor) of AIA
Services and/or AIA Insurance knowing that the boards are not properly seated and are
comprised of interested parties (including John Taylor) with significant claims that
should be asserted against them in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty
of care, and/or the law.
II. HAWLEY TROXELL'S AIDING AND ABETTING AND CONSPIRACY

71.

Hawley Troxell is committing and has committed tortious acts in concert

with other parties (including John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman,
JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, CropUSA, Clements Brown, Quarles Brady, and others)
and/or pursuant to a common design or civil conspiracy with such other parties.
72.

Hawley Troxell knew that the conduct of other parties (including John

Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, CropUSA, Bryan
Freeman, Clements Brown, Quarles Brady and others) constituted breaches of duties
and/or gave substantial assistance and/or encouragement to such other parties in
breaching said duties. Hawley Troxell knew that it was purportedly using the normally
lawful act of practicing law to commit and/or substantially assist others in committing
unlawful acts.
73.

Hawley Troxell gave substantial assistance to other parties (including John

Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, CropUSA, Bryan
Freeman, Clements Brown, Quarles Brady, and others) in committing and/or
accomplishing tortious conduct and/or acts (including, without limitation, breaches of
fiduciary duties, fraud, constructive fraud, fraudulent conveyances, conversion, tortious
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interference, and other claims), and Hawley Troxell's conduct, separately considered,
constitutes the breaches of duties owed to AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and/or Reed
Taylor.
74.

Hawley Troxell conduct constitutes aiding and abetting of other parties in

the commission of the torts and/or caused of action alleged in this Complaint (including
John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, CropUSA,
Bryan Freeman, Clements Brown, Quarles Brady, and others) and/or constitutes the
conduct of a contributing tortfeasor, and such conduct has damaged AIA Services, AIA
Insurance, and Reed Taylor.
75.

Hawley Troxell's conduct constitutes the commission of civil conspiracy

in the commission of the torts and/or causes of action alleged in this Complaint,
including, without limitation, the conspiracy to jointly represent parties to commit torts as
further evidenced by Joint Defense Agreements.
76.

The paragraphs in this Section are incorporated by reference into each

cause of action below as necessary to support aiding and abetting and/or civil conspiracy
of the torts and/or causes of action set forth below and/or contemplated in this Complaint.
ID. FIRST CAUSES OF ACTIONS-CONVERSION

(Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance's Causes of Actions)
77.

Reed Taylor has, and has had during certain relevant time, a valid and

perfected security interest in the commissions and related receivables of AIA Services
and AIA Insurance and all proceeds relating to such security interests. Reed Taylor also
has a security interest in all of the stock of AIA Insurance and the stock of all of AIA
Services' other subsidiaries, including The Universe and all distributions and proceeds
relating to such security interests (i.e., the $1.2 Million Lewis-Clark Mortgage). Hawley
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Troxell had full knowledge of Reed Taylor's security interests in the foregoing property
and such other property reasonably contemplated by the Redemption Agreements.
78.

By way of Reed Taylor's security interest in AIA Insurance's

commissions, his security interest in AJA Insurance's stock, and his asserted contractual
right to the possession and control of AIA Insurance on February 22, 2007, all of AIA
Insurance's revenues, assets, and income should be under the possession and control of
Reed Taylor, including, without limitation, the $1.2 Million Mortgage, settlement
proceeds in the approximate amount of $800,000, all funds and assets transferred or
utilized in any way by CropUSA, and every dollar of revenue generated by AJA
Insurance from all sources since February 22, 2007.
79.

Reed is entitled to possession and control of all of the property to which he

has a contractual right, including, without limitation, the property indicated above and all
other property contemplated in this Complaint through his security interest in the
commissions and related receivables and the proceeds related thereto, security interests in
the stock of all of AJA Services' subsidiaries and the distributions and proceeds related
thereto, and through the security and related rights set forth in the Redemption
Agreements.
80.

All of Reed Taylor's security interests and possession rights can be traced

through various sources to identify all funds and assets that Hawley Troxell has
unlawfully taken or assisted others in taking.

Hawley Troxell has taken control of

property, which Reed Taylor is entitled to possession and control, including without
limitation, all funds received for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs in Taylor v. AL4
Services, et al. and attorneys' fees and costs paid for other purported services. Hawley
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Troxell has exercised dominion and control over assets (including the $1.2 Million
Mortgage) and/or funds (any funds received from AIA Services or AIA Insurance) in
which Reed Taylor is entitled to possession with full knowledge of Reed Taylor's
possessory rights and security interests.
81.

Hawley Troxell has received substantial payments believed to exceed

$500,000 for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs, which such funds Hawley Troxell
had no lawful right to possess or retain, funds that Reed Taylor had the legal right to
possess, and such funds were received in violation of the law, Rules of Professional
Conduct Hawley Troxell's duty of care. Hawley Troxell also assisted in the inappropriate
titling and pledging of a $1.2 Million Mortgage owned by AIA Services to facilitate the
payment of funds to it, which such funds and the $1.2 Million Mortgage Reed Taylor was
legally entitled to possess. Hawley Troxell has also accepted the payment of services for
attorneys' fees and costs rendered for CropUSA, which were paid by the money and/or
assets unlawfully derived from AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance, which such money
and/or assets Reed Taylor held valid security interests.
82.

Hawley Troxell's conduct constitutes the willful interference with

property and/or funds belonging to Reed Taylor, AJA Services and/or AIA Insurance;
and/or which such property and/or funds should be under the possession and/or control of
AJA Services, AJA Insurance and/or Reed Taylor, as the person entitled to such money
and property as a creditor and pledgee. Hawley Troxell intentionally deprived Reed
Taylor, AIA Services and/or AJA Insurance of possession of such property and/or funds.
Despite demands, Hawley Troxell has refused to return such property and/or funds, and
has unlawfully retained the property and/or funds.
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83.

As a direct and/or proximate cause of Hawley Troxell's acts and/or

omissions (which constitute conversion), Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount to
be proven at the time of trial or on summary judgment.
84.

Hawley Troxell has also aided and abetted and/or conspired with other

parties in the conversion of property that Reed Taylor is legally entitled to possess and/or
property to which AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance are entitled to possess (including,
without limitation, funds paid to Hawley Troxell, funds paid to John Taylor and other
interested parties, the pledging of the $1.2 Million Mortgage to CropUSA, and the $1.5
Million unlawfully transferred to CropUSA). As a direct and/or proximate result of
Hawley Troxell's aiding and abetting and/or civil conspiracy relating to the conversion of
assets and/or funds that Reed Taylor, AIA Services, and/or AIA Insurance are legally
entitled to possess, Reed Taylor, AIA Insurance, and/or AIA Services have been
damaged in the amount to be proven at the time of trial or on summary judgment.
IV. SECOND CAUSES OF ACTIONS-TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
(Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance's Causes of Actions)
85.

Reed Taylor is a party to the Redemption Agreements. Hawley Troxell

has full knowledge of the Redemption Agreements. Hawley Troxell has intentionally
interfered with Reed Taylor's contractual rights set forth in the Redemption Agreements
causing breaches of the Redemption Agreements.

Hawley Troxell' s intentional

interference, includes, but is not limited to, tortiously interfering with Reed Taylor's
contractual rights to vote the shares of AIA Insurance, rights to possession of the
commission collateral, right to be a member of the board of AIA Services, right to be an
officer and director of AIA Insurance, right to possession and control of AIA Insurance,
other rights set forth in the Redemption Agreements, and rights set forth in the
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Subordination Agreement with Donna Taylor. Also included in this cause of action are
tortious interference claims based upon Hawley Troxell, John Taylor, Connie Taylor,
James Beck, and other parties exceeding their authority to act on behalf of AIA Services
and/or AIA Insurance.
86.

Hawley Troxell has also aided and abetted and/or conspired with John

Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman,
CropUSA and/or other parties in the tortious interference of Reed Taylor's contractual
rights. Hawley Troxell's acts and/or omissions also constitute the aiding and abetting
and/or civil conspiracy with others in the tortious interference of Reed Taylor's
contractual rights.
87.

As a direct and/or proximate result of Hawley Troxelrs acts and/or

omissions, Reed Taylor has been damaged and is entitled to damages in the amount to be
determined at the time of trial or on summary judgment.
88.

AIA Services is a party to John Taylor's Executive Officer's Agreement.

Hawley Troxell has full knowledge of the Executive Officer's Agreement.

Hawley

Troxell has intentionally interfered with AIA Services' contractual rights set forth in the
Executive Officer's Agreement causing breaches to the Executive Officer's Agreement.
Hawley TroxelPs intentional interference, includes, but is not limited to, tortiously
interfering with AIA Services' contractual rights prevent John Taylor from transferring
AIA Insurances employees to CropUSA, rights to prevent John Taylor from competing
against AIA Services or AIA Insurance through CropUSA, and rights to control John
Taylor's compensation. All of these allegations have been repeatedly alleged by Reed
Taylor throughout the course of Taylor v. AJA Services, et al. Also included in this cause
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of action are tortious interference claims based upon Hawley Troxell, John Taylor,
Connie Taylor, James Beck, and other parties exceeding their authority to act on behalf of
AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance.
89.

Hawley Troxell has also aided and abetted and/or conspired with John

Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman,
CropUSA and/or other parties in the tortious interference of AIA Services' contractual
rights. Hawley Troxell's acts and/or omissions also constitute the aiding and abetting
and/or civil conspiracy with others in the tortious interference of AIA Services'
contractual rights.
90.

As a direct and/or proximate result of Hawley Troxell's acts and/or

omissions, AJA Services has been damaged and is entitled to damages in the amount to
be determined at the time of trial or on summary judgment.
V. THIRD CAUSES OF ACTIONS-FRAUD AND/OR CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD

(Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance's Causes of Actions)
91.

Hawley Troxell owed special duties to Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or

AIA Insurance as described throughout this Complaint.
92.

As a former attorney for Reed Taylor and the attorney who provided an

opinion letter to Reed Taylor, defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by and
through an opinion letter that was based upon Riley's personal knowledge (representing
such facts as the transactions being fully legal and authorized by the corporations), which
further invokes personal liability to Riley. Reed Taylor had a right to rely on Riley's
representations and justifiably relied on such representations. Riley breached his duties
when he asserted that the transaction was illegal. Although Reed Taylor believes the
transaction was legal and supported by applicable law, Riley's actions have breached his
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duties to Reed Taylor and caused Reed Taylor to incur damages from the payments of
attorneys' fees and costs and lost possession of property and funds because of AIA
Insurance being wrongfully withheld from Reed Taylor. As a result of Riley's acts
and/or omissions (which constitute fraud), Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount
to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.
93.

Hawley Troxell owed Reed Taylor special duties as the secured creditor of

AIA Services, the sole pledgee of all of the outstanding shares of AJA Insurance, a stock
pledgee in which Hawley Troxell knew had lawfully voted the shares of AJA Insurance,
the only authorized officer and director of AJA Insurance, the holder of a security interest
in all of the commissions and related receivables of AJA Services and AJA Insurance, the
holder of a security interest in all of the shares of all of AJA Services' other subsidiaries
and all distributions related to the shares (i.e., the $1.2 Million Mortgage and $800,000
settlement), the most significant creditor of the insolvent AJA Services, and the only
party entitled to the remaining assets of AJA Services and AIA Insurance.

94.

Hawley Troxell owed and owes duties to AIA Services and AIA Insurance

to properly represent the best interests of the corporations and to not allow interested
parties (including, without limitation, John Taylor) from taking actions that are not in the
best interests of the corporations, including, without limitation, unauthorized and/or
conflicted persons directing litigation, misappropriation and tortious transfer of assets and
funds to interested parties to the detriment of AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance, to
advise the Court and disinterested shareholders of the actions of John Taylor and other
interested parties, and to not issue opinion letters to auditors and/or other parties to assist
in the commission of tortious conduct. Hawley Troxell has breached its duties and acted
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unlawfully (and all improper and/or unlawful acts set forth and/or contemplated in this
Complaint), and its conduct constitutes constructive fraud for which AJA Services and/or
AJA Insurance are entitled to recover damages in the amount to be proven at trial or on
summary judgment.
95.

Hawley Troxell has also aided and abetted and/or conspired with John

Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman,
CropUSA and/or other parties in the commission of fraud and/or constructive fraud and
to otherwise defraud Reed Taylor, AJA Services and/or AJA Insurance. As a direct
and/or proximate result of Hawley Troxell's acts, Reed Taylor, AJA Services and/or AJA
Insurance have been damaged in an amount to be proven at the time of trial or on
summary judgment.
VI. FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTIONS-MALPRACTICE
(Reed Taylor~· AiA Services and/or AIA Insurance's Causes of Actions)

96.

Hawley Troxell owed Reed Taylor a special attorney-client relationship

for all of the reasons set forth in this Complaint (including, without limitation, the
allegations contained in Reed Taylor's breach of fiduciary duty cause of action). From
time to time, Hawley Troxell has also possessed funds and/or property which it should
have protected and safeguarded for Reed Taylor, but failed to do so. All of the foregoing
results in the existence of duties on the part of Hawley Troxell owed to Reed Taylor, or at
the minimum, a special duty to ensure assets and funds are protected for the benefit of
Reed Taylor in the event that he takes control and possession of AJA Insurance pursuant
to his contractual rights (which such event could have happened at any time during
Hawley Troxell's purported representation of AJA Services and/or AIA Insurance).
97.

Hawley Troxell's purported clients were trustees and/or fiduciaries
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performing similar functions for a non-client, Reed Taylor. Hawley Troxell knew that its
appropriate actions were necessary with respect to the representation of AJA Services
and/or AJA Insurance to take action to prevent and/or rectify the breaches of fiduciary
duties owed by AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance to Reed Taylor when such breaches
were crimes and/or fraud and/or Hawley Troxell assisted and/or are assisting in the
breaches. Reed Taylor was not able to protect his rights because of Hawley Troxell's
actions and Hawley Troxell's obligations to AIA Services and/or AJA Insurance would
not be significantly impaired because the best interests of all the foregoing is to collect
sums owed by others and recover damages for the improper tortious conduct of others
(including, without limitation, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael
Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, and CropUSA).
98.

Hawley Troxell breached its duties (including, without limitation, the duty

of the standard of care) owed by it to Reed Taylor. As a direct and/or proximate result of
Hawley Troxell's failure to perform the duties owed to Reed Taylor, he was damaged in
the amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.
99.

Defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by and through an

opinion letter that was based upon Riley's personal knowledge, which further invokes
personal liability to Riley. Riley breached his duties when he asserted that the transaction
was illegal. Although Reed Taylor believes the transaction was legal and supported by
applicable law, Riley's actions have breached his duties to Reed Taylor and caused Reed
Taylor to incur damages for the payments of attorneys' fees and costs and lost revenues
because of AIA Insurance being wrongfully withheld from Reed Taylor. As a result of
Riley's acts and/or omissions, Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount to be proven
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at trial or on summary judgment.
I 00.

Hawley Troxell owed AJA Services and/or AJA Insurance an attomey-

client relationship for purportedly representing AJA Service and/or AJA Insurance, which
results. in the existence of duties on the part of Hawley Troxell owed to AJA Services
and/or AJA Insurance.
101.

Hawley Troxell owed AJA Services, AJA Insurance and/or Reed Taylor a

duty of care to provide, including, but not limited to, reasonable, prudent, ethical,
unconflicted, loyal and professional legal advice and legal representation in keeping with
the standard of care in the legal profession and as owed to the corporations (referred to
herein and above as "duty of care"). Hawley Troxell breached its duty of care as a result
of its acts and/or omissions thereby damaging the corporations and Reed Taylor, to the
detriment of Reed Taylor.
102.

Hawley Troxell breached its fiduciary duties owed to AJA Services, AJA

Insurance, and/or Reed Taylor, including, without limitation, the duties of care and
loyalty.
103.

Hawley Troxell's acts constitute professional negligence and/or breach of

Hawley Troxell's fiduciary duties, and such conduct have damaged the corporations and
Reed Taylor, in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.
104.

Hawley Troxell breached the duty of the standard of care owed by it to

AJA Services and/or AJA Insurance. As a direct and/or proximate result of Hawley
Troxell's failure to perform the duties owed to AIA Services and/or AJA Insurance in
connection with the legal services purportedly provided by Hawley Troxell, AIA Services
and/or AIA Insurance were damaged in the amount to be proven at trial or on summary
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judgment.

VII .. FIFTH CAUSES OF ACTIONS-VIOLATIONS OF THE I.C.P.A.
(Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance's Causes of Actions)
105.

Reed Taylor, AIA Services and AIA Insurance are all persons as defined

by J.C. § 48-602. Hawley Troxell's purported practice of law constitutes services as
defined by J.C. § 48-602. Reed Taylor, AIA Services and AIA Insurance have either
purchased services directly from Hawley Troxell, are known beneficiaries of services
provided by Hawley Troxell, and/or its attorneys are members of the Idaho State Bar
through which AJA Services, AIA Insurance and/or Reed Taylor has contracted for
services through trade and commerce.
106.

By way of the attorneys of Hawley Troxell' s obligations to the Court and

as members of the Idaho State Bar, they owe duties to their purported clients,
beneficiaries of their services, and the adverse parties in litigation to comply with the
Rules of Professional Conduct and the laws.

Hawley Troxell has served only the

interests of John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Michael Cashman, James Beck, JoLee Duclos,
CropUSA and other interested parties-who Hawley Troxell has not honestly represented
to the Court and Hawley Troxell's beneficiary and/or adversary that Hawley Troxell was
not complying with its obligations under the Rules of Professional Conduct or the law, to
the detriment of Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AJA Insurance. Hawley Troxell's
unlawful and inappropriate acts have a direct impact on consumers and the integrity of
the legal system, and further constitute unfair methods and practices and violations of I.C.
§ 48-601, et seq.
I 07.

Hawley Troxell has falsely represented that it had approval from the Idaho

State Bar and approval from authorized constituents to represent AIA Services and/or
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AIA Insurance, when in fact it did not have such authority in violation of I.C. § 48603(5). Hawley Troxell (including, without limitation, Riley's services to Reed Taylor
through an opinion letter with individual responsibility) has falsely represented that its
services have been provided to a particular standard when in fact its services have not
met the appropriate standards (including the standard of care) in violation of LC. § 48603(7). Hawley Troxell has falsely disparaged the services of Reed Taylor's counsel in
violation of I.C. § 48-603(8). Hawley Troxell has falsely represented that services were
not needed (i.e., not making claims against John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck,
Michael Cashman, CropUSA and others, when it knew such claims were warranted) in
violation of I.C. § 48-603(16). Hawley Troxell has engaged in acts and/or practices that
have been misleading to Reed Taylor, AIA Services and AIA Insurance in violation of
LC. § 48-603(17). Based upon all of the allegations in this Complaint, Hawley Troxell
has also violated other applicable provisions ofl.C. § 48-603 and/or I.C. § 48-601, et seq.
108.

Reed Taylor has purchased services and has lost property and/or money

and has been damaged by the methods, practices and/or acts of Hawley Troxell declared
unlawful by I.C. § 48-601, et seq.
109.

AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance has purchased services and have lost

property and/or money and has been damaged by the methods, practices and/or acts of
Hawley Troxell declared unlawful by LC. § 48-601, et seq. AIA Services and/or AIA
Insurance is requesting that all contracts for purported services provided by Hawley
Troxell be declared void and that all funds and/or assets paid under such contracts be
returned to AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance.
110.

Hawley Troxell knew or should have known that its conduct was
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perpetrated directly and/or indirectly against Reed Taylor in violation of I.C. § 48-608,
including, without limitation, for being an elderly person who has lost more than 25% of
his monthly income by way of Hawley Troxelrs unlawful acts.
111.

Hawley Troxell's acts constitute violations of the Idaho Consumer

Protection Act, specifically, I.C. § 48-601, et seq. Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or
AIA Insurance are entitled to damages, treble damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees
and costs and/or such other requested relief as a result of Hawley Troxell's violations and
as available under I.C. § 48-601, et seq. Hawley Troxell's violations or the unlawful acts
of attorneys (including attorneys as adversaries) are not any of the exceptions to I.C. §
48-601, et seq. as set forth in l.C. § 48-605.

VIll. SIXTH CAUSES OF ACTIONS-BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
(Reed Taylor, AJA Services and/or AIA Insurance's Causes of Action)
112.

Hawley Troxell owed Reed Taylor special duties as the secured creditor of

AIA Services, the sole pledgee of all of the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance, a stock
pledgee in which Hawley Troxell knew had lawfully voted the shares of AIA Insurance,
the only authorized officer and director of AIA Insurance, the holder of a security interest
in all of the commissions and related receivables of AIA Services and AIA Insurance, the
holder of a security interest in all of the shares of all of AIA Services' other subsidiaries
and all distributions related to the shares (i.e., the $1.2 Million Mortgage and $800,000
settlement), the most significant creditor of the insolvent AIA Services, and the only
party entitled to the remaining assets of AIA Services and AIA Insurance. Based upon all
of the foregoing and Hawley Troxell's possession of funds and assets of AIA Services
and/or AIA Insurance from time to time, Hawley Troxell owed a special fiduciary duty to
safeguard the assets and funds of AIA Services and AIA Insurance.
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Hawley Troxell breached its fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor. As a

direct and/or proximate result of Hawley Troxell's breached fiduciary duties, Reed
Taylor has been damaged in an amount to be proven at the time of trial or on summary
judgment.
114.

Hawley Troxell, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, JoLee Duclos

and Bryan Freeman owed and/or owe fiduciary duties to AIA Services and/or AIA
Insurance and to Reed Taylor as the only significant secured creditor of the insolvent
AIA Services and as the pledgee of all the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance (and the
person who voted the shares). Hawley Troxell has substantially assisted other parties in
breaching the Bylaws of AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance. John Taylor owed and/or
owes fiduciary duties to Reed Taylor by way of being Reed Taylor's brother. The
fiduciary duties owed and breached include, but are not limited to, the duty of loyalty,
duty of care and duty to deal in good faith.
115.

Hawley Troxell had full knowledge of all of the fiduciary duties owed to

Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance. The fiduciary duties owed to Reed
Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance include (but are not limited to), the
obligation to safeguard AIA Services and AIA Insurance's assets and business
relationships and to recover funds and assets unlawfully transferred from AIA Services or
AIA Insurance.
116.

Hawley Troxell, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, JoLee Duclos

and Bryan Freeman breached their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AIA Services
and/or AIA Insurance; and Hawley Troxell knew that the foregoing parties' conduct
constituted the breach of fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA
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These breached fiduciary duties are ongoing and Hawley Troxell has

substantially assisted and/or encouraged the foregoing parties in the commission of
breaching their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AJA Services and/or AIA
Insurance. Hawley Troxell also continues to substantially assist and/or encourage the
foregoing parties in breaching their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AIA Services
and/or AJA Insurance.
117.

Hawley Troxell's acts and conduct has damaged Reed Taylor, AIA

Services and/or AIA Insurance in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary
judgment by aiding and abetting and/or substantially assisting others (including John
Taylor and CropUSA) through a civil conspiracy in the commission of breaches of
fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AJA Services and/or AIA Insurance.
118.

Defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by and through an

opinion letter that was based upon Riley's personal knowledge, which further invokes
personal liability to Riley. Riley breached his duties when he asserted that the transaction
was illegal. Although Reed Taylor believes the transaction was legal and supported by
applicable law, Riley's actions have breached his duties to Reed Taylor and caused Reed
Taylor to incur damages for the payments of attorneys' fees and costs and lost revenues
because of AIA Insurance being wrongfully withheld from Reed Taylor. As a result of
Riley's acts and/or omissions, Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount to be proven
at trial or on summary judgment.

IX. SEVENTH CAUSES OF ACTION-EXCESSIVE COMPENSATION/WASTE
(Reed Taylor, AJA Services and/or AJA Insurance's Causes of Actions)
119.

Hawley Troxell has known that AIA Services is insolvent and AIA

Insurance is pledged to Reed Taylor as collateral. Hawley Troxell has known that AIA
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Insurance is a wholly owned subsidiary of the insolvent AIA Services. Hawley Troxell
has known that AJA Insurance's business is in the final years of existence and that its
commissions are dwindling as new health policies have not been issued for years.
120.

Hawley Troxell has aided and abetted and/or conspired with John Taylor,

Connie Taylor, James Beck, and others to pay excessive compensation for salaries and
fees for purportedly being officers and/or directors of AIA Services and AJA Insurance.
Hawley Troxell has aided and abetted and/or conspired with John Taylor, Connie Taylor,
James Beck, Michael Cashman and others to waste the remaining assets of AIA Services
and/or AIA Insurance. All the while Hawley Troxell has known of Reed Taylor's rights
and AIA Services' insolvency. Hawley Troxell had full knowledge that John Taylor and
other directors and officers compensation was required to be set by the lawful board of
directors of AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance, but substantially assisted John Taylor
and others in obtaining inappropriate compensation.
121.

Hawley Troxell's acts and conduct has damaged Reed Taylor, AIA

Services and/or AIA Insurance in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary
judgment by aiding and abetting and/or substantially assisting others (including, without
limitation, John Taylor, Connie Taylor and James Beck) through a civil conspiracy in the
payment of excessive compensation.

X. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1.

Reed Taylor demands a trial by jury of not less than twelve (12) on all

claims and damages so triable.

XI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Reed Taylor prays for the following relief:
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For a judgment against Hawley Troxell, jointly and severally, for

$10,500,000 in damages ($3,500,000 in actual damages and $7,000,000 in treble
damages), the exact amount of which will be proven at trial and/or on summary
judgment, plus an award of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest;
2.

For a judgment against Hawley Troxell, jointly and severally, for treble

damages of $7,000,000, the exact amount to be proven at trial pursuant to J.C. § 48608(2);
3.

For a judgment requiring the disgorgement of the payments of all

attorneys' fees and costs paid to Hawley Troxell by AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance;
4.

For judgment against Hawley Troxell, jointly and severally, for additional

damages as provided under J.C. § 48-608;
5.

For such other relief as may be available to Reed Taylor pursuant to LC. §

48-601, et seq. or the law, including, without limitation, obtaining a preliminary
injunction to restrain Hawley Troxell from undertaking further representation;
6.

For an award of attorneys fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to

Idaho Law, including, without limitation, LC. § 48-608, LC. § 12-120 and/or I.C. § 12121; and
7.

For such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

DATED this _ _ day of October, 2008.
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC

By:

~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Michael S. Bissell
Attorneys for Reed Taylor
Data\1315\1322\Amended Complaint.HTEH.FINAL.doc
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO

)
) SS.

COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE )
I, ReedJ. Taylor, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled action. I have read the contents of this First
Amended Complaint, know the contents of this First Amended Complaint, and believe
that the facts in this First Amended Complaint are true and accurate to the best of my
knowledge and belief.

Reed J. Taylor

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this __ day of October, 2008.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at:
--------~My commission
expires: _ _ _ _ __
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)

v.

)
)

GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V,
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X,
unknown individuals;
Defendants.

CASE NO. CVOS-01765

)

)
)

OPINION AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISMISS AND PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO AMEND
COMPLAINT

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Motion
to Am.end Complaint. A hearing on the Motion to Dismiss was held on October 16, 2008 and a
hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint was held on December 4, 2008. Plaintiff
Reed Taylor was represented by attorney Michael S. Bissell. Defendants Babbitt, Ashby,
Collins, Riley and the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley were represented by attorney
James D. LaRue. The Court, having i-ead the motion and briefs of the parties, having considered
Taylorv. Babbitt, etal.

Opinion & Order on Motion to Dismiss
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the record in the matter, having heard oral arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the

matter, hereby renders its decision.

FACTVALANDPROCiDVRALBACKGROVN~

The above-entitled matter is rooted in the underlying case of Taylor v. AJA. et al., Nez
Perce County Case No. CV07·00208. The issues in the underlying case a:re complex and its
procedural history lengthy, though the matter has yet to go to trial or be fully adjudicated. Reed
Taylor's complaint in the underlying case, amended five times. asserts eleven claims including
one for default of a $6 million promissory note issued to Reed Taylor by the corporate
defendants as part of a buy-out or retirement package. In order to understand the claims being
asserted in the instant matter, certain events in the underlying case must be reviewed.

On January 29, 2007, Reed Taylor filed suit against AJA Services Corporation, AJA
Insurance, Inc., John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Bryan Freeman and Jolee Duclos. AIA Insurance,
Inc. is a business entity under the umbrella of AIA Services Corporation. At the time of the
filing of the lawsuit, John Taylor was the CEO of the corporations and a board member along
with Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos. 1 Connie Taylor, the former wife of John Taylor, held a
community property interest in the corporations. Following the filing of the lawsuit, attorney
Michael McNichols was retained to represent AJA Services, AIA Insurance and John Taylor;
attorney David Gittens was retained to represent Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos; attorney Jotl
·Hally was retained to represent Connie Taylor.
On February 27, 2007, upon motion by the Defendants, the Court granted a temporary
resttaining order against Reed Taylor after he attempted to exercise management authority over
1

Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos resigned as board members shortly after the lawsuit was filed and two new
board members were appointed to replace them.
Taylor v. Babbtn, er al
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the corporate Defendants. A hearing date was then set on the Defendants' accompanying motion
for a preliminary injunction. On March 8, 2007, as a result of actions taken by Reed Taylor

before and immediately follo'Wing the filing of his lawsuit, the Court entered a preliminary
injunction prohibiting Reed Taylor from acting or attempting to act as manager and/or a board
member of AIA Insurance Inc and/or from harassing and/or interfering 'With the management of
AIA Insurance, Inc. and AIA Services Corporation.2 The Court's Order remains in effect.
On March 28, 2007, attorney McNichols filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for AIA
Services and AIA Insurance. Reed Taylor did not object and, at hearing on April 12, 2007, the
Court granted the motion to withdraw. On May 7, 2007, a notice of appearance on behalf of
AIA Services and AJA Insurance was filed by attotneys Gary Babbitt and John Ashby of the law
finn Hawley, Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP. The :finn continues to represent the corporations.
Several months into the Ul'l.derlying litigation, Reed Taylor amended his complaint to
name as additional defendants CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. and others. C!opUSA, a
corporation started by John Taylor who serves as its CEO and on its board or directors, is
represented by attorney Babbitt and by attotn.ey Jam.es J. Oatziolis with the law firm of Quarles
& Brady LLP located in Chicago, Illinois. Attorney Gat.ziolis has obtained limited admission in

Idaho in order to represent CropUSA and has associated for that purpose with the law finn of

Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley.
The last matter in the underlying case that is of relevance to the instant case is a ruling by
the Court on motion for partial summary judgment filed by Reed Taylor. After significant
briefing and oral arguments on the motion, the Court found the corporate Defendants were in
default on a $6 million promissory note issued to Reed Taylor by the corporations. However, the

2

March 8, 2008 Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Prelilninary Injunction at page 6.

Taylorv. Babbitt, et al.
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Court made no determination relative to other terms in the extensive buy-out agreement between
AlA Insurance Corporation and Reed Taylor, such as the effect on voting shares and receivables
upon default of the promissory note. Those issues were not before the Court in the context of the
motion for partial summary judgment and, therefore, have yet to be determined,
After twenty-one months of motions and hearings in the underlying case, after trial dates
had been set and reset. and with a number of motions still pending before the Court, Reed Taylor
filed the above-entitled action against attorneys Babbitt, Ashby, Collins and Riley and the law
firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, cutrent counsel for the corporations in the underlying
case. In his action, filed August 8, 2008, Reed Taylor asserts the following claims against
Defendants: (1) aiding and abetting or assisting others in the commission oftortious acts in the
underlying case; (2) conversion and misappropriation of AIA corporate assets; (3) violations of
Idaho's Consumer Protection Act. I.C. § 48~601 et seq.; and, (4) professional negligence and/or
breach of :fiduciary duties. Defendants, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) along with briefing. Reed Taylor filed briefing in opposition and on October
16, 2008, the Court heard oral arguments of cowisel.
One day prior to the Court's hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff filed a
motion to amend his complaint, attaching his proposed amended pleading. Upon order of the
Court, the Motion to Am.end Complaint was heard on December 4, 2008 and the Court will
address the matter herein.

STANDARD ON MOTION TO DISMISS
In ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to l.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), a court is to review all

facts and inferences in favor of the non-moving party and ask whether a claim for relief has been

Taylor v. Babbitt, •t al
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stated. Rohr v. Rohr, 128 Idaho 137, 141, 911P.2d133, 137 (1996). In the instant matter, the
arguments made by the parties incorporated events and actions that have occurred in the
underlying case of Taylor v. AU, et al. Therefore, in making its analysis in the instant matter
and pursuant to I.R.E. 201, the Court will take judicial notice of the underlying case in toto.

ANALYSIS
(A) DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISM!SS

The issues raised in the instant matter arc less dawiting and complex than the lengthy
briefs and pleadings would make them appear at first blush.3 As stated by Reed Taylor in his
opposition brief, the gravamen of his Complaint is that Defendants aided and abetted John
Taylor and others in committing torts against Recd Taylor and acted to deprive Reed Taylor of
money and property to which he is entitled.4
Plaintiff's core contention is that Defendants are acting in violation of Idaho's
Ptofessional Rules of Conduct by representing all of the corporate defendants in the underlying
case and by entering into a joint defense agreement with the other named defendants. Plaintiff
argues that by their actions, Defendants have aided and abetted John Taylor and others in the
commission oftortious acts that have resulted in significant financial damage to Reed Taylor.
The Defendants in the instant case were retained to represent AJA Insurance, AlA
Services and CropUSA after previous counsel for the AJA corporations had obtained a
preliminary injunction from. the Court that ordered the operations of the corporations to remain
llllchanged until the claims asserted by Reed Taylor have been adjudicated. The injunction was

3

Plaintiff's Complaint ls twenty-three pages in length. Defendants' brlefin support of the motion to dismiss is
thirty-six pages in length. Plaintiff's brief in opposition ls fifty-seven pages in length.
4
Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, at page 18.
Ta.ylol' v. Babbitt, et '11.
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sought after Reed Taylor self-declared the promissory note in default, self-declared himself the
sole shareholder of the corporations and then attempted to take over physical and operational
control of the corporations, all without the benefit of a judicial finding on the issues.
The Court has reviewed in camera (a) written correspondence to the defendants in the
underlying matter from the law :finn of Hawley Troxell Ennis and Hawley, (b) the mitten
representation agreements entered into by the codefendants who arc represented by the law firm,
and (c) the Mitten joint defense agreements entered into by the defendants in the underlying
case. After reviewing the documents and the applicable Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct,

the Court is persuaded the Defendant attorneys and law firm ate well versed in the rules and have

met the criteria necessary to represent clients with potential conflicts of interest. The various
documents are well-drafted, effectively address the concerns and requirements of the
professional rules of conduct and protect and preserve any potential claims that may arise
between the clients.
Of particular concern to the Plaintiff is the joint defense agreement between the
defendants in the underly:ittg case. The purpose behind joint defense agreements is to allow
defendants in the same litigation to communicate and share documents without the
communications and/or documents becomins subject to discovery where those communications
and/or documents are otherwise non-discoverable or fall within the attorney-client privilege. In
the underlying case, many of Reed Taylor's claims challenge interests that the corporations and
the individual board members have in common and, therefore, require a comm.on defense. It is

only reasonable that a degree of cooperation must take place between counsel for the
corporations and counsel for the individual board members, as the corporation is incapable of
communicating with its counsel except through those individuals who run the corporations.

Taylor 11. Babbitt, Bt al.
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Contrary to the position asserted by Plaintiff, entering into a joint defense agreement does
not prohibit the codefendants from asserting claims against each other if such claims are
warranted. Rather, it provides the parties certain protections in regard to their communications
with each other on those areas of comm.on defense and common interest. The joint defense

privilege, or common interest rule, is merely an extension of the attorney-client privilege in that
it protects communications between the parties when they are part of an on-going and joint effort
to set up a common defense strategy in connection with actual or prospective litigation. /ntex

Recreation Corp. v. Team Worldwide Corp., 471 F.Supp.2d 11 (D.D.C.2007). The joint defense
privilege applies not only to communications but also to docwnents protected by the work
product doctrine. Id The circumstances in the instant matter requite a degree of cooperation
between the defendants in the underlying case and, therefore, the Court finds the joint defense
,A,)

agreements reasonable and within the standards allowed by Idaho's Professional Rules of

~~},'4-rtr "~
LJ~
.\"'

c~.

P

.,t"

Having put to rest the questions of joint representation and joint defense agreements, the
Court's analysis moves to the Defendants assertion that Plaintiff's claims in the instant matter
should be dismissed as a matter of law based on the theory of litigatiol'l privilege, a doctrine that

has yet to be addressed by Idaho's appellate courts. Nevertheless. numerous other jurisdictions
have addressed the doctrine at length, providing the Court with direction as to the applicability of
the privilege.
The courts in West Virginia have addressed the litigation privilege on a number of

occasions. In Clarkv. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d 864, 218 W.Va. 427 (W.Va.2005), the plaintiff, a
physician and former defendant in a medical malpractice suit, asserted claims in negligence
against counsel for the plaintiff in the malpractice lawsuit The Clark Court, looking first at the
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duties of an attorney, found an inflexible requirement that attorneys diligently, faithfully and
legitimately perform every act necessary to protect, conserve and advance the interests of their
clients. Clark v. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d at 868. The Court then noted that its research revealed
no case law that would support Clark's assertion that an attorney owes a duty to an opposing
party, such that breach of the duty would subject an attorney to liability. Id. at 869. The Court
stated, "This Court can find no justification for imposing a duty of care in favor of an opposing
party upon counsel. Imposition of such a duty can only work to the detriment of counsel's own
client and would adversely impact counsel's duty of zealous advocacy for his or her own client
and would create an impossible and unjustified conflict of interest." Id.
Court's that have had the opportunity to address the litigation privilege recognize the
adversarial system would be turned on its head if parties to a lawsuit are allowed to bring claims
in tort and/or legal malpractice against opposing counsel for conduct done within the scope of
litigation. While attorneys must not knowingly counsel or assist a client in committing a crime
or frauds. Idaho's Rules of Professional Conduct require an attorney to pursue matters on behalf
of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the attorney and require
an attorney to take whatever lawful and ethical measures arc required to vindicate a client's
cause or endeavor. I.R.P.C., Rule l.3[1]
The doctrine of litigation privilege appears intended to create a safety zone for attorneys
so that they may zealously advocate for their client without fear of retribution. The Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia aptly described the scope and purpose of the litigation
privilege in Clark v. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d 864, 218 W.Va. 427 (2005).
In her concurring opinion in Barefield v. DPIC Companies, Inc., 215 W.Va. 544,
600 S.E.2d 256 (2004), Justice Davis discussed the policies underlying the
5

I.R.P.C., Rule 1.2[10)
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litigation privilege. Therein she stated!
[t]he public policies associated with the litigation privilege include: (1)
promoting the candid, objective and undistorted disclosure of evidence;
(2) placing the burden of testing the evidence upon the litigants during
trial; (3) avoiding the chilling effect resulting from the threat of
subsequent litigation; (4) reinforcing the finality of judgments; (5) limiting
collateral attacks upon judgments; (6) promoting zealous advocacy; (7)
discouraging abusive litigation practices; and (8) encouraging settlement.
Matsuura v. E.1 du Pont de Nemours & Co., 102 Hawai'i 149, 73 P.3d
687, 693 (2003).

Barefield, 215 W.Va. at 560, 600 S.E.2d at 272 (Davis, J., concurring). In light of
these policies, we see no reason to distinguish between communications made
during the litigation process and conduct occurring during the litigation process.
As recognized by the Florida Supreme Court:
absolute immunity must be afforded to any act occurring during the course
of a judicial proceeding, regardless of whether the act involves a
defamatory statement or other tortious behavior such as the alleged
misconduct at issue, so long as the act has some relation to the proceeding.
The rationale behind the immunity afforded to defamatory statements is
equally applicable to other misconduct occurring during the course of a
judicial proceeding. Just as participants in litigation must be free to engage
in unhindered communication, so too must those participants be free to use
their best judgment in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit without fear of
having to defend their actions in a subsequent civil action for misconduct.

Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A .• v. United States
Fire Insurance Company, 639 So.2d 606, 608 (Fla.1994). See also Jackson v.
BellSouth Telecommunications, 372 F.3d 1250, 1274 (11th Cir.2004) (quoting
Levin).
In Collins, we recognized that absolute privileges, such as tho litigation privilege,
should only be permitted in limited circumstances. Collins, 211 W.Va. at 461, 566
S.E.2d at S98. Thus, we do not believe that a litigation privilege should apply to
bar liability of an attorney in all circumstances. In Mehaffy, Rider, Windholz &
Wilson v. Central Bank Denver, N.A., 892 P.2d. 230, 235 (Colo.1995), the
Colorado Supreme court noted that "an attorney is not liable to a non-client absent
a fmding of fraud or malicious conduct by the attorney." See also Baglini v.
Lauletta, 338 NJ.Super. 282, 768 A.2d 825, 833-34 (2001) (''The one tort
excepted from the reach of the litigation privilege is malicious prosecution, or
malicious use of process.''). We believe such exceptions to an absolute litigation
privilege arising from conduct occurring during the litigation process are
reasonable accommodations which preserve an attorney's duty of zealous
advocacy while providing a deterrent to intentional conduct which is unrelated to

Taylor v. Babbitt, et al.
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legitimate litigation tactics and which harms an opposing party. As recently noted
by a California court:
[a] fraud claim against a lawyer is no different from a fraud claim against
anyone else. If an attorney commits actual fraud in his dealings with a
third party, the fact he did so in the capacity of attorney for a client does
not relieve him of liability. While an attorney's professional duty of care
extends only to his own client and intended beneficiaries of his legal work,
the limitations on liability for negligence do not apply to liability for
fraud.

Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, 121 Cal.App.4th 282, 291, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d
26, 31-2 (Cal.Ct.App.2004)(internal citations and quotations omitted).
In order "[t)o maintain an action for malicious prosecution it is essential to prove:
(1) Th.at the prosecution was malicious; (2) that it was -Mthout reasonable or
probable cause; and (3) that it tenninated favorably to plaintiff.'' Syl. Pt. 1, Lyons
v. DavypPocahontas Coal Co., 75 W.Va 739, 84 S.E. 744 (1915). The term
malicious is.defmed as "(s]ubstantially certain to cause injury" and "without just
cause or excuse." Black's Law Dictionary 977 (8th Ed.2004). This definition
implies an improper or evil intent or motive or the intent to do harm. Where an
attorney files suit without reasonable or probable cause with the intent to hann a
defendant, we do not believe the litigation privilege should insulate him or her
from liability for malicious prosecution.
As noted above, we can find no reasonable justification for distinguishing conduct
from communications for the purposes of the litigation privilege. However, we
also recognize the need for limited exceptions from application of the absolute
litigation privilege for certain intentional actions. Accordingly, we now hold that
the litigation privilege is generally applicable to bar a civil litigant1s claim for civil
damages against an opposing party's attorney if the alleged act of the attorney
occurs in the course of the attorney's representation of an opposing party and is
conduct related to the civil action.

Clark v. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d at 870-871.
In the instant matter, the conduct and actions of the Defendants that form the basis of
Plaintiff's claims are all conduct and actions within the scope of the underlying litigation. While
Plaintiff' correctly notes that there are potential conflicts of interest that exist between the clients
of the Defendants, the Court is sufficiently persuaded, based on its review of the in camera
documents, that the Defendants' clients have knowingly waived any conflicts and are fully
informed that, as the litigation progresses, the common interests and defenses of the underlying
Taylor v. Babbitt, at a/.
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defendants may diverge and the parties may fmd themselves adversaries. 'While the underlying
case is complex in that it involves numerous claims asserted against multiple defendants and
itlvolves intetwcorporate transactions approved by directors that cross over from corporation to
corporation, the circumstances are not so unique that the Court is unable to look to the general
analysis of courts with similar, albeit distinguishable, facts.
A case with many similarities to the instant case is helpful to the analysis the Court must

make. JnAlpertv. Crain, Caton &James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d398 (Tex.App.-Houston [l"Dist.]

2005), Robert Alpert filed suit against the law firm of Crain, Caton & James after the firm had
represented Mark Riley, an attorney who found himself being sued by Alpert after their attomeyclient relationship had soured. Alpert's suit against Crain Caton law firm asserted the firm had
conspired with Riley to defraud Alpert, had aided and abetted Riley to defraud Alpert, and had
tortiously interfered with Riley's fiduciary duty to Alpert. The law firm moved to dismiss the
lawsuit based on Alpert's failure to state a recognizable claim. The lower court granted the
motion and Alpert appealed. The trial court's dismissal of the lawsuit was af.finned by the Texas
Court of Appeals. In reaching its decision, the Texas Court made the following statements:
Perhaps as an offshoot of its privity jurisprudence. Texas case law has
discouraged lawsuits against an opposing counsel if the lawsuit is based on the
fact that counsel represented an opposing party in a judicial proceeding. Bradt v.
Sebek, 14 S. W.3d 756, 766 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). An
attorney has a duty to zealously represent his clients within the bounds of the law.
Bradtv. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 71-72 (Tex.App,wHouston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ
denied). In fulfilling this duty, an attomey has the right to interpose defenses and
pursue legal rights that he deel'llS necessary and proper, without being subject to
liability or damages. Id If an attorney could be held liable to an opposing party
for statements made or actions taken in the course of representing his client, he
would be forced constantly to balance his own potential exposure against his
client's best interest. See id Such a conflict hampers the resolution of disputes
through the court system and the attainment of justice. Thus, to promote zealous
representation, courts have held that an attorney is "qualifiedly immune" from
civil liability, with respect to non~clients, for actions taken in connection with
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representing a client in litigation. See, e.g., Butler v. Lilly, 533 S.W.2d 130, 13134 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ dism'd).
This qualified immunity generally applies even if conduct is wrongful in the
context of the underlying lawsuit. Renfroe v. Jones & Assocs., 941S.W.2d285,
288 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ dettied) ("Under Texas law, attorneys
cannot be held liable for wrongful litigation conduct."). For example, a third party
has no independent right of recovery against an attorney for filing motions in a
lawsuit, even if frivolous or without merit, although such conduct is sanctionable
or contemptible as enforced by the statutory or inherent powers of the court. West,
892 S.W.2d at 72. Courts have refused to acknowledge an independent cause of
action in such instances "because making motions is conduct an attorney engages
in as part of the discharge of his duties in representing a party in a lawsuit." Id
(holding no cause of action existed for mald.ng motion for contempt because
attomeys do not owe duty to be correct in legal argwnetits-"even if the ... motion
for contempt had been m.eritless, their conduct in so moving, coming as it did in
the discharge of their duties in representing a party in a lawsuit, would still not be
actionable."). Thus, an attorney's conduct, even if frivolous or without merit, is
not independently actionable if the conduct is part of the discharge of the lawyer's
duties in representing his or her client. Id at 74; Chapman Children's Trust v.
Porter & Hedges, L.L.P., 32 S.W.3d 429, 441 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2000, pet. denied). The immunity focuses on the type of conduct, not on whether
the conduct was meritorious in the context of the widerlying lawsuit. Renfroe, 947
S.W.2d at 288.

Supreme Court observed in McCamish. a lawyer's protection from
liability arising out of his representation of a client is not without limits. See
McCamish, 991 S.W.2d at 793-94; see also Toles v. Toles, 113 S.W.3d 899, 91213 (Tex.App.-Dal.las 2003, no pet.). For example, a cause of action could exist
against an attomey who knowingly commits a fraudulent act outside the scope of
his legal representation of the client. See Likover v. Sunflowet Terrace II, Ltd,
696 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ). If a lawyer
participates in independently fraudulent activities, his action is "foreign to the
duties of an attorney." Id. (quoting Poole v. Houston & T.C. Ry. Co., 58 Tex. 134,
137 (1882)). A lawyer thus cannot shield his own willful and premeditated
fraudulent actions from liability simply on the ground that he is an agent of his
client. See id.
As the Texas

Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d at 405-406.
In the instant case, Reed Taylor's claims against the Defendants are all based on conduct

and actions engaged in by the Defendants within the scope of the underlying litigation.
Nevertheless, under the theory asserted by Plaintiff, a defendant's attorney may become liable to
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a plaintiff if the plaintiff disagrees with or is offended by the litigation tactics of defense counsel
or disagrees with or is offended by the decision of an opposing party to waive conflicts of
interest in order for common interests to be defended in the most efficient and/or effective
manner. It is this very morass that the litigation privilege seeks to prevent.
Each of Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants contends that by defending the
corporations in the underlying action, by accepting payment for their representation, by arguing
positions to the Court in favor of their clients and against the claims of Reed Taylor, and that by
failing to agree with Reed Taylor,s positions in regards to his cl.aims, the Defendants have aided
and abetted and conspired with the corporations and individual directors to interfere with the
contractual rights of Reed Taylor. Yet, Plaintiff is unable to direct the Court to any conduct or
action on the part of the Defendants that falls outside the scope of the Defendants' representation
of their clients.
The Court appreciates the Plaintiff's right to zealously prosecute his claims in the
underlying action and respects his belief that his claims are sound, that he will prevail on those
claims and that the underlying defendants are simply delaying the inevitable. However, the
Court also appreciates the defendants' right in the underlying action to disagree with Reed
Taylor's position and to defend against his asserted claims. The Court is persuaded that the
litigation privilege is a sound judicial concept that should be recognized in Idaho as it is
consistent with the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and the finnly held established standard
in Idaho that an attorney is obligated to provide his clients with zealous representation. In the

instant matter, the conduct and actions of the Defendants, as alleged by Plaintiff, all fall within
the scope of the Defendants' representation of their clients and, therefore, fall within the
protection of the litigation privilege.
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The Court is further persuaded, based on its review of the various documents provided to
the Court for in camera review, that the Defendants took all steps necessary to insure compliance
with the rules of professional conduct in their representation of clients with potential conflicts of

interest and in the use of a joint defense agreement. Therefore, there has been no conduct of

aiding and abetting or conspiracy on the part of the Defendants in their representation of the
underlying corporate defendants. Neither has there been any conversion of assets by the
Defendants. Prior to the Defendants being retained in the underlying case, the Court entered a
preliminary injunction ordering operational authority of AIA to remain status quo. Thus, the
directors of the corporation, including John Taylor, had authority to retain the Defendants to
represent the corporations. Furthermore, representations made by the Defendants to the Court in
fultherance of their of their clients' defense do not constit'Ut.e violations ofidaho's consumer

protection laws when those representations are made within the scope of litigation. Finally,
Plaintiff's claim for legal malpractice fails as a matter of law. The existence of an attorney-client
relationship is a necessary element to a legal malpractice claim and Plaintiff, who specifically
raises the fact that he has not been allowed to choose counsel for the underlying defendants, has
no attorney-client relationship with the Defendants.6

(Bl PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAIN.I

"The decision whether to allow a party to amend its pleadings is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court .... " Wells v. United States Insurance Co., 119 Idaho 160, 166, 804
P.2d 333 (Ct.App.1991). It is not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion to amend where the

6

This issue was addressed fully in the Opinion & order on Defendants Motion to Dismiss in the companion case of
Taylor v. McNichols, et al., Nez Perce County Case No. CVOB-01763. Sec also Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho
134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004) and again in.Estat1 ofBecker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 96 P.3d 623 (2004).
Taylor v. Babbitt, et at.
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record contains no allegation that, if proven, would entitle a plaintiff to the relief claimed. Id. at
167.
The Court, after hearing oral arguments of counsel and after reviewing Plaintiffs

proposed amended complaint, finds it would be a futile act to grant Plaintiff's motion to amend
as the proposed amended complaint would not withstand a tnotion to dismiss. In his proposed
amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts the same claims as set forth in his original Complaint and
seeks to add derivative claims. Plaintiff's amended direct claims fail as a matter oflaw for the
same reasons as addressed by the Court above, despite Plaintiff's bare allegation that the conduct
and actions of the Defendants exceeded the scope of their reptesentation.

Plaintiff's attempt to bring derivative claims on behalf of ALA Insurance and AIA
Services fail as a matter oflaw. Idaho Code§ 30-1-741 clearly and unambiguously provides
standing to bring derivative proceedings only to those who are shareholders at the time of the act

or omission complained of and only to those shareholders who fairly and adequately represent
the interests of the corporation. As noted by the ABA Official Comment at the end ofl.C. § 301-741, while some state's have eliminated the "contemporaneous" ownership rule, Idaho's
legislature chose to retain the requirement, as is evidenced by the language in the statute.
Plaintiff contends that, because other states have allowed creditors and stock pledges to bring
deri-vative claims, standing should not be limited to shareholders. The Court is not persuaded.
Idaho Code § 30-1-741 is clear and unambiguous, making it clear Idaho's legislature has chosen
to limit derivative claims to shareholders only.
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ORDER
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint is hereby DENIED.
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED.

Dated this :Z..~ day of December 2008.
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CERTJFICATE OF MATLIN__O
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoini OPlNION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT was

_tLFAXED
_ _ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Jdaho, this ~ay of December 2008,
to:
Michael Bissell
7 So Howard St., Ste. 416
Spokane WA 99201
James LaRue

PO Box 1539
Boise ID 83701-1539
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OJ THE SICON.D .roDICIAL DISTRICT or THE
STATE OF IDAHO, JN AND FOR THE COUNTY OPNIZ PERCE

ltBBD1. TAYLOR, an individual,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

)

~

)

MICHAEL B. MoNICHOLS, ID individual;
CLEMENTS, BR.OWN & McNICHOLS,
P.A., an Idaho professional oo:rporatioll;
JANS DOES 1-V, Wlknown individuals:

)
)
)

CASBNO. CVOS-01763
OPINION AND ORDBR ON
DEPENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISMISS AND PLAlNTIFP'S
MOnON TO AMEND
COMPLAINT

)
)

Defendants.

)

11tis matter is before the Co'UJ't on Defimdanta' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Motion
to Amend Com.plaint.

A hearlng on the Motion to D~ was held on OW>ber 16, 2008 and a

hearing on the Motio.o. to Amend Complaint was held on December 4, 2008. Plain1i:ff Rood.

Taylor wu represented by attomoy Michael S. Bissell. Defendants Michael E. McNichols and
the law firm of Clements, Brown & McNichols were telRlentod by attomey John J. Janis. The

Court, having read the motion and briefs of the parties, having considered the record in the
matter, having hoard oral arguments of counsel and being fully advised ill the matter, hereby

tenderB its declsion.
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The above-entitled matter is rooted in tho underlying case of Taylor v. AU, 11 al., Nez
Pereo County Case No. CV07-00208. The issues mthe underlying case are complex and its
procedural history lencfhy, though the matter hu yet to go to 1riaL Reed Taylor's eot11pWnt in
the 'llllderlying case, amended five 1fmes, asserts eleven claims including one for default of a S6

million promissory note issued to Reed Taylor by the corporate defendants as part of a buy·out
or retirement package. In order to understand the claims being asserted in the instant matter,
certain events in the underlying oase must be reviewed.
On January 29, 2007, Reed Taylor med suit apjnst AJA Services Coipotation, Af.A

Insurance, Inc., John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos. AIA Insurance,

Inc. is a business enti(f under the umbrella of AJA Services Coipora.tion. At the time of the
filing of the lawsuit, John Taylor was the maaging director of tho corporations and a boud

member along with Biyau Freeman and JoLee Duclos. CODl1ie 'Taylor, the fonner wife of John
Taylor, held a c::ommunity preperty interest bl. the corporations. Followins the filing of'the
la.wauit, attorney Michael McNichols 'WIS retained to represent AJA Servicca, AlA lnaurance and

John Taylor; attorney David Gittens was retained to represent Biyan Freeman and JoLeo Duclos;
sttomey Jon Hally was retained to tepresent Connie Taylor.
On February 27, 2007, upon motion by the Deffllldants, the Com gt8l1ted a temporary
restraiDblg order against Reed Taylor after he attempted to exercise management authority over

the corporate Defendants. A hearing date was then set on the Defendants' accompanying motion
for a preliminary injunction. On March 8, 2007. as a result of actions taken by Reed Taylor

before and immediately following 1M filing of his lawsuit, the Court entered a preliminary
injunction prohibitin& Reed Taylor from acting or attempting to act as manager and!Ol a board
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member of AJA Insurance Ino end/or from harassing and/or fnteifcrin1 with the management of
AlA .Insurance, lnc. and AlA Services Coxporatlon. 1 The Court's Order remains in dfect.
On March 28, 2001, attorney McNichols filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for AJA
Services and AJA Insuranoe. Reed Taylor did not objeot and, at a hearltlg on April 12, 2007, the

Court granted the motion to withdraw. On May 7, 2007, a notice of appesrance on behalf of
AJA Services and A1A Insurance was filed by attomeys Oaty Babbitt mid John Ashby ofthe law

firm Hawley, Troxoll Bmds & HawJey, LLP. The fhm continues to represent the ~otations.
The last matter in the underlying case that ta ofrelevance to the instant case is a ruling by
the Court on motion for parlW. summlQ' judgment fiJod by Reed Taylor. After significant

briefuzg and oral arguments on tho motion, the Court found the corporate Defeadants were in
defalllt on a S6 million promissory note issued to Reed Taylor by the ooipora'tions. However, 1he

Court made no detennlnation telative to other terms in the extensive buy"'°ut agreement between
AJA Insurance Coi:poration md Reed Taylor, S\lCh as tho effect on voting shates and Jeeeivables

upon default of tho promissoey note. Those issues were not before the Court In the context of the
motion for partial summary judgment and, therefore, have yet to be detcmlined.
After twenty...one months of motions and hearings in th& undorlyJng case, after trial dates
had been set and reset, and with a number of motions still peudina before the Court, Reed Taylor
:filed the above-entitled action against attomey MeNichols ~the law fJrm. of Clements, Brown
cl: McNichoh, who curmitiy remain as counsel for John Taylor in the underlying case. In his

action, filed August 8, 2008, Reed Taylor asserts the following claims against attorney
McNkhob and bil law fhm: (I) aiding and abetting or assisdng others in the cotnmission of

tortfous acts 1n the underlyine case; (2) conversion and misappropriation ofAIA col]>Orate

1

Mateh &, 2008 Op!aiotl and Order OD DefendlDll' Mo1ion far PRUmiDGY bijuaction at pap 6

Taylor v Mt:Nlt:lioll

Opinion .t Order oa Modem to Dismbs

3

•..

000499

DEC. 23. 2008 3: 14PM

NO. 9026

DISTRICT COURT

4/19

P.

assets; (3) violatioos ofldaho's Comumer Protection Act, I.C. § 48-601 et seq.; and, (4)

profCBSional negligonce and/or brea~h of fiduciary duties. On September 29, 2008, Defendant
McNiohols, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) along with
britfing Recd Taylor filed briefing in opposition and on October 16, 2008, the Court heard oral
arguments of counscL
One day prior to the Court1s hearing on Defcbdants' Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff' filed a

motion to 1m.cnd his complaint, attaching his pmposod amended pleading. By order of the
Court, hearing on the Motion to Amend was held on December 4, 2008 and the Court will

address tho mauer herein.

S'[ANDARD ON MOTION TO DISMISS
In ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to lR.C.P. 12(bX6), a court is to review all
facts and inferences in favor ofthe non..moving party and ask whether a claim for reliefhas been

stated, Rohr v. Rolll', 128 Idaho 137, 141, 911P.2d133, 137 (1996). In the instant matter, the

arguments made by the parties inoozporated events and actiom that haw occurred in the
underl)'ins case of Taylor v. AJA, et al. Therefore, in making its tmalysis in the inatant matter
and pursuant to I.R..B. 201, tho C'..ourt will take judicial notic" ofthe underlying cast In toto

ANALYSIS

CA>

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISM!Sa
1'he issues raised in the instant matter appear at tint bIUSh to be complex and at times

convoluted. However, despite lengthy briefs and pleadings, the: issues are not as daunting u they
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first appear.2 As stated by Reed Taylor in bis opposition brief; the gravamen ofhls Complaint is
that 1ttomoy McNichols and the law firm of Clemems. Brown & MoNlchols aided and abetted
John Taylor and others in committing torts 111ainst Reed Taylor and acted to deprive Ileed 1aylor
of money and property to whidl ho is cntitled.3

Each of the claims asserted by Plaintiffrelies upon his contention that the Defendant law
fir.al and attorney were retabJed to represent tho AJA corporations by John Taylof and/or othors,

tllat Jobn Taylor and/or others bad no authority to retain legal represen1&tion for the corporations,
and that Defendants knew they were retained without proper corporate authority, This :&ctual
assertion by Plaintiff is critical to his claims and causes oaoh of Plaintifrs olalms to fail u a

matter of law.
In the underlying case, the events ofthe litigation can be divided into three distinot time

frames based on procedural events in the case. The first time frame runs from tho filing ofReed
Taylor's lawsuit against the AJA c01porations. John Taylor and others until the Court's Order
entering l preliminary btjun01ion in the case. The seoond time ftame bo&iDS with the entiy of the
preliminary iI\junctlon until the Coun's Opinion and Order finding AIA in default on the $6
million promissory note (but defemna any findina on other teims of the buy-out agreement until
trial). The third time frame begins with the Court's finding of default on tho promissory note and

continues to "tho pzesent.
rn the instant case, attomey McNichols was retained to represont AJA Services, AJA

Insumnce and John Taylor after Reed Taylor filed suit· against tho cmporations and its board
members in Nez Perce County Case No. CV07-00208. At the time of the filing of the lawsuit,
John Ta.ylor was the manaains director of the co1porations and had been for many yeau. Reed
Plamtiff'1 Complaint ia tweAty-tbree paaes kl Jeqrh. Defeadlllts' 'brferm support of fht motion to cliemisa is
!bfrt)'·lfx pqea ill leagdl. Pla!nWr1 brlefln opposition is My-seven paPt in leqth.
, Pllilld.l!'s R.etpODte to Defttodallls' Motion to Dimi11, atpap l!I.
1
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Taylor contends the apemnent at issue in the underlying case includea terms that render him the
sole shareholder ofthe corporations upon default ofthe promissozy note, and, because he
believed the promiSSOiy note was in default, he was the only person with authority to retain
counsel for the eorporatiom to defend against the action he brought However, at the time
Defendao:ts were retained to represent 1he COiporations and John Taylor. the question of whether
the promissory noto MS hl default had not been det.ermined and mnained p8llding befo1e the
Court. Until such a determination was made, the authority to make deoiaions regarding lc:pl
COUDSe1 for the cozporatiOllS rested wi1h the corpotate board of directon, which included John

Tayler. Therefore, at the time attomey McNichol& was retained to represent the corporatiom,
authority to enter into a contract for legal semces tested with tho cotp0tate board of directors.
Reed Taylor, on the other band, had :no authority during this time period to make decisions for

the e0Jp0nl.1iom. It would be a stnmge situation indeed for a civil plaintttf to be empowered to
select <:0unsel for the defendant or, by logical cxtalsion, decide the defendant should hav6 oo
coUDBCl at all.

Ahr he wu retained to represent John Taylor and the coiporations, attomey McNiohols

filed a inotion &cekillg·a preliminary fiVunctlon aaainst Reed Taylor. The motion was :filed after
Reed Taylor attempted to have locb cilianged at the c:otporate offices in an o.ffort to take over
management of tho corporations. TM litiga1ion action ofattorney McNichoh was clearly
warranted where likelihood of great harm to 1he c01poraiion existed from Reed Taylor's conduct

and no ~crmination on the question of default and/or~ effects of any default had been made

by the Court. As retained counsel f'or the corporations and John Taylor, auomey McNiohols was
obligated to punuo all efforts necessary to prevent harm to the COllJOrations and defend his

clients agaimt the numerous claims ofR.ecd Taylor.

TO,Jl/orv. Mdlkholl
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On March 8, 20rr1, after motions for iDjlmctio.na were filed by both parties in the
underlying suit. after lenat)ly briefiq was submitted and hearings held, the Court entered an

illjunction ordering management of the coxporations to remain status quo, i.e. for managoma:nt of
the corporation to remain vested in the cotperations' board of directors. In addition, the

injunction proJn'bited Reed Taylor from inteifering with corporate management until 1Urther
order of the Court. Following the Court's enuy of the ~limimly Utjunction, attomey
McNichots moved to withdraw as counsel for the corporations.. The Court granted the motion
and new oounsel was subsequently retained to repnsmt the corporations.

In the hmant matter, Plaintift's primary assertion is that attorney McNiohols was retained
to represent the A1A corpom:ions by persons who bad no authority to retain c0tp0rate counsel

and that attorney McNichols knew he was retained without proper authorization. This fact fails

as a mattei' of law as the Court entered an Ordor early in 'Ibo underlying aetlon that established by
judicial order that the operations and managomm.t of the AIA corporations was to remain
~hanged until further ordor of the Court.

The Court's Oxder remains in~ to date. Under

Idaho Code § 30.1-304 coi:P<>rations have the same power as indivicluals to make contracts and
incur liabilities as necessary to cmy out its business affairs and John Taylor, as CEO of tbe

corpoJ&tions and pursuant to the Court's Order, had the authority to retain counsel for the
corporations.
Plaintifrs o1aims also fail under the doctrine of litigation prh'ilege. Tho Court found no
Idaho case Jaw addressing the doctrine. Nevertheless, numerous other jurisdicti~ns bavo
addressed the doctrine at length. providing the Court with direction as to the applicability of the
privilege.

T4011or 'I'. AlcNlcltoll
OpiuiOA !: Onhr OD MOtlCllL to Dimln
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The courts in West Virginia have addressed the lliigation privilege on a number of
occasions. In Clarkl'. D1'UC1rman, 624 S.B.2d 864, 218 W.Va.. 427 (W.Ve.2005), the plamtift', a

physician and former defendant in a medical malpractice suit, asserted claims in negligenco
~ counsel for the plaintiff in the malpractice lawsuit

The Clark Court, looking first at the

duties of an attomey, found an inflWblc ~ent that attorneys diligently, faithfully and

legitimately perfonn every aot necessary to protect, conserve and advance the Interests of their
clients. Clarie v. Dtuckman, 624 S.E.2d at 868. The Court then noted that its research revealed
no case law that would support Clarie' .s ass~on that an attorney owes a duty to an oppoaing
party. such that breach of the duty would subject an attomey to liability. Id. at 869. Tho Court
stated, "This Court em find no jllstifioation for im.poshlg a duty of cm in favor of an opposing
party upon coumel.

Imposition of such a duty can only work to the detriment of counsel's own

client and would adversely impact counsel's duty of zealous advocaey for his or her O'WD. client
and would create an impo!Sible and Unj\1Stified co~ct of interest." Id.
·

Court~s that have had the opportmlity to addms the litigation prlvilege recognize 1he

adversarial system would be turned on its bead ifparties to a lawsuit were allowed to bring
claims for torts and/or legal malpractice against opposing counsel for~ done within the
scope of litigation. While attorneys muat not knowingly counsel or usist a client in committing

a crimo or :tiaud4, Idaho's R\lles of Professional Conduct

req•

an attorney to pursue matklm on

behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or pexsonal inconvenimce to the attomoy and
require an attomey to take whatever lawfu.l llld ethical m~ arc required to vindicate a

client's cause or endeavor. I.R..P.C., Rule IJ[l]
The doctrine of litigation privilege appem intended to create a safety zone for attomcys
so that they may zealously advocate for their clie.nt without fear of mrlbutio.o. The Supmno
• I.U.C., Rule 1.2[10]
Alt:Ntcbu
Opinion .t: Order on MOtlOA fO Dilmltl

Tll)'/orv

I

000504

OEC. 23. 2008 3: 15PM

DfSTRICT COURT

NO. 9026

P. 9/19

Court of Appeals ofWest Virginia aptly described the scope and purpose of the litigation

privilege in Clarkv. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d 8641 218 W.VL 427 (2005).
I'n her concurring opinion. in Barrjltldv. DPIC Contpaniu, ltrc., 21S W.V1. 544,
600 S.E.2d 256 (2004), Justice Davis discussed the policies underlying the
litigation privilege. Therein she stated:
[t]he public policies assoeiated with the litigation privilege inc;lude; (1)
promoting the candid, objective and undistorted disclosure of evidence;
(2) plaoing the burden of testina the evidence upon the litigants during
trial; (3) avoiding tho chilling effect resulting ftom the threat of
subsequent litigation; (4) reinforcing the :finality ofjudgments; (S) limi1lna
collatenl attacks upon judgments: (6) promoting zealous advooacy; (7)
discouraging abusive litigation pncticesi aod (8) encouraging settlement.
Matsuura'IJ. JU duPontdeNemow'ztiCo., 102Hawai'i 149, 73 P.3d
687, 693 (2003).

Barefield, 215 W.Va. at 560, 600 S.E.2d at 272 (Davis, 1., oonc'mrlng). In light of
these policies, lW see no ruson to dlsdnauish botween communications made
during the litigation pxoceu and condllct ocomrlng during the litigation process.
As recognized by the Florida Supieme Court:
absolute immunity must be aff'otded to any act occurring during the course
of a judicial proc;eediDg, tegardless ofwhether the actmvolves a
defamatory statement or other tortiou. behavior such as the alleged
misconduct at issue, s0 loq as the aot has some relation to the proceeding.
The rationale behind the imlXlunity aft'orcled to defamatory statements is
equally applicable to other misconduct occurring during the co1ttSe of a
judicial proi:eeding. Just as participants in litigation must be ftee to engage
in unhindered comm'Ullioation. so too must those participants be ftee to use
their best.judgment in pros~ or defending a lawsuit without fear of
having to defend their actions in a subsequent civil action for misconduct.
Lmn, Mldd/1b'l'Ooks, Mabi1, ThomCll, Maya d: Mitdull. P...4.., v. Unit1d Statu
Fir• Imurancc Company, 639 So.2d 606, 608 (Fla.195>4). &e ahoJac'lrson v.
BellSouth Tsl1commzmtcation.s, 312 F.3d.12SO, 1274 (1 lth Cir.2004) (quoting
Lfvin).

In Collins, we recogni2ed that absolute pzivileges, such as the litigation pri'vilege,
should only be permitted fn limited ciJcumstances. Collms, 211 W.Va. at 461, ~66
S.B.2d at 598. Thus, we do not believe that a litigation privilege should apply to
bar liability of an attomey in all eircumstances. In M1hqffj, Rider, Windho/6 &
Wilson v. C1ntral Bonk D1nver, N.A.., 892 P.2d. 230, 235 (Colo.1995), the
Colorado Supreme court noll:d that "an attorney is not liable to a non-client absent
a findin1 of fraud or malicious conduct by the attomey." S11 also Bagllnt v.
Lau/etta, 338 NJ.Super. 282, 768 A.2d 825, 833-34 (2001) ("The one tort
Taylor v. MoNlaJtols
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excepted fi'om the reach of tho litigation pri"Viloae is malicious prosecution. or

malicious use of process.'~. We believe such exceptions to an absolute litiption
privilege arising from conduct oc:curring during the litigation process are
reasonable accommodations which preaerve an attomey's duty of zealous
advocacy while providing a deteaent to intentional conduct which is unrelated to
legitimate litiption tactics and which harms an opposing party. As recently noted
by a Califomia court
[a) ftaud claim against a lawyer is no different from a &a.ud claim apinst
anyone else. If an attomey commits aetual tl:aud in bis dealings with a
third party, the fact he did so in tho ~ity of attomey for a client does
not relieve bhn of liability. While an attomey's professional duty of care
extends only to his own cliam and intended bcneficiarios ofbis legal work,
the limitations on llabilitf for negligence do not apply to liability for
fraud.

Vega v. Jo11U, Dtrj, Reavis & Pol"f, 121 Cal.App.4th 282, 291, 17 Cal,Rptr.3d
26, 31·2 (Cal.Ct.App.2004)(intemal citations and quotations omitted).
In order 11[t]o maintain an action for malicious prosecution it is essential to prove:
(1) That the prosecution was malicious; (2) that it was without reasonable or
probable cause; and (3) that ntc?minated favorably to plaiutiff." SyL Pt l, Lyons
v. Davy-Pocahontas Coal Co., 1S W.VL 739, 84 S.B. 744 (lSllS). The torm
malicious is dofined as "[s]ubstamially certain to GWSO iJ\iury'' and "without just
cause or excuse,» Black's Law Dicti0ll8rf m (8th Ed.2004). This definition
implies an improper or ml inte.Pt or motive or the intent to do bann. Where an
attomey files suit without reasonable or probable oauso with the intent to bum a
defendant, we do not believe the litigation privilege should insulat4 him or her
from liability for malioioua prosecution.
As noted ibove, we can find no reasonable justi1icatton for distinguishing conduct
from communications for: tm puzposes oftho litigation. pdvilege. However, we

also tecognjze the need for limited exceptiom from application of the absolute
litigation privilege for certain intentional actions. AceordJngly, we now bold 1hat
tho litigation privilege is generally applicable to bar a oivil litigant's claim for civil
damages against an opposing party's attorney if the alleged act of the attomey
occurs in the course of the attomoy's .representation of an opposing party and is
oonduct related to the civil action.

CIOlk v. Druabnan. 624 S.B.2d at 870-871.
In the matant matter, J'lah1tiff hu argued his is a unique situation because he has filed

suit aaainst the AJA cotporations and its board members, that the contractual terms at the core of
his underlying suit make him the sole shareholder of the AJA corporations and, therefore, then is
Tt¢w v. Mt:Nir:lroll
OpilltOll I: Order on Modoa co Dlsmln

10

000506

DEC. 23. 2008 3: 16PM

DISTRICT COURT

NO. 9026

P. 11/19

a conflict between the AIA coiporations and the board membors that makes it inappropriate.
even fraudulent, for the board, or more partioularly for managing board member John Taylor, to
retain counsel for the corporations, to direct counsel for the corporations in any way, or for there
to be any cooperation between counsel for the corporations and counsel for John Taylor.

BoUom

line. Reed Taylor contends he is the only porson With autho.rity to determine who should sorve as
counsel for the corporations he Is suing. The Court, like the Plain~ has been unable to find a

case where a. plmntff haa filed suit against a corporation and its board memben and, while that
litigation remains pending. has filed suit against the attorneys representing the various
dofendanta In the underlying suit.

Nevertheless. the Court does not find tho instant matter to bo

as \mique as Plaintlif paints it.

A case with many similarities to the instant case is helpf\Jl to the analysis the Court must
make. ID..Alpm Y. Crain, Caron&: Jamu, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398 (Tex.App.·H~n [111 Dilt]

2005), Robert Alpert filed suit against the law firm representing Marlc Riley. the defendant in a
separate action filed by Mr. Alpert. Mark Riley was an attomey who had assisted Mr. Alpert in

Ida businen and legal affair&. After the relatfonship between Alpert and Riley somed, Alport
filed suit against Riley and Riley asserted counterclaims. Riley was represented by the Crain

Caton law firm during the litigation. Alpert then filed suit against Crain Caton law finn asserting
the firm bad c;onspired wi1h Riley to defraud Alpert, had aided and abetted Riley to deftaud

Alpert, ha.cl tortiously interfered with Riley's ftdvd.aiy duty to Alpert by CODOealing Riley's
malpnctices and breaches of fiduciary duty, by filing fiivolous l&V1Suits against Alpert and by
dispuaglna Alpert's reputation in the business community. The law firm moved to dismiss the

lawsuit based 011 Alpert's failure to state a recopizable claim. The lower court granted the

Tayltwv. MtNloliok
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motion and Alpert appealed. The trial court's dismissal of the lawsuit was afftnned by tho Texas
Court of Appeals. Jn reaching its decJsion, the Tew Court made the following statements:

Perhaps as an offshoot of ita privify' j\Jrlsprudence, Texas case law has
discouragecl lawsuits against an opposing counsel if the lawsuit is based on the
fact that counsel represented an opposixJa: party ia. ajudidal proceedq. Bradtv.
Sib.A; 14S.W.3d156, 166 (!ex.App.-H0\18tOn [1st Diat.] 2001, pet denied). .An
attomey has a duty to zealously represent bis clients within tbs bollllds of the law
Bradt v. Wm, 892 S.W.2d S6, 71-72 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st D.ist] l 994, writ
denied). Jn :fulfiJJmg this duty, an attomey lw the right to interpose defenses and
pursue legal rights that he deems necessary and proper, wi1hout being subject to
liability or damages. Id If an attorney could be held liable to an opposina party
for sti=mcnta made or actions taken in the course ofrepresentblg his cliatrt, ho
would be forced eoflStantly to bal~ bis own potential exposure against his
olicnfs best interest. 811 Id. Suoh a conflicrt hampers the reso1U1ion of disputes
through the court system and the attalmnem ofjustice.. Thus. to promote zealous
:rcpres1t21tation, courts have held that an attor.ney is ..quall:ftedly bnun:me" from
civil liability, with respect to non"°llerrts, for actions taken in connection with
xeprcsOlltin& a client in litigation. See, e.g.. Butl1r v. Lilly, 533 S.W.2d 130, 131..
34 (Tex.App.-Houston [bt Dist.] 1976, writ dism'd).
This qualified imm1mity gcmemlly applies C"Ven if conduct is wronafbl in the
con1ext of the undcrlyjna lawsuit Re'llfrOI v. Jona & AsSOC$., 941s.W.2d285,
288 (rex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ dallied) C'Under Tmeas law, attorneys
cannot be held liable for wronatUt litiaatlott conduct.9'). For example. a thhd party
has no independent right of recovery against 111 attomey for filiDa znotions in a
lawsuit, evm iffrivolous or without merit, although such conduct is sanctionable
or contemptible as enfoxced by the Btatlltory or inherent )>0We1'S of the court. Wist,
892 S.W.lcl at 72. Courts have refused to acknowledge an mdcponclent cause of
aotion in such instances "becauso makiDa motions is conduut an attomey engaaes
in as part ofthe discharge of his duties in repmenting a party Jn a lawsuit" Id.
(holdhig no cause of action existed for making motion for contanpt because
attomeys do not owe duty to be conect in legal arguments-"even ifthe ... motion
for cont.empt had bemmeritless, their conduct in so moWig, coming as it did in
the dlseharae of tlieir duties in ~presenting a. party In a lawauit, would still not be
actionable."). Thus, an attomey's conduct,
if frivolous or without merit, ii
not indope.ndmtly actionable if the conduct is part of the discharge of the lawyer's
duties in representing his or her client Id at 74; Chapman Children's Tnul v.
Pol'tdr & Huipa, L.L.P.• 32 S.W.3d 429, 441 (Tex..App.-Houston [14thDlst.]
2000, pet. denied). 1he immunity focuses on the type of conduct, not on whether
the conduct was merliorloua in th& context of the undexlyioa lawsuit. Re'flfro1, 941
s.w.2d at 288.

even

AJ the Texas SUpzeme Court observed in McCamish. a lawyer's protection from
liability arising out of hia roprcscntation of a client is not without limits. S11
Tcrylor v.

~cholz
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McCaml8h. 991 S.W.2d at 793-94~ se• alto Tola v. Toles, 113 S. WJd 899, 91213 (Tex.App.·Dallu 2003, no pet.). For example, a cause ofaction could exist
against an attomey who knowbigly commits a fraudulent act outside tho scope of
ms legal repxosentation of the client. Sn Llkclver v. Sunjlowtr T'"ac.i D, Ltd.,
696 S.W.2d 468. 472 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ). If a lawyer
participates in independently frwdulent activities, his action is •'foreign to the

duties of an attorney." Id. (quotiq Poole Y. Houston & T.C. ~ Co., 58 Tex 134,
137 (1882)). A lawyer thus eannot shield his own willful and premeditated
fiaudulent actions from liability simply on the ground that he is an agent ofhis
client. 9,, id.

Alpert v. Crain, Cato" & Jama, P. C, 178 S.W.3d at 405-406.

In the imW1t cue. Reed Taylor's claims against the Defendants are based solely on
ooncluct enp.aed in by attomey McNichols as part ofhis obligation to zealously represent bis
client.I in the litigation process brought about by Reed Taylor's lawsuit aaainst attorney
McNidiols' s clients. Plalntfft's first cause of aclion asserts tb£ Defendants, wi1h full knowledge
of Reed Taylor's rishts under the buy-out agreement, aided and abetted others in the tortious
interfermcc of Reed Taylor's comraotual rights. Plaintiff asserts that in seeking and obtaining a
preliminmy injnnction against him in the underl)'ini oaso. attorney McNichols aided and abetted

in. tho interference ofPlafn1fft's contractual rlghts that are at issue in the UDderlybig case.
Tho conduct alleged by Plaintl1fwas not lllllawful, was doJie in the course oftho

litigation process and in the course of representing his clients' rights until a detemllnation on the
legal i"'1es could be made tbroup the judioial proc~ The condud of the Defondants done in
tho coutse of seeking & judicial determination on tho numerous claims brought against the

Dofendanta' olionts in the undedying case mlls within the litigation privilege 6VCD thoujh lleed

Taylor may eventually prevail fn tho underlying ae1ion. When a party .makes a claim that a
prominoiy note is in default and that certain tems of an agreement are ttiggered by the default,

an attoJDey is obligated to zealously defend his client against the claims. It is not ·onough that a

plllintitf believea ho will prevail on bis claims. The AIA coiporations and the board of directors
1$
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have a lawt\ll right, indeed tho obligation, to apprcprlately defend against the clahns and to be
heard reganling any defenses to the clair.m. In addition, any attomey hired to represent the
corporation and its directon has an inflexible obligation to z.ealously represent his clients in that
dofcnsc and is oblipted to tab whatever steps are necessary within the litigation to protect his

clients rights un1il a determination of the isauaa Lt made by a coUrt.
The second cause of action asserted by Plaintiff'is for one of conversion. 1n· the
underlying case. tho question of whether the terms of the buy-out agreement entitle R.eed Taylor
to the commissions and related receivables of AIA Insuranco as security :for the promissoey note

is an open one. In the instant case. Plaintiff contends that by accepting payment for !cpl
se.rvicea, attomey McNichols and his fhm have converted those assets of AJA in which Reed
Taylor has a security Interest, knowing Reed Taylor bu a security interest in the asset.s1 and thus
have unlawfully converted to Defendants assets belonging to Reed Taylor.' As the Court has
already stated. there is in plaae an Order that management ofthe corporations is to remain with
the board of directors until a dotennination of Reed's clafms is made or until further order of the
Court. SeCOlldly, the corpo.ratiom and the board of directors have a right to defend against the

claims ofReed Taylor and 10 retain counsel to provide the necessary defense. The Defendants'
actions in defending their olients against the claims fall squarely with1D the litigation privilege.
Ralimce on the Court's Order plaoing authority to manage the coiporations With tha board of

directors, which Jncludes contracting to pay for lepl services, is jllstifi.ed and does not make the

Defendants liable for conversion.

J PJllD1Uf argaai

corporation.

tbai u a secured creditor, ha hu a right to mike deeisiou rwprdiq th• operations of the

P~lw provided tho Court with no authotity fot his posltioa. /.$ • aeOIU'eCl oreditor, Plainliff'hu •

rfibC to suk •Judcmoat •llowills him 10 uJce eoncrol ottho security, 1 claim ho bu assorted Ill tho underlying actf1xl
1114 one 1bat bas yet to ht d.termfned.
Tc¢crr Y, Mdlidiolz
Oplnlan cl: On:l11 on MotlOD to Dlsmlu
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Plafntlif's third cause of aodon asserts Defmdan11 violated the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act, in particular I.C. § 48-608(2), by qaefng in ams, conduct, and representations
that wen false, misleading and/or deceptive constituting unfair and/or deceptive acts and/or
praodces. This allegation not only falls within the protections of the litigation privilege, as tho
acts which Plaintiff' alleges Defendants engaged in ware representations presented to the Court
within the scopo of Defendants' representation of the cotporate clients, but the claim fails for
lack of prhrity, which is clearly required under the language of LC. § 48-608(1 ). '
Plaintifrs fourth cause of action alleps professional negligence and/or breach of

Dcmndants• fiduciary duties to Rsed Taylor and the AlA cozporations. This claim fails for two
reasons: (1) litigation privilege and (2) lack of an attorney-client relationship between PlahmJf
and the Defeodants. In H01'1'1gfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004) and again ill
&Iott ofBdc~ v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 96 PJd 623 (2004), Idaho's Sllpreme Court

ditectly ad.dreasM the question of whether an attorney-client relationship is necessary bofbre a

· claim for malpractice may be asserted against an attorney. The Court held that. with the nmow
exception of the dtafting oftestammtary documents, there must be an attomey-clicmt
relationship for a malpractice claim to be viable. Jn the instant matter, not only haS Plaintift' not
asserted the existence of an attomey-client relationship with the Def=dants, a key component of
his Com.plaint is tbat he bas not been consulted or allowed to choose counsel for the
corporations.

Finally, there are two positions asserted by Plaintiff1bat the Court finds should be
addressed. The first is the assertion th• attomey MoNiehol.s should hava withdrawn from
representing, not only the corporacions, but from rcpresentbil John Taylor. Plamd1f arauea
• I.C. § 41-601 rndl fn rdtvllDt pm, "'Air/ perso.ll who pmchaa or lease pds ar senica . . .'' ltced Taylor, by
hil own admiuioa, did not INfChue 1ht 1111Yic11 of attomq McNlcbols or bia law 1lrm.
TaylcrY. Mdllo/loll
OpiJllon .t Order OD Mbtica to Dlsmlu
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attomey McNiobols owed a duty of loyalty to the COipOrations as clients and that potentlal
conflicts of interest between the coxporations and John Taylor demands McNichols not represent

him. The relationships betweflD. the defendants in tbc underlying case have many overlays. some
of which potentially create coaflicts of intctcsts between the defendants and some of which

potentially create commonality of interests between the defendants. One commonality between.
the defendants in tho underlying case is that they are all defendants. If there are conflfots of
interest that have been created by attomey McNiehols initially acting as counsel for the

corporations and John Taylor, it is for the common clients t.o raise or to waive, not the opposiDg
party. R.ule 1.7 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Cob.dUctaddresst!! conflicts of Interest

between clients. Commentary 23 makes clear that there are circumstances in which it is not
improper for an attorney to represent codefmdants even 'though conflicts of interest may

potentially exist In the instant case, attotney McNiehols represented all three clients for only a
brief petiod at the very beginning of the litigation, doing so at av~ critical period in the case.

His immediate actions were clearly within that which is acceptable under the rules of
professi.01181 cond\lct established for attorneys representing codefendants in a litigation.
The second position assorted by PJainti.if is his atgmnent that the codefendant! have acted

wrongly in emerJng Into a joint dcf=se agreement

Jn~ underlying case, mmy of Reed

Taylor's claims challenge interests that the coxporations and the individual board membm have
in common and that, therefore, require a common defense. It is only reasonable that a degree of

cooperation must exist between counsel for the COipOtations and counsel for the individual board
members, as the corporation is incapable of coJIJD).llDicadng with its counsel except through 1hose

indlvidutls who nm the corporations. Contrary to the assertion by Plaintift entering into a joint
defae agreement does not prolu"bit the codefe.ndants from asserting claims against each other if

Taylor Y. Alt:Nit:lro&
Opimoa 4' Ordor oa Motion to Dbmlsl
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such claims are warranted. Rather, it provides the plrtles certain protections in reprd. to their .

communications with each other on those areas of common defenso and common interest. The
joint defense privilege, or ~ommon interest rule, is au extension of the attorney-client privilege
because it protects communications between the parti~ when they are part of an on-going and
Joint offi>rt to set UJ1 a common defense strategy in c01meetion with actual or prospective
litigation. lntB1t Recreation Ccrp. v. Team Worlilwld1 Corp., 471 F.Supp.2d l l (D.D.C.2007).
The rule applies not only to communications but also to dooumcuts protected by the work

product doctri:ne. Id.
In conclusion, for the reasons stated above, the Court finds the claims asse.rted by

Plaintilf fall to state claims for whiQh relief may bo granted. Ai & matter of law, Plaintiff's
claims must be dismissed.

CB> PLAIN'l'IFP'S MQTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT

"The decision whether to allow a party to amend its pleadings is left to the sound
dlsaretton of the trial court ...... 'Ff1tls v. United Stam lnslll'ana• Co., 119 Idaho 160, 166. 804
P.2d 333 (Ct.App.1991). It is not an abuse of dlsaetion to deny a motion to amend w~ the

record contains no allegation that, ifproven, would entitle a plafntiff to tho tolief claimed. Id. at
167.

The Court, after hem:ing oral arguments of counsel and abr reviewins Plaintiffa
proposed ametlded complaint, finds it would be a 1btile aot to grant Plaintiff's motion to amend

as the proposed amended complaint would not withstand a motion to dismiss.

rn. his proposed

amended complaint, Plainti:iJ asserts the same claims as sot forth in his original Complaim and

seeks to add derivative claims. Plaintifrs amended~ claims fail as a mattur of law for the

TllJllor v. MeNkholl
Opluioa A Onl« m Motln lo Dlllldll
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same reasons as addressed by the Court above. despito Plaintiff's bare alleption that tho conduct
and actions of the Defendants exceeded tM scope of their :representation.
Plaintitf's attempt to bring derivative claims on behalf of AIA Insurance and AJA
Services fall as a matter oflaw. Idaho Code § 30·1~741 clearly and unembiguously provides
standing to bring derivative proceedings only to those who arc shareholders at the 1hne ofthe act
or omission complained of and only to thoso shareholdm who fairly am:l adequately xepresent

the interests ottbe corporation. As noted by the ASA Official Comment at the end of J.C. § 301·741, while some state's havo eliminated the "contemporaneous" ownorsbip rule, Idaho's

legislature chose to retain the xequirmnent, as is evidenced by tho language in the statme.
Plaintiff' contends that, because other states have allowed oreditots and stock: pledps to bring
derivative elahns, standin1 should not be limited to shareholdms. The Court is not persuaded.
Idaho Code§ 30-1-741 is clear and unambiguous, making it clear Idaho's legislature has chosen
to limit derhrative olaims to shareholden only.

OBDEB
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint is he.reby DENIED.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is he?eby GRAN'I'BP,

Dated this i...3 day ofDecembor 2008.

Taylt1r v. "'1Ntt:Jlo11
Oplaloa "Onlw OD Molloo 1o Dlsmin
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLO~ an individual,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)

v.

CASE NO. CVOS-01765

)

)
)

GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN )
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V,
)
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A
)
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL )
ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP an Idaho limited )
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X,
)
unknown individuals;
)
)
Defendants.
)

OPINION AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANTS" MOTION
TO DISMISS AND PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO AMEND
COMPLAINT

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Motion
to Amend Complaint. A hearing on the Motion to Dismiss was held on October 16, 2008 and a
hearing on Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint was held on December 4, 2008. Plaintiff
Reed Taylor was represented by attorney Michael S. Bissell. Defendants Babbitt, Ashby,
Collins, Riley and the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley were represented by attorney
James D. LaRue. The Court, having i-ead the motion and briefs of the parties) having considered
Taylor v. Babbitt, et al.
Opinion & Order on Motion to Dismiss
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the record in the matter, having heard oral arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the

matter, hereby renders its decision.

FACTUALANDPROCEDU&y.BACKGROUN~

The above-entitled matter is rooted in the underlying case of Taylor v. AJA et al., Nez
Perce County Case No. CV07-00208. The issues in the underlying case 8l'e complex and its
procedural history lengthy, though the matter has yet to go to trial or be fully adjudicated. Reed
Taylor's complaint in the underlying case, amended five times, asserts eleven claims including
one for default of a $6 million promissory note issued to Reed Taylor by the corporate
defendants as part of a buy-out or retirement package. In order to understand the claims being
asserted in the instant matter, certain events in the underlying case must be reviewed.

On January 29, 2007, Reed Taylor filed suit against AlA Services Corporation, AIA
Insurance, Inc., John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Bryan Freeman and Jolee Duclos. AlA Insurance,
Inc. is a business entity under the umbrella of AJA Services Corporation. At the time of the
filing of the lawsuit, John Taylor was the CEO of the corporations and a board member along

with Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos. 1 Connie Taylor, the former wife of John Taylor, held a
community property interest in the corporations. Following the filing of the lawsuit, attorney
Michael McNichols was retained to represent AIA Services, AIA Insurance and John Taylor;
attorney David Gittens was retained to represent Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos; attorney Jon.
·Hally was retained to represent Connie Taylor.
On February 27, 2007, upon motion by the Defendants~ the Court granted a temporary
restraining order against Reed Taylor after he attempted to exercise management authority over
1

Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos resigned as board members shortly after the lawsuit was filed and two new
board members were appointed to replace them.
Ta;>lor v. Babbitt, et al.
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the corporate Defendants. A hearing date was then set on the Defendants' accompanying motion
for a preliminary injunction. On March 8, 2007, as a result of actions taken by Reed Taylor
before and immediately folloWing the filing of his lawsuit, the Court entered a preliminary
injunction prohibiting Reed Taylor from acting or attempting to act as manager and/or a board
member of AIA Insurance Inc and/or from harassing and/or interfering with the management of
AIA Insurance, Inc. and AIA Services Corporation.2 The Court's Order remains in effect.
On March 28, 2007, attorney McNichols filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for AIA
Services and AIA Insurance. Reed Taylor did not object and, at hearing on April 12, 2007, the
Court granted the motion to with.draw. On May 7, 2007, a notice of appearance on behalf of

AIA Services and AIA Insurance was filed by attotneys Gary Babbitt and John Ashby of the law
finn Hawley, Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP. The finn continues to represent the ooxporations.
Several months into the underlyh1g litigation, Reed Taylor amended his complaint to
name as additional defendants CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. and others. CropUSA, a
corporation started by John Taylor who serves as its CEO and on its board or directors, is
represented by attorney Babbitt and by attotney James J. Gatziolis with the law firm of Quarles
& Brady LLP located in Chicago, Illinois. Attorney Oatziolis has obtained limited admission in

Idaho in order to represent CropUSA and has associated for that purpose with the law finn of
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley.
The last matter in the underlying case that is of relevance to the instant case is a ruling by
the Court on motion for partial summary judgment filed by Reed Taylor. After significant

briefing and oral arguments on the motion, the Court found the corporate Defendants were in

default on a $6 million promissory note issued to Reed Taylor by the corporations. However, the

2

March 8, 2008 Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Prellininary Injunction at page 6.

Taylor v. Babbitt, et al.
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Court made no determination relative to other terms in the extensi"Ve buy-out agreement between

Al.A Insurance Corporation and Reed Taylor, such as the effect on voting shares and receivables
upon default of the promissory note. Those issues were not before the Court in the context of the
motion for partial summary judgment and, therefore, have yet to be determined,
After twenty-one months of motions and hearings in the underlying case, after trial dates
had been set and reset, and with a number of motions still pending before the Court, Reed Taylor
filed the above-entitled action against attom.eys Babbitt, Ashby, Collins and Riley and the law
firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, current counsel for the corporations in the underlying
case. In his action, filed August 8, 2008, Reed Taylor asserts the following claims against
Defendants: (1) aiding and abetting or assisting others in the commission oftortious acts in the
underlying case; (2) conversion and misappropriation of AIA coxporate assets; (3) violations of
Idaho's Consumer Protection Act. I.C. § 48~601 et seq.; and, (4) professional negligence and/or
breach of fiduciary duties. Defendants, through counsel~ filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to

I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) along with briefing. Reed Taylor filed briefing in opposition and on October
16, 2008, the Court heard oral arguments of cowisel.
One day prior to the Court's hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff filed a
motion to amend his complaint, attaching his proposed amended pleading. Upon order of the
Court, the Motion to Amend Complaint was heard on December 4, 2008 and the Court will
address the matter herein.

STANDARD ON MOTION TO DISl\flSS
In ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12{b)(6), a court is to review all

facts and inferences in favor of the non-moving patty and ask whether a claim for relief has been

Taylor v. Babbtrt, et al.
Opinion & Order on MotiQll to Dismiss
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stated. Rohr v. Rohr, 128 Idaho 137, 141,c911P.2d133, 137 (1996). In the instant matter, the
arguments made by the parties incorporated events and actions that have occurred in the
underlying case of Taylor v. AU, et al. Therefore, in making its analysis in the instant matter
and pursuant to 1.R.E. 201, the Court will take judicial notice of the underlying case in toto.

ANALYSIS
(A) DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

The issues raised in the instant matter are less dawiting and complex than the lengthy
briefs and pleadings would make them appear at first blush.3 As stated by Reed Taylor in his
opposition brief, the gravamen of his Complaint is that Defendants aided and abetted John
Taylor and others in committing torts against Reed Taylor and acted to deprive Reed Taylor of
money and property to which he is entitled.4
Plaintiff's core contention is that Defendants are actina in violation of Idaho's
Ptofessional Rules of Conduct by representing all of the corporate defendants in the underlying
case and by entering into a joint defense agreement with the other named defendants. Plaintiff
argues that by their actions, Defendants have aided and abetted John Taylor and others in the
commission of tortious acts that have resulted in significant :financial damage to Reed Taylor.

The Defendants in the instant case were retained to represent AIA Insurance, AIA
Services and CropUSA after previous counsel for the A1A corporations had obtained a
preliminary injunction from. the Court that ordered the operations of the corporations to remain
unchanged until the claims asserted by Reed Taylor have been adjudicated. The irtjunction was

3

Plaintiff's Complaint is twent}'-three pages in length. Defendants' brief in support of the motion to dismiss is
thirty-six pages in length. Plaintiff's brief in opposition is fifty-seven pages in length.
4
Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. at page 18.
Taylor v. Babbitt. et '11.
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sought after Reed Taylor self-declared the promissory note in default, self-declared himself the
sole shareholder of the corporations and then attempted to take over physical and operational
control of the corporations, all without the benefit of a judicial finding on the issues.
The Court has reviewed in camera (a) written correspondence to the defendants in the
underlying matter from the law :fu:.m. of Hawley Troxell Ennis and Hawley, (b) the written
representation agreements entered into by the codefendants who are represented by the law firm,
and (c) the written joint defense agreements entered into by the defendants in the underlying
case. After reviewing the documents and the applicable Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct,
the Court is persuaded the Defendant attorneys and law firm ate well versed in the rules and have
met the criteria necessary to represent clients with potential conflicts of interest. The various
documents are well-drafted, effectively address the concerns and requirements of the
professional rules of conduct and protect and preserve any potential claims that may arise
between the clients.
Of particular concern to the Plaintiff is the joint defense agreement between the
defendants in the underlying case. The purpose behind joint defense agreements is to allow
defendants in the same litigation to communicate and sh.are documents without the
communications and/or documents becoming subject to discovery where those communications
and/or documents are otherwise non-discoverable or fall within the attorney-client privilege. In
the underlying case, many of Reed Taylor's claims challenge interests that the corporations and
the individual board membe:r:s have in common and, therefore, require a comm.on defense. It is
only reasonable that a degree of cooperation must take place between counsel for the
corporations and counsel for the individual board members, as the corporation is incapable of
communicating with its counsel except through those individuals who run the corporations.

Taylor v. Babbitt, et al.
Opinion & Order on Motion to Dismiss
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Contrary to the position asserted by Plaintiff, entering into a joint defense agreement does
not prohibit the codefendants from asserting claims against each other if such claiins are
warranted. Rather, it provides the parties certain protections in regard to their communications
with each other on those areas of common defense and common interest. The joint defense
privilege, or common interest rule, is merely an extension of the attorney-client privilege in that

it protects communications between the parties when they are part of an on-going and joint effort
to set up a common defense strategy in coM.ection 'With actual or prospective litigation. Jntex

Recreation Corp.

v.

Team Worldwide Corp., 471 F.Supp.2d 11 (D.D.C.2007). The joint defense

privilege applies not only to communications hut also to doc01nents protected by the work

product doctrine. Id The circumstances in the instant matter :require a degree of cooperation
between the defendants in the underlying case and, therefore, the Court finds the joint defense
agreements reasonable and with.in the standards allowed by Idaho's Professional Rules of

.

,._'tf\.'t'-~
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Having put to rest the questions of joint representation and joint defense agreements, the
Court's analysis moves to the Defendants assertion that Plaintiff's claims in the instant matter
should be dismissed as a matter of law based on the theory of litigatiol'l privilege, a doctrine that

has yet to be addressed by Idaho's appellate courts. Nevertheless. numerous other jurisdictions
have addressed the doctrine at length, providing the Court with direction as to the applicability of
the privilege.

The courts in West Virginia have addressed the litigation privilege on a number of

occasions. In Clark v. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d 864, 218 W.Va. 427 (W.Va.2005), the plaintiff, a
physician and fonner defendant in a medical malpractice suit. asserted claims in negligence
against co'tll'lsel for the plaintiff in the malpractice lawsuit. The Clark Court, looking first at the

Taylor v. Babbitt, et al.
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duties of an attorney, found an inflexible requirement that attorneys diligently, faithfully and
legitimately perform every act necessary to protect, conserve and advance the interests of their
clients. Clark v. Druckman., 624 S.E.2d at 868. The Court then noted that its research revealed
no case law that would support Clark's assertion that an attorney owes a duty to an opposing
party, such that breach of the duty would subject an attorney to liability. Id. at 869. The Court
stated, "This Court can find no justification for imposing a duty of care in favor of an opposing
party upon counsel. Imposition of such a duty can only work to the detriment of counsel's own

client and would adversely impact counsel's duty of zealous advocacy for his or her own client
and would create an impossible and unjustified conflict of interest." Id.
Court's that have had the opportunity to address the litigation privilege recognize the
adversarial system would be turned on its head if parties to a lawsuit are allowed to bring claims
in tort and/or legal malpractice against opposing counsel for conduct done within the scope of

litigation. While attorneys must not knowingly couo.sel or assist a client in committing a crime
or ftaud 5, Idaho's Rules of Professional Conduct require an attorney to pursue matters on behalf
of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the attorney and require
an attomey to take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's

cause or endeavor. I.R.P.C., Rule 1.3(1]
The doctrine of litigation privilege appears intended to create a safety zone for attorneys
so that they may zealously advocate for their client without fear of retribution. The Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia aptly described the scope and purpose of the litigation
privilege in Clarkv. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d 864, 218 W.Va. 427 (2005).
In her concuning opinion in Bare.field v. DPIC Companies, Inc., 215 W .Va. 544,
600 S.E.2d 256 (2004), Justice Davis discussed the policies underlying the
5

I.R.P.C., Rule 1.2[10]

Taylor v. Babbitt, <!t al.

8

Opinion & Order on Motion to Dismiss

000523

DEC. 23. 2008 3: 25PM

.!CT COURT

•

NO. 9028

P. 9/17

litigation privilege. Therein she stated!
[t]he public policies associated with the litigation privilege include: (1)
promoting the candid, objective and undistorted disclosure of evidence;
(2) placing the burden of testing the evidence upon the litigants during
trial; (3) avoiding the chilling effect resulting from the threat of
subsequent litigation; (4) reinforcing the finality of judgments; (5) limiting
collateral attacks upon judgments; (6) promoting zealous advocacy; (7)
discouraging abusive litigation practices; and (8) encouraging settlement.
MatsuW'a v. E.1 du Pont de Nemours & Co., 102 Hawai'i 149, 73 P.3d
687, 693 (2003).

Barefield, 215 W.Va. at 560, 600 S.E.2d at 272 (Davis, J., concurring). In light of
these policies, we see no reason to distinguish between communications made
during the litigation process and conduct occurring during the litigation process.
As recognized by the Florida Supreme Court:
absolute immunity must be afforded to any act occuning during the course
of a judicial proceeding, regardless of whether the act involves a
defamatory statement or other tortious behavior such as the alleged
misconduct at issue, so long as the act has some relation to the proceeding.
The rationale behind the immunity afforded to defamatory statements is
equally applicable to other misconduct occurring during the course of a
judicial proceeding. Just as participants in litigation must be free to engage
in unhindered communication, so too must those participants be free to use
their best judgment in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit without fear of
having to defend their actions in a subsequent civil action for misconduct.

Levin, Middleb'l'ooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A., v. United States
Fire Insurance Company, 639 So.2d 606, 608 (Fla.1994). See also Jackson v.
BellSouth Telecommunications, 372 F.3d 1250, 1274 (11th Cir.2004) (quoting
Levin).
In Collins, we recognized that absolute privileges, such as the litigation privilege,
should only be permitted in limited circumstances. Collins, 211 W.Va. at 461, 566
S.E.2d at S98. Thus, we do not believe that a litigation privilege should apply to
bar liability of an attorney in all circumstances. In Mehaffy, Rider, Windholz &
Wilson v. Central Bank Denver, N.A., 892 P.2d. 230, 235 (Colo.1995), the
Colorado Supreme court noted that "an attorney is not liable to a non-client absent
a finding of fraud or malicious conduct by the attorney." See also Baglini v.
Lauletta, 338 NJ.Super. 282, 768 A.2d 825, 833-34 (2001) ("The one tort
excepted from the reach of the litigation privilege is malicious prosecution, or
malicious use of process."). We believe such exceptions to an absolute litigation
privilege arising from conduct occuning during the litigation process are
reasonable accommodations which preserve an attorney's duty of zealous
advocacy while providing a deterrent to intentional conduct which is unrelated to

Taylor 'II. Babbitt, et al.
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legitimate litigation tactics and which harms an opposing party. As recently noted
by a California court:
[a] fraud claim against a lawyer is no different from a fraud claim against
anyone else. If an attorney commits actual fraud in his dealings with a
third party, the fact he did so in the capacity of attomey for a client does
not relieve him ofliability. While an attorney's professional duty of care
extends only to his own client and intended beneficiaries of his legal work,
the limitations on liability for negligence do not apply to liability for
fraud.

Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, 121 Cal.App.4th 282, 291, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d
26, 31-2 (Cal.Ct.App.2004)(internal citations and quotations omitted).
In order "[t)o maintain an action for malicious prosecution it is essential to prove:
(1) That the prosecution was malicious; (2) that it was without reasonable or
probable cause; and (3) that it terminated favorably to plaintiff." Syl. Pt. 1, Lyons
v. DavypPocahontas Coal Co.• 75 W.Va. 739, 84 S.E. 744 (1915). The term
malicious is defined as «[s]ubstantially certain to cause injury" and "without just
cause or excuse." Black's Law Dictionary 977 (8th Ed.2004). This definition
implies an improper or evil intent or motive or the intent to do harm. Where an
attorney files suit without reasonable or probable cause with the intent to harm a
defendant, we do not believe the litigation privilege should insulate him or her
from liability for malicious prosecution.

As noted above, we can find no reasonable justification for distinguishing conduct
from communications for the purposes of the litigation privilege. However, we
also recognize the need for limited exceptions from application of the absolute
litigation privilege for certain intentional actions. Accordingly, we now hold that
the litigation privilege is generally applicable to bar a civil litigant's claim for civil
damages against an opposing party's attorney if the alleged act of the attorney
occurs in the course of the attorney's representation of an opposing party and is
conduct related to the civil action.

Clarkv. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d at 870-871.
In the instant matter, the conduct and action$ of the Defendants that form the basis of

Plaintiff's claims are all conduct and actions within the scope of the underlying litigation. While
Plaintiff correctly notes that there are potential conflicts of interest that exist between the clients
of the Defendants, the Court is sufficiently persuaded, based on its review of the in camera
documents, that the Defendants' clients have knowingly waived any conflicts and are fully
informed that, as the litigation progresses, the common interests and defenses of the underlying
Taylor v. Babbitt, et al.
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defendants may diverge and the parties may fmd themselves adversaries. While the underlying
case is complex in that it involves numerous claims asserted against multiple defendants and
involves interwcorporate transactions approved by directors that cross over from corporation to
corporation, the circumstances are not so unique that the Court is wable to look to the general
analysis of courts with similar, albeit distinguishable, facts.
A case with many similarities to the instant case is helpful to the analysis the Court must
make. InAlpertv. Crain, Caton&James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d398(Tex.App.-Houston[l 11tDist.]
2005}, Robert Alpert filed suit against the law firm of Crain, Caton & James after the firm had
represented Mark Riley, an attorney who found himself being sued by Alpert after their attorn.ey-

client relationship had soured. Alpert's suit against Crain Caton law firm asserted the firm had
conspired with Riley to defraud Alpert, had aided and abetted Riley to defraud Alpert, and had
tortiously interfered with Riley's fiduciary duty to Alpert. The law firm moved to dismiss the
lawsuit based on Alpert's failure to state a recognizable claim. The lower court granted the
motion and Alpert appealed. The trial court's dismissal of the lawsuit was affirmed by the Texas
Court of Appeals. In reaching its decision, the Texas Court made the following statements:
Perhaps as an offshoot of its privity jurisprudence. Texas case law has
discouraged lawsuits against an opposing counsel if the lawsuit is based on the
fact that counsel represented an opposing party in a judicial proceeding. Bradt v.
Sebek, 14 S.W.3d 756, 766 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). An
attorney has a duty to zealously represent his clients within the bounds of the law.
Bradtv. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 71-72 (Tex.App,wHouston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ
denied). In fulfilling this duty, an attorney has the right to interpose defenses and
pursue legal rights that he deems necessary and proper, without being subject to
liability or damages. Id If an attorney could be held liable to an opposing party
for statements ma.de or actions taken in the course of representing his client, he
would be forced constantly to balance bls own potential eXposure against his
client's best interest. See id Such a conflict hampers the resolution of disputes
through the court system and the attainment of justice. Thus, to promote zealous
representation, courts have held that an attorney is "qualifiedly immune" from
civil liability, with respect to non~clients, for actions taken in connection with
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representing a client in litigation. See, e.g., Butler v. Lilly, 533 S.W.2d 130, 13134 (Tex.App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1976, writ dism'd).
This qualified immunity generally applies. even if conduct is wrongful in the
context of the underlying lawsuit. Rerifroe v. Jones & Assocs., 947 S.W.2d 285,
288 (fex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied) (''Under Texas law, attorneys
cannot be held liable for wrongful litigation conduct."). For example, a third party
has no independent right ofrecovery against an attorney for filing motions in a
lawsuit, even if frivolous or without merit, although such conduct is sanctionable
or contemptible as enforced by the statutory or inherent powers of the court. West,
892 S.W.2d at 72. Courts have refused to acknowledge an independent cause of
action in such instances "because making motions is conduct an attorney engages
in as part of the discharge of his duties in representing a party in a lawsuit." Id
(holding no cause of action existed for m.aldng motion for contempt because
attorneys do not owe duty to be correct in legal arguments-"even if the ... motion
for contempt had been m.eritless, their conduct in so moving, coming as it did in
the discharge of their duties in representing a party in a lawsuit, would still not be
actionable."). Thus, an attorney's conduct, even if frivolous or without merit, is
not independently actionable if the conduct is part of the discharge of the lawyer's
duties in representing his or her client. Id at 74; Chapman Children's Trust v.
Porter & Hedges, L.L.P., 32 S.W.3d 429, 441 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2000, pet. denied). The inlmunity focuses on the type of conduct, not on whether
the conduct was meritorious in the context of the underlying lawsuit. Rerifroe, 947
S.W.2d at 288.
As the Texas Supreme Court observed in McCamish, a lawyer's protection from
liability arising out of his representation of a client is not without limits. See
McCamish, 991 S.W.2d at 793-94; see also Toles v. Toles, 113 S.W.3d 899, 91213 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). For example, a cause of action could exist
against an attor.tley who knowingly commits a fraudulent act outside the scope of
his legal representation of the client. See Likover v. Suriflowet Terrace II, Ltd,
696 S.W.2d 468, 472 (fex.App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1985, no writ). If a lawyer
participates in independently fraudulent activities, his action is "foreign to the
duties of an attorney." Id. (quoting Poole v. Houston & T. C. Ry. Co., S8 Tex. 134,
137 (1882)). A lawyer thus cannot shield his own willful and premeditated
fraudulent actions from liability simply on the ground that he is an agent of his
client. See id

Alpertv. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3dat405-406.
In the instant case, Reed Taylor's claims against the Defendants are all based on conduct
and actions engaged in by the Defendants within the scope of the underlying litigation.
Nevertheless, under the theory asserted by Plaintiff, a defendant's attorney may become liable to
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a plaintiff if the plaintiff disagrees with or is offe11ded by the litigation tactics of defense counsel
or disagrees with or is offended by the decision of an opposing party to waive conflicts of
interest in order for common interests to be defended in the most efficient a:0d/or effective
manner. It is this very morass that the litigation privilege seeks to prevent.
Each of Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants contends that by defending the
corporations in the underlying action, by accepting payment for their representation, by arguing
positions to the Court in favor of their clients and against the claims of Reed Taylor, and that by
failing to agree with Reed Taylor,s positions in regards to his claims, the Defendants have aided
and abetted and conspired with the corporations and individual directors to interfere with the
contractual rights of Reed Taylor. Yet, Plaintiff is unable to direct the Court to any conduct or
action on the part of the Defendants that falls outside the scope of the Defendants' representation
of their clients.
The Court appreciates the Plaintiff's right to zealously prosecute his claims in the
underlying action and respects his belief that his claims are sound, that he will prevail 011 those
claims and that the Wlderlying defendants are simply delaying the inevitable. However, the
Court also appreciates the defendants' right in the underlying action to disagree with Reed
Taylor's position and to defend against his asserted claims. The Court is persuaded that the
litigation privilege is a sound judicial concept that should be recognized in ldaho as it is
consistent with the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and the :finnly held established standard
in Idaho that an attorney is obligated to provide his clients with zealous representation. In the

instant matter, the conduct and actions of the Defendants, as alleged by Plaintiff, all fall within
the scope of the Defendants' representation of their clients and, therefore, fall 'Within the
protection of the litigation privilege.
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The Court is further persuaded, based on its review of the various documents provided to
the Court for in camera review, that the Defendants took all steps necessary to insure compliance
with the rules of professional conduct in their representation of clients with potential conflicts of

interest and in the use of a joint defense agreement. Therefore, th.ere has been no conduct of
aiding and abetting or conspiracy on the part of the Defendants in their representation of the

underlying corporate defendants. Neither has there been any conversion of assets by the
Defendants. Prior to the Defendants being retained in the underlying case, the Court entered a
preliminary injwiction ordering operational authority of AIA to remain status quo. Thus, the
directors of the corporation, including John Taylor, had authority to retain the Defendants to
represent the corporations. Furthermore, representations made by the Defendants to the Court in
:fu:rth.erance of their of their clients' defense do not constitute violations ofldaho's consumer
protection laws when those representations are made within the scope of litigation. Finally,
Plaintiff's claim for legal malpractice fails as a matter of law. The existence of an attorney-client
relationship is a necessary element to a legal malpractice claim and Plaintiff, who specifically
raises the fact that he has not been allowed to choose counsel for the underlying defendants, has
no attorney-client relationship with the Defendants.6

CB) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT
"The decision whether to allow a party to amend its pleadings is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court .... " Wells v. United States Insurance Co., 119 Idaho 160, 166, 804
P.2d 333 (Ct.App.1991). It is not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion to amend where the

~ This

issue was addressed fully in. the Opinion & Ol'der on Defendants Motion to Di!Jll)iss in the companion case of
Taylor 'II. McNichcls, et al., Nez Perce County Case No. CVOB-01763. See also Harrigfeld v. Rancoc~ 140 Idaho
134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004) and again in Estate ofBecker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 9Ci P.3d 623 (2004).
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Iecord contains no allegation that, if proven, would entitle a plaintiff to the relief claimed. Id. at

167.
The Court. after hearing oral argmnents of counsel and after reviewing Plaintiff's
proposed amended complaint, finds it would be a futile act to grant Plaintiff's motion to amend
as the proposed amended complaint would not withstand a tnotion to dismiss. In his proposed
amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts the same claims as set forth in his original Complaint and

seeks to add derivative claims. Plaintifrs amended direct claims fail as a matter of law for the
sw.ne reasons as addressed by the Court above, despite Plaintiffs bare allegation that the conduct
and actions of the Defendants exceeded the scope of their representation.
Plaintiff's attempt to bring derivative claims on behalf of AIA Insurance and AIA
Services fail as a matter oflaw. Idaho Code§ 30-1-741 clearly and unambiguously provides
standing to bring derivative proceedings only to those who are shareholders at the time of the act
or omission complained of and only to those shareholders who fairly and adequately represent
the interests of the corporation. As noted by the ABA Official Comment at the end ofl.C. § 301-741, while some state's have eliminated the "contemporaneous" ownership rule, Idaho's
legislature chose to retain the requirement, as is evidenced by the language in the statute.

Plaintiff contends that, because other states have allowed creditors and stock pledges to bring
derivative claims, standing should not be limited to shareholders. The Court is not persuaded.
Idaho Code§ 30-1-741 is cleat and unambiguous, making it clear Idaho's legislature has chosen
to limit derivative claims to shareholders only.
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ORDER
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint is hereby DENIED.
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED.

Dated this :Z..,!> day of December 2008.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OFT
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,
Plaintiff,

v.

)
)
)
)

)

)
MICHAEL E McNICHOLS, an individual; )
)
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS,
P.A., an Idaho professional corporation;
)
JANE DOES 1-V, unknown individuals;
)
)
Defendants.
)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~>

CASE NO. CVOS-01763
OPINION AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR AW ARD OF ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS

This matter is before the Cowt on Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's
award of attorneys' fees and costs and Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of the same A
hearing on the Motions was heJd on May 14, 2009. Plaintiff Reed Taylor was represented by
attorney Michael S. Bissell. Defendants Michael McNichols and the Jaw firm of Clements,

Brown & McNichols were represented by attorney John J Tanis. The Court, having read the
motion and briefs of the parties, having considered the record in the matter, having heard oral
arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 3, 2009, this Court entered its Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for
Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, wherein the Court granted Defendants $20,000 00 in
attorneys' fees pursuant to J.C. § 12-121, Rule 54(e)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
LC.§ 30-1-746(2) and LC.§ 48-608(5). On April 21, 2009, Defendants filed a Motion for
Reconsideration asking the Court to reconsider the amount of attorney fees granted and seeking a
clarification of the factors set forth in Rule 54(e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
On May 4, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending the Court erred
in awarding attorneys' fees under l.C. § 12-121, asserting Plaintiff's claims were not frivolous
and, even if attorneys' fees might otherwise be wan anted under IC. § 30-1-746(2) and I. C § 48608(5), no award can be granted as Defendants failed to itemize fees specific to the related
claims.

STANDARDS UPON A REQUEST FOR COSTS AND FEES
The statutory language determines whether an award of attorneys' fees is mandatory or
discretionary. When an award is discretionary, a court must perceive the issue as one of
discretion, act within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it, and the court must reach its decision by an
exercise of reason. P 0 Ventures Inc v Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idal10 233, 159

PJd 870 (2007). A court's discretionary authority includes the discretion to award reasonable
attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action when such an award is provided for by any
statute. I R.C P 54(e)(l ).
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ANALYSIS
Plaintiff asserts the Court erred in awarding attorneys' fees. If the Court is persuaded by
Plaintiffs argument, it would render Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration moot. Therefore,
the Court must first make a dete1mination as to the merits of Plaintiffs motion.
(A) PLAINTIFF'S ASSERTION OF ERROR AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Under I.C. § 12-121 and IR.C P. 54(e), attorneys' fees may be awarded only where there
is a prevailing party and a court finds the lawsuit was brought, pursued or defended fiivolously,
unreasonably and without foundation. Plaintiff asserts his claims, in part if not in their entirety,
were novel issues or issues of first impression and, therefore, were not brought or pursued
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. The Court agrees attorneys' fees are not to be
awarded under J.C.§ 12-121 unless all of the claims brought or pursued are found to be
frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation nor are attorneys' fees appropriate under J.C. § 12121 if the issues are novel or issues of first impression. "A party is not entitled to attorneys' fees
if the issue is one of first impression in Idaho." Lane Ranch v City ofSun Valley, 145 Idaho 87,
91, 175 P.Jd 776 (2007), citing SEIZ Const., LL C v. Idaho State University, 140 Idaho 8, 14,

89 P.3d 848, 854 (2004).
Attorney fees are not appropriate under J.C.§ 12-121 and I.RCP. 54(e) unless all
claims brought or all defenses asserted are frivolous and without foundation.
Where there are "multiple claims and multiple defenses, it is not appropriate to
segregate those claims and defenses to determine which were or were not
frivolously defended or pursued. The total defense of plaintiffs proceedings must
be umeasonable or frivolous" Magic Valley Radiology Associates, PA v.
Professional Business Services, Inc, 119 Idaho 558, 808 P.2d 1303 (1990).
Management Catalysts v Turbo West Corpac, l 19 Idaho 626, 630, 809 P.2d 487 (1991).

In the instant matter, Defendants sought attorneys' fees and costs as the prevailing pazty
after the Court granted Defendants' I.RC P. l 2(b)(6) motion to dismiss and denied Plaintiffs
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motion to amend his complaint. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges four causes of action against
Defendants: (I) conversion; (2) tortious interference; (3) fraud and/or constructive fraud; and, (4)
malpractice. Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants were not based on an attorney-client
relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants Rather, Plaintiffs claims against the Defendants
were based solely on Defendants' representation of AIA Se1vices Corporation and AIA
Insurance, Inc. in a lawsuit brought against the corporations by the Plaintiff Reed Taylor.
Plaintiff theorized that, by accepting money from its corporate clients for legal fees, Defendants
had unlawfully converted to themselves AIA funds that rightfully belong to Reed Taylor and,
that by defending its clients Defendants had committed malpractice, aided and abetted their
clients in committing fraud and aided and abetted their clients in tortiously interfering with
Plaintifrs contractual rights.
Plaintiff contends an award of attorneys' fees was improper as some, if not all, of his
claims were novel issues or issues of first impression. The Court is not persuaded. Three of the
four claims asserted by the Plaintiff are common law theories of recovery that have been
addressed numerous times by Idaho's courts. While Plaintiff's choice of defendants is novel, in
that he opted to bring his claims for conversion, tortious interference and fraud against the
attorneys representing the corporations rather than against the corporations and the corporate
leade1ship, the claims certainly are not novel. Nor is Plaintiffs claim for malpractice brought
against attorneys with whom he had no attorney-client relationship novel or a matter of first
impression

1

The only novel issue or one of fast impression before the Court was the litigation

privilege doctiine raised as a defense by the Defendants.

1

In the unrelated case of Taylor v Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P 3d 156 (2005), Reed Taylor brought an action
against an attorney with whom he had no attorney-client relationship The Supreme Court, in ruling on the appeal,
emphasized !hat an attorney-client relationship is required in a legal malpractice claim
Taylor v McN1chv/1. et al
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The Court, addressing Defendants' motion to dismiss, noted the litigation privilege
doctrine has not previously been addressed by Idaho's appellate courts. Nevertheless, after
reviewing opinions from those jurisdictions that have addressed the privilege, this Court found
the doctrine to be consistent with Idaho's Rules of Professional Ethics and with the firmly
established standard in Idaho that an attorney is obligated to provide his clients with zealous
representation 2 . While the litigation privilege doctrine, which was raised by Defendants in their
Motion to Dismiss and thereby required review by the Cowt, provides a helpful overlay, the
Court is confident it would have reached the same result based solely on the Idaho Rules of
Professional Ethics and the long held standard that obligates attorneys to zealously represent
their clients. This fact is reflected in the Court's Opinion and Order on the issue of attorneys'
fees and costs, wherein the Court stated it was persuaded the Defendants had acted well within
the ethical mles established by the Idaho State Bar.
Finally, the Court reached the determination that each of Plaintiffs claims were brought
and pursued frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation only after finding each asserted
claim was fatally flawed legally and factually. Plaintiff contends the Court erred in this regard,
asserting the Court was required to accept as true all facts alleged by Plaintiff and, that had the
Court done so, it could not have found the claims legally flawed In order for the Court to have
reached the result proposed by Plaintiff, the Court would have been required to ignore its own
prior rulings in the underlying case and simply accept as true Plaintifrs apparent disregard of the
status of the underlying case. This the Court could not do, especially after all parties requested
the Court take judicial notice of the entire case file.

2

This obligation was most recently noted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Heinze v Bauer, 2008 WL 204271
(unpublished opinion), a legal malpractice lawsuit brought by Heinze against the attorney who represented him in
his divorce
Ta1,/o1 v McNicho/1, el al
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In addition to the Court finding attorneys' fees appropriate under I.C. § 12-121 and
I.R.C.P. 54(e), the Cowt found Defendants request for attorneys' fees pursuant to I.C § 30-J746 and IC. § 48-608(5) valid relative to two of Plaintiffs claims. However, the Cowt need not
address whether attorneys' fees were properly requested under the two statutory provisions as the
Court found all of Plaintiffs claims were brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably and
without foundation and, therefore, awarded attorneys' fees pursuant to l.C. § 12-121.
Based on the Court's review and finding that attorneys' fees were appropriate under l.C

§ 12-121 and I R.C.P. 54(e), the Court denies Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider. The Court
continues to be of the opinion that each of Plaintiffs claims was so plainly fallacious as to be
deemed frivolous and that Plaintiff's claims were not supported by a good faith argument for
modification of the law in Idaho. 3

<Bl RULE 54Ce)(3) CONSIDERATIONS
Rule 54(e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
Amount of Attorney Fees. In the event the court grants attorney fees to a party or
parties in a civil action it shall consider the following factors in determining the
amount of such fees:
(A) The time and labor required.
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions .
(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the
experience and ability of the attorney in the particular field oflaw.
(D) The prevailing charges for like work.
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the
case.
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(H) The undesirability of the case.
(I) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(.J) Awards in similar cases.
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted
Legal Research), if the court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a
party's case.
(L) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular case.
1

United lnve5/ors Life Insurance Co v Seven on, 143 Idaho 628, 634, 15 I P Jd 824 (200 7)
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On Motion for Reconsideration, Defendants ask the Court to clarify the factors it
considered in awarding at1orneys' fees and asks the Court to reconsider the amount of the award.
The Court concedes it provided only a general statement regarding its considerations under Rule
54(e)(3) in its April J, 2009 Opinion and that an articulation of the factors considered is
app1op1iate.
TI1e Court did not find the questions presented by Plaintiffs claims particularly novel or
difficult. As Defendants noted in their opposition brief to Plaintiffs motion to reconsider, the
legal requirements for each and every claim brought by Plaintiff are well established and the
fatal flaws in each of Plaintiffs claims should have been easily evident to Plaintiff. The same is
true in defending against each claim
Plaintiff's claims were based in statute and common law and were, for the most part,
claims with well established proof elements. As a result, defending against the claims did not
require extensive time, labor or research as each claim contained a fatal flaw that was easily
discovered and presented to the Court. The Court does not disagree with Defendants' argument
that a malpractice claim presents a case within a case. However, in the instant case there was no
attorney-client relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants, a fatal flaw easily asce11ained
without the need for a full understanding of the complexities of the underlying case as argued by
Defendants' counsel.
One of the many factors considered by the CoUJt in deciding the complexity of the instant
matter along with the time and labor required was the brief elapse of time between the filing of
the Complaint and the grant of Defendants' motion to dismiss, a mere six month time frame. In
addition, counsel for the Defendants, whose fees were based on an hourly rate in the instant
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matter, are sldlled and experienced attorneys able to address issues thoroughly, efficiently and
effectively After reconsideration of the factors the Court is to consider under IR.CP 54(e)(3),
the Court remains of the opinion that a reasonable arnoWlt of attorneys' fees for defending
against the claims brought by Plaintiff is $20,000.00.
Finally, during oral arguments Plaintiff noted the .Judgment entered on April 24, 2009 has
an error in the numerical portion of the $20,000.00 award of attorneys' fees. The .Judgment wil1,
therefore, be amended to correct the error

ORDER
The Court has, as requested by the parties, clazified and articulated the factors considered
by the Court in deciding a reasonable amount of attorneys' fees to be award to Defendants
pursuant to l.C. § 12-121 and I.RC.P. 54(e)(J ).
Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider is hereby DENIED.
Defendants' Motion to Reconsider is hereby DENIED.

Dated th.is

Taylor v McNic/10/1, ef al
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I he1eby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPINION & ORDER was:
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_L_ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this /Sty of June
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Michael S. Bissell
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC
7 South Howard St, Ste 416
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John J. .Jan is
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PO Box 2582
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TH SECOND DICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND F

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,
Plaintiff,
v.

)
)
)
)
)

)
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN)
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
)
)
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL )
ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP an Idaho limited )
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X,
)
unknown individuals;
)
Defendants.

CASE NO. CV08-0l 765
OPINION AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION
AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

)
)

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's
award of attorneys' fees and costs and Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of the same. A
hearing on the Motions was held on May 14, 2009. Plaintiff Reed Taylor was represented by
attorney Michael S. Bissell. Defendants Babbitt, Ashby, Collins, Riley and the law firm of
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley were represented by attorney James D. LaRue. The Court,
having read the motion and briefs of the parties, having considered the record in the matter,
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having heard oral arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its
decision.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 3, 2009, this Court entered its Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for
Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, wherein the Court granted Defendants $20,000.00 in
attorneys' fees pursuant to LC.§ 12-121, Rule 54(e)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
I.C. § 30-1-746(2) and l.C. § 48-608(5). On April 21, 2009, Defendants filed a Motion for
Reconsideration asking the Court to reconsider the amount of attorney fees granted and seeking a
clarification of the factors set forth in Rule 54(e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
On May 4, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending the Court erred
in awarding attorneys' fees under LC.§ 12-121, asserting Plaintiffs claims were not frivolous
and, even if attorneys' fees might otherwise be warranted under l.C. § 30-1-746(2) and I.C. § 48608(5), no award can be granted as Defendants failed to itemize fees specific to the related
claims.

STANDARDS UPON A REQUEST FOR COSTS AND FEES
The statutory language determines whether an award of attorneys' fees is mandatory or
discretionary. When an award is discretionary, a court must perceive the issue as one of
discretion, act within the boundaries of it'> discretion and consistent with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it, and the court must reach its decision by an
exercise ofreason. P. 0. Ventures Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 159
P.3d 870 (2007). A court's discretionary authority includes the discretion to award reasonable
attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action when such an award is provided for by any
statute. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l).
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ANALYSIS
Plaintiff asserts the Court erred in awarding attorneys' fees. If the Court is persuaded by
Plaintiff's argument, it would render Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration moot. Therefore,
the Court must first make a determination as to the merits of Plaintiff's motion.

CA) PLAINTIFF'S ASSERTION OF ERROR AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Under I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e), attorneys' fees may be awarded only where there
is a prevailing party and a court finds the lawsuit was brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably and without foundation. Plaintiff asserts his claims, in part if not in their entirety,
were novel issues or issues of first impression and, therefore, were not brought or pursued
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. The Court agrees attorneys' fees are not to be
awarded under LC. § 12-121 unless all of the claims brought or pursued are found to be
frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation nor are attorneys' fees appropriate under LC. § 12121 if the issues are novel or issues of first impression. "A party is not entitled to attorneys' fees
if the issue is one of first impression in Idaho." Lane Ranch v. City ofSun Valley, 145 Idaho 87,
91, 175 P.3d 776 (2007), citing SEIZ Const., L.L.C. v. Idaho State University, 140 Idaho 8, 14,
89 p .3d 848, 854 (2004).
Attorney fees are not appropriate under LC.§ 12-121 and l.R.C.P. 54(e) unless all
claims brought or all defenses asserted are frivolous and without foundation.
Where there are "multiple claims and multiple defenses, it is not appropriate to
segregate those claims and defenses to determine which were or were not
frivolously defended or pursued. The total defense of plaintiffs proceedings must
be unreasonable or frivolous." Magic Valley Radiology Associates, P.A. v.
Professional Business Services, Inc., 119 Idaho 558, 808 P.2d 1303 (1990).

Management

Cata~ysts

v. Turbo West Corpac, 119 Idaho 626, 630, 809 P.2d 487 (1991).

In the instant matter, Defendants sought attorneys' fees and costs as the prevailing party
after the Court granted Defendants' I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and denied Plaintiffs
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motion to amend his complaint. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges four causes of action against
Defendants: (I) conversion; (2) tortious interference; (3) fraud and/or constructive fraud; and, (4)
malpractice. Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants were not based on an attorney-client
relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants. Rather, Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants
were based solely on Defendants' representation of AIA Services Corporation and AIA
Insurance, Inc. in a lawsuit brought against the corporations by the Plaintiff Reed Taylor.
Plaintiff theorized that, by accepting money from its corporate clients for legal fees, Defendants
had unlawfully converted to themselves AIA funds that rightfully belong to Reed Taylor and,
that by defending its clients Defendants had committed malpractice, aided and abetted their
clients in committing fraud and aided and abetted their clients in tortiously interfering with
Plaintiff's contractual rights.
Plaintiff contends an award of attorneys' fees was improper as some, if not all, of his
claims were novel issues or issues of first impression. The Court is not persuaded. Three of the
four claims asserted by the Plaintiff are common law theories of recovery that have been
addressed numerous times by Idaho's courts. While Plaintiff's choice of defendants is novel, in
that he opted to bring his claims for conversion, tortious interference and fraud against the
attorneys representing the corporations rather than against the corporations and the corporate
leadership, the claims certainly are not novel. Nor is Plaintiff's claim for malpractice brought
against attorneys with whom he had no attorney-client relationship novel or a matter of first
impression. 1 The only novel issue or one of first impression before the Court was the litigation
privilege doctrine raised as a defense by the Defendants.

1

In the unrelated case of Taylor v. Maile, 142 fdaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005), Reed Taylor brought an action
against an attorney with whom he had no attorney-client relationship. The Supreme Court, in ruling on the appeal,
emphasized that an attorney-client relationship is required in a legal malpractice claim.
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The Court, addressing Defendants' motion to dismiss, noted the litigation privilege
doctrine has not previously been addressed by Idaho's appellate courts. Nevertheless, after
reviewing opinions from those jurisdictions that have addressed the privilege, this Court found
the doctrine to be consistent with Idaho's Rules of Professional Ethics and with the firmly
established standard in Idaho that an attorney is obligated to provide his clients with zealous
representation 2 . While the litigation privilege doctrine, which was raised by Defendants in their
Motion to Dismiss and thereby required review by the Court, provides a helpful overlay, the
Court is confident it would have reached the same result based solely on the Idaho Rules of
Professional Ethics and the long held standard that obligates attorneys to zealously represent
their clients. This fact is reflected in the Court's Opinion and Order on the issue of attorneys'
fees and costs, wherein the Court stated it was persuaded the Defendants had acted well within
the ethical rules established by the Idaho State Bar.
Finally, the Court reached the determination that each of Plaintiffs claims were brought
and pursued frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation only after finding each asserted
claim was fatally flawed legally and factually. Plaintiff contends the Court erred in this regard,
asserting the Court was required to accept as true all facts alleged by Plaintiff and, that had the
Court done so, it could not have found the claims legally flawed. In order for the Court to have
reached the result proposed by Plaintiff, the Court would have been required to ignore its own
prior rulings in the underlying case and simply accept as true Plaintiffs apparent disregard of the
status of the underlying case. This the Court could not do, especially after all parties requested
the Court take judicial notice of the entire case file.

2
This obligation was most recently noted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Heinze v. Bauer, 2008 WL 204271
(unpublished opinion), a legal malpractice lawsuit brought by Heinze against the attorney who represented him in
his divorce.
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In addition to the Court finding attorneys' fees appropriate under LC.§ 12-121 and
I.R.C.P. 54(e), the Court found Defendants request for attorneys' fees pursuant to I.C. § 30-1746 and LC.§ 48-608(5) valid relative to two of Plaintiffs claims. However, the Court need not
address whether attorneys' fees were properly requested under the two statutory provisions as the
Court found all of Plaintiff's claims were brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably and
without foundation and, therefore, awarded attorneys' fees pursuant to LC.§ 12-121.
Based on the Court's review and finding that attorneys' fees were appropriate under LC.
§ 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e), the Court denies Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider. The Court
continues to be of the opinion that each of Plaintiffs claims was so plainly fallacious as to be
deemed frivolous and that Plaintiffs claims were not supported by a good faith argument for
modification of the law in Idaho.3

CB) RULE 54(e)(3) CONSIDERATIONS
Rule 54(e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
Amount of Attorney Fees. In the event the court grants attorney fees to a party or
parties in a civil action it shall consider the following factors in determining the
amount of such fees:
(A) The time and labor required.
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions.
(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the
experience and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law.
(D) The prevailing charges for like work.
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the
case.
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(H) The undesirability of the case.
(I) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(J) Awards in similar cases.
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted
Legal Research), if the court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a
party's case.
(L) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular case.
3

United Investors Life Insurance Co. v. Severson, 143 Idaho 628, 634, 151 P.3d 824 (2007).
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On Motion for Reconsideration, Defendants ask the Court to clarify the factors it
considered in awarding attorneys' fees and asks the Court to reconsider the amount of the award.
The Court concedes it provided only a general statement regarding its considerations under Rule
54(e)(3) in its April 3, 2009 Opinion and that an articulation of the factors considered is
appropriate.
The Court did not find the questions presented by Plaintiffs claims particularly novel or
difficult. As Defendants noted in their opposition brief to Plaintiffs motion to reconsider, the
legal requirements for each and every claim brought by Plaintiff are well established and the
fatal flaws in each of Plaintiffs claims should have been easily evident to Plaintiff. The same is
true in defending against each claim.
Plaintiffs claims were based in statute and common law and were, for the most part,
claims with well established proof elements. As a result, defending against the claims did not
require extensive time, labor or research as each claim contained a fatal flaw that was easily
discovered and presented to the Court. The Court does not disagree with Defendants' argument
that a malpractice claim presents a case within a case. However, in the instant case there was no
attorney-client relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants, a fatal flaw easily ascertained
without the need for a full understanding of the complexities of the underlying case as argued by
Defendants' counsel.
One of the many factors considered by the Court in deciding the complexity of the instant
matter along with the time and labor required was the brief elapse of time between the filing of
the Complaint and the grant of Defendants' motion to dismiss, a mere six month time frame. In
addition, counsel for the Defendants, whose fees were based on an hourly rate in the instant
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matter, are skilled and experienced attorneys able to address issues thoroughly, efficiently and
effectively. After reconsideration of the factors the Court is to consider under LR.C.P. 54(e)(3),
the Court remains of the opinion that a reasonable amount of attorneys' fees for defending
against the claims brought by Plaintiff is $20,000.00.

ORDER

The Court has, as requested by the parties, clarified and articulated the factors considered
by the Court in deciding a reasonable amount of attorneys' fees to be award to Defendants
pursuant to LC.§ 12-121 and l.R.C.P. 54(e)(l).
Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider is hereby DENIED.
Defendants' Motion to Reconsider is hereby DENIED.

Dated this
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPINION & ORDER was:

___ hand delivered via court basket, or

SJ;

~mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this l_ day of June
2009, to:

Michael S. Bissell
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC
7 South Howard St, Ste 416
Spokane, VIA 99201
James D. LaRue
Elam & Burke PA
251 East Front St
PO Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701
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James D. LaRue ISB #1780
Loren C. Ipsen ISB #1767
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
E & B File No. 7082-0013

•
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Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. CV 08-01765
JUDGMENT

GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASijBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES 1-X,
unknown individuals;
Defendants.

Defendants' Motion for Costs and Attorneys' Fees came on for hearing before this Court
on February 26, 2009. James D. LaRue of the firm Elam & Burke P.A., appeared for
Defendants Gary D. Babbitt, D. John Ashby, Patrick V. Collins, Richard A. Riley and Hawley

JUDGMENT- I
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Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP. Michael S. Bissell of the law firm Campbell, Bissell & Kirby,
PLLC, appeared for Plaintiff. This Court having reviewed the record in this matter, together with
motions, memoranda, briefs and affidavits filed concerning the above referenced motion, as well
as oral argument presented by counsel, and the Court thereafter having issued its Opinion and
Order on Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs dated April 3, 2009, and
having considered all factors in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), and in the exercise of the discretion of this
Court finds an award of attorneys' fees as set forth below appropriate, Judgment concerning this
matter is now proper.
Accordingly, JUDGMENT is hereby entered, under the standards of Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54 and Idaho Code Sections 12-121, 30-1-746(2) and (3), 48-608(5), in favor of
Defendants Gary D. Babbitt, D. John Ashby, Patrick V. Collins, Richard A. Riley and Hawley
Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, against the Plaintiff in the amount of$20,058.00.
Post-judgment interest on this amount at the current applicable statutory rate shall
commence to run from the date of this Judgment forward.
DATED this

l~ day of April, 2009.

JEFF M. BRUDIE
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

lA_

day of April, 2009, I caused a true and correct
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 416
Spokane, WA 99201
James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

___:::: U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
__ Federal Express
__ Facsimile Transmission (509) 455-7111

~ U.S.Mail

Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission (208) 384-5844

CLERK OF THE COURT

KOUGH
By: _ _JANET
_ _ _L
__
_ _ _ _ _ _ __
Deputy Clerk
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MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
Attorneys for Appellant Reed Taylor
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, WA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
IN THE.DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REEP J. TAYLOR, art individual, who is
bringing this action on behalf ofhimself and
on behalf of the creditors and/or shareholders
of AIA Services Corporation and AJA
Insurance, Inc.;

Case No.: CV-08-01765
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

Appellant,

v.
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D; JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 1 an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES 1~x,
unknown individuals;
Res ondents..
TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, GARY D. BABBITT, D JOHN
ASHBY, PATRICK V. COLLINS, RICHARD A. RILEY, AND
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP. AND THE PARTIES'
ATTORNEY JAMES D. LARUE, ELAM & BURKE, P.A., P.O. BOX
1539, BOISE, ID 83704; AND

TO:

THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1..

The above named Appellant Reed J. Taylor appeals against the above-

named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Order granting
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and denying Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint
entered in the above entitled action on the 23nl day of December, 2008, Opinion and
Order on Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs entered in the
above entitled action, and Judgment entered 011 April 24, 2009, the Honorable Jeff M.
Brudie presiding.
2.

Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

Judgments/Orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable Orders under and
pursuantto Rules 4 and 1l(a)(l), I.A.R.
3.

A preliminary statement of issues on· appeal, which the Appellant intends

to assert in this appeal are as follows ($eVeral of which are issues of first impression);
provided, the following list of issues is not exhaustive and Respondents should expect
others:
a. Did plaintiff state causes of action against attorneys for fraud,
breaches of fiduciary duties, conversion, excessive compensation,
and/or tortious interference and/or causes of actions pertaining to
aiding and abetting and/or conspiracy to assist others in the
commission of any of any of the foregoing causes of actiop,
b. Does the Litigation Privilege exist in Idaho and, if so, does it bar
claims against attorneys for fraud, constructive fraud, breaches of
fiduciary duties, conversion, excessive compensation, and tortious
interference and/or causes of action pertaining to aiding and
abetting and/or conspiracy to assist others in the commission of
any of the foregoing causes of action?
c. Does a plaintiff state a cause of action against an attorney for
conversion and other causes of action by alleging that the attorney
accepted payment for attorney's fees and costs from funds the
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
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attorney knew or should have known were funds in which the
plaintiff held a valid and perfected security interest?
d. Does a stock pledgee, who is also a secured creditor of the
revenues and all of the stock of the corporation, have standing to
pursue direct causes of actions against parties for claims owned by
the corporation? Does the same plaintiff have standing to pursue
derivative causes of action on behalf of the corporation?
e. Does a creditor of an insolvent corporation, who is also a secured
creditor of the revenues of the corporation, have standing to assert
direct causes of action against parties for claims owned by the
corporation? Does the same plaintiff have standing to pursue
derivative causes of actions on behalf ofthe corporation?
attorney has exceeded his/her scope of
representation sufficient to. defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim based upon the Litigation Privilege?

f. Are allegations

th~t an

g. Can an attomeyrepte,sent corporate clients with diverging interests
when the representation was approved by persons with
director/officer conflicts .of interest?
Idaho~s ConsWlier Protect Act bar a person from asserting
direct ·and. derivative claims against an attorney, when the piaintiff
does not have privity of contract with the attorney,. for violations of
Idaho~ s Consumer Protection Act?

h. Does

i. In considering a motion to, dismiss under I.R.cJ>. 12(b)(6), is it

permissible for the district court to take jqdicial notice of an
entirely different case in toto and/or to consider documents which
are not in the record fot that case?
j. Can a stock pledgee of all of the stock and revenues of a pledged

corporation assert direct and/or derivative causes of actions for
malpractiee against an attorney?
k. Can a secured creditor, who is also the most significant creditor of
an insolvent corporation, assert direct and/or derivative claims for
malpractice against an attorney?
I. Can the district court judge, who is the same judge for two related
actions, consider privileged documents in granting a motion to
dismiss under IRCP 12{b)(6) without requiring production of the
documents to the other party?
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m. If a party provides privileged documents to an expert and the
expert provides testimony through an affidavit relying on the
privileged. documents for the experts testimony, has the attomeyclient privilege been waived and must the documents be produced
to the opposing party upon a motion to compel?

n. If Idaho adopts the Litigation Privilege defens.e for an attorney, can
the defense be asserted to dismiss an action pursuant to I.R.C.P.
12(b)(6) for actions taken by the attorney which the attorney
asserts were under the scope of representation, when such scope of
representation was purportedly agreed to by representatives from
the corporation client~ whe:n the attom.ey knows or should have
known that: (1) the representatives of the corporation have
conflicts of int~est; (2) the board of directors of the corporation
client have conflicts of interest; (3) the corporation has not held an
annual shareholder meeting in years; (4) the purported scope of
representation WaS :not in the best int~ests of at •least two
corporation clients with div~ging interests; and (5) the sCC)pe Qf
representatiori was not ill the best intere$ts of ~ach ofthe attorney's
three different clients.
o. Does an attorney ()we a non-client any fiduciary duties, special
duties, and/or third-party benefidary obligations when the atto:mey
knows or should have knoWt1 (includillg, without lintltation): (1)
that all of the shares and revenues of the corporation client the
attomey is purportedly representing are pledged as collateral to the
non-client and an,othet client is in default of the obligations whiCh
trigger remedies pertainbig to sµch security foterests; (2) the no:nclient has voted the shfll"es appointing himself as the sole officer
and director ofthe. corporation client, and the corporation client is
being wrongfully managed by persons· breaching fiduciary duties
and not safeguarding assets; (3) the assets and funds are
insufficient to pay the secured creditor who voted the shares of the
comoration pledged to him as collateral; (4) that millions ofdollars
in assets and funds may-have been 'lffeagfuUy unlawfully
transferred from the corporation client by the very individuals
directing the litigatim1; and (5) the parent corporation. of the
pledged corporation is also being represented by the attorney and
the same non-client is owed millions of dollars by the parent
corporation client who is highly insolvent?
p. Does a plaintiff have a constitutional right (whether under the
United States Constitution or the State of Idaho;s Constitution) to
obtain documents, prosecute causes of action and/or pursue causes
of action to protect and/or recover assets which are subject to a
security interest and/or pursue causes of actions action against
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4
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attorneys relating to any one or more the foregoing?
q. Did the district court err in awarding attorneys' fees to Defendants,
pursuant to I.C. § 12-121. I.C. § 30-1-746 and I.C. § 48..608{5),
when plaintiffs claims under each of the foregoing statutes
involved novel claims and/or issues of first impression, and
plain.tiff asserted claims relating to security interests held by him
for property received by Defendants?
r. Can a district court award a defendant attorneys' fees pursuant to
I.C. § 30..1-746 when it found that the plaintiff was not entitled to
bring derivative actions as a stock pledgee and secured creditor of
an insolvent corporation under I.C. § 30-1-746, which does not
expressly prohibit a stock pledgee or secured. creditor of an
insolvent corporation from pursuing derivative claims?

s. Can a district court award attorneys' fees to a defendant pursuant
to LC.§ 12-121 after plaintiffs complaint was dismissed pttrsuant
to Rule 12(hl{6) based in Part upon the district court adopting the
'~Litigation Privilege" as a first impression defense?
t.

Can a district cgurt find that a plaintiff pursued an action
frivolously when the plain.ti.ff is a secured creditor who pursues
claims against attorneys who have received payment for services
from funds subject to valid and perfected seCurity ·interests and/or
the proceeds of such valid and perfected security interests?

u. Can a district court make findings of facts that attorney defendants
did not violate, any rules of professional conduct in an action
dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(91(6) when the facts alleged in
plaintiff's complaint state that the attorneys violated rules of
professional conduct?

4.

There has not been an Order sealing all or any portion of this record.

5.

A reporter's transcript is not requested.

6.

Appellant requests the following documents be included in the clerk's

record, in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.:
a. This Notice of Appeal;
b. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss;

c. Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss;
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL~ 5
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d. Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss;
e. Plaintiffs Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint(including
the attached proposed First Amended Complaint);

f. Defendants' Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to
Amend Complaint; 6.fl<4
g. Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and

Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint;
h. Defendants' Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees;
1.

Defendants' Brief in Sqpport of Costs and Attorney's Fees;

j. Affidavit of James LaRue in Support of Memorandum Costs and

Attomeys' Fees;
k Plaintiff Reed J, Taylor's Motion to Disallow Defendants' Request
for Attornevs' Fees and Costs;

I. Affidavit of Michael S. Bissell ·in Support. of.Plaintiff Reed 1.
Taylor's Motion to Disallow Defendants' Request for Attorpey"s
Fees and Costs;
m. Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend
Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees;

Defendants'

n. Defendants' Brief in Syp12ort of Motion for Leave to Amend
Defendants' Memorandum.of Costs.and Attorneys' Fees;
o. Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' ResQonse to Plaintiff's Motion to
Disallow Fees and Costs;
p. Defendants' Memorandum in Response to Reed Taylor's Motion
to Disallow Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs;
q. Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend
Memorandum of Costs and Fees;
r. Plaintiffs Reply to Defendantst Response to Plaintiff's Motion to
Disallow Fees and Costs;
s. Defendants' Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend
Memorandtim of Costs and Attorneys' Fees;
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t. Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney
Fees and Costs; and
u. Judgment.
7.

I certify that:

a. A copy of this notice of appeal has not been served on a reporter
because a transcript has not been requested.
b. The clerk of the district court has not been paid any fee for
preparing. a transcript because a transcript has not been requested.

c. The estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been
paid.
d. The appellate filing fee. has been paid.
e. Service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20.

DATED this 15th day of May, 2009.
CAMPBELL; BISSELL

RBYPLLC

By;.~"'"-~"-.1'---------
Michae . Bissell
Attorneys for Appellant Reed Taylor
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of May, 2009, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of Appellant's Amended Notice of Appeal to the following:
DELIVERY
- - HAND
U.S.MAIL
- - OVERNIGHT MAIL
.

~FAX TRANSMISSION

James D. LaRue
Elam & Burke, PA
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83704

__}{__EMAIL {.pdf attachment)

Michael S. Bissell

•

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 8
000561

NO·------::~~,.._

James D. LaRue ISB #1780
J \ . ·~· Loren C. Ipsen ISB #1767
~
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No. CV-OC-0918868

v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; ROBERT M.
TURNBOW, an individual; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD A. RILEY IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Ada

)

) SS.

RICHARD A. RILEY, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says:
1.

l

JAN 15 20lQ

Attorneys for Defendants, Richard A. Riley
and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP

Plaintiff,

___

I am a partner with the firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawley

Troxell"), a defendant in the above entitled action. I am also a defendant in the action.
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2.

I am over 18 years of age, competent to testify regarding the matters set forth in

this affidavit, and make this affidavit based upon my personal knowledge.
3.

Prior to March 1, 1999, I was an attorney employed by the firm of Eberle, Berlin,

Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered ("Eberle Berlin"). During my employment with the
firm, Eberle Berlin was engaged by AIA Services Corporation ("AIA") in connection with the
Stock Redemption Agreement (the "1995 Stock Redemption Agreement") between AIA and
Reed J. Taylor, dated July 22, 1995. A copy of that Stock Redemption Agreement, excluding
exhibits but including the Addendum to Stock Redemption Agreement, is attached hereto as
Exhibit A. 1 In connection with the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, AIA made, executed and
delivered a Promissory Note (the "$6MM Note"), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit
B, dated August 1, 1995, in the principal amount of six million dollars payable to the order of
Reed J. Taylor, together with other ancillary documents.
4.

In connection with the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, the law firm of Eberle

Berlin rendered a written opinion (the "1995 Opinion Letter") dated August 15, 1995, addressed
to Reed J. Taylor, a copy of which, including Schedule III to Stock Purchase Agreement and the
certification ofR. John Taylor, are attached hereto as Exhibit C. I participated in the preparation
of the 1995 Opinion Letter. Eberle Berlin represented only AIA in regard to the 1995 Stock
Redemption Agreement and the 1995 Opinion Letter. Mr Taylor was represented by separate

1

The Bates stamps at the foot of the documents were not part of the original 1995 Opinion Letter or
attachment. Bates stamps and exhibit letters on other documents attached to this affidavit were also not part of the
original documentq but were affixed at a later date.
2

Reed J. Taylor was succeeded by his brother, R. John Taylor, as the president of AIA. Unless the context
clearly indicates otherwise, references herein to Mr. Taylor are to Reed J. Taylor.
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counsel of his selection, Scott T. Bell and N. Frank Taylor of the firm of Cairncross &
Hempelmann,

70th

Floor, Columbia Center, 701 Fifth Avenue, Seattle, Washington 98104. Mr.

Taylor also employed his own certified public accountant, Ernie Dantini. Prior to redemption of
his AIA shares, Mr. Taylor was the majority shareholder of AIA, the president of the corporation,
and the chairman of its board of directors. He had complete access to all financial, accounting
and other records of AIA.
5.

Soon after execution and delivery of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, Mr.

Taylor gave notice that he claimed the agreement to be in default. Attached hereto as Exhibit D
is a copy of a notice of default from Mr. Taylor to AIA dated April 18, 1996. His attorneys also
gave notice of default. Attached hereto as Exhibit Eis a copy of a letter from Scott T. Bell to me
dated April 25, 1996, claiming default of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement.
6.

AIA and Mr. Taylor entered into discussions regarding the alleged defaults, which

resulted in the execution and delivery of a Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement (the "1996
Restructure Agreement") dated July 1, 1996, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit F.
Paragraph G of the 1996 Restructure Agreement provided:
It is the intention of the parties that this Agreement will supersede and
replace the Stock Redemption Agreement with respect to any and all
representations, warranties and covenants of which were made in the Original
Documents and which survived the closing of the stock redemption transaction,
and that neither Creditor nor Company will have any right to claim default under
any of the Original Documents (as they may be amended by this Agreement)
merely because any such representation, warranty or covenant was or in the future
becomes false or unperformed. The parties wish to rely entirely upon those
representations, warranties or covenants contained in the Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement (as defined below). All such representations, warranties and
covenants shall be deemed to have been made on the date of this Agreement.
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7.

The 1996 Restructure Agreement further provided at paragraph 4.2 that "The

Superseded Documents are of no further force or effect." The Superseded Documents were
defined in paragraph C of the 1996 Restructure Agreement as all original documents executed in
1995 other than the $6MM Note.
8.

Eberle Berlin represented only AIA in regard to the 1996 Restructure Agreement,

and Mr Taylor was again represented by the firm of Caimcross & Hempelmann. No opinion was
rendered by Eberle Berlin in connection with the 1996 Restructure Agreement between AIA and
Mr. Taylor.
9.

I joined Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawley Troxell") on March 1,

1999, after over twenty years with Eberle Berlin. I left Eberle Berlin on good terms. By
agreement, I brought certain clients with me to Hawley Troxell, but I did not attempt to solicit
AIA or any of its subsidiaries and did not bring any AIA files to Hawley Troxell.
10.

Subsequent to the execution of the 1996 Restructure Agreement, Mr. Taylor again

claimed that AIA was in default and filed suit against AIA, its wholly-owned subsidiary, AIA
Insurance, Inc. ("AIA Insurance") and several individuals, including R. John Taylor (the "AIA
lawsuit") on January 29, 2007. Michael E. McNichols of Clements, Brown & McNichols
initially appeared in behalf of AIA, AIA Insurance and R. John Taylor. After obtaining a
restraining order to enjoin Reed Taylor from interference with the operations of AIA and AIA
Insurance, Mr. McNichols withdrew from representation of AIA and AIA Insurance, and Hawley
Troxell substituted as defense counsel in the AIA litigation for those two companies. Mr.
McNichols continued as defense counsel for R. John Taylor in the AIA litigation. Although I
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have not appeared in any of the proceedings relating to the AIA litigation and was not designated
as trial counsel, I have communicated from time to time with other Hawley Troxell attorneys
relative to the AIA litigation and filed an Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to
Disqualify Hawley Troxell.
11.

While the AIA litigation was ongoing, Mr. Taylor filed a Complaint for Damages

in the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Nez Perce County,
against Hawley Troxell and four attorneys employed by Hawley Troxell, including me, on
August 18, 2008 (the "Hawley Troxell Litigation No. l "). Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a copy
of that Complaint.
12.

Reed Taylor also filed a separate lawsuit against Mr. McNichols and Clements,

Brown & McNichols (the "McNichols Litigation"). A copy of the Complaint for Damages
against Mr. McNichols, et al., is attached hereto as Exhibit H.
13.

In the Hawley Troxell Litigation No. 1, Mr. Taylor moved to amend his complaint

to allege fraud. Attached hereto as Exhibit I is a copy of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Motion and

Memorandum ofLaw to Amend Complaint in that litigation, with a copy of the proposed First
Amended Complaint for Damages attached thereto. Paragraph 92 of the proposed First Amended
Complaint for Damages alleged:
As a former attorney for Reed Taylor and the attorney who provided an
opinion letter to Reed Taylor, defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by
and through an opinion letter that was based on Riley's personal knowledge
(representing such facts as the transaction being fully legal and authorized by the
corporations), which further invokes personal liability to Riley. Reed Taylor had
a right to rely on Riley's representations and justifiably relied on such
representations. Riley breached his duties when he asserted that the transaction
was illegal. Although Reed Taylor believes the transaction was legal and
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supported by applicable law, Riley's actions have breached his duties to Reed
Taylor and caused Reed Taylor to incur damages from the payment of attorneys'
fees and costs and lost possession of property and funds because of AIA Insurance
being wrongfully withheld from Reed Taylor. As a result of Riley's acts and/or
omissions (which constitute fraud), Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount
to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.
14.

The defendants in both the Hawley Troxell Litigation No. 1 and the McNichols

Litigation brought motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. After hearing on the motions, the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Nez
Perce County, entered judgment dismissing the complaints with prejudice and denying Mr.
Taylor's motions to amend. Attached hereto as Exhibit J is a copy of the Opinion and Order on

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint in Hawley Troxell
Litigation No. 1. Attached hereto as Exhibit K is a copy of the Opinion and Order on

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint in the McNichols
Litigation.
15.

Not only did the District Court for Nez Perce County dismiss Mr. Taylor's

complaints against Hawley Troxell et al. and Mr. McNichols et al., the Court awarded attorney's
fees to the defendants. In the Hawley Troxell Litigation No. 1, the Court found as follows:
"The Court finds the claims alleged by the Plaintiff in his Complaint and
his proposed Amended Complaint were frivolous, unreasonable and without
foundation in law or fact. Therefore, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 and Rule
54(e)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure the Court finds Defendants are
entitled to a reasonable award of attorney fees and cost. In addition, the Court
finds a reasonable award of attorney fees is also warranted under Idaho Code §
30-1-746(2) and (3) and Idaho Code§ 48-608(5) for the cost of defending against
the two claims in Plaintiff's proposed Amended Complaint."
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Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Award ofAttorney's Fees and Costs, Case No.
CV 08-1765 in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County, p. 10, a copy
of which is attached hereto as Exhibit L.
16.

In the Hawley Troxell No. 1 Litigation, the Court found on motions for

reconsideration of the attorney fee award:
"Finally, the Court reached the determination that each of Plaintiffs
claims were brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably and without
foundation only after finding each asserted claim was fatally flawed legally and
factually."

Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration and Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration, Case No. CV 08-1765 in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Nez
Perce County, p. 5, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit M.
17.

In the final Judgment entered in the Hawley Troxell No. 1 Litigation, attorney's

fees were assessed against Mr. Taylor pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-121, 30-1-746(2) and (3),
and 48-608(5). Judgment, Case No. CV 08-01765 in the District Court of the Second Judicial
District, Nez Perce County, p. 2, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit N.
18.

Mr. Taylor filed an appeal of the Judgment against him in Hawley Troxell

Litigation No. 1. See Amended Notice ofAppeal, Case No. CV 08-01765 in the District Court of
the Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 0. That
appeal is pending.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

J:<J.JJu.

A-11-'-J
to
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _!L day ofN0¥el'B:bd, 2009, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the
manner indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, Washington 99201
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

~ U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(509) 455-7111
~

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-9177
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I.
Stock Redemption Agr.ee;m.ent

This Stock Redeinp:tion Agreement (this 1CAgreement") i~ ma.de and ente;red into as of
:2. 2- 1995, and ameng AJA Services Co:q>0ratlon, an Idaho corporatioz+ .
omp~y"), and Reec! J. Taylor C'Shareholder").

·by

r

Recitals
A
·CoID;pany is the parent holdin~ company and own.er of all of:the capital st.ock
(other~ Dire.ctor Qualifying Shares) of The Universe Life 4s'uµmce Comp~y, an Idaho

domeStic lns:urance company (''Univ~rse'~, Al.A Insciance, Inc. ('1AIA1"), and Fa:r:rners Health
Alliance A~ors, Inc. ("Farmers"). Grea~ Fidelify Life IP.surance Company) ~ stbck life
insuranc~ com.pany domiciled in Iiic!iana ("Great Fidelity"), is a w:holly-owned subsidiary of

Uni'v.erse.
B.

I

Shar~halder

Q.
Cqmpany desires to redeem the Shares and Shareholder desires that tlie Shares be
redeemed, on the terms and subject to the cQndition.s liereinafter set .forth.

If_. .

I
I
I
I
I
.I

It
I
I

ovvns 613,494 shares of common stock of Company (the. "S~es").

:A,.greement
For good and valuable C?Onsid~ration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are h~reby
aclmowledged, the parties agree as follows:

Article I -Defmitions

In addition to the terms defined elsewhere in this Agreement, including the preamble and
recitals above, the following terms shall talce the fo~lowing a.sctibe4 meanings:
1

''Agreement, " "this Agreement, ;; "hereto, " 'h~reof," "herein;" "he.reund~r/' "hereby"
apc;f. similar expressions refer to this Agreement, inc~uding the schedules and exhibits attached
hereto, and not ~Y speci£c article;, section, subsection or other subcliviSion hereof or thereof.
"Bonds" has the meaning ascril:>ed to it in Section 10 ofth.e Stock Pledge Agreement
(Exlµbit B hereto).
·

"CAP Program" has the meanin~ aseribe~ to it on Schedule 1 attached hereto.
r'CAP Program Tangible Property" bas the meaning ascribed to it on Schedule 1
· attached her~fo.

"CAP Service$ Center Bafance" has the m~ai:tlng ascribed to it .on Schedule 1 attache~
hereto.
~

l -
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I
I.·
I.

. ,,.,....
I

"Co~lateral" ref¢rs

c.ollectively to the collat~ral to be given to sectire all of the obligations
of Company to Shareholder u:nder 'f:¥s Agreemen't? including b:µt not limited to (1) an of the
outsfancling ~apital stock of Universe (othe:r than' Directors' Qualifying Shares). AIAI and
Farmers, and any capital- stock ~cquired oy Company after the Closing, in9ludfug any stock
acquired as a result of a dividend maje to Comp!fily by UI).iverse (including a dividend of the
stock of Great Fidelity),.Fanners or AIAf, and any divide:qds or proceeds 'With respect to ~y
such st-0ck (collectiyely, the ''Pledged Shares'); (2) all insllf!iD,ce comnfissions paid or payabli;: to.
or for the benefit of Comp~y or i~ direct or indirect ~ubsidiarit;ls and any interest ac~rued
co~ecticin therewith (thf:: "Commissions");. and (3) the Bonds and any interest acci:uec;I in
connection therewith.

I
I
I
I
I

m

'

Debi! Balance" has the m~aning as¢bed to it on. Schedule 1 attac~ed hereto.

1

"Directors' Qualifying Shares" means the shares of the common stock of Universe
required by law t0 be held by such company's directors.
"First Intersta_te" means First Interstate Bank ofii;laho, N.A.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Ir. (

I
I

··;·:.,.,'•.·::: ... : ··:::·:'; - :_,_·~.-:.~··.~'.:1.:..":'..::•'·,\:;·.;,".·,~:·.·· H.·:,,.,,.,::.";•.,:·. ...;•,;• ·;·.:.::~.·....:·.:· ... ·~;': ·,·•'• • ''

"GAA!'" means getierally accepted accotmting prindples, as defined by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants~
"Governmental Author'i'ty" means any nation or government, foreign o:r domestic, any
state or other poiitical subdivisfon thereat;. and any agency or other entity exercis:ing executive,
l~gislative,judieial, regulatory or administra"Pve functions of government, incluqmg, without
limitation, all sta~ insurance regulatory authoriti~s and all taXin.g autharitjes.
"Person" means an i:Q.dividual, corporation, partnership, unincorporated association,
trust, joi;at venture or other organization or entity, including a Governmental Authority.
"Subsidiary" of a Person means (i) atJ.y corporation 50% or mote of the outstanding
voting se9uriti.es having ordinary voting power of which s:Q.all at the time be_ owned or controlled,
directly o:r indirectly, by such Person or by one or m9re of its Subsidiaries or by su9h Person and :.
· cme or more of its Sµbsidiaiies; or (ii) any partnership, a~sociation,joint ventµre or similar
b~iness organization 50% or :more ofth,e ownership interests having ordfuEl!Y voting power of
which shall at the time be so owned or. controlled.
Article II -Re{lemption ofShares; Closing ofRedemption Transaction
2.1

Redemption of Shares

2.1.J Rede·mption. On and subjec~ to the tenns and conclition~ set forth in this
Agreement, at Closing, Co~pany shall re~eem. the Shares.

.-2RJT 0000627
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I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I:~

I
I

/'

.
2.1.2 Redemption Price. The agg~egate consideration to be paid by Company in
full consideration for the redemption of the S~~s shall consist of the following: (a) One
Million Five Hundred Tho}isaild pollars ($1,5000?0.0q) pay~~le by cashier's check at Closing
(the "Down PaYlnei:it''); (b) Sf?c Milfion Dollars (~~:,000,000) payable pursuant to the ter,ms of a
promiSsory note ~o be delivered by Gompany ~t Closing in substantjal.Iy the form attached hereto
-as· Exhibit A (the '"Note"); {c) title to those certain Cessna· 441, Cessna 206 and Piper Cub
airplanes more particularly described on Schedple 2.1.2 attached her~io (the "AirplaJ;J.es"),,
subject to Sl:iareholder's assum.ptioi;t of those currently paid liabilities set forth on ~chedu,le
2.1.2; ( d) elimination of any Debit Balance outstanding at Closing and the release of
obligatfon of ShareP,older to the Company With rc;:spept thereto; (e) eliminatioJ1. of any CAP
Service-!! Center Balance outstanding at Closing and the release of a:ny obligation· of Shareholder
to Company with respect th~r~o and with respect to any ~;iq::ienses of the CAP Program~ and
(f) tJifi GAP Program TaP.gible Property.

any

.

.

2.1.3 .A,.llocation o/R,edemption Price. Th~ reqemption price shall be allocated
for tax purposes as set forth o.n Sche<J,ule 2.1.3 attached hereto .
2.2
Security. To secure amoun~ payable to Shareholde! under the Note and
Company's other obligation$ to Shareholder under this Agreement, Company shall execute imd
deliver at Closing a Stock Pledge Agreement substantially in the form attach.ecj hereto as
Exhibit B (the ·"Pledge Agre~inent''), and shall execute and deliver; and cause its sUbsidiaries to
execute and d~liver, a Sequrify AgreeJii.ent substantially in the foni:i a,tta:ched.h~reto El$ Exhibit C
(t;b.e "Security Agreement''). In the event that ~ompany is able to obtain, for the benefit of
Sb.arehold,er, Bonds meeting the conditions speci,p.ed in Section 10.(ii) of the .Pledge Agreement,
and if Company otherwise meets the terms and conditions for the substitution of 5uch collateral
contained in the Pl~dg~ Agreement, Shareholder will release the Pledge~ Shares (as defined m
the Pledge Agreement) in e.xphange for a pleqge of th~ Bonds. In the event that Company is able
to ebtain, for the benefit ef Shareholder, Bon~ meeting the conditions ~eci:fi~d in Section lO(i)
of tb,e Pledge Agreement, and if CCJmpany otherwise meets th~ terms and co~ditions for the
Substitution· bf such collateraj contained in the Pledge Agreement, 'S~ebolder will release the
Pledged Shares and the Co~ssipns in exchange for a pledge of the Bonds, a:nd the Company's
contip.uation to make timely interest payments.

,.

2.3
Consultjng A~eemeµt. For and in consideration of the mutual covenants of this
Agreemeo,t, Sharehqlder and Company shall also, at Clos~g, enter into a Consulting Agreement
substantially mthe fol:;IJ;l. attached hereto as Exhibit D (the "Consulting Agreement''). In
contlecti.on with the Consulting Agreement, Shareholder shall, at Closing, enter into a
N:oncbpipetition Agreement substantially in the form attached her~to as Exhibit E (the
''Nonc9mpetition Agre~ment).
1

2.4
Clo'sini. The closing of the transactions contemplated be~by (the "Closing")
shall take piace at the offices of AlA Services in:Lewiston, Idaho at 10:00 am. local time on
Ji:liy 20? 1995..
.
..
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Deliveries by Company at Closing~ At Closing, Company shall deliver to
Shareh~lder the Down Payment, plus a sum sufficient to pay all of Shareholder's attomey5' fees
incu:rred in connection with this Agreeme1,lt an4 the transactions contemplated hereby, including but
not limited to the preparatio~ of this Agreement and related docuriJ.entati"Qn, together with the
follov.ring quly-ex:ecuted documents:
2.5

(a)

The Note;

(b) ·

The Pledge A:greement;

(c)
Stock cei;tificates representing the Pledged Shares, other fu?n those
certifica,t~s representing 999,995 ::;hares of common stock of U!liverse currentj.y in the possession
of I?irst Interstate and held as secm:ity by First Interstate (the "First Interstat~ Shares"), together
_with duly executed assigoments·separate from certificate with respect to a.Ii stock certifi"cate.S
rep:i;-esenting the Pledged ~hares;

(d)
Instructions, in foz;m and substance satisfactory to Shareholder, signed by
Company and by First Interstate, req~g that the certificates representing the F4'st Interstate
S~es be delivered promptly and directly to Shareholder -q.pon the satisfactien of those
obligatio:r;is which are outstancfuig as of Closing and whiqh are seeured by the First Interstate
Shares, ru;id prohibiting any action subsequent tq Clc:isi,ng whiCh woul.d increase the moµetary
ob~gation.S of Coi;npany that are S"ecured by the First liitersta.te Shares;
(e)

The Security Agreement;

Transfer documentation) in form and Substance satisfactory to
Shareholder, transferring all of Company's right, ti.tie and mt~restin and to the Airplanes, subject
only to those liens :which are descn'bed on Sched1de 2~1.2;
(f)

(g)
A Bill of Sale in substantially the foim ~ttached hereto as Exhibit F)
transferring title to the CAP Progralll Tangible Property to Shareholder;
(h)

The Consulting Agreement;

(i)

The Noncompetition Agreement;

G)
Exhibit G hereto;

An opinion of CompBily' s legal counsel substantially in the fo;m of

(k)
A certificate signed by an officer of Company, satisfactory in form and
substapce to Shareholder, ce~ifying the acctiracy on the Closing Dat~ of Company's
representations and warranties contained in Article
beloW;

m

A certificate signed by an officer of Company, satisfactory in fonn and
subs.tance to Shareholder, certifying that Shareholder has no obligation to Company, and
(I)

·,
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releasing Share~o~qer from any obligation to Company, with respect to the Debit Balance, the
CAP Se~ces Center ?,alance, any CAP Program expenses, and any am;l all tither matters (ex~ept
for those obligations ·of Shareholqer that arise out of this Agreement); and
(m) Such other documents and instruments as Shareholdt!r pr his counsel may
reasonably require to effectuate or evidence the transactions contemplated hereby.
'•

2.6

Deliveries by Shareholder at Clos_ing. At Closing, Shareholder shall du).y execute
and deliver to Company tlie following documents:
(a)

A certificate. or certificates represeritin.g the Shares, endorsed for transfer
·

qr accompanied by an assignment separate from certificate;

(b)

The Pledge Agreement;

(c)

The s·ecurity Agreement;

(d)

The Consulting Agreement;

(e)

The Noncompeti.ti.on Agreement;

(f)
An assumption agreement, satisfactory in fonn and substal;lce to Company,
relating to the obligations secured by the liens on the Airplanes described m Schedule 2.1~2;

(g)
A certificate sigiied by Shareholder, sa,tisfaetory in form and su~stance tp
Company, certifying the accura..cy on the Closing Date of Shareholder's representations and
warranties contained in Article v below; and
.
(h)
Such other documents and instruments as Company or its counsel may
reasonably require to effectuate or evidence the transactions con.tempfated hereby..

Article

m - Representations and Warranties Regarding Company

To induce Shareholder to enter into and perfori:n this Agreement, Company represents
and warrants to Shareholder as follows:
3.1
Organization and Good.Standing, Each of Company, AIA1 and Farmers is a
corporation duly organized, validly existing !illd in good standing under the laws of the state of
Idaho and has all reqµisite power an,d author~ty to own. lease or opc;:rate: its properties and to carry
on its business as it is nqw being conducted. Universe a domesp.c insurance company duly
organized, validly existing and in good standing under the laws of the state ofldaho and has all
requisite power and authority to own, lease or operate its properties and to carry on its business as it
is now being conducted, Great Fidelity is a stock life insurance company duly organized, validly
existing and in good ~ding under the laws of the state of Indiana and bas aU requisite power and
ai.rthority to owD, lease or operate its properties and to cai-ry on its business as it is now being

is

-5RJT 0000630
000574

I
!

l

1r

conducted. Company and each of its Subsidiaries are duly qualified to do business and are in good
stanO:ing as foreign corporations :ih all jurisdictions w.h.ere th~ ~ure to be so qualified would
materially adversely affect Company or its Subsidiaries. As of the date ofthis Agreeio~nt,
Company oWns all of the outstanding ci;pital stock <;>fUniverse (except for Directors' Qµalifying
SJ:iares)
farmers and Universe owns all of the outstanding capitil stock of AIA1 and Great
fidelity. At Closing; Company will own all of the outstanding capital stock of Universe (except for
Directors' Qtialify1ng Shares), AIAI ~d Farmers, and U.niverse will own aµ of the outstanding
·
·
capital stqc~ of Great Fidelity;

and
I
I
.
I ~ereby.
......
I.~f!
'
and
I

3.2
Power and Authorlty. Company has full co:rp~rate power and authority to · .
execute, deliver and perform this Agr~ei:nent and to c.on~~e the ~actions contemplated
The Company's Bom-Q ofDiI::ectors have duly authori?ed this Agreement and its
.
e:ecution and.de.liYeIJ.:' ~!, C~-In:~2:!'~~ s::1>ject only to (i) ratifi~tion b! Company's shareholders!
/ . ' ·· · (11} consentmlW?M'iil 11 till~- i1 It Iii:~ i;>f Company's Senes A Pref~ed Stock to this
.
Agreement and all other tran~actions incident to the dis.tribution ofFB.mi.er's to Company by
Universe;
(iii) receipt of all required regulatory approvals. Shar~holder covenants a.I).d agrees
to vote his Shares in favor of rati.:Q.ca:ti.on of this Agreement and !111 other transactions lrt9ident to
the distribution of Al.AI to Company by Universe. Upon satisfactiori of such conditio:p.s, this
Agreement shall be a leg~ valid and binding· obligation of Company, enforceable against it in
accordance with it$ terms, except as enforceability may 1'e ljin.ited by bankruptcy, insolvency,
reorgm;ri,.zation or other 'similar laws affectin~ the enforcemimt of creditors• ri,g:l+.ts generally or the
av:aila:bility of eqttjtable rerp.edies subj ec.t to the discretion of the court.

I
I
·1
I
I
I
I
I
I

3.3
Consents: Noncontravention. Assuming satisfaction oftbe conditions set forth in
Section 3.2, th~ execi.,rtion and delivery ofthis Agreement and the performance of the
t+ansacti.ons contemplated hereby will not res~t in a violation of any of the temis or provisions
of the articl~s ofinco:rpora.tion or byiaws Qf Company or any of its Subsidiaries or any
amendments thc;retb, or constitute i;i. violation or default under any indebtedness, .indenture,
mortgage, deed of trust, ;note, bond; license, lease agreement or other material agreement or
instrument to which Company or any ofits Subsidiaries is a party or by wlµch it or any ofits
assets may otherwise be bound, or of any law, rule, license, regulation, judgment,, order, ruling or
decree governing or affecting the operation of Company or:any of its Subsidiaries in any material
respect; nor will the S?Ille constitute an event pennitting termination of any material agreement ·
·or the acceleration of any indebtedness or other liability of Company or any of its Subsidiaries,
with or without notice or lapse of time, or result in the creation .or imposition of any lien upon the
Collateral. No consent, authorization, approval or exemption by, or filing with, any Person or any
Governmental Authority is reqmred in connection with the executiqn., delivery and performance
by Company of this ,Agreement or tbe taking of any action con~empJ.ated hereby~ except where
set forth in Section 3.2(iii) and such have been or shall have been obtained prior to ciosing..
~suming satisfaction of the conditions set forth in Section 3.2, the redemption; of the Shares anq
the other transactions contemplated under this Agreement are not prohibited by and do not
violate l:!IIY insurcmce laws or regulations _of any jurisdiction to wbic.P, Company or any of its
Sq.bsidiaries are subject.

I
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3.4 · Title .to Properties: Encumbrances. Company ow.ns beneficially c;n.d of record, or
~ll at the time. of Closing own beneficially and ofrecord, all of the Pl~dged Shares, .:fre.e and
clear of all pledge~. liens, encumbrances, security intez:estsi equities, c1aiins, options, or
· limitatio:ps on Company's ability to vote such shares or to transfer such.~es to S,b,arehol~er,
except for tl:ie liens in favor of Shareholde+ created in connection with tlie transactions
contemplated by this Agre~m,ep.t and the lieh in favor of Fir~ Interstate upon the First Interstate
Sh~es. Company has full right, title and interest in and to the Plee:igi;:d ~hares_, and full auth.ority
to pledge the Pledged Shi:u:es to Sh8:reholder at Closing as se~utity for the performance .~f
Company's obligations to Shareholder arising under the.Note and this Agreement All of the
Pledged Shares have been du:ly authori.Zed and validly issued, and art'. fully paid and
nonassessab.le.!' At Closing, Shareholder villi have a first priority, pc;:rfected se.curity interest in
the Pledged Shar~ oth~ than the First :µiterstate Shares. There; are no options, warrants, ¢alls,
subscriptions, rights, agreements, commitr;nents Or understan~gs .of any nature that pall for the
.issuance, sale,: pledge or other disposition of any Pledged Shares .r;>r whichimtitie au:y pe1son to
acquire such sb.B:res, other than those rights ~sing under this Agreement The Coi;npany has
good and marke~ble title to, free and Clear of any lie:µ or encum.brances other than those
disclosed on Schedule 2.1.2 or Schedule 3.4 atta:~hed hereto, and full power and authorify to
transfer, (1) tb.e Airplanes, (2) tlie CAP Prog'ram Tangible Property, and (3) the Commissions.
Capitalizatiqn. There are 1,000,000 shares of capital stock ofUnivei;se
outstanding, 999,99$ of which are owned beneficially and ofrec0rd by Co~pany, and the
4,940,490 shares of capital
remaining five of which are Dil'ectors'·Qualifying Shares. There
stock of Gteat Fidelity outstm.iding, all of which ~ owned beneficially and of record by
3.5

are

Universe,
3.6
Financial Condition. The con.solidated :financial statements of Company ~d its
Subsidiaries for the years ended December 31, 1994i 1993 anq 1992 i:;n.d for the quarter cir).ded
March 31, 1995 attached hereto as Schedule 3.6 .(the "Financ.ial Statf?inerit;s") present fairly tjie
.:fuianciai condition and results of operations and changes in financial position of Company and
its Subsidiaries as of such respective dates and for the resp~ctive period~ then ~Iided. in
conformity with GAAP applied on a consi~tent baSis, and since March 31, 1995 no material
adverse changes have occµJ:red affecting the consolidated.financial condition of Company and its
Subsidiaries.
.
3. 7
Litigation. Tuer~ ar~ no claims, actio~, suits, proceedings or investigations
pendmg or, to the best of Company's knowledge, tln:eatened against or relating to Company or
any ofits Subsidiaries, at law o:i: in equity before or by any Govemmental Authority, nor has ~Y
such aetion, suit, proceediri.g or investigation been, to the best of Company's knowiedge, pending
since the commencement of the period covered by the Financial Statements; except as s~t forth
on Sch.edule 3. 7 hereto. Neither Company rior any of it.S Subsidi~es is. in default with respect to
any adjudicatory order, writ, injunctjon or decJ;ee of any Governmental Authority. Neitbe:t;"
Company nor any of its Subsidiarie~ is a party to any c~ase BJ:J.d desist order, supervisory
agreement or arrangement, consensual or qtherwise; with any Government~! Authority, except as
set forth on Schedule 3~7.
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3.8
Taxes. Company ~d its Subsidiaries have file~ all state, county, local and federal
tax and other .rettirns and reports that they are required, to file l 1. resp~ct of all taxes, assessm~nts,
levies, lic~nse and registration fe~s, charges or withholding~ c;>f any p_ature whatsoever shd'wn by
such returns to be, or that are otherwise; due and payable, iricludfu.g, Without liriritatio:ri, income;
business and occup::i.tion, ~emplbym.ent, social security, withholding, excise and workers'
·
con:;pen.Sation taxes and assessments ("~axes''), and to the e~errt l.ts liabilitie8 for Taxes as of
ClOsing have not been fully discharged, full and complete reserves have been eStablished on the
March 31, 1995 balance sheet included in. the Financial Statements. Neithe~ Company nor any of
its Subsidiaries is in default in the payment of any Taxes du~ or payable or of any asse~sments
received in respect thereof.
3.9
Conwliance with Laws, ~ach of Co~pany and its Subsidiaries is in complian~e
in all material respects with all fede~al, state and local laWs, statiites, rules, regulations a:iid orders
of all Governmental Authorities material to its-business; a.iid all required registration,s and othc;:r
filings by or on l:iehalf'of Company and each of its Subsidiaries with all Governmental
Authorities are materially true and coµiplete and are current and validly l.n force; all pennits and
licenses required in connection With the operation oftlle Company's b~iness at the business of
its Subsidiaries have been obtained and are current and val.idly in force; and neither the Company
nor any of its Subs:ldiaries have received any notice that it is in violation of any laws, regulations
or orders.

3..10 Brokers;.Finders. Etc. All negotiations relating to this Agreement and the.
transactions contemplated hereby have been carried on without ~e interventio:r+ of ~Y person
acting on behalf of the Company in such rp.a:imer a,s to give rise to any valid c~ against the
Company or Shareholder for any brokerage or finder's fee, commission:_ or similar
compensation.
3.11 Defaults. Neither Compl[ID.y nor any of i"t;s St;1bsidia.ries is in violation of any of
the terms or provjsibns of its articles ofll;:icoxpora:tion or bylaws or ariy am~ndn+ents thereto, or in
violation or default under any fudebtednes~, indentrire, mortgage, deed of trust, note, bond,
license, lease agreement or other material agreement or insttUmeJ?.t to which C¢Iilp~y or any of
its Subsidiaries is a party or by which it or any of i~ assets may otherwise be bound, or of any
law. rule, license, regulation, judgment, or~er, ruling or decre~ governing or affecting the
operation of Company or any of its Subsidiaries in any material respect, except as disclosed on
Schedule 3.11 attached hereto; and exc~pt as disclosed on S~hedule 3.11$ nb circumstance· exists
which constitutes an eve;nt pennittirig termination of any material agreement or the ac~eleratfon
of any indebtedness or other liability of Company or any of its Subsidiaries, wit:p or without
notice or lapse of time, or which could re~ult in the creation or imposition of any. lien upon the
Collateral. Neither Company nor any of its Subsidiiµies is in violation of any iri~ance laws or
regulations of
jurisdiction to which Company or- any of its Subsidiaries are subject.

any

Article IV -Representations and Warranties ofShareholder

and

To induce Company to ~p.ter into
perform~ Agreement, Shareholder repteser.i;t~
and Warrants to Company as follows: Shareholder owns the Shares free and clear of all pledges,
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liens, encumbrances, securizy interests, equities, claims, optio.ns (other than the option c;iriginally
gr.anted to Centennial Life Insurance ~o:i:npany, later assigned to Company and exercised
pursuant to this Agreement), or limitations~µ Shareholder's ability to vote the Slu!t~s or to
transfer ¢.e Shares to Company. Shar.eholder has full tight, ti.ti~ and interest in and to the Shares.
To the best of Shareholder's. actual knowledge, Withqut investig_ati?n or inquiry, the
.
repre$entations and warranties of C6mpany made in Sections 3~6, 3.7 and 3.8 h~eof
true and
correct :in all m.a~erial respects.

are

Article V - Covenants

5.1

Covenants of Company.: Campany h.ereby covenants to Shareholder that until the
earlier of (i) the stibstitution of Bonds having a !Jlarket.value equal to the principal amount of the
Note m;id a weighted maturity date of the note, for th.e other Collateral in accorda:nc~ with the
requirements of Section 1O(i) of the Pledge Agreement, or (ii) the payment in full of the Note, it
will perform and observe the following cove~ants:
Company wjll pro:vide S~holder With quarterly financial statements,
p:repared in accordance with GAAP; within 45 days of the entj of each :fiscal quarter;
(a)

Company will provide annual audited :fi:ci.m;i.cia.I statements, prepared in
accordance with GAAP, within 150 days of the end of each fisi:al year;
(b)

( c)
As of the last day of each calendar month, Company shall maintain
retained eamlligs, calculated in accordance with GAAP consisten~y applied, equal to or greater

than the accounts at closing.
(d)
As of the last day of each calendar montb, Company shall maintain
working capital {current assets less ctm"ent liabilities), calculated in accordance with GAAP
consistently applied, equal to at least $500;000;
As of the last day of each calendar month, Company shall maintain a ratio
of current assets to current liabili.ties, calculated in accordance with GAAP c@nsi~tently applied,
·
equal to at least 1. l-to-1 ; .
(e)

(f)
As of the last day of each calendar month, Company. shall maintain .a ratio
of Consolidated Long Term Debt-to-Consolid.ateQ. Net Worth (as such te:r;rns are defined in
Section 4.2. l 0 of the Company's Articles of Incorporation, as amendep as of the date hereof {the
'!Articles"}) equal to at le.ast 3.6-to-1 excluding Note payable tq Shareholders;
(g)
The fulanCial ~ondition of Company will at all times meet any regulatory
requirements applicable to Company;

(h)

Company will not loan funds to any affiliate otb~r than wholly-owned

Subsidiaries or as authorized by eXisting Articles of lncorporation, or to pay loan reimbursement
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(i)
Company will not mortgage, pledge, subject to lien or otb.~ encumbrance,
sell, assign ot transfer (i) Collateral or (tl) any qtb.er ~ateri~ assets of Company or any of its.
Subsicliarie~ having a fair market v~ue of more than $ioo,QOO with respect to any particular
tr:ari.saction, or an aggregate fair ~arket value of more than $200,000 with re~ect to cumulative
transactions within any twelve (12) month period, except those transactions in the ordina,ry
course of business, without fust obtaining .Shareholder's written cqnsent, which consent shall not
be upr~asonably. withh~ld; nor shall Company fail to take all reasonable steps necessary tq
maintain its .customer and client base and all othe~ intm~ole a.Ssets;

I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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to John Taylor for incoi:p.e tax liabilities attributable to the 1988 reorganiz.atlon oftb.e Company
incident to shareholder's divorce;

G)
ColIY'any will use its best efforts to r;:ause Shareholder, or a designee of
Sharehl;ilder reasonably acceptable to Company, to be el~cted to Company's Board of Directors;
(k)
CoQJ.pany will permit, and cause each of ~ts Subsidiari~s to permit,
Shareholder, or a designee of Shareholder reasonably acceptaqle to Company, to have full access
to its premises and to all properties, books, contracts, commitments aµd records With. respect to
each such company's business, property and personnel as Sfiareholder or its representatives.may
from time to ti.me request;
I'

Company shall ensure that no additional shares of capital stock are issued
by Universe, Fanners, AIAI or Great Fidelit:y;
(l)

(m)
Company shall calJ a :meeting of its common shareholders for
of ratifying this Agree.ll;lent and the transactjops contemplated h~by;

the ptnposes

(n)
Company shall ~e all steps nece~sazy to ensure that it has the funds
necessary tp. pay the Down Payment a,t Closing;

CQmpany shall use its best efforts to obtain and deliver, as soo:n after the
(o)
Closi.ilg as possible, but in ;no event later than the con~ummation of a pu~lic offering by the
Company, Bonqs meefuig the requirements set forth in the Pledge Agreement, and, to the extent
permissible under applicable insuran~e laws and regulations, will use any net proceeds from the
sale of Great Fidelity or its asset~, anO. any net proceeds from any public offering of Company
stock, tc:iward the purchase oftb.e Bonds; and
5.2

Covenants of the Parties

5.2.J Publicity. Each party hereto agrees that it will not, except as otherwise
required by applicable law or regulations, issue any press releas.e or make any public statement or
disclose any information regarding this Agreement and the transactions contemplated :hereby, or
permit any of its officers, directors or employees to ~o so, un,le~s the form an~ content of any
sach press refease, statement or disclosure and the time of the; release th~reofhas been approved
in advance by the other party her~to.
-10.
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5.2. 2 Cooperatio'n. ~ch party will fully· qooperate 'With the. other party and
such other party's advisor~ ~ connection with any steps required to be taken as part of its
obligations hereunder, and ~ use its b~st efforts to catise all conditions to Clo~ing to be
satisfied as promptly as possible and to obtain all co:nSents and approvals ~~essary for such
patty's due and punC;tua.I perfo~ance of the Agreement and for the sati~faction of the conditions
hez::eof ori. its part to be satisfied; and 'Will execute and deliver, or caus.e to be executed and
delivered, such additional reasonable documents and instrunlents and do, or 9ause to be do~e, all
reasonable tbir;igs ne·cessary, prop~r or 8:dvisable under apppcable fa.w to conswPma,te and make .
effective the transactions contettiplat~d hereby.
.
Arti<;le VI - litdenuiifictition

6.1
Indemnificatipn of Shareholder iind Company. Each party h;rflto ("Indemnifying
Party") lieteby agrees to defend, indei:np:ify and hold harmless. th~ other. party hereto and each of
~ch other party's affiliates, successors, a.Ssigns, o:ffi~ers, directors, shareholders and employees
(''Indei;nni:fied Parties'') from and against and in respect of any apd all costs, losses, clalllw..
liabilities, fines~ penaltic~. damages and· expenses (~clucli,ng, without liniitation, court costs and
reasonable fees and disbursem~ts of counsel .and account;mts) in~~d by an Ind,enmmed Party
in any a,ction commenced by a third party in connection with or arising out of any breach or
~eged preach of any representatiQD, warranty or covenant made by the Indemnifying Party in
this Agreement
6.2
Indemrii:ficatic;m Pro~dure. Promptly after receipt by an Indemnified Party of
notice of the coz:Qmencement of any action by a tl$'d. party covere9 by this Article VI, such
Indemni£.ed Party s};all notify the Inde~g Party in, 'Writing of the copunencement thereof,
provided; however, that ari.y delay by ¢.e IndemDi:fied Party in so notifying the Indemnifying
Party shall not relieve the Indemnifying Party of any liability to the Indemnified Paity hereunder,
except to the extent the;: Indemnifying Party is materially and adversely prejudiced by such delay.
'J;he Indemnifying Party, by delivery ofvni.tten notice to th~ Indemnified Party within 30 days of
receipt. Of.notice 9f cl~ to indemnity from the I,nden:m,ified Patty, ~y elect to contest such
claim, action or proceediii.g at the ;rndenm,.ifying Partjr' ~ ~~ense and by cdunsel of its crwn
choosing. If the Indemnifying Party does not ele~t to contest such claim; action or proceeding,
the Indemnified Party shall have the right-to proseeute, defend, compromise, settle or pay any
cl~ at the Indemnifying Plllfy''s expense. If the Ind6nni5ed Party .requests in vni.ting that s'uph.
claim, action 9r proceeding ;IlQt be c~n~ested, then it shall not be conteSfed, but shall not be
covered by the indemnities provided herein. The Indemnifying Party m.ay settl~ an i:nde~able
matter that it has duly elected to contest with the consent of :the Indemnified Party, after
deliverih.g a written description df the .pr~posed settlement to, and receiving. consent from, the
Indemnified. PBrtr: In the event that the ~de.tnni:fieri Party dec'lines io consent tci a bona fide
settlement acceptable to the claimant, the Inde~ed Party ~haU have I+.O right to
indenmification beyond the am9unt of the proposed s·ettlement. The Indt?mnified Party shall
cooperate with t4e Indemnifying Party in connec:f:ion with anY mattei; or claim for
.fudeinni:fication.
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Article VllI - Termination. and Default

r

8.1
Termination of tbe AiueemenfPrior to· the Clomng. Date. This Agr~ement may be
terminated at
time prior to the Cfosing Date:

any

I
I

I
I
I
I
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(a)

.

by m~ cio~ent of the p~es hereto;

at the electj.on of either party to this Agreement upon writt.en notice to the
other party it it ~become reaso:p.a.bly~ obj ectivc;:ly certain that any condition rc;qtrlred to be
sati.sfie<;i plJI'SllaI1:t to Article Vll hereof, ath~. than a condition that is reasonably within 'the
electing parly's co~trol, will nqt be satjsfied an or prior to Closing Date;
· ·
(b)

by Shareholder ifthere l;i.a.s been .a ~erial viol~tion or breach by
Company of any agreement, ;represen.tatian or w~ contained in this Agre.emen± that has
rendered the sa:tisfaction of any condition ta the ob-ligation of S.Qareholder impossible .;ind such
violation or breach .l;ias not been waived by Shareholder; or
(c)

(d)
by Company ifthere has been a material violation or Preach by
Shareholder of any agi;eement, representation or w~ty contam.ed in this Agreement that ~
rendered the satj.sfac#on of any condition to the obligatipns of Company impossible and such
violation or breach bas not been wa,ived by Compa;iy. ·

.

8.2

Defaults Uni:ler the A~eement. "Event of Default," wherever used herein, means

any one of the following events:

Company shall fail to pay any _interest or any other amount payable to
(a)
Shareholder or his successor(s) or assign(s) pur~uant to the Note, when cuicl as the same bec9mes
dl.ie and i.n accordance with its teons, and such failure continues for five (5) days foliowi,ng the
due d~te;
(b)
Company shall fail to obs~rve or perfomi any term, covenant or agreement
of Company in this Agreement, and such failure shall not have been cured witP.in thirty 00) day~
following written ~oti.ce thereof from Shareholder; '
(c)
Any repr~sentation or wan:anty made by Cqmpany .herein or in connection
With fbis Agreement that shall prove to have been incorrect when made or deemed ~ade, and
~uxe shall not have beep. made withj.n thirty. (3 0) days of written notice thereof from Sha:t:eholder;

(d)
Company shall default Un.d~r the. Nate, th~ Pledge Agreement, the Security
Agreement, the Consulting Agreement, or the Noncompetitia.ri Agreement after the expiration of
any applicable c"Qre period;·
(~)
Company Qr any of its m~eriaI Subsidiaries shall make a general
assignment for the be.pefit of creditors or shall bec;ome insolvent;
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(f)
Company or any of its material Subsidiaries shp]J be the subject of, or the
d,ebtor in, any bankruptcy, reorganization, receivership, compromise, arrangement, insolvency,
readjµstment o:f debt, dissolution or liquidation case or proc;eeding under any law; whether now
or hei:eafter in ~ffect, of any jurisdiction; or
(g)

I
I

of the Compapy' s preferred stock:, or any other

83
Remedies for Default. Upon the occUIIence of any Event of Default or at aiiy'
time t:p.erea.fter, if any Ev~t of Default i~ then continuing, Shareholder may, without notice (or
without ~er notice, if initial notice was required pursuant to Section 8.2 above), in his
discretion:

I
I
I

(a)
decl~e the entire unpaid balani;:e of principal- anc:l interest under the Note
immediately due and payable by Company, without presentment, demand, protest or any notice
of any kfud, all of wJµch are hereby expressly waived by Company;
(b)
subject to the requirements of applicable law then in effect, proceed to
enforce this Agreement or any document contemplated hereby by e~ercising such rem:edies as are
available thereunder or in respect thereof under applicable law, whether for damages, speci:fic
performance of anx cov~t or other agreemen~ or in the exercise of any power granted herein
o:r in the documents contemplate~ hereby;

I
'I

(c)
in addition to the exercise of an! rights now or her~after existing under
applicable law, exercise all rights of a secured creditor under thi;: Uniform ColI11Ilercial Code in
all relevant jurisdictions, and proceecl to protect and enforce its rights hereunder or realize on any
o.r all security granted pursuant h,ereto pr Under the Pledge Agreement, the Sec.urity Agreement or
the Note in any manner or order he deems expedient without regard to any equitable principles of
rruµshaling or otherwi~e; and/or

I
I
'I
I
I

(d)
give wr:i,tten mitice to Company of his desire to become "agent of record"
for all farm association trusts and/or policies for which Company or any of its Subsidiaries, at the
time of giving' of such notice, serves as agent ofrecord. Upon receipt of Sl,lch notice, Company
shall promptly deliver written nonce, in fonn and substan~e satisfactory to Shareholder, to all
such t!:Usts, policy hold~rs C!lld other appropriate parties Qf the appointmen~ of Shareholder as
.agen~ o:f reeo;td.

,

..

I
I

F~ Interstate, the holders

material oblig~e of Company sh.all 'have taken any remedial action, against Company following a
default in the fulfillment of Company's obligations toward any ~ch obligee and such default
shall continue without being cured within any applicable grace period or waived by the obligee
in writing,
.

Article IX - General

9.1
Survival of Representations and Warranties. The ~esentations, warranties,
covenants an.d ~em¢n.ts of the parties set forth in this A~ement, including th.e exhibits a,nd
schedules hereto, and in any written representation and E!XlY ancillary document contemplated
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hereby, and the provisions of Article VI regarding inderrmi~cation and rele~e of claims, shall
survive Olpsing until the later of (i) tbr~e years following Closing pr (ii) :final payment by
Company in full satisfaction qfthe N"ote.

9.2
Amendments and Waiv.ers. The .Provisions of this Agreeinentmay be amended
only by the :written agreemen! of the parties hereto. E~cept as otherwise provided herein, any
waiver, permit, consent or approval of any kind or character o:p. tlie part of either party of any
provision o~ condition of this Agreement must be zp.ade .iii writing imd shall be effective only to
the extent spe~iiically set forth in su_ch writing. No ac;ion tak:~n pursuant to this. Agreement,
iri.~lud:ing any investigation by or o,n behalf of either party, sha:.ll be deemed.to co:QStitut~ a waiver
by the p~ taking 5uch action of compliance with any representation, wmranty, covenant or
agr~ement contained herein. The waiyer by any party h~ret6 of a breach of any provisi9n of this
Agreemen;t shall not operate or be constrqed as a waiver of any subsequent breach.
Parties in Inter~st. This Agreement ~hall inure to the bene::qt of the parties hereto
and shall be binding upon the parties hereto and their respective heirs, personal representatives.
succ.es·sors and assigns. Except to the extent expressly stated in this Agreement, nothing in this
Agr~ement is intended to confer any rights or remeqies on any Person other than the parties
hereto, nor is anything in this Agre~ent intend~d to relieve or discharge the obligation or
:liability of any third party. nor shall any provision give any third par\Y any right of Sl,lbrog~on
or action against any party to this Agreement.
9.3

9.4
Notices. All notices, requests, ~emands and other commun1cations that are
required to be or may be give~ under this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be deemed to
have been duly given when del.ivered in person or transmitted by telex, facsimile, cable or
telegrani. or by certified or registered :first class mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, to
the respective parties as follo"V't'.5:
If to Company, to:
AIA Service~ Corporation
One Lewis Clark Plaza

Lewiston, Idaho 83591
Attention: John Taylor

With a, copy to:
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered
300.Nortli Sixth Street
P.O. Box 1368
Boise, Idaho 83701-1368
Att~ntion:

Ric.hard Riley .
.
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Iftci Shareholder, to:

.<:

Reed J. Taylor
P.O. Box ll65
Lewiston, I~aho

~3501

With a .copy to:
Cairncross & Hempelmann
70th Floor, Columbia Center·
701 Fifth Avenue
Seattle~ WA 98104-7016
Attention: Scott Bell
or to such other address as any party may have :furnished to th~ otP.ers in writing in accor~ce
herewitl4 except thaf notices of change of add:!ess shall be effective only upon receipt.

9.5
Rerriedies· Cumulative. All rights and remedies of Shareholder shall be
cum:Ula:tive an~ may exe~cised at such times and in such order as Shareholder determines. The
failure of ShareJiolder to insist upon or enforce strict performance Qf a,ny provision of this or any
related agreement, or fo exercise the rights or privileges hereu.nder or tliereu.nd~r or any .of its
rights as provid~d by statute or l~w or in equity or otherwise, shall not impair, pz:ejudice or
co.nStitute a waiver of any such right, power, remedy or privilege or be constructed as a waiver of
any default hereunde~ or thereunder or as an acqi!rle~cence therein or preclude the exercise or
enforceme~t thereaf at a later time. Nor shall any single or partial ex:e;rcise of any such right,
power, remedy or privileges preclude any 0¢.er or further exercise of any other right. power,
ren:i~dy or privilege.

be

I

,,.

f?eyerability. The invalidity of all or any part of any section of this Agreement
9.6
shall not render inyalid the remainder of this Agreement or the remainder of such section. If any
provision ofthis Agreement is so broaq as to be unenforceable, such provision shall be
interpreted to be only s~ broad as is enforceable.
9.7
Construction. Singular and plural forms, as the case may be, of the terms defined
in Article I above, or of the capitalized terms Q.efined els.ewhere in this Agreement, have
correlat,ive meanings. Any defined term that relates to a documentinclqdes within its definition
any amendments, modifications, renewals, restatements, extensions, supplements or substitutions
that may heretofore have been or that may hereafter be executed in accordance with the terms
theteof anq as may be permitted by this Agreement.
..
9.8
Headinis. The section and other beadings contained in this Agreement are for
reference purposes only and shall not be deemed to be a part of this Agreement or to affect the
meaning or interpretation of.this Agreement
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9.9
Governing Law: Service of Process. The validity, meaning and effect of this
Agreement shall be determined in accordBI).ce with tPe laws oftb.e Stq.te ofidaho. The parties
hetel?y agree that delivery or :ma.iUng of any_proc;:ess or other papers 4i the manner provided in
Section 9.4 above, or in such other manner as may be pe.rmitted by 1a,w, shall be valid and
·
. sufficient service thereof.
9 .10 ;Entire Agreement. 'Pris Agreement, including the exhibits and schedules and ·
anc:illary documents expressly referr~d to herein that foim a part hereof: constitute tPe entire
agreement of the parties concerning the matters referred to herein and super:;iede ajl prior
agreements arid understandings, oral or written, all of which are hereby superseded and canceled.
9.11

Exhibits and Schedules.

Exhibit A
ExhibitB
Exhibit c

ExhibitD
ExlnoitE

ExluoitF
Exhibit G
Schedule 1
Schedule 2.1.2

Schedule 2.1.3
Schedule 3 .4
Schedule 3.6
Schedule 3. 7
Schedule 3.11
Schedule 5.1

Note
Pledge AgrecmJ.ent
Security Agreement
Consulting Agreement
Noncotnpetition Agreement
:Sill of Sale
FoIIll ofCompany"s Counsel's Opinion
Definitions
Airpkmes
Allocation of Redemption Price
Liens and Encumbrances
Financial Sta:teinents
Litigation
Demults
Financial Complian~e Levels and Ratiosj Exceptio.ru: to
Covenants

9.12 Execution.in Counfewarts. This .A.grf;lement may be executed in any nu,mber of
counterparts, each of which when so executed and delivered shall be deemed an original. and
such counterpart together shall constitute one instrument

DATED the first day entered above .

COM'.PANY:
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SHAREHOLDER:

REED J. TAYLOR

20781 OE.M44
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ADDENDUM TO STOCK REDEMPTION AQREE:MENT

This Addendum to Stock Rcdomption Agreement (this "Addendum'') fa mcde and enter
into by and between AIA Services CO!,Poration, and Idaho corporation (.:Company"), and Reed J

Taylor ("Shareholder'~.
Redta/s

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I·

A
Company and Shareholder have entered .into that certain Stock Redemption
Agreement (the ••Agreement") of even date herewith.
.In connection with the stock redemption, 'the parties have agreed to entet .iri:to a
Consulting Agreement {the "Consulting Agreement').

B.

C.
By this Addendum, Company and Shareholder wish to set forth certain changes •
and add.itiorl!i to the Agreement and the Co~ulting Agreement.
Agreement
For good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby
aclmowlcdgcd, ~ p~cs agree as follow.s:

·-nown.

1.
Section 2.1.2 ofthe Agreement is hereby amended to provide that the
Payment" in the amount of One Mil1ion Five ~undred Thoui;and no!lari;: ($1,500,000) shall be
paid in the form of a promissory note (the "Down Payment Note'') to be delivered to $harehol ·
upoll !he cxci.ul.iu.u uf U.U.:1 AUrkntlum. Tht: Down P!i.ymenL NoLt: shall be an unsecured, interest·
free note due and payable in fW.1 on the date which is 90 days from the date of execution of this
Addendum.. The Note shall bear default interest at the rate of fourteen (14) percent. Section 2.4
of the Agreement is hereby cha:oged to state that the Closing Date shall be such date as the
parties may establish by agreement, but such date shall in no ev~t be later than August 15, 1995
2.
In consideration of Shareholder's willingness to accept the Down Payment Note
in lieu of a cash payment, the Company hereby agrees to continue to employ Shareholder and to
pay him a. monthly salary equal to Twet\ty Tho.wand Dollars ($20,000) per month until the
Down Payment Note and any default interest whlcb may accrue thereupon is paid in full.
Notwithstandjng anything contained in the <.:onsulting Agreement, the Consulting Agreement
shall not commence until SharcbOlder' s employment by Company is terminated upon the
repayment in full of the Down Payment Note. In. the event such commencement date is later
the dnte of execution of the Consulting Agreement, tho tcmi. of the Co.D.Sultiug A~t:.w.t:nl s.h.a1.i .
nevertheless extend for a full three (3) year period from such revised commencement da:te.

,..

:

Also- in consideration of this Addendum, l!omp111ny hereby agrees to pay in full,
upon execution of this Addendum, all of Shareholder's attorneys fees and costs in~ed in
3.

~'

1;
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1.
I
connection with the negotiation of the Agreement, this Addendum and all ancillary docuroentS, .
the production of such documents, and the transactions contemplated by such documents.

I
·1
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
:1 _.
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~Aiw~~t1t' ;1995.
COMPANY:

AJA SERVICES CORPORATION .
•.

·-:.

.·

SHAREHOLDER:

.

F.EED·J. TAYLOR

·-·
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Exhibit A
PROMISSORY NOTE

$ 6,000,000

-~---'f''J;::.:.._--'---'' 1995

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, NA Services Corporation; an Idaho corporation ("AJA''),
hereby promises to pay to the order of Reed J. Taylor (the "Payee) the principal sum of Six
Million Dollars ($6,000,000) together with accrued interest on tlle unpaid principal balance from
the date hereof ata per anntim rate equal to eight and one quarter percent (8Y.1%).
This Note is the Promissory Note referred to in, and is entitled to tb,e benefits of: the
Stock Redemption Agreement (~e "Red~mption Agreement") ~ated as of
~1- '.
1995 between AIA and Pay~. 'Terms used but hot definedherem have the me · g given to
eacl! such term in the Redemption Agreement. This Note is secured by the Stock Pledge
Agreement by and between AlA and :Payee, and by the Security Agreement by and bet-.veeh AIA
and Payee, each of even date h_erewith (the "Stock Pledge Agreement" and the "Security
Agreement," respectively), to which reference is ma.de for a description of the collaierai subject
thereto.

J anh:.

(

Payments of interest only shall be made: monthly in.la\¥ful money oft.he United States in
immediately available funds commencing one month from the date hereof at the address. of Payee
to which notices ar~ to be sent pursuant to the ti:::rms of the Redempti9n Agreement, or at such
other place as the holder hereof shall designate in writing. The entire balance of all principal and
any accrued but unpaid interest shall be di.le and payable on the tenth anniverSa.i.--y of the date of

this Note.

This Note may not be prepaid in whole or in part without the prior mitten consent of

l
I

:,.,.~'

I
I
I
I
I
ll

Payee.

It is expressly provided that if (i) a Q.efault is made in the punctual payment of monthly
interest hereunqer and continues for more thari five (5) business days after the receipt of written ·
iiotice of such default, or (ii) a defuult occurs under the Stock Pledge Agreement or Security
Agreement, or the Consulting Agreement or Noncompetition Agreement betwee_n A).A and
Payee, and such default continues after the expiration ofany applicable cure period, or an Event
ofD,efault under the Redemption Agreement occurs and AIA fails to cure the same. within thirty
days·.after the receipt of written notice of such defq.ult, then the entire remaining unpaid balance
of pri.nci°pal and all interest accrued t:h.ereori may, af th¢ option of the holder hereof: be declared
to be irrunediately due and payable with.out notice (the "Acceleration") and the lien given to
secure its payment may be foreclosed.

EXHIBITB
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,...This Note is subordinate to the payment of the redemption obligatioru owed by Company
to Donna Taylor pursuant to that certain Jetter agreement dated January 11, 199~, signed by
Company, Payee, Donna Taylor and Cumer Green.
Except as otherwise expressly provided herein, the undersigneq and all endorsers and all
persons liable or to become liable on this Note hereby (a) waive diligence, presentment, demand,
protest, and notice of any kind, (b) consent to ap.y and all renewals aod extensions in the time of
payment hereof, (c) waive any right to offset agaiJ!st amounts due to Pay~ hereunder any
amounts due to the undersigned pursuant to the Red.emption Agreement or any agreement (or
exhibit thereto) liSted therein, and (d) agree that at any time the terms of payment hereof may be
modified or security released, without meeting tbe lial;>ilify of any party to this Note or ofany
person liable or t~ become lia1;>1e with respect to any indebtedness eVidenced hereby.

In the event this Note is placed in the hands of an attorney for collection; or suit is
brought on the .Same, or the sa,me is collected through bankruptcy or other.judicial proceedings,
then the undersigned agrees ·and promises to pay reasonable attorney fees and qollection costs
incurred in connection therewith, incl:uding all out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the holder
hereof, with or vrithout suit, on ~ppeal or in bankruptcy or ctlier insolver;icy proceedings.
AIA acknowledges receipt of the following notice: .

•

ORAL AGREEMENTS OR ORAL COM?)1ITMENTS TO LOAN MONEY,
ExrEND CREDIT, O.'R TO ll'OR.}lEARFROM ENFORCING REPAYMENT OF A
DEBT ARE NOT ENFORCEABLE UNDER IDAHO LAW.

I

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION

I
!35679B.M44
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August 15, 1995

Tl!Lll~Ol'lll:

(l!&•J ~·H:llll
jl'ACSIMILS:
(~344-....lt

.JAMa. &..,. 8C"'-'H
0-- C:OV"'"L

T. tt. E•-c 11aaa-1M~J

Reed J. 'l'aylor
P.O. Box 538
I,.ewiston Jl) 8350 l

Re:

Common Stock Redemption

I

.Dear Mt. Taylor:

'Ibis opinion is being de.livered to you pursuant to Section 2.S(j) of the Stock Redemption
Agreement dated July 22, 1995 ( •Agreement") by and between AJA Services Corporation, an
Idal10 COIPoration ("Company") and Reed J. Taylor. All c;:apitalized te.rms not defined herein
shall have the respective meanings ascribed to them in the Agreement. The phrase "Tn.nsaction
Documents" refers colloetively to the Agie.ement, together with tbe Note, the Pledge~nt,
the Security Agreement, the Consulting Agreement and the Noncompetition Agreement, as such
documents are defined in the Agreement.

we have acted u general counsel for the Company in connection with the transactions
contempblted by the Agreement. As wch general counsel, we have assisted in the negotiation,
and have examined executed counterparts (or photostatic copies of cxecutt.d counterparts) of the
Agreement and other Transaction Dl'lcumcnts.
Jn addition, we have ex.Wned originals, executed counteiparts or copies of such
agreements, coiporate records, instruments and certificates., certificates of public authorities and ·
such maucr.s of law as we bave deemed neteswy for the purpo.sc of rendering the opiniom set
forth herein. To the extent we deemed necessary for the purpos~ <>f this opinion, we have
relied upon (i) the statements and representations of the Company as to factual matters, (il) the
corponte records provided to us by the Company, and (iii) certificates and other documents
obtained from public officials. We have further relied as to fa.ctnal matters on the J"e.PieseDtations
and warranties contained in the Agreement and the other Transaction Documtnts (including,
without limitation, Mr. Taylor's representations in Article IV of tbe Agreement) 811d on the
Company's representations in Sclledule m (attached) to the Agreement; and we ha.ve aaswned
the completeness and accuracy of all $uoh representations and warranties u to factual matters.
We have assumed the genuineness of all signatures (other than tbo.se of the Company), the legal
capacity of Mr. Taylor to execute the Agmmient and all other documents we have reviewed,
1lle authenticity Qf all documents submitted to us as originals, and the conformity to original
documents of all documents submitted to us as certified, photostatic, reproduced or conformed
copie3. We have further assumed tha' the Agreement and the other Tram1action Documents bave

,
i

'
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been duly antbori7.ed, executed and delivered by Mr. Taylor and are enforceable ftBainsl him in
acccrdance with their respective terms, and that the execution~ delivery and performance of the
. Agreement and the other Tl'aosaction Documenu by Mr. Taylor does not and will not result in
· a breach of, or constitute a default under, any agreement, instrument or other document to which
Mr. Taylor is. a party, or any order, judgment, writ or decrea applicable to such party to which
~. Taylor's property js subject.

Whenever our opinion with respect to the existence or absence of facts is indicated. to be
based on ,OW' knowledge, we are referring to the actual knowledge of R. M. Turnbow and
Richard A. Riley, who ue the sole atto~ in Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlvr.en.
Chartered who have represented the Company during the course of our .representBtion mthis
transaction. Except as expressly set forth ~crein, we have not undertaken any independent Ieaal
or :tactual inv~tigation to determine the existence ot absence of such facts, and no inference u
to our knowledge of the existence or absence of such facts should be dxawn from such
representadon.

the

&scd upon and subject t.o our examination and assumptions as aforesaid and subject to
qualifications here.i.nafter set forth, we are of the opinion that, except as set forth in the

attached Schedule m and/or the Schedules attached te> the Agreement:
l.

The Company is a corporation duly organized and validly existing under

the laws of the State of ldaho. Based solely on the attached Certificates of Corporat5 Status
issued by the Idaho Sccmtary of State, the Company, Tlle Universe Life Insurance Company
("Universe"), AJ.A Insurance, Joo. ("AIAl") and Farmers Health Alliance Administtators, Inc.
("Farmers") are cotpoiations incorporated under the cmporation laws of the State. of Idaho and
in good standing on the recorm of the Idaho Secret.ary of State.

.1-

2.
The Company and its Subsidiaries have full co:tpOrate power and authority
to enter into, execute a:Dd deliver the TraruJactions Documents and to perform their respective
obligations thereunder; all corporate actlon on the part of Company and its SUbsidiaries, and
their respective direeton and shareholders, necessary fol' the authorlzatlon, execution, delivery
and performance by Company and it.$ Subsidiaries of the Transaction Documents and the
consummation of the traosactions' contemplated thereby has been ta.ken; and the Transaction
Documems have been duly execured and delivered by Coanpany and its Subsidiaries, The
Transaction Documents constitute the valid and binding obligation of ·Company and iu
Subsidiaries enfor~le against thein in acoor<lanca with their respective tetnls. e:xcept that
enforceability may be limited by (a) applicable bankruptcy, insolvency, momtmium,

reorganization, fraudulent transfer, receivership, co,iservatorsbip or similar Jaw& affecdng
creditor's rights ge.nenilly, (b) the exercise of judicial disaetion in accordance with geneml
principles of equity (whether applied by a court of law or equity) and (c) cons.Ide.rations of public
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policy.

3.
Neither the execution and deli'Vet')' of the Transaction Documents by
Company and its Subsidiaries, nor the ccmswnmation of the transactions contemplated thereby,
will (a) conflict with or violate any provision of their respective Artie~ of Incotporation or
Bylawst as amended; or (b) constimte a violation or default under a.ny indebtedness. ind~
mortgage, deed of trust, note, bond, liceJJlle, lease agreement, or other material aarecment or
instrument to which Company or any of its SUb&l.diaries is a party or to which any of its assets
or the as~ of its Subsidiaries may be subject; or (c) to the best of our .knowledge, violate &n1
law, rule, license1 :regulation, judgment, order, ruling1 or decree, including any insm'ance laws
or regulations of any jurisdiction to which Company or any of its Subsidiaries are .subject,
governing or affecting the operation of Company or its Subsidiaries in any material respect.
Neither the execution and delivery of the Tr.msaction Documents by ColJUWIY and its
Subsidiaries, nor the OOI18llmmation of the transacti.On.s contemplated thcteby, will constitute an
event permitting termination of any mate:rlal agreement or the acceleration of any indcl>tcdncss
of the Company or other liability, with or without notice or lapse of time, or result in the
creation or imposition of any lien UJlOn the Collateral.

4.
No consent, authorization, approval or exemption by, or filing with, any
Person or any Governmental Authorl1;y is required in connection with the cxeculi.on, delivmy and
performance by Company and its Subsidiaries of the Transaction Documents, or the taking of
any action contemplated thereby, except such as have been obtained prior to Closing.
5.
All of the currently outstanding Pledged Shares ate owned bcncficlally and
of record by Company and, to the best of our .knowledge, there ~ no warrants, options, or
other rights to purchase such Pledged Shares.

6.
Except fur the lien of First Interstate Lien upon the First Interstate Shares,
and any interest in the Commission collateral created or granted in favor of The Centennial Life
Jru:umncc Company pursuant to that certain Reimbursement ~nt dated August 11, 199.S
among lbe Centennial Life Insurance Company, AJA Services Cmporation, AIA 1nBurance,
Inc., The Universe Life In.surance Company and AJA MidAmeric:a, Inc., the Collateral is 1'rcc
and clear of all pledges, liens, encumbrances, security interests, equitiea, claims, or options.
Upon delivery of certificates rq>resentin1 the Pledged Shares of AIAI and Fanncrs to
Shareholder at Closing, Shareholder shall have at Clo.sins a perfected first priority secmity
interest in such Pledged Shares.
7.
To our knowledge, there are no claims, actions, suits, proceedlllgs or
pending or threatened against or rel.a.ting t.o Company or any of its Subsidiaries,
at law or in equity before o~ by any Governmental Authority, nor has any such action, suit,

inve$~ationa
;

.

..

.
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proceeding or investigation been ptN.ling during the three-year period preceding the date hereof.
Neither Company nor any of its Sub&idiaries is in default with respect to any adjudicatory Older,
writ, iajUJJcdon or decree of any Governmental authority, and neither Company nor any of its
Subsidiaries is a party tD any ~se and desist order, supervisory agreement or arrangement,
consensual or otherwise, with any Governmental Authority.
The foregoing opinions are limited to the laws and regulations of the State of I&iho
(excluding the principle& of conflicts of laws); and we have not considered and expressed no
opinion 01-I the laws or regulations of any other jurisdiction. This opinion is rendered only with
respect to the laws and the rulest regulations and orders (excluding the prlnc:ip.le.s of conflicts
Qf laws) of the State of Idaho that are in effect as of the date hereof. We assume no
responsibility for updating this opinion to talce into account any event, action, interpretation or
change of Jaw occurring subsequent to the date hereof that may affect tht. validity of any of the
opinions expressed herein.

The enforceability opinion expressed in opinion
following additional qualifications:

12 of this letter is subject

to the

(i)
The terms of ~Y commi:ision agreement, Icckbox agreement or other
account agreement which may affect the Commission Collateral, the rlgbts of the parties
(other than Company or any of its Subsidiaries) to any such agr:eement, and any claim
or defense of such partie5 against the Company or any of it.a Subsidiaries rising undcc or
outside any sucb agreement.
(ii)
The qualification that certain rights, remedies and waivers contained in the
Transaction Documents may be rendered ineffective, or be limited. by applicable Idaho
Jaws or judicial decisions governing such rights, remedies and waivers; but the inclusion
of such rigbts1 remedies-and waivers does not affect the validity or enforceability of other
proviSions of the Transaction Docum~11t.S and, in ibe event the Company or any of its
SubSldiarie.S doeanot ~piplywlth the mirterial terms of the Tram.action Dc:Jc11me11U. Mr.
Taylor :may exe;rc:ise reined.le& that. woUid normally be available under Idaho law to a
secured party provided Idaho law applies and Mr. Taylor proceeds in accordance with
such law.

!.

(iii)
We express no opinion with respect to the perfection or the relative
priority of the security interests granted to Mr. Taylor in the CommiS&ion Collateral.

000594
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Reed I. Taylor

August 15, 199S
Pages

Dis Opinion i! futnishe.d by us solely for yoUI benefit fur use Jn COllnection with the
TranSftCtion Documents arJd the tramactions cont.emplatOO thereby~ and it xnay not be furnished
or quoted:w, or Rlied upon, by any other person.

Very truly yours,

sf

I'
!

.,
•.
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SCHEDULE m TO STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT
Thia Schedule sets forth the exceptions to representatlom and warnmtios made by the
Company to the Shateholder in Article m of the Stock Redemption Agreement dat.ed July 22,
1995 ("Agreement") between AJA Services Corporation c•eompany") and Reed J, Taylor
("Shareholder").

L .

EXCEPTIONS APPLYING TO THE COM}IANY GEN.EllALLY.

A.
~lions 3.3 and 3.11. The Company's reptc:.'lelltation that the execution, delivery
and performance of th~ Agreement and the coruiumination of the t:raJWletions contemp.lared
thereby will not :result in a violation or default under any material agreement or other instrument
by which, the Company or any Subsidiary is bound and the Company•s xepreaentation that it is
not in violation of any such agreement or .instrument arc qualified as follows:

The COOlpany is currently in toohnical default of certain fiaancial covenants contained
in the First Interstate Loan agreement. Those covenant defaults are described in the attached

letter to First Intentate Bank from Rick L Johnson, the Company Vice President, Finance.
Absent the Bank's v¢tten consent, completion of 1.Jan!actio.ns contemplated in the Agreement
may ca.use: additional technical defaults of negative .:financial covenants contained in the BIUlk
loan agreement.

The Comproly has thoroughly disclosed to the Bank all details regarding the proposed
transactions. In view of the current defaults, the Company has not aBked for nor has the Bank
volunteered written consent.

.

i•

As tbc Company is current in all payments due to Bank, the Company does not anticipate
adverse action by the Bank prior to the scheduled loan payoff date of July 20, 1996.
lI:

B.
Sections 3..2 and l.:i. The Company's representations concerning conaents in
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 are qualified as follows:

!

1.
The Company has been made aware tllat the Texu Department of
Insurance has taken the position that the distribution of AJA lnsurance, Inc. requires prior
departmental approval due to the status the Company's Subsidiary, The Universe lJfe Insurance
Company (RID.JC"}, as "commercially domiciled" in Texas. The Company, while disputing the
necessity of suc:h approval, has none the Jess filed ~ necessazy forms tO obtain such approval.
The Texas Insnranr.e Department has not yet given its approval for distribution of AJA
lnsurance. loo.

..

The California Departm~t of lnsurance re.quires the submission of a prior
approval form for the Centennlal reinsurance treaty. Since the transaction does not affect any
California insureds, and ULlC is not being diS.!Olved or mergedt approval. is expected in due
course. Approval from Califomfa has not yet been obtained.

,:·

l
J
I

r

SCHEDULE fil • Pag~ 1
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2.

As described above in connection with Section 3.3., certain transactions
the Agreement would violate provisions of the First Interstate Bank: Loan
Agreement and related documents.
con~plated by

C.
Section 3,6, The Company's financial representations contained in Section 3.6
are supplemented by the following attached financlal statements related to the quarter ended June
30, 1995:
AIA Services Consolidated Balance Sheets at June 30,

199~.

AJA Services Consolidated Statement of Income For Six Month& Ending June 30, 1995.
'rhe Universe Life Preliminary Results of Operations (Statutory Basis) For Three and Six •
Month!J Ending June 30, 1995.
Great Fidelity Preliminary Results of Opc:radons (Siatutory Basis) For Three and
Six Month$ Eliding June 30. 1995.
AJA Services Consolidated :Preliminary Results of Operations For Six Months Boding

Juno 30) 1995.
D.

EXCEP1.'10NS APPLYING SOLELY TO lOOVERSE LIFE.

Sections 3.1. 3.9 and 3.11. The Company's representations concerning Universe Lif~'s
good st.anding aud qualification to trawct business in various sta~ and its compliance with
state insurance laws are qualified by the following description of regulatory proceedings in the ·
various stites in which the insurance company transac~ business.

nn.s..

On March 22, 1994, the State of Texas issued Cease and Desist Order No. 94·
0282 agairuit Universe Llfe and its subsidiary 1 AIA Insurance, Inc. The Order was based on
preliminary examination findings reported to the Texas Department of Insurance (w'l'Dr) by the
examiners. The Order alleged that Universe Life and its affillate engaged in unfair m~tho<b of
colllpetitiou aud deceptive practice of insurance and that Universe Life was in hazardous
financial condition. Following discussions with the company and receipt of. additional
documentation, TDI is.sued a Consent Order dated May 17, 1994 which superseded the Cease
and Desi~t Order in its entirety. The Consent Otder abandoned allegations of unfair competition
and deceptive practices and focused on TDI's concerns with the proper reserving for the
Suppleme1:ttal Benefit Accumulation ("SBA") feature of Universe Life's GUH product and the
'Valuation of Universe Life's investment in its subsidiary, AlA InsurMce, Inc.

To address its concern with conflicting actuarial oPinions on the proper ~erves for the
SBA, the May 17, 1994 Consent Order di:tected Universe Life to select an independent aot\laty
to review Universe Life's SBA reserving methods and factors.
Universe Life and the
Department agreed that this actuarial ICView would be per.formed by Donna R. CJa.ire, F.S.A.,
of Claire T.hinldng, an independent consulting actuary. Ms. Claire performed an asset adequacy
analysis of Universe Life's reported December 31, 1993 SBA tc!Cn'CSt including a thorough
review of GUH product features, actuarial assumptions, actual experience and historical trends.
Ms. Claire1s analysis is contained in her Asset Adequacy Report dated June 12, 1994.

'

':i
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In her Report, Ms. Claire observed that Universe Life's GUH product, with it.s SBA
feature, is an imtovative product and that, "[a]s such, there is no current ~e ~ard fOr
the SBA in state law that specifically fits this benefit", Ms. Claire concluded that (i) Universe

llfe's independent consultina actuaries, Milliman and Robense>n, had developed "a methodoloaY
which follows the basic standards of establishing~ that reflect the underlying rlsks of the
product•; (ii) "[t]hc reserve methodology used by [Universe Life's actuaries) docs appear to be
reasonable"; and (ill) "given the ~erlence that was developed through 1993, the reserves
reported in the [1993] Amrual Statement were adequate... Based on sensitivity tests which
showed that the reported reserves may be inadequate if adverse trends occur, however, Ms.
Claire rceomme~ded that the reserves be increased on the basis of "somewhat stronger" re.serve
assumptions. Applying the same gross premium valuation methodology used by Universe Li~
to develop its reported :re.serves, Ms. Claire developed new :reserving factors reflecting her more
conservative assumptions. Universe Life agreed with TDl that the SBA reserves for the Texas
certificatebolders under GUH policy would b() determined prospectively in accordance with the
factors deveJoped by Donna Claire, with any increase in reserves being ~pplied mt:ably beginning

July l, 1995 a.nd with the final entry being made December 31, 1996.

With respect to the valuation of AIA lnsUiance, Inc.~ TOI acknowledge.d that Universe
Life's accounting for tbe value of AJA Insurance was pcrmiasible under Texas law; but, in light
of a Texas statute allowing the Commissioner to a8cribe any other valuation he believe9 more
appropriate (aftet hean)lg) and the hnpending statutory change in the Idaho Jnsurance Code
effe.ctive July 1, 1995 (see below), the May 17, 1994 Consent Order directed that Universe
Life'$ investment in AJA Imurance, Inc. be reduced, ratably over a three-year period beginning
December 31, 1994, to the leMer of net worth as determined in accordance with generally
accepted accoun.ting principles or the valuation amount reflected in the nnal report of tfrls
examination.

.

·i

l
"i

·;
I

During the period of dhcussions bet.ween Universe Life and TOI, the Texas Insurance
Commissioner approved Universe Llfe•s new GUH m product and the transfer of Universe
Ll.fe•s group he.al th and life insurance business in Texas by reinsuring, on an assumption basis,
all of such business with The Centennial Llfe Insurance Compnny. See "Market Conduct
Activities - Policy Form Filings and Approvals" and "Subsequent Event.i:-Sale of Group
Uitlvenal Health Business" above.

On October 13, 1994, TDI issued a further Consent Order which supe~ed the May
17, 1994 Consent Order in its entirety. 'l'he October Otder recited Universe Life's agreement
concerning .the implementation of the Claire factors for :reserving for the SBA and ordered that
um.verse Life reduce the reported value of its subsidiary, AlA Insurance, Ino., to tbe Jess« or
net worth (as determined in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles) or tha
valuation amount re1lect.ed in the final report of this examination, provided that tb adjustment
in the A.IA lnrurance carrying value would be made r.atably over a three-year period beginning
December 31, 1994,

111JlJN. Bn-sed on Ille :financial concern.~ raised by the preliminatY examination results aitd

..

the issua11ce of the 'l'exas Crase and Desist Order, the Idaho :r>epartnu:nt of Insurance
("Department") initiated an inquiry resulting in a Voluntary Agreement Concetnlng SupcIVisor,
dated April 26, 1994 between Universe Life and the Department. Under the Agreement,
Uruverse Life ha~ provided :financial and other infonnation to the Department on a regular basis
SCHEDULE m-Peg" 3
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to enable the Department to informally monitor Univem Llfe's financial condition and
operations to asswe that policyholders' inteJests Were protected during the period required to
resolve the financial and other examination issues. During the period of discussions. the
Department has approved Universe Life's new GlJH ID product, the transfer of Universe Life•s
individual ;health insunmce business to States General Life Insurance Company and the t:ra.n!fer
of its group health and life insurance business to The Centennial. Llfe lnsunnce Company.

By,iagreement dated December 23, 1994, the Idaho Department approved Donna Claire's
gross premium valuation method and Ms. Claire's reserving fact:on for calculating SBA reserves
in aC(:()rdance with her As~et Adequacy Report dated June 12, 1994. Tiie Department agreed
that Unive.aie Life would not be required to restate its 1992or1993 Annual Statements and that
implementation of the Donna Claire reserve adj~stment will be made prospeetlvely, in
~ccordanee wi.th TDl' s Ootobor 13, 1994 Consent Order, on a quamxly basis beginning with the
third quarter of 1995 and ending December 31, 1996. The following table shows the effect of
the Donna· Claire adjustments to Universe life's reported aggregate reserve for aooident and
health policies and to its capital and SUiplus at December 31 1 1992, 1993 and 1994:

Capibll & aurplu11 :reported 'by Univeno Life:
AUre~ re~m' for A &: H policies
As rbported
As i;\aloola~d \I~ Claire faetor
C!afre mclor adjust1M11t

I

Cspital &:

lilUi:}>lu~

oa.fl:e:(' Claire !attor adj11Stme111:

J.m

l22l

lW

$S,418,748

$5,140,830

$ 4,182,.7&l

10,376,371

14,040,415>
14,801.661

9,193,850

7,&43,186
:2,5:13 1184
~wsun

!

761,24'.2)

a~.379.SI§

ll,579,SBl
(

~~.1m

~3,727.~

In fue December 23, 1994 agreement. the Idaho InsuranC6 Department acknowledged
that, until ~uly 1, 1995, the Idaho Jnsurance Code pennits Univ~e llie to continue to report
its in'VCStID~nt in AIA Insu:rance. Inc. at historical cost (subject to a 15 %of assets limitation) on
its 1992, 1~93, and 1994 Annual Statements. Although permitted by Idaho statute, this valuation
of AJA Inslirance, Inc. deviate.s from the NAIC standards for investment in subsidiaries as set
NAIC AccoWlting Practices and Procedures Manual for Life and Accident and
forth in

tbe

Health Insdrance Companies. See "Valuation of AI.A Insurance, Inc." above under the caption
"Comment8 on 1992 Financial Statements: Common Stock•. On July 1, 1995, Universe Life
wm be required to reduce the value of its investment in AJA Insurance, Inc., fot statutory
aocountingipuiposes, to the net book value of AJA Insurance, Inc (which was $2,424,097 at
December 91, 19.92).

OtlJer StJt~s. The ftillowing regulatory proceedings in other jurisdictions were
precipitated by tbe issuance of the Texas Cease. and Desist Order and/or the. preliminary
examinatiop fi:nd':ings c.ontail'JC'4 thereln:

'•

'i

l

'I

A Notke of Hearing ~.nd order to Show Cause with Suspension Instanter WM issued by
the Oklahoma Jnsurnnce Commissioner on April 6, 1994 based on the Texas Cease and Desist
Order. On!Ma.y 26, 1994, by letter agreement based on the May 17, 1994 IDI Consent Order
and Univc:rile Llfi.}•s April 26, I 994 Voluntary Agreement with the Idaho Insumnc8 Department,
the Oklahoma Department agreed to suspend and terminate the prior Notice and Order to Show
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Cause and allow Universe Life r.o continue to solicit business ftom its existing policyholder
associations.

An bro.er of Suspension based on the Texas Cease and Desist Order was issued by the
Illinois DePartinent of Insurance on April 26, 1994. The Suspension Order was lifted by
Stipula1ionland Consent Oider dated July 271 1994, pursuant to which Universe Life agreed to
notify the lllinois Department before transacting new business in the state durlng the next three
yea.rs.

A l}oticc to show cause regarding suspension from doing business in the State of
Mississippi! was issued by the Mississippi lrui\ll'atlce Department on May 6, 1994, based on tho
Texas Cease and Desist Order. Su.spension of Universe Life's certificate of authority was
biitially stayed by the Department; however, on September 81 1994, a Suspension O:tdcr was
enteI'ed based upon the appearance that Universe Life was then in an unsound condition.
'ne· Alaska Insurance Department is.sued an Order S'Uspeading Universe life's certificate
of authority on May 19, 1994, based on the Texas Cease and Desist Order. Universe Life
entered into an Agreement to Suipend New S~es on July 27, 1994; and the Alaska Insurance
Department witbdrew the suspension order. Universe Life had not been writing new business
in Alaska, so the Agreement to Suspend New Sales has had no financial effect on Universe
Life's operations.

!
!

l
l

ThelM.issouri IllSumnce Department issued a Notice of Institution of Case and Statement
of Charges dated June 2> 1994, based upon the Texas Cease and Desist Order. A hearing in the
matter has bee-JI con~inued indefinitely, to be ro-set upon :further notice to Universe Life.
In June 1994 1 ~e. California IllSlll'ance Department initiattd an informal inquiry based
on the T~as C~ur. and Desist Order, Universe Life entered into a confidential volunt.ary
agreement to :-c-a~ie. writing new business in california. Universe Life had not been writing new
busine.$s i.n ·Califo::nia; so the confidential agreement has had no financial effect on Universe
Life's opemtio:ns.

On June. 6, 1994, a Suspension Order was issued by the Wyoming Department of
Insurance without prior notice or heatingt based on the Illinois Suspension Order. Based upon
subse.quent withdraw.aJ of the JlJinois and T~as orders, Wyoming lifted the Order of Suspension
and entered a Stipulat\on and Consent Otder dated July 28, 1994, pursuant to which Univers~
Life was permitted to continm~ r.oliciting its existing policyholder association but agreed not to
solicit other. business in Wyoming without the Department's con~t.
Unive.rn-~ 1.Jre voluntr.rlly agreed to suspend new business in Oregon pending re.solution
:. of the Oregon T:i~uram:e Dep~"iment's co~ns under a unique Oregon statute :regarding
vah1ation of Ul".~Ve"Ne Life's inve..~tment ir. AJA Insurance, Jnc. A Consent Order was issued

Juu.e 30, 1994·. A Suspension Order was issued August 23, upon ~ration of the Consent
Order. Uni.verse Life requestc.d a beating; and an Amended Suspension O.rder prohibiting new
sales was ~tered NovMJber 2, 1994.
August

A N'oti ~ of Summary Suspension was issued by the Iowa Division of Insurance on
1~, 1991, bar~ on failure ofUnive..-se Life to file its annual audited financial report by
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June 11 1994. (The audiior's report on Universe Life's 1993 financ::ial statements was delayed
pending Idaho's detet:minati1JJl of financial ~ues :raised by the examination. A draft of the
audited financial statements had previously been provided to Iowa Division of Insurance.) The

Order of Suspension was rescinded and the administrative proceeding dismiued on September
6, 1994. On January 6, 1995, the Division issued a Notice of Heming to determine whether
Univer.se Life's soiplus met statutory minimums. Outside counsel informed Universe Ufe on
April 10, 1995 that Iowa is dropping the aclfon.
Universe Llfe entered into an Agreemcmt with the Washington lnsorance Department dated
August 181 1994, in which Universe Life voluntarily agreed not to write any new business in
the State without prior approval of the Commissioner, pending submiuion of information
establishing that Universe Life's financial condition is not detriment.al to Washington
policyholders.
On September 9, 1994, the Utah Insurance Deportment issued a Notice of Informal
Adjudicative Proceeding summarlly suspending Univuse Life's Certificate of Authority for

failure to rnalnrain minimum capital and surph.ts as calculated under unique Utah st.atuta.
Universe Life's hf'.aring request was withdrawn aft.er the Department's Chief Examiner advised
that the .suspension order could be. lifted upon informal presentation by Universe Life's
management after. year~end demonstrating compliance with minimum· capital and smplus
requireroent8.
The Ncli:ra$ka Department contack:d Universe Life on OCtober 14, 1994, concerning

Universe Life's .financial condition. Univme Life .signed a Consent Order to suspend new sales
on October 28, 1994 .

........ .1111"'4
~.a.~Mt.~~,...:;·::u':#a
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I, R. JOHN TAYLOR, hereby certify that I am the duly elected,
qualified, and acting President of AIA Services Corporation, a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of
Idaho.
The Company certifies that as of
following is true, correct and complete:
(a)

(b)

August

15,

1995,

the

The Debit Balance of Reed J. Taylor has been eliminated,
and no further obligations are owed by him to the
·;·.\· 9-·
Company;
_
1

L. Jt.X::.1 ·C · •• 1. . ./,;
The CAP Service Center Balance as o:fi: Ma¥· ai; q.~§.-has .been
eliminated and no further obligations are owed by Reed J.
Taylor with respect to the CAP Program except for amounts
due for equipment, services or payroll incurred after May
l, 1995 but not yet reimbursed by the CAP Program to AIA
Insurance, Inc.;

(c)

All conditions to Closing as set forth in section 7.1 of
the stock Redemption Agreement have been satisfied,
except as set forth on the attached Schedule III and/or
on the various other Schedules referenced in Article III
of the Stock Redemption Agreement;

(d)

All representations and warranties of the Company
forth in the stock Redemption Agreement are true
correct, except as set forth on the attached Schedule
and/or on the various other schedules referenced
Article III of the stock Redemption Agreement;

(e)

Except as set forth in the attached Schedule III (!
I.e.), the conditions set forth in Section 3.2 of the
Stock Redemption Agreement have been satisfied;

(f)

The Company agrees that for purposes of Section 5.1(c) of
the Stock Redemption Agreement, the retained earnings of
the Company as of the Closing shall be deemed to be equal
to the retained earnings of the Company as of June 30,

set
and
III
in

1995;
(g)

The Company 1 s
$500,000;

working capital is equal to at

least

(h)

The Company's current ratio is equal to at least 1.1 to
1;

(i)

The company's ratio of Consolidated Long-Term Debt-toConsolidated Net Worth, as described in Section 5 .1 (f) of
the Stock Redemption Agreement is equal to at least 3.6
to 1; and

( j)

Reed J.

'

txRTB1iAC

Taylor is hereby fully and forever release~,,

discharged

;:

and

inde~n i:ied

1

by

000602

claims, causes of action, demands, rights, damages,
costs, expenses, fees, compensation, liabilities and
other obligations to the Company or any of its
Subsidiaries of whatever kind or nature now possessed by
or which may hereafter accrue to company or any of its
Subsidiaries, on account of or arising out of any
agreement with or any act or omission by Mr. Taylor at
any time prior to the date hereof, whether the
consequences thereof are now existing or may hereafter
arise, or whether they are known or unknown, anticipated
or unanticipated (except those such obligations that
arise under the Agreement, the AIA Insurance, Inc.
General Agency Agreement and Addendum thereto dated
August 1, 1995 and any and all undisclosed obligations of
which Reed J. Taylor had actual knowledge, which were
incurred by Reed J. Taylor on behalf of the company or
any of its Subsidiaries and which are not reflected on
company's books and records or its financial statements).
IN WITNESS WHE.'REOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
the corporate seal of 1\IA services corporation on this l.i'Cb. day of

August 1995.

1

/

'. (j

R.

....

1c,.1;0_

.

(J J

J~.h.J: \ray lo~}
President
. /

~-'\lll~l'AVIW.ll!'A'i'C'~~~

.,,...,..,,,.

.·
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April 18, 1996

Mr. R. John Taylor
Chairman
AlA Services Corporation
P.O. Box 538
111 Main Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

~i

1'
[
~

:.

f•

Dear John:

I

I

The pwpose of this letter is to demand payment of rrioney owed pursuant to AIA Service Corporation's
Promissory Note in the original principal amount of $1,500,000 issued under the Addendum To Stock
Redemption Agreement (the "Down Payment Note'') and to give notice of default under the Stock
Redemption Agreement.

•

l

!

i
~

I

I!

Down Payment Note
On July 22, 1995, you, acting on behalf of A1A Services Corporation. signed the Down Payment Note in
my favor. The unpaid principal balance of this Note is Sl,147,175, excluding"CAP" payroll and rent
which are separate obligations of'~AP". In addition, as of October 21, 19:95, default interest began to
accrue at a rate of fourteen percent (14%) per annum. As of April 16, 1995, the amount ofaccrued interest
the corporation owes me is $73,674.96.

I'

~

I
~

I

l

you know, the corporation is now considerably past due in making payment and appears to have no
immediate or planned intention and/or ability of making such payment la the foreseeable future.
Therefore, this letter is to advise you that demand is hereby mndo upon AlA Services Corporation for full
payment of the unpaid principal balance plus accrued interest in .the totlll amount of $1,220,849.96:
Further, for each additional day in which the total due remains unpaid, you will need to add $385.96 in
accrued interest.
As

~

i'

I

r

!

j

~

~

II

If payment is not made by May l, 1996, legal action to enforce the corporation's obligations -under the

terms of the Down Payment Note wiffbe taken.

!
"!:

i
,~:

I
i!

You are hmby given written notice of various events of default by AIA Services Corporation under the
Stock Redemption Agreement also dated July 22, 1996, as amended (the''Agreement''). Specifically, tbe
following outline sets forth those areas where the corporation is either in actual default or alleged default:

!'
,,~

I
!!
i
~

EXHIBITD
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1. FailtR to pay my attorney fees, as required under the Agreement.

2. Failure to provide me with 9uarterly financial statements, prepared in accordance
with GAAP, within 45 days of the end of each fiscal quarter.
3. Failun: to pay the balance of interest accruing in February and March of 1995 on the
$6,000,000 Promissory Note under the terms of the Agreement in the amount of S32,976,
which became due an payable as a result of Donna Taylor's letter recession, dated April 16,
1996, of the July 18, 1995 letter of agreement limiting such interest payments to me.

o'

4. Alleged failme to comply with financial covenants as outlined in Sections 5.1, (c), (d), (e),
and (t) of the Agreement.
:·

In the event that each event of default under (1), (2), and (4) above is not cured within 30 days, and the
event of default under (3) above is not cured within S days, from the date of this letter, I shall have no
recourse other than to exercise all remedies available to me under the Agreement. Please give these

t

matten your prompt attention.

r

i:1/f

·~·

i

~-

Recd I. Taylor

•

.. I

cc: Mr. Al Cooper, Director
"Mr. Bruce Sweeney, Director
Mr. Cum.er Green
Mr. Michael Cashman
Mr. James Beck:
Mr. David Larson

Mr. Richard Riley

ir
I

RJT 0000591

000605

~006/021

ll/06/2008 THU 15:30 F!a ,08 746 8159 AIA INS INC
c ..ua.'iCROSS

-- '..
u.u; omcu

CAIRNCR0ss & HEMPELMANN
A. PllC~LSilNIC!CXllll'OMi.ON

.

l

7Cr~ R.OOR. COU..WIA Ct.""'ia 701 FIFTH A\Jil.t~
Si,..;rn.£. lft,~'-:C'ro.-.S 94 ICf.701.!

~

ac•i w.ctco

: April 25, 1996

Dick Riley, Esq.
Eberlee, Berlin, Kading,
Turnow & McKlveeD-t Chartered
300 North Sixth Street

P .0. Box 1368
Boise, ID 83701-1368

•

Re:

i
AlA Services Corporation- Redemption of Reed Taylors Stock: Notice of
I
Acdition:tl Defaults
;
·

Dear Dick:
As you know, Recd TayloT deliv~red to AlA formal notice of the following de!aultS by a
letter dated April 18, 1996:
~
1.

Failuze to pay the Down ~ayment Note when due;

2.

Fail~

3.

Faillll.""C to provide qua..-ter11 financial statemer:.ts;

4_

Faih.ire to ma.lee interest p~yments under the $6,000,000 promissory note; atid

to pay attorneys' ~ees;

l

s.

Failure to comply with

~ertain specified :financial c:ovenants

contained in the

Stock Redi:mption Ae.Ieement.

.

i

We have tc:ccived a copy of a letter dat~d April 22, 1996 from John Taylor to Reed addressing
each of these defanlrs, and it is the pur1'ose of this letter to res:pond to John Taylor's letter of
April 22.nd. In addition, the purpose of tbi.s letter js to give AIA formal notic~ of additional
defaults W1der the Stock Redemption Agrecme::lt and related documents.
I
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1.
f.ailI.n to Pil!. th~ Do-..vn 'piu'iDent ~ote \'\lbw Dus:. Payment under the Down
Payment No~ was in no way co:wiifoned upon the closing of the ~c of Series C Prefmed
Stock.or th¢ payment of sums to Donna Taylor in redemption of b.er Series A Prefu.red Stock.
The Down Payment Note was a last minute acc:omrnodation to AIA i:n lieu of the cash do~'Il
payment. Unlike the: S61000,000 promissory note, the Down Payrr.ent Note was not made
subordinate to the redemption obligatio_ns of AIA to Donna Taylor. Moreover, tb.e agreement
rnadc miong Oonoa Taylor, AJA, a.nd Retd, by its tenns, relates on!y to the paym~nt of interest
under the $0,000,000 note and not to the Down l>ayment Note. Tue ~serrion made by John in
his April 22. ! 996 letter that the payrnent of the Down Paym~nt Note \Y"aS coodition~d upon the
prior payment to· Donna Taylor of the redemption price for her stock is inaccurate ;md
unsupported by any of'!hc transaction dotumentation. On the face of the Dov,n Payment Note
nnd by the t~ of :r.11 ancilfary do~U.."Ilents, payment under the Down Pa::ment Note is
UllConditional, tmd that note bas been in d~fault since October of 1995.

•

Contrary to Johl'l 's assertions., payments. made by AlA with resp.::et to CAP expenses may
not be offset against payments ow~d under the Down Payment Note. The Dov.'D Payment Note
is ~xplieit that Af.A h::is no right to offset. In addition. to the ex-tent AlA has pa.id CAP e.\:petises
incurred after th~ closing, th~e were. expenses of Advantage .lnsu:ance: Agency, Ine. and not
Reed, a.nd at most could be consicered a sep<1I'a1e lo<'l?l made by AIA to Advantage Insurnnce
Ag:ncy, Inc.· Furth.ennorc, R~::cl disputes th~ calculation of CAP expenses paid by AJA.
Pursuant to the attached invoice and incerest c2kulation worksheet, the total CAP expenses owed
by Advantage Insurance Agency, Inc. to AJA omount to 5143,662.
In addition, there was no O'lrr:rpa}ment in the QJDOll:lt cf $22,640.25 refezred to on the
attac:b.ment to John's letter. AJA initially paid S42,~0 for August accrued interest on the
S6,000.000 note. The correct amount sh~uld have been S41,250, resulting in an OVClJ>aYtllent of
only $1 i350. The assertion t.i.at there n-as a $22,640.25 overpnyment was bas~d 011 the erroneous
assurnptiqo th.:i.t interest on the note accrued from the c!osi.llg date rat.her th2.ll August 1, 1995.
"\V"hen confromed •\i1h tlus error, Su Bro~11 acd Rick Johnson adr.riitted the error. Additionally,

the Sl,350 overpayment may not be offi,et agoiiJlst the balance of the Do-..v11 Payment Note, but
instead bas been applied to future interest.payments under the $6,000,000 note.
:
I

Accountiog for these adjtistmcnt's, the total amount of payments made by AIA \\ith
respect to the Do·.vn Payment Note is $352,825. Nomithst3nding the anacbed sc~du!e, any
such payments made prior to October 2~, 1995 were applied to principal; payment:s af.:er that
date w.::rc applied fir.st to 3ny accrued imerest ba!sce at the time of payment, and then to
pri.ncip<ll.
;

2.
F!'!ilure t12_ Pay Attome_y,s' Fees. Pursuant to Section 2.5 of the Stock Redemption
Agreement and Si::ction 3 of th~ Addendtim to Stock Redemption Agreement. Al:\ undi::rtook to
......
'
'\
,.~
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I

in~wed

pay all of Rced,s attorneys' fees
in connection ·w1u the coosummation of the
transactions contemplated by th.a Sto'ck Redemption Agreement and :mcilfa.1.-y documents.
Nowhere was this obligation limited to costs incurred prior to the closing date, and it ·";as or
should h:l.ve been contemplated by the parties tb<lt attorneys' f-tes would be incurr<:d after the
closing date:: in connection '\\ith the consummation of the stock redemption tnnsaction. Reed is
entitled to the prompt paym~nt of all the attorneys' fees ~.sociat~d with post-closing services that
relate specifieally to matt:rs necessary under and cont!mpfated by th~ stock redemption
trlnSaction documents. Invoices for such fees have bee11 forwtI?ded to AlA end tl!e oon~pay.inent
of these invoices in timely rnanner co~tl.'tes a default under the Stock Redemption Agreement

•

J.
failure tri j>r12,..,.jd' Qui!.l'ter:Jv Financial Stitem.ents. Pursuant to Section S.l{:i.) of
the Stock Redemption Agreement, AJA is obligated to provide Reed v.ith quarterly fmar.clal
st::i.rements prepared in accordance v.ith GA..\P within forr;-five (45) days of 1he end of each
fiscal quarter. To date, Recd hz:.s aot received financial statements for AIA. Wnile Reed has
rec~.:ived financhd statemClltS for some of the operating comp~es o\vned by AI.~ these
deliveries do not satisfy Section 5. l (a) of the Stock Redemption Agreement 2nd are insufficient
to allow Reed to evaluate AIA's compliance v..ith its fi.n:mcfal covenants. Further dday in the
deli"1.'er1 oi adequate ftnanci~ .statements is not accep1.able. In. the ubsei;ce of these financial
staternencs, Recd must assuoc th3.t the cpmpa..'1.y is cuucntly in default under all of the financial
co'licnams cottained in Section 5.1 of :the Stock Redemption Ag:re~me-r.t, including ""itho"t...Tt
limiw.ion, Sections 5.l(c) through (i), and, to the exrenr Reed has nC1t previous!::; giv~ AIA
fonna.l notice of default under scch sections, he does so now.
4.
failure to Pav hllereo:t 'tTnd~r the Sli . OQQ,OOQ '.\lot:. We disagree '\.Vlth your
chmcteri.zation of the S6,000,000 note a~ an obligation contingent upon the payment ofsums to
Donna.. "While: Reed may have agreed tO: subordinate cc::r..ai..n payments under his ;iote to certain
payment.s ro Donna,. this does oot allo\V AJA to avoid a defauJt under the no1e, b11;: ~ere!y
es~blishes Ll-:~ prioricy bc::-..:;e~m Do.nna and Re:d as !o LIJ.e cci!ection of such payments from AIA. ·
Moreo•·er, Reed's agreement "':ith Donnn was induced by Joh.n's representations th.at he hsd
inv.?stors with cash in band a.Dd that pa}·ments would be made imm<::diately. ln light of this
default :ind the other defaults discussed in th.is letter, Reed hereby gives AIA formal notice of the
:iccelcratjotl of the entire bab.occ of the S6,000,000 noca, which is now .immediately due and
payable.
5.
Faihmi to Conwly With Fjnancial Cavcnams. As discus~ed in paragraph 3 above,
i.ve must assume that the i:ompMy is currently in default under the f.manc:iaJ covenants contained
in Section .S.l of the Stock Rcdc:mptioo Agreement, as Reed's requests for a.dcqtIEte finmcial
info:mation w confirm the company's compl.ia:nce · wicb these covenants bas nae been

forthcoming.

•

1

.

'

.
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Dick Riley1 Esq.
April 25, 1996
P~ge4

In addition to these d~faults, of which Al.:\ was previously given formal notice, we
hereby give Al_A formal notice of the: following additioo.al de:faclts:
1.
Failure ta comply \vith the financial covenants contained in 5.1 (g) through (i) as
discussed in paragraph 3 above;
2.
Failure to deliver the exec'!..rted original letter fiom .A..iA to First lctermt~ BW.
regarding the bank's obligations to deli..,·e:: the Universe certificattS to Reed Taylor upon AIA 's
satisfaction of the bank loan pursuant to Section 2.S(o) of the Stock R~demption Agr~mc:nt;
3,
Fcilure to establi.sh a Copunissions Collateral AccoUllt, to provide an executed
lock box agreemmt in connection with the establishment and maintenance of the Commissions
Collateral Account, and to provide: evid~nce of the establishment of such account pursuant to
Section 4 Qfthe Security Agreemenr, de.spite several requests. including a request made by letter
to you dated October 10, 1995;

•

4.
Fa.Hun: to provide Reed with monthly commission statements, a list of account
debtors, and in.fonnation requested pursuant lo Reed's letter dated April 18, 1996, request for
whlch is 3gain rnad~ by th.is letter; and ·
We agree that the parties need to meet as soon as possible:: to discuss these issues.

However, until s.:~h a meeting ta.lees place, ~ed has no choice but to pursue vigorously those
remedies which h:: is afforded under the Stock Redemption Agreement and ancilia:ry doc'UID.~ts-

~
Scott T. Bell

STB/alt
.Enclo.sur~

cc;

Mr. Reed Taylor
Mr. Ernie Dantioi

rilcy:?417.Ca

•
'

,'

\~
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STOCK REDEMPTION RESTRUCTURE AGREEMENT
This Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement ("Agreement") is made and entered into as
of the 1st day of July, 1996, by and among AJA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation ("Company"), REED J. TAYLOR ("Creditor") and DONNA J. TAYLOR ("Series A
PreferT"ed Shareholder").
RECITALS:
A.
Company is the parent holding company and owner of all of the capital stock of AIA
Insurance, Inc. ("AIAI"), Farmers Health Alliance Administrators, Inc. ("Farmers"), and The
Universe Life Insurance Company, an Idaho domestic insurance company ("Universe") (other than
certain shares held by directors of Universe as required by law). Great Fidelity Life Insurance
Company, a stock life insurance company domiciled in Indiana ("Great Fidelity"), is a whollyowned subsidiary of Universe. Company, AIAI, Farmers, Universe and Great Fidelity are
collectively referred to herein as the "Companies".
B.
Pursuant to that certain Stock Redemption Agreement between Company and
Creditor dated July 22, 1995, as amended by that certain Addendum to Stock Redemption
Agreement also date.d July 22, 1995 (together, the "Stock Redemption Agreement"), all of Creditor's
shares of common stock of Company were redeemed.

C.
As part consideration ofthe redemption and Creditor's execution of a Noncompetition
Agreement dated July 22, 1995 ("Noncompetition Agreement"), Company (i) executed a
promissory note dated July 22, 1995 payable to Creditor in the principal amount of $1,500,000 (the
"Down Payment Note"), which Down Payment Note became due and payable in full by its terms
on October 21, 1995; (ii) executed a promissory note dated August 1, 1995 payable to Creditor in
the principal amount of$6,000,000 (the "$6M Note"), which $6M Note was secured by (a) that
certain StockPle.dge Agreement date.d July 22, 1995 ("Stock Pledge Agreement") granting Creditor
a security interest in all of the shares of capital stock held by Company in Universe, AIAI, Farmers
and, in the event of a distribution of such shares to Company, Great Fidelity (the "Pledged Shares"),
and (b) that certain Security Agreement dated July 22, 1995 ("Security Agreement''), granting
Creditor a security interest in all commissions from the sale of insurance or related services by or
on behalf of, or payable to, the Companies (the "Commission Collateral"); and (iii) agreed to pay
Creditor a salary equal to $20,000 per month until the Down Payment note is paid in full. Company
and Creditor also entered into a Consulting Agreement dated July 22, 1995 ("Consulting
Agreement"), pursuant to which Creditor is entitled to receive $12,250 per month for a period of
three (3) years following the payment in full of the Down Payment Note. The Stock Redemption
Agreement, the Down Payment Note, the $6M Note, the Security Agreement, the Stock Pledge
Agreement, the Consulting Agreement and the Noncompetition Agreement are collectively referred
to herein as the "Original Documents". The Original Documents other than the $6M Note are
collectively referenced herein as the "Superseded Documents".
D.
By letters dated April I 8, 1996, April 25, 1996 and June 4, I 996 (collectively, the
''Notice of Default"), Creditor gave Company formal notice of numerous alleged defaults under the
Original Documents, including but not limited to; (i) the failure to pay the Down Payment Note
when due; (ii) the failure to make interest payments under the $6M Note; (iii) the failure to provide
adequate financial infonnation and to comply with various financial covenants in violation of the
Page I
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Stock Redemption Agreement, (iv) the failure to pay Creditor's attorneys' fees as required by the
Stock Redemption Agreement, (v) the failure to comply with certain requirements of the Security
Agreement regarding the establishment and control of a Commission Collateral account, and (vi)
the failure to pay funds raised in the course of the Company's "Series C" preferred stock offering to
Creditor as required by agreement among Company, Creditor and Series A Preferred Shareholder.
Company disputes each of these allegations of default

E.
The parties now wish to restructure the stock redemption transaction by (i) adjusting
the principal amount of the Down Payment Note, extending its maturity date, providing for interest
to accrue on the principal balance of the Down Payment Note, requiring monthly payments of
principal and interest under the Down Payment Note, and providing security for the payment of the
Down Payment Note; (ii) terminating the Consulting Agreement , revising the Noncompetition
Agreement, and terminating the Company's obligation to pay Creditor a monthly salary; (iii)
amending the terms of the Security Agreement and the Stock Pledge Agreement; and (iv) revising
certain representations, warranties and covenants contained in the Stock Redemption Agreement;
and (v) simplifying and consolidating the various default provisions and remedies therefor. In
exchange for this restructuring of the Company's obligations to Creditor, Creditor is willing to agree
to waive, and to forebear from exercising any remedies he may have for, any existing defaults under
the Original Documents, including (without limitation) those defaults alleged in the Notice of
Default.

F.
Series A Preferred Shareholder is the holder of all of the shares of Company's Series
A Stated Value Preferred Stock. Pursuant to (i) Company's Articles of Incorporation and (ii) that
certain letter agreement among the parties hereto and Cumer L. Green ("Green") dated January 11,
1995, as amended by (a) that certain letter from Green to Richard A Riley ("Riley") dated March
22, 1995, (b) that certain letter agreement among the parties, Green and Richard W. ·Campanaro
dated July 18, 1995, (c) that certain letter from Green to Riley dated August 10, 1995, and (d) that
certain letter from Creditor to Series A Preferred Shareholder dated April 16, 1996 (collectively, the
"Series A Preferred Shareholder Letter Agreements"), the parties thereto agreed that Series A
Preferred Shareholder would have her stock in Company redeemed in accordance with a specified
payment plan, and that certain payments to Creditor under the Original Documents would be
subordinated to the Company's obligation to pay ..Series A Preferred Shareholder. Concurrent with
this Agreement, Creditor, Company and Series A Preferred Shareholder have entered into a new
agreerntirtt ("Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement") which supersedes and replaces the Series
A Preferred Shareholder Letter Agreements.

G.
It is the intention of the parties that this Agreement will supersede and replace the
Stock Redemption Agreement with respect to any and all representations, warranties and covenants
which were made in the Original Documents and which survived the closing of the stock redemption
transaction, and that neither Creditor nor Company will have any right to claim default under any
of the Original Documents (as they may be amended by this Agreement) merely because any such
representation, warranty or covenant was or in the future becomes false or unperformed The parties
wish to rely entirely upon those representations, warranties and covenants contained in the Amended
Stock Pledge Agreement (as defined below). All such representations, warranties and covenants
shall be deemed to have been made on the date of this Agreement
AGREEMENTS
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In consideration of the mutual promises contained herein and other good and valuable
consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties agree

1.

Restructure of Redemption Aereement.

I. I
Amended and Restated Down Payment Note. Concurrent with its execution of this
Agreement, Company shall execute an Amended and Restated Down Payment Note ("Amended
Down Payment Note") in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A; and the original note shall be
marked" Amended, Restated, Superseded and Replaced... The Amended Down Payment Note shall
adjust the principal amount of the Down Payment Note to SI,500,000. The principal amount of the
Amended Down Payment Note is hereby acknowledged by the Company to reflect all payments
made by Company with respect to, and all offsets which Company may claim against, such note as
of the date of this Agreement, and any other liabilities Creditor may have to Company (other than
liabilities arising from claims by third parties and liabilities arising under this Agreement or any of
the other Restructured Obligations). In addition, the principal amount of the Amended Down
Payment Note is hereby acknowledged by Creditor to include all amounts (or the present value
thereof) now due or to become due from Company to Creditor under the Original Documents and
all other claims of Creditor against Company whatsoever as of the date of this Agreement, other than
the obligations arising under this Agreement or the other Restructured Obligations. The Amended
Down Payment Note shall bear interest at the rate of9.5% per annum (14% while in default), and
shatI entitle Creditor to monthly payments of principal and interest in the amount of $33, 750 per
month, payable on the first day of each month commencing August I, 1996 and continuing until
such Note is paid in full. The entire balance of principal and accrued but unpaid interest on the
Amended Down Payment Note shall be due and payable on October 31, 1996. The monthly
payment of principal and interest on the Amended Down Payment Note shall be secured by the
Commission Collateral as provided in the Amended and Restated Security Agreement (as defined
below); and all obligations of Company under the Amended Down Payment Note shall be secured
by the Pledged Shares as provided in the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement (as defined below).
I.2
Amended and Restated Security Agreement. Concurrent with the execution of this
Agreement, Company and Creditor shall execute an Amended and Restated Security Agreement
("Amended Security Agreement") in the form attached hereto as Exhibit B; and Company shall
execute such financing statements and other similar documents necessary to perfect Creditor's
securify interest granted pursuant to the Amended Security Agreement. The Amended Security
Agreement shall provide that the Commission Collateral is security only for the payment of monthly
installments of principal and interest under the Amended Down Payment Note and for monthly
installments of interest under the $6M Note. Creditor, Company and the depository institution at
which the Collateral Account (as defined in the Amended Security Agreement) is established shall,
on or before the date of this Agreement, enter into an Escrow Agreement in the form attached thereto
as Exhibit C ("Escrow Agreement").
1.3
Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement. Concurrent with the execution of
this Agreement, the parties shall enter into an Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement
("Amended Stock Pledge Agreement") in the form attached hereto as Exhibit D.
I .4
Termination ofEmployment. Termination of Consulting Agreement and Amendment
of Noncompetition Agreement Effective as of the date of this Agreement, the parties hereby
terminate the Consulting Agreement In addition, Creditor's employment by Company and
Page 3
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Company's obligation to pay Creditor a salary is terminated effective as of the last day of the month
preceding the month in which this Agreement is executed Concurrent with the execution of this
Agreement, Creditor and Company shall enter into an Amended and Restated Noncompetition
Agreement ("Amended Noncompetition Agreement") in the form attached hereto as Exhibit E
1. 5
Amendment to Certain Representations. Warranties and Covenants of Company. The
representations, warranties and covenants made by Company in the Stock Redemption Agreement
or any other Original Document are hereby superseded and replaced by the representations,
warranties and covenants set forth in the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement; and neither Company
nor Creditor shall have any claim for any past, existing or future breach of any representation,
warranty or covenant made in any of the Superseded Documents or any claim for any breach of the
$6M Note if such breach occurred prior to the date of this Agreement
1. 6
Payment of Attorneys' Fees. Concwrent with the execution of this Agreement,
Company shall have entered into a written agreement with Creditor ("Attorney Fee Reimbursement
Agreement") to make periodic installment payments to Creditor's attorneys, Cairncross &
Hempelm~ in addition to any other payments described herein, in accordance with the schedule
attached hereto as Schedule 1.6, to reimburse Creditor for his attorneys' fees incurred prior to the
date of this Agreement in connection with the consummation of and enforcement of the Company's
obligations pursuant to the stock redemption transaction and the drafting of the Restructured
Obligations.

•

1. 7
Office Lease. Col1QJITent with the execution of this Agreement, Company shall enter
into a lease in the form of Exhibit F attached hereto with Reed l Taylor and Advantage Insurance
Agency, Inc. ("Advantage") for the office space currently occupied by Advantage, on the ground
floor ofthe building known as One Lewis Clark Plaza, on terms acceptable to the parties. The lease
shall provide for the payment of monthly rent in the amount of $1500 and shall be for a term
commencing on the date of this Agreement and continuing until the date which is six (6) months
from the date on which the Amended Down Payment Note is paid in full.
1.8
Agreement with Series A Preferred Shareholder. Concurrent with the execution of
this Agreement, Company and Creditor shall have entered into the Series A Preferred Shareholder
Agreement in the form attached hereto as Exhibit G. Such Agreement shall supersede and replace
all of the Series A Preferred Shareholder Letter Agreements.
Definition of Restructured Obligations. "Restructured Obligations" shall mean this
Agreement, the Amended Down Payment Note, the $6M Note, the Amended Security Agreement,
the Escrow Agreement, the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, and the Amended Noncompetition
Agreement.
1.9

2.
Additional Conditions to Restructure. On or before the date of execution of this
Agreement, and as a condition to Creditor's waiver of default and agreement to forbear from
exercising remedies under the Original Docµments, the following shall have occurred:
2.1
Delivery of Universe Certificates. First Interstate Bank shall have delivered to
Creditor any and all original stock certificates representing capital stock of Universe constituting
Pledged Shares.
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2.2
Establishment of Collateral Account. Company's subsidiary, AIA Insurance, Inc
("AIAI"), shall have established the Collateral Account; and Company, AIAI, Creditor and the
depository institution at which the Collateral Account is established shall have entered into the
Escrow Agreement. In addition, AIAI shall have provided written instructions to Mark Twain
Kansas Bank ("Bank") which provide that Bank shall, in accordance with currently effective
instructions and procedures, transfer to the Collateral Account all Commission Collateral deposited
into Account No. 8613004124 at such Bank. Further, Company, AIAI, Creditor and Bank shall have
entered into an agreement which provides that (i) Bank shall immediately notify Creditor of its
receipt of any (a) instruction by AIAI or Company to take any action which would interrupt or
redirect the flow of Commission Collateral into Account No. 86513004124 from any other account
at Bank or the transfer of Commission Collateral from such Account to the Collateral Account, or
(b) re.quest by AIAI or Company to amend that certain lockbox agreement (the "Centennial Lockbox
Agreement") dated June 1, 1995 among AIAI, Universe, The Centennial Life Insurance Company
("Centennial") and Bank, or any notice or instruction delivered to Bank pursuant thereto, or (c)
request by AIAI or Company to move existing bank accounts or establish new bank accounts under
the Centennial Lock Box Agreement; and (ii) Bank shall not implement any such instruction or
request until the lapse of thirty (30) days from delivery of such notice by Bank to Creditor or Bank's
earlier receipt of Creditor's written consent to such instruction or request.
2.3
Payment of Felts Field Bill. Company shall have paid Felts Field Aviation, Inc. the
sum of $15,968.83, which sum constitutes one-half(~) of the total amount claimed by Felts Field
as of July 1, 1996 for repairs to the airplane sold to Creditor pursuant to the stock redemption
transaction Creditor shall be responsible for the payment of the balance of the Felts Field bills; and
Creditor hereby agrees to indemnify Company from and against any and all claims made by Felts
Field relating to the Felts Field bills. In the event Company is sued by Felts Field with respect to any
Felts Field bill, Company may offset any payments it makes to Felts Field and any litigation
expenses incurred by Company in defending such claim against the principal balance of the
Amended Down Payment Note or (if the Amended Down Payment Note has been paid off prior to
such offset) the $6M Note.
2.4
Vesting of Protected Agents. Each insurance agent listed on Schedule 2.4 was
formerly a.o agent of one of the Companies, is now an agent of Advantage Insurance Agency Inc.,
and is now and will remain a "Protected Agent" unless and until such agent loses his Protected
Agent status as provided herein. On or before payment in full of the Amended Down Payment Note,
Company shall pay Creditor the difference between such agent's vested percentage of earned
commissions on insurance policies sold by such agent prior to the date of this Agreement and one
hundred percent (100%) of such earned commissions attributable to the period between Company's
termination of such agent and the date of this Agreement In addition, for so long as such agent
retains Protected Agent status after the date of this Agreement, Company shall pay Creditor the
difference between such agent's vested percentage of earned commissions on insurance policies sold
by such agent prior to the date of this Agreement and one hundred percent ( 100%) of such earned
commissions. Such agent shall lose his Protected Agent status, and Company's payments to Creditor
hereunder shall cease:
(a)
immediately if such agent breaches his agency agreement with Company,
including (without limitation) breach of his agency agreement by "rolling" any policy on which one
of the Companies is receiving premium or a commission; provided, however, that loss of Protected
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Agent status of any such agent shall not affect any obligation of Company to pay override
commissions to any other agent relating to any rolled policy; or

(b)
immediately if such agent becomes an agent of AIA Insurance, Inc on or
before October 31, 1996; or
( c)
the date of termination of his agency relationship with Advantage if such
agent's relationship with Advantage is terminated for any reason.. Creditor covenants and agrees to
notify Company promptly upon termination of any Protected Agent by Advantage.

2.5
Lump Sum Payment Upon execution of this Agreement, Company shall pay
Creditor the sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000), and shall deliver a bill of sale in the form
attached hereto as Schedule 2.5 for furniture, fixtures and equipment now located on the premises
currently leased to Advantage. The parties intend that this bill of sale shall replace in its entirety the
bill of sale delivered to Creditor at the original closing of the redemption transaction.

3.
Mutual Release. Each of Companies and Creditor hereby releases the other from any and
all claims (whether known or unknown, anticipated or unanticipated, contingent or liquidated) such

••••••
r.~~

•••

party may have arising out of previous agreements (including, without limitation, the Original
Documents) or other business arrangement between Company and Creditor or arising out of
Creditor's ownership of or employment by Company prior to the date of this Agreement, other than
those obligations set forth in the Restructured Obligations. Specifically excluded from this mutual
release, however, are unknown claims that might arise out of claims by third parties~ provided that
this exclusion shall not apply to claims against Company by Donna Taylor except to the extent such
claims are based on acts or omissions by Creditor. In particular, Company and Creditor hereby
release each other from any obligations arising out of the payment of expenses associated with the
CAP Program (as defined in the Stock Redemption Agreement), and Company hereby releases
Advantage from any such obligations, except to the extent that such obligations are reflected in the
adjustments made to the principal balance of the Amended Down Payment Note. Except as such
amounts are reflected in the adjustments made to the principal balance of the Amended Down
Payment Note, Creditor releases Company from any liability for the payment of overdue or default
interest for any period prior to the effective date of this Agreement. Company and Creditor gigree
that all currently existing monetary obligations between Company and Creditor are reflected in the
Amended Down Payment Note and the $6M Note, and Company has no right to future offsets
against either note for any monetary obligations arising prior to the date of this Agreement.

4.

General Provisions.

4.1
Capacity in Which Series A Preferred Shareholder is Signing: Consent to
Transaction. Series A Preferred Shareholder is a party to this Agreement for the purpose of
expressing her consent to and approval of the tenns of this Agreement and the accuracy of the
representations made by her in this Section 4.1, and not as a direct beneficiary of the terms hereof,
and she shall have no right arising solely out of this Agreement to enforce, or to seek any remedy
for the breach of, any of the terms of this Agreement Rather, her rights shall be governed by the
Company's Articles of Incorporation and the terms of the Series A Preferred Shareholder
Agreement. Series A Preferred Shareholder represents and warrants to Company and to Creditor
that she has been advised to consult, and has had the opportunity to consult, with independent legal
counsel regarding this Agreement and the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement, that she has
Page6
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read and fully understands the terms of this Agreement and the Series A Preferred Shareholder
Agreement, and that she consents to and approves the terms hereof and thereof, including but not
limited to Company's agreement to pay Creditor in accordance with the terms of the Amended Down
Payment Note and the $6M Note (subject, however, to the subordination provisions of the Series
A Preferred Shareholder Agreement).
4.2
or effect.

Status of Superseded Documents The Superseded Documents are of no further force

4.3
Waiver. Forbearance.. Creditor hereby waives any and all defaults alleged in the
Notice of Default or which could have been alleged under the Original Documents prior to the
effective date of this Agreement, and further agrees to forbear from exercising any remedy he may
have had for any such default under the Original Documents.

•

44
Amendments and Waivers. The provisions ohhis Agreement may be amended only
by the written agreement of Company, Series A Preferred Shareholder and Creditor. Except as
otherwise provided herein, any waiver, permit, consent or approval of any kind or character on the
part of either Company, Series A Preferred Shareholder or Creditor of any provision or condition
of this Agreement must be made in writing and shall be effective only to the extent specificaHy set ··
forth in such writing. No action taken pursuant to this Agreement, including any investigation by
or on behalf of either Company, Series A Preferred Shareholder or Creditor, shall be deemed to
constitute a waiver by the party taking such action of compliance with any representation, warranty,
covenant or agreement contained herein. The waiver by either Company, Series A Preferred
Shareholder or Creditor of a breach of any provision of this Agreement shall not operate or be
construed as a waiver of any subsequent breach.
4.5
Governing Law. The validity, meaning and effect of this Agreement shall be
determined in accordance with the laws of the State ofldaho.
4. 6
Entire Agreement. This Agreement, including the exhibits hereto, and the ancillary
documents expressly referred to herein, constitute the entire agreement of the parties concerning the
matters referred to herein and ~upersede all prior agreements and understandings, oral or written,
all of which are hereby superseded and canceled.
4. 7
Execution in Counteq>arts. This Agreement may be executed in any number of
counterparts, each of which when so executed and delivered shall be deemed an original, and such
counterparts together shall constitute one instrument

EFFECTIVE as of the date first set forth above
COMPANY•

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION

CREDITOR:

REED J TAYLOR
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SERIES A PREFERRED
SHAREHOLDER

DONNA TAYLOR

fu,U- ~~14v
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MICHAEL S. BISSELL. ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane,~A 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111

Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.:

CV !18 -t117 65

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

v.
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
GARY D. BABBITI, an individual; D. JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAmEY LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES 1-X,
unknown individuals;

Category: A.I.
Fee: $88.00

Defendants.
.,

Reed J. Taylor, by and through his atto~eys of J:FCord, CAMPBELL, BISSELL &
KIRBY, PLLC, alleges as follows (all applicable facts alleged below are incorporated by
reference into each cause of action as necessary to support each such cause of action):
I. PARTms.

1.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor is a resident of Lewiston, Nez Perce County,

Idaho. Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor is an elderly person as defined in J.C. § 48-608.

I.
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2.

Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawley Troxell") is an

Idaho limited liability partnership in the business of practicing law. Hawley Troxell is
'•

vicariously liable for the acts of the individual Defendants.
Defendant Gary D. Babbitt is an individual residing in the state of Idaho

3.

and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley Troxell.

4.

Defendant D. John Ashby is an individual residing in the state of Idaho

and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho w.ith and for Hawley Troxell.
5.

Defendant Patrick V. Collins is an individual residing in the state ofldaho

and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley Troxell.
6.

Defendant Richard A. Riley is an individual residing in the state of Idaho

and is an attorney in the state ofldaho with and for Hawley Troxell.
7.

Jane Does 1-X are unknown individuals who are and/or were attorneys that

participated in the tortious acts and conduct alleged against the above known defendants
with and for Hawley Troxell.
II. JURISDICTION. VENUE AND CLAIMS
8.

The Defendants transacted business through the practice of law in Nez

Perce County, Idaho, and have an expectation of be1ng '.nained as defendants in Nez Perce
The Defendants committed tortious acts and/or assisted in the

County, Idaho.

commission of tortious acts in Nez Perce County, Idaho. The Defendants' tortious act$
and/or assistance have inflicted damages upon a resident of Nez Perce County, Idaho.
9.

Damages in this action exceed $10,000.

Jurisdiction and venue are,

therefore, appropriate in Nez Perce County District Court.
.•
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10.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Complaint is not a derivative action. Plaintiff

Reed J. Taylor is the pledgee of all of the shares of AIA Insurance, Inc., the only
shareholder of AJA Insurance, Inc. by way of holding all of its shares as collateral, and
the largest creditor of AIA Services Corporation (Reed J. Taylor is owed over $8,500,000
and AIA Services Corporation is insolvent).

AIA Services Corporation and AIA

Insurance, Inc. 's value and net assets are insufficient to pay the over $8,500,000, plus
interest and attorneys' fees and costs, owed to Reed J. Taylor. Therefore, Plaintiff Reed
J. Taylor is entitled to bring certain claims directly against the Defendants for certain

damages.

ID. FACTS
11.

At all material times, Plaintiff Reed J, Taylor was owed over $6,000,000

by AIA Services Corporation through a promissory note dated August 1, 1995. Plaintiff
Reed J. Taylor is presently owed over $8,500,000 by AIA Services Corporation. At all
material times, the Defendants had full knowledge of AIA Services Corporation's debt
and contractual obligations owed to Reed J. Taylor.
12.

AIA Services Corporation was .in default of the $6,000,000 promissory

note when it failed to pay the note when it mafured on August 1, 2005. Although
unnecessary since the $6,000,000 promissory note matured on August l, 2005, demand
for payment was properly served upon AIA Services Corporation by Plaintiff Reed J.
Taylor on December 12, 2006, a copy of which was also provided to Defendant Richard
A. Riley pursuant to the notice provisions of the agreements. AJA Services Corporation

was insolvent in 2001, and has continued to be insolvent from said date.
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13.

Since 1996, as security for the over $8,500,000 owed by AJA Services

Corporation, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor was granted and possessed a security interest in all
of the stock of AIA Insurance, Inc. and all of the commissions and related receivables of

AIA Insurance, Inc. and AIA Services Corporation. Pursuant to the Amended and
Restated Stock Pledge Agreement dated July l,' 1996, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor had the
contractual right upon default of AIA Services Corporation to vote the stock of AIA
Insurance, Inc., and take operational control of AIA Insurance, Inc. Plaintiff Reed J.
Taylor's right to vote the stock of AIA Insurance was also perfected through AIA
Services Corporation's irrevocable power of attorney granted to Reed J. Taylor that was
coupled with an interest as required by I.C § 30-1-722.
14.

On February 22, 2007. Reed J.' Taylor voted the stock of AIA Insurance,

Inc. and attempted to take control of it pursuant to his contractual rights as provided
under the law, the contract documents, and I.C. § 30-1-722. However, the interested
directors of AIA Insurance, Inc. (including R. John Taylor) by and through the
Defendants intentionally assisted in breaching the terms of the Amended and Restated
Stock Pledge Agreement and refused to acknowledge Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's valid vote
of the stock of AIA Insurance, Inc. and refused to surrender control as required. The
Defendants further engaged in inappropriate conduct in assisting interested parties
(including R. John Taylor) in obtaining and/or maintaining a restraining order and
preliminary injunction against Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, when the Defendants knew there
was no legitimate legal basis to do so, that doing so' was an intentional violation and

'tortious interference with Reed J. Taylor's contractual rights, and that the assets and
funds of AIA Insurance, Inc. were being misappropriated and/or not safeguarded.
'-. -.~·
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15.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor has a pending civil action against AIA Services

Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor, and
others for claims of fraud, fraudulent conveyance, civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches
of :fiduciary duties and other claims under Nez Perce County Case No.

CV-07~00208

("Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al."), and therein Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
obtained an order of partial summary judgment for AJA Services Corporation's default of
the $6,000,000 promissory note and corresponding default of the Amended and Restated
Stock Pledge Agreement. By way of this partial summary judgment and/or his prior vote
of the stock, Reed J. Taylor would and should be in actual control of AIA Insurance, Inc.
but for the actions and R. John Taylor, which Defendants, with full knowledge of Reed J.
Taylor's rights, facilitated and aided and abetted to the detriment of AI.A Services
Corporation, A.IA Insurance, Inc. and Reed J. Taylor.

16.

With the Defendants full knowledge, Reed J. Taylor's claims asserted in

Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al. included claims for breaches of fiduciary duty,
conspiracy, fraudulent conveyance, and fraud perpetrated by R. John Taylor and others
(including Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.), including but not limited to claims that R.
John Taylor had wrongfully transferred over $1,500,000 of AIA Insurance, Inc. 's cash to
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., for no consideration and had transferred
approximately $700,000 of the assets of AIA Insurance, Inc. to Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc. for no consideration. R. John. Taylor was at all material times also. an
:;

interested director, officer and shareholder of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. Also

!

included in the civil action were other claims that R. John Taylor and others had engaged
in self-dealing and/or fraudulent transactions with AIA Services Corporation and/or AIA
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Insurance, Inc. to the detriment of the corporations and Reed J. Taylor, and for the
personal benefit of R. John Taylor and other interested parties (including Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc.).
17.

In 2007, Defendants appeared in the civil action, Taylor v. AJA Services

Corporation, et al., and assumed legal representation of two distinct clients, AIA

Services Corporation, a corporation, and AIA Insurance, Inc., a corporation, and also

represented the interests of R. John Taylor, an individual, and other interested parties
(including Connie Taylor, James Beck and Michael Cashman). At all material times
John Taylor was an interested CEO and director of AIA Services Corporation and AIA
Insurance, Inc. and an interested majority shareholder of AIA Services Corporation. The

civil action clearly alleged acts of fraud, civil conspiracy, conversion, and breaches of
fiduciary duty perpetrated by R. John Taylor and others against AIA Services
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc., and such acts having damaged and continuing to
cause damages to the corporations, their shareholders and creditors. In violation of the

Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care, the Defendants· undertook to
represent the three named clients AIA Services Corporation, AJA Insurance, Inc., and
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., each having irreconcilable conflicts of interest with
the other.

18.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's attorney, Roderick C. Bond, advised the

Defendants in May 2007, that it was not appropriate for the Defendants to represent AIA
Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc., and/or to take direction from R. John
Taylor because of various conflicts of interest and the fact that R. John Taylor was an

interested party. Despite the warning and demandS made by Reed J. Taylor's attorney,
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Roderick C. Bond, the Defendants also appeared and represented Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc., which was created additional conflicts of interest, resulted in a breach of
the Defendants' fiduciary duties (including the duty of loyalty) owed to AIA Services
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc., and was a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct and their duty of care.
19.

The Defendants inappropriately entered into and/or participated in a Joint

Defense Agreement(s) knowing that AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc.,
Crop USA Insurance, Inc., R. John Taylor and other named and unnamed individuals in
Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al. had clear irreconcilable conflicting and

diverging interests in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and duty of care, and
to the detriment AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and Reed J. Taylor. In

Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al., a Joint Defense Agreements was not

permissible or appropriate because it would perpetuate fraud, conspiracy, aiding and
abetting, and other causes of action, was entered into without obtaining informed consent
from disinterested representatives of the corporations, and the Joint Defense Agreement
was also independently not appropriate or permitted when certain parties to a joint
defense agreement should be asserting claims against other parties to the agreement. The
Joint Defense Agreement(s) in question have assisted in others (including R. John Taylor
and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) to perpetrate and/or hide acts of fraud, fraudulent
conveyances, civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and other claims,
while also assisting the Defendants in inappropriately obtaining payment of fees and
costs in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct 8nd their duty of care.
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20.

The Defendants assisted AIA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc.,

Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R John Taylor, and others in entering into various
inappropriate agreements and transactions which were in violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct and their duty of care, were not in the best interests of the
corporations, not authorized by disinterested parties, constituted fraud and/or the
inappropriate transfer of assets and funds belonging to· AIA Services Corporation and/or
AIA Insurance, Inc., were not arms-length transactions, and/or were done so without
requiring AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and/or Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc. to retain separate independent counsel that were retained by separate
independent uninterested parties.
21.

As attorneys for AIA Services Corporation. an entity, the Defendants

owed duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care,
and under the law to the corporation and its shareholders to preserve and protect the
assets and businesses of the corporation, and since AIA Services Corporation was
As attorney for AIA Services

insolvent, to its creditors including Reed J. Taylor.
Corporation, and in light of the claims made against

R.

John Taylor and others by the

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, the Defendants owed a duty to their entity client not to assume
representation of the interests of R. John Taylor, individually and/or through a Joint

Defense Agreement, or with any other interested parties.
22.

As attorneys for AIA Insurance, Inc., an entity, the Defendants owed

duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct their duty of care and the
law to the corporation and its shareholders including a creditor pledgee of the
corporation's stock, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, with contractual rights to vote the shares and
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assume control and who had exercised his contractual rights and had voted the shares but
whose rights were breached and rejected by interested directors and others who were in
control of the corporation including R. John Taylor. As attorneys for AIA Insurance, Inc.

and in light of the claims made against R. John Taylor and others by the Plaintiff Reed J.
Taylor, the Defendants owed a duty to their entity client not to assume representation of
the interests of R. John Taylor, individually and/or through any Joint Defense Agreement,
and/or of other interested parties (including Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., Connie
Taylor, James Beck and Michael Cashman).
23.

As attorneys representing the interests of R. John Taylor through a Joint

Defense Agreement, the Defendants owed their duties first and foremost to AIA Services
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct, duty of care and/or the law. As attorneys for R. John Taylor by and through
taking directions and/or accepting decisions made by him knowing that he was interested
and should have claims asserted against him, and mlight of the claims against R. John
Taylor by the Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, the Defendants owed a duty to their corporate
clients not to assume representation of the interests of R. John Taylor, Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc. or other interested parties. The Defendants failed to notify or
obtain appropriate infonned consents or approvals from appropriate parties or

disinterested shareholders in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the
Defendants' duty of care, and the Bylaws and Articles· of Fonnation of the corporations,
all to the detriment of Reed J. Taylor. The Defendants inappropriately participated in a
Joint Defense Agreement.
.•.r .
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24.

As present and/or former attorneys' for AIA Services Corporation and/or

AIA Insurance, Inc. (individually or through any Joint Defense Agreement) the
Defendants owed duties of loyalty to the corporations and could not represent R. John
Taylor or Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. in Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al.
or represent or assist R. John Taylor in Donna Taylor v. R. John Taylor because the

Defendants' loyalty belongs exclusively to AIA Services Corporation and/or AIA
Insurance, Inc. Furthermore, the Defendants could in no way represent Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc. or participate in any joint defense of Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc. or other interested parties (such as R. John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James
Beck, and/or Michael Cashman) as AJA Services Corporation and/or AJA Insurance, Inc.
should have been asserting claims against Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., each other,

and other interested and uninterested parties.
25.

Defendants represented, and continue to represent, the interests ofR. John

Taylor (individually and/or through a Joint Defense Agreement) and with full .knowledge
that R. John Taylor is an interested party and director of AIA Services Corporation and
AIA Insurance, Inc. and is personally inappropriately conducting and controlling the
course of litigation involving the Defendants'

clien~,

AIA Services Corporation and AIA

Insurance, Inc., while also inappropriately representing Crop USA Insurance Agency,
Inc. to the detriment of the corporations and Reed J. Taylor.
26.

During the course of the civil action after March 28, 2007, the Defendants

have coordinated and participated with Quarles & Brady LLP, the law firm that bas

represented AIA Services and AIA Services Corporation before and throughout litigation,
1:

and Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A., the law firm that formerly represented AIA
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Service Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. in Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al.
During the course of the civil action after March 28, 2007, R. John Taylor and others
have further engaged in inappropriate and/or wrongful transactions involving themselves,
AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.,
which transactions have occurred with Defendants knowledge and/or assistance, and to

the detriment of AIA Services Corporation, AJA Insurance, Inc., and Plaintiff Reed J.
Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee.
27.

Defendants are liable to Reed J. Taylor for an amount to be proven at trial

because the Defendants have provided substantial assistance and/or aided and abetted R.
John Taylor, AJA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., Crop USA Insurance

Agency, Inc., and/or other interested parties in acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances,
conversion, civil conspiracy, and breaches of fiduciary duties.

The acts of fraud,

fraudulent conveyances, civil conspiracy, conversion, and breaches of fiduciary duties
include, but are not limited to: 1) While purporting to represent AJA Insurance, Inc. and
AIA Services Corporation, the Defendants assisted and/or aided and abetted R. John
Taylor in the tortious interference with the a8sertion of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's
contractual rights to control and operate AJ.A Insurance, Inc., which has proximately
caused damages to Reed J. Taylor; 2) While purporting to represent AIA Services
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc., the Defendants inappropriately assisted and/or
aided and abetted R. John Taylor and other interested parties to engage in tortious
transactions involving R. John Taylor, AJA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc.,
and/or Crop USA Insurance Agency, Jnc., which such transactions have been to the
detriment of AJA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and Reed J. Taylor, and
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proximately caused damages to Reed J. Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee; and 3)
While representing R. John Taylor, individually or through a Joint Defense Agreement,
the Defendants have had full knowledge that their client is an interested party and

..

director of AIA Services Corporation, AJA Insurance, Inc., and Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc., and is personally conducting and controlling the comse of litigation
involving the Defendants' former clients, AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance,
Inc., and Defendants have assisted and/or aided and abetted R. John Taylor and others
(including, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) and has coordinated and participated with
the Hawley Troxell and Quarles & Brady in R. John Taylor's engaging in tortious
transactions involving himself, AJA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and Ctop
USA Insurance Agency, Inc., which transactions have been to the detriment of AIA
Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. and proximately caused damages to Reed

J. Taylor as a creditor and stock pledgee.
28.

In connection with the Defendants' inappropriate representation and/or

joint defense of R. John Taylor, AIA Serviees C~rporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., Crop

USA Insurance Agency, Inc., and other interested parties (including Connie Taylor,
James Beck, and Michael Cashman) the Defendants accepted payments of attorneys fees
and costs believed to exceed $500,000 in violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct, their duty of care, and as participating and/or assisting in inappropriate
corporate acts and the aiding and abetting of others.
29.

Over the course of the litigation in Reed J. Taylor v. AJA Services

Corporation, et al., Reed J. Taylor's attorney in that action, Roderick C. Bond of Smith,
~-

.,

.

·•.

Cannon & Bond PLLC, advised the Defendants on numerous occasions that their conduct
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violated Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care, was inappropriate, and
constituted the aiding and abetting of other interested and uninterested parties (including
R John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.), among other potential legal
claims against them.

In early 2007, Mr. Bond advised the Defendants that their

inappropriate actions would result in claims being filed against them by Reed J. Taylor.
Mr. Bond reiterated these warnings orally and in writing on numerous occasions. Despite

Mr. Bond's warnings, the Defendants conduct persisted thereby further damaging Reed J.
Taylor. The Defendants disregard of Mr. Bond's warnings can only be construed as
intentional improper acts to assist R. John Taylor and other interested parties to the
detriment of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor.
30.

The Defendants wrongfully assisted R. John Taylor and other interested

parties in operating Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. with the funds, assets, employees,
trade secrets and other things of value inappropriately obtained from AI.A Services
Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc., and by assisting R. John Taylor and other
interested parties (including Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) in preventing claims
from being asserted and prosecuted against them. The Defendants wrongfully assisted

and/or failed to prevent interested parties (including R. John Taylor) in transferring the
long-tenn employees of AIA Insurance, Inc. to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., while
at the same time representing to the Court in Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation that the
corporations were being operated properly and/or failing to advise the Court of the
inappropriate acts and transactions. All the while the Defendants were aware of and/or
assisted in the inappropriate payment of salaries, benefits, compensation, and director
fees of $20,000 per year when A1A Services Corporation was insolvent.
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31.

Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made personally and through his

attorney Roderick C. Bond) that the Defendants take action to protect the assets and
funds of AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. and recover funds and assets
from R. John Taylor, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. and other interested and
uninterested parties for the benefit of the corporations and Reed J. Taylor, the Defendants
refused to act in accordance with the Rules of Profession Conduct, their duty of care, and
the law. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made through his attorney Roderick C.
Bond) that interests of the minority disinterested shareholders be considered and/or
protected because of the wrongful acts ofR. John Taylor and other interested parties, the
Defendants refused to act and failed to fully and properly disclose all pertinent facts to
the disinterested shareholders and request their votes.
32.

In various motions, responses and affidavits submitted to the court in

Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al., the Defendants made arguments that did not
benefit AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., or Reed J. Taylor,
inappropriately made other arguments preventing valid claims from being asserted
against R. John Taylor, James Beck, Connie Taylor, Michael Cashman, and other
interested and uninterested parties, and failed to take action against responsible parties
(including R. John Taylor, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., Connie Taylor, James
Beck, Michael Cashman, Lancelot Investors Fund, and others).

In the instance of

Michael Cashman, the Defendants successfully argued to the Court in Taylor v. AIA.

Services Corporation, et al. that Mr. Cashman should not be named as an individual
when the Defendants should have been talcing action against Mr. Cashman and others.
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33.

Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made through his attorney Roderick C.

Bond) that disinterested directors and/or parties must direct the litigation on behalf of the
corporations, the Defendants refused and permitted and/or assisted R. John Taylor and
other interested parties to direct the litigation to the detriment of the corporations and
Reed J. Taylor. Despite Reed J. Taylor's de~ands (made through his attorney Roderick
C. Bond) that action be taken to terminate AIA Insurance, Inc. 's improper guarantee of a
$15,000,000 line-of-credit for Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., the Defendants refused
to act, failed to inform or fully disclose to disinterested parties or shareholders the
existence of such inappropriate loan guarantees, and threatened to take legal action
against Reed J. Taylor if he tried to rescind or terminate the improper guarantee (since
Defendant Gary D. Babbitt's threat, the balance o( the loan has increased by over
$5 ,500,000 to over $10,500,000). 1
34.

The Defendants' conduct has violated Idaho Rules of Professional

Conduct and their duty of care, which require the Defendants to disgorge all attorneys'
fees and costs paid to them in Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al. and for other
related and/or unrelated legal services. Despite Reed

1: Taylor's demands (made through

his attorney Roderick C. Bond) to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct and
their duty of care, the Defendants refused to do so.
35.

Through the acts of the Defendants, the value of AIA Insurance, Inc. and

the assets of AIA Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. have plummeted in
value, the corporations' value and assets have been impaired, and/or the assets and funds
have been transferred to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. Through the acts of the
·-

1 The

$15,000,000 loan subject to the guarantee is believed to be in technical detilult Damages for any loss
from the guarantee would accrue upon tho time of the loss or threatened litigation by the lender and,
accordingly, would be additional damages asserted against the Defendants at.that time.
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Defendants, ownership of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. was vested and has
remained vested in interested parties (including R. John Taylor), while the major creditor
Reed J. Taylor and minority shareholders were left with nothing. Despite Reed J.
Taylor's demands (through his attorney Roderick C. Bond) that action should also be
taken for the interests of the innocent minority shareholders and creditors, the Defendants

have refused to take action and inappropriately assisted the interested parties (including
R. John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck and Michael Cashman).
36.

Despite the Defendants having made several legal arguments that lacked

merit, lacked good faith and/or were not grounded in facts, the Defendants provided a
settlement offer to Reed J. Taylor in Taylor v. AJA. Services Corporation, et al., which
included a provision that he release all claims against the Defendants as a condition of the
settlement. The inclusion of such a provision was a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct and Defendants' duty of care.

The Defendants also refused to make any

provisions for disinterested minority shareholders of AJA Services ,Corporation as
requested by Reed J. Taylor.
37.

The Defendants ·have assisted in the inappropriate acts of R. John Taylor

.

and other interested parties in stopping all payments to Reed J. Taylor and Donna J.
Taylor, Reed J. Taylor's former wife and the holder of all outstanding Preferred A Shares
of AIA Services Corporation. Like Reed J. Taylor, Donna J. Taylor is required to be a

member of the board of directors of AJA Services! Corporation. Like Reed J. Taylor, the
Defendants have assisted R. John Taylor and other interested parties in preventing Reed

J. Taylor and Donna J. Taylor from being members of the board of directors of AIA
Services Corporation, which has further far reaching ramifications and results in
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additional damages against the Defendants.
38.

With full knowledge of AIA Services Corporation's obligations to ensure

that Reed J. Taylor and Donna J. Taylor are members of AIA Services Corporation's
board until they were paid in full, the Defendants proceeded to attend and participate in

inappropriate board meetings and/or take inappropriate action based upon board meetings
held by interested directors without Reed J. :raylor or Donna J. Taylor being present and
without providing them the opportunity to be present, which further results in all such
meetings and decisions being null and void, and the Defendants being liable for the
associated damages.
39.

The Defendants represented AIA Services Corporation and AIA

Insurance, Inc. in litigation with the state of Idaho. The litigation was funded by AIA
Insurance, Inc. by and through commission in which Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor held a

.

security interest of which the Defendants had full knowledge.

The litigation was

resolved, however, instead of titling the $1,200,000 Mortgage that was received as
settlement in the name of AJA Insurance, Inc., the Defendants titled the mortgage only in
the name of AJA Services Corporation in an inappropriate scheme to keep the mortgage
from AJA Insurance, Inc. and Reed J. Taylor. The Defendants then inappropriately
represented AIA Services CoI})oration, AJA Insurance, Inc. and Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc. by drafting documents to assist in the inappropriate pledge of the
$1,200,000 Mortgage to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. to facilitate the payment of
the Defendants' services in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of
care, and the law. The Defendants assisted and/or failed to prevent and/or notify
disinterested parties or the Court that AIA Services Corporation had inappropriately
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pledged its sole remaining other significant asset, the $1,200,000 mortgage, to Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc. to facilitate the payment of $500,000 for the Defendants' services
in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care, and the law.
40.

The Defendants omitted and/or misrepresented material facts to the Court

in Taylor v. AIA Services Corporation, et al. to the detriment of Reed J. Taylor. In

several instances, the Defendants persuaded the Court to take action that was not in the
best interests of the corporations or Reed J. Taylor, to the detriment of the corporations
and Reed J. Taylor (including consenting to the issuance of only a $200,000 bond when

the Defendants knew that the corporations were not being operated properly or their
assets safeguarded).
41.

The Defendants have inappropriately assisted R. John Taylor and other

interested parties in misallocating and not allocating expenses and/or services provided
and borne by AJA Insurance, Inc. and/or AIA Services Corporation for the benefit of
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor and other interested parties. Upon
information and belief, the Defendants have assisted in issuing inappropriate opinion
letters to auditors of AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and/or Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc. to assist R. Jobn Taylor and other interested parties in transferring
and utilizing the assets, employees, labor, funds and resources of AIA Insurance, Inc.
and/or AIA Services Corporation for the benefit of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc
while providing no or little consideration in return.
42.

The Defendants had full knowledge of R. John Taylor's Executive

Officer's Agreement, which, upon information and belief, was drafted by Defendant
Richard A. Riley. Regardless, Defendant Richard A. Riley had full knowledge of the
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existence and terms of R. John Taylor's Execl;ltive Officer's Agreement with AIA
Services Corporation.

Even though R. John Taylor has breached the terms of his

employment contract with AIA Services Corporation by competing against AIA Services
Corporation through Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. (and violating the corporate
opportunity doctrine), by soliciting employees of AJA Insurance, Inc., and other
inappropriate actions, the Defendants have intentionally refused to act in the best interests
of AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., their shareholders, and/or Reed J.
Taylor, to the detriment of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor.
43.

The Defendants assisted in inappropriately transferring and retaining

funds, assets and property to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. to defraud AIA Services

Corporation's creditor Reed J. Taylor (including, without limitation, over $95,000 owed
by Pacific Empire Radio Corporation to AIA Insurance, Inc., assistance in transferring

shares of the Pacific Empire Radio Corporation to R. John Taylor, and failing to collect

the over $300,000 owed by R. John Taylor) by not reporting such acts

to disinterested

parties or other appropriate parties as required by the Rules of Professional Conduct and
their duty of care.

44.

In April 2007, the Defendants pennitted and/or assisted interested parties

in holding a joint board meeting of AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc.
with full knowledge that Reed J. Taylor and Donna J. Taylor were being intentionally

denied their right to be on the board of AIA Services Corporation and participating in
such meetings (Donna Taylor has subordinated her right to payment in favor of Reed J.
Taylor). At the meeting held in April 2007, the Defendants permitted and/or assisted R.
.....

John Taylor to appoint Connie Taylor and James Beck to the boards of AIA Services
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Corporation and AJA Insurance, Inc. knowing that they were interested parties who AJA

Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. should be pursuing claims against, that
they inappropriately held shares in Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., that they were
inappropriately being paid $20,000 per year to attend the board meeting of an insolvent

corporation, and that they did not meet the required st~dards necessary to be members of
such boards as set forth under the corporations' bylaws. The Defendants inappropriately
permitted and/or assisted two interested parties, Connie Taylor and James Beck, to
approve and/or consent to a Joint Retainer and Joint Defense Agreement with Hawley
Troxell and others, which also facilitated the inappropriate joint legal representations of
interested parties with conflicting irreconcilable interests and the payment of attorneys'
fees and costs to various attorneys in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and
their duty of care.
45.

Despite demands to the contrary, the Defendants continued to take

instructions and/or directives from the unauthorized boards (or R. John Taylor) of AIA

Services Corporation and/or AJA Insurance, Inc. knowiiig that the boards are not properly
seated and are comprised of interested parties (including R. John Taylor) with significant

claims that should be asserted against them in violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, their duty of care, and/or the law.
IV. FIRST CAUSES OF ACTIONS
46.

The Defendants have damaged Reed J. Taylor by aiding and abetting

and/or assisting others (including R. John Taylor

and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.)

in the commission oftortious acts.

a•·

f
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The Defendants committed tortious acts in concert with others (including

47.

R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) and/or pursuant to a common
design or civil conspiracy with others (including R John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc.).
48.

The Defendants knew that the conduct of others (including R. John Taylor

and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) constituted breach of duties and gave substantial
assistance and/or encouragement to others (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc.) in breaching said duties.

The Defendants' conduct also

constitutes the assistance of interested parties (including R John Taylor and Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc.) with the tortious interference of AIA Services Corporation and
Reed J. Taylor's contractual rights, which such contractual rights the Defendants had

intimate knowledge.
49.

The Defendants gave substantial assistance to others (including R John

Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) in committing and/or accomplishing
tortious conduct and/or acts, and the Defendants' conduct, separately considered,
constitutes the breaches of duties owed to the corporations and/or Reed J. Taylor.
50.

The Defendants conduct constitutes aiding and abetting of others

(including R. Jolm Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) and/or constitutes the
conduct of a contributing tortfeasors, and such conduct has damaged Plaintiff Reed J.
Taylor in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.
V. SECONP. CAUSES OF ACTIONS
51.

Reed J. Taylor holds and has held a valid and perfected security interest in

all of the commissions and related receivables of AIA Services Corporation and AIA
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Insurance, Inc.
52.

All of the shares of AIA Insurance, Inc. were pledged to Reed J. Taylor as

collateral for the over $8,500,000 owed to him by AIA Services Corporation. By way of
this pledge and his prior vote of the stock in February 2007, Reed J. Taylor is entitled to

possession and control of all of the assets of AIA Insurance, Inc.
53.

The Defendants were fully aware of Reed J. Taylor's rights to property in

which he held a security interest and was pledged to him as collateral. In fact, Defendant ·
Richard A. Riley represented AIA Services Corporation in the redemption of Reed J.

Taylor's shares and the drafting of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement
and other applicable agreements. Defendants were responsible for issuing opinion letters
relating to the transaction, which include various applicable representations and
warranties. Defendants are now asserting arguments counter to the representations made
in the opinion letter drafted by Defendants by and through Defendant Richard A. Riley.
Defendants also assisted in the commission of torts by R. John Taylor, Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc., and other interested parties by representing the corporations in

various inappropriate transactions.
54.

The Defendants have received substantial payments believed to exceed

$500,000 for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs, which such payments the
Defendants had no lawful right to possess or retain and were received in violation of the

Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care.
55.

The Defendants also knew that the disinterested minority shareholders of

AIA Services Corporation (innocent shareholders) were never advised of the significant
claims against the interested parties (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance
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Agency, Inc.) and the significant misappropriation of the corporations' assets, but
provided legal services on behalf of the interested parties and accepted payment from
AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. In connection with the payment of
attorneys• fees and costs to other named parties in Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et
al., the Defendants failed to obtain the necessary approvals from Reed J. Taylor or other

disinterested parties to the detriment of the corporations and Reed J. Taylor.

The·

Defendants also assisted in the inappropriate titling and pledging of a $1.2 Million
Mortgage owned by AIA Services Corporation to facilitate the payment of funds to them.

The Defendants have also accepted the payment of services for attomeys' fees and costs
rendered for Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., which were paid by the money and/or
assets of AIA Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc.
56.

The Defendants• conduct constitutes the willful interference with property

and money belonging to AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and/or Reed J.
Taylor and/or which such property and money should be under the possession and/or
control of Reed J. Taylor, as the person entitled to such money and property as a creditor
and pledgee. The Defendants deprived Reed J. Taylor possession of such property and
money. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands, the Defendants have refused to return such
property and money.
57.

The Defendants' conduct constitutes conversion and such conduct has

damaged Reed J. Taylor in an amount to proven at trial or on summary judgment.
VI. mIRD CAUSES OF ACTIONS

58.

The Defendants' conduct has been unconscionable. The have engaged in.

acts, conduct, and representations that were false, misleading, deceptive and/or '
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violation of I.C. § 48-601, et seq. The Defendants' acts, omission, representations and
conduct constitute unfair and/or deceptive acts and/or practices in trade pertaining to the
practice oflaw pursuant to I.C. § 48-601, et seq.
59.

The Defendants' actions have resulted in the loss of over 25% of Reed J.

Taylor's retirement funds and/or such other harm as set forth under I.C. § 48-608(2)(a).
As such, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor is entitled damages, which such amount is also subject
to treble damages pursuant to I.C. § 48-608.
VII. FOURm CAUSES OF ACTIONS
60.

AIA Services Corporation is a trustee of Reed J. Taylor in light of its

insolvency and the fact that it owes Reed J. Taylor over $8,500,000. At the very least,
AIA Insurance, Inc. is a trustee of Reed J. Taylor because all of its shares are pledged to
Reed J. Taylor and he voted the shares in February 2007 naming himself the sole director

and officer of AIA Insurance, Inc.
61.

The Defendants' clients were trustees and/or fiduciaries performing

similar functions for a non-client, Reed J. Taylor. The Defendants knew that their

appropriate actions were necessary with respect to the representation of AIA Services
Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. to take action to prevent and/or rectify the
breaches of fiduciary duties owed by AIA Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance,
Inc. to Reed J. Taylor when such breaches were crimes and/or fraud and/or the
Defendants assisted and/or are assisting in the breaches. Reed J. Taylor was not able to
protect his rights because of the Defendants' actions and the Defendants' obligations to
AIA Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. would not be significantly
impaired because the best interests of all the foregoing is to collect sums owed by others
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and recover damages for the improper tortious conduct of others (including R. John
Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.);
62.

The Defendants owed AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc.

and/or Reed J. Taylor a duty of care to provide, including, but not limited to, reasonable,
prudent, ethical, unconflicted, loyal and professional legal advice and legal representation
in keeping with the standard of care in the legal profession and as owed to the
corporations (referred to herein and above as "duty of c~"). The Defendants breached
their duty of care as a result of their acts and/or omissions thereby damaging the
corporations and Reed J. Taylor, to the detriment of Reed J. Taylor.
63.

The Defendants breached their fiduciary duties owed to AIA Services

Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and/or Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, including, without
limitation, the duties of care and loyalty.
64.

The Defendants' acts constitute professional negligence and/or breach of

the Defendants' fiduciary duties, and such conduct has damaged the corporations and
Reed J. Taylor, in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.

VDI. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor demands

atrial by jury of not less than twelve

(12) on all claims and damages so triable.

IX. PRAYER FOR RELIEF,
WHEREFORE~

1.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor prays for the following relief:

For a judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, for $10,500,000

in damages ($3,500,000 in actual damages and $7,000,000 in treble damages), the exact
amount of which will be proven at trial and/or on summary judgment, plus an award of
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pre-judgment and post-judgment interest;
2.

For a judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, for treble

damages of $7,000,000, the exact amount to be proven at trial pursuant to J.C. § 48608(2);

3.

For a judgment requiring the disgorgement of the payments of all

attorneys' fees and costs paid to the Defendants by AIA Services Corporation and/or AIA
Insurance, Inc.;
4.

For judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, for additional

damages as provided under I.C. § 48-608;
5.

For such other relief as may be available to Reed J. Taylor pursuant to J.C.

§ 48-601, et seq. or the law, including, without limitation, obtaining a preliminary

injunction to restrain the Defendants from undertaking further representation;
6.

For an award of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's attorneys fees and costs

incurred in this action pursuant to Idaho Law, including, without limitation, J.C. § 48608, J.C. § 12-120 and/or LC. § 12-121; and
7.

For such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

DATED

thi~day of August, 2008.

.

YPLLC
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MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, VIA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TilE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR Tiffi COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.:
Plaintiff,

CV 0 8 - tJ 1 7 6 3

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

v.
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

MICHAELE. MCNICHOLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS, BRO\VN & MCNICHOLS,
P.A., an Idaho professional corporation; JANE
DOES 1-V, unknown individuals;

Category: A.I.
Fee: $88.00

Defendants.
Reed J. Taylor, by and through his attorneys of record, CAMPBELL, BISSELL &

KIRBY, PLLC, alleges as follows (all applicable facts alleged below are incorporated by

reference into each cause of action as necessary to suppprt each such cause of action):
I. PARTIES
1.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor is a resident of Lewiston, Nez Perce County,

Idaho. Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor is an elderly person as defined in I.C. § 48-608.
2.

Defendant Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. ("Clements Brown") is

an Idaho professional corporation in the business of practicing law. Clements Brown is
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vicariously liable for the acts of the individual Defendants.
3.

Defendant Michael E. McNichols is an individual residing in the state of

Idaho and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Clements
Brown.
4.

Jane Does 1-V are unknown individuals who are and/or were attorneys that

participated in the tortious acts and conduct alleged against the above known defendants.
II. JURISDICTION. VENUE AND CLAIMS

5.

The Defendants transacted business through the practice of law in Nez

Perce County, Idaho, and have an expectation of being named as defendants in Nez Perce
County, Idaho.

The Defendants committed tortious acts and/01 assisted in the

commission of tortious acts in Nez Perce County, Idaho. The Defendants' tortious acts
and/or assistance have inflicted damages upon a resident of Nez Perce Cowity, Idaho.
6.

Damages in this action exceed $10,000.

Jurisdiction and venue are,

therefore, appropriate in Nez Perce County District Court.
7.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Complaint is not a derivative action. Plaintiff

Reed J. Taylor is the pledgee of all of the shares of AIA Insurance, Inc., the only
shareholder of AIA Insurance, Inc. by way of holding all of its shares as collateral, and
the largest creditor of AJA Services Corporation (Reed J. Taylor is owed over $8,500,000
and AIA Services Corporation is insolvent).

AIA Services Corporation and AIA

Insurance, Inc. 's value and net assets are insufficient to pay the over $8.500,000, plus
interest and attorneys' fees and costs, owed to Reed J. Taylor. Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor is
entitled to bring certain claims directly against the Defendants for certain damages.
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ID. FACTS

8.

At all material times, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor was owed over $6,000,000

by AJA Services Corporation through a promissory note dated August 1, 1995. Plaintiff
Reed J. Taylor is presently owed over $8,500,000 by AJA Services Corporation. At all
material times, the Defendants had full knowledge of AIA Services Corporation's debt
and contractual obligations owed to Reed J. Taylor.

9.

AJA Services Corporation was in default of the $6,000,000 promissory

note when it tailed to pay the note when it matured on August 1, 2005. Although
unnecessary since the $6,000,000 promissory note matured. on August 1, 2005, demand
for payment was properly served upon AJA Services Corporation by Plaintiff Reed J.
Taylor on December 12, 2006. AJA Services Corporation was insolvent in 2001, and has
continued to be insolvent from said date.
10.

Since 1996, as security for the over $8,500,000 owed by AIA Services

Corporation, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor was granted and possessed a security interest in all
of the stock of AIA Insurance, Inc. and all of the com.missions and related receivables of
AIA Insurance, Inc. and AJA Services Corporation. Pursuant to the Amended and
Restated Stock Pledge Agreement dated July 1, 1996, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor had the
contractual right upon default of AJA Services Corporation to vote the stock of AJA
Insurance, Inc., and take operational control of AJA Insurance, Inc. Plaintiff Reed J.
Taylor's right to vote the stock of Al.A Instirance was also perfected through AIA
Services Corporation's irrevocable power of attorney granted to Reed J. Taylor that was
coupled with an interest as required by I.C § 30-1-722.
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11.

On February 22, 2007, Reed J. Taylor voted the stock of AIA Insurance,

Inc. and attempted to take control of it pursuant to his contractual rights as provided

under the law, the contract documents, and LC. § 30· 1·722. However, the interested
directors of AIA Insurance, Inc. (including R. John Taylor) by and through the
Defendants intentionally assisted in breaching the terms of the Amended and Restated
Stock Pledge Agreement and refused to acknowledge Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's valid vote
of the stock of AIA Insurance, Inc. and refused to surrender control as required. The
Defendants further engaged in inappropriate conduct in assisting interested parties
(including R. John Taylor) in obtaining and/or maintaining a restraining order and
preliminary injunction against Plaintiff Reed J.

T~ylor,

when the Defendants knew there

was no legitimate legal basis to do so, that doing so was an intentional violation and
tortious interference with Reed J. Taylor's contractual rights, and that the assets and
funds of AIA Insurance, Inc. were being misappropriated and/or not safeguarded.

12.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor has a pending civil action against AIA Services

Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor, and
others for claims of fraud, fraudulent conveyance, civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches
of fiduciary duties and other claims under Nez Perce County Case No. CV-07-00208
("Taylor v. A/A Services Corporation, et al."); and therein Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
obtained an order of partial summary judgment for AIA Services Corporation's default of
the $6,000,000 promissory note and corresponding default of the Amended and Restated
Stock Pledge Agreement By way of this partial summary judgment and/or his prior vote
of the stock, Reed J. Taylor would and should be in actual control of AIA Insurance, Inc.
but for the actions and R. John Taylor, which Defendants, with full knowledge of Reed J.
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Taylor's rights, facilitated and aided and abetted to the detriment of AIA Services
Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and Reed J. Taylor.
13.

In 2007, Defendants appeared in the civil action, Taylor v. AJA Services

Corporation, et al., and assumed the direct 'legal representation of three distinct clients,
AIA Services Corporation, a corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., a corporation, and John
Taylor, an individual, and indirect legal representation of other interested parties
(including Connie Taylor, James Beck and Michael Cashman). At all material times R.
John Taylor was an interested CEO and director of AIA Services Corporation and AIA

Insurance, Inc. and an interested majority shareholder of AIA Services Corporation. The
civil action clearly alleged acts of fraud, civil conspiracy, conversion, and breaches of
fiduciary duty perpetrated by R. John Taylor and others against AIA Services
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc., and such acts having damaged and continuing to
cause damages to the corporations, their shareholders and creditors. In violation of the
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and Defendants' duty of care, the Defendants
undertook to represent the three named clients, each having irreconcilable conflicts of
interest with the others.

14.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor,s attorney, Roderick C. Bond, advised the

Defendants in early 2007, that it was a violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct and duty of care to represent AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc.,
and R. John Taylor because of various conflicts of interest. On March 28, 2007, the
Defendants finally recognized the violation and withdrew from representing AIA
Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. Although the Defendants should have
withdrawn from representing R. John Taylor, AIA Services Corporation and AIA
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Insurance, Inc. in Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al., the Defendants committed a
further violation of the Idaho Rules of Profession~

~onduct

and their duty of care by

terminating the representation of the corporations and continuing to represent R. John
Taylor, which was a breach of their duty of -loyalty to the corporations. Defendants'
actions constitute a violation of the "hot potato" doctrine.
15.

The Defendants inappropriately entered into and/or participated in a Joint

Defense Agreement(s) knowing that AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc.,
Crop USA Insurance, Inc., R. John Taylor and other named and unnamed individuals in
Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al. had clear irreconcilable conflicting and

diverging interests in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Defendants'
duty of care, and to the detriment AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and
Reed J, Taylor. In Taylor v. AIA Services Corporation, et al., a Joint Defense Agreement

was not permissible or appropriate because it would perpetuate fraud, conspiracy, aiding
and abetting, and other causes of action, was entered into without obtaining informed
consent from disinterested representatives of the corporations, and the Joint Defense
Agreement was also independently not appropriate or permitted when certain parties to a
joint defense agreement should be asserting claims against other parties to the agreement.
The Joint Defense Agreement(s) in question have assisted in others (including R. John
Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) to perpetrate and/or hide acts of fraud,
fraudulent conveyances, civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches of .fiduciary duties and
other claims, while also assisting the Defendants in inappropriately obtaining payment of
fees and costs in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care.

COMPLAINT - 6

000651

16.

The Defendants assisted AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc.,

Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor, and others in taking action that was
not in the best interests of the corporations, not authorized by disinterested parties, and/or
done so without requiring AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and/or Crop
USA Insurance Agency, Inc. to retain separate independent counsel that were retained by
separate independent uninterested parties.

17.

As attorneys for AIA Services Corporation, an entity, the Defendants

owed duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care,
and the law to the corporation and its shareholders to preserve and protect the assets and
businesses of the corporation, and since AIA Services Corporation was insolvent, to its
creditors including Reed J. Taylor. As attorney for AIA Services Corporation, and in
light of the claims made against R. John Taylor and others by the Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor,
the Defendants owed a duty to their entity client not to asswne representation of the
interests of R. John Taylor, individually and/or through a Joint Defense Agreement, or
with any other interested parties.
18.

As attorneys for AIA Insurance, Inc., the corporation, the Defendants

owed duties as provide<t by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care,
and the law to the corporation and its shareholders including a creditor pledgee of the
corporation's stock, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, with contractual rights to vote the shares and
assume control and who had exercised his contractual rights and had voted the shares but
whose rights were breached and rejected by interested directors and others who were in
control of the corporation including R. John Taylor. As attorneys for AIA Insurance, Inc.
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and in light of the claims made against R. John Taylor and others by the Plaintiff Reed J.
Taylor, the Defendants owed a duty to their corporate client not to assume representation
of the interests of R. John Taylor, individually and/or through any Joint Defense
Agreement, and/or of other interested parties (including Crop USA Insurance Agency,
Inc.).
19.

As attorneys for R. John Taylor, individually and through any Joint

Defense Agreement, the Defendants owed their duties first and foremost to AIA Services
Corporation and AJA Insurance, Inc. as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct and their duty of care. As attorneys for R. John Taylor by and through taking
directions and/or accepting decisions made by him knowing that he was interested and
should have claims asserted against him, and in light of the claims against R. John Taylor
by the Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, the Defendants owed a duty to their corporation clients

not to assume representation of any party other than that of the interests of AIA Services
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc.

The Defendants failed to notify or obtain

appropriate informed consents or approvals from appropriate parties or disinterested
shareholders in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care, and the
Bylaws and Articles of Fonnation of the corporations, all to the detriment of Reed J.
Taylor. The Defendants inappropriately participated in the Joint Defense Agreement.
20.

As former attorneys' for AIA Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance,

Inc., the Defendants owed duties of loyalty to the corporations and could not represent R.
John Taylor in Taylor v. AIA Services Corporation, et al., represent the interests of other
interested parties because the Defendants' loyalty belongs also with AIA Services
Corporation and/or AJA Insurance, Inc. Furthermore, the Defendants could in no way
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represent the interests of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. or participate in any joint
defense of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. or other interested parties (such as R. John
Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, and/or Michael Cashman) as AIA Services
Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. should have been asserting claims against Crop
USA Insurance Agency, Inc., each other, and other interested parties.
Defendants represented, and continues to represent, R. John Taylor

21.

(individually and through any Joint Defense Agreement) and with full knowledge that R.
John Taylor is an interested party and director of AIA Services Corporation and AJA
Insurance, Inc. and is personally inappropriately conducting and controlling the course of
litigation involving the Defendants' former clients, AJA Services Corporation and AIA
Insurance, Inc., to the detriment of Defendants' fonner clients, AIA Services Corporation
and AIA Insurance, Inc.
22.

During the course of the civil action after March 28, 2007, the Defendants

have coordinated and participated with Quarles & Brady LLP, the law finn that has
represented AJA Services and AIA Services Corporation before and throughout litigation,
and Hawley Troxell, the law firm that asswned the representation of AIA Service
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. from the Defendants (and later the inappropriate
representation of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.). During the course of the civil
action after March 28, 2007, R. John Taylor and others have further engaged in
inappropriate and/or wrongful transactions involving themselves, AIA Services
Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., which
transactions have occurred with Defendants knowledge and/or assistance, and to the
detriment of AIA Services Corporation, AIA Ins'urance~ Inc., and Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
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as creditor and stock pledgee.
23.

Defendants are liable to Reed J. Taylor ~or an amount to be proven at trial

because the Defendants have provided substantial assistance and/or aided and abetted R.
John Taylor, AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc., and other interested parties in acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances,
conversion, civil conspiracy, and breaches of fiduciary duties.

The acts of fraud,

fraudulent conveyances, conversion, civil conspiracy, and breaches of fiduciary duties
include, but are not limited to: 1) While purporting to represent AIA Insurance, Inc. and
AIA Services Corporation, the Defendants assisted and/or aided and abetted R. John
Taylor in the tortious interference with the assertion of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's
contractual rights to control and operate AIA Insurance, Inc., which has proximately
caused damages to Reed J. Taylor; 2) While purporting to represent AIA Services
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc., the Defendants inappropriately assisted and/or
aided and abetted R. John Taylor and other interested pru.ties to engage in tortious
transactions involving R. John Taylor, AlA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc.,
and/or Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., which such transactions have been to the
detriment of AIA Services Corporation, AfA Insurance, Inc., and Reed J. Taylor, and
proximately caused damages to Reed J. Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee; and 3)
While representing R. John Taylor, individually and through a Joint Defense Agreement,
the Defendants have had

full knowledge that their client is an interested party and

director of AIA Services Corporation, AJA Insurance, Inc., and Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc., and is personally conducting and controlling the course of litigation
involving the Defendants' former clients, AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance,
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Inc., and Defendants have assisted and/or aided and abetted R. John Taylor and others
(including, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) and has coordinated and participated with
the Hawley Troxell and Quarles & Brady in R. John Taylor's engaging in tortious
transactions involving himself, AJA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and Crop
USA Insurance Agency, Inc., which transactions have been to the detriment of AIA
Services Corporation and AJA Insurance, Inc. and proximately caused damages to Reed
J. Taylor as a creditor and stock pledgee.
24.

In connection with the Defendants' inappropriate representation and/or

joint defense of R John Taylor, AJA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., Crop
USA Insurance Agency, Inc., and other interested parties, the Defendants accepted
payments of attorneys fees and costs believ~ to exceed $100,000 in violation of the
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care, and as participating and/or
assisting in inappropriate corporate acts and the aiding and abetting of others.
25.

Over the course of the litigation in Reed J. Taylor v. AJA Services

Corporation, et al., Reed J. Taylor's attorney in that action, Roderick C. Bond of Smith,

Cannon & Bond PLLC, advised the DefendantS on numerous occasions that their conduct
violated Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care, was inappropriate,
and constituted the aiding and abetting of other interested and uninterested parties
(including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.), among other potential
legal claims against them. In early 2007, Mr. Bond advised the Defendants that their
inappropriate actions would result in claims being filed against them by Reed J. Taylor.
Mr. Bond reiterated these warnings orally and in writing on numerous occasions. Despite
Mr. Bond's warnings, the Defendants conduct persisted thereby further damaging Reed J.
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Taylor. The Defendants disregard of Mr. Bond's warnings can only be construed as
intentional improper acts to assist R. John Taylor and other interested parties to the
detriment of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor and others.
26.

The Defendants wrongfully assisted R. John Taylor and other interested

parties in operating Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. with the funds, assets, employees,
trade secrets and other things of value inappropriately obtained from AIA Services
Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc., and by assisting R John Taylor and other
interested parties (including Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) in preventing claims
from being asserted and prosecuted against them. The Defendants wrongfully assisted
and/or failed to prevent interested parties (including R. John Taylor) in transferring the
long-term employees of AIA Insurance, Inc. to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., while
at the same time representing to the Court in Taylor v. AJA Services Corporatfon that the

corporations were being operated properly and/or failing to advise the Court of the
inappropriate acts and transactions. All the while the Defendants were aware of and/or
assisted in the inappropriate payment of salaries, benefits, compensation, and director

fees of $20,000 per year when AIA Services Corporation was insolvent.
27.

Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made personally and through his

attorney Roderick C. Bond) that the Defendants take action to protect the assets and
funds of AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. and recover funds and assets
from R. John Taylor, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. and other interested and
uninterested parties for the benefit of the corporations and Reed J. Taylor, the Defendants
refused to act in accordance with the Rules of Profession Conduct, their dufy of care, and
the law. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made through his attorney Roderick C.
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Bond) that interests of the minority disinterested shareholders be considered and/or

protected because of the wrongful acts of R. John Taylor and other interested parties, the
Defendants refused to act and failed to fully and properly disclose all pertinent facts to
the disinterested shareholders and request their votes.
28.

In various motions, responses and affidavits submitted to the court in

Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al., the Defendants made arguments that did not

benefit AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., or Reed J. Taylor,
inappropriately made other arguments preventing valid claims from being asserted
against R. John Taylor, James Beck, Connie Taylor, Michael Cashman, and other
interested and uninterested parties, and failed to take action against responsible parties
(including R. John Taylor, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., Connie Taylor, James
Beck, Michael Cashman, Lancelot Investors Fund, and others).

In the instance of

Michael Cashman, the Defendants successfully argued to the Court in Taylor v. AJA
Services Corporation, et al. that Mr. Cashman should not be named as an individual

when the Defendants should have been taking action against Mr. Cashman and others.

29.

Despite Reed J. Tayl9r's demands (made through his attorney Roderick C.

Bond) that disinterested directors and/or parties must direct the litigation on behalf of the
cotporations, the Defendants refused and permitted and/or assisted R. John Taylor and
.
other intere~ted parties to direct the litigation to the detriment of the corporations and
Reed J. Taylor. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made through his attorney Roderick

C. Bond) that action be taken to terminate AJA Insurance, Inc. 's improper guarantee of a
$15,000,000 line-of-credit for Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., the Defendants refused

..

to act, failed to inform or fully disclose to disinterested parties or shareholders the
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existence of such inappropriate loan guarantees.
30.

The Defendants' conduct has violated Idaho Rules of Professional

Conduct and their duty of care, which require the Defendants to disgorge all attorneys'
fees and costs paid to them in Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al. and other related
and unrelated legal representations. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made through his
attorney Roderick C. Bond) to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct and their
duty of care, the Defendants refused to do so.
31.

Through the acts of the Defendants, the 'value of AIA Insurance, Inc. and

the assets of AIA Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. have plummeted in
value, the corporations' value and ~sets have been impaired, and/or the assets and funds
have been transferred to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. Through the acts of the
Defendants, ownership of Crop USA 'Insurance Agency, Inc. has remained vested in
interested parties (including R. John Taylor), while the major creditor Reed J. Taylor and
minority shareholders have been left with nothing. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands
(through his attorney Roderick C. Bond) that action should also be taken for the interests
of the innocent minority shareholders and creditors, the Defendants have refused to take
action and inappropriately assisted the interested parties (including R. John Taylor,

Connie Taylor, James Beck and Michael Cashman).
32.

Despite the Defendants having made several legal arguments that lacked

merit, lacked good faith and/or were not grounded in facts, the Defendants provided a
settlement offer to Reed J. Taylor in Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al., which
included a provision that he release all claims against the Defendants as a condition of the
settlement. The inclusion of such a provision was a violation of the Rules of Professional
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Conduct and Defendants' duty of care.

The Defendants also refused to make any

provisions for disinterested minority shareholders of AIA Services Corporation as
requested by Reed J. Taylor.
33.

The Defendants have assisted in the inappropriate acts of R. John Taylor

and other interested parties in stopping all payments to Reed J. Taylor and Donna J.
Taylor, Reed J. Taylor's former wife and the holder of all outstanding Preferred A Shares
of AJA Services Corporation. Like Reed J. Taylor, Donna J. Taylor is required to be a
member of the board of directors of AIA Services Corporation. Like Reed J. Taylor, the
Defendants have assisted R. John Taylor and other interested parties in preventing Reed
J. Taylor and Donna J. Taylor from being members of the board of dkectors of AIA
Services Corporation, which· has further far reaching ramifications and results in
additional damages against the Defendants.
34.

With full knowledge of AIA Services Corporation's obligations to ensure

that Reed J. Taylor and Donna J. Taylor are members of its board until they were paid in
full, the Defendants proceeded to attend and participate in inappropriate board meetings
and take inappropriate action based upon b~ard meetings held by interested directors
without Reed J. Taylor or Donna J. Taylor being present, which results in all such
meetings and decisions being null and void, and the Defendants being liable for the
associated damages.
35.

The Defendants assisted and/or failed to prevent and/or notify

disinterested parties that AIA Services Corporation had inappropriately pledged its sole
remaining other significant asset, the $1,200,000 mortgage, to Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc. to facilitate the payment of the Defendants' services in violation of the
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Rules of Professional Conduct and the law.
36.

The Defendants omitted and/or misrepresented material facts to the Court

in Taylor v. AIA Service8 Corporation, et al. to the detriment of Reed J. Taylor. In

several instances, the Defendants persuaded the Court to take action that was not in the
best interests of the corporations or Reed J. Taylor, to the detriment

of the corporations

and Reed J. Taylor (including consenting to the issuance of only a $200,000 bond when
the Defendants knew that the corporations were not being operated properly or their
assets safeguarded).

37.

The Defendants have inappropriately assisted R. John Taylor and other

interested parties in misallocating and not allocating expenses and/or

~ervices

provided

and borne by AJA Insurance, Inc. and/or AIA Services· Corporation for the benefit of
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor and other interested parties.
38.

The Defendants had full knowledge of R. John Taylor's Executive

Officer's Agreement.

Even though R. John Taylor has breached the terms of his

employment contract with AIA Services· Corporation by competing against AIA Services
Corporation through Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. (and violating the corporate
opportunity doctrine), by soliciting employees of AIA Insurance, Inc., and other
inappropriate actions, the Defendants intentionally refused to act in the best interests of
AIA Services Corporation; AIA Insurance, Inc., their shareholders, and/or Reed J. Taylor.

39.

The Defendants assisted in inappropriately transferring and retaining

funds, assets and property to Crop USA Insurance Agency~ Inc. to defraud AIA Services
Corporation's creditor Reed J. Taylor (including, without limitation, over $95,000 owed

by Pacific Empire Radio Corporation to AIA Insurance, Inc., assistance in transferring
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shares of the Pacific Empire Radio Corporation to R. John Taylor, and failing to collect
the over $300,000 owed by R. John Taylor) by not reporting such acts to disinterested
parties or other appropriate parties. as required by the Rules of Professional Conduct.
40.

In April 2007, the Defendants permitted and/or assisted interested parties

in holding a joint board meeting of AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc.
with full knowledge that Reed J. Taylor and Donna J. Taylor were being intentionally
denied their right to be on the board of AIA Services Corporation and participating in
such meetings (Donna Taylor has subordinated her right to payment in favor of Reed J.
Taylor). At the meeting held in April 2007, the Defendants pennitted and/or assisted R.
John Taylor to appoint Connie Taylor and James Beck to the boards of AJA Services

Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. knowing that they were interested parties who AIA
Services Corporation and/or AJA Insurance, Inc. should be pursuing claims against, that
they inappropriately held shares in Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., that they were
inappropriately being paid $20,000 per year to attend the board meeting of an insolvent
corporation, and that they did not meet the required standards necessary to be members of
such boards as set forth under the corporations' bylaws. The Defendants inappropriately
permitted and/or assisted two interested parties, Connie Taylor and James Beck, to
approve and/or consent to a Joint Retainer and Joint Defense Agreement with Hawley
Troxell and others, which also facilitated the inappropriate joint legal representations of
interested parties with conflicting irreconcilable interests and the payment of attorneys•
fees and costs to various attorneys in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and
their duty of care.
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41.

Despite demands to the contrary, the Defendants continued to take

instructions and/or directives from the unauthorized boards (or R. John Taylor) of AIA
Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, In.c. kl;iowing that the boards are not properly
seated and are comprised of interested parties (including R. John Taylor) with significant
claims that should be asserted against them in violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct and the law.
IV. FIRST CAUSES OF ACTIONS

42.

The Defendants have damaged Reed J. Taylor by aiding and abetting

and/or assisting others (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.)
in the commission oftortious acts.
43.

The Defendants committed tortious acts in concert with others (including

R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) and/or pursuant to a common

design or civil conspiracy with others (including & John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc.). The Defendants' conduct ·also constitutes the assistance of interested
parties (including R. John Taylor) with ,the tortious interference of AIA Services
Corporation and Reed J. Taylor's contractual rights, which such contractual rights the
Defendants had intimate knowledge.
44.

The Defendants knew that the conduct of others (including R. John Taylor

and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) constituted breach of duties and gave substantial
assistance and/or encouragement to others (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc.) in breaching said duties.
45.

The Defendants gave substantial assistance to others (including R. John

Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) in committing and/or accomplishing
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tortious conduct and/or acts, and the Defendants' conduct, separately considered,
constitutes the breaches of duties owed to the corporations and/or Reed J. Taylor.
46.

The Defendants conduct constitutes aiding and abetting of others

(including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) and/or constitutes the
conduct of a contributing tortfeasors, and such conduct has damaged ~Jaintiff Reed J.
Taylor in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.

V. SECOND CAUSES OF ACTIONS
Reed J. Taylor holds and has held a valid and perfected security interest in

47.

all of the commissions and related receivables of AIA Services Corporation and AIA
Insurance, Inc.
48.

All of the shares of AIA Insurance, Inc. were pledged to Reed J. Taylor as ·

collateral for the over $8,500,000 owed to him by AIA Services Corporation. By way of
this pledge and his prior vote of the stock in February 2007, Reed J. Taylor is entitled to
possession and control of all of the assets of AJA Insurance, Inc.
49.

The Defendants were fully aware of Reed J. Taylor's rights to property in

which he held a security interest and was pledged ~o ·him as collateral.
50.

The Defendants have received substantiaJ payments believed to exceed

$100,000 for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs, which were payments the
Defendants had no lawful right to possess or retain and were received in violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct.
52.

The Defendants also knew that the disinterested minority shareholders of

AIA Services Corporation (innocent shareholders) were never advised of the significant
claims against the interested parties (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance
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Agency, Inc.) and the significant misappropriation :of the corporations' assets, but
provided legal services on behalf of the interested parties and accepted payment from
AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. In connection with the payment of
attorneys' fees and costs to other named parties in Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et
al., the Defendants failed to obtain the necessary approvals from Reed J. Taylor or other

disinterested parties to the detriment of the corporations and Reed J. Taylor.
53.

The Defendants' conduct constitutes the willful interference with property

and money belonging to AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and/or Reed J.
Taylor and/or which such property and money should be under the possession and/or
control of Reed J. Taylor, as the person entitled to such money and property as a creditor
and pledgee. The Defendants deprived Reed J. Taylor possession of such property and
money. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands, the Defendants have refused to return such
property and money.

54.

The Defendants' conduct constitutes conversion and such conduct has

damaged Reed J. Taylor in an amount to proven at trial or on summary judgment.
VI. THIRD CAUSES OF ACTIONS
55.

The Defendants' conduct has been unconscionable. The have engaged in

acts, conduct, and representations that were false, ·misleading, deceptive and/or a
violation of J.C. § 48-601, et seq. The Defendants' acts, omission, representations and
conduct constitute unfair and/or deceptive acts and/C?r practices in trade pertaining to the
practice of law pursuant to I.C. § 48-601, et seq.
56.

The Defendants' actions have resulted in the loss of over 25% of Reed J.

Taylor's retirement funds and/or such other hann as set forth under I.C. § 48-608(2)(a).
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As such, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor is entitled damages, which such amount is also subject
to treble damages pursuant to J.C. § 48-608.
VII. FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTIONS

57.

AJA Services Corporation is a trustee of Reed J. Taylor in light of its

insolvency and the fact that it owes Reed J. Taylor over $8,500,000. At the very least,
AIA Insurance, Inc. is a trustee of Reed J. Taylor because all of its shares are pledged to

Reed J. Taylor and he voted the shares in February 2007 naming himself the sole director
and officer of AIA Insurance, Inc.
58.

The Defendants' clients were trustees and/or fiduciaries performing

similar functions for a non-client, Reed J. Taylor. The Defendants knew that their
appropriate actions were necessary with respect to the representation of AIA Services
Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. to take action to prevent and/or rectify the
breaches of fiduciary duties owed by AIA Services Corporation and/or AJA Insurance,
Inc. to Reed J. Taylor when such breaches were crimes and/or fraud and/or the
Defendants assisted and/or are assisting in the breaches. Reed J. Taylor was not able to
protect his rights because of the Defendants' actions and the Defendants' obligations to
AIA Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. would not be significantly
impaired because the best interests ofall the foregoing is to collect swns owed by others
and recover damages for the improper tortious conduct of others (including R. John
Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.).
59.

The Defendants owed AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc.

and/or Reed J. Taylor a duty of care to provide, including but not limited to, reasonable,
prudent, ethical, unconflicted, loyal and professional legal advice and legal representation
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in keeping with the standard of care in the legal profession and as owed to the
corporations (referred to herein and above as "duty of care"). The Defendants breached
their duty of care as a result of their acts and/or omissions thereby damaging the
corporations and Reed J. Taylor, to the detriment of Reed J. Taylor.
60.

The Defendants breached their fiduciary duties owed to AIA Services

Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and/or Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, including, without
limitation, the duties of care and loyalty.
61.

The Defendants' acts constitute professional negligence and/or breach of

the Defendants' fiduciary duties, and such conduct has damaged Reed J. Taylor in an
amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.
VIIl. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor demands a trial by jury of not less than twelve

(12) on all claims and damages so triable.
IX. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor prays for the following relief:
1.

For a judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, for $6,000,000

in damages ($2,000,000 in actual damages and $4,000,000 in treble damages), the exact
amount of which will be proven at trial and/or on swnmary judgment, plus an award of
pre-judgment and post-judgment ii;lterest;
2.

For a judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, for treble

damages of $4,000,000, the exact-amount to be proven at trial pursuant to I.C. § 48608(2);
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3.

For a judgment requiring the disgorgement of the payments of all

attorneys' fees and costs paid to the Defendants by AIA Services Corporation and/or AJA
Insurance, Inc.;
4.

For judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, for additional

damages as provided under I.C. § 48-608;
5.

For such other relief as may be available to Reed J. Taylor pursuant to I.C.

§ 48-601, et seq. or the law, including, without limitation, obtaining a preliminary

injunction to restrain the Defendants from undertaking further representation;
6.

For an award of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's attorneys fees and costs

incurred in this action pursuant to Idaho Law, including, without limitation, J.C. § 48608, l.C. § 12-120 and/or I.C. § 12-121; and
7.

For such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

DATED this

/~ay of August, 2008.
CAMPBELL, BISSELL &

By:·~Zf:~M~~L__ __

Michael S. Bissell
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
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Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CVOB-01765
Plaintiff,

•

v.

PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X,
unknown individuals;

MOTION AND MEMORANDUM OF
LAW TO AMEND COMPLAINT

Defendants.
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") moves the Court for an Order to Amend
and Supplement his Complaint in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A.

I. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON
This Motion and Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion, the attached Exhibit
A, and the Court's file.

•

EXHIBIT I

PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM OF
LA'\V TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 1
000669

II. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT
"[A] party may amend a pleading only by leave of the court ... and leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires ... " l.R.C.P. 15(a). Similarly, a party may move to
supplement a "pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have
happened since the date of the pleading sough to be supplemented ... " l.R.C.P. 15(d).
"Great liberty should be shown in allowing amendments to pleadings in furtherance of
justice between parties." Smith v. Shinn, 82 Idaho 141, 149, 350 P.2d 348 (1960).
Here, Reed Taylor is moving the Court to amend his Complaint in the form
attached hereto as Exhibit A. The purpose of the amendment is to: (1) clarify and
expand the claims and causes of action; and (2) add derivative claims.
Justice requires that Reed Taylor be permitted to file his Amended Complaint.
DATED this

/~ay of October, 2008.

Data\1315\1322\mtn.amend complaint.doc
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /~day of October, 2008, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document with attachment to the
following:

- - HAND DELIVERY

, / U.S.MAIL
- - OVERNIGHT MAIL
- - FAX TRANSMISSION
/
EMAIL (.pdf attachment)

James D. LaRue
Elam & Burke, PA
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83704
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MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, VIA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Reed Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual, who is
bringing this action on behalf of himself and
on behalf of the creditors and/or shareholders
of AIA Services Corporation and AIA
Insurance, Inc.;

Case No.: CVOS-01765

FIRSTAMENDEDCOMPLAINTFOR
DAMAGES
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Plaintiff,

v.
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; HAVILEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAVILEY LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES 1-X,
unknown individuals;
Rawle Troxell.

I.
1.

FACTS

Reed Taylor, by and through his attorneys of record, CAMPBELL,

BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC, alleges as follows (all allegations and claims asserted below
are incorporated by reference into each cause of action, remedy and/or requested relief to
·~HIBIT
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the extent necessary to support each such cause of action, remedy and/or requested
relief):
2.

Reed Taylor ("Reed Taylor") is a resident of Lewiston, Nez Perce County,

Idaho. Reed Taylor is bringing this action on behalf of himself individually and on
behalf of all shareholders and creditors of AJA Services Corporation ("AJA Services")
and AJA Insurance, Inc. ("AJA Insurance"). Reed Taylor is an elderly person as defined
in LC. § 48-608.
3.

Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP ("Hawley Troxell") is an Idaho

limited liability partnership in the business of practicing law.

Hawley Troxell is

vicariously liable for the acts of the individual Hawley Troxell. Hawley Troxell has
purportedly acted as counsel for AJA Services, AJA Insurance and CropUSA Insurance
Agency, Inc. ("CropUSA").
4.

Defendant Gary D. Babbitt ("Babbitt") is an individual residing in the

state of Idaho and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley
Troxell.
5.

Defendant D. John Ashby ("Ashby") is an individual residing in the state

of Idaho and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley
Troxell.
6.

Defendant Patrick V. Collins ("Collins") is an individual residing in the

state of Idaho and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley
Troxell.
7.

Defendant Richard A. Riley ("Riley") is an individual residing in the state

ofldaho and is an attorney in the state ofldaho with and for Hawley Troxell.
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8.

Jane Does 1-X are unknown individuals who are and/or were attorneys that

participated in the tortious acts and conduct alleged against the above known Hawley
Troxell with and for Hawley Troxell who are also responsible for the claims and
damages. (All of the Defendants are collectively referred to as "Hawley Troxell" or "its"
or "Defendants").
9.

Hawley Troxell transacted business through the practice of law in Nez

Perce County, Idaho, and have an expectation of being named as defendants in Nez Perce
County, Idaho.

Hawley Troxell committed tortious acts, exceeded the scope of any

purported representation, and/or assisted in the commission of tortious acts in Nez Perce
County, Idaho. Hawley Troxell's tortious acts and/or assistance have inflicted damages
upon a resident of Nez Perce County, Idaho.
10.

Damages in this action exceed $10,000.

Jurisdiction and venue are,

therefore, appropriate in Nez Perce County District Court. To the extent that there are any
conflicts or discrepancies alleged in this Complaint, they are to be construed as
alternative relief, claims, remedies and damages being sought against Hawley Troxell
(i.e., if Hawley Troxell had authority to represent AIA Services or AIA Insurance, then it
still committed certain torts and breached duties).

However, no allegations in this

Complaint should be construed as any admission by Reed Taylor or any of the
corporations that Hawley Troxell ever had authority to represent AIA Services or AIA
Insurance.
11.

AIA Services is a closely held Idaho corporation. AIA Insurance is a

closely held Idaho corporation. The present purported officers and directors of AIA
Insurance and AIA Services (R. John Taylor "John Taylor", Connie Taylor, James Beck,
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JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman) are interested parties by way of their tortious acts and
ownership of shares in CropUSA. Thus, a direct action for certain claims is appropriate
because, among other reasons set forth in this Complaint, any funds recovered should not
be placed in the hands of the foregoing parties.
12.

AJA Services has pledged all of the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance

that it owns to Reed Taylor pursuant to a $6 Million Promissory Note dated August 1,
1995, the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement, the Amended and Restated
Security Agreement, the Restructure Redemption Agreement, and Series A Preferred
Shareholder Agreement (all of the foregoing, ancillary documents and related documents
are collectively referred to as the "Redemption Agreements").
13.

At all relevant times of the transactions and causes of action set forth in

this Complaint, Reed Taylor was the sole pledgee of all of AJA Insurance's outstanding
shares and the only secured creditors of AJA Services and AJA Insurance entitled to the
commissions and related receivables received by the corporations and all proceeds related
thereto. As a stock pledgee and the sole stock pledgee of AJA Insurance's shares, Reed
Taylor is entitled to bring derivative and/or direct claims as a shareholder since a pledgee
is entitled to all of the rights and protections of a shareholder, in addition to the individual
rights to protect collateral. As the sole pledgee of all shares of AJA Insurance, Reed
Taylor is entitled to recover and possess all funds, damages and/or property recovered
from all direct and derivative causes of action.
14.

As a creditor of the insolvent AJA Services owed over $8,500,000 and a

secured creditor of the insolvent AJA Services, Reed Taylor is entitled to bring derivative
and/or direct claims against responsible parties in the place of, or on behalf of, AJA
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Services. Reed Taylor is the only person entitled to the recovery of funds, damages, and
the like because of being (a) the only creditor with a security interest in AIA Insurance;
(b) the only creditor with a security interest in all past, present and future commissions

and related receivables of AJA Services and AIA Insurance; (c) the only creditor with a
security interest in all of the shares of AIA Services' subsidiaries and all dividends and
distributions related to such shares, including, without limitation the $1.2 Million
Mortgage received from the estate of The Universe; (d) a long standing creditor with
substantial contractual rights, which such rights and amounts owed to Reed Taylor were
specifically detailed in the financial statements of AJA Services since 1995, thereby
placing other creditors on notice of his superior claims; (e) the only person with priority
over all assets, funds and claims of AIA Services by way of the Subordination Agreement
with Donna Taylor; and (f) the creditor who is owed over $8,500,000.
15.

To the extent that any bona-fide creditor or shareholders come forward

with any interests superior to Reed Taylor or to the extent that any dispute may arise
between Reed Taylor and other creditors, Reed Taylor will, without waiving any legal
rights or remedies as a pledgee, creditor and secured creditor, either (a) pay the
creditor(s) in his sole discretion; (b) seek a determination under the law of the priority or
rights to any payments or funds; (c) deposit the subject funds and/or property with the
Court for a determination of priority or rightful possession pursuant to an interpleader
action; or (d) take such other reasonable actions as necessary under the law.
16.

Although Hawley Troxell, John Taylor, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman,

Connie Taylor and James Beck are inappropriately and fraudulently asserting that Reed
Taylor has no rights because his redemption was allegedly illegal (which Reed Taylor
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denies and the applicable law does not support) in an attempt to avoid the causes of
action, claims, remedies and damages being pursued against them for misappropriating
the assets, funds, services and opportunities of AIA Service and/or AIA Insurance, Reed
Taylor will move the Court to deposit all funds and property recovered from Hawley
Troxell until the illegality issue has either been withdrawn, voluntarily dismissed, or a
determination has been made by the Court in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al. The evidence
will show that the redemption was not illegal and that Hawley Troxell and the other
parties (including John Taylor and JoLee Duclos' alleged intervention) are simply
attempting to find any way to delay and/or thwart Reed Taylor's valid rights and causes
of action, and fraudulently avoid all of their unlawful acts and years of misappropriation
of AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance's assets, funds, services and/or opportunities.
17.

AIA Services' financial condition far exceeds the "zone of insolvency" as

Reed Taylor is owed over $9,000,000 and the present fair-market value of AIA Services'
assets are $6,000,000, less than the amount owed Reed Taylor. But for the unlawful
actions of John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos,
Bryan Freeman and other parties to protect their own interests, AIA Services should be in
bankruptcy under close scrutiny of a trustee. Hawley Troxell has full knowledge of
intimate details of the inappropriate and/or unlawful transfer of millions of dollars of AIA
Services and/or AIA Insurance's assets, funds and services to CropUSA, John Taylor and
other parties.
18.

On July 21, 2008, Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor served a derivative

demand letter upon the purported board of directors of AIA Services and AIA Insurance
to take various actions, including specified actions against Hawley Troxell, John Taylor,
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Michael Cashman, James Beck and all responsible parties for various tortious acts and
the recovery of misappropriated assets, funds, services and/or compensation.

Reed

Taylor has also made other written demands upon the purported boards of AJA Services
and AJA Insurance to take action, and no actions have been taken. Reed Taylor has also
made substantial non-frivolous claims against the responsible parties in Taylor v. AJA
Services, et al., but no actions have been taken as a result of the claims or allegations.

However, the purported boards of AIA Services and AIA Insurance have failed to act and
have failed to conduct the corporations in a responsible manner consistent with the law.
19.

The purported relevant past and present board members and officers of

AJA Insurance and AJA Services have failed to conduct shareholder meetings, failed to

properly disclose facts and transactions to the shareholders, and have continued to do so
even after Complaints were filed and with the full knowledge of Hawley Troxell. The
past and present responsible board members and officers have never advised the
shareholders or creditors of the misappropriation of corporate assets, funds, opportunities,
services and claims which should be pursued.
20.

Because of the fact that the relevant past and present purported board

members of AIA Services and AJA Insurance have a vested interest in not pursing claims
against themselves or the attorneys that have unlawfully assisted them and have utterly
and completely failed to do so, Reed Taylor believes that he and Donna Taylor will be
the only parties to pursue the valid claims because the claims will never be pursued by
the parties currently purported to manage AIA Services and AJA Insurance. This action
is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the state ofldaho which it would
otherwise not have.
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21.

•

Although Reed Taylor is the only authorized director and officer of AIA

Insurance and that the actions of AIA Services' board of directors is not authorized, Reed
Taylor is pursuing claims under this Complaint as though the directors were not
authorized to act and, to the extent that the boards were authorized, then the actions were
unlawful, inappropriate and exceeded the scope of any agency act on behalf of AIA
Services and AIA Insurance.
22.

Hawley Troxell's acts, omissions, and torts alleged in this Complaint

exceed any purported attorney-client relationship and are not protected by any litigition
privilege or immunities. Hawley Troxell' s purported legal representation was never
authorized by the proper boards of AIA Services or AIA Insurance. Any purported
waivers Hawley Troxell has obtained were not received by authorized and/or
disinterested representatives of AIA Services and AIA Insurance, and were not
authorized.
23.

To the extent that Hawley Troxell obtained any waivers or consents, its

purported legal representation exceeded the scope of any representation that was in the
best interests of AIA Services or AIA Insurance. By taking direction from John Taylor,
Connie Taylor and/or James Beck, Hawley Troxell knew that any purported
representation was not, and could not, be in the best interests of AIA Services or AIA
Insurance thereby exceeding any scope of purported representation.
24.

AIA Services and AIA Insurance's purported agents, boards and/or

officers, in which Hawley Troxell allegedly relied upon, exceeded the scope of all proper
acts as agents, board members and officers of AIA Services and AIA Insurance, which
further resulted in Hawley Troxell' s acts exceeding the scope of any authorized legal
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and/or attorney-client representation. All of the actions of Hawley Troxell, John Taylor,
Connie Taylor and James Beck were outside of the scope of their authorized acts and
duties.
25.

Reed Taylor's Complaint is comprised of thtee types of claims: (a) those

claims and damages personal and individual to Reed Taylor; (b) those claims and
damages that are personal to Reed Taylor and AJA Services and/or AIA Insurance, but
which are being brought by Reed Taylor directly against Hawley Troxell; and (c) those
claims that are owned only by AJA Services and/or AIA Insurance, but which are being
prosecuted by Reed Taylor derivatively on behalf of AIA Services and/or AJA Insurance.
26.

In addition, Reed Taylor will also pursue claims that are derivatively

being prosecuted on behalf of AJA Insurance directly on behalf of AIA Insurance should
he gain control of the company in the near future. To the extent that funds and/or
property is recovered that exceed the amounts owed to Reed Taylor, he will deposit such
funds and/or property with the Court for the distribution to innocent shareholders of AIA
Services.
27.

Hawley Troxell is not, and has never been, authorized to represent AIA

Insurance or AIA Services in Taylor v. A.IA Services, et al. Hawley Troxell is not, and
has not, represented the interests of AIA Insurance or AJA Services, but instead has
represented the interests of John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman,
JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, CropUSA and other interested parties.
28.

As the only authorized officer and board member of AJA Insurance, Reed

Taylor, has not and will not authorize or consent to Hawley Troxell as being attorneys for
AIA Insurance or representing the company in any fashion. As a person who is required
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•

to be a member of the board of AIA Services, Reed Taylor has not and will not authorize
Hawley Troxell to represent AIA Services.

Thus, Hawley Troxell has no scope of

representation because it is unlawfully representing AIA Services and AIA Insurance.
29.

Reed Taylor is the pledgee of all of the shares of AIA Insurance, the only

shareholder of AJA Insurance by way of holding all of its shares as collateral, the only
officer and director of AIA Insurance, and by far the largest and only secured creditor of
AIA Services (Reed Taylor is owed over $8,500,000 and AIA Services is insolvent).
AIA Services and AIA Insurance's value and net assets are insufficient to pay the over
$8,500,000, plus interest and attorneys' fees and costs, owed to Reed Taylor. Therefore,
Reed Taylor is entitled to bring certain claims directly against Hawley Troxell for certain
damages.
30.

At all material times, Reed Taylor was owed over $6,000,000 by AIA

Services through a promissory note dated August 1, 1995.

Reed Taylor is presently

owed over $8,500,000 by AIA Services. At all material times, Hawley Troxell had full
knowledge of AJA Services' debt and contractual obligations owed to Reed Taylor.
31.

AJA Services defaulted on the terms of the $6,000,000 promissory note

when it failed to pay the promissory note upon maturity on August 1, 2005. Although a
formal demand was unnecessary since the $6,000,000 promissory note matured on
August 1, 2005, demand for payment was properly served upon AJA Services by Reed
Taylor on December 12, 2006, a copy of which was also provided to Defendant Riley at
the law firm of Eberle Berlin pursuant to the notice provisions of the Redemption
Agreements. AIA Services was insolvent in 2001, and has continued to be insolvent
from said date.
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32.

Since 1996, as security for the over $8,500,000 owed by AJA Services,

Reed Taylor was granted and possessed a security interest in all of the stock of AJA
Insurance and all of the commissions and related receivables of AJA Insurance and AJA
Services. Pursuant to the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement dated July 1,
1996, Reed Taylor had the contractual right upon default of AJA Services to vote the
stock of AIA Insurance, and take operational control of AJA Insurance. Reed Taylor's
right to vote the stock of AJA Insurance was also perfected through AJA Services'
irrevocable power of attorney granted to Reed Taylor that was coupled with an interest as
required by I.C § 30-1-722.
33.

On February 22, 2007, Reed Taylor voted the stock of AJA Insurance and

attempted to take control of it pursuant to his contractual rights as provided under the
law, the contract documents, and I.C. § 30-1-722. However, the interested directors of
AIA Insurance (including John Taylor) by and through Hawley Troxell intentionally
assisted in breaching the terms of the A.mended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement
and refused to acknowledge Reed Taylor's valid vote of the stock of AIA Insurance and
refused to surrender control as required.
34.

Hawley Troxell further engaged in inappropriate conduct in assisting

interested parties (including John Taylor) in obtaining and/or maintaining a restraining
order and preliminary injunction against Reed Taylor, when Hawley Troxell knew there
was no legitimate legal basis to do so, that doing so was an intentional violation and
tortious interference with Reed Taylor's contractual rights, and that the assets and funds
of AIA Insurance were being misappropriated and/or not safeguarded.
35.

Reed Taylor has a pending civil action against AJA Services, AIA

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 11

000682

•

Insurance, CropUSA, John Taylor, and others for claims of fraud, fraudulent conveyance,
civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and other claims under Nez
Perce County Case No. CV-07-00208 ("Taylor v. AJA Services, et al.,'), and therein Reed
Taylor obtained an order of partial summary judgment for AJA Services' default of the
$6,000,000 promissory note and corresponding default of the Amended and Restated
Stock Pledge Agreement. By way of this partial summary judgment and/or his prior vote
of the stock, Reed Taylor would and should be in actual control of AJA Insurance but for
the actions of John Taylor, which Hawley Troxell, with full knowledge of Reed Taylor,s
rights, facilitated and aided and abetted to the detriment of AJA Services, AJA Insurance
and Reed Taylor.
36.

With Hawley TroxelPs full knowledge, Reed Taylor's claims asserted in

Taylor v. AJA Services, et al. included claims for breaches of fiduciary duty, conspiracy,

fraudulent conveyance,

and fraud perpetrated by John Taylor and others (including

CropUSA), including but not limited to claims that John Taylor had wrongfully
transferred over $1,500,000 of AJA Insurance's cash to CropUSA, for no consideration
and had transferred approximately $700,000 of the assets of AJA Insurance to CropUSA
for no consideration. John Taylor was at all times material also an interested director,
officer and shareholder of CropUSA. Also included in the civil action were other claims
that John Taylor and others had engaged in self-dealing and/or fraudulent transactions
with AJA Services and/or AJA Insurance to the detriment of the corporations and Reed
Taylor, and for the personal benefit of John Taylor and other interested parties (including
CropUSA).

Ill
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37.

•

•

In 2007, Hawley Troxell appeared in the civil action, Taylor v. AJA

Services, et al., and assumed legal representation of two distinct clients, AJA Services, a
corporation, and AJA Insurance, a corporation, and also represented the interests of John
Taylor, an individual, and other interested parties (including Connie Taylor, James Beck
and Michael Cashman). At all material times John Taylor was an interested purported
CEO and director of AJA Services and AJA Insurance and an interested majority
shareholder of AJA Services.

The civil action clearly alleged acts of fraud, civil

conspiracy, conversion, and breaches of fiduciary duty perpetrated by John Taylor and
others against AJA Services and AJA Insurance, and such acts having damaged and
continuing to cause damages to the corporations, their shareholders and creditors. In
violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care, Hawley
Troxell undertook to represent the three named clients AJA Services, AJA Insurance, and
CropUSA, which such entities had no true common interests and each having
irreconcilable conflicts of interest with the other.
38.

In May 2007, Reed Taylor's attorney advised Hawley Troxell that it was

not appropriate for Hawley Troxell to represent AJA Services and AJA Insurance, and/or
to take direction from John Taylor because of various conflicts of interest and the fact
that John Taylor was an interested party with substantial claims against him. Despite the
warning and demands made by Reed Taylor's attorney, Hawley Troxell also appeared
and represented CropUSA, which created additional conflicts of interest, resulted in a
breach of Hawley Troxell's fiduciary duties (including the duty of loyalty) owed to AJA
Services and AJA Insurance, and was a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
and their duty of care.
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39.

Hawley Troxell inappropriately entered into and/or participated in a Joint

Defense Agreement(s) knowing that AJA Services, AJA Insurance, CropUSA Insurance,
Inc., John Taylor and other named and unnamed individuals in Taylor v. AIA Services, et
al. had clear irreconcilable conflicting and diverging interests in violation of the Rules of

Professional Conduct and duty of care, and to the detriment AIA Services, AJA Insurance
and Reed Taylor. In Taylor v. AIA Services, et al., a Joint Defense Agreement was not
permissible or appropriate because it would perpetuate fraud, conspiracy, aiding and
abetting, and other causes of action, was entered into without obtaining informed consent
from disinterested representatives of the corporations, and the Joint Defense Agreement
was also independently not appropriate or permitted when certain parties to a joint
defense agreement should be asserting claims against other parties to the agreement.
40.

The Joint Defense Agreement(s) facilitated by Hawley Troxell has

assisted in others (including John Taylor, James Beck, Connie Taylor, Michael Cashman
and CropUSA) to perpetrate and/or hide acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances;
conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and other claims, while also assisting Hawley
Troxell in inappropriately and unlawfully obtaining payment of fees and costs for its
services and in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Hawley Troxell' s duty
of care.
41.

Hawley Troxell assisted AIA Services, AJA Insurance, CropUSA, John

Taylor, and others in entering into various inappropriate agreements and transactions
which were in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and its duty of care, were
not in the best interests of the corporations, not authorized by disinterested parties,
constituted fraud and/or the inappropriate transfer of assets and funds belonging to AIA
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Services and/or AIA Insurance, were not arms-length transactions, and/or were done so
without requiring AIA Services, AIA Insurance and/or CropUSA to retain separate
independent counsel that were retained by separate independent uninterested parties.
42.

As the purported attorneys for AIA Services, an entity, Hawley Troxell

owed duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, and
under the law to the corporation and its shareholders to preserve and protect the assets
and businesses of the corporation, and since AIA Services was insolvent, to its creditors
including Reed Taylor. As attorney for AIA Services, and in light of the claims made
against John Taylor and others by Reed Taylor, Hawley Troxell owed a duty to its entity
client not to assume representation of the interests of John Taylor, individually and/or
through a Joint Defense Agreement, or with any other interested parties.
43.

As the purported attorneys for AIA Insurance, an entity, Hawley Troxell

owed duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care and
the law to the corporation and its shareholders including a creditor pledgee of the
corporation's stock, Reed Taylor, with contractual rights to vote the shares and assume
control and who had exercised his contractual rights and had voted the shares but whose
rights were breached and rejected by interested directors and others who were in control
of the corporation including John Taylor. As attorneys for AIA Insurance and in light of
the claims made against John Taylor and others by the

~eed

Taylor, Hawley Troxell

owed a duty to its entity client not to assume representation of the interests of John
Taylor, individually and/or through any Joint Defense Agreement, and/or of other
interested parties (including CropUSA, Connie Taylor, James Beck and Michael
Cashman).
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44.

As attorneys representing the interests of John Taylor through a Joint

Defense Agreement, Hawley Troxell owed its duties first and foremost to its purported
clients AIA Services and AJA Insurance as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional
CondQct, duty of care and/or the law. As attorneys for John Taylor by and through taking
directions and/or accepting decisions made by him knowing that he was interested and
should have claims asserted against him, and in light of the claims against John Taylor by
the Reed Taylor, Hawley Troxell owed a duty to its purported corporate clients not to
assume representation of the interests of John Taylor, CropUSA or other interested
parties. Hawley Troxell failed to notify or obtain appropriate informed consents or
approvals from appropriate parties or disinterested shareholders in violation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct, Hawley Troxell's duty of care, and the Bylaws and Articles of
Formation of the corporations, all to the detriment of Reed Taylor.
45.

As the purported attorneys for AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance

(individually or through any Joint Defense Agreement) Hawley Troxell owed duties of
loyalty to the corporations and could not represent John Taylor or CropUSA in Taylor v.
AJA Services, et al., or represent or assist John Taylor in Donna J. Taylor v. R. John
Taylor because Hawley Troxell's loyalty belongs exclusively to AIA Services and/or
AJA Insurance. Furthermore, Hawley Troxell could in no way represent CropUSA or
participate in any joint defense of CropUSA or other interested parties (such as John
Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, and/or Michael Cashman) as AIA Services and/or
AIA Insurance should have been asserting claims against CropUSA, each other, and other
interested and uninterested parties.
46.

Hawley Troxell represented, and continue to represent, the interests of
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•

John Taylor (individually and/or through a Joint Defense Agreement) and with full
knowledge that John Taylor is an interested party and director of AJA Services and AJA
Insurance and is personally inappropriately conducting and controlling the course of
litigation involving Hawley Troxell' s clients, AJA Services and AIA Insurance, while
also inappropriately representing CropUSA to the detriment of the corporations and Reed
Taylor.
47.

During the course of the civil action after March 28, 2007, Hawley Troxell

has coordinated and participated with Quarles & Brady LLP ("Quarles Brady''), the law
firm that has represented AIA Services and AJA Services before and throughout

litigation, and Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. ("Clements Brown"), the law firm
that formerly purportedly represented AIA Service and AJA Insurance in Taylor v. A.IA
Services, et al. During the course of the civil action after March 28, 2007, John Taylor
and others have further engaged in inappropriate and/or wrongful transactions involving
themselves, AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and CropUSA, which transactions have
occurred with Hawley Troxell's knowledge and/or assistance, and to the detriment of
AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and Reed Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee.
48.

Hawley Troxell are liable to Reed Taylor for an amount to be proven at

trial because Hawley Troxell has encouraged, conspired with, provided substantial
assistance to, and/or aided and abetted John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael
Cashman, Bryan Freeman, JoLee Duclos, AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA,
and/or other interested parties in the commission acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances,
conversion, tortious interference, breaches of fiduciary duties, and other unlawful acts.
The acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances, tortious interference, conversion, and breaches
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of fiduciary duties include, but are not limited to: 1) While purporting to represent AJA
Insurance and AJA Services, Hawley Troxell assisted and/or aided and abetted John
Taylor in the tortious interference with the assertion of Reed Taylor's contractual rights
to control and operate AJAJnsurance, which has proximately caused damages to Reed
Taylor; 2) While purporting to represent AJA Services and AJA Insurance, Hawley
Troxell inappropriately assisted and/or aided and abetted John Taylor and other interested
parties to engage in tortious transactions involving John Taylor, AJA Services, AJA
Insurance, and/or CropUSA, which such transactions have been to the detriment of AJA
Services, AJA Insurance, and Reed Taylor, and proximately caused damages to Reed
Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee; and 3) While representing John Taylor, individually
or through a Joint Defense Agreement, Hawley Troxell has had full knowledge that its
client is an interested party and director of AJA Services, AJA Insurance, and CropUSA,
and is personally conducting and controlling the course of litigation involving Hawley
Troxell's former clients, AJA Services and AJA Insurance, and Hawley Troxell has
assisted and/or aided and abetted John Taylor and others (including, CropUSA) and has
coordinated and participated with Hawley Troxell and Quarles & Brady in John Taylor's
engaging in tortious transactions involving himself, AJA Services, AJA Insurance, and
CropUSA, which transactions have been to the detriment of AJA Services and AJA
Insurance and proximately caused damages to Reed Taylor as a creditor and stock
pledgee.
49.

In connection with Hawley Troxell's inappropriate representation and/or

joint defense of John Taylor, AJA Services, AJA Insurance, CropUSA, and other
interested parties (including Connie Taylor, James Beck, and Michael Cashman) Hawley

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 18

000689

Troxell accepted payments of attorneys fees and costs believed to exceed $500,000 in
violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, and as participating
and/or assisting in inappropriate corporate acts and the aiding and abetting of others.
50.

Over the course of the litigation in Reed Taylor v. AJA Services, et al.,

Reed Taylor's attorney in that action, Roderick C. Bond of Smith, Cannon & Bond
PLLC, advised Hawley Troxell on numerous occasions that its conduct violated Idaho
Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, was inappropriate, and constituted the
aiding and abetting of other interested and uninterested parties (including John Taylor
and CropUSA), among other potential legal claims against them. In early 2007, Reed
Taylor's counsel advised Hawley Troxell that its inappropriate actions would result in
claims being filed against them by Reed Taylor. Reed Taylor's counsel reiterated these
warnings orally and in writing on numerous occasions. Despite the warnings from Reed
Taylor's counsel, Hawley Troxell conduct persisted thereby further damaging Reed
Taylor. Hawley Troxell's disregard of Mr. Bond's warnings can only be construed as
intentional improper acts to assist John Taylor and other interested parties to the
detriment of Reed Taylor.
51.

Hawley Troxell wrongfully assisted John Taylor and other interested

parties in operating CropUSA with the funds, assets, employees, trade secrets and other
things of value inappropriately obtained from AJA Services and/or AJA Insurance, and
by assisting John Taylor and other interested parties (including CropUSA) in preventing
claims from being asserted and prosecuted against them. Hawley Troxell wrongfully
assisted and/or failed to prevent interested parties (including John Taylor) in transferring
the long-term employees of AIA Insurance to CropUSA, while at the same time
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representing to the Court in Taylor v. AIA Services, et al., that the corporations were
being operated properly and/or failing to advise the Court of the inappropriate acts and
transactions.

All the while Hawley Troxell was aware of and/or assisted in the

inappropriate payment of salaries, benefits, compensation, and director fees of $20,000
per year when AJA Services was insolvent.
52.

Despite Reed Taylor's demands that Hawley Troxell take action to protect

the assets and funds of AJA Services and AIA Insurance and recover funds and assets
from John Taylor, CropUSA and other interested and uninterested parties for the benefit
of the corporations and Reed Taylor, Hawley Troxell refused to act in accordance with
the Rules of Profession Conduct, its duty of care, and the law. Despite Reed Taylor's
demands that interests of the minority disinterested shareholders be considered and/or
protected because of the wrongful acts of John Taylor and other interested parties,
Hawley Troxell refused to act and failed to fully and properly disclose all pertinent facts
to the disinterested shareholders and request their votes.
53.

In various motions, responses and affidavits submitted to the court in

Taylor v. AIA Services, et al., Hawley Troxell made arguments that did not benefit AJA

Services, AJA Insurance, or Reed Taylor, inappropriately made other arguments
preventing valid claims from being asserted against John Taylor, James Beck, Connie
Taylor, Michael Cashman, and other interested and uninterested parties, and failed to take
action against responsible parties (including John Taylor, CropUSA, Connie Taylor,
James Beck, Michael Cashman, Lancelot Investors Fund, and others). In the instance of
Michael Cashman, Hawley Troxell successfully argued to the Court in Taylor v. AJA
Services, et al., that Mr. Cashman should not be named as an individual when Hawley
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Troxell should have been tal<lng action against Mr. Cashman and others.
54.

Despite Reed Taylor's demands that disinterested directors and/or parties

· must direct the litigation on behalf of the corporations, Hawley Troxell refused and
permitted and/or assisted John Taylor and other interested parties to direct the litigation
to the detriment of the corporations and Reed Taylor. Despite Reed Taylor's demands
that action be taken to terminate AIA Insurance's improper guarantee of a $15,000,000
line-of-credit for CropUSA, Hawley Troxell refused to act, failed to inform or fully
disclose to disinterested parties or shareholders the existence of such inappropriate loan
guarantees, and threatened to take legal action against Reed Taylor if he tried to rescind
or terminate the improper guarantee (since Defendant Gary D. Babbitt's threat, the
balance of the loan increased by over $5,500,000 to over $10,500,000).
55.

Hawley Troxell's conduct has violated Idaho Rules of Professional

Conduct and its duty of care, which require Hawley Troxell to disgorge all attorneys' fees
and costs paid to them in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., and for other related and/or
unrelated legal services. Despite Reed Taylor's demands to comply with the Rules of
Professional Conduct and its duty of care, Hawley Troxell refused to do so.
56.

Through the acts of Hawley Troxell, the value of AIA Insurance and the

assets of AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance have plummeted in value, the corporations'
value and assets have been impaired, and/or the assets and funds have been transferred to
CropUSA. Through the acts of Hawley Troxell, ownership of CropUSA was vested and
has remained vested in interested parties (including John Taylor), while the major
creditor Reed Taylor and minority shareholders were left with nothing. Despite Reed
Taylor's demands that action should also be taken for the interests of the innocent
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minority shareholders and creditors, Hawley Troxell has refused to take action and
inappropriately assisted the interested parties (including John Taylor, Connie Taylor,
James Beck and Michael Cashman).
57.

Despite Hawley Troxell having made several legal arguments that lacked

merit, lacked good faith and/or were not grounded in facts, Hawley Troxell provided a
settlement offer to Reed Taylor in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., which included a
provision that he release all claims against Hawley Troxell as a condition of the
settlement. The inclusion of such a provision was a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct and Hawley Troxell' s duty of care. Hawley Troxell also refused to make any
provisions for disinterested minority shareholders of AIA Services as requested by Reed
Taylor.
58.

Hawley Troxell has assisted in the inappropriate acts of John Taylor and

other interested parties in stopping all payments to Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor, Reed
Taylor's former wife and the holder of all outstanding Preferred A Shares of AIA
Services. Like Reed Taylor, Donna Taylor is required to be a member of the board of
directors of AJA Services. Like Reed Taylor, Hawley Troxell has assisted John Taylor
and other interested parties in preventing Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor from being
members of the board of directors of AJA Services, which has further far reaching
ramifications and results in additional damages against Hawley Troxell.
59.

With full knowledge of AIA Services' obligations to ensure that Reed

Taylor and Donna Taylor are members of AIA Services' board until they were paid in
full, Hawley Troxell proceeded to attend and participate in inappropriate board meetings
and/or take inappropriate action based upon board meetings held by interested directors
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without Reed Taylor or Donna Taylor being present and without providing them with
their right to be present, which further results in all such meetings and decisions being
null and void, and Hawley Troxell being liable for the associated damages for
substantially participating in such actions.
60.

Hawley Troxell represented AIA Services and AJA Insurance in litigation

with the state of Idaho. The litigation was funded by AIA Insurance by and through
commissions in which Reed Taylor held a security interest of which Hawley Troxell had
full knowledge.

The litigation was resolved, however, and instead of titling the

$1,200,000 Mortgage that was received as settlement in the name of AIA Insurance,
Hawley Troxell titled the mortgage only in the name of AIA Services in an inappropriate
scheme to keep the mortgage from AIA Insurance and Reed Taylor (Reed Taylor is also
entitled to possession of the Mortgage because it is a distribution from the The Universe,
which is another subsidiary pledged to Reed Taylor).
61.

Hawley Troxell inappropriately purportedly represented AIA Services,

AIA Insurance and CropUSA by drafting documents to assist in the inappropriate pledge
of the $1,200,000 Mortgage to CropUSA to facilitate the payment of Hawley Troxell's
services in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, and the law.
Hawley Troxell assisted and/or failed to prevent and/or notify disinterested parties or the
Court that AJA Services had inappropriately pledged its sole remaining other significant
asset, the $1,200,000 mortgage, to CropUSA to facilitate the payment of $500,000 for
Hawley Troxell' s services in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of
care, and the law.
62.

Hawley Troxell omitted and/or misrepresented material facts to the Court

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 23

000694

in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., to the detriment of Reed Taylor. In several instances,
Hawley Troxell persuaded the Court to take action that was not in the best interests of the
corporations or Reed Taylor, to the detriment of the corporations and Reed Taylor
(including consenting to the issuance of only a $200,000 bond when Hawley Troxell
knew that the corporations were not being operated properly or their assets safeguarded).
63.

Hawley Troxell has inappropriately assisted John Taylor and other

interested parties in misallocating and not allocating expenses and/or services provided
and borne by AIA Insurance and/or AIA Services for the benefit of CropUSA, John
Taylor and other interested parties. Upon information and belief, Hawley Troxell has
assisted in issuing inappropriate opinion letters to auditors of AIA Services, AIA
Insurance and/or CropUSA to assist John Taylor and other interested parties in
transferring and utilizing the assets, employees, labor, funds and resources of AIA
Insurance and/or AIA Services for the benefit of CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc while
providing little or no consideration in return.
64.

Hawley Troxell had full knowledge of John Taylor's Executive Officer's

Agreement, which, upon information and belief, was drafted by Defendant Richard A.
Riley. Regardless, Defendant Richard A. Riley had full knowledge of the existence and
terms of John Taylor's Executive Officer's Agreement with AIA Services. Even though
John Taylor has breached the terms of his employment contract with AIA Services by
competing against AIA Services through CropUSA (and violating the corporate
opportunity doctrine), by soliciting employees of AIA Insurance, and other inappropriate
actions, Hawley Troxell has intentionally refused to act in the best interests of AIA
Services, AIA Insurance, their shareholders, and/or Reed Taylor, to the detriment of Reed
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Taylor.
65.

Hawley Troxell assisted in inappropriately transferring and retaining

funds, assets and property to CropUSA to defraud AIA Services' creditor Reed Taylor
(including, without limitation, over $95,000 owed by Pacific Empire Radio Corporation
to AIA Insurance, assistance in transferring shares of the Pacific Empire Radio
Corporation to John Taylor, and failing to collect the over $300,000 owed by John
Taylor) by not reporting such acts to disinterested parties or other appropriate parties as
required by the Rules of Professional Conduct and its duty of care.
66.

In April 2007, Hawley Troxell permitted and/or assisted interested parties

in holding a joint board meeting of AJA Services and AIA Insurance with full knowledge
that Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor were being intentionally denied their right to be on
the board of AIA Services and participating in such meetings (Donna Taylor has
subordinated her right to payment in favor of Reed Taylor). At the meeting held in April
2007, Hawley Troxell permitted and/or assisted John Taylor to appoint Connie Taylor
and James Beck to the boards of AJA Services and AIA Insurance knowing that they
were interested parties who AJA Services and/or AIA Insurance should be pursuing
claims against, that they inappropriately held shares in CropUSA, that they were
inappropriately being paid $20,000 per year to attend the board meeting of an insolvent
corporation, and that they did not meet the required standards necessary to be members of
such boards as set forth under the corporations' bylaws.
67.

Hawley Troxell inappropriately permitted and/or assisted two interested

parties, Connie Taylor and James Beck, to approve and/or consent to a Joint Retainer and
Joint Defense Agreement with Hawley Troxell and others, which also facilitated the
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inappropriate joint legal representations of interested parties with conflicting
irreconcilable interests and the payment of attorneys' fees and costs to various attorneys
in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and its duty of care.
68. ·

Hawley Troxell has been fully aware of Reed Taylor's rights to property

in which he held a security interest and was pledged to him as collateral. In fact,
Defendant Richard A. Riley represented AIA Services in the redemption of Reed
Taylor's shares and the drafting of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement
and other applicable agreements. Hawley Troxell was responsible for issuing opinion
letters relating to the transaction, which include various applicable representations and
warranties. Hawley Troxell is now asserting arguments counter to the representations
made in the opinion letter drafted by Hawley Troxell by and through Defendant Richard
A. Riley. Hawley Troxell also assisted in the commission of torts by John Taylor,
CropUSA, and other interested parties by representing the corporations in various
inappropriate transactions.
69.

Hawley Troxell also knew that the disinterested minority shareholders of

AIA Services (innocent shareholders) were never advised of the significant claims
against the interested parties (including John Taylor and CropUSA) and the significant
misappropriation of the corporations' assets, but provided legal services on behalf of the
interested parties and accepted payment from AIA Services and AIA Insurance.

In

connection with the payment of attorneys' fees and costs to other named parties in Taylor

v. AJA Services, et al., Hawley Troxell failed to obtain the necessary approvals from Reed
Taylor or other disinterested parties to the detriment of AIA Services, AIA Insurance
and/or Reed Taylor.
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70.

Despite demands to the contrary, Hawley Troxell continued to take

instructions and/or directives from the unauthorized boards (or John Taylor) of AIA
Services and/or AIA Insurance knowing that the boards are not properly seated and are
comprised of interested parties (including John Taylor) with significant claims that
should be asserted against them in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty
of care, and/or the law.

II. HAWLEY TROXELL'S AIDING AND ABETTING AND CONSPIRACY
71.

Hawley Troxell is committing and has committed tortious acts in concert

with other parties (including John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman,
JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, CropUSA, Clements Brown, Quarles Brady, and others)
and/or pursuant to a common design or civil conspiracy with such other parties.
72.

Hawley Troxell knew that the conduct of other parties (including John

Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, CropUSA, Bryan
Freeman, Clements Brown, Quarles Brady and others) constituted breaches of duties
and/or gave substantial assistance and/or encouragement to such other parties in
breaching said duties. Hawley Troxell knew that it was purportedly using the normally
lawful act of practicing law to commit and/or substantially assist others in committing
unlawful acts.
73.

Hawley Troxell gave substantial assistance to other parties (including John

Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, CropUSA, Bryan
Freeman, Clements Brown, Quarles Brady, and others) in committing and/or
accomplishing tortious conduct and/or acts (including, without limitation, breaches of
fiduciary duties, fraud, constructive fraud, fraudulent conveyances, conversion, tortious
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interference, and other claims), and Hawley Troxell's conduct, separately considered,
constitutes the breaches of duties owed to AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and/or Reed
Taylor.
74.

Hawley Troxell conduct constitutes aiding and abetting of other parties in

the commission of the torts and/or caused of action alleged in this Complaint (including
John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, CropUSA,

Bryan Freeman, Clements Brown, Quarles Brady, and others) and/or constitutes the
conduct of a contributing tortfeasor, and such conduct has damaged AIA Services, AIA
Insurance, and Reed Taylor.
75.

Hawley Troxell's conduct constitutes the commission of civil conspiracy

in the commission of the torts and/or causes of action alleged in this Complaint,
including, without limitation, the conspiracy to jointly represent parties to commit torts as
further evidenced by Joint Defense Agreements.
76.

The paragraphs in this Section are incorporated by reference into each

cause of action below as necessary to support aiding and abetting and/or civil conspiracy
of the torts and/or causes of action set forth below and/or contemplated in this Complaint.
ID. FIRST CAUSES OF ACTIONS-CONVERSION
(Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance's Causes of Actions)
77.

Reed Taylor has, and has had during certain relevant time, a valid and

perfected security interest in the commissions and related receivables of AIA Services
and AIA Insurance and all proceeds relating to such security interests. Reed Taylor also
has a security interest in all of the stock of AIA Insurance and the stock of all of AIA
Services' other subsidiaries, including The Universe and all distributions and proceeds
relating to such security interests (i.e., the $1.2 Million Lewis-Clark Mortgage). Hawley
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Troxell had full knowledge of Reed Taylor's security interests in the foregoing property
and such other property reasonably contemplated by the Redemption Agreements.
78.

By way of Reed Taylor's security interest in AJA Insurance's

commissions, his security interest in AJA Insurance's stock, and his asserted contractual
right to the possession and control of AIA Insurance on ·February 22, 2007, all of AJA
Insurance's revenues, assets, and income should be under the possession and control of
Reed Taylor, including, without limitation, the $1.2 Million Mortgage, settlement
proceeds in the approximate amount of $800,000, all funds and assets transferred or
utilized in any way by CropUSA, and every dollar of revenue generated by AJA
Insurance from all sources since February 22, 2007.
79.

Reed is entitled to possession and control of all of the property to which he

has a contractual right, including, without limitation, the property indicated above and all
other property contemplated in this Complaint through his security interest in the
commissions and related receivables and the proceeds related thereto, security interests in
the stock of all of AJA Services' subsidiaries and the distributions and proceeds related
thereto, and through the security and related rights set forth in the Redemption
Agreements.
80.

All of Reed Taylor's security interests and possession rights can be traced

through various sources to identify all funds and assets that Hawley Troxell has
unlawfully taken or assisted others in taking.

Hawley Troxell has taken control of

property, which Reed Taylor is entitled to possession and control, including without
limitation, all funds received for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs in Taylor v. A.IA
Services, et al. and attorneys' fees and costs paid for other purported services. Hawley
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Troxell has exercised dominion and control over assets (including the $1.2 Million
Mortgage) and/or funds (any funds received from AIA Services or AIA Insurance) in
which Reed Taylor is entitled to possession with full knowledge of Reed Taylor's
possessory rights and security interests.
81.

Hawley Troxell has received substantial payments believed to exceed

$500,000 for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs, which such funds Hawley Troxell
had no lawful right to possess or retain, funds that Reed Taylor had the legal right to
possess, and such funds were received in violation of the law, Rules of Professional
Conduct Hawley Troxell's duty of care. Hawley Troxell also assisted in the inappropriate
titling and pledging of a $1.2 Million Mortgage owned by AIA Services to facilitate the
payment of funds to it, which such funds and the $1.2 Million Mortgage Reed Taylor was
legally entitled to possess. Hawley Troxell has also accepted the payment of services for
attorneys' fees and costs rendered for CropUSA, which were paid by the money and/or
assets unlawfully derived from AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance, which such money
and/or assets Reed Taylor held valid security interests.
82.

Hawley Troxell's conduct constitutes the willful interference with

property and/or funds belonging to Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance;
and/or which such property and/or funds should be under the possession and/or control of
AIA Services, AIA Insurance and/or Reed Taylor, as the person entitled to such money
and property as a creditor and pledgee. Hawley Troxell intentionally deprived Reed
Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance of possession of such property and/or funds.
Despite demands, Hawley Troxell has refused to return such property and/or funds, and
has unlawfully retained the property and/or funds.
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83.

As a direct and/or proximate cause of Hawley Troxell's acts and/or

omissions (which constitute conversion), Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount to
be proven at the time of trial or on summary judgment.
84.

Hawley Troxell has also aided and abetted and/or conspired with other

parties in the conversion of property that Reed Taylor is legally entitled to possess and/or
property to which AJA Services and/or AJA Insurance are entitled to possess (including,
without limitation, funds paid to Hawley Troxell, funds paid to John Taylor and other
interested parties, the pledging of the $1.2 Million Mortgage to CropUSA, and the $1.5
Million unlawfully transferred to CropUSA). As a direct and/or proximate result of
Hawley Troxell's aiding and abetting and/or civil conspiracy relating to the conversion of
assets and/or funds that Reed Taylor, AJA Services, and/or AJA Insurance are legally
entitled to possess, Reed Taylor, AJA Insurance, and/or AJA Services have been
damaged in the amount to be proven at the time of trial or on summary judgment.
IV. SECOND CAUSES OF ACTIONS-TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
(Reed Taylor, AJA Services and/or AIA Insurance's Causes of Actions)
85.

Reed Taylor is a party to the Redemption Agreements. Hawley Troxell

has full knowledge of the Redemption Agreements. Hawley Troxell has intentionally
interfered with Reed Taylor's contractual rights set forth in the Redemption Agreements
causing breaches of the Redemption Agreements.

Hawley Troxell's intentional

interference, includes, but is not limited to, tortiously interfering with Reed Taylor's
contractual rights to vote the shares of AJA Insurance, rights to possession of the
commission collateral, right to be a member of the board of AJA Services, right to be an
officer and director of AJA Insurance, right to possession and control of AJA Insurance,
other rights set forth in the Redemption Agreements, and rights set forth in the

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 31
000702

Subordination Agreement with Donna Taylor. Also included in this cause of action are
tortious interference claims based upon Hawley Troxell, John Taylor, Connie Taylor,
James Beck, and other parties exceeding their authority to act on behalf of AIA Services
and/or AIA Insurance.
86.

Hawley Troxell has also aided and abetted and/or conspired with John

Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman,
CropUSA and/or other parties in the tortious interference of Reed Taylor's contractual
rights. Hawley Troxell's acts and/or omissions also constitute the aiding and abetting
and/or civil conspiracy with others in the tortious interference of Reed Taylor's
contractual rights.
87.

As a direct and/or proximate result of Hawley Troxell's acts and/or

omissions, Reed Taylor has been damaged and is entitled to damages in the amount to be
determined at the time of trial or on summary judgment.
88.

AIA Services is a party to John Taylor's Executive Officer's Agreement.

Hawley Troxell has full knowledge of the Executive Officer's Agreement.

Hawley

Troxell has intentionally interfered with AIA Services' contractual rights set forth in the
Executive Officer's Agreement causing breaches to the Executive Officer's Agreement.
Hawley Troxell's intentional interference, includes, but is not limited to, tortiously
interfering with AIA Services' contractual rights prevent John Taylor from transferring
AIA Insurance's employees to CropUSA, rights to prevent John Taylor from competing
against AIA Services or AIA Insurance through CropUSA, and rights to control John
Taylor's compensation. All of these allegations have been repeatedly alleged by Reed
Taylor throughout the course of Taylor v. AJA Services, et al. Also included in this cause
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of action are tortious interference claims based upon Hawley Troxell, John Taylor,
Connie Taylor, James Beck, and other parties exceeding their authority to act on behalf of
AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance.
89.

Hawley Troxell has also aided and abetted and/or conspired with John

Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman,
CropUSA and/or other parties in the tortious interference of AIA Services' contractual
rights. Hawley Troxell's acts and/or omissions also constitute the aiding and abetting
and/or civil conspiracy with others in the tortious interference of AIA Services'
contractual rights.
90.

As a direct and/or proximate result of Hawley Troxell's acts and/or

omissions, AIA Services has been damaged and is entitled to damages in the amount to
be determined at the time of trial or on summary judgment.

V. THIRD CAUSES OF ACTIONS-FRAUD AND/OR CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD
(Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance's Causes of Actions)
91.

Hawley Troxell owed special duties to Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or

AIA Insurance as described throughout this Complaint.
92.

As a former attorney for Reed Taylor and the attorney who provided an

opinion letter to Reed Taylor, defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by and
through an opinion letter that was based upon Riley's personal knowledge (representing
such facts as the transactions being fully legal and authorized by the corporations), which
further invokes personal liability to Riley. Reed Taylor had a right to rely on Riley's
representations and justifiably relied on such representations. Riley breached his duties
when he asserted that the transaction was illegal. Although Reed Taylor believes the
transaction was legal and supported by applicable law, Riley's actions have breached his
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duties to Reed Taylor and caused Reed Taylor to incur damages from the payments of
attorneys' fees and costs and lost possession of property and funds because of AIA
Insurance being wrongfully withheld from Reed Taylor. As a result of Riley's acts
and/or omissions (which constitute fraud), Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount
to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.
93.

Hawley Troxell owed Reed Taylor special duties as the secured creditor of

AIA Services, the sole pledgee of all of the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance, a stock
pledgee in which Hawley Troxell knew had lawfully voted the shares of AIA Insurance,
the only authorized officer and director of AIA Insurance, the holder of a security interest
in all of the commissions and related receivables of AIA Services and AIA Insurance, the
holder of a security interest in all of the shares of all of AIA Services' other subsidiaries
and all distributions related to the shares (i.e., the $1.2 Million Mortgage and $800,000
settlement), the most significant creditor of the insolvent AIA Services, and the only
party entitled to the remaining assets of AIA Services and AIA Insurance.
94.

Hawley Troxell owed and owes duties to AIA Services and AIA Insurance

to properly represent the best interests of the corporations and to not allow interested
parties (including, without limitation, John Taylor) from taking actions that are not in the
best interests of the corporations, including, without limitation, unauthorized and/or
conflicted persons directing litigation, misappropriation and tortious transfer of assets and
funds to interested parties to the detriment of AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance, to
advise the Court and disinterested shareholders of the actions of John Taylor and other
interested parties, and to not issue opinion letters to auditors and/or other parties to assist
in the commission of tortious conduct. Hawley Troxell has breached its duties and acted
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unlawfully (and all improper and/or unlawful acts set forth and/or contemplated in this
Complaint), and its conduct constitutes constructive fraud for which AIA Services and/or
AIA Insurance are entitled to recover damages in the amount to be proven at trial or on
summary judgment.
95.

Hawley Troxell has also aided and abetted and/or conspired with John

Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman,
CropUSA and/or other parties in the commission of fraud and/or constructive fraud and
to otherwise defraud Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance. As a direct
and/or proximate result of Hawley Troxell's acts, Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA
Insurance have been damaged in an amount to be proven at the time of trial or on
summary judgment.

VI. FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTIONS-MALPRACTICE
(Reed Taylor~· AiA Services and/or AIA Insurance's Causes of Actions)
96.

Hawley Troxell owed Reed Taylor a special attorney-client relationship

for all of the reasons set forth in this Complaint (including, without limitation, the
allegations contained in Reed Taylor's breach of fiduciary duty cause of action). From
time to time, Hawley Troxell has also possessed funds and/or property which it should
have protected and safeguarded for Reed Taylor, but failed to do so. All of the foregoing
results in the existence of duties on the part of Hawley Troxell owed to Reed Taylor, or at
the minimum, a special duty to ensure assets and funds are protected for the benefit of
Reed Taylor in the event that he takes control and possession of AIA Insurance pursuant
to his contractual rights (which such event could have happened at any time during
Hawley Troxell's purported representation of AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance).
97.

Hawley Troxell's purported clients were trustees and/or fiduciaries
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performing similar functions for a non-client, Reed Taylor. Hawley Troxell knew that its
appropriate actions were necessary with respect to the representation of AIA Services
and/or AIA Insurance to take action to prevent and/or rectify the breaches of fiduciary
duties owed by AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance to Reed Taylor when such breaches
were crimes and/or fraud and/or Hawley Troxell assisted and/or are assisting in the
breaches. Reed Taylor was not able to protect his rights because of Hawley Troxell's
actions and Hawley Troxell's obligations to AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance would
not be significantly impaired because the best interests of all the foregoing is to collect
sums owed by others and recover damages for the improper tortious conduct of others
(including, without limitation, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael
Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, and CropUSA).
98.

Hawley Troxell breached its duties (including, without limitation, the duty

of the standard of care) owed by it to Reed Taylor. As a direct and/or proximate result of
Hawley Troxell's failure to perform the duties owed to Reed Taylor, he was damaged in
the amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment. ·
99.

Defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by and through an

opinion letter that was based upon Riley's personal knowledge, which further invokes
personal liability to Riley. Riley breached his duties when he asserted that the transaction
was illegal. Although Reed Taylor believes the transaction was legal and supported by
applicable law, Riley's actions have breached his duties to Reed Taylor and caused Reed
Taylor to incur damages for the payments of attorneys' fees and costs and lost revenues
because of AIA Insurance being wrongfully withheld from Reed Taylor. As a result of
Riley's acts and/or omissions, Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount to be proven
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at trial or on summary judgment.
100.

Hawley Troxell owed AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance an attomey-

client relationship for purportedly representing AIA Service and/or AIA Insurance, which
results. in the existence of duties on the part of Hawley Troxell owed to AIA Ser\rices
and/or AIA Insurance.
101.

Hawley Troxell owed AIA Services, AIA Insurance and/or Reed Taylor a

duty of care to provide, including, but not limited to, reasonable, prudent, ethical,
unconflicted, loyal and professional legal advice and legal representation in keeping with
the standard of care in the legal profession and as owed to the corporations (referred to
herein and above as "duty of care"). Hawley Troxell breached its duty of care as a result
of its acts and/or omissions thereby damaging the corporations and Reed Taylor, to the
detriment of Reed Taylor.
102.

Hawley Troxell breached its fiduciary duties owed to AIA Services, AIA

Insurance, and/or Reed Taylor, including, without limitation, the duties of care and
loyalty.
103.

Hawley Troxell's acts constitute professional negligence and/or breach of

Hawley Troxell's fiduciary duties, and such conduct have damaged the corporations and
Reed Taylor, in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.
104.

Hawley Troxell breached the duty of the standard of care owed by it to

AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance. As a direct and/or proximate result of Hawley
Troxell's failure to perform the duties owed to AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance in
connection with the legal services purportedly provided by Hawley Troxell, AIA Services
and/or AIA Insurance were damaged in the amount to be proven at trial or on summary
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judgment.
VII. FIFTH CAUSES OF ACTIONS-VIOLATIONS OF THE I.C.P.A.
(Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance's Causes of Actions)

105.

Reed Taylor, AIA Services and AIA Insurance are all persons as defined

by LC. § 48-602. Hawley Troxell' s purported practice of law constitutes services as
defined by LC. § 48-602. Reed Taylor, AIA Services and AIA Insurance have either
purchased services directly from Hawley Troxell, are known beneficiaries of services
provided by Hawley Troxell, and/or its attorneys are members of the Idaho State Bar
through which AIA Services, AIA Insurance and/or Reed Taylor has contracted for
services through trade and commerce.
106.

By way of the attorneys of Hawley Troxell' s obligations to the Court and

as members of the Idaho State Bar, they owe duties to their purported clients,
beneficiaries

of their services, and the adverse parties in litigation to comply with the

Rules of Professional Conduct and the laws.

Hawley Troxell has served only the

interests of John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Michael Cashman, James Beck, JoLee Duclos,
CropUSA and other interested parties-who Hawley Troxell has not honestly represented
to the Court and Hawley Troxell's beneficiary and/or adversary that Hawley Troxell was
not complying with its obligations under the Rules of Professional Conduct or the law, to
the detriment of Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance. Hawley Troxell's
unlawful and inappropriate acts have a direct impact on consumers and the integrity of
the legal system, and further constitute unfair methods and practices and violations ofl.C.

§ 48-601, et seq.
107.

Hawley Troxell has falsely represented that it had approval from the Idaho

State Bar and approval from authorized constituents to represent AIA Services and/or
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AIA Insurance, when in fact it did not have such authority in violation of I.C. § 48603(5). Hawley Troxell (including, without limitation, Riley's services to Reed Taylor
through an opinion letter with individual responsibility) has falsely represented that its
services have been provided to a particular standard when in fact its services have not
met the appropriate standards (including the standard of care) in violation of I.C. § 48603(7). Hawley Troxell has falsely disparaged the services of Reed Taylor's counsel in
violation of l.C. § 48-603(8). Hawley Troxell has falsely represented that services were
not needed (i.e., not making claims against John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck,
Michael Cashman, CropUSA and others, when it knew such claims were warranted) in
violation of I.C. § 48-603(16). Hawley Troxell has engaged in acts and/or practices that
have been misleading to Reed Taylor, AIA Services and AIA Insurance in violation of
I.C. § 48-603(17). Based upon all of the allegations in this Complaint, Hawley Troxell
has also violated other applicable provisions of l.C. § 48-603 and/or I.C. § 48-601, et seq.
108.

Reed Taylor has purchased services and has lost property and/or money

and has been damaged by the methods, practices and/or acts of Hawley Troxell declared
unlawful by I.C. § 48-601, et seq.
109.

AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance has purchased services and have lost

property and/or money and has been damaged by the methods, practices and/or acts of
Hawley Troxell declared unlawful by I.C. § 48-601, et seq. AIA Services and/or AIA
Insurance is requesting that all contracts for purported services provided by Hawley
Troxell be declared void and that all funds and/or assets paid under such contracts be
returned to AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance.
110.

Hawley Troxell knew or should have known that its conduct was
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perpetrated directly and/or indirectly against Reed Taylor in violation of LC. § 48-608,
including, without limitation, for being an elderly person who has lost more than 25% of
his monthly income by way of Hawley Troxell's unlawful acts.
111.

Hawley Troxell's acts constitute violations of the Idaho Consumer

Protection Act, specifically, LC. § 48-601, et seq. Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or
AIA Insurance are entitled to damages, treble damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees
and costs and/or such other requested relief as a result of Hawley Troxell's violations and
as available under LC. § 48-601, et seq. Hawley Troxell's violations or the unlawful acts
of attorneys (including attorneys as adversaries) are not any of the exceptions to LC. §
48-601, et seq. as set forth in I.C. § 48-605.

VIII. SIXTH CAUSES OF ACTIONS-BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
(Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance's Causes of Action)
112.

Hawley Troxell owed Reed Taylor special duties as the secured creditor of

AIA Services, the sole pledgee of all of the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance, a stock
pledgee in which Hawley Troxell knew had lawfully voted the shares of AIA Insurance,
the only authorized officer and director of AIA Insurance, the holder of a security interest
in all of the commissions and related receivables of AIA Services and AIA Insurance, the
holder of a security interest in all of the shares of all of AIA Services' other subsidiaries
and all distributions related to the shares (i.e., the $1.2 Million Mortgage and $800,000
settlement), the most significant creditor of the insolvent AIA Services, and the only
party entitled to the remaining assets of AIA Services and AIA Insurance. Based upon all
of the foregoing and Hawley Troxell's possession of funds and assets of AIA Services
and/or AIA Insurance from time to time, Hawley Troxell owed a special fiduciary duty to
safeguard the assets and funds of AIA Services and AIA Insurance.
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113.

Hawley Troxell breached its fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor. As a

direct and/or proximate result of Hawley Troxell's breached fiduciary duties, Reed
Taylor has been damaged in an amount to be proven at the time of trial or on summary
judgment.
114.

Hawley Troxell, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, JoLee Duclos

and Bryan Freeman owed and/or owe fiduciary duties to AJA Services and/or AIA
Insurance and to Reed Taylor as the only significant secured creditor of the insolvent
AIA Services and as the pledgee of all the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance (and the
person who voted the shares). Hawley Troxell has substantially assisted other parties in
breaching the Bylaws of AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance. John Taylor owed and/or
owes fiduciary duties to Reed Taylor by way of being Reed Taylor's brother. The
fiduciary duties owed and breached include, but are not limited to, the duty of loyalty,
duty of care and duty to deal in good faith.
115.

Hawley Troxell had full knowledge of all of the fiduciary duties owed to

Reed Taylor, AJA Services and/or AJA Insurance. The fiduciary duties owed to Reed
Taylor, AJA Services and/or AJA Insurance include (but are not limited to), the
obligation to safeguard AIA Services and AJA Insurance's assets and business
relationships and to recover funds and assets unlawfully transferred from AJA Services or
AIA Insurance.
116.

Hawley Troxell, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, JoLee Duclos

and Bryan Freeman breached their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AJA Services
and/or AJA Insurance; and Hawley Troxell knew that the foregoing parties' conduct
constituted the breach of fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AJA
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Insurance.

These breached fiduciary duties are ongomg and Hawley Troxell has

substantially assisted and/or encouraged the foregoing parties in the commission of
breaching their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA
Insurance. Hawley Troxell also continues to substantially assist and/or encourage the
foregoing parties in breaching their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AIA Services
and/or AIA Insurance.
117.

Hawley Troxell's acts and conduct has damaged Reed Taylor, AIA

Services and/or AIA Insurance in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary
judgment by aiding and abetting and/or substantially assisting others (including John
Taylor and CropUSA) through a civil conspiracy in the commission of breaches of
fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance.
118.

Defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by and through an

opinion letter that was based upon Riley's personal knowledge, which further invokes
personal liability to Riley. Riley breached his duties when he asserted that the transaction
was illegal. Although Reed Taylor believes the transaction was legal and supported by
applicable law, Riley's actions have breached his duties to Reed Taylor and caused Reed
Taylor to incur damages for the payments of attorneys' fees and costs and lost revenues
because of AIA Insurance being wrongfully withheld from Reed Taylor. As a result of
Riley's acts and/or omissions, Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount to be proven
at trial or on summary judgment.

IX. SEVENTH CAUSES OF ACTION-EXCESSIVE COMPENSATION/WASTE
(Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance's Causes of Actions)
119.

Hawley Troxell has known that AIA Services is insolvent and AIA

Insurance is pledged to Reed Taylor as collateral. Hawley Troxell has known that AIA
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Insurance is a wholly owned subsidiary of the insolvent AIA Services. Hawley Troxell
has known that AIA Insurance's business is in the final years of existence and that its
commissions are dwindling as new health policies have not been issued for years.
120.

Hawley Troxell has aided and abetted and/or conspired with John Taylor,

Connie Taylor, James Beck, and others to pay excessive compensation for salaries and
fees for purportedly being officers and/or directors of AIA Services and AIA Insurance.
Hawley Troxell has aided and abetted and/or conspired with John Taylor, Connie Taylor,
James Beck, Michael Cashman and others to waste the remaining assets of AIA Services
and/or AIA Insurance. All the while Hawley Troxell has known of Reed Taylor's rights
and AIA Services' insolvency. Hawley Troxell had full knowledge that John Taylor and
other directors and officers compensation was required to be set by the lawful board of
directors of AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance, but substantially assisted John Taylor
and others in obtaining inappropriate compensation.
121.

Hawley Troxell's acts and conduct has damaged Reed Taylor, AIA

Services and/or AIA Insurance in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary
judgment by aiding and abetting and/or substantially assisting others (including, without
limitation, John Taylor, Connie Taylor and James Beck) through a civil conspiracy in the
payment of excessive compensation.

X. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1.

Reed Taylor demands a trial by jury of not less than twelve (12) on all

claims and damages so triable.

XI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Reed Taylor prays for the following relief:
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For a judgment against Hawley Troxell, jointly and severally, for

$10,500,000 in damages ($3,500,000 in actual damages and $7,000,000 in treble
damages), the exact amount of which will be proven at trial and/or on summary
judgment, plus an award of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest;
2.

For a judgment against Hawley Troxell, jointly and severally, for treble

damages of $7,000,000, the exact amount to be proven at trial pursuant to LC. § 48608(2);
3.

For a judgment requmng the disgorgement of the payments of all

attorneys' fees and costs paid to Hawley Troxell by AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance;

4.

For judgment against Hawley Troxell, jointly and severally, for additional

damages as provided under LC. § 48-608;
5.

For such other relief as may be available to Reed Taylor pursuant to I.C. §

48-601, et seq. or the law, including, without limitation, obtaining a preliminary
injunction to restrain Hawley Troxell from undertaking further representation;
6.

For an award of attorneys fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to

Idaho Law, including, without limitation, I.C. § 48-608, I.C. § 12-120 and/or I.C. § 12121; and
7.

For such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

DATED this _ _ day of October, 2008.
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC

By:

~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Michael S. Bissell
Attorneys for Reed Taylor
Data\1315\1322\Amended Complaint.HTEH.FINAL.doc
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STATE OF IDAHO

VERIFICATION

•

)
) SS.

COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE )
I, Reed J. Taylor, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled action. I have read the contents of this First
Amended Complaint, know the contents of this First Amended Complaint, and believe
that the facts in this First Amended Complaint are true and accurate to the best of my
knowledge and belief.

Reed J. Taylor

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this __ day of October, 2008.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing a t : - - - - - - - - - My commission expires:

------
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,

)
)

)
)
Y.
)
)
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN )
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V,
)
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A
)
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL )
ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP an Idaho limited )

CASE NO.

CV08~01765

Plaintiff,

liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X,
unknown individuals;

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISMISS AND PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO AMEND
COMPLAINT

)

)
)
)

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Motion
to Amend Complaint. A hearing on the Motion to Dismiss was held on October 16, 2008 and a
hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint was held on December 4, 2008. Plaintiff
Reed Taylor was represented by attorney Michael S. Bissell. Defendants Babbitt, Ashby,
Collins, Riley and the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley were represented by attorney
James D. LaRue. The Court, having xead the motion and briefs of the parties) having considered
Taylor v. Babbitt, et al.

Opinion & Order on Motion to Dismiss
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the record in the matter, having heard oral arguments of counsel and being fully ad'V'ised in the

matter, hereby renders its decision.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The above-entitled matter is rooted in the underlying case of Taylor v. AJA. et al., Nez
Perce County Case No.

CV07~00208.

The issues in the underlying case !ll'e complex and its

procedural history lengthy, though the matter has yet to go to trial or be fully adjudicated. Reed
Taylor's complaint in the underlying case, amended five times, asserts eleven claims including
one for default of a $6 million promissory note issued to Reed Taylor by the corporate
defendants as part of a buy-out or retirement package. In order to understand the claims being
asserted in the instant matter, certain events in the underlying case must be reviewed.

On January 29, 2007, Reed Taylor filed suit against AJA Services Corporation, AIA
Insurance, Inc., John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Bryan Freeman and Jolee Duclos. AIA Insurance,
Inc. is a business entity under the umbrella of AIA Services Corporation. At the time of the
filing of the lawsuit, John Taylor was the CEO of the corporations and a board member along
with Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos. 1 Connie Taylor, the former wife of John Taylor, held a

community property interest in the corporations. Following the filing of the lawsuit, attorney
Michael McNichols was retained to represent AIA Services, AIA Insurance and John Taylor;
attorney David Gittens was retained to represent Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos; attorney Jon
·Hally was retained to represent Connie Taylor.
On February 27, 2007, upon motion by the Defendants, the Court granted a temporary
restraining order against Reed Taylor after he attempted to exercise management authority over

1
Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos resigned as board members shortly after the lawsuit was fil~ and two new
board members were appointed to :replace them.
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the corporate Defendants. A hearing date was then set on the Defendants' accompanying motion
for a preliminary injunction. On March 8, 2007, as a result of actions taken by Reed Taylor
before and immediately folloWing the filing of his lawsuit, the Court entered a preliminary
injunction prohibiting Reed Taylor from acting or attempting to act as manager and/or a board
member of AIA Insurance Inc and/or from harassing and/or interfering 'With the management of
AIA Insurance, Inc. and AIA Services Corporation.2 The Court's Order remains in effect.
On March 28, 2007, attorney McNichols filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for AIA
Services and AIA Insurance. Reed Taylor did not object and, at hearing on April 12, 2007, the

Court granted the motion to withdraw. On May 7, 2007, a notice of appearance on behalf of

AlA Services and AIA Insurance was filed by attotneys Gary Babbitt and Jolm Ashby of the law
finn Hawley, Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP. The finn continues to represent the corporations.
Several months into the Ul'lderlying litigation, Reed Taylor amended his complaint to
name as additional defendants CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. and others. CropUSA, a
corporation started by John Taylor who serves as its CEO and on its board or directors, is
represented by attorney Babbitt and by attotney James J. Oatziolis with the law firm of Quarles
& Brady LLP located in Chicago, Illinois. Attorney Gatziolis has obtained limited admission in

Idaho in order to represent CropUSA and has associated for that purpose with the law firm of

Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley.
The last matter in the underlying case that is of relevance to the instant case is a ruling by
the Court on motion for partial summary judgment filed by Reed Taylor. After significant
briefing and oral arguments on the motion, the Court found the corporate Defendants were in
default on a $6 million promissory note issued to Reed Taylor by the corporations. However, the

2

March 8, 2008 Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Prellininary Injunction at page 6.
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Court made no determination relative to other terms in the extensive buy-out agreement between
AlA Insurance Corporation and Reed Taylor, such as the effect on voting shares and receivables
upon default of the promissory note. Those issues were not before the Court in the context of the
motion for partial summary judgment and, therefore, have yet to be determined,
After twenty-one months of motions and hearings in the underlying case, after trial dates
had been set and reset, and with a number of motions still pending before the Court, Reed Taylor
filed the above-entitled action against attorneys Babbitt, Ashby, Collins and Riley and the law
firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, cutrent counsel for the corporations in the underlying

case. In his action, filed August 8, 2008, Reed Taylor asserts the following claims against
Defendants: (1) aiding and abetting or assisting others in the commission oftortious acts in the
underlying case; (2) conversion and misappropriation of AIA coxporate assets; (3) violations of
ldahoJs Consumer Protection Act. l.C. § 48~601 et seq.; and, (4) professional negligence and/or
breach of fiduciary duties. Defendants, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) along with briefing. Reed Taylor :filed briefmg in opposition and on October
16, 2008, the Court heard oral arguments of cowisel.
One day prior to the Court's hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff filed a
motion to amend his complaint, attaching his proposed amended pleading. Upon order of the
Court, the Motion to Amend Complaint was heard on December 4, 2008 and the Court will
address the matter herein.

STANDARD ON MOTION TO DISMISS
In ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), a court is to review all

facts and inferences in favor of the non-moving party and ask whether a claim for relief has been

Taylor v. Babbitt, at al.
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stated. Rohr v. Rohr, 128 Idaho 137, 141, 911P.2d133, 137 (1996). In the instant matter, the
arguments made by the parties incorporated events and actions that have occurred in the
underlying case of Taylor v. AIA, et al. Therefore, :in making its analysis in the instant matter
and pursuant to 1.R.E. 201, the Court will take judicial notice of the underlying case in toto.

ANALYSIS
(A)

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

The issues raised in the instant matter are less daunting and complex than the lengthy
briefs and pleadings would make them appear at first blush.3 As stated by Reed Taylor in his
opposition brief, the gravamen of his Complaint is that Defendants aided and abetted John
Taylor and others in committing torts against Reed Taylor and acted to deprive Reed Taylor of
money and property to which he is entitled.4
Plaintiff's core contention is that Defendants are acting in violation of Idaho's
Ptofessional Rules of Conduct by representing all of the corporate defendants in the underlying
case and by entering into a joint defense agreement with the other named defendants. Plaintiff
argues that by their actions, Defendants have aided and abetted John Taylor and others in the
commission of tortious acts that have resulted in. significant financial damage to Reed Taylor.
The Defendants in the instant case were retained to represent AJA Insurance, AIA
Services and CropUSA after previous counsel for the AlA corporations had obtained a
preliminary injunction from the Court that ordered the operations of the corporations to remain
unchanged until the claims asserted by Reed Taylor have been adjudicated. The injunction was

3

Plaintiffs Complaint is twenty-three pages in length. Defendants' brief in support of the motion to dismiss is
thirty-six pages in length. Plaintiff's brief in opposition is fifty-seven pages in length.
4
Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, at page 18.
Taylor v. Babbitt, et <ll.
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sought after Reed Taylor self-declared the promissory note in default, self-declared himself the
sole shareholder of the corporations and then attempted to talce over physical and operational
control of the corporations, all without the benefit of a judicial finding on the issues.
The Court has reviewed in camera (a) written correspondence to the defendants in the
underlying matter from the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis and Hawley, (b) the written
representation agreements entered into by the codefendants who are represented by the law firm,
and (c) the vvrittenjoint defense agreements entered into by the defendants in the underlying
case. After reviewing the documents and the applicable Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct,
the Court is persuaded the Defendant attorneys and law firm ate well versed in the rules and have
met the criteria necessary to represent clients with potential conflicts of interest. The various
documents are well~drafted, effectively address the concerns and requirements of the
professional rules of conduct and protect and preserve any potential claims that may arise
between the clients.
Of particular concern to the Plaintiff is the joint defense aw;eem.ent between the
defendants in the underlyio.g case. The purpose behind joint defense agreements is to allow
defendants in the same litigation to communicate and share documents without the
communications and/or documents becoming subject to discovery where those communications
and/or documents are otherwise non-discoverable or fall within the attorney-client privilege. In
the underlying case, many of Reed Taylor's claims challenge interests that the corporations and
the individual board members have in common and, therefore, require a cotnmon defense. It is

only reasonable that a degree of cooperation must take place between counsel for the
corporations and counsel for the individual board members, as the corporation is incapable of
communicating with its counsel except through those individuals who run the corporations.

Taylor v. Babbitt, et al.
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Contrary to the position asserted by Plaintiff, entering into a joint defense agreement does
not prohibit the codefendants from asserting claims against each other if such claims are
warranted. Rather, it provides the parties certain protections in regard to their communications
with each other on those areas of common defense and common interest. The joint defense

privilege, or common interest rule, is merely an extension of the attorney-client privilege in that
it protects communications between the parties when they are part of an on-going and joint effort
to set up a common defense strategy in connection with actual or prospective litigation. Intex

Recreation Corp. v. Team Worldwide Corp., 471 F.Supp.2d 11 (D.D.C.2007). The joint defense
privilege applies not only to communications but also to documents protected by the work

product doctrine. Id The circumstances in the instant matter require a degree of cooperation
between the defendants in the underlying case and, therefore, the Court finds the joint defense
agreements reasonable and within the standards allowed by Idaho's Professional Rules of
Conduct.
Having put to rest the questions of joint representation and joint defense agreements, the
Court's analysis moves to the Defendants assertion that Plaintiff's claims in the instant matter
should be dismissed as a matter of law based on the theory of litigatiort privilege, a doctrine that

has yet to be addressed by Idaho's appellate courts. Nevertheless, numerous other jurisdictions
have addressed the doctrine at length, providing the Court with direction as to the applicability of
the privilege.
The courts in West Virginia have addressed the litigation privilege on a number of
occasions. In Clarkv. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d 864, 218 W.Va. 427 (W.Va.2005), the plaintiff, a
physician and fonner defendant in a medical malpractice suit, asserted claims in negligence
against cowisel for the plaintiff in the malpractice lawsuit. The Clark Court, looking first at the
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duties of an attorney, found an inflexible requirement that attorneys diligently, faithfully and
legitimately perform every act necessary to protect, conserve and advance the interests of their
clients. Clark v. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d at 868. The Court then noted that its research revealed
no case law that would support Clark's assertion that an attorney owes a duty to an opposing
party, such that breach of the duty would subject an attorney to liability. Id. at 869. The Court
stated, "This Court can find no justification for imposing a duty of care in favor of an opposing
party upon counsel. Imposition of such a duty can only work to the detriment of counsel's own
client and would adversely impact coi.msel's duty of zealous advocacy for his or her own client
and would create an impossible and unjustified conflict of interest." Id.
Courfs that have had the opportunity to address the litigation privilege recognize the
adversarial system would be turned on its head if parties to a lawsuit are allowed to bring claims
in tort and/or legal malpractice against opposing counsel for conduct done within the scope of

litigation. While attorneys must not knowingly coU11.Sel or assist a client in committing a crime
or ftaud 5, Idaho's Rules of Professional Conduct require an attorney to pursue matters on behalf
of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the attorney and require
an attomey to take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's

cause or endeavor. I.R.P.C., Rule 1.3[1]
The doctrine of litigation privilege appears intended to create a safety zone for attorneys
so that they may zealously advocate for their client without fear of retribution. The Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia aptly described the soope and purpose of the litigation
privilege in Clark v. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d 864, 218 W.Va. 427 (2005).
In her concurring opinion in Barefield v. DPIC Companies, Inc., 215 W.Va. 544,

600 S.E.2d 256 (2004), Justice Davis discussed the policies underlying the
5

I.R.P.C., Rule 1.2[10]

Taylor v. Babbitt, et al.
Opinion & Order on Motion to Dismiss

8

000724

DEC. 23. 2008 3: 25PM

D

•

t!CT COURT

NO. 9028

P. 9/17

litigation privilege. Therein she stated~
[t]he public policies associated with the litigation privilege include: (1)
promoting the candid, objective and undistorted disclosure of evidence;
(2) placing the burden of testing the evidence upon the litigants during
trial; (3) avoiding the chilling effect resulting from the threat of
subsequent litigation; (4) reinforcing the finality of judgments; (S) limiting
collateral attacks upon judgments; (6) promoting zealous advocacy; (7)
discouraging abusive litigation practices; and (8) encouraging settlement.
Matsuura v. E.1 du Pont de Nemours & Co., 102 Hawai'i 149, 73 P.3d
687, 693 (2003).

Barefield, 215 W.Va. at 560, 600 S.E.2d at 272 (Davis, J., concurring). In light of
these policies, we see no reason to distinguish between communications made
during the litigation process and conduct occurring during the litigation process.
As recognized by the Florida Supreme Court:
absolute immunity must be afforded to any act occuning during the course
of a judicial proceeding, regardless of whether the act involves a
defamatory statement or other tortious behavior such as the alleged
misconduct at issue, so long as the act has some relation to the proceeding.
The rationale behind the immunity afforded to defamatory statements is
equally applicable to other misconduct occurring during the course of a
judicial proceeding. Just as participants in litigation must be free to engage
in unhindered communication, so too. must those participants be free to use
their best judgment in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit without fear of
having to defend their actions in a subsequent civil action for misconduct.

Levin, Middleb'l'ooks, Mabie Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. .• v. United States
Fire Insurance Company, 639 So.2d 606~ 608 (Fla.1994). See also Jackson v.
BellSouth Telecommu:ntcations 372 F.3d 1250, 1274 (11th Cir.2004) (quoting
Levin).
1

1

In Collins, we recognized that absolute privileges, such as the litigation privilege,
should only be permitted in limited circumstances. Collins, 211 W. Va. at 461, 566
S.E.2d at 598. Thus, we do not believe that a litigation privilege should apply to
bar liability of an attorney in all circumstances. In Mehaffy, Rider, Windholz &
Wilson v. Central Bank Denver, N.A., 892 P.2d. 230, 235 (Colo.1995), the
Colorado Supreme court noted that "an attorney is not liable to a non-client absent
a fmding of fraud or malicious conduct by the attorney." See also Baglini v.
Lauletta, 338 NJ.Super. 282, 768 A.2d 825, 833-34 (2001) ("The one tort
excepted from the reach of the litigation privilege is malicious prosecution, or
malicious use of process."). We believe such exceptions to an absolute litigation
privilege arising from conduct occuning during the litigation process a.re
reasonable accommodations which preserve an attorney's duty of zealous
advocacy while providing a deterrent to intentional conduct which is unrelated to
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legitimate litigation tactics and which harms an opposing party. As recently noted
by a California court:
[a] fraud claim against a lawyer is no clifferent from. a fraud claim against
anyone else. If an attorney commits actual fraud in his dealings with a
third party, the fact he did so in the capacity of attorney for a client does
not relieve him ofliability. While an attorney's professional duty of care
extends only to his own client and intended beneficiaries of his legal work,
the limitations on liability for negligence do not apply to liability for
fraud.

Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, 121 Cal.App.4th 282, 291, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d
26, 31~2 (Cal.Ct.App.2004)(internal citations and quotations omitted).

In order "[t]o maintain an action for malicious prosecution it is essential to prove:
(1) That the prosecution was malicious; (2) that it was without reasonable or
probable cause; and (3) that it terminated favorably to plaintiff." Syl. Pt. l, Lyons
v. DavypPocahontas Coal Co., 75 W.Va 739, 84 S.E. 744 (1915). The term
malicious is defined as "(s]ubstantially certain to cause injury" and "without just
cause or excuse." Black's Law Dictionary 977 (8th Ed.2004). This definition
implies an improper or evil intent or motive or the intent to do harm. Where an
attorney files suit without reasonable or probable cause with the intent to hann a
defendant, we do not believe the litigation. privilege should insulate him or her
from liability for malicious prosecution.
As noted above, we can find no reasonable justification for distinguishing conduct
from communications for the purposes of the litigation privilege. However, we
also recognize the need for limited exceptions :from application of the absolute
litigation privilege for certain intentional actions. Accordingly, we now hold that
the litigation privilege is generally applicable to bar a civil litigant's claim for civil
damages against an opposing party's attorney if the alleged act of the attorney
occurs in the course of the attorney's representation of an opposing party and is
conduct related to the civil action.

Clark v. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d at 870-871.
In the instant matter, the conduct and action$ of the Defendants that fonn the basis of

Plaintiff's claims are all conduct and actions within the scope of the underlying litigation. While
Plaintiff' correctly notes that there are potential conflicts of interest that exist between the clients
of the Defendants, the Court is sufficiently persuaded, based on its review of the in camera
documents, that the Defendants' clients have knowingly waived any conflicts and are fully
informed that, as the litigation progresses, the common interests and defenses of the underlying
Taylor v. Babbitt, el al.
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defendants may diverge and the parties may fmd themselves adversaries. While the underlying
case is complex in that it involves numerous claims asserted against multiple defendants and
h'lvolves interwcorporate transactions approved by directors that cross over from corporation to
corporation, the circumstances are not so unique that the Court is unable to look to the general
analysis of courts with similar, albeit distinguishable, facts.
A case with many similarities to the instant case is helpful to the analysis the Court must
make. InAlpertv. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398 (Tex.App.-Houston [1 11cDist.]
2005), Robert Alpert filed suit against the law firm of Crain, Caton & James after the finn had
represented Mark Riley, an attorney who found himself being sued by Alpert after their attomeyclient relationship had soured. Alpert's suit against Crain Caton law finn asserted the firm had
conspired with Riley to defraud Alpert, had aided and abetted Riley to defraud Alpert, and had
tortiously interfered with Riley's fiduciary duty to Alpert. The law firm moved to dismiss the
lawsuit based on Alpert's failure to state a recognizable claim. The lower court granted the
motion and Alpert appealed. The trial court's dismissal of the lawsuit was a:ffumed by the Texas

Court of Appeals. In reaching its decision, the Texas Court made the following statements:
Perhaps as an offshoot of its privity jurisprudence, Texas case law has
discouraged lawsuits against an opposing counsel if the lawsuit is based on the
fact that c01msel represented an opposing party in a judicial proceeding. Bradt v.
Sebek, 14 S.W.3d 756, 766 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). An
attorney has a duty to zealously represent his clients within the bounds of the law.
Bradtv. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 71-72 (Tex.App,wHouston (1st Dist.] 1994, writ
denied). In fulfilling this duty, an attorney has the right to interpose defenses and
pursue legal rights that he deems necessary and proper, without being subject to
liability ot damages. Id If an attorney could be held liable to an opposing party
for statements made or actions taken in the course of representing his client, he
would be forced constantly to balance his own potential eXposure against his
client's best interest. See id. Such a conflict hampers the resolution of disputes
through the court system and the attainment of justice. Thus, to promote zealous
representation, courts have held that an attorney is "qualifiedly immune" from
civil liability, with respect to non~clients, for actions taken in connection with
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representing a client in litigation. See, e.g., Butler v. Lilly, 533 S.W.2d 130, 13134 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ dism'd).
This qualified immunity generally applies even if conduct is wrongful in the
context of the underlying lawsuit. Renfroe v. Jones & Assocs., 947 S.W.2d 285,
288 (fex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied) (''Under Texas law, attorneys
cannot be held liable for wrongful litigation conduct.''). For example, a third party
has no independent right of reco"Very against an attorney for filing motions in a
lawsuit, even if :frivolous or without merit, although such conduct is sanctionable
or contemptible as enforced by the statutory ot inherent powers of the court. West,
892 S.W.2d at 72. Courts have refused to acknowledge an independent cause of
action in such instances "because making motions is conduct an attorney engages
in as part of the discharge of his duties in representing a party in a lawsuit." Id
(holding no cause of action existed for making motion for contempt because
attorneys do not owe duty to be correct in legal argumel'lts-"even if the ... motion
for contempt had been meritless, their conduct in so moving, coming as it did in
the discharge of their duties in representing a party in a lawsuit, would still not be
actionable."). Thus, an attorney's conduct, even if frivolous or without merit, is
not independently actionable if the conduct is part of the discharge of the lawyer's
duties in representing his or her client. Id. at 74~ Chapman Children's Trust v.
Porter & Hedges, L.L.P., 32 S.W.3d 429, 441 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2000, pet. denied). The immunity focuses on the type of conduct, not on whether
the conduct was meritorious in the context of the widerlying lawsuit. Renfroe, 947
S.W.2d at 288.
As the Texas Supreme Court observed i:o. McCamish, a lawyer's protection from
liability arising out of his representation of a client is not without limits. See
McCamish, 991 S.W.2d at 793-94; see also Toles v. Toles, 113 S.W.3d 899, 91213 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). For example, a cause of action could exist
against an attorney who knowingly commits a fraudulent act outside the scope of
his legal representation of the client. See Likover v. Suriflowet Terrace II, Ltd.,
696 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ). If a lawyer
participates in independently fraudulent activities, his action is "foreign to the
duties of an attorney." Id. (quoting Poole v. Houston & T.C. Ry. Co., 58 Tex. 134,
137 (1882)). A lawyer thus cannot shield his own willful and premeditated
fraudulent actions from liability simply on the ground that he is an agent of his
client. See id

Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P. C., 178 S. W .3d at 405406.
In the instant case, Reed Taylor's claims against the Defendants are all based on conduct

and actions engaged in by the Defendants within the scope of the underlying litigation.
Nevertheless, under the theory asserted by Plaintiff, a defendant's attorney may become liable to
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a plaintiff if the plaintiff disagrees with or is offended by the litigation tactics of defense counsel
or disagrees with or is offended by the decision of an opposing party to waive conflicts of
interest in order for comm.on interests to be defended in the lllOSt efficient and/or effective
manner. It is this very morass that the litigation privilege seeks to prevent.

Each of Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants contends that by defending the
corporations in the underlying action, by accepting payment for their representation, by arguing
positions to the Court in favor of their clients and against the claims of Reed Taylor, and that by

failing to agree with Reed Taylor's positions in regards to his claims, the Defendants have aided
and abetted and conspired with the corporations and individual directors to interfere with the
contractual rights of Reed Taylor. Yet, Plaintiff is unable to direct the Court to any conduct or
action on the part of the Defendants that falls outside the scope of the Defendants' representation
of their clients.
The Court appreciates the Plaintiff's right to zealously prosecute his claims in the
underlying action and respects his belief that his claims are sound, that he will prevail on those
claims and that the underlying defendants are simply delaying the inevitable. However, the
Court also appreciates the defendants' tight in the underlying action to disagree with Reed
Taylor's position and to defend against his asserted claims. The Court is persuaded that the
litigation privilege is a sound judicial concept that should be recognized in ldaho as it is
consistent with the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and the :finnly held established standard
in Idaho that an attorney is obligated to provide his clients with zealous representation. In the

instant matter, the conduct and actions of the Defendants, as alleged by Plaintiff, all fall within
the scope of the Defendants' representation of their clients and, therefore, fall within the
protection of the litigation privilege.
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The Court is further persuaded, based on its review of the various documents provided to
the Court for in camera review, that the Defendants took all steps necessary to insure compliance
with the rules of professional conduct in their representation of clients with potential conflicts of

interest and in the use of a joint defense agreement. Therefore, there has been no conduct of
aiding and abetting or conspiracy on the part of the Defendants in their representation of the
underlying corporate defendants. Neither has there been any conversion of assets by the
Defendants. Prior to the Defendants being xetained in the underlying case, the Court entered a
preliminary injunction ordering operational authority of AIA to remain status quo. Thus, the
directors of the corporation, including John Taylor, had authority to retain tbe Defendants to
represent the corporations. Furthermore, representations made by the Defendants to the Court in
furtherance of their of their clients' defense do not constitute violations ofldaho's consumer
protection laws when those representations are made within the scope of litigation. Finally,
Plaintiff's claim for legal malpractice fails as a matter oflaw. The existence of an attorney-client
relationship is a necessary element to a legal malpractice claim and Plaintiff, who specifically
raises the fact th.at he has not been allowed to choose counsel for the underlying defendants, has
no attorney-client relationship with the Defendants.6

(B)

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT
"The decision whether to allow a party to amend its pleadings is left to the sound

discretion of the trial court .... " Wells v. United States Insurance Co., 119 Idaho 160, 166, 804
P.2d 333 (Ct.App.1991). It is not an. abuse of discretion to deny a motion to amend where the

~ This

issue was addressed fully in the Opinion & Order on Defendants Motion to Dismiss in the companion case of
Taylor v. McNichol3, et al., Nez Perce County Case No. CVOB-01763. See also Harrigfeld 'II. Hancock, 140 Idaho
134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004) and again in Estate ofBecker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 96 P.3d 623 (2004).
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record contains no allegation that, if proven, would entitle a plaintiff to the relief claimed. Id. at
167.
The Court, after hearing oral arguznents of counsel and after reviewing Plainti.fr s
proposed amended complaint, finds it would be a futile act to grant Plaintiff's motion to amend
as the proposed amended complaint would not withstand a :tnotion to dismiss. In his proposed
amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts the same claims as set forth in his original Complaint and
seeks to add derivative claims. Plainti:ff s amended direct claims fail as a matter oflaw for the
same reasons as addressed by the Court above, despite Plaintiff's bare allegation that the conduct
and actions of the Defendants exceeded the scope of their representation.
Plaintiff's attempt to bring derivative claims on behalf of AIA Insurance and AIA
Services fail as a matter oflaw. Idaho Code§ 30-1-741 clearly and unambiguously provides
standing to bring derivative proceedings only to those who are shareholders at the time of the act
or omission complained of and only to those shareholders who fairly and adequately represent
the interests of the corporation. As noted by the ABA Official Comment at the end ofl.C. § 301-741, while some state's have eliminated the "contemporaneous" OV\71lership rule, Idaho's
legislature chose to retain the requirement, as is evidenced by the language in the statute.
Plaintiff contends that, because other states have allowed creditors and stock pledges to bring
deri"Vative claims, standing should not be limited to shareholders. The Court is not persuaded.
Idaho Code § 30-1-741 is clear and unambiguous, making it clear Idaho's legislature has chosen
to limit derivative claims to shareholders only.

Taylo,.. v. Babbitt, er al.

15

Opinion & Order on Motion to Dismiss

000731

•

DEC. 23. 2008 3: 27PM

NO. 9028

P. 16/17

ORDER
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint is hereby DENIED.
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED.

Dated this :Z...3 day of December 2008.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND .mDICIAL DISTRICT or THE
STATE OF IDAHO, JN AND FOR THE C011NTY OJi'NIZPERCE

RBBD J. TAYLOR, an individual,
Plainti:.tt
v,

MICHAELE. MoNICHOLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS,
P.A., m Idaho professional ool]Joration;
IA.NE DOES I-V7 unknown Individuals;

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

CASBNO. CV08·01763

OPINION AND OJ.WBR ON

DEP'BNDANTS'MOUON

TO DISMISS AND PLAlN'nFF'S
MOnON TO AMEND
COMPLAINT

)

Defendants.

)

This mattor is bofore the Court on Defondants' Motion to Dismiss and Plamtift's Motion
to Amend Cotnplaint. A hearing on the Motion to D~ was held on Oetobor 16, 2008 and a

hearing on the Motio.o. to Amend Complaint was held on December 4, 2008. PlaintiffReed

Taylor WIS represented by attomcy Michael S. Bissell. Defendants Michael B. McNiohols and
the law finn of Clements, Brown & McNichols were represented by attomey John J. Janis. The

Court, having read the motion and briefs of the parties, having considered the recm:d in the
matter, having hoard oral arguments of counsel and being Mly advjsed in the matter, hgmby

tendm its decision.
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FACJ'UAI, ANDPROCJDJJBAL BACIC.GROUND

The above-ontJtled matter is rooted in tho \lllderlying case of Taylor v. AM, et al., Nez
Pereo County Case No. CV0?-00208. The issues mthe underlying caso Ee complex and its
procedural histoiy leuathY. though the matter has yet to go to trial. Reed Taylor's coinplaiot in
the underlying case, amended five times, asserts eleven claims inolucffng one for default of a S6

million promissory noto issued to Reed Taylor by the cozporate defendants u part of a buy~out
or retitement package. In order to understand the claims being asserted in the instant matter,
certain events in the underlying oase must be reviewed.
On .January 29, 2007, Rsed Taylor filed suit against AJA Services Corporation, Af.A
Insurance, Inc., John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos. AIA Insurance,
Inc. is a business entitf under the wnbrella ofAJA Serrices CoipOration. At 1ho time of the
filing of the lawsuit, Jobn Taylor was the maneging direetor of tho corporations and a board

member along with Bryan Freeman and 1oLee Duclos. Comrie Taylor, the fonner wife of John
Taylor, held a ~mmunity property inteaest mthe coxporations. Following the filing ofthe
lawauit, attorney Michael MoNichois 'WIS retained to represeDt AJA Servlcca, AJA Insurance and

John Taylor; attorney David Gittens was retained to represent Biyan Freeman and Jolee Duclos;
sttomey Jon Hally was retained to tepraent Connie Taylor.
011February27, 2007, upon motion by the Defendants, the Court granted a temporary
reatrainhlg order against Reed Taylor ater he attempmd to exercise management authority over
1he corporate Defendants. A hearing date was then set on the Defendants' accompanying motion
fat a preJiminary injunction. On March 8, 2007, as a result of actions taken by Reed Taylor

before and immediately following tho filing ofhis lawwit, the Court entered a prelimhwy

h>Junotion prohibiting Reed Taylor from acting or attempting to act as manager 81Jf1/or a board
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member of AlA Insurance Jno and/or from harassing and/or interfcrinr with the managoment of
AlA Insurance, Inc. and AJA Servioes Coxpol'ation. 1 The Court's 0.rder remains in effect.

On March 28, 2007, attorney McNichols filed a motion to withdxaw as counsel for AIA
Services and .AIA Insuranoe. Recd Taylor did not object and, at a he&Jblg on April 12, 2007, the
Court granted the motion to withdraw.. On May 7, 2007, a notice of appearanco on behalf of

AJA Servioes and AlA Insurance was filed by attomeys Gary Babbitt mid John Ashby ofthe law

firm Hawley, Troxell Bmii& & Hawley, LLP. The firm continues to represent the eotpo.rations.
'Ihe last matter in the underlying case that is of relevlll&)e t.o the instant case is a rulins by
the Coun on motion for partial summaxy judgment filed by Reed Taylor. Aftrz significant

briefing and oral arguments on tho motion, the Court found the corporate Defendants were in
default on a S6 million promissory note issued to Reed Taylor by the corporations. However, 1he
Court made no detennination relative to other terms in the extensive buy-out agreement between

AIA Jnsuranoe Corporation md Reed Taylor, such as the eft'ect on voting sbar&S and receivables

upon default of the promissoiy note. Those issues were not before the Court in the context of the
motion for partial summary judgment and, thtrefore, have yet to be detomllned.
After twenty~one months of motions and hearings in the underlying case, after trial dates
had been set and reset, mcl with a number of motions still peudiq before the Court, Reed Taylor

filed tU aboVHntitled action against attomey MeNichols ~the law firm of Clements, Brown
cl: McNiohols, who currently remain as counsel for John Taylor in the underlying case. Jn his

action, filed August 8, 2008, Reed Taylor asserts the follo'Wing claims against attomey
MoNichols and hil law fixm: (I) aiding and abetth\a or sssis1ing others in the commission of

tortious acts mthe underlying case; (2) conversion and misappropriation ofAIA co.rporate

1

Match II, 2008 OplalOll and Order Oil De1'Jidllllll' Motion tbr Pttllmilll1Y 1JQ11nction at pap 6

Tay/0111 Mr:Nlt:Mll
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assets; (3) violations ofidaho's Comumer Protection Act, LC. § 48-601 et seq.: and, (4)

professional negligonce and/or breach of :fiduciary duties. On September29, 2008, Defendant
McNiohols, through counsel, tiled a motion to dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) along with

briefing Reed Taylor filed briefing in oppositlon and on CX:tober 16, 2008, the Court heard oral
arguments of COQDScl.
Om: day prior to the Court's hearing on Defcbdants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintift'filed a

motion to amend his complaint,, attaching his proposocl amended pleading. By order of the
Court, headng on the Motion to Amend was held on December 4, 2008 and the Court 'Will

address tho matter herein.

STANDARD ON MOTION TO DISMISS
In ruling on a motion to dismiss purwant to lR.C.P. 12(bX6), a court is to review all
facts and iDferences in favor ofthe non·moving party and ask whether a claim for relief bas been

stated, Rohr v. Rohr, 128 Idaho 131, 141, 911P.2d133> 137 (1996). Jn the instant mauor, the

arguments made by the parties llioozporated events and actions that have occur.red in the
underl;vins case of Taylor v. Al.4, et al. Therefore, in maldng its aaalysis in the instant mattet
and puMl8l1t to I.R..B. 201, tho Court will take judicial notice ofthe underlying case In toto

ANALYSIS

w.. DE.FENDANTS' MQDON TO DISMisa
l'be issues raised in the instant matter appear at fitst blush to be complex and at times
convoluted. However, despite lengthy briefs and pleadings, the issues arc not as daunting as they
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first appear.1 As stated by Reed Taylor in :&is opposition brief; the gravamen ofhis Complaint is
that attorney McNichols aa.d the law firm of Clements, Bxown & MoNiohols aided and abetted

John Taylor and others in committing torts against Reed Taylor and acted to deprive .R.eed Taylor
ofmoney and property to whidl ho is cn1itled.'
Each of the claims asserted by Plallrtfffrelies upon his contention that the Defendant law
fum and attorney were retamed to represent tho AfA. corporations by John Taylor 81J.d/or othors,

that John Taylor and/or others bad no authority to retain legal representation for the coiporations,
and that Defendants knew they were retained without proper corporate authority. This :f'actua1

assertion by Plaintiff is critical to his claims and causes each of Plaintiff's claims to fail as a

matter of Jaw.
In the underlying case, the events ofthe litigation can be divided into three distinot time

:frames based on procedural events in the case. The first timo :frame runs from the filing ofReed
Taylor's lawsuit against the AJA COJporations. John Taylor and others until the Comt's Order
entering a preliminary qunotion in the case. The second time ftamo begins with the entry of the

preliminary hUunction until the Court's Opinion and Order finding AIA in default on the S6
million promissory note (but defeaina any finding on other terms of the buy-out agreement until
trial), The third time frame begim with the Court's findina of default on the promissory note and

continues to the pzesent
rn the instant CISC; attomey McNiohols was retained to rep1esont AJA Services. AfA

Inaurence and John Taylor after Reed Taylor filed suit against the ~mporations and its board
members in Nez Perce County Case No. CV07-00208. At the time of the filing of the lawsuit,
John Ta:ylor was the manaaing director of the cmpomtions and had been for many yeats. Reed
:a PJamtlff'a Complaint ii twmty-tbree pages In leqrh. Defeadlllts' brlet'fn support of Che motion io diemiss is
!bfrt)'·sbtpa1es in leqdl. P~s lmtfill. opposition is flft)'·sevenpa191in11,118tb.
' Plsindl!'s J.e3poue to Defondm&s' Motion to Di&miu, at pap HI.

T•lor v. J/#Nlcho#
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Taylor contends the aareement at mue in the U11derlyhig case includes terms tbat render him the
sole sharchold6l' ofthe eoiporationa Upon default ofthe promissmy note, and. because he

believed the promissory note was in default, he was the only person with authority to retain
counsel for the eoiporatioDB to defend age.inst the action he brought However, at the time
Defendao:ts were retained. to iepresent 1he coxporations and Jolin Taylor. the question of whether
the promisSOJy note WBS in default had not been determined and remained pending before the
Court. Until such a detatmination was mad~ the authority to make deoisions regarding legal

counsel for the cozporations rested with the corporate board of directors, which included John
T1.ylor. Therefore, at the time attomey McNichols was retained to represent the corporations,
authority to enter into a CO!lb'act for legal services rested with tho corpoxate board of directors.
Reed. Taylor, on 1he other band, bad no authority during this time period to make decisions for

the cOJpOnltions. It would be a strange situation indeed for a civil plaintiff to be empowered to
select oounsel for the defendant or, by logical cxtmsion. deoide the defendant should have no
counacl at all

A!tlJr he was retained to represent John Taylor and the COIJ>Orations. attomey MoNichols
tiled a tnotion seeking· a preliminary tllfunction apiust Reed Taylor. The motion was filed after

Reed Taylor ltt.empted to have locb changed at the cor;porate offices in an effort to take over
manapment ofthe corporations. The litigation action ofattorney McNichols was clearly
waxranted where likelihood of great harm to the c01poration existed from Reed Taylor's conduct

atld no determination on the question of default and/or the cft'ecu of any default had been made
by tb Court. As retained counsel for the corporations and John Taylor, attorney McNiohols was
obligated to puouo all efforts necessuy to prevent harm to the coxporations and defend his
clients agamst the n.umero\J8 claims ofRecd Taylor.

To:vlor 11. lll:Nkholl

Opinion i. Order oa Motion to Dlsmlu
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On March 8, 2007, after motions for iajunctio.ns were filed by both parties in the
underlying suit. after leftlthy briefing was submitted and hearings held, the Court entered an

iqunctl.on ordering management of the coxporatlou to remain status quo, i.e. for management of
the corporation to remain vested in the corporations' board of dircctoIS. Jn addition, the

IJUunction proln'bited Reed Taylor from lnterfering with COIPOrate management witll turther
order of the Court Following the Court's entry of the ~liminal'Y iajunction, attorney
McNicbols moved to withdraw as counsel for the corporations. The Court grated the motion
and new oounsel was subsequently retained to repmr.nt 'the WIJ>Orations.

In the mstant matter, Plaintlft's primary assertion is that attorney McNichols was retamed
to represent the AJA corpomions by persons who had no authority to retain corpomte counsel

and that attorney McNichols knew he was retained without proper authori%ation. This fact fails
as a mattet of law as the Court entered an Order early in 'tho underlying action that establls'hed by
judicial ordet that the operaliom and managemm.t of the AJA corporations was to remain

unchanged Wltil fUrther ordor of the Court. 'Ihe Court's Order remains in~ to date. Under

Idaho Code § 30-1-304 corporations have the same power as indivicluals to make contracts and
incur Iia'bilities as necessary to cany out its business affahs and Jobn Taylor, es CEO of tbe

cmpoiations and pursuant to the Court's Order, had the authority to retain counsel for the
co:rporatlons.

Plaintiff's olaims also fall under the doctrine of litigation prl'rilege. The Comt found no
Idaho case law addressing the doctrine. Nevertheless, numerous other jurisdiotiQllS bsvc
addressed the doctrine at length. pmviding the Court with direction as to the applicability of the
privilesc.

7
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The collrts in West Virginia have addressed the litigation privilege on a numbe? of
occasions. In Clarln. Dl'UC!cman, 624 S..E.2d 864. 218 W.Va. 427 (W.Va.2005), the pJaiD.filt a
physician and former defendant in a medical :tnalpractice suit, asserted claims in negligence
agajnst counsel for the plaintiff in the lllalpracti<:e lawsuit. The Clark Court, looking first at the

dutfea of an attorney, found an intlexible l'Cquh'ement that attorneys dilipntly, faithfoD.y and
legitimately porfonn every aot necessaxy to pIOtect, conseive and advance the interests of their

clients. Clllrk Y. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d at 868. The Court then noted that its research revealed

a

no case law that would support Clark's assertion that an attorney owes duty to an opposing
party. such that bieaoh of the duty would subject an attomey to liability. Id. at 869. The Court
stated, "This Court cm find no justification for imposing a duty of caro in favor of an opposing
party upon counsel. Imposition of such a duty can OIJ.ly work to the detriment of counsel's own

client and would adversely impaot counsel's duty of zealous advocacy for his or her O'WD. client
and would cnate an impossible and 'tUljustified codict of intcmt." Id.
·

Court~s 1hat have had the opporhmity to address the litigation prlvilege recognize the

adversarial system would be tlUned on its bead if parties to a lawsuit were allowed to bring

claims for torts encVor legal malpractice against opposhig counsel for conduct done within the

seope oflitigation. While attottteys must not knowingly counsel or assist a client in committing
a crime or fraud 4, Idaho's Rules of Professional Conduct require an attorney to pursue matters on
behalf of a client despite opposition. obstruction or pexsonal inconveniaice to the attomoy and
require an attorney to take whatever lawful and ethical measutes arc required to vindicate a
clientts oause or endeavor. I.R.P.C.• Rule 1.3(1]

The doctrine of litigation privilege appeats intended to create a safety zone for attomcys
so that thoy may zealously advocate for their client without fear ofrefribution. I'he Supmno
• I.llP.C., Rule 1.2[10)
Tq)l/orv Mi:N~

OpbdDll &: Order on MOtfotl to Di8mitt
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Court of Appeals ofWest Virginia aptly described the scope and puxpose of the litigation.

privilege in Clait'V. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d 8641 218 W.VL 427 (2005).
Jn her conouuing opinion in Barlfleld v. D'PIC Companies, Inc., 21 S W.Va. S44,
600 S.E.2d 256 (2004), Justice Davis discussed ib.e policies underlying the
litigation privilege. Therein she stated:

[t]he public policies assoeiated with the litigation privilege include: (1)
promoting the candid, objecttve and UDdistorted clisolosure of evidence;
(2) plaoing the bunien of testina the evidence upon the litigants dmfng
trial; (3) avoiding tho chilling effect resulting ftom. the threat of
subsequent litigation; (4) reinforcing the finality ofjudgments; (S) limi1ing
collateral attacks upon judgments; (6) promoting zealous advocacy; (7)
discouraging abusive litigation practices; and (8) encouraging settlement.
Matsuura11. E.1. duPontdeNemowa&Co., 102Ht.wai'i 149, 73 P.3d
687, 693 (2003).
Barefield, 215 W.Va. atS60, 600S.B.2dat27l{Da.vis,1., oonomrlng). lnlightof
these policies, we see iio reason to distinguish botweer1 aommtmi~at1ons made
during the litigation piocess and condiict ocourrma during the litigation p~.
As recognized by the Florida Supreme Court:

absolute immunity must 'be affotded to any act occurring during the course
of a judicial proc;oeding, tegardless ofwhGthorthe actin'Y'Ol'Ves a
defamatory statement or othertortious behavior such as the allepd
misconduct at issue, s0longas1he aot has some relation to the proceeding.
The rationale behind the inm:tunity afforded to defamatory statements is
cqually applicable to other misconduct occurring during the eourse of a
judicial proceeding. Just as participants ID. litigation must be ftee to engago
in unbmderccl commtmioation, so too must those participants be free to uso
their best judgment in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit without fear of
having to defend their actions in a subsequent civil action for miscondllCt.

Lmn, Mli:ldleb1'0oks, Mabie, 'l'homas, Mayu &; Mitohsl~ P...4.., v. United States
Fire Imurance Compa191, 639 So.2d 606, 608 (Fla.1994). &e also Jackson v.
BellSo'IJth Tslecommunfcatio~ 312 F.3d.12SO, 1274 (11th Cit.2004) (quoting
Levin).

In Collins, we recognized that absolute pzivileges, SllCh as the litigation privilege,
should only be pennitted In limited circumstances. Collins, 211 W.Va. at 461, 566
S.B.2d at 598. Thus. we do not believe that a litigation privilege should apply tO
bar liability of an attorney in all drcwutances. In Mehqffj, Rtdg, Windholr ci
Wilson v. Central BQ/Jk Denver, N.A.., 892 P.Zd. 230, 235 (Colo.199S)J the
Colorado Supreme court noted that "an attorney is not liable to a non-client absent
a finclmg of fraud or malicious conduct by the attomey." 811 also Baglltd v.
Lauletta, 338 NJ.Super. 282. 768 A.2d 82S, 833-34 (2001) ("The one tort
Taylor 11. Mo1ltahols
Opinion&: Ordtt Oil Motion io XI~
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oxcepted from the reach oftho litigation privile1e is malicious prosecution. or
malicious use of process.'~. We believe such exceptions to an absolute litigation
privilep arising ftom ·eoncluet occurrin1 during the litigation process are
reasonable accommodations which preseive an attorney's duty of zealous
advocacy while providing a detment to intentional conduct which is unrelated to
legitimate litigation tactics and which harms an opposing party. As recently noted
by a California court:

[a] ftaud claim against a lawyer is no different from a &a.ud claim against
anyone else. Ifan attomoy commits aetual fraud in his dealings with a
third party, the fact he did so in tho oapae.ity of attorney for a client does
not relieve him of liability. While an attomey's professional duty of care
extends only to his own client and intended beneficiaries of bis legal work:
the limitations on liability for negligence do not apply to liability for
fraud.

Vega v. Jo-nes, Day, Reavis &: Pogue, 121 Cal.App.4th 282, 291 1 17 Cal,Rptr.3d
26, 31~2 (Cal.Ct.App.2004)(mtomal citations and quotations omitted).

In order "[t]o maintain an action for malicious proseartion it is essential to prove:
(1) That the prosecution was malicious; (2) that it was without reasonable or
probable cause; and (3) that it terminated favorably to plaintiff." Syl. Pl 1, Lyons
v. Davy-Pacalrontas Coal Co., 1S W.Va. 739, 84 S.B. 744 (lSHS). Thetonn
malicious is dofined as "[s]ubstautially cc.ttain to cause qury'' and "without just
cause or excuse." Blaclc's Law DictiODarY 977 (8th Ed.2004). This definition
implies an improper or evil inteilt or motive or the intent to do bmn. Where an
attorney :files suit without reasonable or probable cause with the intent to harm a
defendant, we do not believe tho litigation privilege should insulata him or her
:&om liability for mali~ious proseoution,
As noted ibove, we can find no reasonable justification for distingu!shing conduct
fi'om communications for th8 pw:poscs oftho litigation privilege. However, we

also recognize the need for limited exceptions from application of the absolute
litigation. privilege for certain intentional actions. Aceoxcilngly, we now hold that
tho litigation privilege is gonerally applicable to bar a oivil litigant's claim for civil
damages apinst an opposing party's attorney if the alleged act of the attomey
occurs in the course ofthe attorney's xepresentation of an opposing party and is

oonduct related to the civil action.
Clark v. Dnmkman. 624 S.B.2d at 870-871.
Jn the mstant matter, Plaln.tift'bas argued bis is a unique situation because he has filed

suit against the AIA cotporations and its board members, that the contractual terms at the core of
his underlying suit make him the sole shareholder oftho AJA corporations and, therefore, there is
Tqlllol' v. MeNi~ofl
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a conflict between the AIA corporations and the board members that makes it inappropriate.
even fraudulent, for 1he board, or more particularly for managing board member John Taylor, to
retain counsel for the corporations, to direct counsel for the corporations in any way, or for there
to be any cooperation between counsel for the corporations and oounsel for John Taylor.

Bouom

line, Reed Taylor contends he is the only person With authorlty to determine who should serve as
OOlDlsol for 1he corporations he is suing. The Court, like the Plaintiff, has been unable to find a

case where a. plahttiffhas filed suit age.inst a corporation and its board members and, while that
litigation remai.ns pending, has filed suit against the attomeys representing the various
defendants fn the underlying suit. Nevertheless. the Court does not find tho instant matter to be
as \mique es Plaintiff paints it

A caso with many similarities to 1he instant case is holpf\Jl to the analysis the Court must

make. ht.J.Ipf11 v. Crain, Caron & Jamss, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398 (Tex.App...Ho~n [11t Dist)
2005), Robert Alpert filed suit again.gt the law firm representing Marie Riley, the defendant in a
separate action filed by Mr. Alpert. Mark Riley was an attorney who had assisted Mr. Alpert in

his business and legal affairs. After the relationship between Alpert and Riley soured, Alpert
filed suit against Riley and Riley asserted counterclahns. Riley was represented by the Crain

Caton law firm during the litigation. Alpert then filed suit against Crain Caton law fin11 asserting
the firm. had conspired with Riley to defraud Alpert, had aided and abetted Riley to defi:aud
A!pert, had tortiously interfered with Riley's fldudary duty to Alpert by concealing Riley•s

malprac1ices and breaches of fiduciary duty, by filing :fiivolous laws\lits against Alpert and by
disparaging Alpert's reputation in the business community. The law fiJm moved to dismiss the

lawsuit based on Alpert's failure to state a recognizable claim. The lower court granted the

11
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motion and Alpert appealed. The trial cou:rl's dismissal ofthe lawsuit was affirmed by the Teas
Court of Appeals. In reaching its decision, the Tew Court made the following statements:
Perhaps as an offshoot of its prlv.ity jurisprudence. Texas case law baa
discouragecl lawsuits against an opposing collDsel ifthe lawsuit is based on the
fact that counsel represented an opposing party in ajudieial proceeding. Bradt 11.
Sdbd; 14S.W.3d156, 766 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. dcnic:d.). An
attomey has a duty to zealously .represent his clieQ.fs within the bounds of the law
Bradtv. W•st, 892 S.W.2d S6, 71-72 (I'ex.App.-Houston [1st Dist] 1994, writ
denied). rn i\Jlfilling this duty, an attorney has the right to interpose dofenses and
pursue legal rights that he deems necessary and proper, wi1hout being subject to
liability or damages. Id If an attorney could be held liable to an opposing party
for statements made or actions taken in the oourse ofrepresonting his cli~ ho
'WOuld be forced constantly to balanc.e his own potential exposure against his
client's best interest.
id. Suoh a conflict hampers the resolution of disputes
through the court system and the attainment ofjustice.. 1'hus. to promote zealous
.rcpreseutation, courts have held 1hat an attor.ney is 14quallfiedly immune" ti'om
civil liability, with respect to non~ollents, for actions taken in connection with
rcpxCBcutin& a client in litigation. See, e.g.. Butlir v. Ltlly, 533 S.W.2d 130, 131-·
34 (Tox.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ dism'd).

s.,

This qualified immuntt.y generally applies C'VC!l if conduct is wronafbl in the
context oftho undcrlyina lawsuit Re'flfro1 v. JoIW & .A.ssotJS., 941 S. W.2d 285,
288 (Tex.App.-Fon Worth 1997, w.dt dcnied) ("Under Texas law, attomeys
cannot be held liable for wrongtUl litigation conduct."). For example, a third party
has no independent right of recoveJ1 against an attomey for filiJ1g 1t10tiom in a
lawsuit, evm iffrivolous or withO\lt merit, althotJih such conduct is sanctionable
or contemptible as enfoteed by the statutory or inherent powers of the court. Wist,
892 S.W.2cl at 72. Courts have refused to acknowledge an indcpoudent cause of
action in such instmces "because makiDg motions is conduot an attorney engaaes
mas part ofthe cliacharp ofhis duties in representing a party in a lawsuit" Id.
(holdbig no cause of action existed for JDlldng motion for contanpt because
attomeys do not owe dufy' to bt conect in legal arguments-"even ifthe ... motion
fo1' commnpt bad been meritless, thoir conduct in so moving, coming as it did in
the discharge of their duties in :n:prescnting a. party in a lawauit, would still not be
actionable."). Thus, an attorney's conduct,
if frivolous or without nieri.t, is
not inclopendontly actionable if the conduct is part of the discharge of the lawyer's
duties in representing bis or her client Id at 74; Chapman Children's Tnut v.
Porter & H•dpa, L.L.P., 32 S.W.3d 429, 441 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2000, pet. denied). !he i.mmwlity focuses on 1he type of conduct, not on whc:tber
the conduct was meritorious in the context ofthe uuderlying lawsuit. Rerlfroe, 941
s.w.2d at 288.

even

AJ the Tew SUpxeme Court observed in McCamish. a lawyer"s protection from
liability arising out of his roprcscnta1ion of a client is not without limits. Ste
r~orv.

MdliMoll
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McCaml8h. 991S.W.2dat793.94~ see also Tola v. Toles, 113 S.W.3d 899, 91213 (Tex.App.·Dallas 2003, no pet.). For example, a cause ofaction could exist
against an attorney who knowblgly commits a fraudulent act outside tho scope of
his legal representation of tho client. Su Llk<lver y. Sunflower Terrace JI, Ltd.,
696 S.W.2d 468. 4n (Tex.App.-Bouston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ). If a lawyer
participates in independently fraudulent activities, his action is 11fareign to the
duties of an attorney." Id. (quotiq Poole\!, Houston&: T.C. ~ Co., 58 Tex 134,
137 (1882)). A lawyer thus cannot shield his own willful and premeditated
fraudulent mions from liability simply on the ground that he is an agent ofhis
client. See id.
A.lpm v. Crain, Caton & Jamu, P. Ct 178 S.W.3d at 405-406.

Jn tho instant co0i Reed Taylor's claims against the Defendants are based solely on

ooncluct engaged in by attomey McNichols as part ofhis obligation to zealously represent his

clients in 1hc litigation process brought about by Reed Taylor's lawsuit aaainst attomey
McNidlols' s clients. Plalntift's first cause of action asserts the Defendants, with :fUll knowledge
ofReed Taylor's rights Wlder the buy-out agreement, aided and abetted others in the tortious
intorfermce of R.eed Taylor's con1rao\Ual rights. Plaintiff assem that in seeking and obtaining a
pnliminary injunction against him in the underlying

oase. attomcy MeNicbols aided and abetted

in tho interference of Plain1lif's contractual rights that aro at issue in the underlybig case.
The co.a.duct alleged by Plainti1fwas not unlawful, was do11e in the course ofthe
litigation process and in the course of representing his clients' rights until a determination on the
legal iss'Ues could be made through the judioial proc~ The conduct of the Defondants done in
the COUl'Se of seeking a judicial determination on the numerous claims brought against the

Defendants' olionts in the undedyhig case fhlls within 1hc litigation privilege even though lleed
Taylor may ewentually pre'Vail in the underlying action. When a party makes a claim that a

prominoey note is in defauh and that certain terms of an asrcement are 1riggered by the dofault,
an attorney is obligated to 7.ealously defend bis client apimt the claims. It is not ·cmough that a

plaintiff believes he will prevail on bis claims. The AIA coiporations and the board of directors
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have a laWiUl right, indeed the obligation, to appropriately defend against the claims and to be
hca:rd reganling any defenses to the claims. In addition, any attomey hired to represent the
corporation and its directors has an inflexible obligation to zealously rq>resent his clients in that
defense and is obligated to tab whatever steps are necessary within the litigation to protect his
clients rights until a determination ofthe issues is made by a coUrt.

lho seeond cause of action asserted by Plaintiff is for one of conversion. 1n· the
underlying case. tho question of whether the terms of the buy-out agreement entitle Reed Taylor
to the commissions and related receivables of AlA Insurance as security for the promissoiy note

is an open ono. In the instant case. Plaintiff contends that by accepting payment for legal

services, attomey McNichols and his firm havo converted those assets of AJA In which Reed
Taylor has a security Interest, knowing Reed Taylor has a security interest in the 1SSets, and thus
have unlawtully converted to Defendants assets belonghig to Reed Taylor.5 As the Court has
already stated. there is in place an Order that management ofthe corporations is to remam with
the board of directors until a dotermination of Reed's claims is made or untll fbrther order of the
Court. SeCOlldly, the COrpOl'atioos and the board of directors bavo a right to defend against the

claims ofReed Taylor and 10 retain counsel to provide the necessary defense. The Defendants'
actions in detonding thoir clients against the claims fall squarely within the litigation privilege.
Reliance on the Court's Order placing authority to manage the COlporations with the board of

directors, which Includes contraoting to pay for lepl services. is justified and does not make the
Defendants liable for conversion.

J P1afn1Uf argaeii that u a secured creditor, ha has a right to mike dleisions r.prdinJ th• operations ofthe
corporation. PJafntlfflw provided tho Court with no aulhorky for his J)Olltion. AJ a secured oreditor, Plaintiffhu •
rrpc to sak ajudpient aJlowq him to uke conirol oftllo security, a claim ho bu asserted ln tho underlying action
md one that .bis yet to bt d.tvmfnld.
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Plaintiff's· third cause of aotion asserts Defendants violated the Idaho Consumer
Protection Art, in particular I.C. § 48-608(2), by engaging in acts, conduct, and representations

that were false, misleading and/or deceptive constituting unfair and/or deceptive acts and/or

praodce&. This allegation not only falls within the protcotions of the litigation prlvilep, as the
acts which Plabitiff' alleges Defendants engaged in were representations presonted to the Court
within the scope of Defendants' representation of the co~orate clients, but the claim fails for
lack ofprivity, which is clearly required under the language of LC. § 48-608(1).6

Plaintiff's fourth cause of acrtion alleps professional negligence and/or breach of
Detmdants' fiduciary duties to Reed Taylor and the AJA coiporations. This claim fails for two

reasom: (1) litigatian privilege and (2) lack of an attomey~lient relationship between Plaintiff
and the Defeiufants. In Harrlgfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004) and again in

Estate o/Becket- v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 96PJd 623 (2004), Idaho's Supreme Comt

ditectly addressed the question of whedJ.er an attorney-client relationship is necessary bofbie a
· claim for malpractice may be asserted against an attorney. The Couit. h£ld that, with the narrow
oxception of the drafting of testamentary documents, thm must be an attomey-clicmt
relationship for a malpractice claim to be viable. Jn the instant matter, not oJlly haS Plainti!' not
asserted the cxistellce of an attomey-client relationship with the Defendants, a. key component of
his Complaint is that he has not been CODSUlted or allowed to choose counsel for the

corporations.

Finally, there ate two positions asserted by Plaintiff1hat the Court finds should be
addressed. The first is the assertion th• atto.mey MoNieb.ols should have withdrawn from
representing, not only the corporadons, but from ropiesenting John Taylor. PlaiJxdfr argues
1 I.e. § 48-608 reaa. fn releva:ot part, "Alr/ persoo. who pmdaaHI or lwe pds or semees . .
hil OWll •dmiRioa. dlduotpurchue 1he 1111Yices ofattomqMc'NU:bols or bis Jaw firm.

Td)'lor'Y. McNloltoh
Opinion & Ordet on Mllliorl to Dlsml.u
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attomey McNiohols owed a duty of loyalty to the corporat.ions as climts and that potential
conflicts of interest between the corporations and John Taylor elem.ands McNichols not represent

him. The relationships between the defendants in tbc underlying case have many overlays.. some
of which potentially create conflicts of intc:tcsts between the defendants and some of which
potentially create commonality of interests bet.ween the defendants. One commonality between

the de~ in tho underlying case is that they are all defendants. Ifthere are contliGts of
interest that have been created by attomey McNi~ols initially acting as counsel for the
corporations and John Taylor, it is for the common clients to raise or to waive, not the opposing

pany. Rule 1.7 of the Idaho Rules of Frofessional Co~ addresses conflicts of interest

between clients. Commentary 23 makes clear that there are circumstances in which it is not
improper for an attorney to represent codefmdants even 'though conflicts of interest may

potentially exist. In the instant case, attotney McNiehols represented all three clients for only a
briof petiod at the very beginnjng of the litigation, doing so at a very critical period in the case.
His hnmediate actions were clearly within that which is acceptable undor the rules of
professioml cond\J.ct established for attomeys representing codefe.ndants in a litigation.
The second position assorted by PlainUff is his aigoment that the codefendant! have aoted.

wrongly in emerJng Into a joint dofOJl.se agreement Jn the underlying case, mmy of Reed
Taylorts claims challenge interests that the coxporations and the indiVidual boud members have
in common and that, therefore, require a common defmsc. It is only reasonable that a degxee of

cooperation must exist between eounsel for the COipOtations and counsel for the individual board
members, as the corporation is incapable of connnllnicatfng with its counsel except through 1hose
individuals who nm the corporations. Contrary to the assertion by Plaintiff, entering into a joint
defense agrccmont does not piohl"bit the coclefendants from asserting claims asainst each other if
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suc:h claims are warranted. Rather, it provides the parties certain protections in regard to their .
communications with eaoh other on those areas of comm.on defe11so and common interest. The

joint defense privilege, or ~on interest ml~ is an extension of the attorney-client privilege

.

.

because it protects communications between the parties when they are part of an on-going and
joint offort to set up a common defense S1rategy in connection with actual or prospective
litigation. lntex RetJl'eation Corp. v. Team Worldwide Corp., 471 F.Supp.2d I 1 (D.D.C.2007).
The rule applies not only to coDl11111Dieations but also to doouments protected by the work
product doctnue. Id.
In conclusion, for the reasons stated above, the Court finds the claims asserted by

Plaintiff fall to stato claims for whi9h relief may ho granted. A1I a ml.1.teI of law, Plaintiff's
claims must be dismissed.

CB) PLAINTJF'F'S MQ1JON TO AMeND COMPLAINT

"The decision whethor to allow a party to amend its pleiadinp is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court ...... 'Wtlltv. Unit1a Stote.r Insuranae Co., 119 Idaho 160, 166, 804
P.2d 333 (Ct.App.1991). It is not an abuse of dlscre'tion to deny a motion to am.end wh= the
record contains no allegation that, if proven, would entitle a plainti1f to the toliof claimed. Id. at
167.

Tho Court, after hem:iq oral arguments of counsel and after reviewing Plaintiirs
proposed amended complaint, finds it would be a fatile aot to grant Plaintiff's motion to amend

as 1he proposed amended complaint would not withstand a motion to dismiss. Jn his proposed
amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts the same claims as sot forth in his original Com.plaim and
seeks to add derivative claims. Plaintifi' s amended direct claims fail as a matter oflaw for the

Taylar v. Mdltdloll
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same reasons as addressed by the Court above. despite Plaintiff's bare allegation that the conduct
and actions of the Def'endants exceeded the scope oftheir Iip?CSentation.
Plabitiff's attempt to bring derivative claims on behalf of AIA Insunmoe and A1A
Services fall as a matter of law. Idaho Code § 30·1~741 clearly and unambiguously provides

standing to bring derivative proceedings only to those who are shareholders at the time ofthe act
or omission complained of and only to those sharaboldm who fairly and adequately 1epresent
the interests of the corpotation. As noted by the ABA Official Comment at the end of J.C. § 301-741, while some state's have cUminated the "contemporaneous" ownorshiprule, Idaho's
legislature chose to retain the requirement, as is evidenced by tho language in the statute.

Plaintiff' contends that, because other states have 8llowed creditors and stock: pledses to bring
derivative clahns, standing should not be limited to shareholdOis. The Court is not persuaded.
Idaho Code § 30-1-741 is clear Bild unambiguous, making it clear Idaho's le,gislatule has chosen
to limit derivative claims to shareholders only.

ORDER

Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint is hozeby DENIED.
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is he.teby GRANTBP,

Dated this :Z..3 day of Decembor 2008.

Toylor y. /,laNldlal1
Oplaloa "Ordtr OD Molloo 1a Dlnnin
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JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN)
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
)
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A
)
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL )
ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP an Idaho limited )
liability partnership; JANE DOES 1-X,
)
unknown individuals;
)
)
Defendants.
)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.)

CASE NO. CV08-01765
OPINION AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR AW ARD OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and
Costs. A hearing on the Motion was held on February 26, 2009. Plaintiff Reed Taylor was
represented by attorney Michael S. Bissell. Defendants Babbitt, Ashby, Collins, Riley and the
law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley were represented by attorney James D. LaRue. The
Court, having read the motion, affidavits and briefs of the parties, having considered the record
in the matter, having heard oral arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the matter,
hereby renders its decision.
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Prior to the filing of the above-entitled action, Plaintiff Reed Taylor filed a lawsuit
against AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance Inc. and various other defendants, asserting
numerous claims sounding in tort and contract, all of which stem from a complex stock buyout
agreement between Reed Taylor and the AIA corporations that Reed Taylor started, turned into a
profitable business and then left to the management of his brother, John Taylor. The Defendant
attorneys in the above-entitled action represent AJA Services and AJA Insurance in the
underlying action.
This matter began on August 18, 2008, with the filing of Plaintiffs Complaint naming as
Defendants the Boise law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP and the individual
attorneys with the firm. Defendants Gary Babbit and D. John Ashby, attorneys with the
Defendant law firm, represent AJA Services Corporation and AJA Insurance Inc. in the
underlying lawsuit filed by Plaintiff Reed Taylor. 1 It is the representation of the AIA
corporations by the Defendants that form the basis of Plaintiffs claims in the above-entitled
action.
On September I 0, 2008, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in
Support. On October 2, 2008, Plaintiff filed his brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss. A
hearing on the motion was scheduled and heard on October 16, 2008. However, one day prior to
the hearing, Plaintiff filed a Motion and Memorandum to Amend Complaint. The Court heard
oral arguments of counsel on Defendants' motion to dismiss as scheduled and subsequently, for
reasons of judicial economy, informed the parties no ruling would be entered until a hearing on
Plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint could be heard. On November 6, 2008, the

1

Taylor v. A/A Services, et al., Nez Perce County Case No. CV2007-00208
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Defendants filed a brief in opposition to Plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint and the Court
heard oral arguments on December 4, 2008. On December 23, 2008, the Court entered its
Opinion and Order denying Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint and granting Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss.
On January 6, 2009, Defendants filed a Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' fees,
Affidavit in Support and Brief in Support. Plaintiff filed his Motion to Disallow Defendants'
Request for Attorneys' Fees and Costs on January 20, 2009. Before the matter was scheduled for
hearing, Defendants filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Memorandum of Fees and Costs and
supporting briefing. On February 19, 2009, Plaintiff filed a response brief to Defendants' motion
to amend, stating he had no objection to Defendants' motion to amend the memorandum of fees
and costs. On February 26, 2009, the Court heard oral arguments on Defendants' request for
fees and costs and, there being no objection from Plaintiff, the Court will make its analysis based
on a grant of Defendants' motion for leave to amend.

STAND ARDS UPON A REQUEST FOR COSTS AND FEES
The statutory language determines whether an award of attorneys' fees is mandatory or
discretionary. When an award is discretionary, a court must perceive the issue as one of
discretion, act within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it, and the court must reach its decision by an
exercise ofreason. P.O. Ventures Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 159
P.3d 870 (2007). A court's discretionary authority includes the discretion to award reasonable
attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action when such an award is provided for by any
statute. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l).
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ANALYSIS
Plaintiff Reed Taylor, in the instant matter, asserted the following causes of action in his
Complaint against the Defendant attorneys and law firm: (1) aiding and abetting their clients,
AIA corporations, and others in the commission of tortious acts for the purpose of preventing
Plaintiff from obtaining the legal remedy he seeks in his lawsuit against AIA and others; (2) by
receiving payment for legal services from AIA, Defendants willfully interfered with property and
money that should have been under the possession of Plaintiff; (3) Defendants' conduct in
representing AIA constitutes unfair and deceptive acts or practices under I. C. § 48-601; and, (4)
by assisting AIA in resisting Reed Taylor's claims against AIA, Defendants committed
professional negligence and/or breached fiduciary duties the Defendants owed to Reed Taylor.
Defendants, who prevailed on their Motion to Dismiss, now seek an award of attorneys' fees and
costs pursuant to LC.§ 12-120(3), I.C. § 12-121, LC.§ 30-1-746 and LC.§ 48-608(5).

(A) I.C. § 12-120(3) AND DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) reads:
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill,
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except
transactions for personal or household purposes. The term "party" is defined to
mean any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the
state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof.

Defendants assert I. C. § 12-120(3) is applicable to their request for attorney fees as they
contend the instant action was one to recover on a commercial transaction. Defendants direct the
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Court to the recent decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in City of McCall v. Buxton, 2009 WL
198305 (2009) wherein the Court held the commercial transaction portion ofl.C. § 12-120 is not
limited to contract actions and, therefore, is applicable to tort actions involving a commercial
transaction.
Plaintiff Reed Taylor's claims against the Defendants sounded in tort, not in contract.
Nevertheless, under the holding in Buxton, reasonable attorney fees are to be awarded to the
prevailing party in a civil action when the recovery sought was based on a commercial
transaction. The question this Court must answer is whether the recovery sought in the aboveentitled matter was based on a commercial transaction. In Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, 127 Idaho
624, 903 P.2d 1321 (1995), the Court addressed the test this Court must apply to the question
before it.
An award of attorney fees is not warranted every time a commercial transaction is
remotely connected with a case. Rather, the test is whether the commercial
transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit. Attorney fees are not
appropriate under I. C. § 12-120(3) unless the commercial transaction is integral to
the claim and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover.
Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 776, 890 P.2d 714, 727 (1995).
Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, 127 Idaho at 631.
Plaintiffs Complaint in the instant matter is replete with statements about the commercial
transaction between Reed Taylor and AIA corporations. However, the commercial transaction
between Reed Taylor and AIA is not integral to his claims against the Defendants, is not the
gravamen of his claims against the Defendants, and does not constitute the basis of his attempted
recovery. The gravamen of Plaintiffs attempted recovery is the alleged acts and/or conduct of
the Defendants in representing their corporate clients. The commercial transaction, while the
foundation of the underlying suit, is only remotely connected to the instant action. Plaintiffs
Complaint asserted claims for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duties, conversion of
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property, aiding and abetting tortious acts, and unfair and deceptive practices in violation of
Idaho's Consumer Protection Act. 2 The commercial transaction between Reed Taylor and AIA
is only tenuously related to the Plaintiff's claims in the instant action and, as such, I.C. § 12120(3) is inapplicable. 3
(B) J.C.§ 12-121 AND DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS

Idaho Code§ 12-121 reads:
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or
amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees. The
term "party" or "parties" is defined to include any person, partnership,
corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political
subdivision thereof
Idaho Code§ 12-121 must be read in conjunction with I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l), which reads in
relevant part, "[A ]ttorney fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the court
only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued or defended
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Defendants contend that each claim asserted
by the Plaintiff in the instant matter was frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation.
Plaintiffs first claim alleged the Defendants had aided and abetted their corporate clients
and others in the commission oftortious acts for the purpose of preventing Reed Taylor from
obtaining a legal remedy to which he was entitled. Plaintiffs Complaint, which is lengthy,
contends the legal posture taken by the Defendants in defending their clients in the underlying

2

Defendants contend that by asserting a claim under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, LC. § 48-601 et seq.,
Plaintiff clearly sought recovery on the basis of a commercial transaction. The Court is not persuaded. The Idaho
Consumer Practices Act is applicable to goods and services purchased for personal and household purposes as well
as to business transactions. See J.C. § 48-601.
3
Even if the Court was persuaded that the commercial transaction was the gravamen of Plaintiffs action against the
Defendants, an award of attorney fees may not be warranted under J.C.§ 12-120(3). Defendants in the underlying
action of Taylor v. AJA et al. have pending before the Court a Motion for Summary Judgment wherein they seek to
have the commercial transaction between Reed Taylor and AIA declared illegal and unenforceable. Where a
commercial transaction is found illegal, no party is permitted to claim the benefit of J.C. § 12-120(3). Trees v.
Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 12, 56 P.3d 765 (2002).
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action, was an act of conspiracy done for the purpose of providing the underlying defendants
time and opportunity to fraudulently transfer AIA funds and commit other tortious acts against
Reed Taylor. Plaintiff's second claim alleged that by accepting payment for legal services from
their clients, the Defendants took funds they knew lawfully belonged to Reed Taylor, as Reed
Taylor would have controlled the corporate funds but for the Defendants' acts of conspiracy in
obtaining a preliminary injunction for their clients. The third claim alleged by Plaintiff was that,
in defending their clients in the underlying action, the Defendants engaged in false, misleading
and deceptive conduct in violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Finally, Plaintiffs
fourth claim alleged the Defendants committed legal malpractice by breaching their fiduciary
duties to Reed Taylor, a duty Reed Taylor contends arose the day he declared himself to be the
majority shareholder of the corporations under the terms of the stock redemption agreements
despite the Court's finding that the issue has yet to be determined.
In response to the Defendants' motion to dismiss, Plaintiff conceded his claims were
novel and/or unusual but encouraged the Court to allow the case to go forward. The Plaintiff's
claims, however, were more than novel or unusual. In regards to his claim for legal malpractice,
Plaintiff made a similar claim in a prior unrelated case that found its way to the Idaho Supreme
Court. In that earlier case, the Supreme Court stated in clear and unambiguous terms that an
attorney-client relationship is an absolute prerequisite to a professional malpractice claim.
Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 258, 127 P.3d 156 (2005). There is without question no

attorney-client relationship between Plaintiff and the Defendants in the instant matter.
The Plaintiff's claim for breach of fiduciary duties was also unreasonable. While the
Maile Court held that a person may sue an attorney for breach of fiduciary duty even where no

attorney-client relationship exists, the Court clearly stated that a plaintiff must allege facts that
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show a defendant attorney assumed a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff. Id. at 259. In the instant
matter, no such facts were alleged nor are there any facts in the record that would support a
finding that Defendants assumed any fiduciary duties to the Plaintiff. It is insufficient that
Plaintiff has a personal belief that he is automatically entitled to certain remedies by virtue of the
terms of the 1995 and 1996 Agreements between Reed Taylor and AIA, one of those being an
automatic transfer of the majority of stocks to Plaintiff and, that as the majority stockholder
Defendants owe him fiduciary duties. The 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and the
modification entered into in 1996 are complex agreements not subject to a simplistic analysis.
The complexity of the issues is recognized by every party in the underlying case, including the
Plaintiff, as each has expressed to the Court the need to reconstruct the 1995 and 1996 financial
health of AIA Services and AIA Insurance in order to analyzed the issues and reach a
determination. While not an impossible task, it is a daunting and complex one.
The remaining claims brought by the Plaintiff were frivolous and unreasonable, having
no foundation in law or fact. Plaintiffs claims were based on his theory that, in defending their
clients rather than conceding every issue to the Plaintiff, the Defendants entered into a
conspiracy undertaken solely for the purpose of preventing Plaintiff from receiving that which
Plaintiff believes he is entitled without need for judicial adjudication. If this Court, or any court,
adopted the Plaintiffs position it would unquestionably tum the adversarial system on its head.
It is the duty of an attorney to zealously represent his client and to do so without concern that he

may be disliked or berated by those who disagree with his legal strategies or positions as long as
the representation falls within the boundaries allowed by law.
In the instant matter, the Court is fully persuaded that the acts of the Defendants in
representing their clients in the underlying action were reasonable and necessary and the Court is
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persuaded the Defendants acted well within the ethical rules established by the Idaho State Bar.
The claims brought by the Plaintiff against the Defendant<; were frivolous, unreasonable and
without foundation in law or fact and, therefore, an award of attorney fees under LC. § 12-121 is
warranted.
CC) LC.§ 30-1-746 AND DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS
The Defendants seek an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 30-1-746(2) and (3), which
read,
On termination of the derivative proceeding the court may:
(2) Order the plaintiff to pay any defendant's reasonable expenses, including
counsel fees, incurred in defending the proceeding if it finds that the proceeding
was commenced or maintained without reasonable cause or for an improper
purpose; or
(3) Order a party to pay an opposing party's reasonable expenses, including
counsel fees, incurred because of the filing of a pleading, motion or other paper, if
it finds that the pleading, motion or other paper was not well grounded in fact,
after reasonable inquiry, or warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for
the extension, modification or reversal of existing law and was interposed for an
improper purpose, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation.

Plaintiff's proposed Amended Complaint sought to bring derivative claims against the
Defendants on behalf of AIA. As stated by the Court in its Opinion and Order granting
Defendants' motion to dismiss, Plaintiff's proposed derivative claims failed as a clear matter of
law as the Plaintiff was without standing to bring such claims.
Standing to bring a derivative action is limited by LC. § 30-1-741 to persons who were
shareholders at the time of the complaint of act or omission. Plaintiff was not a shareholder
when the Defendant law firm was retained to represent AIA Services and AIA Insurance, nor has
Plaintiff at any time to date been determined to be a shareholder by way of a lawful transfer of
shares or other means. While the Plaintiff believes adjudication of the underlying stock
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redemption agreement will result in him being judged the majority shareholder, that
determination has yet to be made. Plaintiffs claim based on a derivative action was, therefore,
frivolous, unreasonable and not based in law or fact.

(D) LC.§ 48-608(5) AND DEFANDANTS' MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS
Plaintiff attempted in his proposed amended complaint to bring a cause of action based
on violations of Idaho's Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiffs allegations were merely a
reiteration of his claim that, by Defendants representing their clients in a zealous manner rather
than conceding the issues to Plaintiff, Defendants engaged in acts that were deceptive,
misleading and false. Under Plaintiffs theory, whenever a defendant's attorney defends his
client by taking a position that is contrary to the plaintiffs position, the defending attorney has
violated Idaho's Consumer Protection Act. The claim asserted by the Plaintiff lacked any basis
in law or fact and as such was frivolous and unreasonable.

CONCLUSION
The Court finds the claims alleged by the Plaintiff in his Complaint and his proposed
Amended Complaint were frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation in law or fact.
Therefore, pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and Rule 54(e)( 1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court finds Defendants are entitled to a reasonable award of attorney fees and
cost. In addition, the Court finds a reasonable award of attorney fees is also warranted under
Idaho Code § 30-1-746(2) and (3) and Idaho Code § 48-608( 5) for the cost of defending against
the two claims in Plaintiffs proposed Amended Complaint. In determining a reasonable amount
to award in attorney fees, the Court has considered the degree to which each of Plaintiffs claims
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is settled law in Idaho, a factor argued to the Court by Defendants in their motion for an award of
attorney fees.
The Court does not find Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) applicable to Defendants' request for an
award of attorney fees.

ORDER

It is hereby the finding of the Court that Plaintiffs claims were frivolous, unreasonable
and without foundation in law or fact and that Defendants are entitled to costs as a matter of right
and an award of reasonable attorney fees in the following amounts:
Costs as a matter of right:

$ 58.00

Discretionary Attorney fees:

$ 20,000.00

Dated this _._3~_ day of April 2009.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPINION & ORDER was:

hand delivered via court basket, or

.).

v"

mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this
2009, to:

3

°'z-

day of April

Michael S. Bissell
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC
7 South Howard St, Ste 416
Spokane, WA 99201
James D. LaRue
Elam & Burke PA
251 East Front St
PO Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TH SECOND DICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND F
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED .T. TAYLOR, an individual,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN)
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
)
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A
)
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL )
ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP an Idaho limited )
liability partnership; JANE DOES 1-X,
)
unknown individuals;
)
)
Defendants.
)

CASE NO. CVOS-01765
OPINION AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION
AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's
award of attorneys' fees and costs and Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of the same. A
hearing on the Motions was held on May 14, 2009. Plaintiff Reed Taylor was represented by
attorney Michael S. Bissell. Defendants Babbitt, Ashby, Collins, Riley and the law firm of
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley were represented by attorney James D. LaRue. The Court,
having read the motion and briefs of the parties, having considered the record in the matter,
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having heard oral arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its
decision.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 3, 2009, this Court entered its Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for
Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, wherein the Court granted Defendants $20,000.00 in
attorneys' fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121, Rule 54(e)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
I.C. § 30-1-746(2) and l.C. § 48-608(5). On April 21, 2009, Defendants filed a Motion for
Reconsideration a<;king the Court to reconsider the amount of attorney fees granted and seeking a
clarification of the factors set forth in Rule 54(e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
On May 4, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending the Court erred
in awarding attorneys' fees under I.C. § 12-121, asserting Plaintiffs claims were not frivolous
and, even if attorneys' fees might otherwise be warranted under LC.§ 30-1-746(2) and I.C. § 48608(5), no award can be granted as Defendants failed to itemize fees specific to the related
claims.
STANDARDS UPON A REQUEST FOR COSTS AND FEES
The statutory language determines whether an award of attorneys' fees is mandatory or
discretionary. When an award is discretionary, a court must perceive the issue as one of
discretion, act within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it, and the court must reach its decision by an
exercise of reason. P.O. Ventures Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 159
P.3d 870 (2007). A court's discretionary authority includes the discretion to award reasonable
attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action when such an award is provided for by any
statute. l.R.C.P. 54(e)(l).
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ANAI,YSIS
Plaintiff a5serts the Court erred in awarding attorneys' fees. If the Court is persuaded by
Plaintiffs argument, it would render Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration moot. Therefore,
the Court must first make a determination as to the merits of Plaintiff's motion.
(A)

PLAINTIFF'S ASSERTION OF ERROR AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Under I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e), attorneys' fees may be awarded only where there

is a prevailing party and a court finds the lawsuit was brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably and without foundation. Plaintiff asserts his claims, in part if not in their entirety,
were novel issues or issues of first impression and, therefore, were not brought or pursued
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. The Court agrees attorneys' fees are not to be
awarded under I.C. § 12-121 unless all of the claims brought or pursued are found to be
frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation nor are attorneys' fees appropriate under I.C. § 12121 if the issues are novel or issues of first impression. "A party is not entitled to attorneys' fees
ifthe issue is one of first impression in Idaho." Lane Ranch v. City ofSun Valley, 145 Idaho 87,
91, 175 P.3d 776 (2007), citing SEIZ Const., L.L.C. v. Idaho State University, 140 Idaho 8, 14,
89 p .3d 848, 854 (2004).
Attorney fees are not appropriate under LC.§ 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e) unless all
claims brought or all defenses asserted are frivolous and without foundation.
Where there are "multiple claims and multiple defenses, it is not appropriate to
segregate those claims and defenses to determine which were or were not
frivolously defended or pursued. The total defense of plaintiffs proceedings must
be unreasonable or frivolous." Magic Valley Radiology Associates, P.A. v.
Professional Business Services, Inc., 119 Idaho 558, 808 P.2d 1303 (1990).
Management Catalysts v. Turbo West Corpac, 119 Idaho 626, 630, 809 P.2d 487 (1991 ).
In the instant matter, Defendants sought attorneys' fees and costs as the prevailing party
after the Court granted Defendants' I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and denied Plaintiffs
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motion to amend his complaint. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges four causes of action against
Defendants: (1) conversion; (2) tortious interference; (3) fraud and/or constructive fraud; and, (4)
malpractice. Plaintiffs claims against the Defendants were not based on an attorney-client
relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants. Rather, Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants
were based solely on Defendants' representation of AIA Services Corporation and AIA
Insurance, Inc. in a lawsuit brought against the corporations by the Plaintiff Reed Taylor.
Plaintiff theorized that, by accepting money from its corporate clients for legal fees, Defendants
had unlawfully converted to themselves AIA funds that rightfully belong to Reed Taylor and,
that by defending its clients Defendants had committed malpractice, aided and abetted their
clients in committing fraud and aided and abetted their clients in tortiously interfering with
Plaintiffs contractual rights.
Plaintiff contends an award of attorneys' fees was improper as some, if not all, of his
claims were novel issues or issues of first impression. The Court is not persuaded. Three of the
four claims asserted by the Plaintiff are common law theories of recovery that have been
addressed numerous times by Idaho's courts. While Plaintiff's choice of defendants is novel, in
that he opted to bring his claims for conversion, tortious interference and fraud against the
attorneys representing the corporations rather than against the corporations and the corporate
leadership, the claims certainly are not novel. Nor is Plaintiff's claim for malpractice brought
against attorneys with whom he had no attorney-client relationship novel or a matter of first
impression. 1 The only novel issue or one of first impression before the Court was the litigation
privilege doctrine raised as a defense by the Defendants.

1

In the unrelated case of Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005), Reed Taylor brought an action
against an attorney with whom he had no attorney-client relationship. The Supreme Court, in ruling on the appeal,
emphasized that an attorney-client relationship is required in a legal malpractice claim.
Taylor v. Babbit, et al.
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The Court, addressing Defendants' motion to dismiss, noted the litigation privilege
doctrine has not previously been addressed by Idaho's appellate courts. Nevertheless, after
reviewing opinions from those jurisdictions that have addressed the privilege, this Court found
the doctrine to be consistent with Idaho's Rules of Professional Ethics and with the firmly
established standard in Idaho that an attorney is obligated to provide his clients with zealous
representation 2 . While the litigation privilege doctrine, which was raised by Defendants in their
Motion to Dismiss and thereby required review by the Court, provides a helpful overlay, the
Court is confident it would have reached the same result based solely on the Idaho Rules of
Professional Ethics and the long held standard that obligates attorneys to zealously represent
their clients. This fact is reflected in the Court's Opinion and Order on the issue of attorneys'
fees and costs, wherein the Court stated it was persuaded the Defendants had acted well within
the ethical rules established by the Idaho State Bar.
Finally, the Court reached the determination that each of Plaintiffs claims were brought
and pursued frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation only after finding each asserted
claim was fatally flawed legally and factually. Plaintiff contends the Court erred in this regard,
asserting the Court was required to accept as true all facts alleged by Plaintiff and, that had the
Court done so, it could not have found the claims legally flawed. In order for the Court to have
reached the result proposed by Plaintiff, the Court would have been required to ignore its own
prior rulings in the underlying case and simply accept as true Plaintiffs apparent disregard of the
status of the underlying case. This the Court could not do, especially after all parties requested
the Court take judicial notice of the entire case file.

2
This obligation was most recently noted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Heinze v. Bauer, 2008 WL 204271
(unpublished opinion), a legal malpractice lawsuit brought by Heinze against the attorney who represented him in
his divorce.
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In addition to the Court finding attorneys' fees appropriate under LC.§ 12-121 and
I.R.C.P. 54(e), the Court found Defendants request for attorneys' fees pursuant to J.C.§ 30-1746 and LC.§ 48-608(5) valid relative to two of Plaintiffs claims. However, the Court need not
address whether attorneys' fees were properly requested under the two statutory provisions as the
Court found all of Plaintiffs claims were brought and pursued frivolously, umeasonably and
without foundation and, therefore, awarded attorneys' fees pursuant to LC.§ 12-121.
Based on the Court's review and finding that attorneys' fees were appropriate under LC.

§ 12-121 and l.R.C.P. 54(e), the Court denies Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider. The Court
continues to be of the opinion that each of Plaintiffs claims was so plainly fallacious as to be
deemed frivolous and that Plaintiffs claims were not supported by a good faith argument for
modification of the law in ldaho. 3

CB) RULE 54(e)(3) CONSIDERATIONS
Rule 54(e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
Amount of Attorney Fees. In the event the court grants attorney fees to a party or
parties in a civil action it shall consider the following factors in determining the
amount of such fees:
(A) The time and labor required.
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions.
(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the
experience and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law.
(D) The prevailing charges for like work.
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the
case.
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(H) The undesirability of the case.
(I) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(J) Awards in similar cases.
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted
Legal Research), if the court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a
party's case.
(L) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular case.
3

United Investors Life Insurance Co. v. Severson, 143 Idaho 628, 634, 151 P.3d 824 (2007).
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On Motion for Reconsideration, Defendants ask the Court to clarify the factors it
considered in awarding attorneys' fees and asks the Court to reconsider the amount of the award.
The Court concedes it provided only a general statement regarding its considerations under Rule
54(e)(3) in its April 3, 2009 Opinion and that an articulation of the factors considered is
appropriate.
The Court did not find the questions presented by Plaintiffs claims particularly novel or
difficult. As Defendants noted in their opposition brief to Plaintiffs motion to reconsider, the
legal requirements for each and every claim brought by Plaintiff are well established and the
fatal flaws in each of Plaintiffs claims should have been easily evident to Plaintiff. The same is
true in defending against each claim.
Plaintiffs claims were based in statute and common law and were, for the most part,
claims with well established proof elements. As a result, defending against the claims did not
require extensive time, labor or research as each claim contained a fatal flaw that was easily
discovered and presented to the Court. The Court does not disagree with Defendants' argument
that a malpractice claim presents a case within a case. However, in the instant case there was no
attorney-client relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants, a fatal flaw easily ascertained
without the need for a full understanding of the complexities of the underlying case as argued by
Defendants' counsel.
One of the many factors considered by the Court in deciding the complexity of the instant
matter along with the time and labor required was the brief elapse of time between the filing of
the Complaint and the grant of Defendants' motion to dismiss, a mere six month time frame. In
addition, counsel for the Defendants, whose fees were based on an hourly rate in the instant
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matter, are skilled and experienced attorneys able to address issues thoroughly, efficiently and
effectively. After reconsideration of the factors the Court is to consider under l.R.C.P. 54(e)(3),
the Court remains of the opinion that a reasonable amount of attorneys' fees for defending
against the claims brought by Plaintiff is $20,000.00.

ORDER

The Court has, as requested by the parties, clarified and articulated the factors considered
by the Court in deciding a reasonable amount of attorneys' fees to be award to Defendants
pursuant to J.C.§ 12-121 and l.R.C.P. 54(e)(l).
Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider is hereby DENIED.
Defendants' Motion to Reconsider is hereby DENIED.

Dated this

Taylor v. Babbit, et al.
Order on Motions for Reconsideration of Fees & Costs

;t

day of June 2009.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPINION & ORDER was:

-

hand delivered via court basket, or

s?

~mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this j_ day of June

2009, to:

Michael S. Bissell
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC
7 South Howard St, Ste 416
Spokane, VVA 99201
James D. LaRue
Elam & Burke PA
251 East Front St
PO Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701
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James D. LaRue ISB #1780
Loren C. Ipsen ISB #1767
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
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CLERK OF THE DIST. COURT

JANET L KOUGH
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 08-01765
JUDGMENT

v.
GARY D. BABBITI, an individual; D. JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES 1-X,
unknown individuals;
Defendants.

Defendants' Motion for Costs and Attorneys' Fees came on for hearing before this Court
on February 26, 2009. James D. LaRue of the firm Elam & Burke P.A., appeared for
Defendants Gary D. Babbitt, D. John Ashby, Patrick V. Collins, Richard A. Riley and Hawley

JUDGMENT- I
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Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP. Michael S. Bissell of the law firm Campbell, Bissell & Kirby,
PLLC, appeared for Plaintiff. This Court having reviewed the record in this matter, together with
motions, memoranda, briefs and affidavits filed concerning the above referenced motion, as well
as oral argument presented by counsel, and the Court thereafter having issued its Opinion and
Order on Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs dated April 3, 2009, and
having considered all factors in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3}, and in the exercise of the discretion of this
Court finds an award of attorneys' fees as set forth below appropriate, Judgment concerning this
matter is now proper.
Accordingly, JUDGMENT is hereby entered, under the standards ofldaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54 and Idaho Code Sections 12-121, 30-1-746(2) and (3), 48-608(5), in favor of
Defendants Gary D. Babbitt, D. John Ashby, Patrick V. Collins, Richard A. Riley and Hawley
Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, against the Plaintiff in the amount of $20,058.00.
Post-judgment interest on this amount at the current applicable statutory rate shall
commence to run from the date of this Judgment forward.
DATED this

l~ day of April, 2009.

JEFF M. BRUDIE
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

..zS_

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of April, 2009, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 416
Spokane, WA 99201

__.:::: U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
_ _ Federal Express
_ _ Facsimile Transmission (509) 455-7111

James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

__::: U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission (208) 384-5844

CLERK OF THE COURT

JANET l 5-COUGH

By:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Deputy Clerk
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MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
Attorneys for Appellant Reed Taylor
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, VVA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
IN THE .DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual, who is
bringing this action on behalf of himself and
on behalf of the creditors and/or shareholders
ofAIA Services Corporation and AIA
Insurance, Inc.;

Case No.: CV-08-01765
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

Appellant,

v.
GARY O. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; HAVVLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAVVLEY LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X,
unknown individuals;
Res ondents.
TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, GARY D. BABBITT, D JOHN
ASHBY, PATRICK V. COLLINS, RICHARD A. RILEY, AND
HAVVLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAVVLEY LLP. AND THE PARTIES'
ATTORNEY JAMES D. LARUE, ELAM & BURKE, P.A., P.O. BOX
1539, BOISE, ID 83704; AND

TO:

THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1..

The above named Appellant Reed J. Taylor appeals against the above-

named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Order granting
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and denying Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint
entered in the above entitled action on the 23rd day of December, 2008, Opinion and
Order on Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs entered in the
above entitled action, and Judgment entered on April 24, 2009, the Honorable Jeff M.
Brudie presiding.
2.

Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

Judgments/Orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable Orders under and
pursuant to Rules 4 and l l(a)(l), I.A.R.
3.

A preliminary statement of issues

on appeal, which the Appellant intends

to assert in this appeal are as· follows ($eVeral of which.are issues of first impression);
provided, the following list ofissues is not exhaustive and Respondents should expect
others:
a. Did plaintiff state causes of action against attorneys for fraud,
breaches of :fiduciary duties, conversion, excessive compensation,
and/or tortious interference and/or causes of actions pertaining to
aiding and abetting and/or conspiracy· to assist others in the
commission of any of any ofthe foregoing causes of action.
b. Does the Litigation Privilege exist in Idaho and, if so, does it bar
claims against attorneys for fraud, constructive fraud, breaches of
fiduciary duties, conversion, excessive compensation, and tortious
interference and/or causes of action pertaining to aiding and
abetting and/or conspiracy to assist others in the commission of
any of the foregoing causes of action?
c. Does a plaintiff state a cause of action against an attorney for
conversion and other causes of action by alleging that the attorney
accepted payment for attorney's fees and costs from funds the
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
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attorney knew or should have known were funds in which the
plaintiff held a valid and perfected security interest?
d. Does a stock pledgee, who is also a secured creditor of the
revenues and all of the stock of the corporation, have standing to
pursue direct causes of actions against parties for claims owned by
the corporation? Does the same plaintiff have standing to pursue
derivative causes of action on behalf of the corporation?
e. Does a creditor of an insolvent corporation, who is also a secured
creditor of the revenues of the corporation, have standing to assert
direct causes of action against parties for claims owned by the
corporation? Does the same plaintiff have standing to pursue
derivative causes of actions on behalf of the corporation?
f. Are allegations that an attorney has exceeded his/her scope of

representation sufficientto.defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim based upon the Litigation Privilege?
g. Can an attorney represent corporate clients with diverging interests
when the representation was approved by persons with
director/officer conflicts of interest?
h. Does Idaho~s Consumer Protect Act bar a person from asserting
direct and derivative claims against an attorney, when the plaintiff
does not have privity of contract with the attorney, for violations of
Idaho's Consumer Protection Act?
i. In considering a motion to dismiss under l.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), is it

permissible for the district court to take judicial notice of an
entirely different case in toto and/or to consider documents which
are not in the record for that case?
j. Can a stock pledgee of all of the stock and revenues of a pledged
corporation assert direct and/or derivative causes of actions for
malpractice against an attorney?
k. Can a secured creditor, who is also the most significant creditor of

an insolvent corporation, assert direct and/or derivative claims for
malpractice against an attorney?

1. Can the district court judge, who is the same judge for two related
actions, consider privileged documents in granting a motion to
dismiss under IRCP 12(b)(6) without requiring production of the
documents to the other party?

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3
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m. If a party provides privileged documents to an expert and the
expert provides testimony through an affidavit relying on the
privileged documents for the experts testimony, has the attorneyclient privilege been waived and must the documents be produced
to the opposing party upon a motion to compel?
n. If Idaho adopts the Litigation Privilege defense for an attorney, can
the defense be asserted to dismiss an action pursuant to I.R.C.P.
12(b}(6) for actions taken by the attorney which the attorney
asserts were under the.scope of representation, when.such scope of
representation was purportedly agreed to by representatives from
the corporation client, when the attorney knows or should have
known that: (1) the representatives of the corporation have
conflicts of interest; (2) the board of directors of the corporation
client have conflicts of interest; (3) the corporation has not held an
annual shareholder meeting in years; (4) the purported scope of
representation was not in the best interests of at .least two
corporation clients with diverging interests; and (5) the scope of
representation was not in the best interests of each of the attorney's
three different clients.
o. Does an attorney owe a non-client any fiduciary duties, special
duties, and/or third-party beneficiary obligations when the attorney
knows or should have known (including, without limitation): (l)
that all of the shares and revenues of the corporation client the
attorney is purportedly representing are pledged as coliateral to the
non-<;lient and· another client is in default of the obligations which
trigger remedies pertaining to such security interests; (2) the nonclient has voted the shares appointing himself as the sole officer
and director of the. corporation client, and the corporation client is
being wrongfully managed by persons· breaching fiduciary duties
and not safeguarding assets; (3) the assets and funds are
insufficient to pay the secured creditor who voted the shares of the
corporation pledged. to him as collateral; (4) that milliQns of dollars
in assets and funds may-have been 'llfOftgmUy unlawfully
transferred from the corporation client by the very individuals
directing the litigation; and (5) the parent corporation of the
pledged corporation is also being represented by the attorney and
the same non-client is owed millions of dollars by the parent
corporation client who is highly insolvent?
p. Does a plaintiff have a constitutional right (whether under the
United States Constitution or the State of Idaho;s Constitution) to
obtain documents, prosecute causes of action and/or pursue causes
of action to protect and/or recover assets which are subject to a
security interest and/or pursue causes of actions action against
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4
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I,

attorneys relating to any one or more the foregoing?
q. Did the district court err in awarding attorneys' fees to Defendants.
pursuant to I.e. § 12-121. LC. § 30-1-746 and I.C. § 48-608(5),
when plaintiff's claims under each of the foregoing statutes
involved novel claims and/or issues of first impression, and
plaintiff asserted claims relating to security interests held by him
for property received by Defendants?
r. Can a district court award a defendant attorneys' fees pursuant to
I.C. § 30.. 1-746 when it found that the plaintiff was not entitled to
bring derivative actions as a stock pledgee and secured creditor of
an insolvent corporation under I.C. § 30-1-746, which does not
expressly prohibit a stock pledgee or secured creditor of an
insolvent corporation from pursuing derivative claims?
s. Can a district court award attorneys' fees to a defendant pursuant
to I.C. § 12-121 after plaintiff's complaint was dismissed pUrsuant
to Rule 12(J:>)(6) based in part upon the district court adopting the
"Litigation Privilege" as a first impression defense?
t.

Can a district court find that a plaintiff pursued an action
frivolously when the plaintiff is a secured creditor who pursues
claims against attorneys who have received payment for services
from funds subject to valid and perfected security· interests and/or
the proceeds of such valid and perfected security interests?

u. Can a district court make findings of facts that attorney defendants
did not violate any rules of professional conduct in an action
dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) when the facts alleged in
plaintiffs complaint state that the attorneys violated rules of
professional conduct?

4.

There has not been an Order sealing all or any portion of this record.

5.

A reporter's transcript is not requested.

6.

Appellant requests the following documents be included in the clerk's

record, in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.:

a. This Notice of Appeal;
b. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss;
c. Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss;
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5
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d. Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss;
e. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint (including
the attached proposed First Amended Complaint);

f. Defendants' Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to
Amend Complaint; aaEl
g. Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint;
h. Defendants' Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees;
1.

Defendants' Brief in Support of Costs and Attorney's Fees;

j. Affidavit of James LaRue in Sup,port of Memorandum Costs and
Attorneys' Fees;

k PlaintiffReedJ. Taylor's Motion to Disallow Defendants' Reguest
for Attorneys' Fees and Costs;

1. Affidavit of Michael S. Bissell in Sup,port of Plaintiff Reed J.
Taylor's Motion to Disallow Defendants' Request for Attorney's
Fees and Costs;
m. Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend
Memorandum of Costs and Attorn.eysf Fees;

Defendants'

n. Defendants' Brief in Sup,port of Motion for Leave to Am.end
Defend.ants' Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees;
o. Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion to
Disallow Fees and Costs;
p. Defendants' Memorandum in Response to Reed Taylor's Motion
to Disallow Reguest for Attorney's Fees and Costs;
q. Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend
Memorandum of Costs and Fees;
r. Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion to
Disallow Fees and Costs;
s. Defendants' Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend
Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees;

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 6
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t.

Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney
Fees and Costs; and

u. Judgment.

7.

I certify that:

a A copy of this notice of appeal has not been served on a reporter
because a transcript has not been requested.
b. The clerk of the district court has not been paid any fee for
preparing a transcript because a transcript has not been requested.
c. The estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been
paid.
d. The appellate filing fee has been paid.
e. Service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20.
DATED this 15th day of May, 2009.
CAMPBELL, BISSELL

RBYPLLC

By:.~"'-IC.4JC.~~~~~~~~~
Michae . Bissell
Attorneys for Appellant Reed Taylor
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of May, 2009, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of Appellant's Amended Notice of Appeal to the following:

- - HAND DELIVERY
U.S.MAIL
- - OVERNIGHT
MAIL
---,--,,-~FAX TRANSMISSION
__}{__EMAIL (.pdf attachment)

James D. LaR.ue
Elam & Burke, PA
P.0. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83704

Michael S. Bissell
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James D. LaRue, ISB #1780
Loren C. Ipsen, ISB #1767
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
E & B File No. 7082-0013

JAN I .5 2010
J~ CAVtD NAVARRo. as.t

l'I MfHV J. BEHL
lllVrY

Attorneys for Defendants, Richard A. Riley
and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; ROBERT M.
TURNBOW, an individual; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

Case No. CV-OC-0918868
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS RICHARD A. RILEY'S
AND HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS &
HAWLEY LLP'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.
Defendants Richard A. Riley ("Riley") and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawley
Troxell"), by and through their counsel of record, Elam & Burke, P.A., hereby submit the following
memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's complaint
with prejudice.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD A. RILEY'S AND HAWLEY
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
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INTRODUCTION
In this case the plaintiff, Reed J. Taylor, seeks to re-litigate against defendants Riley and
Hawley Troxell issues he has already litigated and lost in the District Court of the Second Judicial
District of the State ofldaho, Nez Perce County. His complaint is barred by resjudicata. A number
of other grounds also exist for entering summary judgment against the plaintiff.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
Summary judgment shall be "rendered forthwith ifthe pleadings, depositions, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." First Sec. Bank ofIdaho,

NA. v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 790, 964 P .2d 654, 657 (1998). An adverse party may not simply
rely upon mere allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth in affidavits specific facts showing
there is a genuine issue for trial. Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227
(1994). The affidavits either supporting or opposing the motion must set forth facts that would be
admissible in evidence and show that the affiant is competent to testify. Id.; I.R.C.P. 56(e).
To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party's case must be anchored
in something more than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine
issue. Zimmerman v. Volkswagon ofAmerica, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 854, 920 P.2d 67, 69 (1996).
The moving party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law" if the nonmoving party fails to make
a sufficient showing on an essential element of his case with respect to which he has the burden of
proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD A. RILEY'S AND HAWLEY
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Reed J. Taylor1 was the founder and, prior to 1995, the majority shareholder of AIA Services
Corporation ("AIA"), an Idaho corporation, headquartered in Lewiston, Idaho. AIA is and was the
parent company of AIA Insurance, Inc. ("AIA Insurance"); that is, all the stock of AIA insurance is
and was owned by AIA. In 1995 Mr. Taylor was serving as the president of AIA and was chairman
of its board of directors. (Riley Affidavit, ~ 4)
On July 22, 1995, Mr. Taylor and AIA entered into a written agreement (the "1995 Stock
Redemption Agreement") pursuant to which AIA agreed to redeem all 613,494 ofhis shares of the
common stock of AIA. Under the terms of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, he was to
receive, among other things, (a) $1,500,000 at closing (converted into a promissory note by the
Addendum to the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement); (b) $6,000,000 plus interest payable pursuant
to the terms of a promissory note (the "$6MM Note"); (c) elimination of certain debts he owed to
AIA; and (d) title to certain airplanes. (Riley Affidavit, Exhibit A)
In connection with the redemption of Mr. Taylor's stock, AIA was represented by the Boise
law firm of Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered ("Eberle Berlin"). (Riley
Affidavit,~~

3-4) Mr. Taylor was represented by separate counsel of his choosing, namely Scott

T. Bell and N. Frank Taylor of Caimcross & Hempelmann, 701h Floor, Columbia Center, 701 Fifth
A venue, Seattle, Washington. (Riley Affidavit, ~ 4) Additionally, he engaged the services of an
independent accountant, Ernie Dantini. (Riley Affidavit,~ 4) Eberle Berlin rendered an opinion
1

After Reed J. Taylor sold his stock in AIA, his brother R. John Taylor succeeded him as president of the
corporation. The relationship between the brothers deteriorated, and Reed J. Taylor sued R. John Taylor among
other parties. In order to avoid confusion, all references in this brief to "Mr. Taylor'' refer to Reed J.Taylor unless
the context clearly indicates otherwise.
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letter (the "1995 Opinion Letter") dated August 15, 1995, relating to the 1995 Stock Redemption
Agreement. 2 (Riley Affidavit, ii ii 3-4) Mr. Riley participated in drafting and preparing the 1995
Stock Redemption Agreement and other documents relating to the transaction (the "Transaction
Documents") and the 1995 Opinion Letter. (Riley Affidavit ii ii 3-4)
AIA defaulted almost immediately in the payment of the $6MM Note. The parties entered
into further negotiations regarding the redemption of Mr. Taylor's stock, which eventuated in
restructuring the transaction. The 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement was superseded by a Stock
Redemption Restructure Agreement dated July 1, 1996 (the "1996 Restructure Agreement"), which
stated that, with the exception of the $6MM Note, all prior documents "are of no further force and
effect." (Riley Affidavit,

ii ii 5-7) Eberle Berlin represented AIA in preparing and drafting the

documents in 1996, and Mr. Taylor was again represented by Caimcross & Hempelmann

No

opinion was issued regarding the 1996 Restructure Agreement. (Riley Affidavit, ii 8)
Mr. Taylor alleges that AIA soon defaulted in the performance of the 1996 Restructure
Agreement. 3

When the $6MM Note matured on August 1, 2005, AIA was unable to pay the

balance. (Babbitt Affidavit,

ii 5) Mr. Taylor filed suit on January 29, 2007, against AIA, AIA

2

Eberle Berlin opined in the 1995 Opinion Letter that, "The Transaction Documents constitute the valid
and binding obligation of the Company and its Subsidiaries enforceable against them in accordance with their
respective terms, except that enforceability may be limited by (a) applicable bankruptcy, insolvency, moratorium,
reorganization, fraudulent transfer, receivership, conservatorship or similar laws affecting creditor's rights generally,
(b) the exercise of judicial discretion in accordance with general principles of equity (whether applied by a court of
law or equity), and (c) considerations of public policy." Eberle Berlin further opined that, to the best their
knowledge, the execution and delivery of the Transactions Documents would not "violate any law, rule, license,
regulation, judgment, order, ruling, or decree, including any insurance laws or regulations of any jurisdiction to
which Company or any of its Subsidiaries are subject, governing or affecting the operation of Company or its
Subsidiaries in any material respect."
3

Mr. Taylor alleges that AIA never performed its covenants under the 1996 Restructure Agreement. See
Fifth Amended Complaint in AIA litigation, ml 2.18, 2.19, 2.21, 2.24, 2.26 and 2.28. (Babbitt Affidavit, Exhibit E)
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Insurance and several officers, directors and employees of AIA and their spouses. 4
Affidavit,~~ 3-5)

(Babbitt

Shortly after filing suit, Mr. Taylor attempted unsuccessfully to exercise self-help

but was thwarted by law enforcement. 5
Michael E. McNichols of Clements, Brown & McNichols initially appeared in behalf ofAIA,
AIA Insurance and R. John Taylor. Mr. McNichols withdrew from representation of AIA and AIA
Insurance, and Hawley Troxell substituted in as defense counsel in the AIA litigation for those two
companies. Mr. McNichols continued as defense counsel for R. John Taylor in the AIA litigation. 6
Mr. Riley left Eberle Berlin and joined Hawley Troxell on March 1, 1999. (Riley Affidavit, ~ 9)
He has been a member of Hawley Troxell firm since 1999 and has communicated from time to time
with other members of the firm regarding the AIA litigation. (Riley Affidavit,~ 10) As one of their
defenses in the AIA litigation, the defendants raised the issue that AIA did not have sufficient
surplus to redeem Mr. Taylor's common stock in AIA The defendants argued that the purported
redemption of Mr. Taylor's stock was in violation ofldaho Code § 30-1-46, as it was in effect prior
to 1997, which restricted a corporation from purchasing its own stock when it lacks earned surplus.
It was contended the transaction was therefore illegal and the $6MM Note was unenforceable.

(Babbitt Affidavit, ~ ~ 6-8)

4

The lawsuit, which will be referred to as the "AJA litigation," was filed as Case No. CV 07-00208 in the
District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State ofldaho, Nez Perce County. Included among the
defendants were Reed J. Taylor's brother, R. John Taylor, along with Connie Taylor, Brian Freeman, Jolee Duclos,
James Beck and Corrine Beck. (Babbitt Affidavit, Exhibit E)
5

Reed Taylor and accomplices were discovered by Lewiston police at 3:00 o'clock a.m. trying to break
into the offices of AJA. (Babbitt Affidavit, Exhibit A)
6

Babbit Affidavit, ii 3.
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In June 2009 the District Court granted defendants' partial summary judgment motions. The
Court found that, although none of the defendants had standing to raise the illegality issue, the Court
had a duty to raise and address the issue sua sponte. The Court held that the redemption of Mr.
Taylor's stock was illegal and unenforceable and, therefore, granted partial summary judgment in
favor of the defendants. (Babbitt Affidavit, ~ 9) Mr. Taylor moved for reconsideration, which
motion was denied. (Babbitt Affidavit,

~

10) The District Court certified the matter as final for

purposes of Rule 54(b), and Mr. Taylor filed an appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, which is
pending. 7 (Riley Affidavit, ~ 9)
While the AIA litigation was ongoing in the District Court, Reed Taylor filed suit against Mr.
McNichols and the Clements Brown law firm in District Court in Nez Perce County8 and a similar
but separate lawsuit against Hawley Troxell and four of its attorneys, including Mr. Riley. 9 Those
suits alleged conversion, breach of fiduciary duties, tortious interference with contract, malpractice,
violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, and aiding, abetting and conspiring with others in
the commission of tortious acts. (Riley Affidavit,~ 11, Exhibit G) The complaints in those actions
bear a striking resemblance to the complaint in the case at bar.
In response to Rule 12(b)(6) motions filed by the defendants, the District Court in Nez Perce
County held that Mr. Taylor's complaints failed to state a cause of action and dismissed with

7

Taylor v. AIA Services Corporation et al., Docket No. 36916-2009, Idaho Supreme Court.

8

Taylor v. McNichols, et al., Case No. CV 08-01763, in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, Nez Perce County (hereinafter the "McNichols Lawsuit").
9

Taylor v. Babbitt, et al., Case No. CV 08-01765, in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, Nez Perce County (hereinafter the "Hawley Troxell Lawsuit No. l ").
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prejudice both the McNichols Lawsuit and Hawley Troxell Lawsuit No. 1. (Riley Affidavit,~~ 1314) Mr. Taylor moved to amend his complaint to bring claims of fraud against Mr. Riley and others,
but that motion was denied by the District Court. (Riley Affidavit,~ 13-14) The District Court
awarded attorneys fees against Reed Taylor pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 because his claims
were brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation. (Riley Affidavit, ~ ~
15-17) Mr. Taylor appealed. This appeal is also pending before the Idaho Supreme Court. 10 (Riley
Affidavit, ~ 18)
Seeking yet another bite of the apple, Mr. Taylor filed the present action against Hawley
Troxell and Mr. Riley. Defendants have moved for summary judgment, primarily upon the ground
of res judicata, because the issues are the same as were raised or could have been raised in the
Hawley Troxell Lawsuit No .1. For the sake of completeness, other grounds which entitle defendants
to summary judgment are addressed.

PLAINTIFF'S ENTIRE COMPLAINT IS BARRED BY RES JUD/CATA
Mr. Taylor's attempt to re-litigate the same issues, or those which could have been litigated,
against the same defendants in Hawley Troxell Lawsuit No. 1 is barred by the doctrine of res

judicata. "Res judicata prevents the same plaintiff from bringing multiple lawsuits against the same
defendant for actions arising from the same event." Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d

10

Taylor v. McNichols et al. and Taylor v. Babbitt et al., Consolidated Docket Nos. 36130-2009 and
36131-2009, Idaho Supreme Court.
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803, 805 (2002). The doctrine is comprised of claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue
preclusion (collateral estoppel). 11 Under principles of claim preclusion, a valid final judgment
rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action
between the same parties upon the same claim.
The three fundamental purposes served by res judicata are:
First, it "[preserves] the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against the
corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same matter were twice litigated to
inconsistent results." Second, it serves the public interest in protecting the courts
against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and third, it advances the private interest
in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims.

Aldape at 257, 668 P.2d at 133 (citation omitted).
The doctrine of res judicata is but a manifestation of the recognition that endless
litigation leads to confusion or chaos. The doctrine reflects the refusal of the law to
tolerate a multiplicity of, or needless, litigation and is based on the worthy premise
that the interest of proper administration of justice is best served by limiting parties
to one fair trial of an issue or cause. It rests upon the ground that the party to be
affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated, or had an
opportunity to litigate, the same matter in a former action in a Court of competent
jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again to the harassment and
vexation of his opponent.

Erickson v. Amoth, 105 Idaho 798, 800, 105 P.2d 398, 400 (1983).
"The doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent relitigation of a claim previously
asserted, but also subsequent relitigation ofany claims relating to the same cause ofaction which

11

"Although the literal definition of the term 'res judicata' is expansive enough to cover both preclusion of
relitigation of the same cause of action and re litigation of the same issue, the modem tendency is to refer to the
aspect of the doctrine that precludes relitigation of the same issue in a separate cause of action as 'collateral
estoppel' and to refer to that aspect preventing relitigation of the same cause of action as 'res judicata.' See 46
Am.Jur.2dJudgments §516 (1994)." Rodriguez v. Department of Correction, 136 Idaho 90, 92, 29 P.3d 401, 403
(2001).
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were actually made or which might have been made." Hindmarsh at 94, 57 P .3d at 805 (emphasis
added). 12
Idaho has adopted the "transactional approach" to res judicata. U.S. Bank Nat 'l. Ass 'n. v.

Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222, 226, 999 P .2d 877, 881 (2000). This means that the courts are not limited
to examining whether the subsequent case is based upon the same cause of action or legal theory as
the prior litigation. Rather, "[w ]hen a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes
the plaintiffs claim . . . the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies
against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction . . . out of which the action
arose." Nash v. Overholser, 114 Idaho 461, 464, 757 P.2d 1180, 1183 (1988), quoting with approval

Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho at 258-59, 668 P.2d 15 134-35. 13

12

"(A] valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes all claims arising out of the same
transaction or series of transactions out of which the cause of action arose." Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc, 119
Idaho 146, 150, 804 P.2d 319, 323 (1990). Resjudicata bars not only subsequent relitigation of a claim previously
asserted, but also relitigation of any claims relating to the same cause of action which were actually made or which
might have been made. Wing v. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912 915-16, 684 P.2d 314, 317-18 (Ct.App. 1984) ("[T]he rule
against splitting a claim applies even though the remedies or forms of relief demanded in one suit are different from
those demanded in another."); Farmers Nat. Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63,70, 878 P.2d 762, 769 (1994) ("It is 'well
established' in Idaho law that 'in an action between the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the former
adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the
claim but also every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit."); C Systems, Inc. v. McGee,
145 Idaho 559, 181P.3d485, 488 (2008) ("[A] valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes all
claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions out of which the claim arose."); Joyce v. Murphy
Land & Irrigation Co., 35 Idaho 549, 553, 208 P. 241, 142-43 (1922) ("We think the correct rule to be that in an
action between the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes parties and
privies not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim but also as to every matter
which might and should have been litigated in the first suit.").
13

"[D]ismissal for failure to state a claim precludes a second action that presents the same claim through a
better complaint." C. Wright, A Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §4439, at 358 (1981). See
also Mervin v. FTC, 591 F.2d 821, 830-31 (D.C.Cir. 1978), holding that dismissal of a prior action for failure to
state a cause of action operates to bar a second action ("This was an adjudication on the merits having full res
judicata effect.); Mirin v. Nevada, 547 F.2d 91, 94 (91h Cir. 1976), cert.den. 432 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct 2952, 53 L.Ed.2d
1079, holding that dismissal of a prior action for failure to state a cause of action "operates as an absolute bar to a
second suit between the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action not only in respect of every
matter actually litigated, but also as to every ground ofrecovery or defense which might have been presented.";
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Comment d to § 24 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (1982) explains
the effect of res judicata as follows:
Having been defeated on the merits in one action, a plaintiff sometimes attempts
another action seeking the same or approximately the same relief but adducing a
different substantive law premise or ground. This does not constitute the
presentation of a new claim when the new premise or ground is related to the same
transaction or series oftransactions, and accordingly the second action should be held
barred.
In Farmers Nat. Bankv. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 878 P.2d 762 (1994), the Idaho Supreme Court
discussed the three elements required for application of the doctrine of res judicata as set out in

Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho434, 437, 849P.2d107,110(1993): (!)identity
of parties, (2) identity of subject matter, and (3) finality of judgment.
Identity of parties refers to the rule that the same party or those in privity with such party may
not relitigate claims already litigated. As to Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell, the same parties are
involved in the case at bar as in Hawley Troxell Lawsuit No. I in Nez Perce County.
Identity of subject matter means that the claims in both actions must arise out of the same
transaction or series oftransactions. "The 'sameness' of a cause of action for purposes of application
of the doctrine of res judicata is determined by examining the operative facts underlying the two
lawsuits." Diamond at 149, 804 P.2d at 322. The underlying transaction or series of transactions
in Hawley Troxell Lawsuit No.I included the redemption of Mr. Taylor's stock and subsequent

Carter v. Money Tree Co., 532 F.2d 113 (8 1h Cir. 1976) cert den. 426 U.S. 925, 96 S.Ct. 2636, 49 L.Ed.2d 380 ("A
dismissal for failure to state a claim is res judicata as to the then existing claim which plaintiff was attempting to
state ... If, upon dismissal of the complaint, the plaintiff seeks leave to file an amended complaint and such leave
is denied with prejudice, the denial is res judicata as to any claim made by plaintiff in that amended complaint."
(emphasis added); Hubicki v. ACF Indus., Inc., 484 F2d 519, 523 (3'd Cir. 1973) ("[A] Rule 12(b)(6) motion raises
matters in bar and results in a judgment on the merits.").
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corporate actions. In paragraph 53 of his Complaint for Damages in Hawley Troxell Litigation No.
1, Mr. Taylor specifically raised the same issues he is now alleging with respect to the 1995 Stock
Redemption Agreement and the 1995 Opinion Letter. 14 Consequently, the requisite identity of
subject matter is present.
Finality of judgment refers to a final adjudication or judicial order or decree that ends the
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. In re

Landmark Hotel & Casino, Inc., 872 F.2d 857, 860 (91h Cir. 1989). "To qualify for preclusion, a
judgment must be valid, final, and on the merits." C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal

Practice and Procedure §4432, at 298 (1981). 15
"Traditionally, finality was identified for purposes of preclusion in much the same way as
it was identified for purposes of appeal." Id. at 298-99. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS (1981) § 13, Comment b. "[T]he preclusive effects of a lower court judgment cannot
be suspended simply by taking an appeal that remains undecided." Id., §4433, at 305. "The bare act
of taking an appeal is no more effective to defeat preclusion than a failure to appeal. The established

14

In pertinent part, if 53 alleges, "Defendant Richard A. Riley represented AIA Services Corporation in the
redemption of Reed J. Taylor's shares and the drafting of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement and
other applicable agreements. Defendants were responsible for issuing opinion letters relating to the transaction,
which include various applicable representations and warranties. Defendants are now asserting arguments counter to
the representations made in the opinion letter drafted by Defendants and by and through Defendant Richard A.
Riley."
15

See also Kootenai Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. The Lamar Corporation, 2009 WL 3153077*4 (Oct. 2,
2009), "Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim or upon claims
'relating to the same cause of action . . . which might have been made.' Ticor Title, 144 Idaho at 123, 157 P.3d at
617 (quoting Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002)). There are three requirements for
claim preclusion to bar a subsequent action: (1) same parties, (2) same claim, and (3) fmaljudgment. Ticor Title,
144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d at 618. Additionally, this Court has interpreted claim preclusion to hinge on whether the
matter 'might and should have been litigated in the same suit.'" Id. at 126, 157 P.3d at 620."
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rule in the federal courts is that a final judgment retains all of its res judicata consequences pending
decision of the appeal apart from the virtually nonexistent situation in which the 'appeal' actually
involves a trial de novo." Id., §4433, at 308. 16
In Gilbert v. State, 119 Idaho 684, 686, 809 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Ct.App. 1991), reh. den. May
22, 1991, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated:
Recently, our Supreme Court noted that it is appropriate to look to relevant sections
ofRESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS (SECOND) (1982) for guidance in deciding
questions concerning res judicata. Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., l 19 Idaho 146,
804 P .2d 319 (1990). The Restatement at§ 13, comment f, takes the position that the
pendency of an appeal should not deprive a judgment of res judicata effect.
However, the Court of Appeals held it was not necessary to determine in Gilbert whether the
Restatement rule should be adopted in Idaho because the plaintiffs appeal in that case had been
dismissed for failure to prosecute. To the best of undersigned counsels' knowledge, the issue of
whether a judgment of the trial court is res judicata notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal has
never been squarely decided in Idaho. The Restatement rule that a final judgment of the trial court
retains all of its res judicata consequences notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal should be

16

Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499, 24 S.Ct. 154, 48 L.Ed. 276 (1903); Tripati v. Henman, 857
F.2d 1366, 1367 (9th Cir. 1988) ("'The established rule in the federal courts is that a final judgment retains all of its
res judicata consequences pending decision of the appeal. ... ' * * * To deny preclusion in these circumstances
would lead to an absurd result: Litigants would be able to refile identical cases while appeals are pending, enmeshing
their opponents and the court system in tangles of duplicative litigation."); Hawkins v. Risley, 984 F.2d 321, 324 (9th
Cir. 1993) (" '[I]n federal courts ... the preclusive effect of a lower court judgment cannot be suspended simply by
taking an appeal that remains undecided.'"); Raitport v. Commercial Banks Located Within This District, 391
F .Supp. 584, 586 ( 1975) ("[P]endency of an appeal does not detract from the finality of the judgment."); Prager v.
El Paso Nat. Bank, 417 F .2d 1111, 1112 ( 1969) ("The fact that the judgment is now on appeal ... [where it remains
undecided] has no effect on its absolute effect as a bar."; Nixon v. Richey, 513 F.2d 430, 438 n.75 (D.C.Cir. 1975)
("The federal rule is that pendency of an appeal does not suspend the operation of a final judgment for purposes of
collateral estoppel, except where appellate review constitutes a trial de novo."); Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park
Dist., 557 F.2d 580, 595 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.den. 439 U.S. 1090, 99 S.Ct. 873, 59 L.Ed.2d 57, holding that the
pendency of an appeal does not defeat preclusion.
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applied in the present case. To hold otherwise would open the door to much mischief and risk the
possibility that different courts would enter inconsistent decisions on the same issues. This Court
should not allow itself to be put in the position of second guessing the District Court of the Second
Judicial District or the Idaho Supreme Court. It should be held that the present case is barred by res
judicata, notwithstanding the pendency of Mr. Taylor's appeal of the decision of the District Court
of the Second Judicial District dismissing his lawsuit against Hawley Troxell and Mr. Riley. 17

PLAINTIFF'S FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD OR
CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD IS BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
Plaintiff alleges that the 1995 Opinion Letter prepared by Eberle Berlin contained erroneous
statements constituting actionable fraud. However, this contention was raised by plaintiff in prior
litigation and rejected. Plaintiff is barred by collateral estoppel from again raising the same issue
in the hope he will be able to achieve a better result from his standpoint in another forum.
Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, prevents litigants from re-litigating the
identical issue with the same party or its privy. Ticor Title v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d
613, 617 (2007).
Five factors are required to bar relitigation of an issue determined in a prior
proceeding: (1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the present action; (2) the issue
decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present
action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior
litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5)
the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to
the litigation.

17

Even if Mr. Taylor's fraud claim were not barred by issue preclusion, it fails to state a claim for the same
reason articulated by Judge Brudie - the 1995 Opinion Letter contains statements of opinion, not fact, that cannot
form the basis for fraud. See infra.
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Kootenai Electric Cooperative v. Lamar, 2009 WL 3153077*4 (Idaho 2009).
In the course of his multifarious litigation, Mr. Taylor has already raised and litigated the
issue of alleged fraud in connection with the 1995 Opinion Letter.

Mr. Taylor's fraud theory

relating to the 1995 Opinion Letter was soundly rejected by the Court in the AIA litigation:
Plaintiff's fourth argument for the enforceability of the agreement is a claim
of constructive fraud. Plaintiff bases his claim on the opinion letter from corporate
counsel stating that, to the best of counsel's knowledge, the stock redemption
agreement violated no laws or regulations and on the representations of John Taylor
as a corporate director that no laws or regulations were violated by the agreement.
To prove fraud, including constructive fraud, a claimant must show a false statement
of fact on which the hearer relied. Country Cove Development Inc. v. May, 143
Idaho 595, 150 P.3d 288 (2006). The statements by corporate counsel and others
that the stock redemption agreement did not violate any laws or regulations were
offered as opinion, not fact. "Opinions and predictions cannot form the basis of a
fraud claim because they do not speak to matters of fact." Id. at 601. Counsel for
AIA expressed an opinion that no statute was violated by the stock redemption
agreement, an opinion currently postulated to the Court by Plaintiff. Such an opinion
was no more a statement of fact when expressed by corporate counsel in 1995 than
it is now when asserted by Plaintiff. It is, simply, an opinion based on one's
interpretation oflaw and cannot form the basis of a fraud claim. 18
Mr. Riley was not a party to the AIA litigation. However, as a member of the defense firm
in the AIA litigation, he was in privity with his client, AIA. See Weinberger v. Tucker, 510 F .3d 486
(2007) (applying Virginia law); Jaye/ Corporation v. Cochran, 366 Ark. 175, 234 S.W.3d 278
(2006); DeLisle v. Avallone, 117 N.M. 602, 874 P.2d 1266 (1994); A.I. Credit Corp. v. Aguilar &

Sebastinel/i, 113 Cal.App.4th 1072, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 813 (1988) (describing the circumstances in which
attorney and client are in privity for purposes of collateral estoppel). The same counsel who represent

18

Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of Court's Grant of
Partial Summary Judgment; Clarification ofRuling on Motions to Strike; Alternative Motion for Rule 54(b)
Certification; Motion for Order to Protect Property and for Stay, Case No. CV 07-00208, in the District Court of
the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for Nez Perce County, p. 6. (Babbitt Affidavit , Exhibit K)
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Mr. Taylor in the present case represented him in the AJA litigation and raised the same claims of
fraud which Mr. Taylor now seeks to assert in the present litigation. Having had full opportunity to
litigate those issues in the AJA litigation, Mr. Taylor cannot attempt to re-litigate them. Mr. Riley's
actions as one of the preparers of the 1995 Opinion Letter were under scrutiny by the Court in the
AIA litigation, and the Court expressly found that such actions did not constitute fraud. Collateral
estoppel bars his attempt to assert fraud and constructive fraud against Mr. Riley.

PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT IS BARRED
BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATION
A.

Plaintiff's Cause of Action for Professional Malpractice Is Barred by I.C. § 5-219(4).
Plaintiffs second cause of action, professional malpractice, is asserted against Messrs.

Turnbow and Riley and Eberle Berlin, but not Hawley Troxell. 19 Plaintiff conveniently fails to
mention that the 1995 Opinion Letter was penned approximately 14 years ago. Plaintiffs cause of
action for legal malpractice is barred by the 2-year statute oflimitation contained in Idaho Code §5219(4).

That statute defines "professional malpractice" as "wrongful acts or omissions in the

performance of professional services by any person, firm, association, entity or corporation licensed
to perform such services under the law of the state ofldaho." I.C. § 5-219(4). 20

19

Paragraph 45 of the Complaint alleges that, "Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Tumbow's acts
constitute negligence, malpractice, negligence and/or negligent issuance of an opinion letter; and such acts, conduct
and/or omissions have directly and/or proximately damaged Reed Taylor, in an amount to be proven at trial."
20

The gravamen of the action is malpractice, regardless of the label put on it by the plaintiff. See Nerco
Minerals Company v. Morrison Knudson Corporation, 140 Idaho 144, 148, 90 P.3d 894, 898 (2004), where the
Court stated, "In Lapham, this Court stated that the focus of a professional malpractice claim under J.C.§ 5-219(4) is
'whether the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred in the course of performing professional services.' Lapham,
137 Idaho at 589, 51 P.3d at 403. Put differently, the 'appropriate statute oflimitations is determined by the
substance, not the form, of the action.' Trimming v. Howard, 52 Idaho 412, 416, 16 P.2d 661, 662 (1932)."
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A cause of action for professional malpractice accrues and the statute oflimitation begins to
run when the plaintiff sustains "some damage." Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 542, 808 P .2d
876, 879 (1991). 21 In the present case, some damage occurred when AIA was unable to pay the
balance of the purchase price on August 1, 2005, at the latest. 22

At that point Mr. Taylor

indisputably sustained some damage and his cause of action for professional malpractice accrued. 23
There is no discovery exception to the statute of limitation for professional malpractice. "In
accordance with the legislature's rejection of a discovery rule, the statute begins to run when there
is 'some damage,' not when the party claiming malpractice discovers the damage." Elliott v.

Parsons, 128 Idaho 723, 725, 918 P.2d 592, 594 (1996). The statutory limitation period will not be
extended due to any continuing consequences, resulting damages, or continuing professional
relationship. Fairway Development Co. v. Petersen, Moss, Olsen, Meacham & Carr, 124 Idaho
866, 868, 865 P .2d 957, 959 ( 1993). The Idaho courts apply an "objectively ascertainable damage"

21

"This Court has dealt with the question of professional malpractice in a number of recent cases. These
cases point out that while LC.§ 5-219(4) provides that 'the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued as of the
time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of ... , ' nevertheless until some damage occurs no cause of
action accrues for professional malpractice, even though the 'occurrence, act or omission complained of,' which
ultimately causes the damages has occurred earlier." Treasure Valley Bank v. Killen & Pittenger, P.A., 112 Idaho
357, 359, 732 P.2d 326, 328 (1987), citing Mack Financial Corp. v. Smith, 111 Idaho 8, 720 P.2d 191 (1986); Streib
v. Veigel, 109 Idaho 174, 706 P.2d 63 (1985); Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 698 P.2d 315 (1985); Stephens v.
Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 (1984).
22

While Mr. Taylor avoids specifying the dates of performance defaults, there can be no dispute that the
$6MM Note was not paid when it matured on August I, 2005.
23

Mr. Taylor sustained some damage when he signed the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and gave up
his AJA shares and control over AJA. As he himself bewailed, "Almost 14 years have gone by since I sold my
shares in AJA Services in 1995. John Taylor, James Beck, and Michael Cashman have controlled AJA services since
my shares were redeemed in 1995 and there is nothing that can be done to replace the lost time. I have been
deprived of my right to request to have my shares returned because over 13 years have transpired and AJA Services
business has been substantially depleted under the management of John Taylor." Affidavit of Reed J. Taylor if 7,
dated April 9, 2009, in AJA litigation. (Babbitt Affidavit, Exhibit A)
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rule to all actions for professional malpractice. "[A]n action for professional malpractice shall be
deemed to have accrued for the purposes ofl.C. § 5-219(4) only when there is objective proof that
would support the existence of some actual damage." Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 Idaho 482, 487, 835
P.2d 1293, 1298 (1992).
The only statutory bases for extending the statute oflimitation for professional malpractice
are the foreign object and fraudulent concealment exceptions. 24 An action within the fraudulent
concealment exception must be commenced within the later of two years from the occurrence, act
or omission complained of or one year following the date the "injured party knows or in the exercise
of reasonable care should have been put on inquiry regarding the condition or matter complained
of .... " 1.C. § 5-219(4).
The one-year fraudulent concealment exception does not avail plaintiff for at least three
reasons: (1) Mr. Riley did not stand in a professional or commercial relationship with Mr. Taylor.
Rather, Mr. Riley represented AIA; Mr. Taylor was represented by his own attorneys. (2) The fact
of damage was not concealed from plaintiff. He was damaged as soon as AIA defaulted. (3) In any
event, the issue of the illegality of the stock redemption was raised in the AIA litigation as early as
April 16, 2008, when defendants Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck filed an answer
which alleged that the stock redemption agreement between Reed Taylor and AIA was void and
illegal because AIA lacked sufficient surplus to redeem its stock. (Babbitt Affidavit, ~ ~ 6-7) On
April 21, 2008, Hawley Troxell as counsel for AIA moved to amend AIA' s answer to raise the same

24

Fraudulent concealment for this purpose is defined in Idaho Code§ 5-219(4) as "[W]hen the fact of
damage has, for the purpose of escaping responsibility therefor, been fraudulently and knowingly concealed from the
injured party by an alleged wrongdoer standing at the time of the wrongful act, neglect or breach in a professional or
commercial relationship with the injured party.... "

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD A. RILEY'S AND HAWLEY
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 17
G:\7082\0013\HTEH - #2\Pleadings - HTEH #2\Motion for Summaty Judgment\Briefin Support of Motion for Summaty Judgment ver_09.wpd

000801

affirmative defense. (Babbitt Affidavit~ 7) By any measure, Mr. Taylor not only suffered monetary
damages but was apprised ofthe illegality issue within the statutory period ofldaho Code§ 5-219(4);

i.e., more than one year before filing this action. His cause of action for professional malpractice
against Mr. Riley is barred by the statute oflimitation.

B.

Plaintiff's Cause of Action of Alleged Violation of the ICPA Is Barred by I.C. § 48-619.
Plaintiffs third cause of action alleges that Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell violated the Idaho

Consumer Protection Act, Idaho Code§§ 48-601through48-619 (2003) (hereinafter the "ICPA").
Among other infirmities, plaintiffs third cause of action fails because it is time-barred. Idaho Code
§ 48-618 provides that, "No private cause of action may be brought under this act (the ICP A) more
than two (2) years after the cause of action accrues." The cause of action for alleged violation of the
ICPA accrued as early as 1995, but in any event not later than August 1, 2005, when the plaintiff
suffered "some damage." His cause of action for alleged violation of the ICP A is barred by Idaho
Code§ 48-619.

C.

Plaintiff's Cause of Action for Fraud is Barred by I.C. § 5-218(4).
Plaintiffs fifth cause of action, fraud and constructive fraud, is asserted against defendants

Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin, but not Hawley Troxell. The statute of limitation for fraud or
mistake is three years. I.C. § 5-218(4). There is a discovery exception. "The cause of action in such
case [is] not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts
constituting the fraud or mistake." I.C. § 5-218(4). An objective test is applied to determine when
a reasonable person should have discovered the facts constituting the alleged fraud.
A three-year statute of limitation for fraud is established by I.C. § 5-218(4). The
statute does not begin to run until the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have
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known of the facts constituting the fraud. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 820 P.2d
360 (1991). Application of LC.§ 5-218(4) does not depend on when the plaintiff
should have been aware that something was wrong; as used in the statute,
"discovery'' means the point in time when the plaintiff had actual or constructive
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud. McCoy, 120 Idaho at 773, 820 P.2d at
368. Actual knowledge will be inferred ifthe allegedly aggrieved party could have
discovered the fraud by the exercise of due diligence. Nancy Lee Mines, Inc. v.
Harrison, 95 Idaho 546, 547, 511P.2d828, 829 (1973); Gerlach v. Schultz, 72 Idaho
507, 514, 244 P.2d 1095, 1099 (1952); Mason v. Tucker and Associates, 125 Idaho
429, 435, 871 P.2d 846, 852 (Ct.App. 1994).

McCorkle v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 550, 554-55, 112 P.2d 838, 842-43 (2005).
Ordinarily, what constitutes reasonable diligence to discover fraud is a question of fact, but
"[W]here only one conclusion can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the question of the
exercise of reasonable diligence to discover fraud may be decided by the court as a matter of law."

Full Circle, Inc. v. Schelling, 108 Idaho 634, 638, 701 P.2d 254, 259 (1985). In the present case,
only one conclusion can reasonably be drawn from the undisputed facts. As the president, chairman
of the board, and largest shareholder of AIA, Mr. Taylor was familiar with its operations and
finances and was represented by counsel and an accountant of his choosing. (Riley Affidavit,~ 4)
He had full opportunity to examine the corporate records. No facts regarding the financial condition
ofthe corporation were hidden from him. The facts constituting any alleged fraud in connection with
the redemption of his stock were known or should have been known to him in 1995.

It is notice of the facts constituting the alleged fraud that is the crucial factor, not the
realization of legal consequences to be drawn from those facts. "Discovery relates to the facts
constituting fraud rather than a mere recognition that something is wrong and the commencement
of an investigation." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 773, 820 P.2 360, 368 (1991). "The statute
of limitations begins to run when plaintiffs have knowledge of facts sufficient to put a reasonably
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prudent person on notice that fraud has occurred." Stewart v. Hood, 95 Idaho 198, 201, 506 P.2d
95, 98 (1973).
In regard to the redemption of Mr. Taylor's stock in AIA, the key fact was whether the

corporation possessed sufficient earned surplus in 1995 or 1996 to redeem his stock. There can be
no question that a reasonably prudent person in Mr. Taylor's position, with the assistance of paid
professionals chosen by himself, should have been able to ascertain for himself the corporation's
capital structure. There is no allegation that the corporate financial records were themselves
misleading or incomplete. While the effect of a lack of earned surplus is a rather abstruse issue of
corporate law on which trained legal minds might differ, there is no dispute regarding the accuracy
and completeness of the corporate records themselves, which were prepared during Mr. Taylor's
tenure as president and board chairman of the company and under his supervision.

Assuming

arguendo the Opinion Letter was knowingly false and fraudulent (a huge and unsupported
assumption}, Mr. Taylor must be deemed to have been on notice of facts in 1995 that would have
commenced the running of the statute of limitation applicable to an action for fraud.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "actual knowledge of the fraud will be inferred
where the allegedly aggrieved party could have discovered it by the exercise of due diligence."
Nancy Lee Mines, Inc. v. Harrison, 95 Idaho 546, 547, 511 P.2d 828, 829 (1973), citing Davis v.
Harrison, 25 Wash. 2d 1, 167 P.1015, 1024 (1946):
We hold that this action was barred by the three year statute of limitations,
whether appellants had actual knowledge of the various transactions or not, for the
reason that the facts were open and appeared upon the records of the corporation,
subject to inspection by stockholders. If the stockholders failed to examine the
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corporate records, they must have been negligent and careless of their own interests.
The means of knowledge were open to them, and means of knowledge are equivalent
to actual knowledge.
In present case, plaintiff and his advisors had full and unfettered opportunity to inspect the
corporate records. Mr. Taylor knew, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
known, the amount of AIA' s earned surplus, or lack thereof. He must be deemed to have knowledge
of facts sufficient to put him on notice of any alleged fraud in 1995, which is when the statute of
limitation for fraud commenced to run. Plaintiff is time barred from bringing an action based on
alleged fraud 14 years later.

D.

Plaintiff's Causes of Action for Negligent Misrepresentation and Breach of Fiduciary
Duty Are Barred by I.C. § 5-224.
Plaintiffs first cause of action attempts to state a claim against Mr. Riley for negligent

misrepresentation, and plaintiffs fourth cause of action alleges breach of fiduciary duty against all
defendants in connection of the redemption of plaintiffs stock in AIA and the issuance of the 1995
Opinion Letter. 25 These events occurred in 1995. Where a claim is not covered by any other statute
oflimitation, the 4-year limitation ofldaho Code§ 5-224 will be applied. Jones v. Kootenai County
Title Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 607, 873 P.2d 861 (1994).

Since the occurrence, acts or omissions

complained of happened more than four years ago, Idaho Code§ 5-224 bars any claim at this time
for alleged negligent misrepresentation or breach of fiduciary duty.

25

Paragraph 57 of the Complaint alleges that somehow Mr. Riley's alleged fiduciary duties to Mr. Taylor
at the time the 1995 Opinion Letter was prepared in 1995 were imputed to Hawley Troxell, although this was several
years before Mr. Riley went to work for that firm.
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DEFENDANT RILEY IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION,
ALLEGED NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
Plaintiff's first cause of action alleges negligent misrepresentation against defendants Riley,
Turnbow and Eberle Berlin. With one narrow exception not applicable here, the tort of negligent
misrepresentation is not recognized in this state. See Duffin v. Idaho Corp Improvement Ass 'n., 126
Idaho 1002, 1010, 895 P.2d 1195, 1203 (1995), reh. den. June 22, 1995, where the Idaho Supreme
Court stated, "[W]e expressly hold that, except in the narrow confines of a professional relationship
involving an accountant, the tort of negligent misrepresentation is not recognized in Idaho." Accord,

Feldv. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass 'n., 126 Idaho 1014, 895 P.2d 1207 (1995), reh. den. June 22,
1995; IntermountainConstruction,Inc. v. Cityo/Ammon, 122Idaho931,933,841P.2d1082, 1084
(1992), ("Furthermore, except in the narrow confines of a professional relationship between an
accountant and client, as was the case in Idaho Bank & Trust v. First Bancorp, 115 Idaho 1082, 772
P .2d 720 (1989), this Court has rejected the tort of negligent misrepresentation.").
The Duffin rule was recently reaffirmed in Mannos v Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166
(2007). There, the buyer of a business alleged he was misled by false financial statements provided
to him during a due diligence period by the sellers. Among other theories, the buyer contended the
sellers negligently misrepresented the finances of the business. Rejecting this contention, the Idaho
Supreme Court stated as follows:
Mannos contends that the defendants negligently misrepresented Peterbilt's
financial condition prior to his investment, and that this Court should extend the tort
of negligent misrepresentation to "misrepresentations made by persons in basic
accounting documents, such as financial statements." In Duffin v. Idaho Crop Imp.
Ass 'n., 126 Idaho 1002, 1010, 895 P.2d 1105, 1203 (1995), the Court strictly and
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narrowly confined the tort of negligent misrepresentation to professional
relationships involving an accountant. This case does not involve a professional
accounting relationship; rather, it involves a business relationship between a
purchaser and a seller. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment
on this claim.
Id. at 935, 155 P.3d at 1174.

In the present case, negligent misrepresentation is not a viable cause of action, and
plaintiffs claim therefor is subject to dismissal as a matter oflaw.
CONCLUSION

Having litigated and lost against Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell, plaintiff is barred from
suing them again based upon the same transaction or series of transactions. Res judicata bars not
only subsequent relitigation of claims previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of any
claims which could have been made. With respect to plaintiff's allegations of fraud based upon the
1995 Opinion Letter, those issues have been heard and decided by another court. The Court in the
AIA litigation expressly held that the opinions expressed in the 1995 Opinion Letter were just that
-- opinions -- rather than statements of present fact and could not form the basis for fraud. Issue
preclusion, or collateral estoppel bars plaintiff from re-litigating the same issue. Each ofplaintiff's
claims is also barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. Plaintiff suffered some damage
over14 years ago, and in any event not later than August 1, 2005. Each of his alleged causes of
action is time barred. His claim for professional malpractice is barred by the 2-year limitation of
1.C. § 5-218(4); his claim for fraud is barred by the 3-year limitation ofl.C. § 5-219(4), and his
claim for violation of the ICPA is barred by the 2-year limitation of LC.§ 48-619. Any other
alleged cause of action is barred by the catch-all 4-year limitation ofl.C. § 5-224.
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Plaintiff cannot sue Mr. Riley for alleged negligent misrepresentation because Idaho does
not recognize that cause of action in these circumstances. For all of the above reasons, summary
judgment should be granted in favor of Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell.
DATED this _j£_ day of January, 2010.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / ~ day of January, 2010, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, Washington 99201

. / U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(509) 455-7111

Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

/.

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-9177
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DEPUTY

Jack S. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208)336-9777
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Attorneys for Defendants Robert M. Turnbow and
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered

0:::

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

0

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
ROBERT M. TURNBOW, an individual; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0918868

MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

COME NOW, Defendants Robert M. Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &
McKlveen, Chtd., by and through their counsel of record, Gjording & Fouser, PLLC, and move
this Court for an order granting summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure, on the grounds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
said Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, P. 1
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This motion is based upon the files and pleadings on record as well as the supporting
Memorandum and Affidavit to be filed in accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED ON THIS MOTION.
~
DATED this 16
day of January, 2010.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

f5fl- day of January, 2010, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Roderick C. Bond
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, VIA 99201
James D. LaRue
ELAM BURKE
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701-1539
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Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
CAMPBELL, BfSSELL & KmBY, PLLC
7 South 'Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, WA 99201

Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR IBE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF REED J. TAYLOR lN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

V.

RICHARD A. RILEY, m individual~
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY

LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
ROBERT M. TURNBOW, an individual; and
EBERLE, BERLlN, KADING, TUR."1\ffiOW
& :McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;
Defendanti.
STATE OF WASHlNGTON

)
) ss:

COUNTY OF ASOTIN

)

I, Recd J. Taylor. being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
l.

I am

o~er

the age of eighteen years, competmt to testify in court, the plaintiff in

the above-entitled action, and make this Affidavit based. upon my personal knowledge. I 9.lso
have personal knowledge of all of the pleadings and papers filed in my action agairist AlA

AFFIDAVIT OF REED J. TAYLOR- l
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r.nt

TOTAL
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Services Corporation and other defendants.
2.

Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Opinion Letter dated

August 15, 2009 ("Opinion Letter"), and attachments, provided to me by Eberle Berlin in
response to a request for admission in this action, which were provided to me in connection with
redemption of my common shares in AIA Services Corporation ("AIA Services") in 1995.
Although Exhibit A is the same form and substance as the Opinion Letter attached as Exhibit A
to the Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond dated November 10, 2009, I am attaching Exhibit A to this
Affidavit to eliminate any objections. I would note that the Opinion Letter was dated August 15,
2009, but I did not receive it until after that date at the time of the closing of the transaction,
which occurred sometime on or shortly after August 16, 2009. I know that closing took place
after August 15, 2009, because the final, unsigned, form of the Opinion Letter that was
acceptable to me was not provided to me until August 16, 2009. Attached Exhibit Bis a true
and correct copy of the fax cover sheet from Mr. Riley and the final form of the Opinion Letter
faxed to Scott Bell on August 16, 1995.
3.

I retained Scott Bell to representing me in connection with negotiating and

drafting the Redemption Agreement (11/24/09 Riley Aff., Ex. A), the $6 Million Promissory
Note (Id., Ex. B.) and the ancillary agreements. Mr. Bell and his firm were not retained by me to
act as counsel for AIA Services; rather, that job was left to my attorneys at Eberle Berlin. Mr.
Bell did not draft shareholder meeting resolutions or board resolutions for AIA Services. Rather,
Mr. Riley and Eberle Berlin provided those services and related services for many years and I
relied upon Mr. Riley, Mr. Turnbow and Eberle Berlin to ensure that the redemption was done
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properly and accordance with the law. Obviously, I did not rely upon them to negotiate the
terms of my Stock Redemption Agreement and ancillary agreements, as I left the negotiation and
drafting of the final written terms of the agreements to Scott Bell.

I recognized that it was

appropriate for me to obtain separate counsel for negotiating and finalizing the terms of my
redemption, and, although Mr. Bell drafted the agreements and reviewed and approved the form
of the Opinion Letter to ensure that I was protected, I relied upon Mr. Riley, Mr. Turnbow and
Eberle Berlin to ensure that the Redemption Agreement (11/24/09 Riley Aff., Ex. A.), $6 Million
Promissory Note (Id., Ex. B.), and ancillary agreements and documents could be executed by
AIA Services and that the transaction was even permissible. However, my use of Scott Bell had
no impact on my expectations for Mr. Riley, Mr. Turnbow and Eberle Berlin to properly
represent me and AIA Services for corporate formalities, shareholder consents and to comply
with all laws as a condition of the redemption of my shares.
4.

Beginning in the 1980s and extending into the years leading up to the redemption

of my shares in 1995, Mr. Riley and Eberle Berlin served as my personal divorce attorneys. Not
only did I rely upon Mr. Riley and Eberle Berlin to handle my long divorce proceeding, I relied
upon them to reorganize AJA Services and its subsidiaries for purposes of issuing Series A
Preferred Shares to complete my divorce. In those transactions, I contributed my overwhelming
majority ownership in AIA Insurance, Inc., and stakes other entities to AIA Services in exchange
for additional common shares and the issuance of the Series A Preferred Shares. After this
reorganization, AIA Insurance, Inc., became a wholly owned subsidiary of AIA Services. In
addition, Mr. Riley and Eberle Berlin acted as my attorneys for my investment in a company
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involving land in Canada.
5.

I was never advised orally or in writing that Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin

were no longer my attorneys and that I could not rely upon them. The fact that the Opinion
Letter was drafted and delivered to me only confirmed that they had obligations to me as my
attorneys. At no time, did Richard Riley, Robert Turnbow or Eberle Berlin advise me, orally or
in writing, that I was responsible for hiring or retaining a separate attorney for AIA Services to
ensure that all corporate formalities and laws were complied with for the redemption of my
shares. Had I known that I could not rely upon them or their Opinion Letter, I would have
retained new counsel for AIA Services for the redemption of my shares in 1995. It was clear to
me and everyone involved that Mr. Riley, Mr. Turnbow and Eberle Berlin were representing the
interests of me, the other shareholders and AIA Services to ensure that the redemption was
completed properly, that all necessary shareholder consents were obtained, and that the
redemption was completed in accordance with Idaho law. I was never asked to sign any waiver
nor was I provided any disclaimer or documentation from Mr. Riley, Mr. Turnbow or Eberle
Berlin stating that they were not representing my interests when they provided the legal services
for the redemption of my shares in 1995. I relied upon Mr. Riley, Mr. Turnbow and Eberle
Berlin as both my personal attorneys and the attorneys for AJA Services to ensure that all
necessary shareholder and board consents were obtained and that all laws were complied with for
the redemption of my shares.
6.

I relied upon the Opinion Letter and the representations and warranties made

through the Opinion Letter by Mr. Riley, Mr. Turnbow and Eberle Berlin when I agreed to
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permit AIA Services to redeem my shares in 1995.

Although the Redemption Agreement

(11/24/09 Riley Aff., Ex. A) was dated July 22, 1995, the transaction to redeem my shares did
not close until after the Opinion Letter was drafted and delivered in a form acceptable to me.
(See Ex. B.) This was because I had a right to not close the transaction if everything was not

order and the Opinion Letter was not drafted and delivered to me to rely upon. I proceeded to
close the transaction to redeem my shares based upon the Opinion Letter being drafted and
delivered to me and based upon the representations and warranties set forth in the Opinion
Letter. I relied upon Mr. Riley, Mr. Turnbow, and Eberle Berlin's representations and warranties
contained in the Opinion Letter and their actions as my attorneys and the attorneys for AIA
Services to ensure that the redemption complied with all laws. I was given the right to negotiate
and approve the· form of the Opinion Letter before it was delivered to me and before I agreed to
permit the transaction to close for the redemption of my shares in AIA Services. (11/24/09 Riley .
Aff., Ex. A, p. 4, § 2.50).) I exercised that right and Scott Bell did in fact approve the form and
content of the Opinion Letter and the representations and warranties contained in the Opinion
Letter.

Before the Opinion Letter was delivered to me, its contents, representations and

warranties were also approved by a committee at Eberle Berlin. However, I do not know what
attorneys were members of the committee that approved the Opinion Letter.
7.

I would have never agreed to sell my shares without being provided the Opinion

Letter by Mr. Riley, Mr. Turnbow and Eberle Berlin. I relied upon Mr. Riley, Mr. Turnbow and
Eberle Berlin to provide the legal representation necessary to legally and properly complete the
redemption of my shares for me and AIA Services. Neither I nor AIA Services had any other
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attorneys retained for the purpose of providing the legal representation to ensure the redemption
of my shares had all necessary consents and did not violate any laws. I would have never agreed
to sell my shares had I known the transaction was not legal and that all necessary shareholder
consents had been obtained, which was contrary to the express written opinions and
representations provided to me by Mr. Riley, Mr. Turnbow and Eberle Berlin.
8.

Prior to the date my shares were redeemed, AIA Services had a shareholder

meeting where the overwhelming majority of all shareholders approved the redemption of my
shares. Attached as Exhibit C are true and correct copies of (i) AIA Services Board of Directors
Meeting Minutes dated July 18, 1995 (Ex. C, pp. 1-4.); (ii) AIA Services Minutes of Special
Meeting of Shareholders dated March 7, 1995 (Ex. C, pp. 5-6.); (iii) AIA Services Notice of
Special Shareholder Meeting dated February 9, 1995 (Ex. C., pp. 7-8.); and (iv) AIA Services
Board of Directors Meeting Minutes dated January 12, 1995 (Ex. C, pp. 9-10.) As indicated on
pages 5-6 of Exhibit C, 932,925.07 shares voted in favor of redeeming my shares, while only
6,688.09 shares voted against it, at the shareholder meeting held on March 7, 1995. As a person
lacking legal knowledge, I never imagined nor can I still believe that anything else would have
been required other than the majority of shareholders voting their shares to approve the
redemption of my shares. As depicted in Exhibit C, Mr. Riley attended various shareholder
meetings, drafted shareholder resolutions, drafted board resolutions and was for all practical
purposes the attorney who handled the corporate governance issues at AIA Services in 1995.
Board and shareholder meetings were also held at the offices of Eberle Berlin from time to time,
and Mr. Riley regularly attended those meetings providing legal advice.

Mr. Riley also
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specifically advised me at board meetings that all disclosures to shareholders exceeded the legal
requirements, and I relied on his legal advice and representations. (Ex. C., p. 2.)
9.

I would like to point out that my brother R. John Taylor and virtually all of the

other shareholders desired to redeem my majority interest in AIA Services in an attempt to take
the company public or to sell it. I was not soliciting others to buy my shares nor was I overly
_ interested in selling my shares in AIA Services. R. John Taylor and other shareholders and
investors persuaded me to sell my shares.

They wanted to take the company a different

direction. Mr. Riley, Mr. Turnbow and Eberle Berlin was retained to ensure that all of our needs
were met by effectuating the redemption of my shares and by providing the company with new
investors, who would also have certain rights. The only adverse representation in the redemption
of my shares involved the exact final written terms of my agreements, which is why I had Scott
Bell for those issues. The goal of the shareholders and investors in AIA Services was to redeem
my shares to eliminate my controlling interests in AIA Services and to provide me with
transaction documents that satisfy my needs to entice me to have my shares redeemed.
10.

I had the utmost in trust and confidence in Mr. Riley, Mr. Turnbow and Eberle

Berlin pertaining to their legal services provided to me and AIA Services in 1995. My trust and
confidence in Mr. Riley, who had been my long-term attorney, remained steadfast even after he
left Eberle Berlin. Even when Mr. Riley moved to Hawley Troxell and even when Hawley
Troxell initially represented AIA Services in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., I trusted Mr. Riley
would not attack the transaction to redeem my shares. I would have never imagined that Mr.
Riley would draft and deliver the Opinion Letter to me and then assist the defendants and
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Hawley Troxell in obtaining an order stating that the redemption of my shares was illegal. Mr.
Riley now admits that he has communicated with other Hawley Troxell attorneys in Taylor v.
AJA Services, et al. In addition, I have seen Mr. Riley carbon copied on various filings and

emails in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., and he refused to be deposed in that action or to advise
me of the facts. He has now utterly and completely abandoned me and his obligations to me.

Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell have ignored Mr. Riley's obligations to me and AIA Services that
existed when my shares were redeemed in 1995, in favor of the new management who have
unlawfully transferred millions of dollars from AIA Services over the years since my shares were
redeemed.
11.

To this day, Mr. Riley has still never advised me that he and Eberle Berlin did not

obtain a specific shareholder resolution approving the payment of the redemption of my shares
from capital surplus. Instead, he and his firm Hawley Troxell have taken adverse actions to the
redemption as evidenced by AIA Services' Motion for Summary Judgment filed in February
2009, Mr. Riley's failure to comply with obligations owed to me and AIA Services as it existed
in 1995, Hawley Troxell's successful acts of thwarting my discovery, and Mr. Riley's refusal to
cooperate in discovery and to otherwise support his Opinion Letter-all taking place from
January 2009, through the date the district court ruled the redemption of my shares was illegal on
June 17, 2009 (See 12/4/09 Babbitt Aff., Ex. J.), and the date of the judgment in that action on
September 4, 2009 (See Ex. D.)
12.

Attached as Exliibit Dis a true and correct certified copy of the judgment entered

against me in Reed Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al., Nez Perce County District Court
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Case No.: CV07-00208 ("Taylor v. AJA Services. et al.").
13.

As a result of the Court's Judgment in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al. (Ex. D.), I

presently do not have an enforceable contract to obtain payment for the over $8,500,000 that was
owed to me by AIA Services from the redemption of my shares in 1995. I have been damaged
by the over $8,500,000 owed to me under the $6 Million Promissory Note that wa8 ruled
unenforceable by the Court in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., on June 17, 2009, and by the
subsequent judgment entered on September 4, 2009. (See Ex. D.) If Mr. Riley, Mr. Turnbow
and Eberle Berlin had simply obtained a shareholder resolution expressly approving the invasion
of capital surplus, I would not be here today seeking the payment of the over $8,500,000 owed to
me from Mr. Riley, Mr. Turnbow, Eblerle Berlin and Hawley Troxell as I would have been
entitled to payment of that amount under the terms of the $6 Million Promissory Note, plus all
accrued interest under the $6 Million Promissory Note exceeding $2.5 Million. (See 11/24/09
Riley Aff., Ex. A-B.)
14.

I am also a holder of over Series C Preferred Shares in AIA Services for which I

paid over $300,000. Since my common shares were redeemed in AIA Services in 1995, Mr.
Riley and Hawley Troxell have assisted and provided legal representation to CropUSA Insurance
Agency, Inc. ("CropUSA") In connection with their representation of CropUSA, Mr. Riley and
Hawley Troxell drafted and delivered yet another opinion letter. This time, they drafted and
delivered an opinion letter to CropUSA's lender for a $15 Million line-of-credit that was
wrongfully guaranteed by AIA Insurance, Inc. (AIA Services' only operated entity and its
wholly owned subsidiary). In Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell's opinion, they asserted that AIA
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Insurance had the legal authority to guarantee the loan, when in fact the loan was barred by AIA
Services' Amended Articles of Incorporation. Attached as Exhibit E are true and correct copies
of pertinent pages of AIA Services Amended Articles of Incorporation. Attached as Exhibit Fis
a true and correct copy of the opinion letter dated October 27, 2006, from Hawley Troxell Ennis
& Hawley LLP pertaining to the opinion issued for a $15 Million revolving loan from Lancelot

Investors Fund, L.P. to CropUSA. Neither I, nor AIA Services, nor any of its subsidiaries own
any shares in CropUSA nor do any of us have an ownership interest in that company (which has
been the recipient of millions of dollars of funds, assets and trade secrets of AIA Services and its
subsidiary). I did not consent to this opinion letter and to my knowledge none of the other
innocent shareholders in AIA Services consented to this opinion letter or the $15 Million loan.
In addition, my ex-wife, Donna Taylor, the sole holder of all outstanding Series A Preferred
Shares in AIA Services, did not consent to this loan. She, like me, has not been paid.
15.

In the early 2000s, Mr. Riley had me sign a conflict of interest waiver permitting

him to provide legal services drafting lending documents for the financing of my Cessna
airplane. This conflict waiver was requested when Mr. Riley was an attorney with Hawley
Troxell and was requested and executed by me after Mr. Riley left Eberle Berlin. This conflict
waiver confirmed to me that Mr. Riley was my attorney and that he considered himself my
attorney.
16.

I am 73-years-old. I founded what now is known as AIA Insurance in 1969 and

have worked hard my entire life. My $6 Million Promissory Note (11124/09 Riley Aff., Ex. B)
was for my retirement and the interest payments generated and the payment of the principal was
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for my retirement. More than 25% of my monthly income has been taken away from me as
result of the acts of the defendants. In fact, over 75% of my retirement income has been taken
away from me as a result of the defendants' acts and the finding of illegality in Taylor v. AJA

Services, et al. In Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., Hawley Troxell had AJA Services place
monthly payments to me in an interest bearing account as a result of the illegality argument. In
2009, they stopped paying the money in the account and Hawley Troxell withdrew a motion AJA
Services had filed to pay the funds into the court registry. Then, Hawley Troxell permitted those
funds in excess of $300,000 to be utilized by the insiders who have mismanaged AJA Services
and AIA Insurance (its subsidiary) and who have transferred out millions of dollars from the
company to themselves and other entities they control.
DATED: This 2°dday of February, 2010.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2°d day of February, 2010.

Notary Public for ashington
Residing at:
~
My commission expires: "'2 / :2- f' Ji
I
I

(J :z.4/o&,,

.

(
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the date indicated below, I caused to be served true and
correct copies of the foregoing document to the following parties:
Via:

Jack S. Gjording
Julianne S. Hall
Gjording & Fouser, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax: (208) 336-9177

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
~.Facsimile

~Email (pdf attachment)

Via:

James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
Elam & Burke, PA
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83 704
Fax: (208) 384-5844

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
~Facsimile
~Email (pdf attachment)

Signed this 3rd day of February, 2010, at Clarkston, W shington.

Roderi
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August 15, 1995
T,

Reed J. Taylor

[

P.O. Box 538

Lewiston ID 8350 l

r

t Re:

1

Common Stock Redemption

Dear Mr. Taylor:

H, tac~LC l••n·•O'?)

I

---

_,,,.,-This opinion is being delivered to you pursuant to Section 2.50) of the Stock Redemption
Agreement dated July 22, 1995 ("Agreement") by and between AIA Services Corporation, an
Idaho corporation ("Company") and Reed J. Taylor. AU capitalized terms not defined herein
shall have the respective meanings ascribed to them in the Agreement. The phrase "Transaction
Documents" refers collectively to the Agreement, together with the Note, the Pledge Agreement,
the Security Agreement, the Consulting Agreement and the Noncompetition Agreement, as such
documents are defin~ in the Agreement.
·-

[
[

We have acted as general counsel for the Company in connection with the transactions
contemplated by the Agreement. As such general counsel, we have assisted in the negotiation,
and have examined executed counterparts (or photostatic copies of executed counterparts) of the
Agreement and other Transaction Documents.

l-

In addition, we have examined originals, executed counterparts or copies of such
agreements, corporate records, instruments and certificates, certificates of public authorities and
s1:1ch matters of law as we have deemed necessary for the purpose of rendering the opinions set
forth herein, To the extent we deemed necessary for the purposes of this opinion, we have
relied upon (i) the statements and representations of the Company as to factual matters, (ii) the
corporate records provided to us by the Company, and (iii) certificates and other documents
obtained from public officials. We have further relied as to factual matters on the representations
and warranties contained in the Agreement and the other Transaction Documents (inclupjng,
without Hmitation, Mr. Taylor's representations in Article IV of the Agreement) and on the
Company's representations in Schedule III (attached) to the Agreement; and we have assumed
the completeness and accuracy of all such representations and warranties as to factual matters.
We have assumed the genuineness of all signatures (other than those of the Company), the legal
capacity of Mr. Taylor to execute the Agreement and all other documents we have reviewed,
the authenticity of all documents submitted to us as originals, and the conformity to original
documents of all documents submitted to us as certified, photostatic, reproduced or conformed
copies. We have further assumed that the Agreement and the other Transaction Documents have
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been duly authorized, executed and delivered by Mr. Taylor and are enforceable against him in
accordance with their respective terms, and that the execution, delivery and performance of the
Agreement and the other Transaction Documents by Mr. Tay~or does not and will not result in
a breach of, or constitute a default under, any agreement, instrument or other document to which
Mr. Taylor is a party, or any order, judgment, writ or decree applicable to such party to which
Mr. Taylor's property is subject.
·
Whenever our opinion with respect to the existence or absence of facts is indicated to be
based on our .knowledge, we are refening to the actual knowledge of R. M. Turnbow and
Richard A. Riley. who are the sole attorneys in Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen,
Chartered who have represented the Company during the course of our representation in ·this
transaction. Except as expressly set forth herein, we have not undertaken any independent legal
or factual investigation to determine the existence or absence of such facts, and no inference as
to out knowledge of the existence or absence of such facts should be drawn from such
representation.

Based upon and subject to our examination and assumptions as aforesaid and subject to
the qualifications hereinafter set forth, we are of the opinion that, except as set forth in the

attached Schedule III and/or the Schedules attached to the Agreement:
1.
The Company is a corporation duly organized and validly existing under
the laws of the State of Idaho. Based solely on the attached Certificates of Corporate Status
issued by the Idaho Secretary of State, the Company, The Universe Life Insurance Company
("Universe"), AIA Insurance, Inc. ("AIAI") and Farmers HeaJth Alliance Administrators, Inc.
("Farmers") are corporations incorporated under the corporation laws of the St.ate of Idaho and
in good standing on the records of the Idaho Secretary of State.
2.
The Company and its Subsidiaries have full corporate power and authority
to enter into, execute and deliver the Transactions Documents and to perform their respective
obligations thereunder; all corporate action on the part of Company and its Subsidiaries, and
their respective directors and shareholders, necessary for the authorization, execution, delivery
and performance by Company and its Subsidiaries of the Transaction Documents and the
consummation of the transactions contemplated thereby has been taken; and the Transaction
Documents have been duly executed and delivered by Company and its Subsidiaries. . The
Transaction Documents constitute the valid and binding obligation of Company and its
Subsidiaries enforceable against them in accordance with their respective terms, except that
enforceability may be limited by (a) applicable bankruptcy, insolvency, moratorium,
reorganization, fraudulent transfer, receivership, conservatorship or similar laws affecting
creditor's rights generally, (b) the exercise of judicial discretion in accordance with general
principles of equity (whether applied by a court of law or equity) and (c) considerations of public
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policy.
3.
Neither the execution and delivery of the Transaction Documentstrly
Company and its Subsidiaries, nor the consummation of the transactions contemplated thereby,
will (a) conflict with or violate any provision of their respective Articles of Incorporation or
Bylaws, as amended; or (b) constitute a violation or default under any indebtedness, indenture,
mortgage, deed of trust, note, bond, license, lease agreement, or other material agreement or
instrument to which Company or any of its Subsidiaries is a party or to which any of its assets
or the assets of its Subsidiaries may be subject; or (c) to the best of our knowledge, violate any
Jaw, rule, license, regulation, judgment, order, ruling, or decree, including any insurance.laws
or regulations of any jurisdiction to which Company or any of its Subsidiaries are subject,
governing or affecting the operation of Company or its Subsidiaries in any material respect.
Neither the execution and delivery of the Transaction Documents by Company and its
Subsidiaries, nor the consummation of the transactions contemplated thereby, will constitute an
event permitting termination of any material agreement or the acceleration of any indebtedness
of the Company or other liability, with or without notice or lapse of time, or result in the
creation or imposition of any lien upon the Collateral.

L
[

l

4.
No consent, authorization, approval or exemption by, or filing with, any
Person or any Governmental Authority. is required in connection with the execution, delivery and
performance by Company and its Subsidiaries of the Transaction Documents, or the taking of
any action contemplated thereby, except such as have been obtained prior to Closing.
5.
All of the currently outstanding Pledged Shares are owned beneficially and
of record by Company and, to the best of our knowledge, there are no warrants, options, or
other rights to purchase such Pledged Shares.

6.
Except for the lien of First Interstate Lien upon the First Interstate Shares,
and any interest in the Commission collateral created or granted in favor of The Centennial Life
Insurance Company pursuant to that certain Reimbursement Agreement dated August 11, 1995
among The Centennial Life Insurance Company', AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance,
Inc., The Universe Life Insurance Company and AIA MidAmerica, Inc., the Collateral is free
and clear of all pledges, liens, encumbrances, security interests, equities, claims, or options.
Upon delivery of certificates representing the Pledged Shares of AIAI and Farmers to
Shareholder at Closing, Shareholder shall have at Closing a perfected first priority security
interest in such Pledged Shares.

l

7.
. To our knowledge, there are no claims, actions, suits, proceedings or
investigations pending or threatened against or relating to Company or any of its Subsidiaries,
at law or in equity before or by any Governmental Authority, nor has any such action, suit,
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proceeding or investigation been pencli~g during the three-year period preceding the date hereof.
Neither Company nor any of its Subsidiaries is in default with respect to any adjudicatory order,
writ, injunction or decree of any Governmental authority, and neither Company nor any of its
Subsidiaries is a party to any cease and desist order, supervisory agreement or arrangement,
consensual or otherwise, with any Governmental Authority.

Id~~

r

The foregoing opinions are limited to the laws and regulations of the State of
tetclilding the principles of conflicts of laws); and we have not considered and expressed no
opinion on the laws or regulations of any other jurisdiction. This· opinion is rendered only with
respect to the laws and the rules, regulations and orders (excluding the principles of conflicts
of laws) of the State of Idaho that are in effect as of the date hereof. We assume no
responsibility for updating this opinion to take into account any event. action, interpretation or
change of law occurring subsequent to the date hereof that may affect the validity of any of the
opinions expr_essed herein.
The enforceability opinion expressed in opinion
following additional qualifications:

12

Qf this letter is subject to the

(i)
The terms of any commission agreement, lockbox agreement or other
account agreement which may affect the Commission Collateral, the rights of the parties
(other than Company or any of its Subsidiaries) to any such agreement, and any claim
or defense of such parties against the Company or any of Hs Subsidiaries rising under or
outside any such agreement.

(ii)
The qualification that certain rights, remedies and waivers contained in the
Transaction Documents may be rendered ineffective, or be limited, by applicable Idaho
laws or judicial decisions governing such rights, remedies and waivers; but the indusion
of such rights, remedies and waivers does not affect the validity or enforceability of other
provisions of the Transaction Documents and 1 in the event the Company or ariy of its
Subsidiaries does not comply with the material terms of the Transaction Documents, Mr.
Taylor may exercise remedies that would normally be available under Idaho law to a
secured party provided Idaho law applies and Mr. Taylor proceeds in accordance with
such law.

We express no opinion with respect to the perfection or the relative
(iii)
priority of the security interests granted to Mr. Taylor in the Commission Collateral.
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This opinion is furnished by us solely for your benefit for use in connection with the
Transaction Documents and the transactions contemplated thereby; and it may not be furnished
or quoted to, or relied upon, by any other person,

Very truly yours,

S/

-~
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SCHEDULE m TO STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT
This Schedule sets forth the exceptions. to representations and warranties made by the
Company to the Shareholder in Article m of the Stock Redemption Agreement dated July 22,
1995 ("Agreement") between AJA Services Corporation ("Company") and Reed J. Taylor
("Shareholder").

I.

EXCEPTIONS APPLYING TO IBE COMPANY GENERAILY.

A.
Sgctjons 3.3 and 3.11. The Company's representation that the execution, dclivery
and performance of the Agreement and the consummation of the transactions contemplated
thereby will not result in a violation or default under any material agreement or other instrument
by which the Company or any Subsidiary is bou~d and the Company's representation that it is
not in violation of any such agreement or instrument are qualified as follows:
The Company is currently in technical default of certain financial covenants contained
in the First Interstate Loan agreement. Those covenant defaults are described in the attached
letter to First Interstate Bank from Rick L Johnson, the Company Vice President, Finance.
Absent the Bank's written consent, completion of transactions contemplated in the Agreement
may cause additional technical defaults of negative financial covenants contained in the Bank
loan agreement.

The Company has thoroughly disclosed to., the Bank all details regarding the proposed
transactions. In view of the current defaults, the Company has not asked for nor has the· Bank
volunteered written consent.
As the Company is current in all payments.due to Bank, the Company does not anticipate
adverse action by the Bank prior to the scheduled loan payoff date of July 20, 1996..
Seci;ions 3.2 and 3.3~ The Company's representations concerning consents in
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 are qualified as follows:
B.

1.
The Company has been made aware that the Texas Department of
Insurance has taken the position that. the distribution of AIA Insurance, Inc. requires prior
departmental approval due to the status the Company's Subsidiary, The Universe Life Insurance
Company ("ULIC"), as "commercially domiciled" in Texas. The Company, while di&puting the
necessity of such approval, has none the less filed the necessary forms to obtain such approval.
The Texas Insurance Department has not yet given its approval for distribution of AJA
Insurance, Inc.
The California Department of Insurance requires the submission of a prior
approval form for the Centennial reinsurance treaty. Since the transaction does not affect any
California insureds, and ULIC is not being dissolved or merged, approval is expected in due
course. Approval from California has not yet been obtained.
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,______ ....b.. --· As descrlbed..ab.o.v.e..in _connection-with-Section-.3..3.rGmain-tmnsaetiens
contemplated by the Agreement would violate provisions of the First Interstate Bank Loan
Agreement and related documents.
C.
Section 3.fi. The Company's financial representations contained·in Section 3.6
are supplemented by the following attached financial statements related to the quarter ended June
30, i995:

AIA Services Consolidated Balance Sheets at June 30, 1995.
AI.A Services Consolidated Statement of Income For Six Months Ending June 30, 1995.
The Universe Life Preliminary Results of Operations (Statutory Basis) For Three and Six

Months Ending June 30, 1995.
Great Fidelity Preliminary Results of Operations (Statutory Basis) For Three and

Six Months Ending June 30, 1995.
Al.A Services Consolidated Preliminary Results of Operations For Six Months Ending
June 30, 1995.

ll.

EXCEPTIONS APPLYING SOLELY TO UNIVERSE LIFE.

Sections· 3.1. 3.9 and 3.j 1. The Company's representations concerning Universe Life's
good standing and qualification to transact business In various states and its compliance with.
state insurance laws are qualified by the following, description of regulatory proceedings in the
various states in which the insurance company transacts business.

Ima. On March 22, 1994, the State of Texas issuecl Cease and Desist Order No. 940282 against Universe Life and its subsidiary, AIA Insurance, Inc. The Order was based on
preliminary examination .findings reported to the Texas Department of Insu~ ("TDI") by the
examiners. The Order alleged that Universe Life and its affiliate engaged in unfair methods of
competition and deceptive practice .of insurance and that Universe Life was in hazardous
financial condition. Following discussions with the company and receipt of .additional
documentation, TDI issued a Consent Order dated May 17, 1994 which superseded the Cease
and Desist Order in its entirety. The Consent Order abandoned allegations of unfair competition
and deceptive practices and focused on TDrs concerns with the proper reserving for the
Supplemental Benefit Accumulation ("SBA") feature of Univer&e Life,s GUH product and the
va,l.uation of Universe Life's investment in its subsidiary, AIA Insurance, Inc.
To address its concern with conflicting actuarial opinions on the proper reserves for the
SBA, the May 17, 1994 Consent Order directed Universe Life to select an independent actuary
to review Universe Life's SBA reserving methods and factors. Universe Life and the
Department agreed that this actuarial review would be performed by Donna R. Claire, F.S.A., ·
of Claire Thinking, an independent consulting actuary. Ms. Claire performed an asset adequacy
analysis of Universe Life's reported December 31, 1993 SBA reserves, including a thorough
review of OUH product features, actuarial assumptions, actual experience and historical trends.
Ms. Claire's analysis is contained in her Asset Adequacy Report dated June 12, 1994.
SCHBDULB ill • Page 2
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-·····- . .In .her .Report,-Msr-CJ.aire..o9sei:ved-that--tJniverse·tife!s ·GB'H-product, with-its SB2\
feature, is an innovative product and that , "[a]s such, there is no current reserve standard for
the SBA in state law that specifically fits this benefit". Ms. Claire concluded that (i) Universe

Life's independent consulting actuaries, Milliman and Robertson, had develoP.ed "a methodology
which follows the basic standards of establishing reserves that reflect the underlying risks of the
product"; (ii) p[t]he reserve methodology used by [Universe Life1s actuaries} does appear to be
reasonable"; and (iii) "given the experience that was developed through 1993, the reserves
reported in the [1993] Annual Statement were adequate". Based on sensitivity tests which
showed that the reported reserves may be inadequate if adverse trends occur, however, Ms.
Claire recommended that the reserves be increased on the basis of •somewhat stronger" reserve
assumptions. Applying the same gross premium valuation methodology used by Universe Life
to develop its reported.reserves, Ms. Claire developed new reserving factors reflecting her more
conservative assumptions. Universe Life agreed with TOI that the SBA reserves for the Texas
certificateholders under GUH policy would be determined prospectively in accordance with the
factors developed by Donna Claire, with any increase in reseives being applied ratably beginning
July 1, 1995 and with the final entry being made December 31, 1996.
With respect to the valuation of AIA Insurance, Inc., TDI acknowledged that Universe
Life's accounting for the value of Af.A Insurance was permisSI'ble under Texas law; but, in light
of a Texas statute allowing the Commissioner to ascribe any other valuation he believes more
appropriate (after hearing) and the impending statutory change in the Idaho Insurance Code
effe.ctive July I, 1995 (see below), the May 17, 1994 Consent Order directed that Universe
Life's investment in AIA Insurance, Inc. be reduced, ratably over a three·year period beginning
December 31, 1994, to the lesser of net worth as determined in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles or the valuation amount reflected in the final report of this
examination.
..
!
During the period of discussions between Universe Life and TD!, the Texas Insurance
Commissioner approved Universe Life's new GUH III product and the transfer of Universe
Life's group health and life insurance business in Texas by reinsuring, on an assumption basis,
all of such business with The Centennial Life Insurance Company. See "Market Conduct
Activities ·- Policy Form Filings and Approvals" and "Subsequent Events-Sale of Group
Universal Health Bustness" above.
On October 13, 1994, TDI issued a further Consent Order which superseded the May
17, 1994 consent Order in its entirety. The October Order recited Universe Life's agreement
concerning the implementation of the Claire factors for reserving for the SBA and ordered that
Universe Life reduce the reported value of its subsidiary, AJA Instttance, Inc., to the lesser or
net worth (as determined in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles) or the
valuation amount reflected in the final report of this examination, provided that the adjustment
in the AIA Insurance carrying value would be made ratably over a three--ye.ar period beginning
December 31, 1994.
ld.ahQ. Based on the financial concerns raised by the preliminary examination results and
the issuance of the Texas Cease and Desist Order, the ldaho Department of Insurance
("Department") initiated an inquiry resulting in a Voluntary Agreement Concerning Supervisor,
dated April 26, 1994 between Universe Life and the Department. Under the Agreement,
Universe Life has provided financial and other information to the Department on a regular basis
SCHBDULB m • Page :J
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enable_ the Department..JQ.Jnf.ormally..-monitor...Uni:verse ..LJ.fc!.s-·.:finaooia1-·-GQDGition· -and
operations to assure that policyholders' interests were protected during the perio'd required to
resolve the financial and other examination issues. During the perlod of discussions, the
Department has approved Universe Life's. new GUH lII product, the transfer of Universe Life's
individual health insurance business to St.ates General Life Insurance Company and the transfer
of its group health ~nd. life insurance business to The Centennial Life Insurance Company.

· ""'" -

By agreement date.cl December 23, 1994, the Idaho Department approved Donna Claire's
gross premium valuation method and Ms. Claire's reserving factors for calculating SBA reserves
in accordance with her Asset Adequacy Report dated June 12, 1994. 'The Department agreed
that Universe Life would not be.required to restate its 1992 or 1993 Annual Statements and that
implementation of the Donna Claire reserve adjustment will be made prospectively, in
accordance with TDl's October 13, 1994 Consent Order, on~ quarterly basis beginning with the
third quarter of 1995 and ending December 31, 1996. The following table shows the effect of
the Donna Claire adjustments to Universe Life's reported aggregate reserve for accident and
health policies and to its capital and surplus at December 31, 1992, 1993 and 1994:

Capital & surplus reported by Univene Life:
Aggregate roaerve f!)r A & H policies
As reported
As calculated by Claire factor
Cbdre factor adjustmont
Capital & surplus after Claire faotor adjustment:

Wl

lm

1224

$ 5,418,748

$ S,140,830

$ 4,182,781

10,376,371
7,843,186

14,040,419
14,801,661
(
:Z~'Lal

9,519,581

z.sn.134

.i1.2s1.m

1~ma~ns

9,193,850
.(

~§~.:Z~ll

i~il2Z1SW!

In the December 23, 1994 agreement, the Idaho Insurance Department acknowledged
that, until July 1, 1995, the Idaho Insurance Code permits Universe Life to continue to report
its investment in AIA Insurance, Inc. at histoiical cost (subject to a 15 % of ass,ets limitation) on
its 1992, 1993, and 1994 Annual Statemenrs: Although permitted by Idaho statUte, this valuation
of AIA Insurance, Inc. deviates from the NAIC standards for investment in subsidiaries as set
forth in the NAIC Accounting Practices and Procedures Manual fer Ufe and Accident and
Health Insurance Companies. See "Valuation of AIA Insurance, Inc." above under the caption
"Comments on 1992 Financial Statements: Common Stock". On July 1, 1995, Universe Life
will be required to reduce the value of its investment in AJA Insurance, Inc., for statutory
accounting purposes, to the net book value of AIA Insurance, Inc (which was $2A24,097 at
December 31, 1992).
·

Ofber Sm. The following regulatory proceedings in other jurisdictions were
precipitated by the issuance of the Texas Cease and Desist Order and/or the preliminary
examination fmdings contained therein:
A Notic~ of Hearing and Order to Show Cause with Suspension Instanter .yas issued by
the Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner on April 6, 1994 based on the Texas Cease and Desist
Order. On May 26, 1994, by letter agreement based on the May 17, 1994 TDI Consent Order
and Universe Life's April 26, 1994 Voluntary Agreement with the Idaho Insurance Department,
the Oklahoma Department agreed to suspend and terminate the prior Notice and Order to Show·
SCHBDULE III • Page 4
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Cause and to allow Universe
Life to ~_ptJnue.
~9 .!9Ji_gt bunnes.s. fmm its..exis.ting..policy.holder
..... -··· -- .
associations.
.

. -··-- ····-·-·-··...--:-i--·-··· ···---

-~··-

An Order of Suspension based on the Texas Cease and Desist Order was issued by the
Illinois Department of Insurance on April 26, 1994. The Suspension Order was lifted by
Stipulation and Consent Order dated July 27, 1994, purSllant to which Universe Life agreed to
notify the Illinois Department before transacting new business in the state during the next three
years.

A notice to show cause regarding suspension from doing business in the State of
Mississippi was issued by th~ Mississippi Insurance Department on May 6, 1994, based on the
Texas Cease and Desist Order. Suspension of.Universe Life's certificate of authority was
initially stayed by the Department; however, on S~ber 8, 1994, a Suspension Order was
entered based upon the appearance that Universe Life was then in an·unsound condition.
The Alaska Insurance Department issued an Order suspending Universe Life's certificate
of authority on May 19, 1994, based on the Texas Cease and Desist Order. Universe Life
entered into an Agreement to Suspend New Sales on July 27, 1994; and the Alaska Insurance
Department withdrew the suspension order. Universe Life had not b~ writing new business
in Alaska, so the Agreement to Suspend New Sales has had no financial effect on Universe

Life's operations.
The Missouri Insurance Department i!sued a Notice of Institution of Case and Statement
of Charges dated June 2, 1994, based upon the Texas Cease and Desist Order. A hearing in the
matter has been continued indefinitely, to be re-set upon further notice to Universe Li~.
In June 1994, the California Insurance DePartment initiated an·informal inquiry based
on the Texas Cease and Desist Order. Universe Life entered into a confidendal voluntary
agreement to cease writing new business in California. Universe Life had not been writing new
business in California; so the confidential agreement has had· no financial effect. on Universe
Life's operations.
On June 6, 1994, a Suspension Order was issued by the Wyoming Department of
Insurance without prior notice or hearing, based on the Illinois Suspension Order. Based upon
subsequent withdrawal of the ntinois and Texas orders, Wyoming lifted the ~der of Suspension
and entered a Stipulation and Consent Order dated July 28, 1994, pursuant to which Vniverse
Life was permitted to continue solicitiitg its existing policyholder association but agreed not to
solicit other business in Wyoming without the Department's consent.

Universe Life voluntarily agreed to suspend new business in Oregon pending resolution
of the Oregon Insurance Department's concerns under a unique Oregon statute regarding
valuation of Universe Life's investment in AIA Insurance, Inc. A Consent Order was issued
June 30, 1994. A Suspension Order was issued August 23, upon expiration of the Consent
Order. Universe Life requested a hearingi and an Amended Suspension Order prohibiting new
sales was entered November 2, 1994.
A Notice of Summary Suspension was issued by the Iowa Division of Insurance on
August 15, 1994, based on failure of Universe Life to file its annual audited financial report by
SCHEDULE ill - Page S
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June 1, .1994 •. _(Thuuditor~s-tepo1t-on_Uni:v.er.se..Life~-l.g93-finaneial-statements-was-delayed·---- ·......._... ·pending Idaho's .determination of financial issues raised by the examination. A draft of the
audited financial statements had previously been provided to Iowa Division of Insurance.) The
Order of Suspension was rescinded and the adminJstrative proceeding dismissed on September
6, 1994. On January 6, 1995, the Division issued a Notice of Heanng to determine whether
Universe Life's surplus met s~tutory minimums. Outside counsel informed Universe Life on
April 10. 1995 that Iowa is dropping the action.
Universe Ufe entered into an Agreement with the Washington Insurance Dep~ent dated
August 18, 1994, in which Universe Life voluntarily agreed not to write any new business in
the. State without ·prior approval of the Commissioner, pending submission of information
establishing that Universe Life's financial condition is not detrimental to Washington
policyholders.
.
On September 9, 1994, the Utah Insurance Department issued a Notice of Informal
Adjudicative Proceeding summarily suspending Universe Life's Certificate of Authority for
failure to maintain minimum capital and surplus as calculated under unique Utah statutes•
. Universe Life's hearing request was withdrawn after the Department's ChiefExantiner advised
that the suspension order could be lifted upon informal presentation by Universe Life's
management after year-end demonstrating compliance with minimum capital and surplus
req_uirements.
The Nebraska Department contacted Universe Life on October 14, 1994, ooncerning
Universe Life's financial condition. Universe Life signed a Consent Order to suspend new sales
on October 28, 1994.

ftllMtCfll.,...
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CERTIFICATE OF CORPORATE STATUS
OF

THE UNIVERSE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

I, PETET. CENARRUSA, Secretary of State of the State of Idaho, hereby
certify that I am the custodian of the corporation records of this State.
I FURTHER CERTIFY That the records of this office show that the above
named corporation was incorporated under the laws of Idaho and was is.iued a
certificate of incorporation in Idaho on December 29, 1989 und~r the file number
C91082.
I FURTIIER CERTIFY That the· corporatioll is in good.standing on the

records of this office.
Dated: August 16, 1995

~(//1.~
SECRETARY OF STATE
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CERTIFICATE OF CORPORATE STATIJS
OF

FARMERS HEALTH ALLIANCE ADMINISTRATORS, INC.

1, PETET. CENARRUSA, Secretary of State of the State of Idaho, hereby
certify that I am the custodian of the corporation records of this State.

I FUR1HER CERTIFf That the records of this office show that the above
named corporation was incorporated under the laws of Idaho and was issued a
certificate ~f incorporation in Idaho on April 14, 1995 under the .file number
C110233.

I Ft:JRTimR CER1_1Ff That the 'corporation is in goodstanding on tlte
records of this office.
Dated: August 16, 1995

~(/1'~·
·-SECRETARY OF STA-TE
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----State- of Idaho _ _
CERTIF!CATEOFCORPORATESTATUS
OF

.AJA. INSURANCE, INC.

I, PETET. CENA.RRUSA, Secretary of State of the State of Idaho, hereby

certify that I am the cust?dian of the corporation records of this State.

I FURTHER CERTIFY That the recorO.s of this office show that the above
named corporation was incorporated under the laws of Idaho and was issued a
certificate of incorporation in Idaho on January 31, 1977 under t~e file number
C54973.
I FU'.F.TimR CERTIFY That the· corporation is in goodstanding on the

records o( this office.
Dated: A1.\gust 16, 1995

~(Ji'~
SECRETARY OF STATE
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EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED
300 North Sixth Street
Post Office Box 1368

Boise, Idaho 83701-1368
Telephone No.: (208) 344-8535
Facsimile No.: (208) 344--8542

FAX COVER SHEET
DATE: August 16, 1995
PAGES INCLUDING THIS SHEET: 15

TO:

Scott Bell and Ft"ank Taylor

NUMBER CALLED: (206) 587-2308

FROM: Richard Riley

MA TIER: 80550-4

I

~~O:

This is the final form of our opinion which you accepted by telephone this

~"""'°" aad which we have signed arul federal

expressed lo AIA for delivety at closing.

---J
If transmission is not properly received please call Savito at (208) 344-8535.

* * * • • •
Tbe informatiQn contained in this traMmission is attorney-client privill}ged, confidential and i.ntended only for the use
of the individual or entity named above. If tho rea,U;r <>f this tnOllsagc is not the intended recipient, you are horeby
notified that any dissemination, distribution or copyhtg of this oonununication ls strictly prohibited. 1f you have received
this communication in error, please notify us immediately by collect telephone and return tho original lI10338gO to \ll •t
the above add«as via U.S. Mail. We Will reinlburi6 you for p08Ulge. Thank you.
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Af'IORNEY:5 AND COUNSELOR~ ,.TI.Aw
CAPIYOl. P ... AK Pl.AZA

300 NOl'ITH Sl~TH 5TllEET
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Box

1~66

TltLEPHONE

(11'06) 3.tA•863!1
F°ACSIMILE

(208) 34••8542
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August 15, 1995

.JAMC:SL.. "S..:R"LIN
OrCOUN15Et.

Reed J. Taylor
P.O. Box 538

Lewiston ID 83501
Re;

Common Stock Redemption

Dear Mr. Taylor:
This opinion is being delivered to you pursuant to Section 2.5(j) of the Stock Redemption
Agreement dated July 22, 1995 ( "Agreement") by and between AJA Services Corporation, an
Idaho corporation (ft Company") and Reed J, Taylor • All capitalized terms not defined herein
shall have the respective meanings ascribe.d to them in the Agreement. The phrase "Transaction
Documents• refers collectively to the Agreement, together with the Note, the Pledge Agreement,
the Security Agreement, the Consulting Agreement and the Noncompetition Agreement, as such
documents are defined in the Agreement.

We have acte.d as general c0unsel for the Company in connection with the transactions
contemplated by the Agreement. As such general counsel, we have assisted in the negotiation,
and have examined executed counterparts (or photostatic copies of executed counterparts) of the
Agreement and other Transaction Documents.
In addition, we have examined originals, executed counterparts or copies of such
agreements, corporate records, instruments and certificates, certificate.-; of public authorities and

such matters of law as we have deemed necessary for the purpose of rendering the opinions set
forth herein. To the extent we deemed necessary for the purposes of this opinion, we have
relied upon (i) the statements and representations of the Company as to factual matters, (i.i) the
corporate records provided to us by the Company, and (iii) certificates and other documents

ohtained from public officials. We have. further relied as to factual matters on the representations
and warranties contained in the Agreement and the other Transaction Documents (including,
without limitation, Mr. Taylor's reptesentations in Article JV of the Agreement) and on the
Company's representations in Sche.dule III (attached) to the Agreement; and we have assumed
the completeness and accuracy of all such representations and warranties as to factual matters.
We have assumed the genuineness of all. signatures (other than those of the Company), the legal
capacity of Mr. Taylor to execute the Agreement and all other documents we have reviewed,
the authenticity of all documents submiued to us as originals, and the confonnity to original
documents of all documents submitted to us as certified, photostatic, reproduced or conformed
copies. We have further assumed that the Agreement and the other Transaction Documents have
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Reed J. Taylor
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been duly authorized, executed and delivered by Mr. Taylor and are enforceable against him in
accordance with their respective terms, and that the execution, delivery and performance of the
Agreement and the other Transaction Documents by Mr. Taylor does not and will not result in
a breach of, or constitute a default under, any agreement, instrument or other document to which
Mr. Taylor is a party, or any order, judgment, writ or dec.7ee applicable to such party to which
Mr. Taylor's property is subject.

Whenever our opinion with respect to the existence or absence of facts is indicated to be
bared on our knowledge, we are referring to the actual knowledge of R. M. Turnbow and
Richard A. Riley, who are the sole attorneys in Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen,

Chartered who have represented the Company during the course of our representation in this
transaction. Except as expressly set forth herein, we have not undertaken any independent legal
or factual investigation to determine the existence or absence of such facts, and no inference as
to our knowledge of the existence or absence of such facts should be drawn from such
representation.
Based upon and subject to our examination and assumptions as aforesaid and subject to
the qualifications hereinafter set forth, we are of the opinion that, except as set forth in the
attached Schedule Jn and/or the Schedules attached to the Agreement:
1.
The Company is a corporation duly organized and validly existing under
the laws of the State of Idaho. Based solely on the attached Certificates of Corporate Status
issued by the Idaho Secretary of State, the Company, The Universe Life Insurance Company
("Universe"), AJA Insurance, Inc. (" AIAI") and Farmers Health Alliance Administrators, Inc.
("Farmers") are corporations incorporated under the corporation laws of the State of Idaho ·and
in good standing on lhe records of the Idaho Secretary of State.
2.
The Company and its Subsidiaries have full corporate power and authority
to enter into, execute and deliver the Transactions Documents and to perform their respective
obligations thereunder; all corporate action on the part of Company and its Subsidiaries, and
their respective directors and shareholders, necessary for the authorization, execution, del1very
and performance by Company and its Subsidiaries of the Transaction Documents and the
consummation of the transactions contemplated thereby has been taken; and the Transaction
Documents have been duly executed and delivered by Company and its Subsidiaries. 111e
Transaction Documents constitute the valid and binding obligation of Company and it.~
Subsidiaries enforceable against them in accordance with their respective terms, except that
enforceability may be limited by (a} applicable bankruptcy, insolvency, moratorium,
reorganization, fraudulent transfer, receivership, conservatorship or similar laws affecting
creditor's rights generally, (b) the exercise of judicial discret1on in accordance with general
principles of equity (whether applied by a court of Jaw or equity) and (c) considerations of public
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policy.
3.
Neither the execution and delivery of the Transaction Documents by
Company and its Subsidiaries, nor the consummation of the transactions contemplated thereby,
will (a) conflict with or violate any provision of their respective Articles of Incorporation or
Bylaws, as amended; or (b) constitute a violation or default under any indebtedness, indenture,
mortgage, deed of trust, note, bond, license, lease agreement, or other material agrC".ement or
instrument to which Company or any of its Subsidiaries is a party or to which any of its assets
or the assets of its Subsidiaries may be subject; or (c) to the best of our knowledge, violate any
law, rule, license, regulation, judgment, order, ruling, or decree, including any insurance laws
or regulations of any jurisdiction to which Company or any of its Subsidiaries are subject,
governing or affecting the operation of Company or its Subsidiaries in any material respect.
Neither the execution and delivery of the Transaction Documents by Company and its
Subsidiaries, nor the consummation of the transactions contemplated thereby, will constitute an
event permitting termination of any material agreemeut or the acceleration of any indebtedness
of the Company or other liability, with or without notice or lapse of time, or result in the
creation or imposition of any lien upon the Collateral,

4.
No consent, authorization, approval or exemption by, or filing with, any
Person or any Governmental Authority is required in connection with the execution, delivery and
performance by Company and its Subsidiaries of the Transaction Documents, or1he taking of
any action contemplated thereby, except such as have been obtained prior to Closing.

5.
All of the currently outstanding Pledged Shares are owned beneficially and
of record by Company and, to the best of our knowledge, there are no warrants, options, or
other rights to purchase such Pledged Shares.
6.
Except for the lien of First Interstate Lien upon the First Interstate Shares,
and any interest in the Commission collateral created or gmnted in favor of The Centennial Life
Insurance Company pursuant to that certain Reimbursement Agreement dated August 11, 1995
among The Centennial Life Insurdnce Company, AIA Senrices Corporation, AIA Insurance,
Inc., The Universe Life Insurance Company and AIA MidAmerica, Inc., the Collateral is free
and clear of all pledges, liens, encumbrances, security interests, equities, claims, or options.

Upon delivery of certificates representing the Pledged Shares of AIAI and Farmers to
Shareholder at Closing, Shareholder shall have at Closing a perfected first priority security
interest in such Pledged Shares.
7.
.To our knowledge, there are no claims, actions, suits, proceedings or
;nvestigations pending or threatened against or relating to Company or any of its Subsidiaries,
at law or in equity before or by any Governmental Authority, nor has any such action, suit,
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proc:eeding or investigation been pending durl.ng the three-year period preceding the date hereof.
Neither Company nor any of its Subsidiaries is in default with respect to any adjudicatory order,
writ, injunction or decree of any Governmental authority, and neither Company nor any of its
Subsidiaries is a party to any cease and desist order, supervisory agreement or arrangement,
consensual or otherwise, with any Governmental Authority.
The foregoing opinions are limited to the laws and regulations of the State of Idaho
(excluding the principles of conflicts of laws); and we have not·considered and expressed no
opinion on the laws or regulations of any other jurisdiction. This opinion is rendered only with
respect to the laws and the rules, regulati.ons and orders (excluding the principles of conflicts
of laws) of the State of Idaho that are in effect as of the date hereof. We assume no
responsibility for updating this ppinion to take into account any event, action, interpretation or
change of law occurring subsequent to the date hereof that may affect the validity of any of the
opinions expressed herein.
The enforceability opinion expressed in opinion
following additional qualifications:

12

of this letter is subject to the

(i)
The terms of any commission agreement, lockbox agreement or other
account agreement which may affect the Commission Collateral, the rights of the parties
(other than Company or any of its Subsidiaries) to any such agreement, and any claim
or defense of such parties against the Company or any of its Subsidiaries rising under or
outside any such agreement.

(ii)
The qualification that certain rights, remedies and waivers contained in the
Transaction Docum~nts may be rendered ineffective, or be limited, by applicable Idaho
laws or judicial decisions governing such rights, remedies and waivers; but the inclusion
of such rights, remedies and waivers does not affect the validity or enforceability of other
provisions of the Transaction Documents and, in the event the Company or any of its
Subsidiaries does not comply with the material terms of the Transaction Documents, Mr.
Taylor may exercise reme.dies that would normally be available under Idaho law to a
secured party provided Idaho law applies and Mr. Taylor proceeds in accordance with
such law.
.

(iii)
We express no opinion with respect to the perfection or the relative
priorily of the security interests granted to Mr. Taylor in the Commission Collateral.
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206 587 2308:# 6116

Reed J. Taylor
August 15, 1995
Page 5

This opinion is furnished by us solely for your benefit for use in connection with the
Transaction Documents and tlle transactions contemplated thereby; and it may not be furnished
or quoted to, or relied upon, by any other person.
Very truly yours,

sl
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AIA SERVICES CORPORATION
BOARD OF DIRECTORS MEETING
July 18, 1995
special meeting of the Board of Directors of AIA services corpor:ation was held, pursuant to notice, on July 18, 1995. Chairman,
Reed J. Taylor, called the meeting to order at 9:30 a.m. PDT, in
the third floor conference. room of The Universe Life Insurance
Company, in Lewiston, Idaho.
·

·A

·Roll ·call was taken and the following Directors were

pre~ent:

R~ed J. Taylor
R. John Taylor
Paul D. Durant
Daniel L. Spickler
Bruce SWeaney
Al cooper
CUmer Green

Others in attendance were:
Rick L Johnson
JoLee Duclos
Dick Riley
Richard Campanaro
Suzi Schafer

I
1
I

The first order of business to come·before the Board was approval
of the minutes for the March 7, 199!5, meeting. '?here was a motion
and .second to approve tha minutes as presente4. The motion passed
unanimously.

i

I

Rick Johnson presented the consolidated financials ~or year-end
1994.
He advised the board there is no opinion from KMPG Peat
Marwick at this time. First quarter financials for Universe Lif'e
and Great Fid~Iity Life, as well as on a consolidated basis, were
also discussed.
Mr. Johnson also presented . the preliminary
consolidated second quarter financials to the board. It was noted
the second.qilarter figures do. not include any gain made on the
centennial · transfer.
The transfer of certain Long Term care
business to Duncanson & Holt on a reinsurance basis was discussed,
as was ·the statutory write down of AIA Insurance, Inc. '.rhere wa$
• motion and second to approve the Treasurer's Repor~. Tbe motion
p~ssed unanimously.

I
t
~

I

Rich Campanaro then introduced Bill Tarbart, as head.of the new
marketing team.
Mr. Tarbart told the board about his business
background and briefly outlined the key agents and key states in
his marketing plan. The board was advised that we also plan to
expand into other areas~ such as disability, life and annuities, so
we can offer our farm niche a.complete line of financial/insurance
Minutes of the Board of Directors
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choices. The company's current practice of maintaining agents as
"captive" ~nd future plans for possible chanqe was discussed.
The board was advised that the company would soon be hiring
Willamette to perform the appraisal on th~ ESOP plan, and that the
profit sharing was doing really well this year. Recent real estate
purchases by the Plan were also discussed.
·
·

CWner Green requested a report on the pro9J1.osis of the C share
offering.
Richard Campanaro brought the board up to date.
He
pointed out that a major chanqe in the current offering compared to
the March offering is we're sellinq the ma~ketinq company, not the"
insurance company.
A resolution to amend the comP,any•s medical pian was reviewed by
Paul Durant explained the resolut_ion and
the board members.
answered questions. After proper motion and second, the r.esolution
unanimously passed.

I

The followinq slat~ of officers was presented. After motion and
second properly made, the slate was ~anilitously elected.

I

Reed J. Taylor·
R.. John 'l'aylor
Paul D. Durant ·
Daniel L. Spickler
Rick L Johnson
JoLee K. DUclos
Bo))ette Ruddell
Sherry L. Ro))~rts

Chairman/CEO

Chairman/COO
Executive-vice President
Vice Presi4ent/secretary
Vice President/Treasurer
Assistant Secretary
ASsistant Secretary
ASsistant secretary
Pre~i4ent/Vice

I
I

·The reinsurance of additional GUH business with 'l'he Centennial Life
Insurance Company was discussed.
·
After luncheon adjournment, the board reconvened.
Dick Riley
detailed the resolutions related to the proposed transaction.

I

Some points of discu~sion were as follows:
The legality of the Disclosure statement to Shareholders was
discussed. Dan· Spickler, General Counsel, and Mr. Riley on behalf
of his law firm, both stated they believed it met or exceeded the
legal requirements.· Cumer Green asked whether there was anything
included in or omitted from ·the statement which could be a
legitimate cause for a lawsuit. .He was advised that was correct.

l

1-

i

I

Resolution 1:

..

i.1 This is.basically for housekeeping and is a ratification
of actions.

:1·l:

if.,
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i

!

I.

-----...

1.2 Authorizes amendment of the Articles of Incorporation to
increase the common shares, reduce their par value, and a sto¢k
split.
1.3 Abandons tbe111erqer and related transactions proposed at
the March 7, 1995,_ special meeting of the board of directors.
1.4 Approves . and ratifies the In"l.l'estment Agreement
·authorizes issuance of warrants to Messrs. Cashman ~nd Beck.

and

1. 5 Authorizes offering of additional shares of Series C
Preferred Stock and Warrants.
·
1. 6

Authorizes the corporation to incur additional bank debt.·

After proper motion and second, Resolution #1 passed.
and is attached to these minutes.

,,..--..._

unanimous~y,

Resolutions 2 and 3 were discussed simultaneously. Discussion was
held regarding Reed Taylor's $1.5 million cash down payment and
whether the funds to be received by Universe Life would be
sufficient to dividend AIA Insurance to AIA Services Corporation.
The principals to the aqreement, Reed Taylor, Cumer Green for Donna
Taylor, and John Taylor for AIA Services Corporation will siqn an
agreement as of this date setting forth how t?ie funds would be
distributed.
such letter agreement will be lodqed with the
corporate secretary.
·
.

I
I

·I

.

This record will also reflect· that the resolution states Reed
Taylor will receive a consulting fee of $145,000 per year for.three
years in lieu of the override commission previously contemplated,
while the Investment Agreement reflects he will receive $14 7 ,.ooo
per year. The letter. aqreement between the principals .-will also
address that issue.
After proper motion and second, Resolution #2 passed by majority.
cwner Green abstained from the vote.
After proper motion .and
second, Resolution #3 passed unanimously. Both resolutions are
attached to these minutes.
·
After discussion, Resolution #4 was amended to indicate " ••• the
corporation shall contribute at lea~t $1.5 million and as much as
$2 • O million · to . the capital of the corporation's wholly-owned
insurance s~bsidiary, The Universe Life Ii:isurance company •.• "
··
Af.ter proper motion and second., Resolution #4 passed unanimously as
amended, and is attached to these minutes.

I

I
I
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J

Discussion on Resolution #5 included. review by the board of
handout showing possible stock issuance. It was confirmed that
Reed Taylor would receive $1.5 million and Donna Taylor $700,000
before R_ichard Campanaro would be allowed to exer.cise his option.
A~ter

proper motion and ~econd, Resolution #5 passed unanimously
and is attached to these minutes.

[

After discussion Resolution #6 was amended as followsl
•. ·
" ••• promissory note payable to Reed J. Taylor, the July 18, 1995,
letter agreement with the holder of the ·series A Preferred
Stock ••• "
After proper motion and second, Resolution #6 passed unanimously as

am.ended and is attached to these·minutas.

There being no further business, the meeting was adjourned at 3:58
p.m.

I

I

I
'
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MINUTES OF A SPECIAL MEB'l'ING OF SBAREHOLDEnS
o:r.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION
March 7, 1995, 3:0S a.m., offices of Eberle, Berlin, et al.,
North Sixth Street, Boise, Idaho.
.
.
order
atock
or by

3~
...J

:J

)O

A ·special shareholders meeting of the Corporation was called to
by President, R. John -raylor. Of the 973,333.5 shares of common
issued and outetandin9, 932,925 .07 were represented either in person
proxy. A quorum was declared present.
.

The following persons were present:

·

·

·

Stan Sturtz representing the ASOP
Stan Sturtz representing the ESOP ..
Paul D. Durant
·
Mary I(. Froat
Bruce Sweeney
R. John Taylor
Reed J. Taylor
Rockwell s. Wilson
Daniel L. Spickler
JoLee K. Duclos
Richard campana.ro
Michael <::ashman
Jim Hansen

I
I

John Taylor explained the proposed transactions and required Form A
filings which are expected to be finalized by early May.
Richard
Campanaro reported on the .J. G. Kinnard & Company offering. ':rha 111inimwil
offering is expected by week's end and all "C" shares are purchased.
Rook Wilson questioned John Taylor'& acquisition of 800,000 shares
of common stock, which Mr. Taylor explained was coDipensation offered in
his employme~t contract.

I
I

Mr. Wilson asked why current shareholders had nOt been given the
opportunity to purchase shares. The minimum investment requirements and
qualification of proposed invest9rs was explained.
Mr. Wilson then questioned what he believed to be

l

a 360\ dilution of

the stock, from $3.55 to $1.21 at book value •. Mr. Taylor explained that
that there would be a 50\ dilution .in the percentage ownership of the
company.
.
.
. Mr. Wilson asked what price the approximately 14,000 ESOP shares
were sold at on December 31, 199~, and was told they were·aold for the
appraised market price. · ·
·

i

Past problems related to the ASOP were discussed;. The redemption
and vesting schedules were discussed.
..

Ii

. Mr. Wilson asked whether the CAP plan was shown as income .and was
advised it was, however, the company discontinued being the insurer for
new business for the plan as of January 31, 1995.
·
·

Wilaon asked whether a minority stockholder could be a· director,
and was told any person nominated by the shareholders and reoeivinq enough
votes could be a director.
Mr.

il

--.....
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Post-merger. stockholder rights were discussed and share~oldArfl

[

t:.teH

adviaad there would be no piggy•back rights. The possibility of a future
public offerinq was di•cuased and it• at'fect on the minority shareholders.

John Taylor again reviewed the proposed changes,_ and Dan Spickler
explained disaenter•a riqhts. Th• shareholders were al.so advised that the
Board of Directors had not approved the ·changes to the Articles of
Incorporation affeotin9 the preferred stock.
·
.

A shareholder vote was then taken.

p.m.

·~·.

The'shareholders approved the

[reorganization plan by a vote of 926,698.07 •yea• to 6,688.09

l

J

There being no further business, the meeting was adjourned at 3:57

I, Daniel L. Spickler, Secretary of AIA Services Corporation,
certify that this is a true and cor et copy of the minutes of the
shareholders meetin~ of the corpora.ti
uly 1!elcl Marc
1_99 •

,..---..,.,_
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AIA SERVICES CORPORATION
One Lewis Clark Plaza
Lewiston, idaho 83501
NOTICE OF SPECIAL MEETJNG OF SHAREHQLDERS

invi~

[

You are cordia.Uy
to attend a special meeting of shareholders of AI.A Services]·
Corporation ("Company"). The meeting will be held at the of~ces of Eberle, Berlin, Kading,
Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered; 300 North Sixth Street, Second Floor, Boise, Idaho on
Tuesday, March 7, 1995 at 3:00 p.m. MST. ·
We hope that you will be able to join us; but whether or not you plan to attend, it would
·
be helpful if you would sign the enclosed proxy and return it in the envelope provi~ed. Please
do this immediately so that we can save time and expense of contacting you again. Returning
your proxy .will not prevent you from voting iri person if you attend the meeting, but will assure
that your vote will be counted if you are unable to attend.
·
The meeting will be held for the purpose of considering and voting upon certain
corporate transactions necessary to. implement the plan adopted by the Company's Board of
Directors, subject to shareholder approval, to reorganize the Company's capitalization,
ownership and operations. The proposed reorganization includes the following transactions:

. 1.

Amendment of the. Company's Articles of Incorporation ("Amendment")
to authorize 735,000 shares of Series B' 10% Preferred Stock, 150,000 ·
shares of Series C 103 Preferred Stock, Series B Warrants to purchase
up to 22.643 of the Company's Common Stock and Series C WarrantS
to purchase up to 10.4% of the Company's· Common Stock.

2.

Merger of RJ Hold~ngs Corp. with and into the Company ("Merger")
pursuant to the terms and conditions summarized in the enclosed
Disclos1:1re Statement; and ratification of RI Holdings Corp. employment
agreements with R. John Taylor and Richard W. Campanaro.

3.

· Issuance of the newly authorized Series B and Series C Preferred Stock
and related Series B and Series C Warrants pursuant to a private
placement conducted.by J. G. Kinnard and Company, Incor:P,orated.

4.

Redemption of 500,000 of Reed·J. Taylor's 613,494 shares of Company's
Common Stock for $7.5 million; application of the proceeds of sale of
the Series C Preferred Stock and Warrants to the $1.5 million down
payment of the redemption price for Reed J. Taylor's Common Stock;
issuance of the Company's $6 million promissory note for the balance of
the redemption price for Mr. Taylor's Common Stock; and approval of
related transactions with Mr. Taylor.

5.

Application of a por~on· of the proceeds of sale of the Series. B Preferr

NOTICE OF SPECIAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS - Page I
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Stock and Warrants to the partial or complete redemption of the
outstanding Series A Stated Value PreferrCd Stock. ·
6.

Contribution of at least $4.2 million of the proceeds of sale of the Series
B Preferred Stock and Warrants to the Company's subsidiary, The
Universe Life Insurance Company ("ULIC"); and distribution of ULIC's
subsidiary, AJA Insurance, Inc., to th·e Company.

l.

7.

Ratificatiqn of an am~ndment of the Company's Bylaws to provide that the
number of directors may range from seven (7) ·to fifteen (15) and to
authori~ the Board of Directors to determine tlle number of directOr~ by
resolution.

8.

All other corporate actions necessary to recapitalize and reorganize the
Company (including, without limitation, all necessary regulatory filings
to obtain approval of change of control of <;::ompany' s insurance
subsidiaries) ·in accordance with the reorganization plan approved by
Board of Directors,'
·

Accompanying this Notice is a Disclosure Statement which SUllJ.marizes the various transactions
included in the proposed plan of reorganization and describes your right, in connection with
certain of the proposed transactions, to dissent and obtain payment for your shares by complying
strictly with the terms ofldaho Code Sections 30-1-80 and 30-1-81. Copies of these statutes are
attached.
·
. PI~se sign and date the enclosed proxy and return it promptly, so that your shares may
be represented. If you attend this meeting, you ·may vote either in person or by your proxy.
If you have any questions, please do. not hesitate to contact us.

DANIEL L. SPICKLER
Secretary

. Lewiston, Idaho
February 9, .1995
.Attachments
D.isclosure Statement
Proxy

NOTICE OF SPECIAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS - Page 2
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AIA SERVICES CORPORATION
BOARD OF DIRECTORS MEETING
January 12, 1995
A special meeting of the Board of Directors of AIA Services corporation was held, pursuant to notice, on January 12, 1995. Chairman,
Reed J. Taylor, ealled the meeting to.order at 8:10 a.m •. PST, in
the.second floor conference room of The universe Life Insurance
Com~any, Lewiston, Idaho.
Roll call

w~s

taken and the following Directors were present:

Reed. J. Taylor
. R. John Taylor

Paul D. Durant
Daniel L. Spickler .
Bruce Sweeney by telephone
Al cooper by telephone
CUlner Green by telephone
Others in·attendance were:
Rick L Johnson
JoLee Duclos
Dick Riley by telep~one
Mickey TUrnhow by telephone

[

I

John Taylor explained the private placement offering with J.G.
Kinnard & company, to include chan(Jes in the stock structure,
redemption of Reed Taylor's stock and proposed pay-off of the
preferred stockholder's debt. Mr. Taylor also described the new
marketing team ~eaded by Richard Campanaro.
.

.

Al Cooper requested that the 9ffering Memorandwn be discussed in
·greater detail( and it was. Dick Riley than described the investor
qualifications.

t

'i

CUmer Gree~ questioned the exposure of the directors. Mr. Riley
responded that it was the obligation of the directors to exercise
due diligence in review of the docUltlents and understanding the
transaction. Mr. Riley also advised that prior to the· sale of.any
securities, the law firm of Eberle Berlin, et al. must give an
opinion that all acts have been performed in accordance with the
law. Mr. Green requested confirmation that the opinion would not
be given unless it was true, and Mr. Riley confirmed that fact.
John Taylor advised the board that proposed.new directors for the
B and C stocks arre James W. Hansen and Michael Cashman. He gave
a brief background description for each director.' Mi. Taylor also
advised the board Of Various.meetiriqs he would attend to promote
the offering.
Minutes of the Board of Directors
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l
qumer Green requested copies of the financial statements related to
the offering, which Rick Johnson agreed to forward. He will send
copies to all directors and copies will also be attached to the
final offering.
The board was advised about the ability C>f
minority shareholders.to exercise their dis~enter's rights •
.,:rohn Taylor reviewed the resolution · attached hereto and
incorporated herein by reference, item by item. Upon proper motion
and second, the majority of directors approved the resolution.
cilmer Green abstained from voting.
·

There being no further business,

a.m.

Minutes of the Board of Directors
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OFT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND

REED l TAYLOR., a single person,

ICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
i.-·~~UNTYOFNEZPERCE

)
)

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CV07-00208

)
)

v.

./f"""~ "·

)
)

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AJA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof,
BRIAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho
corporation; and JAMES BECK and
CORRINE BECK, individually and the
community.property comprised thereof,
Defendants.
CONNIE W. TAYLOR and JAMES BECK,
Counterclaimants,

v.
REED J, TAYLOR, a single person,
Counterdefendant.

JUDGMENT

)

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
')
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

.·.

Taylor v. AJA et aL
Judgment
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On June 17, 2009, the Court entered an Order granting Defendants, Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment after the Court found the 1995 stock redemption agreement between Reed
Taylor and AIA Corporation was unlawful and unenforceable under the illegality doctrine where
the agreement was entered into in violation of then existing I.C. § 30-1-6. Based on the Court's

ruling, it is hereby the Order of the Court that the following Causes of Action found in Plaintiff's
Fifth Amended Complaint are dismissed as to all Defendants:

[

a) First Cause of Action - Breaches of Contract
b) Third Cause of Action - Misrepresentations/Fraud

-:J

c) Fourth Cause of Action - Conversion

d) Sixth Cause of Action - Constructive Trust
e) Eighth Cause of Action - Specific Performance ·
f) Tenth Cause of Action - Breach of Implied Covenants of Good Faith and Fair

Dealing

The Judgment of the Court is hereby entered as to some, but not all, of Plaintiff's claims
asserted in his Fifth Amended Complaint. The Court, nevertheless, directs that tbisis a final
Judgment as to those claims listed above, finding there is no just reason for delay of such final
Judgment.

Dated this

Taylor v. AJA et al.
Judgment

_j_

day of September 2009.

2
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RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE
With respect to the issues detennined by the above Judgment, it is hereby CERTIFIED,
in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P ., that the Court has determined that there is no just reason
for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the Court has and does hereby direct that the

above judgment shall be a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be
taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules.

Dated this

_L day of September 2009.

Taylor v. AJA et.al.
Judgment
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing Judgment was:
_ _ hand delivered via court basket, or faxed

_Lmailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at-Lewiston, Idaho, this 1!!day of
September, 2009, to:

Roderick Bond
7 SHowardSt
Spokane, ViA 99201

David R. Risley
Randall, Blake & Cox
POBox446
Lewiston,ID 83501

Michael S. Bissell
7 SHoward St
Spokane, ViA 99201

James Gatziolis
Charles E. Harper
Quarles and Brady LLP
300 North.LaSalle St., Ste 4000
Chicago IL 60654

Michael E. McNichols ~ ~
Clements, Brown & McNichols ~
PO Box 1510
Lewiston,ID 83501
David A. Gittins
PO Box 191
Clarkston, ViA 99403

Charles Brown
PO Box 1225

Lewiston, ID 83501

GaryD. Babbitt
DJohnAshby
Hawley, Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
PO Box 1617
Boise, ID 83

Taylor v. AIA, et al.
Judgment
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-~~TICLESOFAMENDMENT

sFf'.=i. ~y·r TQ'mE ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION
~;;; ;.;i "- .; ' .• . .. I
OF
AJA SERVICES CORPORATION

Pursuant to the provisions of §30-1·58, §30-1-59 and §30-1·61 of the Idaho Business
Corporation Act, the undersigned corporation adopts the following ArtkJ.es of Amendment to its

'

.

.

Articles of Incorporation, as filed on December 20, 1983 and previously amended on October 14,
1986, December 29, 1987, April 11, 1995 and August 3, 1995.
FIRST: The name of the corporation is AJA SERVICES CORPORATION.

SECOND: On December 14, 1995, the shareholders of the corporation adopted and
approved the following Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation of A1A Services
Corporation, pursuant to which Section 4.3.3 of Article Fourth was amended by replacing it in its
entirety.
"AMENDED AND RESTATED ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION
OF
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION

Except for the amendment of Section 4.3 .3 of Article Fourth by replacing it in its entirety,
these· Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation of AIA Services Corporation correctly set
forth without change the corresponding provisions of the original Articles of Incorporation as
hereinbefore filed on December 20, 1983 and amended on October 14, 1986, December 29, 1987,
April 11, 1995 and August 3, 1995; and these Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation,
including the amended Article Fourth, supersede the original Articles of Amendment and all
previous amendments thereto.

The name of the corporation is AJA SERVICES CORPORATION.
IDIHI SECIETlllY tF STA1E
DATE O:S/08/1996 0900

SECOND

60950

2

The period of its duration is perpetual.

t•

C< 11 6.1564
CISTt l0168
AMEND PROF'

30.00•

30.00

ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT· Page 1
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4.2.7 Liquidation Preference. In.case of the voluntary liquidation or dissolution
of the corporation, the holder of Series A Preferred Stock shall have the right to be paid in full,
before any amount shall be paid to the owners of the Common Stock or to the owners of the Series
C Preferred Stock, as follows:

$8.00 per share if the liquidation price is paid on or before September
14, 1990.
$8.50 per share if the liquidation price is paid after September 14,

1990 and on or before September 14, 1993.

$10.00 per share if the liquidation price is paid after September 14,
1993.
In case of the involuntary liquidation or dissolution of the corporation, the holder of Series A
Preferred Stock shall have the right to be paid $10.00 per share, in full, before any amount shall be
paid to the owners of the Common Stock or to the owners of the Series C Preferred Stock After
payment to the holders of the Series A Preferred Stock of the full preferential amounts hereinabove
provided. the holders of the Series A Preferred Stock as such shall have no right or claim to any of
the remaining assets of the corporation either upon any distribution of such assets or upon
dissolution, liquidation or winding up; and the remaining assets to be distributed. if any, upon a
distribution of such assets or upon dissolution, liquidation or winding up, may be distributed among
the holders of the Series C Preferred Stock and the Common Stock in accordance with the provisions
of this Article Fourth.
4.2.8 Limited VotinK Riahts. The Series A Preferred Stock shall have no right
(except as required by law or as provided by Section 4.2.12 of this Article Fourth) to receive notice
of or to vote at any regular or special meeting of stockholders, except that the holders of a majority
of the shares of Series A Preferred Stock shaJl have the right, voting separately as a class, to elect
one director to the board of directors of the corporation.

4.2.9 Covenants. So long as any shares of Series A Preferred Stock are outstanding,
and except with the consent of the holders of a majority of the outstanding shares of Series A
Preferred Stock.
(a)
Common Stock. The corporation shall not issue any Common Stock for less than book value
(determined as of the end of the immediately preceding fiscal year), except for Common Stock
issued to pay a dividend payable solely in shares of Common Stock or issued to employees or agents
pursuant to incentive stock option or bonus plan.
(b)
Preferred Stock. The corporation shall issue no Preferred Stock or securities
convertible into such stock, other than the Series A and Series C Preferred Stock.

Indebtedness. The corporation will not, and will not permit any of its
(c)
Subsidiaries to, directly or indirectly, create, incur, assume, guaranty or otherwise become or remain
directly or indirectly liable with respect to, any Indebtedness, except:
ARTICLES OF AMENDMENf ·Page 4
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(1)
The corporation may remain liable in respect of Indebtedness
outstanding on the date of adoption of this Article Fourth by the corporation's shareholders.

(2)
The corporation and its Subsidiaries may become and remain liable
with respect to Indebtedness that is not secured by a Lien on any of the assets of the
corporation or its Subsidiaries, provided that the aggregate principal amount of such
unsecured Indebtedness shall not exceed Consolidated Net Worth less goodwill of the
corporation at any time; and
(3)
The corporation and its Subsidiaries may become and remain liable
in respect of Indebtedness secured by any of the following Liens:
(i)
Liens for taxes, assessments or governmental charges or
claims the payment of which is not yet delinquent or is being contested in good faith,
if such reserve or other provision, if any, as shall be required by generally accepted
accounting principles, consistently applied, shall have been made therefor;
(ii)
Statutory Liens of landlords and lines of carriers,
warehousemen, mechanics, materialmen and other liens imposed by law incurred in
the ordinary courses of business for sums not yet delinquent or being contested in
good faith, if such reserve or other appropriate provision, if any, as shall be required
by generally accepted accounting principles, consistently applied shall have been
made therefor;
(iii)
Liens incurred or deposits made in the ordinary course of
business in connection with worker's compensation. unemployment insurance and
other types of social security, or to secure the performance of tenders, statutory
obligations, surety and appeal bonds, bids, leases, governmental contracts,
performance and return-of-money bonds and other similar obligations (exclusive of
obligations for the payment of borrowed money);

(iv)
Any attachment or judgment Lien; proyided that if the
judgment it secures exceeds $250,000 (alone or when aggregated with all other
judgments secured by Liens permitted by this clause (vi)), such judgment shall,
within forty-five (45) days after the entry thereof: have been discharged or execution
thereof stayed pending appeal, or shall have been discharged within forty-five (45)
days after the expiration of any such stay;
(v)
Easements, rights-of-way, restrictions and other similar
charges or encumbrances not interfering with the ordinary conduct of the business
of the corporation or any ofits Subsidiaries;
(vi)

Any interest or title of a lessor under any lease;

(vii)
Any Lien existing on any asset of any corporation at the time
such corporation becomes a subsidiary if such Lien was not created in contemplation
of such event;
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(viii) Any Lien on any asset securing Indebtedness incurred or
assume for the purpose of financing not more than Eighty.five percent (85%) of the
cost of acquiring such assets; provided that such line attaches to such asset
concurrently with or within ninety (90) days after the acquisition thereof,
(ix)
Any Lien on any asset of any corporation existing at the time
such corporation is merged into or consolidated with the corporation or a subsidiary,
if such Lien was not created in contemplation of such event;

(x)
Any Lien existing on any asset prior to the acquisition thereof
by the corporation or a Subsidiary, if such Lien was not created in contemplation of
such acquisition;
(xi)
Any Lien arising out of the refinancing. extension. renewal or
refunding of any Indebtedness secured by any Lien permitted by any of.the foregoing
clauses of this Section 4.2.9(c); proyided that the amount of such Indebtedn~ is not
increased and that ·such Indebtedness is not secured by any additional assets; and

(xii) Liens not otherwise permitted by the foregoing clauses of this
Section 4.2.9(c) (including, without limitation, Liens on stock of Subsidiaries,
whether consolidated or unconsolidated) securing Indebtedness in an aggregate
principal amount of any time outstanding not to exceed ten percent {100/o) of the
difference between Consolidated Net Worth and the amount of the goodwill of the
corporation.
( d)

Cow orate Existence.. The corporation will maintain its corporate existence

and will not liquidate, wind up or dissolve itself (or suffer any liquidation or dissolution), or enter

into any transaction of merger or consolidation with any Person (including any Subsidiary) unless
(i) this corporation is the surviving corporation following any such merger or consolidation, and (ii)
the Consolidated Net Worth of the surviving corporation immediately foJlowing such merger or
consolidation equals or exceeds the Consolidated Net Worth of this corporation immediately prior
to such merger or consolidation.
Sale of Assets. The corporation will not, and will not permit any of its
Subsidiaries to, convey, sell, lease, transfer or otherwise dispose of all or any material part of its
business, property or assets, whether now owned or hereafter acquired, except:
(e)

(1)
The corporation and its Subsidiaries may convey, sell, lease, transfer or otherwise dispose
of investment assets in the ordinary course of business;
(2)
The corporation and its Subsidiaries may sell or otherwise dispose of
Capital Assets or real property if the asset so disposed of is concurrently replaced by a
substantially equivalent asset having a value equal to or greater than the assets disposed of;
~.

(3)
The corporation and is Subsidiaries may seIJ or otherwise dispose of
obsolete or worn out property in the ordinary course of business;
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(4)
The corporation and its Subsidiaries may sell and lease back any
newly acquired asset for the purpose of financing the acquisition of such asset and securing
the repayment oflndebtedness, provided that such Indebtedness shall not exceed eighty-five
percent (85%) of the cost of such asset and is otherwise permitted by the covenants
contained in this Article Fourth; and

(5)
The corporation and its Subsidiaries may sell or otherwise dispose of
any of their other assets; proyided that any such sale or other disposition is made for the fair
market value of such assets.
(t)
Acq.uisjtions. The corporation will not, and will not permit any of its
Subsidiaries to, acquire by purchase or otherwise all or substantially all the business, property or
fixed assets, or the stock or other evidence of beneficial ownership, of any Person unless,
immediately prior to and after giving effect to such transaction, no violation of any of the covenants
or other provisions contained in this Article Fourth shall have occurred and be continuing or would
be caused by such acquisition.

(g)
Transactions with Shareholders and Affiliates. The corporation will not, and
will not permit any of its Subsidiaries to, directly or indirectly, enter into or permit to exist any
transaction (including, without limitation, the purchase, sale, lease, loan or exchange of any property
or the rendering of any service) with any director or officer or any holder of equity securities of the
corporation, or with any Affiliate of the corporation or of such director, officer or holder, on terms
that are less favorable to the corporation or that Subsidiary, as the case may be, than those which
might be obtained at the time from Persons who are not such a director, officer, holder or Affiliate;
proyiq~ that the foregoing restriction shall not apply to (i) any transaction in effect at the date of
adoption of this Article Fourth by the corporation's shareholders; (ii) any transaction between the
corporation and any of its wholly-owned Subsidiaries or between any of its wholly-owned
Subsidiaries; (iii) compensation (net of amounts contributed or repaid to the corporation or any
Subsidiary or to Lewiston Land Company and contributed or repaid to the corporation or any
Subsidiary), by way of salary or bonus, paid to director or officers of the corporation in an amount,
as to any one individual, not greater than the greater of $400,000 or the total compensation paid in
calendar year 1986; (iv) compensation paid to any director or officer of the corporation in amounts
equal to income tax liability of such director or officer attributable to transactions involving the
corporation, AI.A., Inc., AIA Travel Services, Inc., AIA Travel, Inc., Lewiston Land Company,
AIA Bancard Services Corporation or Taylor Brothers Aircraft on or before January 1, 1988 or to
other personal income tax liability of such director or officer for tax years ended before January 1,
1988; or (v) any loan to or account receivable from an officer, director or stockholder which is
repaid in full at least annually on or before the last day of the fiscal year.
(h)
Consolidated Net Worth. The corporation will not permit Consolidated Net
Worth at any date to be less than the number of shares of Series A Preferred Stock outstanding at
such date multiplied by $10.00 per share.
(i)
Dividend Restricticm. The corporation will not, directly or indirectly, declare,
order, make or set apart any sum for payment of any dividend in respect of its Common Stock (other
than a dividend payable solely in shares of Common Stock), except that the corporation may declare
and pay Common Stock dividends in an aggregate amount not exceeding the Dividend Availability ·
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Amount.

G)
Debt/Equity Ratio. Neither the corporation nor any Subsidiary will incur any
new Indebtedness (other than Indebtedness permitted by Section 4.2.9(c)(xi) of this Article Fourth)
if, at the time of incurring such Indebtedness, the ratio of Consolidated Long Tenn Debt to
Consolidated Net Worth exceeds, or such additional Indebtedness would cause such ratio to exceed,
3.6 to 1.0.
(k)
Debt Service Coyemge. Neither the corporation nor any Subsidiary wi11 incur
any new Indebtedness (other than Indebtedness permitted by Section 4.2.9(c)(xi) ohhis Article
Fourth) if, at the time .ofincurring such Indebtedness, the ratio of (i) Consolidated Net Income plus
depreciation and amortization expenses plus compensation contributed or repaid to the corporation,
any Subsidiary, Lewiston Land Company or AIA Travel Services, Inc. during the immediately
preceding fiscal year of the corporation, divided by (ii) current maturities of Long Tenn Debt is, or
such additional Indebtedness would cause such ratio to be, less than .8 to 1.0.

4.l.10 Definitions. For the purpose of Section 4.2.9 of this Article Fourth, the
following terms shall have the following meanings:
"Affiliate", as applied to any Person, shall mean any other Person directly or
indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with, that Person. For the purposes
of this definition, "control" (including, with correlative meanings, the terms "controlling",
"controlled by" and "under common control with"), as applied to any Person, means the possession,
directly or indirectly, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies
of that Person. whether through the ownership of voting securities or by contract or otherwise.

"Capital Asset11 shall mean, as at any date of determination, those assets of a Person

that would, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, consistently applied, be
classified as plant, property or equipment on the balance sheet of that Person.
"Consolidated Long Term Debt" shall mean, as at any date of determination, the
total of all Long Term Debt of the corporation and its Subsidiaries on a consolidated basis
determined in accordance with generally accepted (or, in the case of an insurance company for
which GAAP financial statements are not prepared, statutory) accounting principles consistently
applied.
"Consolidated Net Worth" shall mean, as at any date of determination, the sum of
(a) the capital stock and additional paid-in capital, (b) plus retained earnings (or minus accumulated
deficit) of the corporation and its Subsidiaries on a consolidated basis, determined in conformity
with generally accepted (or, in the case of an insurance company for which GAAP financial
statements are not prepared, statutory) accounting principles consistently applied.
"Consolidated Net Income" for any period, shall mean the net income (or loss) of
the corporation and its Subsidiaries on a consolidated basis detennined in conformity with generally
accepted (or, in the case of an insurance company for which GAAP financial statements are not
prepared, statutory) accounting principles consistently applied.
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"Dividend Availability Amount" shall mean, as at any date of detennination, an
amount equal to fifty percent (50%) of Consolidated Net Income for the period (taken as single
accounting period) commencing January 31, 1987 and ending on the last day of the fiscal quarter
immediately preceding such date of determination.
"Indebtedness" as applied to any person, means (a) all indebtedness for borrowed
money, (b) that portion of obligations with respect to finance leases which is capitalized on a
balance sheet in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, consistently applied, (c)
notes payable and drafts accepted representing extensions of credit whether or not representing
obligations for borrowed money, (d) any obligation owed for all or any part of the deferred purchase
price of property or services which purchase price is (i) due more than six (6) months from the date
of incurrence of the obligation in respect thereof, or (ii) evidenced by a note or similar written
instrument, and (e) all indebtedness secured by any Lien or vendor's interest under any conditional
sale or other title retention agreement existing on any property or asset owned or held by that Person
regardless of whether the indebtedness secured thereby shall have been assumed by that Person or
is non-recourse to the credit of that Person; provided, however, that "Indebtedness" shall not include
policy claims, policy reserves or mandatory securities valuation reserves of a regulated insurance
company; and further provided that "Indebtedness" shall not include indebtedness of the corporation
to any Subsidiary.
"Lien" shall mean any lien, mortgage, pledge, security interest, charge or
encumbrance of any kind (including any conditional sale or other title retention agreement, any lease
in the nature thereof, and any agreement to give a security interest).
"Long Term Debt", as applied to any Person, shall mean all Indebtedness of that
Person which by its tenns or by the terms of any instrument or agreement relating thereto matures
more than one year, or is directly renewable or extendable at the option of the debtor to a date more
than one year (including an option of the debtor under a revolving credit or similar agreement
obligating the lenders to extend credit over a period of one year or more), from the date of creation
thereof: but excluding any payments due under the terms thereof within twelve (12) months of any
date of detennination.
"Person" shall mean an individual, corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust,
unincorporated organization or any other jurisdictional entity, or a foreign state or any agency or
political subdivision thereof.
"Subsidiaryn shall mean any corporation of which at least a majority of the
outstanding stock having by the tenns thereof ordinary voting power to elect a majority of the board
of directors of such corporation (irrespective of whether or not at the time stock of any other class
or classes of such corporation shall have or might have voting power by reason of the happening of
any contingency) is at the time directly or indirectly owned or controlled by the corporation or one
or more of its Subsidiaries or by the corporation and one or more of its Subsidiaries.

.---..

4.2.11 Conversion Ricbt. The holders of the Series A Preferred Stock shall have
the following conversion right ("Conversion Right"):

(a)

Right to Convert. Each share of Series A Preferred Stock shall be convertible,
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or carrying a right to subscribe to or acquire such shares, except as provided in the Idaho Business
Corporation Act.
SIXTH

The location of the initial registered office of the corporation is One Lewis Clark Plaza,
Lewiston, Idaho 83501; and the name ofits initial registered agent at such address is R. John Taylor.
SEVENm

The number of directors constituting the initial Board of Directors is four, and the names and
addresses of the persons who are to serve until the first annual meeting of the shareholders and until
their successors are elected and qualified are:
Address

Reed J. Taylor

P.O. Box538
Lewiston ID 83501

R. John Taylor

P.0.Box538
Lewiston ID 83501

Raymond R. Heilman

P.O. Box 538

Lewiston ID 83501
Mary K. Frost

P.0.Box538

Lewiston ID 83501
EIGHTH

The name and address of the incorporator is as follows:
Reed J. Taylor
P.O. Box538
Lewiston ID 83501
NINTH

The Board of Directors is expressly authorized to alter, amend or repeal the Bylaws of the
corporation and to adopt new Bylaws, subject to repeal or change by a majority vote of the
shareholders.
TENTH

Shareholders entitled under Article Fourth to vote in the election of directors of the
corporation shall not be entitled to vote their shares cumulatively in the election of directors of the
corporation.
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ELEVENTH
A director of this corporation shall not be personally liable to this corporation or its
sharehoJdersfor monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, except for liability (a)
for any breach of the director's duty ofloyalty to this corporation or its shareholders, (b) for acts or
omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of Jaw,
(c) under Idaho Code §30-1-48, or (d) for any transaction from which the director derived an
improper personal benefit If the Idaho Business Corporation Act is amended to authorize corporate
action further eliminating or limiting the personal liability of directors, then the liability of a director
of this corporation shall be eliminated or limited to the fullest extent permitted by the Idaho Business
Corporation Act, as so amended. Any repeal or modification of this Article Eleventh by the
shareholders ofthe corporation shall not adversely affect any right or protection of a director of the
corporation existing at the time of such repeal or modification."
THIRD: The number of shares of the corporation outstanding at the time of such adoption
was 1,079,520 shares of Common Stock, 170,562 shares of Series A Stated Value Preferred Stock.
and 185,000 shares of Series C Preferred Stock; and the number of shares entitled to vote thereon
was 1,079,520 shares of Common Stock and 185,000 shares of Series C Preferred Stock.
FOURm: The designation and number of outstanding shares of each class entitled to vote

thereon as a class were as follows:
Number of Sbares
1,079,520

Common

185,000

Series C Preferred

FIFTH: The following table sets forth the number of shares of Common Stock and the
number of shares of Series C Preferred Stock voted for and against such amendment:
Number of Share3

Em:

Asllinst

Common

865,093.5

48,153.5

Series C Preferred

165,000

-0-

DATED this

pt dayofMay, 1996.
AIA111WICES CORPORATION

By~
atliJL. Spickler, ecretary
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877 Main Streat. Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
B~ise, Idaho 83701-1617
(208) 344-6000 Fax (208) 342-3829
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Lancelot JnvestOrs Fund, L.P.
c/o Lancelot In.vestment Management, LLC
1033 Skokie Boulevard, Suite 620 ·
Northbrook, Illinois 60062
AGM,LLC
.1033 Skokie Boulev~ Suite 620
Northbrook, Illinois 60062

Loan and Security Agreement dated as ofOctober 27, 2q<J6 by and among Crop
USA. l1l3urance Agency, Inc., as Borrower; R. John Taylor and AU Insurance,
Inc., each as a Guarantor; Lancelot Investors Fund, L.P., tu Lender,· and AG!>{,
LLC, as A.dministrattve Agent (the "Loan andSecuri&A.ueement").

Ladies and Gentlemen:
We have acted as Idaho counsel to erop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., an Idaho
cotp0ration (''Borrowef1, and AIA Insurance, Inc., an Idaho 001pomtion ("Cox;porato
Guarantor"). and R. John Taylor ('"Taylor"; Coipomte Guarantor and Taylor are hereln
. collectively referred to as "Guarantgrs" and eac:h is a "Guarantor'•; BOIIOwer and Guarantors atCl
herein collectively referred to as ''.Climt§" and each are a ''SJimr')' in connection with the
t:ransacti<>ns contemplated by the Loan and SecuritY, Agreement {referenced.above and defined

below). Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shali have the meanings asoribed to them
in the Loan and SccuritY Agreement.

·

L DOCUMENT REVIEW

. As such counsel, we have reviewed the following documents and instruments for
pmposes of delivery of this opinion letter:
(a}
the Loan and· Security Agreement, dated as of October. 27, 2006, among
Boaower, Guarantors, Lancelot Inv~tors Fun~ LP. {"Initial Lender") and. ..A,G~ LLC {the
"Administrative Agent•'), for the benefit-of Lender Parties;
·

«1823.0007.882lill0.7
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{b)
the Promissory Note, dated as October 27, 2()()6, executed by Borrower in favor
of !¢tial Lender and its p~itted assigns, and the successors thereof;

.
(c)
the Guaranty, dated as of October 27, 2006, executed by Taylor in favor of
Administrative Agent, for the benefit of Lender Parties;
·
(d)
the Guaranty, dated as of October 27, 2006, executed by Corporate Guanmtor in
favor of Administrative Agent, for the benefit of Lender Parties;

Control A~ent for Deposit Account at U.S. Banlc National Association, dated
(e)
as of October. 27, 2006, among Borrower, U.S. Bank National Association, and the
Administrative Agent, for the benefit of Lender Parties;
(f}
Blocked Account Control Agreement (with Lockbox Services), dated as of
October 27, 2006, among Borrower, U.S. Bank National Association, and th9 Administrati,ve
Agent, for the benefit of Lender Parties;
(g)
Certificate of Deposit Control Agreement. dated as of Qctober 27, 2006, among
Taylor, James W. Beck. Michael W. Cashman, Private Bank Mimiesota, and the Administrative
Agent, for the benefit of Lender Parti~;
·
:,..-....._

(h)
Certificate of Deposit Control Agreement, dated as of October 27, 2006, among
Borrower, Taylor, Randolph D. Lamberjack. Zions First National Bank, and the Administrative
Agent for the benefit of the Lender Parties;

(i)
Consent and Agreein.ent, dated as of October 27, 2006, among Borrower.
Clearwater Insurance Company, and the Administrative Agent, for the benefit of Lender Parties;
(j)
Pledge Agreement. datea as of October 27, 2006, executed by Taylor in favor of
AGM, LLC; in its capacity as administrative agent for the Lenders;

(k)
Pledge Agreement, dated: as of October 27, 2006, e1'ecuted by Taylor, Ivfichael
Cashman, James W. Beck in favor of the Administrative Agent for the Lenders;

~l

I
!

(1)
Pledge Agreement, dated as of October 27, 2006, executed by Randolph D.
Lam.berjack in favor ofAGM, LLC, in its capacity as administrative agent for the Lenders;
(m) a certified copy of the Articles of Incorporation of Borrower, as certified by the
Idaho Secretary of State on September 5, 2006 (the "Bori-owerA@eles 9fJncoroorationj;

(n)
a copy of the New Restated Bylaw:s of CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. dated as
of October 5, 2006, (the "Bggower Bylaws"; Borrower Articles of lnCOipOiation and Borrower
Bylaws being herein collectively re~ to as ..Borrower Orwmizational Documentsj;

40923.c>o07.892880.7
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(o)
a Certificate of Borrower With respect to (i) the Borrower Organizational
Documents, (ii) the resolutions of the members of Borrower relating to the Loan and· Security
Agreement and other Loan Documents, and (iii) incumbency of
signatories of
. the authorized
.
Borrower;
(p)
a Certificate of Borrower with respect to (i) the names of every jurisdiction that
requires licensing and qualification as a foreign entity where Borrower owns, operates or leases
property, or conducts business; and (ii) the governmental pennits, approvals, and licenses
necessary to conduct its business operation;
(q)
a certified copy of the .Articles of Incorporation of Corporate Guarantor, as
certified by the Idahp ·Secretary of State on October 1O, 2006 (the "Comorate Guarantor Articles
of Incoiporatio9''');

(r)
a copy of the Bylaws of Cotporate Guarantor dated as of January 5, 1988, (the
"Comorate Guarantor Bylaws": Corporate Guarantor Articles of Incorporation and Corporate
Guarantor Bylaws being herein collectively referred to as "Comomte Guarantor Organizational
J;2ocuments"); and
(s)
a Certificate of Corporate Guarantor with respect to (i) the Corporate Guarantor
. Organization Documents, {ii) the resolutions of members of Corporate Guarantor relating to the
Loan and Security Agreement, and (iii) incumbency of the authorized signatories of Corporate
Guarantor.
(t)
~ Certificate of CorJ,orate Guarantor with respect to (i) the names of every
jurisdiction th8t requires licensing and qualification as ·a foreign entity where Corporate
Guarantor owns, operates or leases property, or conducts business; and {ii) the governmental
pennits, approvals, and licenses necessary to conduct its business operati6n;

Those documents and instruments listed above as items (a) through (k) are herein
collectively ~ed to as the "Loan Docunients".
I

I

!
'I

in addition, we have examined such other instruments and documents and examined such
matters of law as we have deemed necessary as. a basis for the opinions set forth below.
II.OPINIONS

Based on the foregoing and subject to the assumption8 and qualifi.catiODB. set forth below,
we are of the opinion that: ·
·
(a)
Borrower is dwy formed, validly existing and in good standing. under the laws of
the ~ of Idaho. Borrower has the power and authority to own, lease, and operate ·its cUI:rCllt
properties and 'assets and to conduct the btJSiness in Which it is currently engaged and .aS
contemplated in the Loan Documepts .

.~·
40823.0007-892580.7
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(b)
Corporate Guarantor is duly formed, validly existing and in good standing, llll.der
the laws of the State of Idaho. Corporate Guarantor has the power and authority to oWn, lease,
and operate its current properties and assets and to conduct the business in which it is currently
engaged and as contemplated in the Loan Documents.

(c)
Based solely on a certificate of an !'fficer of Borrower, Borrower is qualified and
licensed as a foreign entity in every other jurisdiction in which the ownership of property or the
conduct of its business requires such lic~g and qualification. .
(d)
Based solely on a certificate of an officer of Corporate Guarantor, Coiporate
Guarantor is qqalified and licensed as a foreign entity in every other jurisdiction in which the
ownexship of property or the conduct of its busin~ss requires such licensing and qualification.
(e)
Each Client has the power and authority, to execut~ deliver, and perfonn its
obligations under and consummate the transactions contemplated by the Loan Documents to
whieh it is a party. The execution, delivery, and performance as of the date hereofby.J3orrower
and Guarantors of the Loan Documents to which Borrower and Guarantors are party have been
duly authorized by all necessary action of Borrower and Guarantors. The officers ofBoITower
and Corporate Guarantor executing any Loan Documents on behalf of Borrower and Corporate
Guarantor have been duly authorized to execute and deliver such document!!.

(.£)
The Loan Docum.entS have been duly executed and delivered by each Client that
is a party thereto. Were an Idaho court, or a federal court sitting in Idaho, to apply Idaho law to
the Loan Documents notwithstanding the parties' choice of the law of Dlinois as the governing
law, the Loan Documents constitute the legal, valid, and binding obligations of each Client (to
the extent such Client is a party to such Loan Documents), enforceable in accordance "with their
terms.
·

I

i
1
I

!

·1

(g)
The execution, delivery, and performance as of the date hereof by each Client of
the Loan Documents to which each Client is a party does not: (i) require any approval of the
officers, members, or managers, as applicable of such Client whic4 has not been obtained; and
(rl) violate the Borrower Organizational Documents or the Guarantor Organizational Documents.
(h)
Assuining tht provisions of the Loan. and Security Agreement are sufficient. to
create in your favor a security interest in all right. title, and interest of Bom>Wer in those items
Collateml in which a security inteceSt ntay be on:ated under Article 9 of the Idaho Unifomi
Commercial Code (''JE._C") and assuming the .Admitristrative Agent properly tiles the financing
statement attached· hereto as Exb.tl>it A with the Secretary of State of the State of Idaho (the
..Filing Office"). the. interests granted under the Loan Documents will constitute perfected
seco.rity interests in the Collatoral, to the extent that a security interest in stich Collateral can be
perfected by filing under the UCC.

of

l

.i

·1
>--...
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(i)
Neither the Administrative Agent or any Lender is required to register or to
qualify to do business or to.obtain an.y license or permit in th~ state of Idaho to make"the Loan
Doownents enfurceable, to ~low the Administrative Agent or any Lender to foreclose on the
Collateral in local courts, or for any other reason related to the transactions evidenced by the
Loan D<?ouments.
(j)
The Loan, as described and evidenced by the Loan Documents, is not usurious
under CU1JC11t applicable Idaho law.

(k).
In a proceeding to enforce the loan Documents, an Idaho court, or a federal court
sitting in Idaho .applying Idaho conflict of law rules, as the~ may be, should give effect tO the
parties' designation of the law of the State of Illinois as the governing law; provided, however:

i.
we assume the state of Illinois bears a reasonable relationship to tJi.e
parties and the transaction;

I

L
I

!

ii.
the law of a state will govern the validity, perfection, priority, enforcement
and interpretation of interests in real property or of a sCcurity inter~ in tangible personal
pioperty located in such state; .
.
w,
Idaho state courts and federal courts sitting in Idaho will not enforce a
forum-selection clause; and

.
iv.
Idaho s~·courts and. federal courts sitting in Idaho may apply the law of
the State of Idaho or the law of another state with a relationship to the- transaction. if the
law of the state chosen plll'Sllant to the Loan Documents is contrary to a ••fundamental
policy" of the State ofidaho or s\lch other state. While not expressing an opinion, except
as described herein we ~ not aware of any fundamental policY. of the State of Idaho to ·
which the Loan Documents are contrary.
·
· Ill. ASSUMPTIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

The opimons expressed in Section II above are subject to ·the following assumptions,

qualifications, and limitations:

·

·

Jn rendering this .opinion, we have ~~ed that:
1.
All natural persons executing th-e Loan Documents have legal capacity to do so;
all signatures. on all documents submitted to us are gOO.uine; documents submitted to us as
originals are authentic; all docmnenfs submitted to us as copies conform to the original
documents, which them.selves are authentic; all certi:lioations of public officials are accurate; and
all documents were executed in the same form, except for de m"inimis changes, as the oopies
which were provided to us.

40823.00CJ7.8925ll0.7
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2.

Each of the parties to the Loan Documents other than Bouower and Guarantors

has the requisite power and authority to execute, deliver, and perfoim such documents.to

whicl:i

it is a party; has taken all necessary action to enter into the Loan Documents; and bas duly
executed. ami delivered each such document. To the extent that the Loan Documents impose any
obligation upon Lender or any other party other than Borrower and Guarantors, the Loan
Documents ~ valid and binding obligations of the. Lender and such other parties and
enforceable against each of such parties in accordance with their respective temli!.
3.
Administrative Agent and Lender will enforce their rights under the Loan
Documents in a commercially reasonable manner.

4. · The delivery to, or .for the benefit ot the Borrower at the closing of the Loan of
the funds to be.loaned to it pursuant to the Loan Documents has occurred.
5.
There are 'no material oral or written modifications of or ~endments to the Loan
Documents and there has been no waiver of any of the provisions of the Loan Documents. by
ootions.or condu.Ct of the parties or otherwise.
.

I
I

.k

6.
The Loan Documents comply with any test required by law of good fhlth or
faimess, and each party will act in accordance With the tcmis and conditions of the Loan
Documents.

We understand that all of the fo!e~ing assumptions are acceptable to you.
In addition, our opinions expressed above are subject to the following qualifications and
limitations:
·
(a)
Inasmuch as we are admitted to practice la.w only in the State of Idahot we
di.Sclaim and do not express any opinion regarding any matters v4tlch may be govemed by the
law of any other state or jurisdiction. The opinions set forth herein are based solely upon the
generally applicable law of the State ofldaho in force and effect On the date hereof We disclaim
any opinion as to the statutes and ordfnanves, the administrative decisions, and tho rules and
regulations of any county, town, muoicipality or special politi.cal subdivision and any judicial
decisions to the extent that they·deal with any of the foregoing. We thrth.er express no oplnion as
to what effeot laws. regulations ot rulings promn]gated, or judicial decisions estah~hed,
subsequent to the date hereof with a retroactive date may have on the opinions set forth herein.
(b)
Enforceability of the I.pan D<?cum.ents may ·be limited by: (i) bankruptcy,
hlsolvency, reorganization,. arrangement. moratorillmt fraudulent conveyance, and othct state and
:tederal Jaws relating to or affecting the rights-or creditors genemlly; and {ii) general principles of
equity, the application of which may deny Lender and. Admhrlstrative Agent certain of the.rights
8:!1d remedies granteQ. to Lender and Administrative Agent under the Loan Documents, in~uding
rights to specific perfonnance, ittjunctive relief. and the appointment ofa receiver.
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(c)
We express no opinion as to the priority of any security interest. Without limiting
the foregoing, we .express no opinion as to the priority as- against any security in~ts or o_ther
liens as to which a UCC filing in the Filing Office is not required. Further, our opinion is subject
to the limitations on perfection of seeurlty interests in proceeds resulting from the operation of
Section 9-315 of the UCC; the limitations with respect to buy01'$ in the ordiwuy course of
business imposed by Sections 9-320, 9-323, and 9-330 of the UCC; the limitations with respect
to documents, instruments, and securities imposed by Section 9-331 of the UCC; the rights of
holder8 of security interests in goods that are or are to become fixtures under Section 9-334 of
the UCC; the limitations with respect to accessions and commingling imposed by Sections 9-335
and 9-336 of the UQC; the provisions of Sections 9·204, 9-322, 9-323, and 9:324 of the UCC
relating to the time of attacbment and priority of a security interest in ~ items of the pWperty
which are not now owned and in the possession of the Borrower; Sections 544 and 552 of
Title 11 of the Unit~ States Bankruptcy Code (''Bankrul)tcy Code") with respect to any of the
property acquired by the Borrower after the commencement of a case by oi;: against the Borrower
under the Bankruptcy Code; the limitations with zespect to buyers of goods other than buyer& in
the ordinary course ofbusiness imposed by.Sections 9-320 and 9-323 of the UCC; and the rights
of account debtors or obligors and any claims or defenses of such account debtors or obligors,
subject to Sections 9-404, 9-405, 406 and 9-408 of the UCC. against the Borrower arising under
or outside ootes, agreements, or contracts and the tezms of such notes. agreements, or contracts
between the ~orrower and the ac<?ount debtors or obiigors.

i

l

:j
l

(d)
The enfon:eability of the Loan Documents is subject to the qualification that
certain. remedies, waivers, and other provisions of the Loan. Documents may be rendered ·
ineffective, or limited, by applicable Idaho laws or judicial decisions governing such remedies,
waivers> and provisions, but the inclusion of such remedies, waivers, and provisions does not
affect the validity or enforceability of the other provisions thereof and in the event Borrower or
any Guarantor does not comi)ly with the material terms of a Loan Document to which it is a
party, the Lender and Administrative Agent may exeroise remedies that would normally be
available under Idaho law to a secured lender provided it proceeds in accoidance with Idaho law.
Without limiting th~ generality of the preeeding quali£.oation. we advise you that

i.
limitations ~imposed. by Idaho Code Section 8-601 on the right to obtain
the appointment of a receiver; and
ii. . every stipulatio~ or condition in a contract. by which any party thereto is
teStricted from enforcing his rights under tile contract by ·the usual proceedings in the
·ordinacy tribuDatS, or which limits the time within which he may thus enforce bis rights.
is void pursuant to Idaho. Code Secfion 29-110.

i

(e)
The filing of the Financing Statement in the.Filing. Office will not re.suit in 1he·
· ·perfection of a security interest in items of collateral_ (such as motor vehicles) which are subject
to a certificate of'title or registµtion statute that specifies a method of Security interestperfection.
different than the filing or filings referred to in opini<!n paragraph {h) above or in "items ~f

1
~

+

~·

...........

•

H-.. ........
-~
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collateral which are or will be classified as farm products under Section 9-102 of the UCC; or
·
which are timber, as-extracted collateral or fixtures.
(f)
The enforceability of waiver of rights to a jury trial. certain confession of
judgment provisions, and certain rights to indemnity contained in the l;oan Documents,
including, without limitation, a right to indemnification for one's own negligence, may be limited
by public policy considerations.
(g)
·To the extent our opinion relates to the creation or perfection of a security interest
in general intangibles, you Shov.ld be aware that Idaho law may limit or otherwise affect the
creation or perfection of a security interest in licenses, permits, or similar consents or certificates ·
issued by an Idaho goverml1ental authority (such as water right permits,. liquor licenses, or
operating licenses) to the extent that applicable statutes or regulations prohibit or limit the
creation or enforcement of a security interest therein or require authorization, approval, or other
action by, or notice to or filing with, any Idaho goverpmental authority for the creation. or
enforcement of such a security interest.
(h)

L
I~
j
I

l

i
l

!
r

i;

We wish to point out that any provision of a Loan Document which pmports to

require indemnification of any person in respect of the willful misconduct or gross negligence of
. such person may be Wlenforceable.
(i)
We express no opi.nion as to any actions th.at may be required to be taken
.periodically or upon the occurrence of future events under the UCC or other applicable law in
order for the effectiveness of the Financing Statement, or the validity· or perfection of any
security interest, to be maintained.

(j)
Except as expressly stated otherwise herein, we express no opinion regarding the
need for existence of
general business licenses or permits.

·or

any

(k)
This opinion is limited to the matters set forth herein and no opinion may be
in:fcmd or implied beyond those explicitly stated herein. We have no continuing obligation to
infurm you of changes in law or facts subsequent to the date hereof or facts of which we become
aware after the date hereof.

(1)
This opinion is based and relies upon the current status of the hi.w and existing
facts and is Subj~t to and may be limited by future legiSlation as well as by developing ~law.

we

(m) Wherever we have stated that
have assumed any matter, it is intended to
· · indicate that we have assumed such matter without making any .tactual, legal, or other inquiry or
investigation, and withc>ut expressing any. opinion or conclusion of any kind concerning· such
matter. The qualification of any opinion or statement herein by the ~c of the words
''knowledge," ••our lmowledge," "current actual knowledge," ''(a the best of our Jm.owledge," or
''known to us" means tliat during the course of our representation of the Clients, no matter has
come to the attention of the attorneys directly involved in such activities or transactions which
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give such attorneys actual knowledge of the existence of the matters so qualified. Furthennore,
except as otherwise expressly set ~orth herein. we have not undertaken any special br genCral
inquiry or investigation whatsoever to determine the existence of such matters, and n:o inference
as to our knowledge thereof shall be drawn from the fact of our representation of any party or
otherwise.
IV. CONCLUSION
This letter: (i) has been fumished to you at your request, (ii) is :rendered in connection
with the transactions contemplated by the Loan and Security Agreement and niay not be relied
upon by any person other than the addressees hereof without our prior written consent. and (iii)
the date hereof; and we undertake no, and hereby disclaim any,, obligation to
is rendered as
advise you of any changes in or any new developments which might affect any matters or
op~ons set forth herein.

of

Respectfully submitted,

,HfWIJY TROXEJb ENNIS

&

,HfWifl LLP

~~'{._,.;.,, t /~ UJ'

I

{

1
.h.

·~
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RODEIUCK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
JvllCl-li\EL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY. PLLC
I Slmth Ho\var<l Street, Suite -'t ! 6
Spnbne, WA 99201
Td. (50 1)) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111

Attorneys for Plamtiff Reed J. Taylor

TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL I >ISTlUCT OF Tl IE STATL OP

IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNT'Y l WADA
REED J. TAYLOR. an individual,

Case No.: CV-OC-2009 18868
Plaintiff.
v

PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S
lVIEMORANf){Ji\f OF LAW IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUl'v1MARY
JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS

JUCH1\RD A. RILEY, an individual;
HA \\'LEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LL P. an Idaho limited liability partnersl1ip;
ROBERT M. TURNBOW, 1m individual; and

RILEY, JI1\ WLEY TROXELL, TUR.NBOW
AND EBEl<LE BERLIN

EBERLE, BERLIN. KADING, TlJRNBO\V

ORAL AR<;Ui\IENT lH:C)lJESTfl>

&. \·kKLVEEN, CHARTERED. an Idnho
cnrpuralion:

Deftmdants.

Plaintiff Reed J. l;1ylor ("Reed Taylor"), by nnd through his att11rncys of rcco1 d.
C;imphc-11, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC. submits the following i\kn1ort1w.ium of Law iu Snp1•111t uf
!\.1orion for Partial Summaiy Judpncn1 against Defendants Rid1;.1ni A. Riley

l 1uxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ·~ ("H:iwley Troxell"), lfohl'l t 1\•l. Turnbow
Elit:rk. Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Charte1ecrs
I.

1.1

C'8ilt~y"'I.

IT,l\vky

C"T1Jntl 1nw"·1

:111d

('L~b::de:J~5din"):

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Reed Taylor is 73-years-old, founded AJA iu 1969, and

ha~•

worked hard ht'

entire life in preparation for his retirement. (Affidavit of Recd .l. Taylor d;:itcd Fdm1;ny ), .'01 O
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("212110 Taylor Aff."),

~16.)

In 1995, other shareholders and inves1ors solicited Recd Liylor hJ

l1ave his majority interest in AlA Services redeemed so that they could attcmpj in Iakc: tlw
company public. (Id.,

~9.)

~lT\·icc·<;")

On January 12, 1995, AIA Seiviccs Cn1poratinn ("J\L\

held a .special board meeting to discuss various matters. including the redemption of Recd
T,1ylur' s shares. (Id., Ex. C, p. 9.) Reed Taylor attend in~ t11is mi::eting in ptrsoJt, whik Mr.

Riley ;md Mr. Turnbow attended via telephone and they proYidcd represcntntions:
i'vlr. Riley also advised that prior to the sale of any securities, the law firm of Eberle
Berlin, et al. must give an opinion that all acts haYe k:cn pcrf1HlI1t'.U in acconL:rllT with
the law. Mr. Green requested confirmation that the opinion woul<l nol lw giHn
unlrss it W:lS trur, :mcl l\fr. Riley conffrmed that f:wt.
(Id (cmplrnsis added).) On Febmary 9, 1995, AIA Services sent a Notice of Special

i\.Jectin~

Shareholder to be held at Eberle Berlin's offices for the pmpose of considering and votinµ:
certain transactions, including the redemption of Reed Taylor'i>

shore~.

c•i
011

(Id. Ex. C. p. 7 ) \To

mention was made regarding obtujning shareholder approval to invade capital surp]w; ti"• rnlcem
Recd Taylor's shares. (Id) On l\farch 7, 1995, AJA Services hdd a spel~ial sharcht)lder nh'.e~mi:
and the sh<Jreholders approved the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares by a vote of 926,f.()8 07
shares in favor and 6,688.09 shares against.

(Id., Ex. C. pp. 5-6.)

At this meeting the

shareholders discussed "going public" which Reed Taylor testified was the reflson for relkcmiuv
his shares. (Id,,
fVh::etin~

~9

and Ex. C, p. 6.) On July 18, 1995, AIA Services held a Board of Dircchm

to approve numerous tr:rns;ictions and the redemption of Reed T;)ylor".->

C. pp. 1-4.) Mr. Riley was at this meeting and again the iss1w

ofle~ality

sri;m~·-~.

Ud,, F,x,

was i·a1sed

The legality of the Disclosure Statement to Sha.-eholdet·s was discuo;se1l. I )an
Spickler, General Counsel, and 'Mr. Riley on behalf or his hm ffrin, both stated thcv
Jlclicvcd it met or r.xcccrlcrl the legal reguiremrnts.
(id at p. 2 (emphasis added).) Reed Taylor was present at this

upou l\lr Riley's statements at this and other board

meetin~.-;.

mc:diu~~

(Id.) If.: ab11 1i.:lll:d

1)12110 Taylor Aff. W-i..J
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1.2

On July 22, 1995, Reed Taylor and AIA

Ser\'lcc~::;

executed the Stock Rcdt::mpliun

Agreement. (Affidavit of Riclmrd A. Riley dated November 74, 2009 CHl2·1{Q_9_Rilcy :\If"),
Ex. A)

As a condition of Recd Taylor's obligation to close the rt:demption transacti\ilt. Riky,

Turnl.H)W and Eberle Berlin were required to deliver him an opinion in an acceptable form. (Id,

p 4,

~2.4(j).)

On August 16, 1995, the form of Riley, Turnbow :ind Eberle

Berlin'~:

<)pinwn

ktter was finally approved by Recd Taylor. (2/2/10 Taylor Aff., Ex. B.) The final opinion kttcr
dated

1\ll~iu::J

15.

arld was signed and delivered to Reed Taylor on or nhont

Au;~u~t

17.

wns approved by a committee at Eberle Berlin (2/2/10 Taylor Aff.,
l 995 ("Opinicm

Lett~('),

~().),was

199). (2/2/l 0 Taylor A.ff. Ex. A-B.) The Opinion Letter was for Recd Taylor to rely u1•l1tt:
Jt]his opinion is furnished by us solely for vom· benefit for me in connccti<!I!.~-~·it h lhr
1
Transaction Documcnts and the transactions contemplated thr.rchy; nnd it uwy rtot
be furnished or quoted to, or relied upon, by any other person.

(7/2/l 0 Taylor Aff., Ex. A, p. S (emphasis added).) The Opini0n Letter makes clear th::f I\ tky.
Turnbow a11d Eberle Berlin \VClC' [!Jl responsible for the reprel'entations and wamrntie:: pn1•:idcd
WhL"never our opinion with respect to the existence or abse11ct: of fad-; is mdirnted 10 he
based on our knowledge. we nre referring to the aclual kuowl~!lgc of R.M. Turnhol_~
au1l Richard A. Riley, who are the sole attorneys at Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Tl1rnhPw &
KcKlveen, Chartered who have represented the Company <luring the 'courl'c of our
representation in this transaction
The Compar1y and its Subsidiaries have full COl]JOrllte power and authority to u1kr into,
execute and deliver the Transaction Documents and to pe1·form their rc::pt.::t 1vc
obligations thereunder; all corporate action on the pn.-t of Com1~:~y :i.wt its
Sub~idiaries, and their respective directors and sh:ncholrlcr& nt·'.1'1~.,~a1·y for flu'.
authorization, excl·ution, delivery and pe1·fonua11l'e h_y___ Companr and---~~
Subsidiaries of the Transaction Documents and the consummation Q!. tfo·
t rausactions contcmnl:itcd thereby has been taken: and the Transaction fJpcumrnts
ha\'e been duly executed and delivered by Company and its subsidiaries.
(Id, p. 2 (emphasis added).)
II!
'T1an5~ction Documents'' is defined as the Steck Redemption A~rc~1n~n1. % l\lillion P[l)n1i:,so1y ~foll' a::,l
:111,.i!lm)' documents related to the redemption of Reed Taylor's shores. (}!'!.! J 0 Tayl\'r Aff.. Ex. A. p I.)
1
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... to the best of onr knf)wledge [Riley and Turnbowl. [t!te redemption
~ny law, rule, license, regulation, judgment ...

doe~

nut I ,·io];ill'

No consent, authorization, approval or exemption byL!!!_fil~_.!!_Ul~tJ!!lIJ~~·r,-.or~ or
any Governmental Authority is required in conn~ct_~(I!! w~t_l1 __tlI()._r,~cl'.!!!io__nJ_drl~y_t>!T
and -gcrformance by Company and its Subsidia•·ic:s of tht' Tnmsartiou Doc11111rn(s,
or the taking of any nction contemplated thereby, cx<'.{'Jlf sud1 as lia''l' been oht:tiuNI
prior to Closing ...
Upon delivery of the certificates representing the Pledged Shares of AIAI and Fnn::i:::r:'. Ui
Shareholder at Closing, Shareholder shall have at nosing a pcrfcx·tcd fir~t priority
scrnrity inte1·est in sud1 Pledged Sharers ...

(:>./2/10 Taylor Aff., Ex. A. p. 3 (emphasis added).)

Tht: foregoing opinions are limited to the laws ... ofthc State of Idaho ...

llln

the event tbe Comp:mv

01·

any of its Subsidiaries does not <'Ontply with th1•

material terms of the Transaction Documents, J\fr. Tl'tYlor may exercise rem<·ciie~
that would normally be :w:lifoble under Idaho law to a seemed party provi<frd khho
law applies and Mr. T<lylor proceeds in accordance with such law.
(2/2/10 TJylor Aff.. Ex. A, p. 4 (emphasis added).) The Op1111011 Letter does not state tl1,it l\c·cd
Tayh)!. or his interests were not being represented by Riley, ·runtbow and Eberle Berlin,

w.11 dlH:~;

the Clpinion Letter state that they have never represented Recd Taylor. (Id) As a result of kill~'.
pt0vided the Opinion Letter, t!ie transuction was closed 1D n:deem Recd Taylor's

~:harr:-:

in

August 1995. (2/2/10 Taylor Aff.. ~6.)

1.3

Reed Taylor h;id a long standing anorney dient rclation,;Jilp witl1 Riky ;1ud

l:bcrlc Berlin, which began in 1he 1980s. (Id, iJ4.) Riley and Eberle Berlin

wcr~

Recd

T~1ylc 1 r·s

penon:il divorce attorneys from the 1980s through the 1990s and assisted him in rcstruc1 uring
AIA Services through the conhibution of significant personal assets to the compm1y. ({d) Riley

<llld Eberle Berlin also acted a$ counsel for Reed Taylor for illlotlu:r company. (fd.) Altl11111r h
1

Reed Taylor retained separate counsel for purposes of negotintirig and finalizinf.' the k'n:1:.

n(

rh.::

S1ock Redemption Agreement cmd ancillary agreement::<, Reed T::iylor relii.·d 11pnn 1-'. i Icy.
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rurnbow and Eberle Berlin to ensure the redemption was pH>perly completed in ac...:ordal\L'.e with

:1pplicahle laws. (2/2110 Taylor Aff,

~\3)

Scott Bell had no involvement m tl1c reprc:scntatinn

11i

AIA Services. (Id) To the contrary, Riley and Eberle Berlin were also Reed Taylor·,, pnsr,1131
attorneys in 1995. (Id.) Reed Taylor, as both a shareholder and individual client to Riky aud
Eberle Berlin, trusted and rclled upon them to ensure compliance with corporate t\·11rn:11iticc;.
ob ta in necessary shareholder consents and to comply with all laws.
Significantly, the Stock Redemption Agreement does not cont.iin

.l11y

(Id.,

~!~3, 7 ;11 \\l

I0 I

prov1sio11s st.11iuµ: that !\lr.

Riley and Eberle Berlin were not representing Reed Taylor. ( 11 !2'1/09 Ril.ey All, Ex. A.)
The terms and conditions set forth in the Stock Redcmp1ion J\p,rccmcnt ck.H ly
demonstrate that Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's leg11l rcprcsent<1tion was to cnsun::

tl1Jt

the

1edcmp1iun of Reed Taylor's shares constituted legal a11J t:nfon:eablr.: .:igiccments cuf1H-..:u1blc

uadcr the law against all parties to !he agreements. (l l/24/0!J Riley A tl, Ex. A-C.)

Tl1r~~~: 1;1L~1 ,,

and Recd Taylor's reliance upon Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Hedin are fo1ther corrobo::-:.i1d hy
Reed T<lylor's testilnony. (2/2110 Taylor Aff.,
Hawley Troxell. (11124/09 Riley Aff,

~3.)

~~5-7,

9-10.) On March l, 1999, Riley joined

However, Riley\

:ittnrncy-~licnt rclatinn~hip

Rrcd TJylor remained intact and was also confirmed in the early

2000~

wirll

wlwn Riley rcq:icstcd

and nbtaincd a conflict waiver from Reed Taylor to dn1ft knding doc11111cnts fN the kndn of hi:;

:1ii-planc. (212110 Taylor Aff.,
1,4

iP 5.)

On January 29, 2007, Reed Taylor filed suit against AlA Services. and o1hns fN

the non-payment of a $6 Million Promissory Note and various other contract and tort~ for the-

payment of the over $8.5 Million owed to him ("Tavlor v. Al.1

Aff, ~;1 ~)2-.3: see

al,~o

Scn:h:_~~"',_et_gl, '').

Affidavit of Gary Babbitt dated Dccemhcr 3, 2009

(l lllO/O'J Hond

C' 12/1/09 Ra]1l)1lt/\[C.

Fx. F.) On Apri I 16, 2008, "ft er almost fifteen months after Recd Tnylor fikrl his Cornp Ju int in
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foylor· v AJA Services, et al, Connie Taylor and James Beck ti·:t Jssertcd that !he redemp1io11 of
H.cd T01ylor's shares was illcgnl. (12/03/09 Babbitt Aff,

l~x,

Troxell successfully obtained a stay in discovery m Taylot

v.

F-fl.) In early 200 1>, I!;wdey

AJA Services, et al., thereby

tlt\\'Urtiug any attempts to question Riley ot others about the Opinion Letter. (21)/l 0 T;ivlor A ff.,
4

[10; 11110/09 Bond Aff.,

~9.)

On February 12, 2009, Connie: Taylor and James Bed' lilcd

:·1

i\{emorandum in Support of ivf01iou for Summary Judgment asserting the rccfomµtH1n CJ1 HCL·d
Taylor's shares vLOlated LC. § 30-1-6 (1995) und, consequently, that the icdcmptiou
Wt"rc

agn:.:c·n1L·11t~;

illegal and unenforceable. (11110/09 Bond Aff., Ex. B; 12/3/09 Babbitt Aff, Ex. 0.) 011

February 12, 2009, AIA, through Hnwley Troxell and with thr.

a~~sistc.:mce

of Riley, lilcd i1:;

Mntion for Summary Judgmcn1 asserting that the redemption of Recd Taylor's slrnre:·:
aud al5<' incorporated by reference Connie Taylor and

Jame~

\\Wi

nw11

ilkt•.;tl

Beck's ivlcmoran1itml. ( ! I1 If)/(Jti

l)lmd Aff., Ex. E; 2/2110 Taylor Aff., j]~l0-11; 11/24 Riley Afr..

i1rn.) On

February>~), :'()()l.l,

.'\Lt\. through Hawley Troxell and with the assistance of Riley, filed a Joinder to Com1ic Taylor
and James Beck's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Aff, ,i'110-l l; 11124/09 Riley Aff.,

~10.)

2

(1 I/10i09 Bond Aff Ex. C; 212110 TnylPr

Despite Riley's 1'cinuer legal represeutntion:;

Sen·1ccs and Reed Taylor, he a<.:sisted in the litigation and rcl'used to be deposed Pr

AL\

111

olbcrwi'.'t~

disclose facts rel;:itive to his Opinion Letter and prior legal reprcscutntion in the partic·; in

J

ll 1)..,

(212110 Taylor Aff., "~'.I 0-11; 11/ 10/09 Bond Aff., ~~9-11.)
On June 17, 2009, in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al, the

tfr~tlict

redemption agreements and S<'t-.,1 Note were illegal rmd une11fo1ccahle

comt iulcd 1h:\t 1ltc
c~)ntract[;.

( 1:'.'.Vt) 1l

Babbitt :\ff, Ex, l) The district comt specifically found tha1the1cdc1nptit1u \Va~~ illc.µal:
///

; AIA's Joinder indicates that it w;1s signed on February 2, 2009, but it wa:.; not servcci until Febni;iry 23, 201.l'.I.
0 lf!0/09 Bond Aff., Ex. C, pp. 2-3)
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The Court can rerich hul one •·esult - the 199~_ stork n~el_l![)tion :-1gn'<·mc111 tll1CHd
into between Recd Tayl1w and AJA violated I.C . .§_}0-1-6 ns it existed iu l 1N~ and,

therefore, the contrart hct:ween the parties is illccrtl ~1n{Lt1n.&!!.f~rrrnhlc ...
(l'.'/OV09 Babbitt Aff, Ex . .T., p. 9 (emphasis added).)

Fu1ther. the district court noted tl1;J

"[tlhere is fl!so no reason to doubt that all parties, includinp; the Plaintiff, sought t0 benefit

fn1111

the bu~incss <igreement."3 (Id at p. 13.) The district court c1)1H.:luded:

In 1995, the earned surplm of AIA was in the neg;ltivc and there has been 110 evidcm:e
presented to the Court th11t there was an affirmative vnte of the majority of r;harel 1• >lllrn:
that capital suivlus could be looked to for the redemption of Recd Taylor's :-:harc~;
The1·efore, the stock rr<lemption ag.-eement was cutcrcd i.!1tojn violation of rila ho
codr., making the agrcrment illegal and unenfo1·crahll'. Following the lnw [n ldaho.
the Court must apply the illegality doctrine, denying cnforccmcnl of the cirntrnct and
leaving the parties where the Court finds them.
(id :11 p. 14 (emphasis added).) The district court also noted:

Plaintiff relies heavily ou an August 15, 1995 opinion kttcr· frum Richard RiltJ'! an
attorney then with the Boise law firm of Ehr.de, Ucrliu, Kadin~, J'nrnho'~-~'..!l~.~
fy]_~Kl"ecn, Chartered, wbo acted as general counsel fr1t A.IA iu connection with the ~-:turk
redemption agreement between AIA and Reed Taylor. In his letter. '1tlorncy Riley
\)ffored the opinion that the stock redemption agreement "did not conflict with or
''inlate ... law, rule or regulation'' without making specilic reference to or di~cn~sing l.C. ~
30 1-6. See Exhibit 6 to the Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond filed April n, 2009. Hy thi~
rnling today, the Cour1 finds the attorney opinion inrorrecJ.
(Id at p. 12, n 15 (emphasis added).)

On September 4: 2009, the court entered a judgment dismissing the majority of Recd

Tay !or':; causes of action, meluding all claims relating to the enforceabiltly of the
Not~.

$f)

iVJ i II ion

:md certified the judgment in accordimce with Rule 51l(b) in Tay/01· v. AfA Services. er ol.:

Pn June 17, 2009, the Comt entered an Order granlmG

Dcfr11dantt-' fVfotion for (J;1rtia1
Summary Judgment after the Court found the 199S stock rcdcm1Jtion ag_~t~£_nu>nt
lictwccn Reed Taylo1· and AIA [Service's] _(~q>_(_!1·11tion was uulawful and
unenforce11ble under lhc illegality doctrine where rh.!:J!&rrcmcnt was entered iuto in
violation of then existing J.C. § 30-1-6 [(1995)]. BasNJ__o,_n_t_!1c_('.;ourt's ruliug, i1 is
hereby the Order or thl' Court that the follo,ri~g C':rnse~ of A<'ti.011 fo1md in
' Tia,:> fo:ther evidences the foct that the redemplion of Reed Taylor's s11;11ls was intended to bcnd11 all p:.irtic; a11d.
cn11stq11rntly. the legal representations provided by Riley, Turnbow aml Eberle Berlin was haftnbllinu:; witfa }{ccd
Tuyh)I aad AIA Serviccs·--that evrryo:11~·s gOE1l w~s to ensure the rtdemplio11 wils leg.ii ;md cnforcenhle.
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Plaintifrs Fifth Amcnrlecl Complaint are dismissC'd as to all Dcfcnctauts: a) First
Cause of Action - Breaches of Conttact ... c) Fourth Cause or Action -- C0nvcrsi11n: d)
Sixth Cause of Action -· Con.strnctive Trust; e) Eigl1th Cause of Action - Sprrilic
Performnnce; [and) f) Tenth Cause of Action - Brcucl1 of Implied C'ovcn~nls of <loPll
Faith and Fair Dealing.

(2/2/lO Taylor Aff., Ex. D (emphasis added); see also 12/V09 Babl,itt .'\ff, Ex. E.)
\\'Mds, all of Reed

Taylor'~

c:c1ntract relnted claims ;md

tort~;

Jn 01hcr

srt forth in his Filth :\u1c·ndnl

Crimplaint were dismissed on September 4, 2009. (Id)
In his Answer, Riley admitted that he acted as l)Uts1de cmmsel for A IA ServLCe:-J.

1.5

particip:itect in drafting and delivering the Opinion Letter, !tad knowledge concerning tho:-.c /\lA
S(!rviceg matters referred to Eberle Berli11 to which he "devoted substantial attcntiuu." ;111t:mb I

l•omd meetings, and drafted some hoal·d resolutions, among olher things. (Riley's .i\m:wn.
10, 17, 15.)

'·:~:

In Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's Answers, they admit that they were inYnlvcd in

drnfiing and dehvering the Opinion Letter, involved in the rcprcsent<ltion for the rcdrmpt1on c1f
Rcl'.d Taylor's shares, and were counsel for AIA Services. (Turnbow's Answer, '1)~]7-8, 10 L~.

Eberle Berlin's Answer,
primM)'

~~7-S.

10-12 and 21.) They also <1ppcai to elude

th~1t

R1ky wa:. tlil'

attorney for the redemption and the Opinion Lener. Ud) None of 1l1cir t\w;wi.:r:; dt:11y

nny former nttomey-client relationship with Reed Taylor. (T:nnbow's

An~wer;

Eberle Bnlin ·s

A11swer; Riley's Answer.) On November 24, 2009, Mr. Riley, for the first time, <Hlmitied m

sworn testimony that:
I have communicated from time to time with othC'r Hawley Troxell aHornl'P

relative to the AIA litigatiou and filed an Affidavit in Opposition t(I
Troxell. "4

Di~.qunlify

f l:1wky

(11/2:1/09 Riley Aff., ~10 (ernph(lsis added); see also 2/2/10 Taylor Aff, ~ii!J0-11: 11/lll l~olld

AtT,

~j~19-l

l .) Riley 11lso mhnittcd that he "pa11icipated in tlic p1eparatinn of the l l)l)5 l':lpini1H1

-·-- -·-·--- · · - - · - - - - - - - - -

1 Al1lw1u;h dated November 24. 2009 . ti.1r. Riley's Affidavit was not filed 1mtil Jmm:1ry 15. 20 I0 (Coll'. l Fik )
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Letter." (l l/24/09 Riley Aff., •11~i; see also 2/2/10 Taylor Aff, Ex. B.) Despite l\ilcy :1,1,·111i'
prnvid~~d

Affidavit testimony in this action and Taylor

exphdnc<l his opinions and

reprc~entations

1•.

AJA Serl'iet~s. et af., [i,_. Ii::~

set forth in the Opinion Letter ;md ucvcr

111..:Vl'I

:t1'.!Tt'll 1r1

hl'

depnscd or otherwise testify on behalf of his former clients AlA Services an<l Recd L1ylor.
(!0110 Taylor Aff., ~~10-lL l 1/10/09 Bond Aff., ~~9-l l)

In fact, ivtr. Riley refused tu ht:

deposed regarding the Opinion Letter in the AIA litigation, but instead assisted lii1mclf tht'
insiders nt ATA Services anrl his firm, who were

attemptin~

to avoid liability for c0nvcr:.1on and

other torts through Reed Taylor's Complaints filed in 1998, in avoiding liability by ol1Llilli11i:: nu

order finding the redemption illegal. (Id.; 12/03/09 Babbitt Aff. Ex. J. N 0.)
1.6

As a result of Riley. Turnbow, Eberle Berlin and Hawley Troxell':;

~1cts

aml/or

0mi_-::;ions, Reed Taylor has been letl with an unenforceable $6 tvrillion Promissory Nutt: 1!1:it had
('1\'Cr

and

$2.5 tvfillion in accrued interest-a total of over $8.::i f'vlillion. t2/2110 TayllJr t\11.. Fx. [)
~ir1 ~

:md 16.) In addition to over $8.5 Million, Recd Taylor has lo,..:;t

retirement income. (Id.,

~16.)

O\'Or

-1s::..1 l1f lus

As demonstrated by the distti(;t comt's t'tdcr in Taylor

:,:,·rvit"es, er al., Riley, Turn11ow and Eberle Berlin men::ly 11ecdcd to <lrafr ilnd

i·.

ALJ

~uhni1

a

shardrnldcr resolution approving the invasion of capital surplu:- to n:dcem Recd Tay\(ir's .·:hm··:s
to

h;m~

prevented the Court's Opinion :md Order date<i J1mc l 7,

,:~u09. ~ncl .lud.1_',tl1t~11t

d.ited

Sq1tcmhcr 4, 2009. (12/4/0fl Bn11bitt Aff, Ex. J; 2/2/10 Taylor Aff., Fx. D.)

Rerd l;ivlor

\\\>Hid not have sold his shares in AlA Services but for the Opinion Letter and tht

rcpn~:,ent . di(•n'>

aud warranties contained in the Opinion Letter, and he relied upon Riley, Tuinbow and Flit:Lle.
Berlin's representations, including, without limitation, that all conseuts had locen 0btni ncd :11d 110
law~

\\"t:re violated by the redemption, among others. (2/2/J(l Taylor Ail.,
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nlsu :'l:Jiccl on Riley's representations at Board Meetings. 5 (Id.

i1s and Exhibit C, pp.) :wd

1

J.)

lL RELIEF REQUESTF:D
Reed Taylor requests an order for partial sumrmiry j\1dgmrnt [or
matter of law:

6

l'l!l

order fiw li11.•.'

:i:-;

•~

(l) thl'lt Eberle Berlin, Riley and Tumh~)\v' s <u.:t~: con~tituk uq• Ii ~·,..:111

misrepresentations; (2) that Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's ads and/or omissiom:

~:1m-;1itutc

frnnd and/or constructive fraud; (3) that Riley and Hawley Troxell have breached their fiduciary
duties owed to Reed Taylor; (-'1) that Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlrn'3 acts and/cir
constitute negligence and

malprn~iice

('111d~si()Ji';

against Reed Taylor as a client. a tltird party l1l.'1tefiLin1 y,

twn-client. und/or a shareholder; (5) that Riley, Turnbow nnd Eberle f-:erlin·s

;i

act~; c1<11>litutC'

nq',ligcnce per se and the iss11c$ of duty and breach should Ii::, ns a nrnttcr of law,

t:il\L'l1 :l\Y<l)'

frum the jury in this action for all of Reed Taylor's claims for negligence and malpracfin::

(t;)

that Riley and Hawley Troxell violated Idaho's Consumer Protection Act and inknillinally
dq•nwd the 73-year-old Reed Taylor of over 75% of his retirement mcomc;

Cl)

lh<·!( l~'.ley,

Tu111bow and Eberle Berlin circ c:stoppcd from denying rm n\t(1nicy-client 1clati\)11sl1ip witl1
Taylor; and (8) that Eberle Berlin and Hawley Troxell are vicariously liable for the

act~;

11

l~vc.J

f Riley

and Turnbow.

III. LEr.AL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENTS
A. Summary Judgment St:mdard.

Summary judgment is ptopcr when "the pleadings.

tfopos~twns,

and

adnfr,·~im1~~ 1111

rik.

together with tlle affidavits, if any. sho\v that there is no gcrmiuc issw:: as to any matenid L:c:t .md
lhi·1t !lie mMing party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56\c).

1 rht' t:nti1e Stfltement of fllcts is incoq>ornted by reference into each and every arg11tnt~nt below, fl!nn.·~ willi l:r:t:d
'T',1ylnr' s entire Affidavit dated Feb111.1ry I, 20 I 0.
~ Al!lwugh Reed Taylor believes p~11i.il summiU)' judgment is apprnpri.111..: for all of the 1cqt1cstcd 1eli•:t: lie t•:lp11.:.t.
tliat the Comt grant partial ~ummary ,1udg1nent for any one or more rof the issues as~e1tcd bclt1w ;hould tl,1. c,,,11 L
frnd that 11arti'll summary judgmenr i.s not appropriate to all of the rtC}Uf'.,,'.f·d rtli('.f
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l ,,c, ' (,11

..

Once the 111oving p;:i1ty has provided sufficient evidenct: to supp<nt rbe 1notin11, tlil: ti;:rty
against whom a mo1ion for summary judgment 1.s sought way not merdy tL·q 1.lli
allegations contained in the pleadings, but must come forward and produce evitirnlT by
way of deposition or ;i ffi<lavit to contradict the assert10ns of the movinp, p;;ri y and
establish a genuine issue of material fact.
/\1st v. Idaho Farnnvay, lnc, 135 Idaho 475, 478, 20 P.3tl l L 14(2001) (citing LR.C.P.

McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765. 770, 820 P.2d 360,

36~

"l(•(\~L

"~t!~h_r~_i_~ence 11n_1~.l cnn:;i~•l

(1991)).

ofSJJecific facts. and cannot be conclusory or based ovJtt;i11:say.,. Id. (emphasis added)
fhe moving party is entitled to judgment when the llL)l\lUovmg patty fails tll 111;1kc it
showing sufficient to c~ta blish the existence of an clemeut esstmtial to that patty's c: 1sc 011
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
Tl10111as v. Medical Center Phvsicions,

P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 205, 61 PJd 557, 562 (2002) (citi1w

Celotex v. Catrett, 477U.S.J17, 106 S.Ct. 254, 91 L.Ed.2d

~(i5

(1986)).

Recd Taylor has met tlw hmden required by the moviug party :md parti<tl ;-:1111·r11ary

i i:d~mcnt is warranted for tho issues and claims presented below.
B. The Court should cnlcr :rn order of partial sununaty judgment iu favor of
Taylor on the issues a1Ht causes of action addressed below.

l. Riley,

Turn how and
misrepresentations.

Eberle

Berlin '!ii

ads

hlaho, like many other states, has recognized the 1Pr1 of
ngaim•t professionals when

;i

special relationship

cxi~t:-:

consfitute

ucgli~ellt

R~rd

ncglii..:,•nt

misreprc:-::..:r1f:!li11n::

or the occurrence 1)1· unique

circumstances requires a difforent allocation of risk. Nelson v. Andrrson Lumber Co , 1:HJ khlw
702, 710, 99 P.3d l 092, 1100 (Ct. App. 2004); Duffin v. Idaho Cr'op lmpro\!r111e11r Ass '11, l )()
ldalw 1002, 1007-08 . 895 r.2d 1195, 1200-01 (1995). Although

ncglifl,t~nt

n1is1.::pJ(;.';(;.11t«1tH'll

diims were previously limited to accountants in Idaho, the tort has been clilrilicd in
ti)

apply in circumstances where there is a "special relationship" pe1taining

r(~CC'Jt~ yl':1r:'

t<1 scr\'icc~~ prt 1 •:idcd

I•) professionals such as atrQLD.t:y~, engineers, phys1c1:m~, iusur.:iuce agc11ts und
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\

.

,11..'c/son, 140 Idnho at 710 (empha.;;1s added).

Stntes that have recognir.cd the tort of negligent misrepresentation

again~t Mtorncy·~

1dal11)), first recognized the tort zis one that may be brough1 ag::iust ai.:counlants; hut tl1l':;•.::
(like ld;:lto) have evolved tc'

al~•o

permit the tort to be

as~;c:rtcd

t_likl'

;elate:.

ilgilinst attorneys. Sec eg.

Pi-udeJtrial lnsw·ance Company Df America v. Dewey, Ballo11ri11e, Bushby. Palmer & Wood,

fJO~

h.E.2d 318, 320 (N.Y. 1992) ("there is no reason to arbitrarily limit the potential liable

ddcrniants to [accountants]"); Crossland Savings Bank FSn v Rockwood !11:wra11n-· (\1111pm1v,
700 fo. Supp. 1274 (N.Y.

198~i);

G1·eycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. [i)8'/). Jq pro\·r·

ttetcligent misrepresentation h<lscd upon an attomey 1s opinion lctkr, a plaintiff nmst show:

Ll) attorney was aware th<lt opinion WftS to be used for a particubr purpose; C.l npiui(lt:
was relied upon it1 furtherance of that purpose; (3) attorney was awa1e of the rcku1ct:: ('I)
opinion contamed misrepresentation; and (5) plaintiff suffered damages as a rcsu 11 c1 r i1 ~;
reliance upon misrepn::st:ntntion.

Fi11ova Cap/fa/ Cotporatio11 ''· Berger, 18 A.D.3d 256,

_:\JC}-81

(N.Y. 2005): sec (l/su Walcu

lnvcstmrnfs, Inc. v. Thenen, SSl F.Supp. 1576 (D.C. Fltirida 19 1)5): Prudential

lm1trrm4't'

Company of America v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby. Pahnt.r & TYood, 60.5 N. E.~d l l S tN .Y.
19 1J2); Roberts v. Ball, 1!11nr, llim, Brown & Baerwitz, 128 Cal.Rptr. 901, 906 (Cal 197£

1),

SI'.(

also Restatement (Second) of Tort:,§ 552 (1977). 7

Reed Taylor has proven. as a matter of law, that the Opinion Lt;ttcr cc)ntains 11cµ:ligrn1:y

misrepresented facts and opinirllls. (Statement of Facts "Fags", §§ 1.2-1.4.) Eberle Berlin. Kile>'
.~nd

l\1rnb0w were aware that their opinions and rcpresentatin11s were to be used for tbc purpo:-:1.·

of the transaction to redeem Reed Taylor's shares. (Id.) These opinions and rcprc::.rnt;ition:·
iudude those set forth in the 011i11ion Letter and those made l'Y Riley ;it vnrio11s mcctinf'c: cif t\ l ·\

Services' Board of Directors. Vd, §§1.1-1.2 and 1.6.) Recd T11ylor n:lini upon the opinic1ns

___

._

;1n1i

. __ ,.. __ _

' The legal ar~uments asserted in Section) are incorporated by reference htrei11.
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rcpn:.':n1tations and Eberle flcrlin, Riley and Turnbow wen· aware of his rclialllT. an1 L in fact.
cxp1c:;~!y

invited his reliance. (Facts, §§1.1-1.4.) In fact, Eberle Berlm,

cxprc.dy stated that "[1]liis__9pinion is furnished solely foryorn

}~~11cfit,.

it

upop by,;:)_ny other person." (Id, §1.2; 2/2/10 Taylor Aff.. Fx. A, p. S.)

Rik~y

and Tn:nhnw

111;:iy

u(l( lie_ relied

Thcincprc~:cn1rition~

w1d opinions contained misrepresentations as determined by the distri1:t cuurt in foyfor

11•

AJA

S1Tvices, et a{ (Facts, §1.4; l 2/3i09 Babbitt Aff., Ex. J.) R<.:L'd Tuylor has suffrrcd d:1m:1_1.'.GS ac:
he would have never sold his shares but for the representation:- and opinions, and his :% i'vlillion
Pw1ni:·~:c;0ry

Note (plus accrued interest of over $2.S !v1illion) has been ruled illtTa1 ;md_

tHH:11fr1rccable. (Facts, §1.6; 2/2/10 Taylor Aff., Ex. D; 12/3/09 Babbitt All, Ex . .I.)
Having proving the reqnired elements for egligent

mi~~representatwns,

parlLtl

_:w11111,iry

judb'tLLrnt should be granted in favor of Reed Taylor on the 1~q10 of liethility for this clni111.

2. Riley, Turnhow and Eberle Berlin's acts consti1ufe fraud.

Ckntrnlly, the following nine elements in order to state a clui111 for fraud:
(1) a statement or reprcsent<ition of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its matnialtt): vl) the

speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the spe<1ker'~ i111ent that them be rclim1L:c·: (h) the
hcnrcr's ignornnce of the folsity of the statement; (7) rclirmcc by the hearer; U~) jtr~tifi::ibk
rclinnce: imd (9) result<lnt injury.
M(l1111os v.

Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 931, l 55 PJd 1166, I UO

(:-~007).

Idahn <'nurts lwn: \l)ap

recognized '"constructive fraud" as an alternative to common law fraud, thereby tnkinv
four1h and fifth elements required to prove fraud. See e.g.. McGhr.e 1•. /vfc(!/u-:r.

8~

;1\.v:1y

tile

f,fa[11:• 16 i.

371, l:') P.2d 760, 762 (l 960), 37 Am. Jr. 2d Fraud and Deceit§') t2009).
Cienerally, opinions and predictions cannot form the

ha~is

of ct

fr~ud

claim, lww1.:vt:r, ;m

excepiinn exists whete a false prediction or opinion is givc11 with the intent ln

mi~-:!cad.

C1wc nevelopment, Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, 601, 150 l'. l(I 288, 294 ()006);

(\

1

101/11·

r1 J\rn ..lr ..ld

Fraud and Deceit § 73 (2009). This principal also holds true for opi11ions giYl~n \Vhcn tlw pem)11
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" 1 .

:\ -

j

is aware that the facts are incompatible with the opinion, and I lie opimou rwiy cc1n~.1 i1 l :k

:>lah:tncnt of fact if made wilh !he intention of deceiving nr

Eberle Berlin, Riley and Tu1nbO\\' made numeron.•;

1111,;leJdint~

.i

la l~c

Id

re1m~se11laii<111s

of fr1ct <'!11..l 1•11i11io11 tn

Recd l;-iylor by and thrnugh the Opinion Letter. (Facts, §1.2.) Such representations wen: fnbc
and rnatcrial as determined hy the district court in Taylor " AIA Services. rt al. (Id.

~ 14.)

Riley. Turnbow and Eberle ncrlin knew that he would rely upon the representations ;·,;; they

add1 csscci and delivered the 011i11 i()n Letter to him and specifically

~lated

tirnt it wm: for ltim to

rely Uptm. (Facts, §1.2; 2/2/10 Taylor Aff., Ex. A.) They alsu knew that their n..:prc:.(·nlahm-:
were frilsc, i.e., tlrnt no spcGific shareholder resolution lwd hee11 presented Jnd voted upon
cx:prc,~~ly

approving the use of capital surplus to pay him

(F~1cts.

§§ 1.4 ; sec also 1~~/J/O»

Bahbi11 Aff., Ex. J.) Reed Taylor was ignorant to, and had uo knowledge <1f t11c fabty 11f s11cll
representalions, and he JUStitl11hly relied upon the

Taylor Aff,

~~5-8

reprcse11~:nion:;.

(bet:;, ~ l.1-1.11: .?/2/10

and 10.) f<'irn1lly, the misrepresentations l1ave damaged Reed Tayh1r lo tlit

tune of 111il lions of dollars find depriving him of his retirement. (Facts, § L.4-1.6; 12n;oq B.lbhitt

Aff., Ex. J: 2/2110 Taylor Aff.. f 13

~nd

15 and Ex. D.)

Th11s, all nine elemenls ol' fraud are proven and no issue of foct remains.

f\l1.1tc(1\'Cr,

seven demcuts of constructive li'.rnri are proven and no issue of fact remains. Pnrti:il
j11dp,nwnt

l'~

,111

:~u111awry

appropriate and warr:mted for this claim on the is::uc of liability.

3. Riley and llawlc)' Troxell owed Recd Taylm· fiducinr)' <lutic.'> and
intentionally hrc;whed those fiduciary dutirs.

J\ttC1rneys can be liable for a separate claim of breilch of fiduci;-iry duties upon
of sclf'-dcnl111g, deception, or misrepresentations that go
TrrJ1/S1i11lc:: V. He.11ry, 261 S.\\'Jd

mtorney owes a duty of loy<1lly

nt

10 il

b~·yond

(Tex. 2008). Even in the

a

kt~<'ll

a~scncc

:il11~e.1tions

malpradic1: ;1('lHnt.

of any cnnride1t v::, Clll

former client that prevents that altomey from

1ill.ld<.111:~

111
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inteqin.:ting, work performed
R1/h~e

Disposal District

v

1)1"

supervised for the former dient.

S11l/iva11 Cow1t1' Rcgw111rl

Town of Acwonh, 686 A2d 755 (N.H l 1J%). see also fr(111s1/ale

~·

llmr.r·, 261 S. W.3d 221 (Ttox. 7008).

When a law)'er

prcYil'IU~dy

cha:1:::e simply because there

i;;

represents a coqJoration dicnt, the co1pt>rn1c

n change in shareholders as thc attorney owetl d11tiL'S

the corp0rate form at tlIL· ti me of the representation or transaction.
Co1111111111icafions

f11n11

111

d11c:•

1101

llly;tll]

to

Jn 1-.~ .".'lyw(]y

Holding Cort. '" Island Capital Managemrnr. LLC , 415 H. R. SS(),

R(i<) (\ 1. 0.

Florida 2009). This also :ippl iv:; when the ownership of a ct1rp111ation cha:1gcs:
.IlJ.Y~fir.m

previously n·pn ~;ented the corporation ii1 t_l1(: l)ist1jct_(ot:~t_;~_ccu!ilic·:; litig.di1•1t,
in its effo1ts to dcfc11Jl•c: COIJl(l!ati(ln'~ clnim~ ng:1i11~1
Lt. Clearly, the cnrpuiation' s ownership has ch.111gcd as a result o ! ll 11.: :-;l11c k
purchase ... Skyway's _1:01pc,rate form cannot be disrcg:u\lc~i, liow~vcr, ;~olel_y h.:cm1::1.:. it~'
stockholdets have cL1~·111gcQ. 'In fact, a found ati QI 1_.v L rormn;1t1~ __la w_j_s. tl 1<!!- unlike
partnership or a sole proprietorship, the existence Q( a ~p_rpgr:;itc.~ntity isgot -dh~l;1cd by
~banges in its ownership 11r changes in managert)_rn1- ·
~nQ_riJ>w rq~resents tlv~_lkfr:-11da11t

S~vway

Communications, 415 B.R. at 869 (emphasis added) (i11tcrnnl citation omitted).
A violation of rule~ 01· d'.iics pertaining to conflicts nf interest may lie used ,1; cvidcuu:.

:wainst an attorney in a malpracl1ce action. RTC MongagC' l'rnsr 1994 N-1 v. Fideli(r N11tio1111/

Title /11s11ra11ce Company, 5){ 1:.supp.2d 503 (D. N.J. 1999)

The knowledge of

:111 n.!'ent

ic;

imputed to the prmcipal whc:11 it is received by agent while actirw within the' scnpi:: •)f hi'."
emplnyment, and when it is in u::forence to matters over which agcni's authority

cxft·11d~:

undrr

lhc dcic\rine of respondeat S\1 pc1ii11. Id

Here, Riley owed fidncimy duties to his former

client~·~

Reed Taylor '1tld Al1\

a11d such fiduciary duties nrc i111puted upon Hawley Troxdl. (F;:icts, §§ 1.1-1.6,

Alf,

~i~]2-8,

St1 vkt':,

:u:~flO

'I aylo1

10-13 and 15-lll.) Riley and Hawley Troxdl have flagrantly and mtentio11Jlly

breached their fiduciary

dutiL~:;

\)wed to Reed Taylor and AlA Setvice;: as its c01 pnrnll' Conn
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~

L'.~is1cd

:,

j

: :

3: 19F\1

';,

1

in July/August 1995, i.e., he owed duties to not ;iUack the n::de111pt1nn pf Ren! I :i\'l•.•r's

sl1::n::; as he was the attorney for that transaction and he nwcd dutiL:S to not d11cd\
;\1~<ick

the Opinion Letter that he provided to Reed Taylor.

t)f

(Facts. §§1.1.-1.6.)

il\dircdlv

With i\IA

Servires' present existence being that of the present sharcholrlcr rnmmiUitW cou11tlc.ss "a.ct.<. of
fraud and torts to avoid the contractual and legal obligations to Rn:J Taylor, Riley owed lm
d11t1cs to Reed Taylor and Al A Services based upon the corpNati1m · s cxistem· c in 1')'(i wi icll hL'
1(·p1(:.q·nted it, Reed TRylnr :1•td provided the Opinion Letter.

iutL'ntioually pursued

a11 adver:·~c

position to that of his former

Sr.:1viccs. as they existed in 199.5. (Id.; 212/10 Taylor Aff,

Jns1ead. t111'. l\1l(·y

(id)

clicr1.t~

.-:i:2 lt' and

Ret'.d Taylur :rnd Al:\
E~\..

A: l ll/·1109 Hiley

!\if. Ex. A-B.) They have intentionally violated the undivided dul}' 11f l()ytl!ics owed

laylor and to AIA Service:;

a~~

the corporation existed in 199::-, when RL·ed Tayl1q·

majmity shareholder and the clear intent of all parties
Taylor'~~

W<t'i

tn

cn~urc

[(I

·1fr::d

w.1~;

llw

the mlcrr1ptio11 ui· Rc,\l

shares complied with the law. (Id.) Presumably, they elected to intcntiow1lly l11cncL

liducia1 y duties owed to Recd Taylor and AIA Services to pm~ue what they bclicvnl ;1~' the

course of least resistance. at lhe time in order to defend
i1ct~

tlH~rn..:;dvcs

riom their prior itt:rn1io11:1 I

of conversion and aidinr, and abetting in the commission of torts. (See U/.l/09 lhhhiit :\IL.

•JJ 1-3:

f:~cts.

§§ l. l l .(1.)

l hey

i nl\:ntionally and mulicioosly h•ok action that 'vas direct! y adverse to that iJf Riley'~

lii11 u(·1

Ex. N: 11/10/09 Bond Aff. ' ]2-9; 2/2/10 Taylor A.ff.,
]'
1
1

clients, Reed Taylor and A[A Services, and action that was udvc1se to

Riley'~

Opi11iu11 l.dtct

(Id.) They also inappropriately ;md successfully failed to chsclnse material fac1:-; to Rn.:d l:1yh11
a1 id l1ttvl: thwarted discover)' as it pertains to the Opinion Lctli.:1 iu J;1.i1or v. A Ill S'oTin:s, ' t 11/..

all in the vain efforts of avt)idinc liability for their torts hy nbtaininr; :m tJrder'

lr11111

th· c111111

fi1tcli11i::, the redemption agreeuwnls were illegal and unenforcl'ahle. (Id)
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Accordingly, there is no issue of fact that rern;ilns.

-

Riley ;.mcl Hawky Twxcil

mtrntionally breached their fiduciary duties, specifically their duties of undivided ll)yal1y.
to l<1ky's fom1er clients Reed Taylor and AIA Services

trn·~·d

l\1(1rcovcr, Riley and lLw.ky lr1.1xvll

inh:'.nti on ally violated their undivided duty of loyalty owl:d t() R1ky' s t: hen( Reed L: vlnr. ,i:•
evidenced by Riley obtained a conflict waiver from him in the ~arly 2000s. (Id; 7/)/lll l'::ylm

4. Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin commith:d negligl'ncc/malpradicc awl

partial summary jurlgment should be enfrrnd in bffor of Recd Taylor.
The clements of negligence are (1) duty; (2) breach: 0) \.'.ausatioa; and (4) 1.brn1.L e:'
1

f·:srare of {j,>cker v. Callahan, 1·Hl Idaho 522, 525-26, % P. {\]

,,:n.

r>?ll-n (70041. In lHdrr 1e1

cst1l.,ltsh a claim for profession;il negligence, the plaintiff nm.:.t show:
(1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship: V) the exi~frnce of ,1 cl11ty l)JI :lie
pni:t of the lawycr; O) the failure to perform that duty; and ( 1) the faihm'. to pnfon n
the duty must be a pwximate cause of the injuries :~11ffercd by the client
1

J.rr.IJ F11gi11eers. Inc. v. SC'curitr bi.rnrance Company of fI.wtjord, l4b Idal1031l.J17. 11H J' .. ~d

U11der the legal thcorw.c: ;irticulated below, Reed Taylor as proven that Riley, Turnbow-.

aud Eberle Berlin's acts and/or omissions constitutes ncgligt•11cc and malpractice. They had an
athirney-client relationship with Reed Taylor and drafted ,lnd dcli\'cred th0 Opinwn

lPtt(~r

\(1

l1i111. (Facts. §§ 1.1-1.3.) They nwcd Reed Taylot duties of can:~ by uud thrnllglt rep1(.'T'.:ti111'. i11:n.
rq1n''.it.:HI ing

AIA Services, by Le presenting both AIA Services :111J ltim. by provid i11!! I1i 11: t I1c

Opini\m Letter, and the combirrntion of all of the foregoing. (Id; 212110 Tay IN AfL 'iii!2 8.
I J ami l 5-16.) They failed to perform their duties in accordance with the npplica ble dnty
and breached their duties. (Fnctsi §§ 1.4.) Moreover,

l'lS

set fotth in Seel ion

~

111

l' {\_ ;\1

c

hclPw, the ilu1y

and hrcach have been taken ;w:;iy from the jury by way oft.heir legal services violntirw I.!·

:~: -qi.
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\ ...

\

..

l-<1 ( 1995). (Facts, §1.4.) Their failure to properly ob1ain the required slwrcholdt'.:·

UHL~t.:r11

appmving the invasion of capi1al surplus is the cause of Recd Tayhir:s $6 Millioll Nuk ht.:i11g
found illei:;al and

unenforce~hle

thereby depriving him of $R.:l 'tvfillion ;.incl hi::; retirement. (Id:

l ~~/ V09 Babbitt Aff.: Ex. l) Their acts constitute negligcnci:: .ind ma lprilcticc. ~
a. Riley, Tllmbriw and Eberle Berlin have C1•ttt11t!tkd u1alp1ar.11ce
client Reed T~wlor.
From the 1980s through the mid 1990s, Riley aud
pcr~'>l'lJl,11

•

l~lit:rle

.i2~1in•

I tlwir

Berlill vvcre R•:n.l ·1 <1ylor';.

attorneys and the attorneys fbr AJA Services. (Facts, §§ l l -1 J: 212/1 O l<l y Ior i\ I: .

1• [2-lh) Over many yeius, they represented him tluough his divo1cc nnd rite rcstrncturittg oi'Al.r\

1 1

Sen·iccs wherein he contrilmtcd millions of dollars of

:Cl5St'.t:·:

lo AIA Services.

tM.) 111 !:11.:'.,

Riley':-: attorney-client relationship with Reed Taylor was contirrm:d in the c-arly 200fh wl1cn lie
w.-i:~

with ffawlr.y Troxell. (Facts, §1.3; 2/2/10 Taylor Alf, ~!1.5.) Riley, Hawley l r•i:'.l:l:l1. and

Euc11c Berlin are, as a matter of law, liable to Reed Taylor f<.)t their m1.1lpractice.
a. Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin represc1itcd

Bct:-d_Taylo~nnd_i\ L\

Scn·icl'c\,

Attorneys may be Enble for malprnctice in Idoho wh-.-n they represent a corp11t«1tiP11 :111d

its slmrd10lders. Wick v. Eisman, 122 Idaho 698, 838 P.2d :101 (1992). Riley, lurnh1w dud
Ehnle Berlin elected to represrnt both Reed Taylor and AIA SnviCl'.S, and prnvick l1im wi'lt 1l1c
()pinion Letter.

(Facts, §§1.l-l .3; 2/2/IO Taylor Aff.,

~i].~-11.)

They arc, a:-; a ni;1tlcr d J;1\\,

liabk (('him for malpractice.
b. Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's acts C0!1Stitute ueglizcuccl1tL•llpi;H t:n~
against_Ri::<:sLTajjO..L even if he was nQ.tJhcirclie11t.
Aaorneys may also be liable for malpractice to intended third pnrty bencfici;1ri(·:, J;,'tifi··
~·.

Jlcrt::herg & Golden, P.C, 571 N.W.2d 716 (Mich. 1997): TVolco f11vesrme11rs, Inc r. ilu:.·11e11.

• The.,c arguments and fact~ are inco111r-rated by reference into each oftlw bdlH\ suh,;t·cti,)ns under Thi~ Sr'.ction
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1 ;,

j

:,

3: 2:) r :v1

\.

HH l l:.Sup;.>. 1576 (D.C. Florida l 995). The issuaHce (If kgnJ

heudit for n client, either nwnetary ot othenvise, must lie

l)•:~ued

1ip111H111

iu1ernkd 1\l

:;1~u1~e

:1

:'.1iutrn:~·c-:

witli dut.: ..::m:. :ind

wlll! do nnt act carefully will h;wc breached the duty owed tn thPse 1ht.:y :i1tcmp1cd or cxr1:r.·kd 1P
iIL11u~:mT.

Roberrs v. Ball, Hu11r, Hart, Brown & Baerwit;;, 128 Cal.Rptr. 901, ()Oh ((';ii. I ')F)).

Al11m1eys may also be liable f0r malpractice/negligence to non-dicrits. Davin. !.LC v /)a/111111.

74C• A.7.d 1034 (NJ. 2000): RTr Mortgage Trust 1994 N-1 v Fiddif)· Nlifi()l11il T1rlc·
Co111pa11y, 58 F.Supp.2<l 503 (D.C. N.J. 1999); Lloyd v Wolrcn', 217 S LUd 8!'8

lu~1o·~iwe

rs

t

':11oli1i1t

I 981 ).

[n 1995. the clear in1rn1

c)f

all parties was to cnsun:: that Recd Taylor';.. sl1:1rl·:: wct\:

n:dccmcd legally. (Facts, §§ l. l-l .3.) This fact, coupled \Yith the Opinion Letter. mike:; ck:ir

tlwt l{ecci Taylor has third-patty beneficiary rights to punrnc ncf!ligcucc and m;1lprncii1T claim:
a1:1,ains1 Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin, and they ure liable

10

him, as a mat!rr of lJw,

their

1(11

negligence cmd malpractice. (fr/.; 12/3/09 Babbitt Aff., Ex . .T.)
c. fuley, Tu11J\?()~v and Eberle Berlin have hn·aclted tliQir cc1n1ractua! nblig:11i(lJl:'
owe_c!_Jp_Rec(L1)ylor.

The tort of legal ma lprncticc is also a breach of the ,)ttorncy-cl icnt contrnct. F11f frr

1·.

Wu/fers, 119 Idaho 415, 807 P.2d 633 (1991).

Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin breached their c1mtrm:tual oblie:1tinns
1"1~1 l11r

hy and tluough their Opinion Letter delivered

ctlmmitting malpractice. (Facts.

§~1.1-1.6.)

fl),

and rclid upnn, by

O\\Td 11 • He(·li
l'.i1~1.

1hc·1vl•y

They \\-Tongfolly represrnted and w;m1.wtc·d 1:1at all

necessary shareholder consents had been obtained and that the redemption did 1.1ot vioJalc

.111y

laws. amo11g other representations. (Id., §1.2; 212/10 Taylor ,\ff., Ex.. A.) They hrm: '1rt oidtul
0

ti 1~ir co1Lt.n1.:tual obligations '1nd warranties to Reed Taylor thcrdl)' committing mril pr:H.:l ice.
///
l~EED TAYLOR'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPOl~ I" OF
f'ARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDAN rs . 19

000894

,.

~

:·:

j

:·:

2. -'1

:;~ : . I_~ ~ V

Eberle Berlin agr~c~;d f~)_ft1J~T into _;m~aHt·r~\l:\'-l'lit·nt
with Reed Tavlor by and thro.!_1£,.lLthc;__ ~_~prt:·.;~ wntJ"act 11nwi:·~iP11
in the Stock Redemption Agreement.

d. Rj]ey,

Tu1:nl~~J.\Lrr_Q_q

[~~!lQ.Q§}Jjp

An attorney's duty arise:; out of the contract hetwc:c11 tltc a1llJmcy

<iud

lii3 ~·: l:\;1 dic1d

.Jolmwm v Jones, 103 Idaho 7m, 704, 652 P .2d 650 (1982).
£fc1c, AIA

Service~

and Reed Taylor had a C<)111tnctual agn::erncnl

Turnl.io\\' ::md Eberle Berlin agreed lo provide legal

servio...~~·;

wl1·~·1el1y

to Reed Taylor.

l\iky,
~

( 1::h:t::.

1..2:

l l/~ 1 1/0<) Riley Aff., Ex. A, p. 11, §2.40).) They negligently provided tl10:-:c legal service:: 1c• Rccd
Taylor l')' nddrcssing and delivering the Opinion Letter 1\J him, whcu in fad 1hc J\'(;L:1npfi111i
violakd Idaho law.

e.

(Facts,§~

l .4.-1.6.) Their acts constitu1c

rH:~!ligc.:n~x

and 111<ilpr;irtirt.

Ril~.Y,_I11rnb•J_W

and Eberle Berlin's ac1s __and/or omi:~~~ion.': ct•n'·,lt111h'
malpractice ag.1inst Reed Taylor as the 111;1jori_ty_~;ban*t•ld~~r of Al:\ Sci \'iC(' ~·
who has h:".en cfoprived of his majority in,tcre!iL

Shareholders may also pursue derivative claims for rnalprncticc. Scliii/111,11;
,\'a111so11.

PC. 951 A.2d l 05 l (1\'.J. 2008). However, n shard1oldcr may

brin~~

11

Woll &

1·.

dcrivatin·

;ic1 ion

directly against parties if he cnn show distinct damc:iges only applicable: to him. St11·lm1111

1•.

M111/ori-, 110 Idnho 5 l 0, 716 P.2ci 1282 (1986).
l\lTd T;:iylor

W<lS

the majority shareholder of AlA

lfocrk Herl in provided their

lq~al

services to AIA

Service~.

s(~rvicrs

when Riley, 'l11rnb '>'V .md
1

(Facts, §§ 1. l · l J.) Hrc,rn;ct: lie

the· only shareholder ii1jured thr0ugh their negligence, he is the only

1.1LT~W11

e111itlcd

1P

damages for the loss and may directly pursue the derivative malpincticc d:iiiw;. ( F:1ct::.
1(1 )

w~r~

rL·cpn:r
i,;~ 1.1-

Eberle Berlin, Riley and ·nirnbow's acts were neglige111 and <.:unc-:tit ult: uw lprn~'.1 in:.
5. Eberle Uerlin, Uilcy imd Turnbow's flrls and/or omissions (·onstitutl- 11er
negligence.

.\t'

Negligence per se is established when a violation of ;i statute occur:;;. Ohe11dmj ,. ll'1·n1
]fog

.)/11'<1)'

Company, Inc., 145 hfaho 892, 898, l8S P. :Id 8 ~·l (/OOX).
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:

,.., ''

.

:,

1::;t:1lili:-.hes that a person ha.s violated a statute, the first tw<1 eh.:1ncnts nf duty and

takl'll :iway from the jury. Obcndmf, 145 Idaho at 898. To p1T\'Uil on
i;-;

11l)t

rcg11ired to specifically plead negligence per se

l'IS

l•Cl'.icl1

n~gligen~:epu·

rue

;~ p:11'.y

,\1·.

a distinct thc(11 y. Id

Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow provided lega I ~crvicc::; throup.h direct reprc:-:rntat inri
nm\ through the opinions and representations made in the Opinion
l\tL~d ft:1yl0r~-all

drafted t1nd

ddivt'.n~d lt. •

of which resulted in the district cou11 indin-ctly found were nq:l q•\'.1 ·t 11.·hc11 i1

f()und that the redemption of Recd Taylor's shares violated l.l:.
Thu~ ..

L~1ter

§ 30-1-6 (l995). fh1c'. ..

sl :J)

f•llrfol summary judgment is appropriate against Riley, Turnhow ;md Ehcrk fkrli1i li11di 1::

1il;H tliey have committed negligence

:iway from the jury on all

per se and the issues of duty and breach sl11rnld h tukl'1t

m~gl igence

1:

based claims asse1tcd liy Reed Taylor. incl11d i11~:

tlt1):-;L

m:gli!JJ.:ncc mid malpractice cbir•.1s assei1ed above. 9
6.

Rilt~)'

and Hawley Troxell violated Idaho's Consumu Protcl'1[1111 Ad It~·
drafting an,J rldinring false opinion ktka·s and hy rcprcscntin~ :ufrtr~l'
interests.

Under the Idaho

Con~11mcr

Protection Act, the followinp, acts

appli~:nblc

to

tlti~~ act1nu :.!IL'

d.:clarc:d to be 011lawfol:
(7) Representing that. scn·ices are of a particular
another;

~;tamlnrd. l{Uahty

(17) Engaging in any act or p1actice which is otherwise
the consumer;

mi~leadi11g.

[( ~. ~ ·iS-603(7) and (l 7). "Services" mean work, labor or any othn act

performed hy a seller to or on behalf of

fl

consumer." I.C. §

4~-602.

tlr

or gr<Hlr.· ... if illL"y ul

false,

01 ck~1;ptivc

practice 1·1 c•v1ded nr

In order 10 ret.:l•Vcr <l11

enhanced penalty, the Court must find that the offending party knew or should h;lve
Iii$ conduct' was perpetrated

ar~:iinst m1

elderly person (a pw=on over

<i'.'-yc;1!'~-nld)

kttl)Wll tlt:.J

;1ml ii. ~;uclt

~ nus aq~ument is incorporated by rcf~rcnce into e11ch and every argumt"·nt :1~~;oe1ted hndn !h:it pl·11.1:1:·.
h' nl'.f;li1;cnce, nrnlpractice or dutie~;.
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\.

couduct Cl'l.sed the elderly person to lose 25% or more of his monthly mcorne.
l>UX(.~)(a),

~

U'

·l X-

(a)(ii) and (c)(iii).

Here. Riley and Hawley Troxell knew that Reed Taylor

over 10-ycm:: old. ,is l'vlr.

W.1S

Riley b;1;;: represented him for dcc<ides. (Facts, §§1.1-lA.) Riley had privily witlt l-'.lTll 1'.1yh)r
and is

L~Sh)pped

from asserting otherwise. (Id.; Section 7 hdow.) gjley and llawJcy ·1 l\).'cd!

"11l'\\' that their actions would deprive Reed Taylor of over
i11i.:c•111c when they

succe~sfully

l.S 01~

of his rnnnthly rl'.lin.:1ne111

persuaded the district couit to !Ind the rcdc111pt10n

\)f

hi::

:~lm1

t:,'•

mid tile legal services provided by Riley to be illegal. (Fac:1:-;, §§1.l-l.tJ) They k1ww 1ld Hilt:y
l1:td provided Reed Taylor the Opinton Letter, which the dis'.r;ct court fouud

v. AJA Services. er al, and which such letter was decepti,·c r111d
(Id.; 21'.UlO Taylor Aff.,
<iud. cv\.n

~]~5-7)

1(1

mic;lc~<liiw

lie fo I:<(' i11 forh•r

br

it~

Riley h11d engaged in acts mis1ep1 csenting facts and

opinion~~,

more egregious, toci k arl\'erse actions against the Op iniou Letter and 11 i;: fo n uc 1

rCJHl::-;l-..ntation of Reed Taylor and AIA Services.

11/10/09 Bond Aff.,

,]~2-9

(Fact~. §~t. 1 i-UI;

2/2/10 Taylor .-'\tf,

and Ex. A-E.) Most importantly, their 11ctiuus

dn~ <l

·rv1illion in amounts pre,·iously due, and the taking of virtu;illy all of hi:~ rttin:mcnt.

However, the egregious facts above were not to be
l\ikv and Hawley Troxell delivered yet another opinion

la~t.

le~tn.

lbc opinion letter was imippropriately utilized to oh1.1i11

wl1ich Al!\ Services held

n0 nwm~rship

As rcct'.l\f

a~

~:i12-l6;

dircl·i l:a11:-;c 111

111illi1111s of dollars in danrnGcs to Reed Taylor by and throu!!l1 thc cxti11g11i5hu1cnt

t11110

very term;.

11~ '·'''\:!"
q::Kl~'.

Sk.:'

§ 1.6.)

Oc1ol 1c1 27. :~ l)()c,,

(2f2/10 Tay:nr AfL I'.:-:. I·) Thi-;

;J :~lS

\filliou loan G.n :!rJ c11ti1y

interest and was a vinlation of AlA

~ervicc-:·

i11

.tu11t:udul

Ari ic!c:) of lncorporntion. (fd, Ex. E.) This demonstrates a clc.lr comsc of conduct hy rvlr. Hilcy

u r dratting and delivering opinion lette1s without concern for their accuracy or 1!1ei1
1)ll

the prntics This opinion ktter, like the Opinion Letter

t(1

l\ccd Taylor,

rc~mifo~2tinn··

dc1110nstr,:tc~:

that

t10
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•· .

l.:~m

i-;sues of fact remain and par1bl summary judgment should '11: e11tered. iforeover. 1licrl:

be

no bencr facts to support findi11i:; liabili1y and exernplnry d. wwges 11nder the Act. \•,focl1 q1cl1
(fatnngcs w111 be taken up with th~ Court at a later date.

7. Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin a1·e cstop1•ccf from as~crhng lack of privity
as ft defense, even if they were not Reed Taylor's pc•·souaJ attornq·~.
When an 11ttorne.y deliYcrs an opinion to a third pa1 ty nt 1hi: request of his cl icn1.
established as a matter of Jaw. Firwva Capital Corporatio11 '"
/.l)l)'i );

RTC: lvfortgage Trust 1994 N-1 v. Fide{f{y

F.~~Ll'P·2d

pcll ly° s

lkr.~;o-.

Nof ir.l11,1/

i ·:ity i >

18 A.D.3d ?St•, /.S7

(~·L\.

Tirlc /ils11m11rc ( 'u111p. u,r.

503, 521 (D. N.J. 1999). When a laivyer represents that he is acting

bchalt~

1·1

M

"'~

tlw 1h11d

the attorney is e.";tOpperl from denying the atto111ey-c!icnt relation:-; hip 1111\1 ruay l•e

ltdd liable for breach of fiducinry duty or negligence.

Crossland Sai,i11gs

!311111. /SJJ \'.

/<1Jl·kwood Insurance Company. 700 F. Supp. 1274 (N. Y. 1988); Col1c;1 v. God/1i111.f. 1>6'.'
F.Sllpp. 152. 158 (E.D. NY. 198'1).

Herc. Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow representing that tltt:} were acti111! nn Rt:ed

faylor':; bch;-ilf when they drnftcd, addressed and delivered the Opiuion Letter to hi111. ull at the
n~que.q

tlwir

of AIA Services. (Facts, §§1.1-1.3.) This attorney-clic:it rclntion:-h1p is iudcpcudrnt nf

dntil~S fl)

Reed

T~ylor

as Iii;;; personal attorneys, whic!1 ;tl:;D

t'.~tablishcs

an atlorrwy ._ 1irnt

1clntio11ship between Eberle Berlin. Riley and Turnbow iu J l)l)'.) ;md b\.;yo11d in tltc
("/.)

C<l''L'

1•l l·:iiey.

Rcg::udless, Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow a1e cslopped from denying <Ht <1H11111cy-

t:licn1 relationship with Reed Taylor.

8. To the extent that the Court may bclit:n tli"t any of the ahovc nms('.s of
action are not presently recognized by Ida ho, lhcr should he rccogui:ti'll.
When decidmg whether tn recognize a duty beyo1hl the

~cc,pe

previously irnp1>::._:, L 1he

ld;\\111 Supreme Court engages in ~1 balance-of-the-harms t~~~•I. Ihm·i,1~fi'ld v. J]) flt1111·~ 1c/,. I \IJ
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Idaho

1:~4,

I -

.. -

BR, 90 P.3d 884, 8R8 (2004).

That test invo!Yes the consideration of policy and the wc1µhi11g: nf factors, whicil itil '.1Hk:
[l] the foreseeability of the harm to the plaintiff; /21 tlie lh::gn:.e of celtainly th.11 the
plaintiff suffered ir\i my: [3] the closeness of the counection hctwc:cn the 1.kt(·'.111 1.mt''
conduct and the injury suffered; [4] the moral blmnc :ltladu:d to the dcll:udatit'::. cc111duct;
the policy of preventing future harm; [5] the extent or the hunkn 10 1hc (k!\::.11d,11it Jlld
c0nscquences to the wmrmmity in imposing a duty :o ex:crci~c care witit re.· nlting
liability for breach; and [6] the availability, cost, and prcvaleun: of iusurnucc Jl•r 111..: risk
involved.

For the reasons articulated in this Memorandum, the Com! should, to the extent

!ICct·~;:,ary,

i1nposc liability to the fullest extent permissible to afford Retd L1y:or the 1111lst d1irm: and 1l:licr.
(f''acts.

~§ 1.1-1.6.)

The above eler:1ents are satisfied by the

fad~~

in

thi.~

matter. (id·)

9_ Hawley Trnxrll :rnrl Eberle Berlin arc vicariou~I}' liable.
''A law firm is subject to civil liability for injury legally caused to

:i

pl;r::;on hy <lllY

wwngfol act or omission of any principal or employee of the firm ... " Restatement (Third) LJw
Uovcrning Lav-.1 ers § 58 (2009). Hawley Troxell and Eberle Berlin arc vicariou::ly li11ldr fpr
1

Riley and Turnbow's acts and nrnissions.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons mticul:ited above, the Court should grant pat tial summary judgnwut in
fovor of Recd Taylor on the issues and claims asse1ted ahove.
~;lrnuld ~rant

In the ::tltc11ntiVl\ the <'.mu I

partial summary judgment on those issues mu]/l)r claims it fi11ds me :ti:1•:n1111,1tv.

Un: 1·-:sw. of the amom1t of Reed Tay!or"s damages is best kti for the jury nr a fl.1ture 1unti\•11.
DATED this 3•d day of Febnrnry, 201().

I!&

CAMPBELL,

BTS~ELL

& KIRBY PLLC

/

By

Roderick C. Ii nd
Michael S. H'.c;sell
Attorneys foi l'lainl1ffRecd .I. Taylur
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Jack S. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
Julianne S. Hall, ISB No. 6207
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208)336-9777
Facsimile: (208)336-9177

ByE. HOLMES
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendants Robert M. Turnbow and
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
ROBERT M. TURNBOW, an individual; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;
Defendants.
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AFFIDAVIT OF STANLEY
J. THARP IN SUPPORT OF
EBERLE DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

STATE OF IDAHO )
)ss.
County of Ada
)
STANLEY J. THARP, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:

AFFIDAVIT OF STANLEY J. THARP IN SUPPORT OF EBERLE DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, P. 1
000901

1.

I am the President of Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered

("Eberle Berlin"), a Boise law firm.
2.

I am familiar with and have reviewed Eberle Berlin's files and billing records for

Reed Taylor.
3.

Eberle Berlin represented Reed Taylor between March of 1987 and April of 1991

during his divorce from Donna Taylor.
4.

The scope of Eberle Berlin's representation of Reed Taylor was limited to

handling a portion of his divorce and the related enforcement of the Property Settlement
Agreement executed in the Taylor divorce.
5.

After completing Reed Taylor's divorce and residual property settlements, Eberle

Berlin's attorney-client relationship with Reed Taylor concluded in 1991.
6.

Per our normal billing procedures, Eberle Berlin would have last billed for work

performed on behalf of Reed Taylor in 1991.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 27th day of January, 2010.

~().41\ f\O'\i\~ ~

N~RY PUBLIC fo~
Resides at Boise, Idaho
Commission expires: 01-13-2015
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GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208)336-9777
Facsimile: (208)336-9177
Attorneys for Defendants Robert M. Turnbow and
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
ROBERT M. TURNBOW, an individual; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;
Defendants.
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)
)
)
)
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)
)
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)

Case No. CV OC 0918868

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

COME NOW, Defendants Robert M. Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &
McKlveen, Chtd. (hereinafter "Defendants", "Turnbow" and/or "Eberle Berlin"), by and through
their counsel of record, Gjording & Fouser, PLLC, and respectfully submit this Memorandum in
Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff asserts five causes of action against Defendants Turnbow and Eberle Berlin:
negligence/professional malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation,
violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act and fraud/constructive fraud. Plaintiffs causes
of actions should be dismissed on summary judgment because each cause of action is either not
recognized, as alleged, under Idaho law or the cause of action is barred by the statute of
limitations.
In asserting his negligence/professional malpractice cause of action, Plaintiff fails to
establish there was an attorney-client relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants Riley,
Turnbow and Eberle Berlin. Without a relationship, there can be no breach of any duty which
would arise from such a relationship. Plaintiff is also asserting a shareholder's derivative action,
in his own name, for Defendants' alleged professional malpractice in representing AIA Services
Corporation ("AIA"). However, Plaintiffs derivative cause of action cannot stand under Idaho
law for a multitude of reasons, including, but not limited to, an insufficient demand notice to
AIA and lack of standing. Moreover, any cause of action for professional malpractice is barred
by the two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiffs cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty is
similarly barred by the statute of limitations.
In Idaho, there is no recognized cause of action for negligent misrepresentation against an
attorney; hence, summary judgment on this cause of action is appropriate. Plaintiff also lacks
standing to assert a cause of action for the alleged violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection
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Act. However, in any event, a cause of action for the alleged violation of the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act is barred by the statute of limitations.
Lastly, opinion statements cannot serve as the basis for a fraud action. In the previous
litigation, Judge Brudie already addressed the alleged fraud and held Plaintiffs claim was not
actionable in fraud under Idaho law. Furthermore, the statute of limitations bars any claim by
Plaintiff for fraud/constructive fraud.
Hence, Defendants respectfully request that this Court grant their Motion for Summary
Judgment and dismiss all of Plaintiffs causes of action.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The pending litigation arose out of a corporate transaction occurrmg m 1995.
Specifically, in 1995, AIA Services Corporation ("AIA"), an Idaho corporation, sought to redeem
613,494 shares of the common stock of AIA held by its majority shareholder, Plaintiff Reed J.
Taylor. (Affidavit of Babbitt, Exhibit D, Taylor v. AJA et. al, Plaintiffs Complaint, ,-r 2.10.)
Reed J. Taylor founded AIA and, prior to 1995, owned the majority of AIA's common stock. In
1995, Mr. Taylor serving as the president of AIA and was chairman of its board of directors.
(Affidavit of Riley, ,-r 4; Affidavit of Babbitt, Exhibit D, Taylor v. AJA et. al, Plaintiffs
Complaint, ,-r 2.18.) Under the terms of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, Mr. Taylor was
to receive, among other things: (a) $1,500,000 at closing (converted into a promissory note by
the Addendum to the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement); (b) $6,000,000 plus interest payable
pursuant to the terms of a promissory note; (c) elimination of certain debts he owed to AIA; and
(d) title to certain airplanes. (Affidavit of Riley, Exhibit A: 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement.)
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In 1995, during the negotiation and closing of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement,
Mr. Taylor was represented by independent counsel of his own choosing, Scott T. Bell and N.
Frank Taylor of Cairncross & Hempelmann, of Seattle, Washington. (Affidavit of Riley,

if 4.)

Additionally, during this time, Plaintiff engaged the services of an independent accountant, Ernie
Dantini. (Affidavit of Riley, if 4.) 1
In 1995, AIA was represented by the Boise law firm of Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow
& McKlveen, Chartered. (Affidavit of Riley,

iii! 3-4.)

Defendant Eberle Berlin represented AIA

in negotiating the terms, conditions and agreements for AIA to purchase Mr. Taylor's shares.
(Plaintiffs Complaint,

if

7.)

Additionally, in the course of their representation of AIA,

Defendant Eberle Berlin rendered an opinion letter dated August 15, 1995 (the "1995 Opinion
Letter") relating to the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. (Affidavit of Riley,

iii! 3-4.)

Eberle

Berlin opined, in the 1995 Opinion Letter, with certain exceptions that the Transaction
Documents constitute the valid and binding obligation on AIA. (Affidavit of Riley, Exhibit C:
1995 Opinion Letter.) Eberle Berlin further opined, to the best of their knowledge, that the
execution and delivery of the Transaction Documents would not "violate any law, rule, license,
regulation, judgment, order, ruling, or decree, including any insurance laws or regulations."

1

Several years before the AIA transaction, Eberle Berlin represented Reed Taylor as a client during a portion of his
divorce proceedings. (Affidavit of Stanley Tharp,~ 3.) Eberle Berlin represented Reed Taylor from March of 1987
through April 1991. (Affidavit of Stanley Tharp,~ 3.) The scope of Eberle Berlin's representation of Mr. Taylor was
limited to handling a portion of his divorce and the related enforcement of the Property Settlement Agreement
executed in the Taylor divorce. (Affidavit of Stanley Tharp,~ 4). After completing Mr. Taylor's divorce and residual
property settlements, Eberle Berlin's attorney-client relationship with Mr. Taylor concluded in 1991. (Affidavit of
Stanley Tharp, ~ 5.) Mr. Taylor was last billed for legal work performed by Eberle Berlin in 1991. (Affidavit of
Stanley Tharp,~ 6.)
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(Affidavit of Riley, Exhibit C: 1995 Opinion Letter.) Of note, Mr. Riley left Eberle Berlin and
joined Hawley Troxell on March 1, 1999. (Affidavit of Riley,~ 9.)
After the closing of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, Plaintiff suffered financial
losses.

On April 18, 1996, Plaintiff wrote a letter to the then Chairman, R. John Taylor,

regarding his financial losses. (Affidavit of Riley, Exhibit D.) Shortly thereafter, on April 25,
1996, Plaintiff's attorney, Scott Bell, wrote a second letter to AIA outlining the numerous
defaults and AIA's failure to perform. (Affidavit of Riley, Exhibit E.) Plaintiff's monetary
damages in April of 1996 included: ( 1) a failure to receive timely payment on the Down Payment
Note of $1,500,000; (2) a failure to receive payment for the attorney fees for Cairncross &
Hempelmann's representation of Mr. Taylor in the negotiation and execution of the 1995 Stock
Redemption Agreement; and (3) a failure to receive interest payments on the $6,000,000
promissory note. (Affidavit of Riley, Exhibit E.)
On July 1, 1996, Mr. Taylor and AIA entered into a Stock Redemption Restructure
Agreement, which provided that the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement was superseded and,
with the exception of the $6,000,000 promissory note, all prior documents "[were] of no further
force and effect." (Affidavit of Riley,~~ 5-7.) No opinion was issued regarding the 1996 Stock
Redemption Restructure Agreement.

(Affidavit of Riley,

~

8 and Exhibit A.)

During the

negotiation and closing of the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement, Mr. Taylor was
still represented by Cairncross & Hempelmann, of Seattle, Washington. (Affidavit of Riley,~ 8.)
On January 29, 2007, Mr. Taylor filed suit, against AIA alleging a variety of causes of
action, including breach of contract and non-payment of the $6,000,000 promissory note ("the
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AIA litigation"). (Affidavit of Babbitt,

iii! 3-5.)

During the course of the AIA litigation in the

Nez Perce District Court, Mr. Taylor also filed two additional lawsuits, alleging among other
things, malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty against five attorneys and two law firms,
including Mr. Riley, who is also a Defendant in this pending action. 2 (Affidavit of Riley,

iii! 11-

12, Exhibits Hand G.)
In the AIA litigation the court, in an Order addressing the defendants' partial summary
motion, sua sponte raised the issue of legality of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement.
(Affidavit of Babbitt, if 9, Exhibits J and K.) Judge Brudie held that the 1995 Stock Redemption
Agreement, violated Idaho Code§ 30-1-6, as it existed in 1995; therefore, the contract to redeem
stock between Mr. Taylor and AIA had been illegal since the contract was executed on the
closing date in 1995. In 2009, Judge Brudie refused to enforce the 1995 and 1996 Agreements
because a court must leave the parties where it finds them when it is presented with an illegal
contract. He further noted that the passage of time does not alter the character of an illegal
contract, nor does the passage of time make an illegal contract become an enforceable contract.
Hence, thereafter, the Nez Perce District Court certified the matter as final for purposes of Rule
54(b), and Mr. Taylor filed an appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, which is pending. (Affidavit
of Babbitt, if 11).
In Mr. Taylor's two other lawsuits against the attorneys and their respective law firms,
the Nez Perce District Court held that Mr. Taylor's Complaints failed to state a cause of action

2

Taylor v. Babbitt, et. al., Case No. CV 08-01765, in the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, County of Nez Perce and Taylor v. McNichols, et al., Case No. CV 08-01763, in the District Court of the
Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, County of Nez Perce.
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and dismissed Mr. Taylor's Complaints with prejudice. (Affidavit of Riley,

iii! 14-17, Exhibits J-

N.) The court also awarded attorney's fees against Mr. Taylor. (Affidavit of Riley,

if 15). This

appeal is also pending before the Idaho Supreme Court. (Affidavit of Riley, if 18).

III. STANDARDOFCARE
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) establishes that summary judgment shall be granted
when the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). Summary judgment is appropriate where the nonmoving party bearing the burden of proof fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case. Harris v. Department of Health and
Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992). In other words, when a defendant
moves for summary judgment, the plaintiff cannot "rest on mere speculation because a mere
scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of facts."

Anderson v.

Hollingsworth, 136 Idaho 800, 803, 41 P.3d 228, 231 (2001); McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765,
769, 820 P.2d 360, 364 (1991).
If the moving party challenges an element of the non-moving party's case on the basis
that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to
present evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact.

Mitchell v.

Bingham, 130 Idaho 420, 422, 942 P.2d 544, 546 (1997). Moreover, a "complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts
immaterial." Foster v. Traut, 141 Idaho 890, 893, 120 P.3d 278, 281 (2005).
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IV. ARGUMENT
A.

PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE: NO DUTY EXISTS.

As discussed below, Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendants Riley, Turnbow and
Eberle Berlin had an attorney-client relationship with Plaintiff, nor can Plaintiff establish that
Defendants owed him any duties arising from an attorney-client relationship. 3 In filing his
Complaint, Plaintiff asserts three arguments in support of his professional malpractice cause of
action.

Plaintiff contends Defendants owed him a duty in the subject corporate transaction

because: 1) Defendants engaged in prior representation of Plaintiff in a divorce action; 2) as a
third-party beneficiary or as the majority shareholder of AIA, Plaintiff had an attorney-client
relationship with Defendants; and 3) the contractual provisions in the 1995 Stock Redemption
Agreement between Plaintiff and AIA gave rise to an attorney-client relationship between
Plaintiff and Defendants.
Plaintiff is also asserting a shareholder's derivative action for Defendants' alleged
professional malpractice. Of significance, Plaintiff is asserting this cause of action in his own
name, not in the name of the corporation.
1.

Alleged malpractice based on a direct attorney-client relationship.

In Idaho, to assert a legal malpractice action, a direct attorney-client relationship is
required to exist between the plaintiff and the attorney-defendant prior to the assertion of the
malpractice action. Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 137, 90 P.3d 884, 887 (2004). See
also Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 526 (2004 ). It is a well established rule of law
3

All references to Mr. Riley in this brief are limited to the time he worked at Eberle Berlin (i.e., until 1999).
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that an attorney will be held liable for negligence only to his or her client. Harrigfeld, 140 Idaho
134, 137, 90 P.3d at 887.
Additionally, the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct establish the standards of conduct
for attorneys and define the roles and duties of the attorneys in our legal system. See Preamble.
In general, according to the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, the duties flowing from the
attorney-client relationship attach only after the client has requested the attorney to render legal
services and the attorney has agreed to do so. See Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932, 934 (1990).
An attorney-client relationship cannot be assumed or inferred, it should be created by mutual
assent. Restatement, Third, The Law Governing Lawyers §14(1)(a) (2000 ed.).
In this case, Mr. Taylor fails to establish the formation of the attorney-client relationship
(i.e., request and acceptance) with Defendants Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin for the 1995

Stock Redemption Agreement.

After Mr. Taylor and Defendants' legal representation

relationship terminated in 1991, Mr. Taylor never requested that Defendants Riley, Turnbow or
Eberle Berlin represent him, in his individual capacity, in the AIA transaction, a matter wholly
separate from his divorce action.

Furthermore, and equally important, there is no factual

evidence that Defendants ever agreed to provide any legal representation to Mr. Taylor in the
AIA transaction.
Plaintiff alleges that because Defendants Riley and Eberle Berlin represented him in his
divorce in the late 1980's and early 1990's, Mr. Riley and the other attorneys at Eberle Berlin,
including Mr. Turnbow, owed Plaintiff duties in the AIA Stock Redemption transaction in 1995.
Yet, in Idaho, the representation of a client in a matter is completed when the agreed-upon
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assistance is concluded. Rule 1.16 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, Commentary 1.
The scope of Eberle Berlin's representation of Mr. Taylor (i.e., the agreed-upon assistance) was
limited to handling a portion of his divorce and the related enforcement of the Property
Settlement Agreement executed in the Taylor divorce. After completing Mr. Taylor's divorce
and residual property settlements in 1991, the direct attorney-client relationship concluded.
Hence, in 1995, the only duty owed to Mr. Taylor would be confidentiality as a former client of
Defendants Riley and Eberle Berlin. Rule 1. 9 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct.
Thus, as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate as to Plaintiffs claims that
Defendants Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin owed him any duty in 1995 in the corporate stock
redemption arising from any direct attorney-client relationship.
2.

Alleged malpractice arising from Plaintiff's third-party beneficiary status or
Plaintiff's majority shareholder position.

In recent years, the Idaho Supreme Court has addressed potential exceptions to the direct
attorney-client relationship requirement. However, the Court has only recognized one narrow
exception where an attorney could be liable for malpractice to a third-party. Id. Specifically, the
Court in Harrigfeld carved out a narrow exception to the direct relationship rule for attorneys
drafting testamentary documents. Id.
Of note, after the Court decided Harrigfeld, it addressed and rejected another potential
third-party exception to this direct attorney-client relationship requirement in Taylor v. Maile.
142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005). In Taylor v. Maile, Mr. Reed Taylor attempted to sue the
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trustee's attorney for legal malpractice. 4 Maile, 142 Idaho at 255. In Maile, Mr. Taylor was a
remainder beneficiary of the trust.

Id.

The Court rejected Mr. Taylor's malpractice claim

because Mr. Taylor did not have a direct attorney-client relationship with Attorney Maile, the
attorney for the trustee, as required under Idaho law. Id.
Moreover, the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct provide bright line rules as to the
identity of an attorney's client and the duties owed, especially when the attorney is hired to
represent a corporation. Rule 1.13 provides that a attorney employed by or retained by an
organization "represents the organization." Comment 2 to Rule 1.13 further clarifies the identity
of the client in discussing the confidentiality of the communication with the organization's
constituents or shareholders. 5 Comment 2 to Rule 1.13 also expressly states that when an
attorney communicates with an organization's constituents "the constituents of an organizational
client are not the clients of the attorney."

Rule 1.13 further provides that the attorney's

representation of the shareholders is not automatic when an attorney forms a relationship with an
organization client; there is no representation for the shareholders absent a specific
representation agreement. See Rule 1.13, Rule 1.7, Commentary 34.
Case law further supports that the attorney represents the corporation, an entity legally
distinct from its directors, officers, and shareholders, and that individual members of a
corporation do not have an attorney-client relationship with the corporation's attorney. Multilist

Serv. of Cape Girardeau, Mo., Inc. v. Wilson, 14 S.W.3d 110, 114 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).

4

Mr. Reed Taylor in Taylor v. Maile is the same individual as the Plaintiff in this pending case.
The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct use the phrase "constituent" as opposed to shareholder as the Rule
applies to organizations other than a corporation.

5
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Additionally, a duty does not arise when an attorney represents a corporation and takes actions
on behalf of the corporation which benefit the shareholders. Brennan v. Ruffner, 640 So. 2d 143,
146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1994). Rather, corporate counsel's duty mandates that he or
she act to ensure the undertaken actions are in the best interest of the company, regardless of the
impact on individual shareholders.

Egan v. McNamara, 467 A.2d 733, 739 (D.C. 1983);

Brennan v. Ruffner, 640 So. 2d 143, 146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1994).
This Court would also be able to and would be justified in taking judicial notice of Judge
Brodie's Orders in the two related Nez Perce County lawsuits, Taylor v. McNichols, et. al. and
Taylor v. Babbitt, et. al., so as to similarly conclude that Plaintiffs malpractice claims against
Defendants Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin cannot go forward under Idaho law.

In the

McNichols and Babbitt cases, Judge Brudie held Plaintiffs malpractice claims should be
dismissed because Mr. Taylor did not have the required direct relationship with Mr. McNichols,
Mr. Babbitt or their respective law firms.
In this case, this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs allegations of malpractice against
Defendants, based on his status as a third-party beneficiary or a shareholder, because Plaintiff did
not have a direct attorney-client relationship as required under Idaho law. Defendants, as general
counsel for AIA, did not represent Mr. Taylor's individual interest in the corporate stock
transaction.
In light of the facts of this case, Multilist Serv. of Cape Girardeau, Mo., Inc. v. Wilson is
an instructive case.

Wilson, 14 S.W.3d at 114. In Wilson, the constituents of a non-profit

organization sued the organization's attorney and his law firm for malpractice.

Id.

The
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constituents alleged that the attorney's actions were more consistent with his representation of
the individual constituents, not the organization and, accordingly, the attorney should be liable to
the individual constituents for malpractice. Id. However, the court in Wilson expressly held that
the attorney's actions were consistent with his representation of the organization, not its
individual constituents, despite the attorney's communication with individual constituents,
attendance at meetings for the organization and distribution of advice to specific constituents. Id.
Significantly, in Wilson, the organization's attorney also wrote a letter expressing his opinion on
the legality of the organization's actions. Id.
In Wilson, summary judgment entered in favor of the organization's attorney because the
plaintiffs failed to establish that the attorney had a direct relationship with the constituents or,
alternatively, that the attorney's actions formed an attorney-client relationship with individual
constituents. Id. It was held that the attorney owed no duties arising under an attorney-client
relationship to the individual constituents. Id.
This case is similar to Wilson. While representing AIA as general counsel, Defendants
Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin had direct communication with Reed Taylor (albeit through
his Seattle counsel) and drafted an opinion letter regarding the legality of the proposed action by
the corporation, like the attorney in Wilson.

Similarly, like the direct communication and

opinion letter in Wilson, the direct communication and opinion letter in this case are also
insufficient to deem Mr. Taylor to be Defendants' individual client. Moreover, Defendants'
authorship of the opinion letter did not alter or expand the identity of their client (i.e., AIA), nor
did Defendants' authorship create duties owed to Plaintiff.

In this case, like in Wilson,
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Defendants' actions were more consistent with their representation of AIA, not its individual
constituents like Reed Taylor.
Defendants' client was AIA; there was no direct attorney-client relationship established
with Mr. Taylor as a third-party beneficiary or a shareholder of AIA. Accordingly, under Idaho
law, Defendants owed no duties to Plaintiff in negotiating or drafting the 1995 Stock
Redemption Agreement and Plaintiff's causes of action for malpractice for an alleged breach of
these "duties" should be dismissed.
3.

Alleged malpractice arising from a contractual provision.

Plaintiff also alleges that he had a direct attorney-client relationship with Defendants by
and through an express contract provision. This Court, as a matter of law, should find that the
express contract provision reference by Plaintiff in the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement does
not provide for a direct attorney-client relationship under Idaho law.
The terms of the express contract provision are not disputed. Provision 2.5 G) of the
1995 Stock Redemption Agreement provided for the delivery of "an opinion of Company's legal
counsel substantially in the form of Exhibit G hereto" at the closing. Plaintiff contends an
attorney-client relationship formed with delivery of the Opinion Letter attached to the 1995
Stock Redemption Agreement because the Opinion Letter stated that "this opinion is furnished
by us solely for your benefit for use in connection with the Transaction Documents and the
transactions contemplated thereby; and it may not be furnished or quoted to, or relied upon, by
any other person."
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As discussed above, the drafting and delivery of the Opinion Letter is an action consistent
with Defendants' representation of AIA, not Mr. Taylor. A corporate attorney has a duty to the
corporation to act in its best interest regardless of the interest of the shareholders. This rule does
not change when an attorney's action or the contractual language drafted by the attorney on
behalf of the corporation incidentally benefits the shareholders; there is still no attorney-client
relationship formed. Brennan, 640 So. 2d at 146. Also, the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct
clearly establish that AIA was Defendants' client and absent mutual assent there was no
attorney-client relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants.
Furthermore, the legal representation of Mr. Taylor and AIA Services was clearly
contemplated by the parties in drafting the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. The language of
the Agreement itself makes it abundantly clear that Mr. Taylor was not individually represented
by Defendants Eberle Berlin and Turnbow. The contract provides that the Opinion Letter was
drafted by the "Company's [AIA's] legal counsel." (Affidavit of Riley, Exhibit C: 1995 Opinion
Letter). Provision 2.5 further provides that at the closing, the "Company (AIA) shall deliver to
Shareholder (Plaintiff) a sum sufficient to pay all of Shareholder's attorneys' fees." (Affidavit of
Riley, Exhibit A: 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement). Also, the notice provision in the 1995
Stock Redemption Agreement specifically states that notices addressed to AIA should be sent to
Defendants Riley and Eberle Berlin, whereas notices addressed to Plaintiff should be directed to
his attorneys at Cairncross & Hempelmann. (Id. at if 9.4.) Moreover, the language of the 1995
Stock Redemption Agreement and the Opinion Letter further echoes the provisions of Rule 1.13;
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the language makes it clear that Defendants represented AIA, not any specific constituent like
Mr. Taylor.
In sum, no matter how Plaintiff tries to characterize the situation, being in an "assumed"
direct attorney-client relationship, being a third-party beneficiary of the attorney-client
relationship between AIA and Defendants or a majority shareholder, or having a contractual
relationship stemming from the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, Plaintiff does not have a
cause of action for professional malpractice under Idaho law. Plaintiff cannot establish the
requisite direct attorney-client relationship with Defendant; thus, summary judgment should be
granted in favor of Defendants.

4.

Plaintiff's claim for derivative malpractice as a shareholder.

Plaintiff is also alleging a shareholder's derivative action for Defendants' alleged
malpractice in representing AIA. A shareholder's derivative action is an action brought by one
or more shareholders of a corporation to enforce
corporation.

~

corporate right or remedy a wrong to the

McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228, 233, 61 P.3d 585, 590 (2002).

A

shareholder's derivative action can be brought in cases where the corporation, because the
corporation is controlled by the wrongdoers or for other reasons fails and refuses to take
appropriate action for the corporation's own protection. McCann, 138 Idaho at 233.
Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 30-1-742, no shareholder derivative action can be commenced
until: (1) a written demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable action, and (2)
ninety (90) days have expired from the date of the demand. In this case, Plaintiff admits he
failed to make the required demand under Idaho Code§ 30-1-742. Plaintiff, in his Complaint,
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contends that his failure to comply with Idaho Code § 30-1-742 should be excused because "the
demand would have been futile." (Plaintiff's Complaint, if 46.)
However, Idaho no longer permits "futility" arguments as an excusing condition for a
failure to make the requisite demand under Idaho Code§ 30-1-742. Mannas v. Moss, 143 Idaho
927, 934 (2007). In Mannas, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court did not error in
granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants because no genuine issue of fact existed
regarding whether Mannos made a written demand upon Peterbilt before commencing his
derivative action. Mannas, 143 Idaho at 934. Of note, Mannos argued futility as the reason he
did not make the requisite demand prior to commencing his derivative action. Id.
Additionally, under Idaho law, a shareholder may not commence or maintain a derivative
proceeding unless: (1) the shareholder was a shareholder of the corporation at the time of the act
or omission complained of and; (2) the shareholder fairly and adequately represents the interests
of the corporation in enforcing the right of the corporation. I.C. § 30-1-741.
In this case, Plaintiff was not a shareholder when he commence4 this derivative
proceeding.

Plaintiff ceased to be a shareholder when his stock was

re~emed in

Furthermore, Plaintiff cannot be said to represent the interests of AIA Services
or the larger community of shareholders.

1995.

orI AIA Insurance,
I

I

Accordingly, it is clear for a multitude of reasons that Plaintiff's defvative cause of
action cannot stand under Idaho law and summary judgment for Defendants pn this cause of
action is appropriate.
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B.

PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE:
LIMITATIONS.

TIME BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF

In the unlikely event that this Court determines there is a duty giving rise to a cause of
action for professional malpractice, Plaintiff's cause of action is nevertheless barred by the
statute oflimitations. Idaho Code§ 5-219(4) provides for a two-year statute oflimitations which
accrues "as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of." Of note, "professional
malpractice" means the wrongful acts or omissions in the performance of professional services
by any person, firm, association, entity or corporation licensed to perform such services under
the laws of the state of Idaho. Idaho Code § 5-219(4). When some damage occurs and such
damage is objectively ascertainable, the statute of limitations on a professional malpractice cause
of action begins to run. Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 Idaho 482, 835 P.2d 1293 (1992); City of
McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 659 (2009).
In this case, Plaintiff's cause of action accrued when Plaintiff, based on the alleged
negligent advice of "his attorneys", Defendants Riley and Turnbow and their then law firm
Eberle Berlin, entered into and closed on the unenforceable 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement.
Mr. Taylor's own statement establishes that he was damaged and such damages were objectively
ascertainable as early as 1995:
Almost 14 years have gone by since I sold my shares in AIA Services in
1995. John Taylor, James Beck and Michael Cashman have controlled
AIA Services and its subsidiaries since my shares were redeemed in 1995
and there is nothing that could be done to replace the lost time. I have
been deprived of the right to request to have my shares returned because
over 13 years have transpired and AIA Services business has been
substantially depleted under the management of John Taylor. ... Thirteen
years cannot be returned to me.
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(See Affidavit of Babbitt, Exhibit D: Affidavit of Reed Taylor, dated April 9, 2009.)
According to Plaintiff and his attorney, his financial losses continued to become more
objectively ascertainable in 1996. Plaintiff wrote a letter on April 18, 1996 to the Chairman of
AIA regarding his financial losses. (Affidavit of Riley, Exhibit D.) Shortly thereafter, on April
25, 1996, Plaintiff's attorney, Scott Bell, wrote a second letter to AIA outlining the numerous
defaults and AIA's failure to perform. (Affidavit of Riley, Exhibit E.) As set forth in these
letters, Plaintiff's monetary damages in April of 1996 included: (1) a failure to receive timely
payment on the Down Payment Note of $1,500,000; (2) a failure to receive payment for the
attorney fees for Cairncross & Hempelmann's representation of Mr. Taylor in the negotiation
and execution of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement; and (3) a failure to receive interest
payments on the $6,000,000 promissory note.
Hence, as outlined herein, Plaintiff's cause of action accrued and Plaintiff suffered some
damage in 1995. Plaintiff's financial losses continued to become more objectively ascertainable
in April 1996. In his Complaint, Plaintiff suggests that he first discovered Defendants' alleged
professional negligence when Judge Brudie issued his June 17, 2009 Order. However, the Idaho
Supreme Court has clearly established that there is no discovery exception to Idaho Code § 5219(4). Elliott v. Parsons, 128 Idaho 723, 918 P.2d 592, 594 (1996). Accordingly, under Idaho
law, the two-year statute of limitations started to run, at the latest, in April 1996. Therefore,
Plaintiff's cause of action for professional malpractice, asserted in 2009, is time barred and
summary judgment is appropriate.
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C.

BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY:
LIMITATIONS.

TIME BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF

Plaintiff has asserted causes of actions for negligence/professional malpractice and
breach of fiduciary duty.

Plaintiff asserts that he had an attorney-client relationship with

Defendants Riley and Turnbow and their then law firm Eberle Berlin and as a result of this
alleged relationship, they owed him fiduciary duties pertaining to the redemption of his shares
and the Opinion Letter in 1995. (Plaintiff's Complaint,

iii!

55-57). Although, as discussed

above, it is highly unlikely that Plaintiff had an attorney-client relationship with Defendants, for
purposes this portion of the motion such a relationship will be presumed to have existed based on
Plaintiff's

allegations.

Plaintiff attempts

to

separate

his

causes

of action

for

negligence/professional malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, yet Idaho Code § 5-219(4) is
still the applicable statute of limitations because the claimed fiduciary duty arises out of
Plaintiff's alleged attorney-client relationship with Defendants.
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed this issue in Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 585
(2002).

6

The Idaho Supreme Court held that the proper focus, in analyzing the statute of

limitations, is whether the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred in the course of performing
professional services. Id. In Lapham, the applicable statute of limitations was the two-year
statute set forth in Idaho Code § 5-219(4) because the plaintiff's causes of action arose from the
attorney's performance of professional services in his capacity as a real estate attorney. Id.

6

In Lapham, the plaintiff engaged the defendant attorney to provide professional services in connection with a real
estate loan, including holding funds in the attorney's trust account to disburse to the borrowers. Lapham, 137 Idaho
at 585. After the unauthorized disbursement of the loan proceeds, the plaintiff asserted four causes ofaction against
the defendant attorney (professional negligence, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract). Id.
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Though the plaintiff characterized his causes of action as ordinary negligence and breach of a
fiduciary duty, the plaintiff could not avoid the shorter two-year statute of limitations for breach
of a fiduciary duty while the defendant attorney was acting as a "professional." Id.
In this case, Plaintiffs cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against Defendants
Turnbow and Eberle Berlin (to the extent that Defendants Riley and Turnbow were attorneys
employed by Eberle Berlin) arises out of Defendants' performance of professional services like
in Lapham. Accordingly, Plaintiffs cause of action is governed by the two-year statute of
limitations set forth in Idaho Code§ 5-219(4). As discussed above, the statute of limitations for
professional malpractice begins to run when the cause of action accrues. Plaintiff was damaged
in 1995 and it is undisputed that such damage was objectively ascertainable in April of 1996. To
assert a cause of action, Plaintiff needed to bring an action in 1998; Plaintiffs cause of action in
2009 is time barred.
In the event that this Court determines, as a matter of law, that Plaintiffs breach of
fiduciary duty cause of action does not arise out of Defendants' performance of "professional"
services, Plaintiffs cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty fails for two additional reasons:
1) Plaintiff failed to allege facts showing Defendants assumed a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff; and
2) Plaintiffs cause of action is barred by the statute oflimitations.
To sue an attorney for breach of fiduciary duty in the absence of an attorney-client
relationship, Plaintiff must first establish that the attorney assumed a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff.
Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 258, 127 P.3d 156 (2005). Judge Brudie previously addressed

Mr. Taylor's ability to sue attorneys for breach of fiduciary duty in the absence of an attorney-
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client relationship in his Order of Defendants' Motion for Fees, dated April 3, 2009. (Affidavit
of Riley, Exhibit L: Judge Brodie's Order, pages 7-8.) Judge Brudie held, in the context of this
transaction, there were no facts which would support a finding that an attorney assumed any
fiduciary duties to Plaintiff. Id. Judge Brudie further held that Mr. Taylor's "personal belief that
he is automatically entitled to certain remedies by virtue of the terms in the 1995 and 1996
Agreements ... and as the majority shareholder" are insufficient to establish the assumption of a
duty by the defendant attorneys. Id.
Furthermore, in any event, Plaintiffs cause of action is barred by the statute of
limitations. Under Idaho law, if a breach of fiduciary duty cause of action is not covered by any
of the other specific statutes of limitations, the applicable statute is the four-year statute of
limitations contained in Idaho Code§ 5-224. Jones v. Kootenai County Title Ins. Co., 125 Idaho
607, 614 (1994). Of note, Idaho Code§ 5-224 provides that an action for relief not hereinbefore
provided for "must be commenced within four years after the cause of action shall have
accrued." Accordingly, Plaintiffs cause of action asserted in 2009 cannot go forth and summary
judgment should be entered in favor of Defendants on this cause of action.
D.

NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION:
ACTION UNDER IDAHO LAW.

NOT A RECOGNIZED CAUSE OF

The tort of negligent misrepresentation is not recognized in Idaho except in the narrow
confines of a professional relationship involving an accountant.

Duffin v. Idaho Crop

Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1010, 895 P.2d 1195, 1203 (1995). See also Idaho Bank &
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Trust Co. v. First Bancorp of Idaho, 115 Idaho 1082, 772 P .2d 720 ( 1989); Mannas v. Moss, 143

Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166 (2007).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim for negligent misrepresentation against Defendants Riley,
Turnbow and Eberle Berlin, attorneys and a law firm, cannot stand under Idaho law. Plaintiffs
claims must be dismissed as a matter of law.
Of note, Plaintiffs claim for negligent misrepresentation is also timed barred pursuant to
Idaho Code § 5-224. It is time barred because this action, assuming such a cause of action was
valid, must be commenced within four years after the cause of action accrued.

Any

representations giving rise to such a claim were made by Defendants Riley, Turnbow and Eberle
Berlin in 1995. Plaintiff did not file his cause of action until September 30, 2009. Plaintiffs
four years for commencing a claim under Idaho Code§ 5-224 had long since lapsed.
E.

IDAHO'S CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: NO STANDING AND TIME
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
1.

Plaintiff lacks standing.

A private cause of action may only be asserted under that Idaho Consumer Protection Act
by a "person who purchases or leases goods or services and thereby suffers any ascertainable
loss of money or property..." LC. § 48-608. Reed Taylor did not "purchase" any service
provided by either Richard Riley and/or his then firm Eberle Berlin. Rather, any such services
were purchased by AIA Services, a corporate entity. Furthermore, in this case, Eberle Berlin,
through its then association with Richard Riley, did not provide a legal service to Reed Taylor as
an independent consumer; rather, the service was to AIA. Of significance, Plaintiff is asserting a
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violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act in his own name and alleging damages personal
to him as a consumer.

Plaintiff lacks standing to assert a cause of action under the Idaho

Consumer Protection Act because he did not "purchase" any services from Defendants.
2.

Plaintiff was not an "elderly person" under the Idaho Consumer Protection
Act.

Plaintiff further alleges that he was an "elderly person" under the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act. Idaho Code § 48-608 (c)(ii) provides that an "elderly person" is at least sixtytwo (62) years of age. Plaintiff was seventy-two years old in 2009. (Plaintiffs

Complaint,~

49).

The alleged rendering of legal services and drafting of the Opinion Letter for AIA occurred in
1995. (Plaintiffs Complaint,

~

49). In 1995, Plaintiff was only fifty-eight or fifty-nine. As a

matter of law, Plaintiff did not constitute an "elderly person" and, accordingly, Plaintiff is not
entitled to any enhanced penalties provided by statute.
3.

Plaintiff's claim under Idaho Consumer Protection Act is time barred.

Under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, a private cause of action cannot be brought
more than two years after the cause of action accrues. LC. § 48-618. Any cause of action under
this Act accrued in 1995. Plaintiff brought his action in 2009, 14 years later. Thus, summary
judgment should enter in favor of Defendants on this cause of action.
F.

FRAUD: NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR AN OPINION.
The basis of Plaintiffs fraud/constructive fraud causes of action are that Defendant

Eberle Berlin authored and drafted the 1995 Opinion Letter, which set forth Mr. Riley's and Mr.
Turnbow' s opinions about the future enforceability of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement
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and the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement's compliance with the laws of Idaho. (Plaintiff's
Complaint,

ifil 64-65, Affidavit of Riley, Exhibit C:

1995 Opinion Letter.) Eberle Berlin's 1995

Opinion Letter also set forth Mr. Riley's and Mr. Turnbow's opinions about the sufficiency of
actions taken by AIA and its subsidiaries, their respective directors and shareholders prior to the
closing of the contemplated 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. (Plaintiff's Complaint,

iii! 64-

65, Affidavit of Riley, Exhibit C: 1995 Opinion Letter).
However, under Idaho law, opinions and predictions cannot form the basis of a fraud
claim because they do not speak to matters of fact. Country Cove Dev., Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho
595, 601 (2006). Furthermore, an action for fraud or misrepresentation will not lie for statements
of future events. Id. Idaho law clearly requires the plaintiff to form his or her own conclusions
regarding the occurrence of future events. Thomas v. Med. Ctr. Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200,
207, 61 P.3d 557, 564 (2002). Additionally, to assert a cause of action for fraud, the person
alleging fraud must be ignorant of the falsity of the statement, the person must have relied on the
statement and this reliance must be justifiable. Mannas v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 931, 155 P.3d
1166, 1170 (2007).
Under Idaho law, Plaintiff's fraud cause of action premised on an opinion letter with
representations about the future enforceability of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and its
legality do not constitute "factual" statements which are actionable in fraud.

Judge Brudie

previously addressed this issue in the Taylor v. AJA, et. al. litigation. Judge Brudie held that the
opinions by counsel regarding the transaction contemplated by 1995 Stock Redemption
Agreement were no more statements of fact when the statements were expressed by corporate
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counsel in 1995 then they were when expressed by Plaintiff in 2009; rather such statements were
and are simply an opinion based on one's interpretation of the law.

Accordingly, such

statements cannot form the basis for a fraud claim. (Affidavit of Babbitt, Exhibit K: Taylor v.
AJA et. al., Judge Brodie's Opinion dated August 13, 2009, page 6).

Furthermore, Judge Brudie also addressed Mr. Taylor's claimed ignorance and reliance.
Judge Brudie held that court "was not persuaded by Plaintiffs efforts to paint himself as an
innocent and naive party" in part because Mr. Taylor "was in a position to have intimate
knowledge of the corporation's financial status" and "had independent legal counsel to advise
him regarding the statutory requirements for the corporate redemption of the shares." 7 (Affidavit
of Babbitt, Exhibit K: Taylor v. AJA et al., Judge Brodie's Opinion dated August 13, 2009, page
5). As previously judicially addressed, Mr. Taylor's alleged ignorance of the falsity of the
statement was unpersuasive, and his reliance on Defendants' allegedly false statements was not
justified in light of having independent counsel. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim for
fraud/constructive fraud against Defendants Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin cannot stand
under Idaho law. Plaintiffs claims must be dismissed as a matter oflaw.

G.

FRAUD: TIME BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Furthermore, the statute of limitations for fraud is three years. LC. § 5-218(4). Hence,

even if this Court determines Plaintiffs fraud cause of action can withstand summary judgment
as a valid cause of action, Plaintiffs assertion of his fraud cause of action is barred by the statute
of limitations. Idaho Code § 5-218(4) provides that a cause of action for relief on the ground of
7

Judge Brudie further noted, "[i]fReed Taylor was uninformed as to the financial status of his corporation, that was
a voluntary choice on his part and is insufficient to make him an innocent party to the agreement." Id.
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fraud or mistake accrues upon discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the
fraud or mistake. See also McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 772 (1991). Discovery means the
point in time where the plaintiff had actual or constructive knowledge of the facts constituting
the fraud.

McCoy, 120 Idaho at 772.

Actual knowledge will be inferred if the allegedly

aggrieved party could have discovered the fraud through the exercise of due diligence. Gerlach
v. Schultz, 77 Idaho 507, 244 P.2d 1095 (1952); Nancy Lee Mines, Inc. v. Harrison, 95 Idaho
546, 511 P .2d 828 (1973 ). The statute of limitations for fraud begins to run when the plaintiff
has knowledge of facts sufficient to put a reasonably prudent person on notice that fraud has
occurred. Stewart v. Hood Corp., 95 Idaho 198, 201 (1973).
In Nancy Lee Mines, Inc., the plaintiff's allegations included fraud and illegal procedures
surrounding two stock assessment sales occurring in 1958, but the lawsuit was not commenced
until 1969. Nancy Lee Mines, Inc., 95 Idaho at 546. The court held that it was unnecessary to
consider the issue of whether or not there was any fraud, because, if there was any fraud, the
fraud could have been discovered in the exercise of reasonable diligence at the time the alleged
fraud was committed. Id. at 547. In reaching its holding, the court in Nancy Lee Mines, Inc.
adopted the reasoning of the Washington Supreme Court in Davis v. Harrison. The Washington
court in Davis held a cause of action for fraud was barred under the statute of limitations because
the facts were open and appeared upon the records of the corporation, records which
shareholders were free to inspect. Davis v. Harrison, 25 Wash.2d 1, 167 P.2d 1015, 1024
(1946). The court continued its analysis by stating that [i]f the shareholders failed to examine
the corporate records, the shareholders must have been negligent and careless of their own
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interests. Davis, 167 P.2d at 1024. Ultimately, the court held that the means of knowledge were
open to the shareholders, and means of knowledge are equivalent to possessing actual knowledge
when analyzing the commencement of a statute of limitations in a fraud cause of action. Id.
The date of accrual of a cause of action is a question of law where there is no dispute
over any issue of material fact regarding the accrual. Davis, 167 P.2d at 1024. Furthermore,
where only one conclusion can be reasonably drawn from the evidence, the question of the
exercise of reasonable diligence to discover fraud may be decided by the court as a matter of law.
Full Circle v. Schelling, 108 Idaho 634, 638 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985).

In this case, Mr. Taylor retained an independent accountant and independent counsel.
Mr. Taylor either personally, or through his agents, was or should have been familiar with the
financial status of AIA. Mr. Taylor was the founder of AIA, served on the Board of Directors,
and was the majority shareholder when he entered into and closed on the 1995 Stock
Redemption Agreement. (Affidavit of Riley,~ 4; Affidavit of Babbitt, Exhibit K: Taylor v. AJA,
et. al., Judge Brudie's August 13, 2009 Order). As the court in Davis reasoned, the means of
knowledge were open to Mr. Taylor, and the means of knowledge are equivalent to actual
knowledge when analyzing the commencement of a statute of limitations in a fraud cause of
action. That being said, the facts constituting any alleged fraud in connection with the 1995
Stock Redemption were known or should have been known to Mr. Taylor through the exercise of
reasonable diligence in 1995.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs cause of action for fraud against

Defendants is time barred and summary judgment should enter for Defendants.
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V. CONCLUSION
Defendants Turnbow and Eberle Berlin respectfully request this Court grant their Motion
for Summary Judgment and dismiss Plaintiff's causes of action for negligence/professional
malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, violation of the Idaho
Consumer Protection Act and fraud/constructive fraud.

et_

DATED this

4

day of February, 2010.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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Attorneys for Defendants, Richard A. Riley
and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No. CV-OC-0918868

Plaintiff,
v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HAWLE
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; ROBERT M.
TURNBOW, an individual; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKL VEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD A. RILEY IN
OPPOSITION TO REED J. TAYLOR'S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO )
)

County of Ada

SS.

)

RICHARD A. RILEY, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says:
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·•

,

l

'

1.

I am a partner with the firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawley

Troxell"), a defendant in the above entitled action. I am also a defendant in the action.
2.

I am over 18 years of age, competent to testify regarding the matters set forth in

this affidavit, and make this affidavit based upon my personal knowledge.
3.

Prior to March 1, 1999, I was an attorney employed by the firm of Eberle, Berlin,

Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered ("Eberle Berlin"). During my employment with that
firm, Eberle Berlin was engaged by AIA Services Corporation ("AIA") in connection with the
Stock Redemption Agreement (the "1995 Stock Redemption Agreement") between AIA and
Reed J. Taylor, dated July 22, 1995.
4.

In connection with the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, the law firm of Eberle

Berlin rendered a written opinion (the "1995 Opinion Letter") dated August 15, 1995, addressed
to Reed J. Taylor. Eberle Berlin represented only AIA in regard to the 1995 Stock Redemption
Agreement and the 1995 Opinion Letter. Mr Taylor1 was represented by separate counsel of his
selection, Scott T. Bell and N. Frank Taylor of the firm of Cairncross & Hempelmann, 701h Floor,
Columbia Center, 701 Fifth Avenue, Seattle, Washington 98104. Mr. Taylor also engaged his
own certified public accountant, Ernie Dantini.
5.

Soon after execution and delivery of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, Mr.

Taylor gave notice that he claimed the agreement to be in default. AIA and Mr. Taylor entered
into discussions regarding the alleged defaults, which resulted in the execution and delivery of a

1

Reed J. Taylor was succeeded by his brother, R. John Taylor, as the president of AIA. Unless the context
clearly indicates otherwise, references herein to Mr. Taylor are to Reed J. Taylor.
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._.
Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement (the "1996 Restructure Agreement") dated July 1,
1996.
6.

Eberle Berlin represented only AIA in regard to the 1996 Restructure Agreement,

and Mr Taylor was again represented by the firm of Caimcross & Hempelmann. No opinion was
rendered by Eberle Berlin in connection with the 1996 Restructure Agreement between AIA and
Mr. Taylor.
7.

I joined Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawley Troxell") on March 1,

1999, after over twenty years with Eberle Berlin. At no time did Hawley Troxell, Eberle Berlin
or I represent Reed J. Taylor in connection with the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, the
1996 Restructure Agreement or any of the transactions contemplated thereby.
8.

Reed J. Taylor filed suit on January 29, 2007, against AIA Services Corporation

("AIA"), its wholly-owned subsidiary, AIA Insurance, Inc. ("AIA Insurance"), and several
individuals, including R. John Taylor, the brother of Reed J. Taylor. See Taylor v. AJA Services

Corporation, et al., Case No. CV 07-00208, in the District Court of the Second Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, Nez Perce County (the "AIA litigation"). Hawley Troxell represented AIA
and AIA Insurance in the AIA litigation and continues to represent those two companies in the
pending appeal of that case filed by Mr. Taylor (Docket No. 36916-2009, Idaho Supreme Court).
At no time since I joined Hawley Troxell on March 1, 1999, did Hawley Troxell or I represent
Reed J. Taylor.
9.

While the AIA litigation was ongoing, Mr. Taylor filed a Complaint for Damages

in the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Nez Perce County,
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against Hawley Troxell and four attorneys employed by Hawley Troxell, including me, on
August 18, 2008 ("Hawley Troxell Lawsuit No. l ").

The District Court of the Second Judicial

District, Nez Perce County, dismissed Hawley Troxell Lawsuit No. 1 with prejudice (Opinion
and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint, Case
No. CV 08-1765 in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County, a copy
of which is attached as Exhibit J to my prior Affidavit herein) and imposed attorney's fees
against Mr. Taylor (Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Award ofAttorney's Fees and
Costs, Case No. CV 08-1765 in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Nez Perce
County, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit L to my prior Affidavit herein).
10.

In the course of the AIA litigation and Hawley Troxell Lawsuit No. 1, Reed J.

Taylor and his counsel have affirmatively stated on numerous occasions that Mr. Taylor was
represented by his own attorneys and accountant in connection with the 1995 Stock Redemption
Agreement, the 1996 Restructure Agreement and the transactions contemplated thereby, without
ever asserting that Eberle Berlin represented him in those matters. The following list of
documents is by no means exhaustive but will demonstrate that, contrary to their present
contentions, Mr. Taylor and his counsel have always stated in prior judicial proceedings that
Eberle Berlin and its attorneys, including me, represented only AIA and AIA Insurance in
connection with the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, the 1996 Restructure Agreement and
the transactions contemplated thereby. Prior to the present lawsuit, Mr. Taylor and his counsel
have never asserted the existence of any attorney-client relationship between Mr. Taylor and
Eberle Berlin or me, even in circumstances such as Mr. Taylor's motion to disqualify Hawley
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Troxell in the AIA litigation, where the existence of such relationship would clearly have been
pertinent.
11.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a copy of the relevant portions of the Affidavit of

Roderick C. Bond in Support of Reed Taylor's Motion to Extend/Enlarge Time to Respond to
James Beck and Connie Taylor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, in Opposition to Rule
67 Deposit, and in Opposition to Defendants John Taylor, Connie Taylor, and James Beck's
Motion for Protective Order, dated April 24, 2008, and filed in the AIA litigation. In that

Affidavit, Mr. Bond states at~ 12:
Richard (Dick) Riley represented AIA Services and AIA Insurance involving the
redemption of Reed's shares. In addition, Mr. Riley has drafted documents
assisting the individual defendants in various transactions involving Crop USA
and has knowledge of various transactions involving Crop USA and AIA
Services. Mr. Riley is presently an attorney with the law firm of Hawley Troxell.
12.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a copy of the relevant portions of the Affidavit of

Reed J. Taylor in Opposition to AJA Services and AJA Insurance's Motion to Amend Answer and
Motion to for Rule 67 Deposit and in Opposition to Connie Baylor, James Beck and Corrine
Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dated May 9, 2008, and filed in the AIA

litigation. In his Affidavit, Mr. Taylor states at~ 10:
Attached as Exhibit I is an opinion letter provided to me on August 15, 1995, by
counsel for AIA Services stating that the redemption of my shares was legal, that
AIA Services had the power and authority to redeem my shares and that AIA
Services had received the necessary shareholder approval for the redemption of
my shares.
Exhibit I to Mr. Taylor's May 9, 2008, Affidavit is a copy of the 1995 Opinion Letter prepared by
Eberle Berlin as counsel for AIA. The 1995 Opinion Letter expressly identifies Eberle Berlin's
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client: "We have acted as general counsel for the Company [AIA Services Corporation] in
connection with the transactions contemplated by the [1995 Stock Redemption Agreement]."
13.

Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a copy of the relevant portions of the Affidavit of

Roderick C. Bond in Support of Reed Taylor's Motion to Disqualify the Attorneys and Law Firms
of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, Clements Brown & McNichols, P.A., and Quarles &
Brady LLP; Motion to Relinquish Collateral; Motion to Compel; Motion to Protect Collateral;
and Motion for Continuance, dated August 28, 2008, and filed in the AIA litigation. In his
Affidavit, Mr. Bond represents

at~

54:

It is significant to note that Richard Riley is also a partner of
Hawley Troxell and Richard Riley negotiated the terms of the
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. In fact, Richard Riley,
through his old firm, represented AIA Services and AIA Insurance
in connection with the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares.
Richard Riley attended board meetings for AIA Services after the
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares (including board meeting
specifically discussing defaults of AIA Services' obligations to
Reed Taylor). Richard Riley is the person to whom notices are
required to me [sic] sent pursuant to the terms of the various
agreements associated with the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares
in AIA Services (see Ex. 4 above.)
14.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Dis a copy of the relevant portions of Plaintiff Reed

Taylor's Amended Motion to Disqualify the Attorneys and Law Firms of Hawley Troxell Ennis
& Hawley LLP; Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A.; and Quarles & Brady LLP, dated

September 24, 2008, and filed in the AIA litigation. Mr. Taylor's Amended Motion states at p.
25:
Gary Babbitt, D. John Ashby and Hawley Troxell have been
asserting arguments against Reed Taylor (including the alleged
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illegality argument) with full knowledge that such arguments are
counter to an opinion letter issued on behalf of AIA Services to
Reed Taylor, which was based upon knowledge held by Richard
Riley, who is also an attorney with Hawley Troxell ....
I5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Eis a copy of the relevant portions of Plaintiff's

Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, dated October 2, 2008, and filed in the Hawley
Troxell Lawsuit No. I. Mr. Taylor's Response states at p. I 8:
Here, AIA Services promised Reed Taylor to not impair the value
of AIA Insurance and to vest the voting rights to its shares in AIA
Insurance to Reed Taylor upon a default, with the full knowledge
of Hawley Troxell and Richard Riley (who was attorney for AIA
Services in the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares) ....
I 6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a copy of the relevant portions of Plaintiff Reed

Taylor's Motion and Memorandum of Law to Amend Complaint, dated October I 5, 2008, and
filed in the Hawley Troxell Lawsuit No. I. Attached as Exhibit A to this Motion are the relevant
portions of the proposed First Amended Complaint for Damages. The proposed First Amended
Complaint states in part at~~ 92, 99, and I I 8 as follows:
92. As a former attorney for Reed Taylor and the attorney
who provided an opinion letter to Reed Taylor, defendant Riley
owes Reed Taylor special duties by and through an opinion letter
that was based upon Riley's personal knowledge (representing
such facts as the transactions being fully legal and authorized by
the corporations), which further invokes personal liability to Riley.

99. Defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by
and through an opinion letter that was based upon Riley's personal
knowledge, which further invokes personal liability to Riley ....
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118. Defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by
and through an opinion letter that was based upon Riley's personal
knowledge, which further invokes personal liability to Riley.
17.

Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a copy of the relevant portions of Plaintiff Reed

Taylor's Amended Response in Opposition to AJA Services 401 (k) Profit Sharing Plan's Motion
to Intervene (Corrected), dated February 5, 2009, and filed in the AIA litigation. Plaintiffs
Amended Response at pp. 2-3 quotes from an April 14, 1995, letter from Richard Campanaro
evidencing that in connection with the redemption of his stock Mr. Taylor was represented by
Scott Bell, not Eberle Berlin or Mr. Riley:
"[F]ollowing the Board of Director's and Stockholder's meetings
held in Boise, Idaho in early March, Mr. Michael Cashman,
myself. Mr. Jim Beck... expected a response from Mr. Reed Taylor
detailing the sale of his stock in AIA. .. that, in fact, [Reed Taylor]
had retained the services of an attorney for the purpose of
attempting to finalize the details of our sale and purchase
agreement. ...
" ... Mr. Reed Taylor has refused to negotiate an agreement [for the
purchase of his shares] .... Mr. Reed Taylor addressed issues with
his attorney, Scott Bell, that, as the Chairman of the Board of
Directors, he should have known were heretofore resolved ....
" ... I am sending Dick Riley a copy [of this letter] so that he might
appropriately respond to the letter of intent drafted by Scott T. Bell,
which, in my opinion, is another indication of Reed Taylor's lack
of seriousness concerning the sale of his stock.... "
18.

Attached hereto as Exhibit H is a copy of the relevant portions of Plaintiff Reed

Taylor's Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendants Re: Counterclaims and
Defenses Pertaining to any Violation of Redemption or Distribution Statutes and Alleged
Illegality of the Redemption of Reed Taylor's Shares, dated February 12, 2009, and filed in the
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AIA litigation. Plaintiffs Motion at pp. 5 and 6 again quotes from Mr. Campanaro's letter,
which evidences that Scott Bell, not Eberle Berlin or Mr. Riley, acted as Mr. Taylor's attorney.
19.

Attached hereto as Exhibit I is a copy of the relevant portions of Plaintiff Reed

Taylor's Response in Opposition to Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and Bryan Freeman, Jolee Duclos, R. John Taylor, AJA Services, AJA
Insurance, and AJA Services 401 (k) Plan's Joinder and Reed Taylor's Objections/Motion Strike
and/or in Limine the Affidavits of Hooper and Voth, dated February 26, 2009, and filed in the
AIA litigation. Plaintiffs Response states at pp. 16-17:
Under the terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement, AIA
Services was required to deliver an opinion letter to Reed Taylor
from AIA Services counsel.
On August 15, 1995, an opinion letter was issued to Reed Taylor
verifying many requirements had been met by AIA Services,
including, without limitation, that the purchase of Reed Taylor's
shares was a legal transaction and that necessary shareholder
approvals were obtained. 73 The opinion letter was based upon the
knowledge ofR. M. Turnbow and Richard Riley. 74 The opinion
letter makes no reference to any violations of I.C. § 30-1-46 or I.C.
§ 30-1-6 or possible violations of the foregoing Idaho Code
Sections or any other Code Sections. 75
However, Richard Riley's opinion letter expressly represented,
among other things, the following:
(1) Richard Riley represented AIA Services in the negotiations and
acted as general counsel for AIA Services;76
Plaintiffs Response further states at p. 51:
(14) On July 1, 1996, Richard Riley advised Reed Taylor's
attorney that the value of the collateral pledged to Reed Taylor
exceeded AIA Services' obligations by over $2.5 Million as of
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December 31, 1995, as evidenced by appraisals that have never
been produced to Reed Taylor. 271
Plaintiffs Response further states at p. 57:
... In 1995 and 1996, Richard Riley was AIA Services' counsel
who negotiated the redemption agreements, drafted the redemption
agreements, issued of an opinion letter to Reed Taylor, and
negotiated the restructure of the redemption agreements ....
Plaintiffs Response further states at p. 90:
... Finally, AIA Services, by and through its attorney Richard
Riley and Eberle Berlin, made representations to Reed Taylor
through an opinion letter dated August 15, 1995 ....
20.

Attached hereto as Exhibit J is a copy of the relevant portions of Plaintiff Reed

Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment Against Bryan Freeman, Jolee Duclos, R. John Taylor, AJA
Services, AJA Insurance, and AJA Services 401 (k) Plan's Joinders and in Support of Granting
Partial Summary Judgment in Favor of Reed Taylor, dated April 9, 2009, and filed in the AIA
litigation. Plaintiffs Memorandum states at p. 14:
... In 1995 and 1996, Richard Riley was AIA Services' counsel
who negotiated the redemption agreements, drafted the redemption
agreements, issued of an opinion letter to Reed Taylor, and
negotiated the restructure of the redemption agreements ....
21.

Attached hereto as Exhibit K is a copy of the relevant portions of the Affidavit of

Scott T Bell (1) in Support of Reed Taylor's Motions for Rule 56(/) Continuance; (2) in Support
of Reed Taylor's Pending Motions to Compel Depositions and Discovery; (3) in Opposition to
Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Joinders by the
401 (k) Plan and Other Defendants; and (4) in Support of Reed Taylor's Motions for Partial
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Summary Judgment, dated May 12, 2009, and filed in the AIA litigation. In his Affidavit, Mr.
Bell states at ~ 5:
Because of Reed Taylor's membership on the board of directors for
AIA Services Corporation, he and my firm supported the
establishment of an independent committee of the board of
directors to negotiate and approve the terms of the redemption of
Reed Taylor's shares. Reed Taylor was not a member of this
committee. Richard Riley of Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &
McKlveen, Chartered ("Eberle, Berlin") served as counsel to this
committee and AIA Services Corporation in connection with the
redemption.
Mr. Bell further states at ii 8:
During the course of my firm's representation of Reed Taylor, my
firm determined that, as a condition to the redemption, AIA
Services Corporation's outside counsel should deliver to Reed
Taylor a written legal opinion regarding certain legal matters
surrounding the redemption. Reed Taylor agreed with this
assessment. Eberle, Berlin was in a position to analyze whether,
with respect to AIA Services Corporation, the transactions were
authorized, complied with applicable Idaho laws, triggered
complications with third parties, etc. Without access to the
confidential books, records and proceedings of AIA Services
Corporation, and not being a licensed Idaho lawyer, my firm was
not in a position to make these determinations. Moreover, in my
experience, it is customary for the party seeking to redeem shares
and its counsel to carry out the "due diligence" associated with
determining the legal viability of the redemption. Richard Riley
was extremely well-versed in the legal, financial and operational
affairs of AIA Services Corporation as a result of his long-standing
relationship with the company. With the advice from my firm,
Reed Taylor determined that he should receive a legal opinion
form Eberle, Berlin, who had superior knowledge of AIA Services
Corporation's legal affairs, to confirm AIA Services Corporation's
legal ability to honor its obligations under the redemption. In my
experience, a written legal opinion in these circumstances is
appropriate and normal. Mr. Riley and Eberle, Berlin agreed to
provide the opinion. Mr. Riley and I negotiated the content of the
opm1on.
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22.

Attached hereto as Exhibit L is a copy of the relevant portions of the Affidavit of

Reed J. Taylor in Support of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Motion for Reconsideration, dated July
21, 2009, and filed in the AJA litigation. At ~9 of that Affidavit, Mr. Taylor represents to the
Court that he was represented by Scott Bell in connection with the redemption of his stock, while
AIA was represented by Eberle Berlin:
Upon the advice of my counsel Scott Bell, J conditioned the sale of my shares on
AJA Services obtaining all necessary approvals and consents from all
shareholders, that the agreements did not violate any laws, and that AJA Services'
outside counsel, Richard Riley and Mickey Turnbow of Eberle, Berlin, et al.,
would provide me with legal opinion and representations that the agreements were
enforceable, approved by shareholders and did not violate any laws. Richard
Riley and other attorneys at Eberle, Berlin, et al., had represented AJA Services
and its subsidiaries for years prior to the redemption of my shares and were
intimately familiar with their operations and their legal affairs.

23.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Mis a copy of the relevant portions of Plaintiff Reed

Taylor's Reply in Support ofMotion of Reconsideration, dated July 21, 2009, and filed in the
AJA litigation. At p. 9 thereof, counsel for Mr. Taylor recognizes that Eberle Berlin acted as
counsel for AJA:
Although previously asserted, the Defendants do not deny that R. John
Taylor (as signer of the redemption agreements and the person who certified that
the shareholders had ratified the agreements), AJA Services (by and through the
redemption agreements) and Eberle, Berlin, et al.'s opinion letter (as agent for
AJA Services) all represented to Reed Taylor that shareholder approval and
consent were obtained, that the redemption agreements were enforceable, and the
redemption agreements would not violate any laws.
24.

While J was employed at Eberle Berlin, Eberle Berlin and J did represent Reed J.

Taylor in connection with his divorce and in connection with his interest in a Canadian hunting
lodge. The divorce was finalized in 1987, and the hunting lodge matter concluded prior to the
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redemption of Mr. Taylor's AIA stock in 1995.

Neither I nor Eberle Berlin had any

arrangement with Mr. Taylor after the conclusion of his divorce or the hunting lodge matter to
represent him in the future with respect to unrelated matters. Nor did Eberle Berlin's
representation of AIA at any time while Mr. Taylor was an officer, director or shareholder of that
corporation constitute an arrangement or commitment to represent him personally. At all times,
AIA was a distinct corporate entity, separate and apart from its officers, directors and
shareholders. Eberle Berlin's representation of AIA in connection with the 1995 Stock
Redemption Agreement, the 1996 Restructure Agreement and any of the transactions
contemplated thereby was limited to the corporation.
25.

In 2006 Hawley Troxell, through one of its attorneys, Steven C. Hardesty,

represented PNC Aviation Finance and its parent company, PNC Equipment Finance, LLC, in
connection with an aircraft loan being made to Mr. Taylor and requested a waiver from AIA
Insurance, Inc., and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., of any potential conflict of interest. The
waiver was sought because I had been representing AIA Insurance, Inc., and Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc.

Attached hereto as Exhibit N is a copy of a draft letter dated August 9,

2006, prepared by Hawley Troxell regarding the proposed waiver. Since Mr. Hardesty's files do
not contain a signed copy of the letter, I am unable to determine whether it was ever mailed to or
received by Mr. Taylor, or whether communications regarding the waiver were instead oral
and/or by means of email.

In any case, the waiver was requested from the corporations and was

deemed appropriate because of my representation of such corporations. Attached hereto as
Exhibit 0 is a copy of my email dated August 9, 2006, which was in fact sent to Mr. Taylor and
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which confirms that waiver was requested because of my past and ongoing representation of AIA
as a current Hawley Troxell client and because of my past representation of Mr. Taylor as a
former client of Eberle Berlin while I was employed by that firm with respect to certain matters.
None of those matters involved the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, the 1996 Restructure
Agreement or any of the transactions contemplated thereby.

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this//

rt-y

of February, 2010.

Notary Public f~aho
Residing at
~ l "S.~
Commission expires:

9 -2-2- ;26 t I

AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD A. RILEY IN OPPOSITION TO REED J. TAYLOR'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 14
G:\ 7082\00 I 3\HTEH - #2\Pleadings - HTEH #2\Affidavit of Richard A. Riley in Opposition to Reed J. Taylor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ver_03. wpd

000947

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __f_J_ day of February, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the
manner indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC

7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, Washington 99201
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

v

v

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(509) 455-7111
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-9177
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RODERICK C. BOND
NED A. CANNON, ISBA #2331
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Fax: (208) 746-8421
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DlSTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Case No.: CV-07-00208
Plaintiff,

v.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and
CORRINE BECK, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;

AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND IN
SUPPORT OF REED TAYLOR'S MOTION
TO EXTEND/ENLARGE TIME TO
RESPOND TO JAMES BECK AND CONNIE
TAYLOR'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IN OPPOSITION
TO RULE 67 DEPOSIT, AND IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS JOHN
TAYLOR, CONNIE TAYLOR, AND JAMES
BECK'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
ORDER

Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss:
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE )
I, Roderick C. Bond, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in court, one of

the attorneys for the plaintiff Reed Taylor ("Reed") in this action, and make this Affidavit
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8.

Attached as Exhibit B is a calendar drafted by my office to reflect the

availability dates of certain counsel as it presently stands for the months of June and July,
as of the date of this Affidavit. Other counsel did not provide me with availability dates
for depositions. Thus, the availability of counsel is only 1 day in May and 3 days in June.
9.

On October 22, 2007, I served Connie Taylor with Reed's First Requests

for Production of Documents, First Requests for Admission and First Interrogatories.
10.

Attached as Exhibit Care pertinent portions of Connie Taylor's Amended

Responses to Reed's First Requests for Production, First Requests for Admission and
First Interrogatories. These are the same discovery requests that were at issue when
Connie Taylor filed her Motion for Protective Order in December, 2007, and the same
discovery requests that the Court stated that substantive responses and document
production would be expected. On the date of the hearing on Connie Taylor,s Motion for
Protective Order, I spent several hours with Jon Hally going over the discovery requests
and clarifying that "you" or "your,, does not mean Connie Taylor's friends in terms of the
responses that Reed would find acceptable.
11.

Despite my repeated efforts to obtain documents from Connie Taylor, she

has not produced a single document.
12.

Richard (Dick) Riley represented AIA Services and AJA Insurance

involving the redemption of Reed's shares. In addition, Mr. Riley has drafted documents
assisting the individual defendants in various transactions involving Crop USA and has
knowledge of various transactions involving Crop USA and AIA Services. Mr. Riley is
presently an attorney with the law firm of Hawley Troxell. Through discovery, Reed
requested all opinion letters from attorneys and accountants. As part of the transaction
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James Beck, and the others.
DATED: This 24th day of April, 2008.

I

<I
Roderick C. 801

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 241b day of April, 2008.

Notary PubHfic(ridah.o •
Residing at: lr i«// s/cy J
My commission expires: '3/;J~O/'(
I
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RODERICK C. BOND
NED A. CANNON, ISBA #2331
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Fax: (208) 746-8421

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECO~TI JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Case No.: CV-07-00208
Plaintiff,

v.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and
CORRINE BECK, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;

AFFIDAVIT OF REED J. TAYLOR IN
OPPOSITION TO AIA SERVICES AND AIA
INSURANCE'S MOTION TO AMEND
ANSWER AND MOTION FOR RULE 67
DEPOSIT AND IN OPPOSITION TO
CONNIE 'FAYLOR, JAMES BECK AND
CORRINE BECK'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss:
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE )
I, Reed J. Taylor, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:

1.

I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in court, the

plaintiff in this action, and make this Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge.

AFFIDAVIT OF REED J. TAYLOR - 1
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agreement was provided to my attorneys through discovery by AJA Services.

7.

Attached as Exhibit F is the Subscription Agreement for James Beck's

purchase of his Preferred C Shares that was provided to my attorneys through discovery
by AIA Services.
8.

Attached as Exhibit G is a Preferred C Shareholder list that was provided

to my attorneys through discovery by AJA Services. As indicated on the shareholder list,
James Beck did not become a shareholder until after my shares were redeemed by AIA
Services. James Beck had fulJ knowledge of all of the details of the redemption of my
shares and was one of the persons behind trying to redeem my shares.
9.

Attached as Exhibit H is a shareholder list for AIA Services that was

provided to my attorneys through discovery by AIA Services. This document shows that
my shares were canceled by AIA Services. The shareholder list indicates that the shares
owned by John and Connie Taylor are listed only in John Taylor's name.

I 0.

Attached as Exhibit I is an opinion letter provided to me on August 15,

1995, by counsel for AIA Services stating that the redemption of my shares was legal,
that AIA Services had the power and authority to redeem my shares and that AIA
Services had received the necessary shareholder approval for the redemption of my
shares.

11.

Attached as Exhibit J are pertinent pages of AIA Services' Bylaws that

were provided to my attorneys through discovery by AIA Services.
DATED: This 9th day of May, 2008.

,,

' ' ,.- <,,..,..

/':.·z;:;-;-:;-;.,,

Reed J. Taylor'-
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 9th day of May, 2008.

Motary Public for Idaho
Residing at: __....................._..............._ __..,._ __
My commission expires: -=;i3~~~o.r.....~-
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Eee:RLE, Be:RL.tN, KADING, TURNBOW & McKLVEEN,
CHART£ A EC
ATTOPl'NE'f9 AND COUN5C:l.Ol't5 AT LAW
CAl>ITOI. Pl'\A'K PLA;CA

300 NOATH Sl:cTlot STREET

PoST Oirncc: Box 13ae
BOISE, IDAMO El:l701

August 15, 1995

TELf:l"~ONI!:.
(20&) .ll<W-liS35
l"N;.81MILE

120•1 344·Ql42
.JAMl:lll 1.. liJIORllN
Cl:>UH&EL

°'"

Reed J. Taylor
P.O. Box 538

Lewiston ID 83501
Re:

Common Stock Redemption

Dear Mr. Taylor.

'This opinion is being delivered t.o you pursuant to Section 2.S(j) of the Stock Redemption
Agreement dated July 22, 1995 ( •Agreement") by and between AJA Services Corporation, an
Idaho corporation rcompany") and Reed J, Taylor • All capitalized terms not defined herein
shall have the respective meanings ascribed to them in the Agreement. The phrase "Transaction
Documents" refers collectively to the Agreement, together with the Not.e, the Pledge Agreement,
the Security Agreement, the Consulting Agreement and the Noncompetition Agreement, as such
documents are defined in the AgreemenL

We have acted as general counsel for the Company in connection with the transactions
contemplated by the Agreement. As such general counsel, we have assisted in the negotiation,
and have examined executed counterparts (or photostatic copies of executed counterparts) of the
Agreement and other Transaction Documents.
In addition, we have examined originals, executed counterparts or copies of such
agreements, corporate records, instnlments and certificates., certificates of public authorities and
such matters of law as we have deemed necessary for the purpose of rendering the opinions set
forth herein. To the extent we deemed necessary for the purposes of this opinion, we have
relied upon (i) the statements and representations of the Company as to factual matters, (ii) the
corporate records provided t.o us by the Company, and (iii) certificates and other documents
obtained from public officials. We have further relied as to factual matters on the representations
and warranties contained in the Agreement and the other Transaction Documents (including,
without limitation, Mr. Taylor's representations in Article IV of the Agreement) and on the
Company's representations in Schedule m (attached) to the Agreement; and we have assume.d
the completeness and accuracy of all such representations and warranties as to factual matters.
We have assumed the genuineness of all signatures (other than those of the Company), the legal
capacity of Mr. Taylor to execute the Agreement and all other documents we have reviewed,
the authenticity of all documents submitted to us as originals, and the conformity to original
documents of all documents submitted to us as certified, photostatic, reproduced or conformed
copies. We have further assumed that the Agreement and the other Transaction Documents have

EXHIBIT J:.
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Reed J. Taylor
August 15, 1995
Page 2

been duly authorized, executed and delivered by Mr. Taylor and are enforceable against him in.
accordance with their respective terms, and that the execution, delivery and perfonnance of the
Agreement and the other Transaction Documents by Mr. Taylor does not and will not result in
a breach of, or constitute a default under, any agreement, instrument or other document to which
Mr. Taylor is a party, or any order, judgment, writ or decree applicable to suoh party to which
Mr. Taylor's property js subject.

Whenever our opinion with respect to the existence or absence of facts is indicated to be
based on ,our .knowledge, we arc referring to the actual knowledge of R. M. Turnbow and
Richard A. Riley, who are the sole attorneys in Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen,
Chartered who have represented the Company during the course of our represenmtion in this
transaction. Except as expressly set forth herein, we have not undertaken any independent legal
or factual investigation to determine the existence or absence of such facts, and no inference as
to our knowledge of the existence or absence of such facts should be drawn from such
representation.
Based upon and subject to our examination and assumptions as aforesaid and subject to
the qualifications hereinafter set forth, we are of the opinion that, except as set forth in the
attache:d Schedule m and/or the Schedules attached to the Agreement:

1.
The Company is a corporation duly organized and validly existing under
the laws of the State of Idaho. Based solely on the attached Certificates of Corporate Status
issue.d by the Idaho Secretary of State, the Company, The Universe Life Insurance Company
("Universe"), AJA Insurance, Inc. (• AIAI") and Fanners Health Alliance Administrators, Inc.
(ttFarmers") are corporations incorporated under the cmporation laws of the State of Idaho and
in good standing on the records of the Idaho Secretary of State.

2.
The Company and its Subsidiaries have full corporate power and authority
to enter into, execute and deliver the Transactions Documents and to perform their respective
obligations thereunder; all corporate action on the part of Company and its Subsidiaries, and
their respec:tive directors and shareholders. necessary for the authorization, execution, delivery
and performance by Company and its Subsidiaries of the Transaction Documents and the
consummation of the transactions contemplated thereby has been taken; and the Transaction
Documents have been duly executed and delivered by Company and its Subsidiaries. The
Transaction Documents constitute the valid and binding obligation of Company and if!
Subsidiarles enforceable against them in accordance with their respective tenns, except that
enforceability may be limited by (a) applicable bankruptcy, insolvency, moratorium,
reorganization, fraudulent transfer, receivership, conservatorsbip or similar laws affecting
creditor's rights generally, (b) the exercise of judicial discretion in accordance with general
principles of equity (whether applied by a court of law or equity) and (c) considerations of public
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Reed J. Taylor
August 15, 1995

Page 3

policy.

3.
Neither the execution and delivery of the Transaction Documents by
Company and its Subsidiaries, nor the consummation of the transactions contemplated thereby,
will (a) conflict with or violate any provision of their respective Articles of Incorporation or
Bylawst as amended; or (b) constlmte a violation or default under any indebtedness, indenture,
mortgage, deed of trust, note, bond, license, lease agreement, or other material agreement or
instrument to which Company or any of its Subsidiaries is a party or to which any of its assets
or the as~ of its Subsidiaries may be subject; or (c) to the best of our .knowledge, violate any
law, rule, license, regulation, judgment, order, ruling, or decree, including any hisurance laws
or regulations of any jurisdictlon to which Company or any of its Subsidiaries are subject,
governing or affecting the operation of Company or its Subsidiaries in any material respect.
Neither the execution and delivery of the Transaction Documents by Company and its
Subsidiaries, nor the consummation of the transactions contemplated thereby t will constitute an
event permitting termination of any material agreement or the acceleration of any indebtedness
of the Company or other liability, with or without notice or lapse of time, or result in the
creation or imposition of any lien upon the Collateral.
4.
No consent, authorization, approval or exemption by, or filing with, any
Person or any Governmental Authority is required in connection with the execution, delivery and
performance by Company and its Subsidiaries of the Transaction Documents, or the taking of
any action contemplated thereby, except such as have been obtained prior to Closing.

5.
All of the currently outstanding Pledged Shares are owned beneficially and
of record by Company and, to the best of our knowledge, there are no warrants, options, or
other rights to purchase such Pledged Shares.
6.
Except for the lien of First Interstate Lien upon the First Interstate Shares,
and any interest in the Commission collateral created or granted in favor of The Centennial Life
Insurance Company pursuant to that certain Reimbursement Agreement dated August 11, 1995
among The Centennial Life Insurance Company, Af.A Services Corporation, AI.A Insurance,
lnc .• The Universe Life Insurance Company and AJA MidAmerica, Inc., the Collateral is free
and clear of all pledges, liens, encumbrances, security interests, equities, claims, or options.
Upon delivery of certificates representing the Pledged Shar~ of AlAI and Fanners to
Shareholder at Closing, Shareholder shall have at Closing a perfected first priority security
interest in such Pledged Shares.

7.

To our knowledge, there are no claims, actions, suits, proceedings or

investigations pending or threatened against or relating to Company or any of its Subsidiaries,
at law or in equity before o~ by any Governmental Authority, nor has any such action, suit,
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Reed J. Taylor

August 15, 1995
Page 4

proceeding or investigation been pending during the three-year period preceding the date hereof.
Neither Company nor any of its Subsidiaries is in default with respect to any adjudicatory O'rder t
writ, injunction or decree of any Governmental authority, and neither Company nor any of its
Subsidiaries is a party to any cease and desist order, supervisory agreement or arrangement,

consensual or otherwise, with any Governmental Authority.
The foregoing ll¢nions are limited to the laws and regulations of the State of Idaho
(excluding the principles of conflicts of laws); and we have not considered and expre.9Sed no
opinion O.t;J the laws or regulations of any other jurisdiction. This opinion is rendered only with
respect to the laws and the rules, regulations and orders (ex.eluding the principles of conflicts
of laws) of the State of Idaho that are in effect as of the date hereof. We assume no
responsibility for updating this opinion to take into account any event, action, interpretation or

change of law occurring subsequent to the date hereof that may affect the validity of any of the
opinions expressed herein.

The enforceability opinion expressed in opinion
following additional qualifications:

12

of this letter is subject to the

(i)
The terms of any commission agreement1 lockbox agreement or other
account agreement which may affect the Commission Col1ateral, the rights of the parties
(other than Company or any of its Subsidiaries) to any such agreement, and any claim
or defense of such parties against the Company or any of its Subsidiaries rising under or
outside any such agreement.

(ii)
The qualification that certain rights, remedies and waivers contained in the
Transaction Documents may be rendered ineffective, or be limited, by applicable Idaho
laws or judicial decisions governing such rights, remedies and waivers; but the inclusion
of such rights, remedies and waivers does not affect the validity or enforceability of other
provwons of the Transaction Documents and, in the event the Company or my of its
Subsidiaries does not comply with the material terms of the Transaction Documents, Mr.
Taylor may exercise remedies that worild nonnally be available under Idaho law to a
secured party provided Idaho law applies and Mr. Taylor proceeds in accordance with
such law.
(iii)
We express no opinion with respect to the perfection or the relative
priority of the soourity int.erests granted to Mr. Taylor in the Commission Collateral.
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Tills opinion is furnished by us solely for your benefit for use in connection with the
Transaction Documents and the transactions contemplated thereby; and it may not be furnished
or quoted to, or relied upon, by any other person.
Very truly yours,

s/
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SCHEDULE m TO STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT
This Schedule sets forth the exceptions to representations and wamntles made by the
Company to the Shareholder in Article ID of the Stt>ck Redemption Agreement dated July 22,
1995 ("Agreement") between AJA Services Corporation ("Company•) and Reed J. Taylor
("SharehoJderft).

I.

EXCEPTIONS APPLYJNG TO THE COMPANY GENERAILY.

A.
Sections 3.3 and 3.11. The Company's representation that the execution, delivery
and perfonnance of the Agreement and the consummation of the transactions contemplated
thereby will not result in a violation or default under any material agreement or other instrument
by which, the Company o.r any Subsidiary is bound and the Company's rep.resentation that it is
not in violation of any such agreement or instrument are qualified as follows:
The Company is currently in technical default of certain financial covenants contained
in the First Int.erstate Loan agreement. Those covenant defaults are described in the attached

letter to First Interstate Bank from Rick L Johnson, the Company Vice President, Finance.
Absent the Bank's w:rltten consent, completion of tm.nsactions contemplated in the Agreement
may cause additional technical defaults of negative .financial covenants contained in the Bank
loan agreement.
The Company has thoroughly disclosed to the Bank all details regarding the proposed
Company bas not asked for nor has the Bank

transactions. In view of the current defaults, the

volunteered written consent.
As the Company is current in all payments due to Bank, the Company does not anticipate
adverse action by the Bank prior to the scheduled loan payoff date of July 20, 1996.
B.
Sections 3.2 and 3 1;h The Company's representations concerning consents in
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 are qualified as follows:
1.
The Company has been made aware that the Texas Department of
Insurance has taken the position that the distribution of AIA Insurance, Inc. requires prior
depart.mental approval due to the status the Company's Subsidiary, The Universe Life Insurance
Company ("UUC"), as ~commercially domiciled" in Texas. The Company, while disputing the
necessity of such approval, ha8 none the Jess filed the necessary forms to obtain such approval.
The Texas Insurance Department has not yet given its approval for distribution of AIA
Insurance, Inc.
The California Department of Insurance requires the submission of a prior
approval form for the Centennial reinsurance treaty. Since the transaction does not affect any
California insureds, and UUC is not being dissolved or merged, approval is expected in due

course. Approval from California has not yet been obtained.
SCH.eDVLE m · Page l
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2.
As described above in connection with Section 3.3., certain transactions
contemplated by the Agreement would violate provisions of the First Interstate Bank Loan
Agreement and related documellt'j.
C.
Section 3.,6.. The Company's financial representalions contained in Section 3.6
are suwlementcd by the following attached financial statements related to the quarter ended June
30, 1995:
AIA Services Conrolidated Balance Sheets at June 30, 1995.

AJA Services Consolidated Statement of Income For Six Months Ending June 30, 1995.
The Universe Life Preliminary Results of Operations (Statutory Basis) For Three and Six
Months Ending June 30, 1995.
~

Fidelity Preliminary Results of Opc:rations (Slatutory Basis) For Three and
Six Months Ending June 30, 1995.
A1A Services Consolidated Preliminary Results of Operations For Six Months Ending
June 30, 1995.

D.

EXCEPTIONS APPLYING SOLELY TO lJNIVERSE LIFE.

Sections 3.1, 3.9 e,nd 3.11. The Company's representations concerning Universe Life's
good st.anding and qualification to transact business in various state& and its compliance with
state insurance laws are qualified by the following description of regulatory proceedings in the
various states in which the insurance company transacts business.
~. On March 22, 1994, the State of Texas issued Cease and Desist Order No. 940282 against Universe Llfe and its subsidiary, AIA Insurance, Inc. The Order was based on
preliminary examination findings reported to the Texas Department of Insurance ("TDI .. ) by the
examiners. The Order alleged that Universe Ufe and its affiUate engaged in unfair methods of
competition and deceptive practice of insurance and that Universe Life was in hazardous
financial condition. Following discussions with the company and reccipt of. additional
documentation, TOI issued a Consent Order dated May 17, 1994 which superseded the Cease
and Desist Order in its entirety. The Consent Order abandoned allegations of unfair competition
and deceptive practices and focused on TDI's concerns with the proper reserving for the
Supplemental Benefit Accumulation ("SBA") feature of Universe Llfe's GUH product and the
valuation of Universe Life's investment in its subsidiary, AJA Insurance, Inc.

To address its concern with conflicting actuarial opinions on the proper reserves for the

SBA, the May 17, 1994 Consent Order directed Universe Life to select an independent actuary
to !\'!view Universe Life's SBA reserving methods and factors. Universe Llfe and the
Department agreed that this actuarial review would bepetformed by Donna R. Claire, F.S.A.,

of Claire Thinking, an independent consulting actuary. Ms. Claire performed an asset adequacy
analysis of Universe Life's reported December 31, 1993 SBA reserves, including a thorough
review of GUH product features, actuarial assumptions, actual experience and historical trends.
Ms. Claire's analysis is contained in her Asset Adequacy Report dated June 12, 1994.
SCHEDULE ill - Pago 2
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In her Report, Ms. Claire observed that Universe Life's GUH product, with it! SBA
feature, is an innovative product and that, "[a]s such, there is no current reserve s1anda:rd for
the SBA in state law that specifically fits this benefit9. Ms. Claire concluded that (i) Universe
Life's independent consulting actuaries, Milliman and Robenson, had developed "a methodology
which follows the basic standards of establishing reserves that reflect the underlying risks of the
product•; (ii) "[t]he reserve methodology used by [Universe Life's actuarles] does appear to be
reasonable"; and (iii) "given the experience that was developed through 1993, the reserves
reported in the [1993) Annual Statement were adequate". Based on sensitivity tests which
showed that the reported reserves may be inadequate if adverse trends occur, however, Ms.
Claire recommended that the reserves be increased on the basis of "somewhat stronger" reserve
assumptions. Applying the same gross premium valuation methodology used by Universe Life
to develop its reported reserves, Ms. Claire developed new resexving factors reflecting her more
conservative assumptions. Universe Life agreed with TDI that the SBA :reserves for the Texas
certificateholders under GUll policy would be determined prospectively in accordance with the
factors developed by Donna Claire, with any increase in reserves being applied rat.ably beginning
July 1, 1995 and with the final entry being made December 31, 1996.

With respect to the valuation of AlA Insurance. Inc., TDI acknowledged that Universe
Life's accounting for the value of AIA Insurance was permissible under Texas law; but, in light
of a Texas statute allowing the Commissioner to a.Scribe any other valuation he believes more
appropriate (after hearing) and the impending statutory change in the Idaho Insurance Code
effective July 1, 1995 (see below), the May 17, 1994 Consent Order directed that Universe
Life's investment in AIA Insurance, Inc. be reduced, ratably over a three-year period beginning
December 31, 1994, to the lesser of net worth as determined in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles or the valuation amount reflected in the final report of this
examination.
During the period of discussions between Universe Life and 'IDI, the Texas Insurance
Com:missioner approved Universe Llfe's new OUH ill product and the transfer of Universe
Life's group health and life insurance business in Texas by reinsw:ing, on an assumption basis,
all of such business with The Centennial life Insurance Company. See "Market Conduct
Activities ~ Policy Fonn Filings and Approvals" and "Subsequent Events-Sale of Group
Universal Health Business" above.
On October 13, 1994, TDI issued a further Consent Order which superseded the May
17, 1994 Consent Order in its entirety. The October Order recited Universe Life's agreement
concerning the implementation of the Claire factors for reserving for the SBA and ordered that
Universe Life reduce the reported value of its subsidiary, AlA Insurance, Inc., to the lesser or
net worth (as determined in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles) or the
valuation amount reflected in the final report of this examination, provided that the adjustment
in the AJA Insurance carrying value would be made ratably over a three-year period beginning
December 31, 1994.

ld,abQ. Based on the financial concerns raised by the preliminary examination results and

the issuance of the Texas Cease and Desist Order, the Idaho Department of Insurance
("Department") initiated an inquiry resulting in a Voluntary Agreement Concerning Supervisor,
dated April 26, 1994 between Universe Life and the Department. Under the Agreement,
Universe Llfe has provided financial and other infonnati.on to the Department on a regular basis
SClllIDULB ill - Pttge 3
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to enable the Department to infonnally monitor Universe Llfe's financial condition and
operations to assure that policyholders' interests were protected during the period required to
resolve the financial and other examination issues. During tbe period of discussions, the
Department has approved Universe Life's new OUH ID product, the transfer of Universe Life1s
individuat,bcalth insurance business to States General llie Insurance Company and the transfer
of its group health and life insurance business to The Centennial. Life Insurance Company.

By 1agreement dated December 23, 1994, the Idaho Department approved Donna Claire's
gross premium valuation method and Ms. Claire's reserving factor5 for calculating SBA reserves
in acx:ordancc with her Asset Adequacy Report dated June 12, 1994. The Department agreed
that Universe Life would not be required to resta.1:8 its 1992 or 1993 Annual Statements and that
implementation of the Donna Claire reserve adjustment will be made prospectively, in
accordance with TDI's October 13, 1994 Consent Order, on a quarterly basis beginning with the
third quarter of 1995 and ending December 31, 1996. The following table shows the effect of
the Donna· Claire adjustments to Universe Life's reported aggregate reserve for accident and
health policies and to its capital and surplus at December 31, 1992, 1993 and 1994:

Capital & surplus reported by Universg Life:
Aggregate re:serve for A & B policies
As rbported
As ~culated by Claire factor
Claife factor adjustment

.l.22l

.l22l

1m

$ s.418,748

$ 5,140,830

$ 4,182,781

10,376,371
7,843,186

14,04-0,419

9,193,850

14,801,661

2.533.184

(

:Z6l1242}

9,519,581
(

~ss.1~n

t

Capital & wrplus afte~ Claire factor adjustment:

$ 7.951.932

i~.l221 5 H

~

3,797,0SO

In the December 23, 1994 agreement, the Idaho Insurance Department acknowledged
that, until July 1, 1995, the Idaho Insurance Code permits Universe Life to continue to report
its investm¢nt in AJA Insurance, Inc. at historical cost (subject to a 15 % of assets limitation) on
its 1992, 1993, and 1994 Annual Statements. Although permitted by Idaho statute, this valuation
of AIA Ins'urance, Inc. deviat.es from the NAIC standards for investment in subsidiaries as set
forth in th~ NAIC Accounting Practices and Procedures Manual for Life and Accident and
Health Insti:rance Companies. See "Valuation of AJA Insurance, Inc. " above under the caption
"Comment! on 1992 Financial Statements: Common Stock•. On July 1, 1995, Universe Life
wrn be required to reduce the value of its investment in AJA Insurance, Inc., for statutory
accounting:purposes, to the net book value of AIA Insurance, Inc (which was $2,424,097 at
December 31, 1992).

Otl.mr States. The following regulatory proceedings in other jurisdictions were
precipitated by the issuance of the Texas Cease and Desist Order and/or the preliminary
examinatio'1 findings contained therein:
A Notice of Hearing and Order to Show Cause with Suspension Instanter was issued by
the Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner on April 6, 1994 based on the Texas Cease and Desist
Order. On.May 26, 1994, by Jetter agreement based on the May 17, 1994 TDI Consent Order
and Univer8e Life's April 26, 1994 Volunt:ary Agreement with the Idaho Insurance Department,
the Oklahoma Department agreed to suspend and terminate the prior Notice and Order to Show
SCHBDULE ID • Page 4
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Cause and Ito allow Universe Life to continue to solicit busin~ from itx existing policyholder
associations.
An Order of Suspension based on the Texas Cease and De&st Order was issued by the
Illinois DePartment of Insurance on April 26, 1994. The Suspension Order was lifted by
StipuJation\and Consent Order dated July 27, 1994, pursuant to which Universe Life agreed to
notify the lliinois Department before transacting new business in the state during the next three
years.

A notice to &how cause regarding suspension from doing business in the Smte of
Mississippi! was issued by the Mississippi Insurance Department on May 6, 1994, based on the
Texas Cease and Desist Order. Suspension of Universe Life's certificate of authority was
ipitially stayed by the Department; however, on September 8, 1994, a Suspension Order was
entered based upon the appearance that Universe Llfc was then in an unsound condition.
T}1e· Alaska Insurance Department issued an Order suspending Universe Life's certiflcate
of authority on May 19, 1994, based on the Texas Cease and Desist Order. Universe Life
entered into an Agreement to Suspend New S~es on July 27, 1994; and the Alaska Insurance
Department withdrew the suspension order. Universe Life had not been writing new business
in Alaska, so the Agreement to Suspend New Sales has had no financial effect on Universe
Life's operations.
TheiMissouri Insurance Department issued a Notice of Institution of Case and Statement
of Charges dated June 2t 1994t based upon the Texas Cease and Desist Order. A hearing in the
matter has been continued indefinitely, to be re-set upon further notice to Universe Llfe.

In June 1994, ~e. California Insurance Department initiated an informal inquiry based
on the Texas Cease and Desist Order. Universe Life entered into a confidential voluntary
agreement to cease writing new business in California. Universe Ufe had not been writing new
business in California; so the confidential agreement has had no financial effect on Universe
Life's operations.
On June 6, 1994, a Suspension Order was issued by the Wyoming Department of
Insurance without prior notice or hearing, based on the Illinois Suspension Order. Based upon
subsequent withdrawal of the Illinois and Texas orders, Wyoming lifted the Order of Suspension
and entered a Stipulation and Consent Order dated July 28, 1994, pursuant to which Universe
Life was permitted to continue soliciting its existing policyholder association but agreed not to
solicit other business in Wyoming without the Department's consent.

Universe Life voluntarily agreed to suspend new business in Oregon pending resolution
of the Oregon Insurance Department's concerns under a unique Oregon statute regarding
valuation of Universe Life's investment in AlA Imunnce, Inc. A Consent Otder was issued
June 30, 1994. A Suspension Order was issued August 23, upon expiration of the Consent
Order. Uniyerse Life requested a bearing; and an Amended Suspension Order prohibiting new
sales was entered November 2, 1994.
A Notice of Summary Suspension was issued by the Iowa Division of Insurance on
August 15, 1994, based on failure of Universe Life to file its annual audited financial report by
SCHEDtn.E ill • Page 5
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Jwie 1, 1994. (The auditor's report on Universe Life•s 1993 financial statements was delayed
pending Idaho's detennination of financial issues raised by the examination. A draft of the
audited financial statements had previously been provided to Iowa Division of Insurance.) The
Order of Suspension was rescinded and the administrative proceeding dismissed on September
6, 1994. On January 6, 1995, the Division issued a Notice of Hearing t.o determine whether
Universe Life's surplus met statutory minimums. Outside counsel informed Universe Life on
April 10, 1995 that Iowa is dropping the action.
Universe Life entered into an Agreement with the Washington Insurance Department dated
August 18, 1994, in which Universe I.Jfe voluntarily agreed not to write any new business in
the State without prior approval of the Commissioner, pending submission of information
establishing that Universe Life's financial condition is not detrimental to Washington
policyholders.

On September 9, 1994, the Utah Insurance Depertment issued a Notice of Informal
Adjudicative Proceeding summarily suspending Universe Life's Certificate of Authority for
failure to maintain minimum capital and surplus as calculated under unique Ut.ah statut.es.
Universe Life's hearing request was withdrawn after the Department's Chief Examiner advised
that the suspension order could be lifted upon informal present.ation by Universe Life's
management after. year-end demonstrating compliance with minimum capital and surplus
requirements.
The Nebraska Department contacted Universe Life on October 141 1994, concerning
Universe Life•s financial condition. Universe Life signed a Consent Order to suspend new SaletJ
on October 28, 1994.
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RODERICK C. BOND (Pro Hae Vice)
NED A. CANNON, ISBA #2331
SMITI I, CANNON & BOND PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Fax: (208) 746-8421

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Case No.: CV-07-00208
Plaintiff,

v.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AJA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and
CORRINE BECK, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;

AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND IN
SUPPORT OF REED TAYLOR'S MOTION
TO DISQUALIFY
ATTORNEYS AND
LAW FIRMS OF HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, CLEMENTS
BROWN & MCNICHOLS, P.A., AND
QUARLES & BRADY LLP.; MOTION TO
RELINQUISH COLLATERAL; MOTION TO
COMPEL; MOTION TO PROTECT
COLLATERAL; AND MOTION FOR
CONTINUANCE

nrn

\

Defendants.

STA TE OF IDAHO

)
) ss:
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE )
I, Roderick C. Bond, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
I.

I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in court, one of

the attorneys for the plaintiff Recd J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") in this action, and make
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND
IN SUPPORT OF DISQUALIFfCATION - l

EXHIBIT C
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•
should not be named when in fact they knew it was in the best interests of the
corporations to name him. Attached as Exhibit 30 is the Response drafted and filed by
Hawley Troxell in which several inappropriate arguments were asserted that were not in
the best interests of the corporations. It is significant that Reed Taylor's proposed Fifth
Amended Complaint (See Ex. 15) had allegations of fraud, conspiracy,

fraudul~nt

conveyance and other claims against Mr. Cashman. As former counsel for AIA Services
and AIA Insurance (who owed a duty of loyalty to the corporations), Michael McNichols
and Clements, Brown & McNichols joined in Hawley Troxell's Opposition and to
naming Michael Cashman as a defendant, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 31.
Neither Hawley Troxell nor Clements, Brown & McNichols appeared in the action on
behalf of Mr. Cashman.
54.

It is significant to note that Richard Riley is also a partner of Hawley

Troxell and Richard Riley negotiated the terms of the redemption of Reed Taylor's
shares.

In fact, Richard Riley, through his old firm, represented AlA Services and AIA

Insurance in connection with the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. Richard Riley
attended board meetings for AIA Services after the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares
(including board meeting specifically discussing defaults of AIA Services' obligations to
Reed Taylor). Richard Riley is the person to whom notices arc required to me sent
pursuant to the terms of the various agreements associated with the redemption of Reed
Taylor's shares in AIA Services (see Ex. 4 above).
55.

Also, Richard Riley provided an opinion letter to Reed Taylor through his

former law firm (which such opinion letter specifically referenced Richard Riley's name
as the person with knowledge) (see Ex. 2 above). Richard Riley was fuJly aware of the

AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND
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84.

Attached as Exhibit 40 is a copy of the bank statement where AIA

Services has been paying the funds it stopped paying to Reed.
85.

Attached as Exhibit 41 is a copy of the Joint Meeting of the boards of

AIA Services and AJA Insurance.
86.

Attached as Exhibit 42 are pertinent pages of the transcript of the

deposition of R. John Taylor.

These transcripts show that R. John Taylor has been

directing the litigation in this action.
87.

Attached as Exhibit 43 are pertinent pages of Reed's Third Discovery

Requests to R. John Taylor, which were served on October 19, 2007.
DATED: This 28 1h day of August, 2008.

Roderick
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28 1h day o August, 2008.

Notary Public for Idaho

Residing at: La.tlis1D~ ~~
My commission expires:

J AL
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RODERICK C. BOND (Pro Hae Vice)
NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, WA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,

Plaintift~
v.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an Idaho
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE
TAYLOR, individually and the community
property comprised thereof; BRYAN
FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS,
a single person; CROPUSA INSURANCE
AGENCY, INC., an Idaho Corporation; and
JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK,
individually and the community property
comprised thereof;

Case No.: CV-07-00208
PLAINTIFF REED TAYLOR'S
AMENDED MOTION TO
DISQUALIFY THE ATTORNEYS
AND LAW FIRMS OF HAWLEY
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP;
CLEMENTS, BROWN &
MCNICHOLS, P.A.; AND QUARLES
&BRADYLLP

Defendants.
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•
and CropUSA in the transaction. See Bond Aff., Ex. 42, p. 250;

2nd

Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 46.

On December 18, 2007, Reed Taylor's counsel requested proof that AIA Insurance's
guarantee of CropUSA's $15 Million loan was terminated.: See Bond Aff., Ex. 33. Gary Babbitt
and Hawley Troxell responded by stating that if Reed Taylor took action to rescind the
guarantee, then Reed Taylor would be sued for tortious interference. See Bond Aff., Ex. 33.
On July 21, 2008, Reed Taylor's counsel, Michael S. Bissell, sent a letter to the ptrrported
boards of AIA Services and AJA Insurance demanding that the boards take action against the
attorneys and law finn of Hawley Troxell for various ethical violations, malpractice, various
claims and torts.

See Bond Aff., Ex. 16.

In response, Hawley Troxell retained its own

independent counsel, who, on July 31, 2008, inquired about the allegations made in Mr. Bissell's
demand letter. See Bond Aff., Ex. 34.
Gary Babbitt, D. John Ashby and Hawley Troxell have been asserting arguments against
Reed Taylor (including the alleged illegality argun.lent) with full knowledge that such arguments
are counter to an opinion letter issued on behalf of AJA Services to Reed Taylor, which was
based upon knowledge held by Richard Riley, who is also an attorney with Hawley Troxell. See
Bond Aff., Ex. 2, p. 2,

1 2; Court File.

Gary Babbitt, D. John Ashby and Hawley Troxell have

also participated in ceasing all payments to Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor without permission
from the Court. See Affidavit of Reed Taylor; Affidavit of Donna Taylor; Court File.

Lawsuits Against Certain Attornevr And lending J;awsuig Aoinst Otheg
On August 18, 2008, Reed Taylor, through his counsel, Michael S. Bissell, filed nonfrivolous and non-derivative lawsuits against Hawley Troxell and Clement, Brown &
McNichols, which such lawsuits include claims for aiding and abetting, tortious interference, and
conversion, among other claims relating to attorneys exceeding their scope of representation.
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION TO DISQUALIFY - 25
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DATED~

This 24lh day efS.eptember~ 2-008~
SMITH, CANNON & BONDPLLC
CMIPElELL~ BISSELL & KIRll

·

B$:.~4~~~tr::4-~4l~~::::::L~od~ri~kC.

BQnd

Ned A.Cannon
Mi~ha¢1 S. Bi$sell
J\~qtn~Y:$- for Plaintiff ~ee<tJ.. Ta:y19r
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MICHAELS. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, VI.A 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST.ATE OF ID.AHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. T.AYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CVOS-01765
Plaintiff,

v.

PLA.INTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

G.ARY D. B.ABBIIT, an individual; D. JOHN
.ASHBY, an individual; P.ATRlCK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A. .
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAVILEY, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES 1-X,
unlmown individuals;
Defendants.
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor"), by and through his attorneys, Campbell,
Bissell & Kirby, PLLC, hereby responds to Defendants' (collectively "Hawley Troxell")
Motion to Dismiss.
............. -.............................................................

·····

I. INTRODUCTION
Reed Taylor's claims involve factual and legal claims that entitle him to damages
and that cannot be resolved through an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion. Indeed, dismissal is not

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS - 1
EXHIBIT E
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cause of action and the shareholder's cause of action result from the same
wrongful acts, such as for mismanagement of the corporate business and
diversion of assets in breach of an express contract with the shareholder ...
... The shareholder's individual claim based upon a contract between the
corporation and another may be brought as a third-party beneficiary
action, despite lack of privity between the plaintiff shareholder and the
defendant, provided the shareholder as an intended beneficiary of the
contract...
12B Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 5921 (2008) (internal citations omitted) citing Vogel v. Reed

Supply Co., 277 N.C. 119, 126, 177 S.E. 2.d 273, 278 (N.C. 1970) (third-party
beneficiaries not in privy of contract may bring an action in their own name to "enforce a
contract made for their benefit. ..") (other citations omitted). There are other instances in
which a third-party has standing to pursue claims against an attorney:
... [A]n attorney may owe a duty to a party who is not his or her client, but
who is a third-party beneficiary to an agreement between the attorney and
his or her client Accordingly, third party liability of an attorney arising
from representation of a client may be found to exist where the attorney is
responsible for ·damage caused by his or her negligence to a person
intended to be benefited by his or her performance irrespective of any lack
of privity. Privity between an attorney and a non-client is not necessary
for a duty to attach where the attorney had reason to foresee the specific
harm which occurred...
. . .Thus, although a legal malpractice claim may accrue only to the
attorney's client, an attorney may be liable for damages to a third party
because of events arising out of his or her representation of a client if the
attorney's acts are fraudulent or tortious and result in injury to that third
person.
An attorney for a trustee is liable for breach of fiduciary duty to the thirdparty beneficiaries of the trust when the attorney has placed his or her selfinterest about that of the trustee.
·
. ............

7Am.Jur.2dAttorneys.at Law §234.(2008).(intemalcitationsomitted).
Here, AlA Services promised Reed Taylor to not impair the value of AIA
Insurance and to vest the voting rights to its shares in AIA Insurance to Reed Taylor upon
a default, with the full knowledge of Hawley Troxell and Richard Riley (who was

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS - 17
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attorney for AIA Services in the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares). AIA Services is
insolvent and Reed Taylor is the only beneficiary entitled to its remaining assets. As
such, Reed Taylor is a third-party beneficiary of any services purportedly provided by
Hawley Troxell, who in turn was required to represent the best interests of AIA Insurance
and AIA Services-but failed to do so. Moreover, Hawley Troxell owed Reed Taylor a
duty, by and through Richard Riley, to not renege on the terms of an opinion letter
provided to Reed Taylor. Finally, Hawley Troxell also owed special duties to Reed
Taylor by way of him being the pledgee of AIA Insurance's shares and the sole officer
and director of the company.

The cumulative effect of all of the above establishes that

Hawley Troxell owed Reed Taylor duties. 5

8. Assuming Reed Taylor Does Not Have Standing Under Any One Of
The Above Reasons, He Should Have Standing As A Result Of All Of
The Above Collective Reasons.
The gravamen of Reed Taylor's Complaint is that Hawley Troxell has been aiding
and abetting John Taylor and others in committing torts against Reed Taylor and
depriving him of money and property to which he is rightfully entitled. Hawley Troxell's
actions have occurred knowing that duties are owed to Reed Taylor, as a pledgee,
director, officer, creditor and secured party. There is no other bona-fide shareholder or
creditors entitled to the remaining assets, funds, and claims owned by AIA Services and
AIA Insurance. The little remaining assets are being unlawfully utilized to cover up the
acts of John Taylor, Hawley Troxell, CropUSA and other individuals. Moreover, Reed
Taylor is a creditor owed over $9,000,000, he has a security interest in the commissions
5

Even if none of the single factual issues creates a third-party beneficiary entitlement for Reed Taylor, a
special exception should apply based upon Reed Taylor being a secured creditor of AJA Services and AJA
Insurance, a creditor owed over $8,500,000 by an insolvent AJA Services incapable of ever satisfying the
debt, the pledgee of AJA Insurance, the sole officer and director of AJA Insurance, and the only
shareholder of AJA Jnsurance by way of being the pledgee of all of its outstanding shares.

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS - 18
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alleged deficiencies, and add additional causes of action and facts. 15
IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Hawley Troxell's Motion to Dismiss should be
denied in full.
DATED

thi~

,,J

1

day of October, 2008.

D11111\1315\1322\responsc.mln dismiss.FINAL.doc

15
A motion to amend and supplement complaint will be filed before the hearing and a draft version of the
proposed amended complaint will be filed at that time. The amended complaint will clarify facts, clarify
and add causes of action, and include additional facts ascertained since the Complaint was filed.

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISJMISS 56
M

000975

•

•

'i

f:
~

~

1
.
~

•O

r~
0.

''

•

')
•"•

,..,ZG
G3 081

15 Pfl 3

cJ

1·1r,T··r'{ 0. \!ECt~S
,_,, "rf TPE D\ST. C"U~T
v K
1

MICHAELS.BISSELL,ISBNo.5762-c:. ~""
CAMPBELL. BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, WA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111

,

•., •

..,···~:c•~f;S

~~B-fyt'':i\..~~"'""""'

-

Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIIE
STATE O:e' IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CVOS-01765
Plaintiff,

•

v.
PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S

GARY D. BABBIIT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X,
unknown individuals;

MOTION AND MEMORANDUM OF
LAW TO AMEND COMPLAINT

Defendants.
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") moves the Court for an Order to Amend
and Supplement bis Complaint in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A.

I. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON
This Motion and Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion, the attached Exhibit
A, and the Court's file .

•

EXHIBITF

PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM OF
LAW TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 1
000976

II. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT
"[A] party may amend a pleading only by leave of the court ... and leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires ... " I.R.C.P. 15(a). Similarly, a party may move to
supplement a "pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have
happened since the date of the pleading sough to be supplemented ... " l.R.C.P. 15(d).
"Great liberty should be shown in allowing amendments to pleadings in furtherance of
justice between parties.'' Smith v. Shinn, 82 Idaho 141, 149, 3 50 P .2d 348 (1960).
Here, Reed Taylor is moving the Court to amend his Complaint in the form
attached hereto as Exhibit A. The purpose of the amendment is to: (1) clarify and
expand the claims and causes of action; and (2) add derivative claims.
Justice requires that Reed Taylor be permitted to file his Amended Complaint.
DATED this

/~y of October, 2008.

MrlCllftel S. Bissell
ttomeys for Plaintiff

Data\1315\1322\mtn.amend complaint.doc
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MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, VIA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Reed Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual, who is
bringing this action on behalf of himself and
on behalf of the creditors and/or shareholders
of AIA Services Corporation and AIA
Insurance, Inc.;

Case No.: CVOS-01765

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR
DAMAGES
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Plaintiff,

v.
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; HAVILEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAVILEY LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES 1-X,
unknown individuals;
Rawle Troxell.

I. FACTS
1.

Reed Taylor, by and through his attorneys of record, CAMPBELL,

BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC, alleges as follows (all allegations and claims asserted below
are incorporated by reference into each cause of action, remedy and/or requested relief to

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 1
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of action are tortious interference claims based upon Hawley Troxell, John Taylor,
Connie Taylor, James Beck, and other parties exceeding their authority to act on behalf of
AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance.
89.

Hawley Troxell has also aided and abetted and/or conspired with John

Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman,
CropUSA and/or other parties in the tortious interference of AJA Services' contractual
rights. Hawley Troxell's acts and/or omissions also constitute the aiding and abetting
and/or civil conspiracy with others in the tortious interference of AIA Services'
contractual rights.
90.

As a direct and/or proximate result of Hawley Troxell's acts and/or

omissions, AIA Services has been damaged and is entitled to damages in the amount to
be determined at the time of trial or on summary judgment.

V. THIRD CAUSES OF ACTIONS-FRAUD AND/OR CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD
(Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance's Causes of Actions)
91.

Hawley Troxell owed special duties to Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or

AIA Insurance as described throughout this Complaint.
92.

As a former attorney for Reed Taylor and the attorney who provided an

opinion letter to Reed Taylor, defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by and
through an opinion letter that was based upon Riley's personal knowledge (representing
such facts as the transactions being fully legal and authorized by the corporations), which
further invokes personal liability to Riley. Reed Taylor had a right to rely on Riley's
representations and justifiably relied on such representations. Riley breached his duties
when he asserted that the transaction was illegal. Although Reed Taylor believes the
transaction was legal and supported by applicable law, Riley's actions have breached his
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duties to Reed Taylor and caused Reed Taylor to incur damages from the payments of
attorneys' fees and costs and lost possession of property and funds because of AIA
Insurance being wrongfully withheld from Reed Taylor. As a result of Riley's acts
and/or omissions·(which constitute fraud), Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount
to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.
93.

Hawley Troxell owed Reed Taylor special duties as the secured creditor of

AIA Services, the sole pledgee of all of the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance, a stock
pledgee in which Hawley Troxell knew had lawfully voted the shares of AIA Insurance,
the only authorized officer and director of AIA Insurance, the holder of a security interest
in all of the commissions and related receivables of AIA Services and AIA Insurance, the
holder of a security interest in all of the shares of all of AIA Services' other subsidiaries
and all distributions related to the shares (i.e., the $1.2 Million Mortgage and $800,000
settlement), the most significant creditor of the insolvent AIA Services, and the only
party entitled to the remaining assets of AIA Services and AIA Insurance.
94.

Hawley Troxell owed and owes duties to AIA Services and AIA Insurance

to properly represent the best interests of the corporations and to not allow interested
parties (including, without limitation, John Taylor) from taking actions that are not in the
best interests of the corporations, including, without limitation, unauthorized and/or
conflicted persons directing litigation, misappropriation and tortious transfer of assets and
funds to interested parties to the detriment of AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance, to
advise the Court and disinterested shareholders of the actions of John Taylor and other
interested parties, and to not issue opinion letters to auditors and/or other parties to assist
in the commission of tortious conduct. Hawley Troxell has breached its duties and acted
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performing similar functions for a non-client, Reed Taylor. Hawley Troxell knew that its
appropriate actions were necessary with respect to the representation of AJA Services
and/or AJA Insurance to take action to prevent and/or rectify the breaches of fiduciary
duties owed by AJA Services and/or AJA Insurance to Reed Taylor when such breaches
were crimes and/or fraud and/or Hawley Troxell assisted and/or are assisting in the
breaches. Reed Taylor was not able to protect his rights because of Hawley Troxell's
actions and Hawley Troxell's obligations to AJA Services and/or AJA Insurance would
not be significantly impaired because the best interests of all the foregoing is to collect
sums owed by others and recover damages for the improper tortious conduct of others
(including, without limitation, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael
Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, and CropUSA).
98.

Hawley Troxell breached its duties (including, without limitation, the duty

of the standard of care) owed by it to Reed Taylor. As a direct and/or proximate result of
Hawley Troxell's failure to perform the duties owed to Reed Taylor, he was damaged in
the amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.
99.

Defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by and through an

opinion letter that was based upon Riley's personal knowledge, which further invokes
personal liability to Riley. Riley breached his duties when he asserted that the transaction
was illegal. Although Reed Taylor believes the transaction was legal and supported by
applicable law, Riley's actions have breached his duties to Reed Taylor and caused Reed
Taylor to incur damages for the payments of attorneys' fees and costs and lost revenues
because of AJA Insurance being wrongfully withheld from Reed Taylor. As a result of
Riley's acts and/or omissions, Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount to be proven
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at trial or on summary judgment.
100.

Hawley Troxell owed AJA Services and/or AJA Insurance an attomey-

client relationship for purportedly representing AJA Service and/or AJA Insurance, which
results. in the existence of duties on the part of Hawley Troxell owed to AJA Seni'ices
and/or AJA Insurance.
101.

Hawley Troxell owed AJA Services, AJA Insurance and/or Reed Taylor a

duty of care to provide, including, but not limited to, reasonable, prudent, ethical,
unconflicted, loyal and professional legal advice and legal representation in keeping with
the standard of care in the legal profession and as owed to the corporations (referred to
herein and above as "duty of care"). Hawley Troxell breached its duty of care as a result
of its acts and/or omissions thereby damaging the corporations and Reed Taylor, to the
detriment of Reed Taylor.
102.

Hawley Troxell breached its fiduciary duties owed to AJA Services, AJA

Insurance, and/or Reed Taylor, including, without limitation, the duties of care and
loyalty.
103.

Hawley Troxell's acts constitute professional negligence and/or breach of

Hawley Troxell's fiduciary duties, and such conduct have damaged the corporations and
Reed Taylor, in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.
104.

Hawley Troxell breached the duty of the standard of care owed by it to

AJA Services and/or AJA Insurance. As a direct and/or proximate result of Hawley
Troxell's failure to perform the duties owed to AJA Services and/or AJA Insurance in
connection with the legal services purportedly provided by Hawley Troxell, AJA Services
and/or AJA Insurance were damaged in the amount to be proven at trial or on summary
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Insurance.

These breached fiduciary duties are ongomg and Hawley Troxell has

substantially assisted and/or encouraged the foregoing parties in the commission of
breaching their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA
Insurance.. Hawley Troxell also continues to substantially assist and/or encourage the
foregoing parties in breaching their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AIA Services
and/or AIA Insurance.
117.

Hawley Troxell's acts and conduct has damaged Reed Taylor, AIA

Services and/or AIA Insurance in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary
judgment by aiding and abetting and/or substantially assisting others (including John
Taylor and CropUSA) through a civil conspiracy in the commission of breaches of
fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance.
118.

Defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by and through an

opinion letter that was based upon Riley's personal knowledge, which further invokes
personal liability to Riley. Riley breached his duties when he asserted that the transaction
was illegal. Although Reed Taylor believes the transaction was legal and supported by
applicable law, Riley's actions have breached his duties to Reed Taylor and caused Reed
Taylor to incur damages for the payments of attorneys' fees and costs and lost revenues
because of AIA Insurance being wrongfully withheld from Reed Taylor. As a result of
Riley's acts and/or omissions, Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount to be proven
at trial or on summary judgment.

IX. SEVENTH CAUSES OF ACTION-EXCESSIVE COMPENSATION/WASTE
(Reed Taylor, AJA Services and/or AJA Insurance's Causes of Actions)
119.

Hawley Troxell has known that AIA Services is insolvent and AIA

Insurance is pledged to Reed Taylor as collateral. Hawley Troxell has known that AIA
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RODERICK C. BOND (Pro Hae Vice)
NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331
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I. INTRODUCTION
The motion to intervene of the AJA Services 401 (k) Profit Sharing Plan ("Plan") should
be denied. The Plan has no standing. The shareholders have all consented and acquiesced in the
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. Moreover, even if the Plan had standing, its asserted claims
and defenses are barred by the statue of limitations thereby making intervention futile.
Even if the Plan had standing and the Plan's claims were not futile, the Plan's
intervention is untimely under both I.R.C.P. 24(a) and (b), being pursued by the same person
who was a named defendant almost two years ago.

Significantly, the Plan's intervention

involves asserting the same alleged "illegality" defense which is already being asserted by the
defense in virtually every recent pleading and motion. The Plan's intervention is improper and
clearly being pursued for the interests of the individual defendants in this action, rather than for
the true interests the Plan.

II•. STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Jo1in···Tay1or1Jam9·Buk,.MiD·ft•mu'·1n.d:·mC1tarfl. cavart·Wmtid.ilod.•O!l
Richard Campanaro, James Beck and Michael Cashman were an investor group who
desired to redeem Reed Taylor's shares in AIA Services, along with R. John Taylor.

See

Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. A. In the letter from Richard Campanaro to
Reed Talor and John Taylor dated April 14, 1995, Mr. Campanaro stated the following when
negotiations were faltering to repurchase Reed Taylor's shares:

th' .

[F]olfowmg
Bow ofDirettot•s ma S'tOCkholger•i meetmss held in Boist. ldabt. m
early March. Mt. Michael Cashman. m~sel:f,Mr. Jin1 Beck.. ;expected a· response from
Mr. Reed Taylor detailing the sale of his stock in AIA ... that, in fact, [Reed Taylor] had
retained the services of an attorney for the purpose of attempting to finalize the details of
our sale and purchase agreement. ..
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... Mr. Reed Taylor has refused to negotiate an agreement [for the purchase of his
shares] ....Mr. Reed Taylor addressed issues with his attorney, Scott Bell, that, as the
Chairman of the Board of Directors, he should have known were heretofore resolved.
This indicates to; me a lack of seriousness on his part or a complete lack of understanding
of the structure we were attempting td avail ourselves of in order to effectuate this
purchase [of Reed's shares]. It appears that Mr. Reed Taylor was attempting to sabotage,
for whatever reason, the entire purchase agreement. ...
.. .I was, and continue to be, a sincere purchaser of Reed Taylor's stock and the
restructuring of AJA ...

•• Jam alse sendiQ;;Jlick Riley a co,iy Lot thiS: leijer] ,89; that he mi$Ut:@PPOOpriately
res,gond to the letter of in!!!U draf!sd by $@tt}T. Bell, whieh; m)f opipiom· is anotJutr
iildicaUQJl 9{Reed T1y1or•s !Mk of seriousness concerning the sale ofhis $t0cl<. ...

m

...If you both [Ra yd John TaylO!] yrish tcJ l?UJIU~trus .matter [the purcnue.afReed's
stock]. please advise me as soon as possible... ·
·
See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. A, pp. 1-5 (emphasis added).

Mr.

Campanaro' s letter clearly demonstrates that Mr. Campanaro, on behalf of himself and the other
members of the Investor Group (Michael Cashman and James Beck) were pressuring Reed
Taylor to sell his shares. Id
On June 30, 1995, James Beck, Michael Cashman, Richard Campanaro and R. John
Taylor entered into an Investment Agreement. See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008,
Ex. E. Under the terms of the Investment Agreement, R. John Taylor, James Beck and Michael
Cashman specifically agreed that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares was a condition
precedent to them purchasing the Series C Preferred Shares in AJA Services:
9. Conditions To Investors Obligations at the Closing. The obligations of [Beck,
Cashman and Campanaro] are subject to the fulfillment, prior to or on the Closing Date,
as indicated below, of each of the following conditions ...

***

(d) Reed Taylor Buyout. The Company shall successfully negotiate and conclude
its transaction with Reed Taylor for the purchase of all of his stock and stock
rights in and to Company stock, in form and substance satisfactory to [Beck,
Cashman and Campanaro].
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millions of dollars of funds and assets.

JoLee Duclos, the trustee of the Plan, is looking after

herself and the interests of the other defendants and her actions should not be rewarded.
The Plan's trustee is not neutral and has substantial conflicts of interest. As discussed
above, such conflicts require a neutral trustee to be appointed. As such, the Plan should be
forced to pursue litigation against the responsible parties and not delay this action by forcing the
court to deal with conflicts of interest and proceedings to remove the Plan's trustee, which will
be forthcoming should the Plan's intervention be granted. Moreover, a federal court action is the
proper venue so that all claims, both federal and state can be resolved. 8
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated above, the Plan's Motion to Intervene should be denied and
Reed Taylor should be awarded fees and costs.
DATED: This 5th day of February, 2009.
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC

.Jffl.

/JJiJk

Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Michael S. Bissell
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

8

The undersigned is confident that a federal court action against the true wrongdoers would never occur while the
Plan is under control of the present management and trustee. Regardless, federal court has exclusive jurisdiction
over ERISA actions pertaining to breaches of fiduciary duties, which such valid claims should be brought against
John Taylor and JoLee Duclos, the same people who disregarded the 401(k) Plan's interests when they engineered
the unlawful purchase of Preferred C Shares from CropUSA without purchasing a single share from the Plan and
without first redeeming the Series A Preferred Shares held by Donna Taylor (which have priority over the Preferred
C Shares).
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reasons. See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. H.

There Were Other Efforts To Buy Reed Taylor's Shares Prior to the 1995 Redemption
It is clear from the board meetings, board meeting minutes, notices to shareholders and
shareholder votes that John Taylor, James Beck, Mike Cashman and Richard Campanaro wanted
operational control over AIA Services in an attempt to take it public and profit handsomely
without having to personally be obligated to pay Reed Taylor. See Affidavit of Roderick Bond
dated February 12, 2009, Ex. 1-19; Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. A-F.

AIA's Board Set Up A Special Committee to Negotiate the Redemption of Reed's Shares
A special committee of the board of AIA Services was established to negotiate with Reed
Taylor for the redemption of his shares. See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. A,
p. 4; see also Affidavit of Roderick Bond dated February 12, 2009, Ex. 1-19. In other words,
Reed Taylor had no involvement at the corporation with the redemption of his shares and outside
directors also played a role. See Affidavit of Roderick Bond dated February 12, 2009, Ex. 1-19.

Reed Had To Be Persuaded to Sell His Shares
Richard Campanaro, James Beck and Michael Cashman were an investor group who
desired to redeem Reed Taylor's shares in AJA Services, along with R. John Taylor.

See

Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. A. In the letter from Richard Campanaro to
Reed Taylor and John Taylor dated April 14, 1995, Mr. Campanaro stated the following when
negotiations were faltering to repurchase Reed Taylor's shares:
[F]ollowing the Board of Director's and Stockholder's meetings held in Boise, Idaho in
early March, Mr. Michael Cashman, myself, Mr. Jim Beck ... expected a response from
Mr. Reed Taylor detailing the sale of his stock in AIA ... that, in fact, [Reed Taylor] had
retained the services of an attorney for the purpose of attempting to finalize the details of
our sale and purchase agreement ...
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... Mr. Reed Taylor has refused to negotiate an agreement [for the purchase of his
shares] .... Mr. Reed Taylor addressed issues with his attorney, Scott Bell, that, as the
Chainnan of the Board of Directors, he should have known were heretofore resolved.
This indicates to me a lack of seriousness on his part or a complete lack of understanding
of the structure we were attempting to avail ourselves of in order to effectuate this
purchase [of Reed's shares]. It appears that Mr. Reed Taylor was attempting to sabotage,
for whatever reason, the entire pmchasc agreement ....

. . .I was, and continue to be, a sincere purchaser of Reed Taylor's stock and the
restructuring of AIA ...
.. .I am also sending Dick Riley a copy [of this letter] so that he might appropriately
respond to the: letter of intent drafted by Scott T. Bell, which, in my opinion. is another
indication of Reed Taylor~s lack ofseriousness concerning the sal~ of his stock....

. ..If you both [Reed and John Taylor] Wish to 12ursue this matter (the purchase of Reed's
stock], please advise me as soon as possible ...
See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. A, pp. 1-5 (emphasis added).

Mr.

Campanaro's letter clearly demonstrates that Mr. Campanaro, on behalf of himself and the other
members of the Investor Group (Michael Cashman and James Beck) were pressuring Reed
Taylor to sell his shares. Id.

The Becks Would Not Invest In AIA Unless Reed Taylor's Shares Were Redeemed.
On June 30, 1995, James Beck, Michael Cashman, Richard Campanaro and R. John
Taylor entered into an Investment Agreement. See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008,
Ex. E. Under the terms of the Investment Agreement, R. John Taylor, James Beck and Michael
Cashman specifically agreed that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares was a condition
precedent to them purchasing the Series C Preferred Shares in AIA Services:
9. Conditions To Investors Obligations at the Closing. The obligations of [Beck,
Cashman and Campanaro j arc subject to the fulfillment, prior to or on the Closing Date,
as indicated below, of each of the following conditions ...

***
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VII.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons articulated above, the Court should grant Reed Taylor's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and dismiss the Defendants' counterclaims and defenses based upon
violations ofl.C. § 30-1-6 and I.C. § 30-1-46, along with any claims or defenses based upon the
alleged "illegality" of the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. 21
For the same reason stated above, the Court should also enter an order denying Connie
Taylor and James Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the Joinders to the Motion
as the issues raised are moot.
Reed Taylor should be awarded his attorneys' fees and costs incurred in dismissing the
individual Defendants counterclaims and defenses pursuant to l.C. § 30-1-746(3).
DATED: This 121h day of February 2009.
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC

· oderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Michael S. Bissell
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

21

For any one or more of the reasons articulated above, there are no innoctint shareholders who may attack the
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. The above arguments also apply to the 40l(k) Plan's Counterclaim against
Reed Taylor (the Plan's proposed affirmative defenses are irrelevant because Reed Taylor has no claims against the
Plan).
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0. .John Tavlor, James Beck, Michael Cashman and Richard Campanaro Execute A
Shareholder Voting Agreement.
As part of their Investor Agreement, John Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman and
Richard Campanaro agreed to enter into a Shareholder Voting Agreement wherein they agreed to
ensure certain people for appointed to the board of AIA Services. 69 The obvious purpose of the
Shareholder Voting Agreement is to ensure that John Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman and
Richard Campanaro are directors of AIA Services to enable them to retain "operational and
financial control of AIA."70

Reed Taylor was not a party to the Shareholder Voting

Agreement. 71

P.

Eberle Berlin ~md Richard Rilev's Opinion Letter Re1>rcscnted to Recd Taylor that
the Redemption Was Legal.
Under the tenns of the Stock Redemption Agreement, AIA Services was required to

deliver an opinion letter to Reed Taylor from AIA Services' counsel. 72
On August 15, 1995, an opinion letter was issued to Reed Taylor verifying many
requirements had been met by AIA Services, including, without limitation, that the purchase of
Reed Taylor's shares was a legal transaction and that necessary shareholder approvals were
obtained. 73 The opinion letter was based upon the knowledge of R.M. Turnbow and Richard
Riley. 74 The opinion letter makes no reference to any violations of LC. § 30-1-46 or LC. § 30-16 or possible violations of the foregoing Idaho Code Sections or any other Code Scctions. 75

69

See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. F, p. 10, § f.

70

ld.; Affidavit of Michael Bissell dated February 26, 2009, Ex. 38, pp. 2-3; Affidavit of Roderick Bond dated
September 3, 2008, Ex. 45, p. 1,, 3.
71
72

id

See Hearing, Ex. Z, p. 4, § 2.5(j).
73
See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. I, pp. 1-5.
74
/d. at p. 2, , 2.
75
See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. I.
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However, Richard Riley's opinion letter expressly represented, among other things, the
following:
(1) Richard Riley represented AIA Services in the negotiations and acted as general

counsel for AIA Services; 76
(2) "[A]ll corporate action on the part of [AIA Services] and its Subsidiaries, and their
respective directors and shareholders, necessary for the authorization, execution, delivery and
performance by [AJA Services] ... and the consummation of the transactions contemplated
thereby has been taken; and the [redemption documents] have been duly executed and delivered
by [AIA Services] and its Subsidiaries;" 77
(3) The redemption of Reed Taylor's shares does not "violate any law, rule, license,
regulation ... " 78
(4) "No consent, authorization, approval or exemption by, or filing with, any Person .. .is
required in connection with the execution, delivery and performance by [AIA Services] and its
Subsidiaries of the Transaction Documents ... except such as have been obtained prior to
Closing;"79 and
(5) "This opinion is rendered only with respect to the laws and the rules, regulations and
orders ... ofthe State of Idaho that are in effect as of the date hereof." 80
It is noteworthy that prior to, during, and after the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares,

Richard Riley regularly attended many board of directors meetings for AIA Services. 81 Mr.

76

See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. I, p. 1.
Id., at p. 2, ~ 2.
78
id., at p. 3, ~ 3.
79
id., at p. 3, ~ 4.
80
Id., at Ex. 1, p. 4.
77
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authority to redeem Reed Taylor's shares, among other representations. 270
(14)

On July 1, 1996, Richard Riley advised Reed Taylor's attorney that the value of

the collateral pledged to Reed Taylor exceeded AIA Services' obligations by over $2.5 Million
as of December 31, 1995, as evidenced by appraisals that have never been produced to Reed
Taylor. 271
VI.

RESPONSE TO THE DEFENDANTS' ALLEGED "FACTS"

Connie Taylor and James Beck assert pages upon pages of alleged "facts" which are not
supported by any evidence, let alone credible evidence. Reed Taylor objects to all alleged
"facts" asserted by the Defendants and/or the Plan that are not supported by admissible evidence,
which are to numerous to object to individually. As with other motions, the Defendants and
Plan's motions are littered with conclusory and unsupported factual allegations and inferences.
VII.
A.

LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

Summary Judgment Standard
1. The Summary Judgment Standard For the Moving Party

Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c).
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact is on the
moving party. Hayward v. Jack's Pharmacy, Inc., 141 Idaho 622, 625, 115 P.3d 713 (2005).
The court must liberally construe all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party, and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record will be drawn in favor of the nonmoving
270
271

See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. I.
See Affidavit of Roderick Bond dated February 12, 2009, Ex. 30, p. 3.
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3. The Defendants Argued That AIA Services Was Not Insolvent in 1995
When They Asked Reed Taylor to Restructure the Deal in 1996.
As the Court is well aware and as argued by the Defendants, AIA Services defaulted on
its obligations to Reed Taylor in 1995 and 1996. In 1995 and 1996, Richard Riley was AIA
Services' counsel who negotiated the redemption agreements, drafted the redemption
agreements, issued of an opinion letter to Reed Taylor, and negotiated the restructure of the
redemption agreements.

Mr. Riley, obviously quite persuasively, argued that appraisals

conducted by AIA Services confirmed that the value of AIA Services' exceeded all of its debts
(including the over $7 Million owed to Reed Taylor) by over $2.5 million on December 31,
1995. 275 It is noteworthy that neither AIA Services nor its counsel has provided this appraisal to
Reed Taylor for obvious reasons. In addition, Mr. Riley also provided Reed Taylor an opinion
letter stating that the transaction was legal and AIA Services had the authority and power to enter
into the redemption agreements. 27 b
Nevertheless, the valuation of AIA Services alleged by it in 1996 and Mr. Riley's opinion
letter dated August 15, 1995, create issues of fact that denying the partial summary judgment
requested by the Defendants and the Plan. 277

4. AIA Services Has Been In Business for Over 13 Years Since the
Redemption of Reed Taylor's Shares
Here, the fact that AIA Services has been in business for over 13 years since Reed
Taylor's shares were redeemed proves it was far from insolvent, for purposes of determining

m See Affidavit of Roderick Bond dated February 12, 2009, Ex. 30, p. 3.
276

See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. I.
Mr. Riley's individual knowledge was expressly included in the opinion letter, even though the opinion letter was
issued by Eberle Berlin. Id. It is also noteworthy that Mr. Riley is also a factual witness and his knowledge is
imputed on all of the attorneys at Hawley Troxell and his opinions and factual statements are counter to the very
arguments being asserted by Hawley Troxell on behalf of the Defendants.
277
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Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2007) (holding that misrepresentations
and discrepancies in corporate financial statements precluded summary judgment in buyer's
action for fraud).
Idaho Courts have long recognized "constructive fraud" as an alternative cause of action
to common law "fraud" and that "constructive fraud" does not require a plaintiff to plead the
nine elements of common law "fraud." See e.g., McGhee v. McGhee, 82 Idaho 367, 371, 353
P.2d 760 (1960) (Recognizing constructive fraud as an alternative cause of action to fraud and
that the requirement of pleading and proving all nine elements of fraud "is not the case");
Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 61, 415 P.2d 698 (1966)(a promise to build a house to certain

standards constitutes "constructive fraud" when the builder failed to do so).
AIA Services and John Taylor made representations in all of the redemption agreements
that the actions were authorized, legal and that all approvals had been obtained. See Hearing, Ex.
B-F, Z, AA-AD.

AIA Services, by and through John Taylor, also made numerous

representations through an indemnification and release agreement dated August 16, 1995. See
Hearing, Ex. AC. Finally, AIA Services, by and through its attorney Richard Riley and Eberle
Berlin, made representations to Recd Taylor through an opinion letter dated August 15, 1995.
See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. I.

All of the representations contained in

the foregoing documents were relied upon by Reed Taylor. Recd Taylor had a right to rely upon
these representations and did in fact justifiably rely upon such representations. To the extent that
Defendants and the Plan are successful with their arguments, the representations made to Reed
Taylor were false and Reed Taylor has been damaged.
Ill
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Reed Taylor should be awarded his attorneys' fees and costs incurred in dismissing the
individual Defondants counterclaims and defonses pursuant to LC. § 30-1-746(3).
DATED: This 26ur day of February 2009.
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY ) ,LC

ed A. Cannon
Michael S. Bissell
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
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RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, WA 9920 I
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

v.
AJA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an Idaho
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE
TAYLOR, individually and the community
property comprised thereof; BRYAN
FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS,
a single person; CROP USA INSURANCE
AGENCY, INC., an Idaho Corporation; and
JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK,
individually and the community property
comprised thereof;

Case No.: CV-07-00208
PLAINTIFF REED TAYLOR'S
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN
OPPOSITION TO CONNIE TAYLOR
AND JAMES BECK'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST BRYAN FREEMAN, JOLEE
DUCLOS, R. JOHN TAYLOR, AIA
SERVICES, AJA INSURANCE, AND AIA
SERVICES 401(k) PLAN'S JOINDERS
AND IN SUPPORT OF GRANTING
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
FAVOR OF REED TAYLOR

Defendants.
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EXHIBIT J

3. The Defendants Represented that AIA Services Was Not Insolvent In
1995 By the Terms of the Redemption Agreements and Are Judicially
Estopped From Now Asserting Otherwise.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes parties from taking inconsistent positions,
whether legal or factual, absent newly discovered evidence or fraud. McKay v. Owens, 130
Idaho 148, 155, 937 P.2d 1222 (1997). The policies underlying judicial estoppel
are general considerations of the orderly administration of justice and regard for
the dignity of judicial proceedings ... Judicial estoppel is intended to protect
against a litigant playing fast and loose with the courts ... Because it is intended to
protect the dignity of the judicial process, it is an equitable doctrine invoked by a
court at its discretion.
Id., 130 Idaho at 152, quoting Rissetto v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 601

(9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
Here, the Defendants have all asserted in pleadings that AIA Services was not insolvent.
The Defendants are judicially estopped from asserting insolvency.
As the Court is well aware and as argued by the Defendants, AIA Services defaulted on
its obligations to Reed Taylor in 1995 and 1996. In 1995 and 1996, Richard Riley was AIA
Services' counsel who negotiated the redemption agreements, drafted the redemption
agreements, issued of an opinion letter to Reed Taylor, and negotiated the restructure of the
redemption agreements.

Mr. Riley, obviously quite persuasively, argued that appraisals

conducted by AIA Services confirmed that the value of AIA Services' exceeded all of its debts
(including the over $7 Million owed to Reed Taylor) by over $2.5 million on December 31,
199 5 .15 It is noteworthy that neither AIA Services nor its counsel has provided this appraisal to

15

See Affidavit of Roderick Bond dated February 12, 2009, Ex. 30, p. 3.
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based upon the alleged "illegality" of the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. 87
For the same reason stated above, the Court should also enter identical orders denying the
Defendants' Joinders to Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
and granting partial summary judgment in favor of Reed Taylor.
Reed Taylor should be awarded his attorneys' fees and costs incurred in dismissing the
individual Defendants counterclaims and defenses (and the Plan's) pursuant to LC. § 30-1746(3).
DATED: This 9th day of April, 2009.
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC

By:_ _ _.,_
Roderick C. Bond i
Michael S. Bissell
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

87

For any one or more of the reasons articulated above, partial summary judgment would be appropriately granted
in favor of Reed Taylor against any party that is not presently involved in this action because there are no
shareholders and no creditors who may attack the redemption of his shares, even if statutory requirements were not
met.
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RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
508 Eighth Street
Le\¥iston,Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, VIA. 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

IN 1HE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIA.L DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TA.YLOR, a single person,
Case No.: CV-07-00208
Plaintiff,

v.
A.IA. SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; A.IA. INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TA.YLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA.
INSURANCE A.GENCY, INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and JAMES BECK. and
CORRINE BECK, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;

AFFIDA.VIT OF SCOTT T. BELL (1) IN
SUPPORT OF REED TA.YLOR'S MOTIONS
FOR RULE 56(f) CONflNUANCE; (2) IN
SUPPORT OF REED TA.YLOR'S PENDING
MOTIONS TO COMPEL DEPOSITIONS
AND DISCOVERY; (3) IN OPPOSITION TO
CONNIE TA.YLOR AND JA.MES BECK'S
MOTIONFORPA.RTIA.LSUMMARY
JUDGMENT A.ND JOINDERS BY THE
401(k) PLAN AND OTHER DEFENDANTS;
AND (4) IN SUPPORT OF REED
TA.YLOR'S MOTIONS FOR PA.RTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.
STA.TE OF VIA.SIDNGTON
COUNTY OF KING

)
) ss:
)
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•

•

seemed that Reed Taylor held inferior .knowledge to R. John Taylor regarding the
financial affairs of AIA Service Corporation and its subsidiaries.

5.

Because of Reed Taylor's membership on the board of directors of AIA

Services Corporation, he and my firm supported the establishment of an independent
committee of the board of directors to negotiate and approve the terms of the redemption
of Reed Taylor's shares. , Reed Taylor was not a member of this committee. Richard

Riley of Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered ("Eberle, Berlin")
8erved as counsel to this committee and AIA Services Corporation in connection with the
redemption.
6.

R. John Taylor and the other investors suggested the redemption of Reed

Taylor's shares as a means to achieve their objectives. Although Reed Taylor was
initially resistant to a redemption of bis shares, he ultimately became willing to do so. At
no point did he force AIA Services Corporation, through bis majority vote or otherwise,
to effectuate a preferential redemption of his shares over other shareholders. In addition,
as noted above, AIA Services Corporation established a special committee of its board of

directors to negotiate and approve the redemption tenns to prevent any potential conflicts
of interest.
7.

The negotiation of the tenns of the redemption and the redemption

agreements primarily involved Richard Riley and my firm. I believe that the other
investors had a Minnesota law finn involved in the transaction.

AIA Services

Corporation's general counsel, Daniel Spickler, was also involved in the transaction and
my firm corresponded directly with him on certain matters.

AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTI T. BELL - 3
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·8.

During the course of my firm's representation of Reed Taylor, my fm:n

detennined that, as a condition to the redemption, AIA Services Corporation•s outside
counsel should deliver to Reed Taylor a written legal opinion regarding certain legal
matters surrounding the redemption. Reed Taylor agreed with this assessment. Eberle,
Berlin was in a position to analyx.e whether, with. respect to AIA Services Corporation,
the transactions were authorized, complied with applicable

I~

laws, triggered

complications with third parties, etc. Without access to the confidential books, records
and proceedings of AIA Services Corporation, and not being a licensed Idaho lawyer, my
firm was not in a position to make these detenninations. Moreover, in my experience, it
is customary for the party seeking to redeem shares and its counsel to carry out the "due
diligence" associated with detennining the legal viability of the redemption. Richard
Riley was extremely well-versed in the legal, :financial and operational affairs of AIA
Services Corporation as a result of his long-standing relationship with the company.
With the advice from my firm, Reed Taylor determined that he should receive a legal

opinion from Eberle, Berlin, who had superior knowledge of AIA Services Corporation's
legal affairs, to confinn AIA Services Corporation's legal ability to honor its obligations
under the redemption. In my experience, a written legal opinion in these circumstances is
appropriate and normal. Mr. Riley and Eberle, Berlin agreed to provide the opinion. Mr.
Riley and I negotiated the content of the opinion.
9.

As discussed above, upon the advice of my flrm, Reed Taylor sought to

obtain and did obtain an opinion letter from Eberle, Berlin for the purpose of confirming
the legality of the transaction, that the corporation had the legal power and authority to
enter into the transaction (among other things), that the redemption agreements were

AFFIDAVIT OF SCOIT T. BELL - 4
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Reed Taylor's shares, I have no reason to believe that Richard Riley involved himself in
an illegal transaction or a transaction that violated an Idaho statute, particularly when his
own fum's opinion letter expressly stated that no laws were violated as a result of the
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. I have no reason to believe that Mr. Riley did not
consider all necessary facts and laws prior to authoring and issuing the opinion letter.
Mr. Riley impressed me as a very competent and honorable attorney.

th .

DATIID:

This}Z_dayor~,2009~

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this Jl..~ of May, 2009.

ChM.lt§fti;~. J.·lrenk=

Notary Public for W~n
Residing at: 6
My commission expires: 7-23-1(

e&Jtfe
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RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, VIA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Case No.: CV-07-00208
Plaintiff,

v.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and
CORRINE BECK, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;

AFFIDAVIT OF REED J. TAYLOR IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF REED J.
TAYLOR'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

Defendants.

STA TE OF IDAHO

)
) ss:
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE )
I, Reed J. Taylor, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in court, the

plaintiff in the above-entitled action, and make this Affidavit based upon my personal
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..

information on Daniel Spickler which I obtained from the Idaho State Bar website, which
shows Mr. Spickler has been licensed to practice law in Idaho since 1982. At no time did
Mr. Spickler or anyone else advise me that the redemption of my shares violated any laws
or statutes. Despite my requests and motions to compel, we have never been provided
the opportunity to depose Mr. Spickler to ascertain any facts surrounding the redemption
of my shares, shareholder meetings and board meetings. Attached as Exhibit B is a true
and correct copy of the attorney information on Mickey Turnbow which I obtained from
the Idaho State Bar website. Mr. Turnbow was one of the attorneys that represented AlA
Services in the redemption of my shares and issued the opinion letter to me. Richard
Riley was the primary attorney for the negotiation and finalizing of the redemption
agreements for the redemption of my shares. Attached as Exhibit C is a true and correct
copy of Richard Riley's print out that I obtained from the Idaho State Bar website. As
indicated in the attached Exhibit C, Mr. Riley is now practicing law with Hawley,
Troxell, et al., one of the firms asserting the illegality argument.
9.

The negotiations for the redemption of my shares commenced months

before the signing of the Stock Redemption Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement,
Security Agreement and ancillary agreements were executed on and after July 22, 1995
("agreements"). Upon advise of my counsel Scott Bell, I conditioned the sale of my
shares on AIA Services obtaining all necessary approvals and consents from all
shareholders, that the agreements did not violate any laws, and that AIA Services' outside
counsel, Richard Riley and Mickey Turnbow of Eberle, Berlin, et al., would provide me
with legal opinions and representations that the agreements were enforceable, approved
by shareholders and did not violate any laws.

Richard Riley and other attorneys at

AFFIDAVIT OF REED J. TAYLOR - 5
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..
Eberle, Berlin, et al., had represented AJA Services and its subsidiaries for years prior to
the redemption of my shares and were intimately familiar with their operations and their
legal affairs.
I 0.

Through the Stock Redemption Agreement (signed by R. John Taylor),

agreements (signed by R. John Taylo1), the certificate signed by R. John Taylor on
August 16, 1995 (which was a document required prior to closing the redemption of my
shares, the contents of which were provided to us prior to closing), and Richard Riley,
Mickey Turnbow, and Eberle, Berlin, et al. 's representations contained in their Opinion
Letter dated August 15, 1995 1 (which was a document required prior to closing the
redemption of my shares the contents of which were provided to my attorney prior to
closing), (1) AIA Services, its attorneys, and R. John Taylor represented to me
(including, without limitation) that AIA Services had the power and authority to enter
into the Redemption Agreements and agreements, that all necessary shareholder
approvals and consents were obtained, that the agreements were enforceable, and that the
agreements would not violate any laws; (2) these representations were false as set forth in
the Court's Opinion and Order dated June 17, 2009; (3) these representations were
material and were used to induce me to sell my shares in AIA Services through the Stock
Redemption Agreements and agreements, but for these representations I would have
never permitted my shares to be redeemed in AIA Services; (4) I was ignorant as to the
falsity of these representations and had no reason to doubt in the slightest that the
Redemption Agreements and agreements violated Idaho law or I.C. § 301-6, particularly
when R. John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Daniel Spickler, Richard Riley and Mickey
1

The opinion letter as it applies to this case only relates to Richard Riley, Mickey Turnbow and Eberle,
Berlin, ct al. 's representations as agents for AIA Services, and not their acts and/or omissions pertaining to
my claims against them.
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l l.

I would never have agreed to sell my shares had anyone advised me that it

would was illegal or the agreements would be illegal contracts.

As I have testified

before, I had to be persuaded to sell my shares in AIA Services. The defendants argue
now that [ "pillaged the village" yet they are the ones who have unlawfully transferred
millions of dollars from AIA Services and its subsidiaries to themselves, CropUSA and
other corporations, and have made the illegality argument to avoid liability for their acts
and not pay me the money that I am owed.

12.

I had no knowledge of share redemption laws or statutes in Idaho and I

had no knowledge of the existence or meaning of J.C.§ 30-1-6 until the issue was raised
in this action. Until this action, no one has ever explained or mentioned to me that J.C. §

30-1-6 existed or needed to be complied with in any way, let alone how to comply with
it. I would have never agreed to have my shares redeemed in AIA Services but for the
overwhelming majority of the other shareholders voting and desiring to have my shares
redeemed. For the defendants to make the inference that I somehow pulled the wool over
the eyes of five attorneys licensed to practice law in Idaho and shareholders who voted
and approved of the redemption of my shares is a not only incorrect, but also not
supported by any evidence.

I never forced anyone to redeem my shares through a

majority vote of my shares or otherwise.
DATED: This 21st day of July, 2009.
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..
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN

to

before me this 21st day of July, 2009.
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RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, WA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-711 l
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintift~

v.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AJA INSURANCE, INC., an Idaho
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONN IE
TAYLOR, individually and the community
property comprised thereof; BRYAN
FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS,
a single person; CROP USA INSURANCE
AGENCY, INC., an Idaho Corporation; and
JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK,
individually and the community property
comprised thereof;

Case No.: CV-07-00208

PLAINTIFF REED TAYLOR'S REPLY
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

Defendants.
Plaintiff Reed Taylor submits this Reply in support of his Motions scheduled for hearing
on July 23, 2009:
Ill
Ill
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19-20.)

Previously, the Defendants had never addressed the fraud exception argument until

Recd Taylor re-asserted it in his Motion for Reconsideration.

Now, the Defendants ATA

Services and AIA Insurance assert that Reed Taylor must prove all elements of fraud and
constructive fraud to demonstrate an issue of facts exists as to the defense.
Once Reed Taylor raised the fraud defense, the burden is on the Defendants and Plan to
prove that no genuine issue of facts exists to the fraud defense and that Recd Taylor cannot
prevail on the defense as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56. None of the Defendants or the Plan has
presented any evidence to rebut Reed Taylor's assertion of the fraud exception to enforce the
redemption agreement.

Nevertheless, to demonstrate that Reed Taylor is entitled to partial

summary judgment on the defense (as asserted in his Memorandum in Opposition to Partial
Summary Judgment), Reed Taylor testified as to all nine elements of fraud and the Defendants
are unable to rebut this testimony. (Reed Taylor Aff., pp. 6-7, ~ 10.)
Although previously asserted, the Defendants do not deny that R. John Taylor (as signer
of the redemption agreements and the person who certified that the shareholders had ratified the
agreements), AJA Services (by and through the redemption agreements) and Eberle, Berlin, et
al. 's opinion letter (as agent for AIA Services) all represented to Reed Taylor that shareholder
approval and consent were obtained, that the redemption agreements were enforceable, and the
redemption agreements would not violate any laws. (Hearing, Ex. Zand AC; Bell Aff., Ex. A.)
Now, the defendants have elected to rescind these representations to argue otherwise, but, once
given, representations may not be unilateral rescinded.

There is no dispute that material

misrepresentations were made to Reed Taylor by the Defendants.
Ill
Ill
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"

of delay, waste of time, or needless ... cumulative evidence." I.R.E. 403. Hearsay is not
admissible evidence. I.R.E. 802.

"[A ]ny redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous

matter" may be stricken by the court. I.R.C.P. l2(f).
Reed Taylor previously objected to Exhibit 1 to Connie Taylor and James Beck's
Response dated July 16, 2009, when it was submitted attached to the Affidavit of Aimee as
Exhibit W (See Connie Taylor and James Beck's Response, p. 7 and Ex 1.). However, Exhibit 1,
as docs Exhibit W to the Gordon Affidavit is inadmissible. The Defendants' use of the dollar
amounts on Exhibit l are irrelevant since the amount of funds paid to Reed Taylor has no
bearing on any of the arguments. The dollar amounts include payments for the use of Reed
Taylor's airplane (Reed Taylor Aff., pp. 3-4,

~I,

5-6.) The exhibit contains hearsay. The dollar

amounts also include debts assumed by Reed Taylor as admitted by the Defendants. Finally,
Exhibit 1 confuses the issues and unfairly prejudices Recd Taylor by misrepresenting the true
amounts that he received.
lJI.CONCLUSION

The Court should grant Reed Taylor's Motion for Reconsideration, vacate its order
granting partial summary judgment to Connie Taylor and James Beck and enter an order granting
partial summary judgment to Recd Taylor holding that the redemption agreements are valid and
enforceable.
DA TED: This 21st day of July, 2009.
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & K U3Y, PLLC

By: _ _ __..__-'-_________
Roderick C. Bond
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing and the Affidavit of Reed Taylor (w/ Exhibits A-C) on the following
parties via the mcthod(s) indicated below:
David /\.. Gittins
Law Office of David/\.. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Attorney for Defendants JoLee Duclos and
Bryan Freeman

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for R. John Taylor

David R. Risley
Randall, Blake & Cox
1106 Idaho St.
Lewiston, lD 83501
Attorney for Connie Taylor, James Beck and
Corrine Beck

Gary D. Babbitt
D. John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite I 000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
Attorneys for AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and
Crop USA Insurance Agency

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)
Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) I land Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)
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James J. Gatziolis
Charles E. Harper
Quarles & Brady LLP
Citigroup Center, 500 West Madison Street
Suite 3700
Chicago, IL 60661-2511
Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance Agency

Charles A. Brown
Attorney at Law
324 Main Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneys for AIA Services 401 (k) Plan

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered - Via Messenger
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Signed this 21 51 day of July, 2009, at Lewiston, Idaho.

Roderick C. I3ond

.'
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HAWLEYTRoXELL

877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
(208) 344-6000 Fax (208) 342-3829

ENNIS &HAWLEY,.,
Al1UH.Ntn Al LAW

www.hteh.com
STEPHEN C. HARDESTY
ADMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW IN IDAHO AND CALIFORNIA
EMAIL: SCH@HTEH.COM
OIRECTOIAt: (208) 388-4822

August 9, 2006

VIA FACSIMILE
VIA E-MAIL
Mr. Reed John Taylor
President
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.
One Lewis Clark Plaza
111 Main Street
P. 0. Box 538
Lewiston, ID 83501-0538
Re:

Potential Conflict of Interest

Dear Mr. Taylor:
The purpose of this letter is to bring to your attention and resolve a potential conflict of
interest.
This firm has a relationship with PNC Aviation Finance and its parent company PNC
Equipment Finance, LLC ("PNC Aviation Finance"). PNC Aviation Finance regularly requests
that this firm provide a legal review of PNC's aircraft loans prior to closing. In this regard, PNC
Aviation Finance.has recently requested that this firm provide a legal review of the loan file for
your proposed refinance Joan on the Cessna 441 Conquest II, N2722Y (the "Aircraft").
Upon receipt of the loan file from PNC Aviation Finance, our firm conducted an internal
search to determine if anyone has represented the you. That search disclosed that my partner,
Dick Riley, has represented AIA Insurance, Inc. and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., two
entities of which I understand you are a principal and officer. This creates a potential conflict of
interest.
The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct provide certain guidelines for attorneys in
Idaho. In particular, the Rules address "conflicts of interest." Rule I. 7 provides a lawyer shall
not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client,
unless: (l) the lawyer reasonably believes the lawyer will be able to provide competent and

42348.0001 887381 1
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Mr. Reed John Taylor
August 9, 2006
Page 2

diligent representation of both clients and (2) each affected client gives consent, in writing, after
consultation.
The purpose of this letter is to disclose this potential conflict of interest and request your
waiver to the conflict of interest. We do anticipate that our finn's review of your proposed loan
with PNC Aviation Finance will adversely affect either you, or your related entities, or PNC
Aviation Finance. For that reason, in accordance with Rule 1.7, we reasonably believe the
continued representation of both parties to this Aircraft loan will not adversely be affected, and
we request that you waive the conflict of interest.
Please let me know if you have any further questions or comments. We appreciate your
attention to the matter and your consideration of this conflict of interest.
Sincerely,
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

Stephen C. Hardesty
SCH/jko

CONSENT:
The undersigned consents to the representation of PNC Aviation Finance by
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP in connection with Reed J. Taylor's loan on the
Aircraft.

AIA INSURANCE, INC.
By:

AJA Insurance, Inc.
Date:

------

By:

42346.0001.887361'1
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..
From:

To:
Date:
Subject:

RAR • Richard Riiey x-4842
dwhisner@aiainsurance.com
81912006 2:09:36 PM
Confirming waiver of any conflict of Interest

'

Reed: This email confirms today's telephone call in whici\ you agreed that you have no concern with
Hawley Troxell's representation of Aviation Finance Group in connection with review of loan
documentation for the refinance of the loan
your aircraft, notwithstanding my prior and ongoing
representation of AIA in various matters and my representation, while employed at Eberle Berlin, of you
personally with respect to certain matters, none of which involve any airplane financing transactions.
Dick

on

Richard A. Riley
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
(208) 388-4842 (Direct Dial)
(208) 342-3829 (Fax)
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE
This electronic message transmission contains information which may be confidential or privileged. The
information is intended solely for the use of the individual or entity named above. If you are not the
Intended recipient, please be aware that any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of this
message Is prohibited. If you receive this electronic transmission in error, please notify the sender and
delete the copy you received.

CC:

JOLS • John Olson • x4878; SCH • Steve Hardesty x-4822
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James D. LaRue ISB #1780
Loren C. Ipsen ISB #1767
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844

.J.-/
±
:$2
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FEB 1 7 2010
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By J. RANDALL
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendants, Richard A. Riley
and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,
v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HA WLE
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; ROBERT M.
TURNBOW, an individual; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKL VEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

Case No. CV-OC-0918868
DEFENDANTS RICHARD A. RILEY'S
AND HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS &
HAWLEY LLP'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.
Defendants Richard A. Riley ("Riley") and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawley
Troxell"), by and through their counsel of record, Elam & Burke, P.A., file this brief in opposition
to plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment.

DEFENDANTS RICHARD A RILEY'S AND HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP'S
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GOVERNING STANDARDS
The basic standards governing motions for summary judgment are well-established.
Summary judgment should be granted if"the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c) "The burden at all times
is upon the moving party to prove the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Mackay v. Four
Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408, 410, 179 P .3d 1064 (2008) (citation omitted). "[A]11 doubts are

to be resolved against the moving party, and the motion must be denied ifthe evidence is such that
one may draw conflicting inferences therefrom, and if reasonable people might reach different
conclusions." Id. at 410-411 (citation omitted).
The standard applied when ruling on a motion for summary judgment is not lessened simply
because both parties have moved for summary judgment. Kromrei v. AID Ins. Co., 110 Idaho 549,
551, 716 P.2d 1321, 1323 (1986), Farmers Ins. ofIdaho v. Brown, 97 Idaho 380, 381-82, 544 P.2d
1150, 1151-52 (1976). The fact that both parties have filed summary judgment motions alone does
not in itself establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie,
103 Idaho 515, 518, 650 P.2d 657, 661, n. 1 (1982). This is so because by filing a motion for
summary judgment a party concedes that no genuine issue of material fact exists under the theory
that he is advancing, but does not thereby concede that no issues remain in the event that his
adversary seeks summary judgment upon different issues or theories. Id.

In order to determine

whether either party is entitled to summary judgment, the Court must examine each motion
separately, reviewing the record and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it in favor of

DEFENDANTS RICHARD A. RILEY'S AND HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP'S
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each party's opposition to his adversary's motion for summary judgment. City ofChubbuck v. City

ofPocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 200-01, 899 P.2d 411, 413-14 (1995).

ANALYSIS

I.
THIS COURT SHOULD FIRST DETERMINE WHETHER PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE
BARRED BEFORE DECIDING PLAINTIFF'S SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENTS
As noted in Mr. Riley's and Hawley Troxell's Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Taylor's
claims in this action are barred by res judicata (claim preclusion), collateral estoppel (issue
preclusion) and/or the applicable statutes of limitation.

Mr. Taylor simply fails to address these

determinative issues in his Motion for Partial Summary Judgement.
Under the "transactional approach" to res judicata, which has been adopted in Idaho, 1 the
Courts are not limited to examining whether the subsequent case is based upon the same cause of
action or legal theory as the prior litigation. Rather, "[w]hen a valid and final judgment rendered in
an action extinguishes the plaintiffs claim ... the claim extinguished includes all rights of the
plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction ... out
of which the action arose." Nash v. Overholser, 114 Idaho 461, 464, 757 P.2d 1180, 1183 (1988)
(citation and internal quotation omitted).
The three elements required for application of the doctrine of res judicata are ( 1) identity
of parties, (2) identity of subject matter, and (3) finality of judgment. Farmers Nat. Bank v. Shirey,
126 Idaho 63, 878 P .2d 762 (1994). Identity of parties refers to the rule that the same party or those

1

US. Bank Nat'/. Ass 'n. v. Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222, 226, 999 P.2d 877, 881 (2000).

DEFENDANTS RICHARD A. RILEY'S AND HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP'S
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in privity with such party may not re-litigate claims already litigated. As to Mr. Riley and Hawley
Troxell, the same parties are involved in the case at bar as in Hawley Troxell Lawsuit No. I in Nez
Perce County.2
Identity of subject matter means that the claims in both actions must arise out of the same
transaction or series of transactions. The underlying transaction or series of transactions in Hawley
Troxell Lawsuit No. I included the I 995-I 996 redemption of Mr. Taylor's stock and subsequent
corporate actions. 3

In his Complaint for Damages in Hawley Troxell Lawsuit No. I, Mr. Taylor

raised the same issues he is now alleging with respect to the I 995 Opinion Letter.4
In addition to other theories, in Hawley Troxell Lawsuit No. I Mr. Taylor specifically sought
to amend his complaint to plead a cause of action for fraud against Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell. 5
(Riley Aff., Ex. I) Paragraph 92 of the proposed First Amended Complaint for Damages alleged:
As a former attorney for Reed Taylor and the attorney who provided an
opinion letter to Reed Taylor, defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by
2

Taylor v. Babbitt, et al., Case No. CV 08-01765, in the District Court of the Second Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Nez Perce (referred to herein as "Hawley Troxell Lawsuit No. l ").
3

In his Complaint for Damages in Hawley Troxell Lawsuit No. 1, Mr. Taylor alleged conversion, breach
of fiduciary duties, tortious interference with contract, malpractice, violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act,
and aiding, abetting and conspiring with others in the commission oftortious acts. (Riley Affidavit,~ 11, Exhibit G)
In pertinent part,~ 53 of his Complaint for Damages alleged, "Defendant Richard A. Riley represented
AIA Services Corporation in the redemption of Reed J. Taylor's shares and the drafting of the Amended and
Restated Stock Pledge Agreement and other applicable agreements. Defendants were responsible for issuing opinion
letters relating to the transaction, which include various applicable representations and warranties. Defendants are
now asserting arguments counter to the representations made in the opinion letter drafted by Defendants and by and
through Defendant Richard A. Riley."
4

Carter v. Money Tree Co., 532 F.2d 113 (8 1h Cir. 1976) cert den. 426 U.S. 925, 96 S.Ct. 2636, 49
L.Ed.2d 380 ("A dismissal for failure to state a claim is res judicata as to the then existing claim which plaintiff was
attempting to state ... If, upon dismissal of the complaint, the plaintiff seeks leave to file an amended complaint

and such leave is denied with prejudice, the denial is res judicata as to any claim made by plaintiff in that
amended complaint." (Emphasis added)
DEFENDANTS RICHARD A. RILEY'S AND HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP'S
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and through an opinion letter that was based on Riley's personal knowledge
(representing such facts as the transaction being fully legal and authorized by the
corporations), which further invokes personal liability to Riley. Reed Taylor had a
right to rely on Riley's representations and justifiably relied on such representations.
Riley breached his duties when he asserted that the transaction was illegal. Although
Reed Taylor believes the transaction was legal and supported by applicable law,
Riley's actions have breached his duties to Reed Taylor and caused Reed Taylor to
incur damages from the payment of attorneys' fees and costs and lost possession of
property and funds because of AIA Insurance being wrongfully withheld from Reed
Taylor. As a result of Riley's acts and/or omissions (which constitute fraud), Reed
Taylor has been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.
Consequently, the requisite identity of subject matter is present. In any event, the doctrine of res
judicata bars not only subsequent re-litigation of a claim previously asserted, but also re-litigation

of any claims relating to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have
been made. Wing v. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912 915-16, 684 P.2d 314, 317-18 (Ct.App. 1984)
Finality of judgment refers to a final adjudication or judicial order or decree that ends the
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. In re
Landmark Hotel & Casino, Inc., 872 F.2d 857, 860 (91h Cir. 1989). "To qualify for preclusion, a

judgment must be valid, final, and on the merits." C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal
Practice and Procedure §4432, at 298 (1981 ). While Mr. Taylor is currently appealing the decision

of the District Court in Hawley Troxell Litigation No. 1, the pendency of that appeal does not bar
the application of res judicata in this case. 6

6

"Traditionally, finality was identified for purposes of preclusion in much the same way as it was
identified for purposes of appeal." C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §4432, at
298-99 ( 1981 ). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ( 1981) § 13, Comment b. "[T]he
preclusive effects of a lower court judgment cannot be suspended simply by taking an appeal that remains
undecided." Id., §4433, at 305.
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Mr. Taylor's fraud claim is also barred by collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel, also
known as issue preclusion, prevents litigants from re-litigating the identical issue with the same party
or its privy. Ticor Title v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613, 617 (2007). Mr. Riley, as a
member of the defense firm in the AIA litigation, was in privity with his client, AIA. See

Weinberger v. Tucker, 510 F.3d 486 (2007) (applying Virginia law). The same counsel who
represent Mr. Taylor in this lawsuit represented Mr. Taylor in the AIA litigation and raised the same
claims of fraud which Mr. Taylor now seeks to assert in the present litigation. Having had full
opportunity to litigate those issues in the AIA litigation, Mr. Taylor cannot attempt to re-litigate them
in this action. If Mr. Taylor is dissatisfied with the decision of the District Court in the AIA
litigation, his recourse is to pursue his appeal, not to seek to re-litigate the same issues in a second
suit brought in another District Court.
Mr. Riley's actions as one of the preparers of the 1995 Opinion Letter were under scrutiny
by the Court in the AIA litigation, and the Court expressly found that such actions did not constitute
fraud. 7

Collateral estoppel bars plaintiffs attempt to assert fraud and constructive fraud against

Mr. Riley here.

7

The Court in the AJA litigation expressly held, "The statements by corporate counsel and others that the
stock redemption agreement did not violate any laws or regulations were offered as opinion, not fact. 'Opinions and
predictions cannot form the basis of a fraud claim because they do not speak to matters of fact.' Id. at 601. Counsel
for AJA expressed an opinion that no statute was violated by the stock redemption agreement, an opinion currently
postulated to the Court by Plaintiff. Such an opinion was no more a statement of fact when expressed by corporate
counsel in 1995 than it is now when asserted by Plaintiff. It is, simply, an opinion based on one's interpretation of
law and cannot form the basis of a fraud claim." Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and
Clarification of Court's Grant of Partial Summary Judgment; Clarification of Ruling on Motions to Strike;
Alternative Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification; Motion for Order to Protect Property andfor Stay, Taylor v. AJA
Services, Inc., et al., Case No. CV 07-00208, in the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for Nez Perce County, p. 6 (herein referred to as the "AIA litigation"). (See Babbitt Affidavit, Exhibit
K).
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In addition, Mr. Taylor's claims are barred by several statutes of limitation. His claim for
professional malpractice against Mr. Riley is barred by the two-year statute of limitations set out in
Idaho Code§ 5-219(4). A cause of action for professional malpractice accrues and the statute of
limitation begins to run when the plaintiff sustains "some damage." Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho
539, 542, 808 P.2d 876, 879 (1991). In the present case, Mr. Taylor sustained some damage when
he signed the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and gave up his AIA shares and control over AIA.
As he himself has complained, "Almost 14 years have gone by since I sold my shares in AIA
Services in 1995. John Taylor, James Beck, and Michael Cashman have controlled AIA services
since my shares were redeemed in 1995 and there is nothing that can be done to replace the lost time.
I have been deprived of my right to request to have my shares returned because over 13 years have
transpired and AIA Services business has been substantially depleted under the management of John
Taylor." Affidavit of Reed J. Taylor if 7, dated April 9, 2009, in AIA litigation. (Babbitt Affidavit,
Exhibit A). In any event, some damage occurred when AIA defaulted in the balance of the purchase
price on August 1, 2005, at the latest.
Mr. Taylor's cause of action for alleged violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act
("ICPA") accrued as early as 1995, but in any event not later than August 1, 2005, when the plaintiff
suffered "some damage." His cause of action for alleged violation of the ICPA is barred by the twoyear statue of limitation in Idaho Code § 48-619.
Plaintiff's fraud claim is barred by the three-year statute oflimitation set out in Idaho Code
§ 5-218(4). While there is a discovery exception, that exception does not apply in this case because
the facts constituting any alleged fraud in connection with the redemption of his stock were known
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or should have been known to him in 1995. This is because Mr. Taylor, as the president, chairman
of the board and largest shareholder of AIA, was familiar with its operations and finances and was
represented by attorneys and an accountant of his choosing. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that,
"actual knowledge of the fraud will be inferred where the allegedly aggrieved party could have
discovered it by the exercise of due diligence." Nancy Lee Mines, Inc. v. Harrison, 95 Idaho 546,
547, 511P.2d828, 829 (1973), citing Davis v. Harrison, 25 Wash. 2d 1, 167 P.1015, 1024 (1946):
We hold that this action was barred by the three year statute of limitations,
whether appellants had actual knowledge of the various transactions or not, for the
reason that the facts were open and appeared upon the records of the corporation,
subject to inspection by stockholders. If the stockholders failed to examine the
corporate records, they must have been negligent and careless of their own interests.
The means of knowledge were open to them, and means of knowledge are equivalent
to actual knowledge.
In present case, plaintiff and his attorneys and accountant had full and unfettered opportunity
to inspect the corporate records. Mr. Taylor knew, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have known, the amount of AIA's earned surplus was insufficient to redeem his stock. He
must be deemed to have knowledge of/acts sufficient to put him on notice of any alleged fraud in
1995, which is when the statute of limitation for fraud commenced to run. Plaintiff is time barred
from bringing an action based on alleged fraud 14 years later.8

8

The Court in the AIA litigation found as follows: "Plaintiffs second contention is that, even ifunlawful,
the agreement should be enforced as Reed Tay !or was justifiably ignorant of the illegality of the agreement. The
Court is not persuaded by plaintiffs efforts to paint himself as an innocent and naive party. Reed Taylor was the
founder of AIA and, at the time the agreement was entered into, the majority shareholder. Reed Taylor was in a
position to have intimate knowledge of the corporation's financial status. This is not a case where the parties to the
agreement were not in pari delicto, as asserted by Plaintiff. If Reed Taylor was uninformed as to the financial status
of the corporation, that was a voluntary choice on his part and is insufficient to make him an innocent party to the
agreement." (Babbitt Aff., Ex. K, Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of
Court's Grant of Partial Summary Judgment; Clarification of Ruling on Motions to Strike; Alternative Motion for
Rule 54(b) Certification; Motion for Order to Protect Property and for Stay, AIA litigation).
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Where a claim is not covered by any other statute of limitation, the four-year limitation of
Idaho Code§ 5-224 will be applied. Jones v. Kootenai County Title Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 607, 873
P.2d 861 (1994). Since the occurrence, acts or omissions complained of happened more than four
years ago, Idaho Code§ 5-224 bars any claim at this time for alleged negligent misrepresentation
or breach of fiduciary duty.
Rather than address the arguments asserted in Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, considerations of judicial economy suggest that this Court first determine whether Mr.
Taylor's claims can be re-litigated in this lawsuit or whether they are barred by res judicata,
collateral estoppel and/or the statutes of limitation, irrespective of the arguments asserted in
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. In the event a response to plaintiffs arguments
is deemed appropriate, those arguments are refutable on the following grounds.
II.

MR. TAYLOR IS NOT ENTITLED TO PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

With regard to his motion for partial summary judgment, Mr. Taylor bears the burden of
establishing there are no genuine issues of material fact and that he is entitled to the relief requested
as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 56(c) His motion is predicated almost entirely upon the proposition
that the defendants acted as his attorneys in connection with the redemption of his stock, 9 an
allegation which the defendants strongly deny. See Mr. Riley's Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (the "Riley Opposition Affidavit").

Not only does this

9

Under Idaho law, a direct attorney-client relationship is required to exist between the plaintiff and the
attorney-defendant in a legal malpractice action, except in the narrow circumstance of an attorney preparing
testamentary instruments. Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004). See also Becker v. Callahan,
140 Idaho 522, 90 P.3d 617 (2004); Taylorv. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005).
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conflict in the evidence preclude granting the relief sought by plaintiff in his Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, but the plaintiff himself has created conflicting fact issues by taking
inconsistent and contradictory positions. At various times, he has acknowledged that defendants
were not his attorneys in regard to the transaction in question. See Riley Opposition Affidavit, which
attaches as exhibits numerous documents in which Mr. Taylor has represented to the Courts in prior
proceedings that the defendants acted as counsel for AIA and that he was represented by counsel of
his own choosing. He now seeks to take the opposite position. The shifting sands of Mr. Taylor's
factual contentions are too treacherous to support his motion for partial summary judgment.

1.

The Tort of Negligent Misrepresentation Is Not a Cause of Action Recognized
in Idaho Against Attorneys.

With one narrow exception not applicable here, the tort of negligent misrepresentation is not
recognized in this state. See Duffin v. Idaho Corp Improvement Ass 'n., 126 Idaho 1002, 1010, 895
P.2d 1195, 1203 (1995), reh. den. June 22, 1995; Mannos v Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 935, 155 P.3d
1166, 1174 (2007). Plaintiff relies on Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702, 710, 99 P .3d
1092 (Ct.App. 2004 ), in arguing that the tort of negligent misrepresentation may be brought against
professionals, including attorneys, when a special relationship exists or the occurrence of unique
circumstances requires a different allocation of risk. (Reed Taylor 's Memorandum ofLaw in Support
of Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendant ("Plaintiffs Memorandum"), p. 11.) However,
the portion of the Nelson opinion cited by Taylor addresses the economic loss rule in the context of
a negligence action. See Nelson, 140 Idaho at 710. Nelson does not recognize the tort of negligent
misrepresentation as a cause of action that can be asserted against attorneys. Id. In fact, negligent
misrepresentation was neither a cause of action raised in the underlying action in Nelson, nor was
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it a cause of action addressed by the Idaho Court of Appeals on appeal. Id. The cases cited by Mr.
Taylor from other jurisdictions are simply not applicable, as they are contrary to established Idaho
law.

2.

Mr. Riley's Acts or Omissions Cannot Form a Predicate for Fraud or
Constructive Fraud.

At the outset, plaintiff is confronted with two insurmountable obstacles. First, his allegations
of fraud have already been heard in prior actions and are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel. Having previously litigated those issues in both Hawley Troxell Lawsuit No.
1 and the AIA litigation, Mr. Taylor is not entitled to re-litigate them. Second, the alleged fraud
occurred approximately 14 years before Mr. Taylor filed the present lawsuit and was long ago barred
by the three-year statute oflimitation applicable to fraud actions in Idaho. 1 C. §5-218(4). Further,
as noted iyifra at pp. 7-8, the discovery exception does not apply in this case.
Even if plaintiff were starting with a blank slate, his claim of fraud must still fail. Under
Idaho law, opinions and predictions of future events, as opposed to representations of fact, cannot
form the basis for fraud. Country Cove Dev., Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, 601,150 P.3d 288, 294
(2006) ("Opinions and predictions cannot form the basis of a fraud claim because they do not speak
to matters of fact."); Thomas v. Med. Ctr. Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 207, 61 P.3d 557, 564
(2002) ("An action for fraud or misrepresentation will not lie for statements of future events. The
law requires the plaintiff to form his or her own conclusions regarding the occurrence of future
events.") (internal citations omitted); Sharp v. Idaho Investment Corp., 95 Idaho 113, 122, 504 P.2d
386, 395 (1972) ("[A] representation consisting of[a] promise or a statement as to a future event will
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not serve as a basis for fraud, event though it was made under circumstances as to knowledge and
belief which would give rise to an action for fraud had it related to an existing or past fact.").
There are two exceptions under Idaho law to the general rule about statements or promises
regarding the future:
(1) fraud may be predicated upon the nonperformance of a promise in certain cases
where the promise is a device to accomplish fraud; (2) in cases where promises are
blended or associated with misrepresentations of fact, there is fraud if a promise is
accompanied with statements of existing fact showing the ability of the promisor to
perform the promise without which it would not have been accepted or acted upon.

Sharp v. Idaho Investment Corp., 95 Idaho 113, 122, 504 P.2d 386, 395 (1972). (Citations omitted)
Neither of these exceptions is applicable to the present case. Mr. Riley made no promises
or representations of future performance to the plaintiff. Simply by virtue of being one of the
preparers of the 1995 Opinion Letter, Mr. Riley did not thereby become the guarantor of his client's
ability or willingness to perform. 10 The most that can be said is that a Court may have subsequently
disagreed with Eberle Berlin's opinions regarding enforceability of the 1995 Stock Redemption
Agreement. Such opinions do not, and cannot, constitute fraud.
The elements of constructive fraud under Idaho law are summarized in Gray v. Tri-Way

Construction Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 378, 386, 210 P.3d 63, 71 (2009):
An action in constructive fraud exists where there has been a breach of a duty
arising from a relationship of trust and confidence, as in a fiduciary duty. Examples
of relationships from which the law will impose fiduciary obligations on the parties

10

Another formulation of the second exception to the general rule is found inCountry Cove Dev., Inc. v.
May, 143 Idaho 595, 601, 150 P.3d 288, 294 (2006), where it was stated that, "[W]here a speaker gives an opinion
when he is aware of facts incompatible with such opinion, the opinion may amount to a false statement of fact if
made with the intention of misleading or deceiving." (Citations omitted) However, the complaint in the present case
does not allege that Mr. Riley was aware of any facts incompatible with his opinion, or what those facts may have
been. All nine elements of fraud must be pied with particularity. IRCP 9(b).
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include when the parties are: members of the same family, partners, attorney and
client, executor and beneficiary of an estate, principal and agent, insurer and insured,
or close friends. The gist of a constructive fraud finding is to avoid the need to
prove intent (i.e, knowledge of falsity or intent to induce reliance) .... In sum, if a
plaintiff establishes that there has been a breach of duty arising from a relationship
of trust and confidence, the plaintiff is not required to prove (1) the speaker's
knowledge of the falsity regarding the statement or representation of fact, or (2) the
speaker's intent that the hearer rely on the statement or representation of fact, to
sustain a claim of constructive fraud. However, the party is still required to prove
the remaining seven elements of actual fraud. (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)
The same impediments as mentioned previously bar plaintiffs effort to plead constructive
fraud, i.e., res judicata and the statute of limitation. The District Court in Nez Perce County
expressly held that plaintiffs prior allegations of fraud and constructive fraud were without merit. 11
That adjudication bars any attempt to re-litigate the same issues. For the same reasons that apply to
plaintiffs fraud claims, his constructive fraud theory is time-barred.

While an attorney-client

relationship may give rise to fiduciary duties, plaintiffs own repeated statements in prior litigation
that Eberle Berlin and Mr. Riley represented only AIA in connection with the 1995-1996 stock
redemption, and that plaintiff was represented by Mr. Bell, preclude plaintiff from now changing his
testimony to allege the existence of an attorney-client relationship with Eberle Berlin or Mr. Riley.

3.

Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell Assumed No Fiduciary Duty to Taylor.

Plaintiffs claim against Hawley Troxell and Mr. Riley for alleged breach of fiduciary duty
was not only rejected by the Court in Hawley Troxell Lawsuit No. 1, but the Court awarded
attorney's fees against plaintiff on the ground that his complaint was been brought frivolously and
11

The Court found in Hawley Troxell Lawsuit No. 1 that plaintiffs asserted causes of action included
"fraud and/or constructive fraud" and dismissed such claims as a matter of law. Riley Aff., Ex. M, Opinion and
Order on Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration and Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, p. 4, Case No. CV
08-01765 in the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for Nez Perce County.
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without foundation. (Riley Aff., Ex. L, Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Award of
Attorney's Fees and Costs). The Court stated:

The Plaintiffs claim for breach of fiduciary duties was also unreasonable.
While the Maile Court held that a person may sue an attorney for breach of fiduciary
duty even where no attorney-client relationship exists, the Court clearly stated that
a plaintiff must allege facts that show a defendant attorney assumed a fiduciary duty
to the plaintiff. Id. at 259. In the instant matter, no such facts were alleged nor are
there any facts in the record that would support a finding that Defendants assumed
any fiduciary duties to the Plaintiff.
Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Award ofAttorney's Fees and Costs, pp. 7-8, Case
No. CV 08-01765, in the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and
for the County of Nez Perce.

As the District Court in Nez Perce County found, plaintiff has failed to adduce any facts
which would tend to establish the assumption by Mr. Riley or Hawley Troxell of a fiduciary duty to
plaintiff.
Additionally, any claim for alleged breach of fiduciary duty is time-barred by Idaho Code §5219(4) (two years), or Idaho Code §5-224 (four years). In Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 51
P.3d 396 (2002), a client sued his attorney for alleged unauthorized disbursement ofloan proceeds
in connection with a real estate transaction. In an attempt avoid the strictures of the two-year statute
of limitation applicable to professional malpractice actions, the client contended that such acts
constituted a breach of fiduciary duty, as opposed to malpractice. The Idaho Supreme Court,
however, held that alleged wrongful acts or omissions in the performance of professional services
must be analyzed as malpractice actions:
[T]he focus is whether the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred in the course
of performing professional services. [Client] retained [attorney] to provide
professional services as an attorney in preparing the loan documents and disbursing
the loan funds. Because the causes of action alleged are based on [attorney's]
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allegedly wrongful disbursement of the loan funds while performing those
professional services, Idaho Code §5-219(4) is the applicable statute oflimitations.

Id. at 589, 51 P.3d at 403.

4.

Since Mr. Riley Owed No Duty to Plaintiff, Plaintiffs Professional Negligence
Claim against Him Must Necessarily Fail.

In Hawley Troxell Lawsuit No. 1, the District Court found that, "There is without question
no attorney-client relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants in the instant matter." (Riley Aff.,
Ex. L, Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Award ofAttorney's Fees and Costs, p. 7, in
the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for Nez Perce County)
Consequently, the Court dismissed with prejudice Mr. Taylor's malpractice claim against Hawley
Troxell and Mr. Riley due to lack of privity. "[A]n attorney-client relationship is an absolute
prerequisite to a professional malpractice claim." Id., p. 7. Thus, plaintiffs malpractice claim has
been previously litigated and is barred by res judicata. In any event, any malpractice claim against
Mr. Riley (or by extension Hawley Troxell) which arises out of acts or omissions which occurred
14 years prior to filing the present suit is time-barred.
Assuming arguendo that res judicata and the statute of limitation for professional
malpractice did not bar plaintiffs malpractice claim, plaintiff is still not entitled to prevail on his
motion for partial summary judgment. Mr. Taylor attempts to avoid the privity rule by asserting that
Mr. Riley acted as his attorney, which at minimum creates an issue of fact which precludes entry of
partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. 12 Defendants, however, do not concede that Mr.
12

Mr. Taylor's assertions that Eberle Berlin and Mr. Riley were his attorneys in connection with the
redemption of his stock are contradicted by Mr. Riley's affidavit, which states that, "Eberle Berlin represented only
AIA in connection with the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and the 1995 Opinion Letter. Mr. Taylor was
represented by separate counsel of his selection, Scott T. Bell and N. Frank Taylor of the firm ofCaimcross &
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Taylor has successfully adduced admissible facts which tend to establish the existence of an attorneyclient relationship. To the contrary, a "sham affidavit," i.e., an affidavit which contradicts a party's
previous testimony or representations to the Court, does not suffice to create a factual issue. As
elucidated in Mr. Riley's Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (the "Riley Opposition Affidavit"), Mr. Taylor has acknowledged throughout the course
of his lengthy litigation against AIA and its lawyers that Mr. Riley represented only AIA in
connection with the redemption of Mr. Taylor's stock. Mr. Taylor's attempt to repudiate his
representations to the Court in prior litigation should not be countenanced.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the purpose of summary judgment is served by a rule
that prevents a party from creating sham issues by offering testimony contrary to previous testimony.
Tolmie Farms, Inc. v. Stauffer Chemical Company, Inc, 124 Idaho 607, 862 P.2d 299 (1993), citing
Kennedy v. Allied Mut., 952 F.2d 262, 266-67 (9th Cir.1991). A party cannot create an issue of fact
by an affidavit contradicting prior testimony." Allied Mut., supra.

The Court may strike an affidavit

by which a party attempts to create "sham" evidence for use on summary judgment. Consequently,
"a sham affidavit which directly contradicts prior testimony may be disregarded on a summary
judgment motion." Keeven v. Estate of Keeven, 126 Idaho 290, 298, 882 P.2d 457, 465 (Ct. App.
1994).
It is well-settled "that a party cannot create an issue of fact by an affidavit contradicting his
prior testimony." Kennedy v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 952 F .2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1991 ). See also

Hempelmann .... " Riley Aff., ~ 4 (emphasis added). Mr. Riley's affidavit further states, "Eberle Berlin represented
only AIA in regard to the 1996 Restructure Agreement, and Mr. Taylor was again represented by the firm of
Caimcross & Hempelmann." Riley Aff., ~ 8 (emphasis added).
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Orr v. Bank ofAmerica, 285 F.3d 764, 784 n. 28 (Court found plaintiff's affidavit to be a sham

submitted in an attempt to create a material issue of fact. Because plaintiff's deposition testimony
contradicted her affidavit, she did not raise a triable issue of fact).

5.

Mr. Riley's Alleged Acts or Omissions Do Not Constitute Negligence Per Se.

Idaho Code § 30-1-6, as in effect prior to 1997, did not define the applicable standard of

care applicable to attorneys and thus cannot constitute the basis for a negligence per se claim against
Mr. Riley.13

Rather, it regulated the ability of a corporation to make distributions to an insider

where the effect would be to deprive the corporation of sufficient capital to pay its trade debts or
satisfy the claims of other stakeholders. Plaintiff's reliance on l C. §30-1-6 to establish negligence
per se on the part of an attorney is misplaced.

6.

Defendants Did Not Violate the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.

The District Court in Hawley Troxell Lawsuit No. 1 found no violation of the ICP A. That
holding is binding on the plaintiff. Also, plaintiff's ICPA claim must fail as a matter oflaw because
of lack of any allegation or factual showing that Mr. Taylor purchased or leased goods or services
from Hawley Troxell or Mr. Riley. 14 Claims under the ICPA are limited to circumstances involving

13

Obendorfv. Terra Hug Spray Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 892, 899, 188 P.3d 834, 841 ((2008), reh. den., July
8, 2008, outlines the required elements of aper se negligence claim based on a violation of statute: "(l) the statute or
regulation must clearly define the required standard of conduct; (2) the statute or regulation must have been intended
to prevent the type of harm the defendant's act or omission caused; (3) the plaintiff must be a member of the class of
persons the statue or regulation was designed to protect; and (4) the violation must have been the proximate cause of
the injury."
14

A private cause of action may be asserted under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act only by a "person
who purchases or leases goods or services and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property .... "
I.C. § 48-608. (Emphasis added)
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a clear and distinct contractual relationship between the parties. Haskin v. Glass, 102 Idaho 785, 640
P .2d 1186 (Ct.App. 1982). There is no contract here for the purchase or lease of goods or services
upon which plaintiffs claim under the ICPA can be based.

7.

Mr. Riley Is Not Estopped from Asserting Lack of Privity.

Plaintiff contends Mr. Riley is estopped from denying an attorney-client relationship with
Mr. Taylor in connection with the redemption of Mr. Taylor's stock and preparation of the 1995
Opinion Letter. However, the District Court in Hawley Troxell Lawsuit No. 1 expressly held that
there was no privity between Mr. Riley/Hawley Troxell and Mr. Taylor, and that the lack ofprivity
barred Mr. Taylor's attempt to sue Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell for professional malpractice. Res
judicata precludes Mr. Taylor from raising the issue here.
Even if the preclusive effect of prior adjudication were disregarded, plaintiffs motion for
partial summary judgment must be denied.

At the very least, there is a factual issue regarding

whether Mr. Riley acted as Mr. Taylor's attorney in connection with the relevant transactions. 15

8.

Hawley Troxell Is Not Vicariously Liable for any Acts or Omissions of Mr. Riley
Committed before He Joined that Firm.

The plaintiff, citing only a brief excerpt from the Restatement, 16 requests entry of partial
summary judgment determining that Hawley Troxell is vicariously liable for the alleged acts of Mr.

15

Mr. Taylor has failed to provide the Court with any admissible evidence (as opposed merely to
conclusory statements) of the existence of any attorney-client relationship. Mr. Taylor and his counsel in the course
of prior proceedings acknowledged that Mr. Riley was not his attorney in connection with the stock redemption.See
Riley Opposition Affidavit.
16

Plaintiff cites to §58 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (2000): "A law firm is
subject to civil liability for injury legally caused to a person by an wrongful act or omission of any principal or
employee of the firm .... " Plaintiff omits the remainder to §58 which contains the proviso,"... who was acting in
the ordinary course ofthejlrm's business or with actual or apparent authority." (Emphasis added)
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Riley. Plaintiffs theory disregards the fact that Mr. Riley was not an employee, agent or principal
of Hawley Troxell at the time the 1995 Opinion Letter was prepared, but only joined that firm on
March 1, 1999, approximately four years after the opinion was rendered. (Riley Aff., iii! 3 and 9)
In 1995 and 1996, Mr. Riley was not acting within the ordinary course of Hawley Troxell's business
or with actual or apparent authority from Hawley Troxell. The doctrine of respondeat superior is
not applicable to acts or omissions which occur where there is no principal-agent relationship.
Accordingly, Hawley Troxell can have no vicarious liability for any alleged acts or omissions of Mr.
Riley which occurred years before he joined the firm.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell respectfully request that this Court
deny Mr. Taylor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
DATED this l!f_ day of February, 2010.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

Riley and
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _LJ__ day of February, 2010, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner indicated
below:
Roderick C. Bond
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, Washington 99201

Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

V

V

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(509) 455-7111
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-9177
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J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By JUDY SUWVAN
DEPUTY

RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, WA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868
Plaintiff,

v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
ROBERT M. TURNBOW, an individual; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS RILEY,
HAWLEY TROXELL, TURNBOW AND
EBERLE BERLIN'S MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN
SUPPORT OF REED TAYLOR'S CROSS
MOPTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

)
) ss:
)

I, Roderick C. Bond, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in court, one of the

attorneys for the plaintiff in the above-entitled action, and make this Affidavit based upon my
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personal knowledge. I have personal knowledge of all of the pleadings and documents attached
to this Affidavit as they have been the subject of actions through which I have served as counsel
for Reed Taylor. The following exhibits are all true and correct copies of the documents or
pleadings filed in either Taylor v. Hawley Troxell, et al. or Taylor v. AJA Services, et al.
2.

Attached as Exhibit 1 is the Stock Pledge Agreement between Reed Taylor and

AIA Services Corporation ("AIA Services") dated July 22, 1995.
3.

Attached as Exhibit 2 is the Security Agreement between Reed Taylor and AIA

Services dated July 22, 1995.
4.

Attached as Exhibit 3 is the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement

between Reed Taylor and AIA Services dated July 1, 1996.

The shares pledged in this

agreement remained unchanged from Exhibit 1.
5.

Attached as Exhibit 4 are the Assignments Separate From Certificates for the

shares pledged to Reed Taylor. In other words, Reed Taylor had a right to self-help transfer the
shares to him upon AIA Services' default of its obligations to him.
6.

Attached as Exhibit 5 is the Amended and Restated Security Agreement between

Reed Taylor and AIA Services dated July 1, 1996.
7.

Attached as Exhibit 6 are spreadsheets depicting payments made to Reed Taylor

from AIA Services. These payments demonstrate that payments were being made well after the
due date of Reed Taylor's $6M Note.
8.

Attached as Exhibit 7 are Consents in Lieu of Special Meeting of Shareholders

and Board of Directors for AIA Services executed by Reed Taylor on February 22, 2007, in
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accordance with his right vote the shares of AIA Insurance under Exhibit 3.
9.

Attached as Exhibit 8 is AIA Services' Memorandum in Support of Motion to

Dismiss dated May 22, 2007. On pages 18-20, AIA Services successfully argued that Reed
Taylor could not pursue claims for Unjust Enrichment since he had valid claims under written
agreements. Judge Brudie dismissed this claim.
10.

Attached as Exhibit 9 is Reed Taylor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on

Promissory Note dated November 15, 2007.
11.

Attached as Exhibit JO is AIA Services' Memorandum m Opposition to

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment dated December 3, 2007.
12.

Attached as Exhibit 11 is the district court's Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for Injunction dated February 8, 2008.
13.

Attached as Exhibit 12 is AIA Services and AIA Insurance's First Amended

Answer to Plaintiffs Fifth Amended Complaint, Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial dated
March 7, 2008. This is AIA Services' last Answer filed in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al.
14.

Attached as Exhibit 13 is the district court's Opinion and Order on Defendants'

Motion for Reconsideration, Or, In the Alternative, For Certification For Interlocutory Appeal
dated May 8, 2008.
15.

Attached as Exhibit 14 is AIA Services' Memorandum in Support of Motion for

Permissive Appeal Pursuant to l.A.R. 12(C) dated May 22, 2008.
16.

Attached as Exhibit 15 is the Idaho Supreme Court's Order Denying Motion for

Permissive Appeal dated June 12, 2008.
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17.

Attached as Exhibit 16 is Hawley Troxell, et al.' s Memorandum in Support of

Motion to Dismiss dated September 9, 2008.
18.

Attached as Exhibit 17 is Defendants' Reply Brief in Support of Motion to

Dismiss dated October 10, 2008.
19.

Attached as Exhibit 18 is Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to

Amend Complaint dated November 5, 2008.
20.

Attached as Exhibit 19 are the hearing transcripts for Defendants' Motions to

Dismiss held on October 18, 2008, and Reed Taylor's Motions to Amend held on December 4,
2008. Exhibits 16-19 all pertain to Taylor v. Hawley Troxell, et al.
21.

Attached as Exhibit 20 is Hawley Troxell, et al. 's Memorandum in Support of

Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration.

Hawley Troxell requested reconsideration of the

district court's award of $20,000 in attorneys' fees and requested their full $43,912.50 in fees
and costs. This request was denied.
22.

Attached as Exhibit 21 is the Affidavit of Reed Taylor in Opposition to Connie

Taylor and James Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated April 9, 2009. A portion
of this Affidavit was attached as Exhibit D to Gary Babbitt's Affidavit dated December 3, 2009
(but this affidavit was not filed until January 15, 2010 in this action).
23.

Attached as Exhibit 22 is the Affidavit of Scott Bell dated May 12, 2009.

24.

Attached as Exhibit 23 is Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Memorandum of Law in

Support of Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the Court's Opinion and Order on
Plaintiff and Defendants' Motions to Strike Expert Affidavits and Defendants' Motion for Partial
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Summary Judgment; Or, Alternatively, Motion/Request for Rule 54(b) Certification, Motion for
Order to Protect Property and Motion to Stay dated July 8, 2009.
25.

Attached as Exhibit 24 is Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Reply in Support of Motion for

Reconsideration dated July 21, 2009.
26.

Attached as Exhibit 25 are pertinent pages of AIA Services' Restated Bylaws,

which were adopted in 1989.
27.

Attached as Exhibit 26 is a letter from AIA Services to Reed Taylor dated April

22, 1996. As indicated in this letter, it was in response to Reed Taylor's letter dated April 18,
1996 (See 11/24/09 Riley Aff., Ex. D.) This document was also produced in discovery to me.
28.

Attached as Exhibit 27 is a letter from Richard Riley to Scott Bell dated May 3,

1996. As indicated in this letter, it was a response to Scott Bell's letter dated April 25, 1996 (See
11/24/09 Riley Aff., Ex. E.) This document was also produced in discovery to me.
29.

I am familiar with the books and records of AIA Services pertaining to payments

made to Reed Taylor over the years since his shares were redeemed (including the attached
Exhibit 6). The defendants' assert that Reed Taylor was objectively damaged in 1996 as a result
of the non-payment of Reed Taylor's $1.5M Down Payment Note and the non-payment of his
attorneys' fees. However, the defendants are mistaken as AIA Services has paid Reed Taylor's
$1.5M Down Payment Note in full and paid his redemption attorneys' fees (See also Exhibit 6.)
DATED: This 17th day of February, 2010.

Roderick C. Bond
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 17th day of February, 2010.

Notary Public ti r Idiiiho
Residing at: "="'""~.,_...................,.._..___.....---------,-My commission expires:___..&..+--'--'-+'.......,.._.____.-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the date indicated below, I caused to be served true and correct copies of
the foregoing document to the following parties:

Via:
Jack S. Gjording
Julianne S. Hall
Gjording & Fouser, PLLC
509 W. Hays St.
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 336-9777
Fax: (208) 336-9177

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
(X) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
Elam & Burke, PA
251 East Front St.
Boise, ID 83 704
Phone: (208) 343-5454
·Fax: (208) 384-5844

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
(X) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Email (pdf attachment)

Signed this 17th day of February, 2010, at Lewiston, Idaho.
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ExhibitB
STOCK PLEDGE AGREEMENT
This STOCK PLEDGE AGREEMENT is entered into as of J~ f. . l L 1- , 1995, by and
between AJA Services Corporation, an Idaho Corporation ("Pledgor''), and'Reed J. Taylor
("Secured Party"). Capitalized terms used in this Agreement and not otherwise defined shall
have the meanings given to them in the Redemption Agreement (as defined below).
RECITALS
A.
Pledgor and Secured Party are parties to that certain Stock Redemption
Agreement, dated as of ]""' I 'i 2.. i:r-1995 (the ''Redemption Agreement''), pursuant to which
Pledgor will redeem 613,494 shares of its Common Stock held by Secured Party in exchange for,
in part, a Promissory Note of even date herewith in the principal amount of $6,000,000 (the
''Note"). Pledgor and Secured Party are also parties to that certain Security Agreement (the
"Security Agreement''), that certain Consulting Agreement (the "Consulting Agreement'') and
that certain Noncompetition Agreement (the ''Noncompetition Agreement''), all of even date
herewith.
The Universe Life Insurance Company, an Idaho domestic insurance company
B.
("Universe"), Fanners Health Alliance Administrators, Inc., an Idaho corporation ("Farmers"),
and AJA Insurance, Inc., an Idaho corporation ("AIAI''), are wholly owned subsidiaries of
Pledgor.
C.
As a condition of Secured Party's entry into the Redemption Agreement, Secured
Party has required that Pledgor pledge all of the shares of capital stock of each of Universe,
Farmers and AIAI, and any other shares of capital stock acquired by Pledgor after the date
hereof, including shares distributed to Pledgor by Universe, Farmers, or AIAI (collectively, the
"Shares''), as security for the Note and other obligations of Pledgor to Secured Party arising
under the Redemption Agreement.
D.
Secured Party desires, and Pledgor agrees to grant to Secured Party, as security
for the Secured Obligations (as defined below) and on the terms and ~oncijtions hereinafter set
forth, a security interest in all right, title and interest of Pledgor in the Pledged Collateral (as
further defined below), including, but not limited to, the Shares.
E.
Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to
them in the Redemption Agreement.
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AGREEMENTS
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, and for other
good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged,
the parties agree as follows:
l.

Secured Obligations

This Agreement is made to secure the punctual payment and performance by Pledgor of
any and all obligations, liabilities and amounts now or hereafter owing, due or not due, direct or
indirect, liquidated or contingent, to Secured Party pursuant to any or all of the Redemption
Agreement, the Note, and the Security Agreement, including, without limitation, any and all
amounts payable to Secured Party hereunder or thereunder, and prompt observance and
performance by Pledgor of its covenants, agreements and obligations hereunder and thereunder
(collectively, the "Secured Obligations'').
2.

Pledge

As collateral security for the payment and performance in full of the Secured Obligations,
Pledgor hereby pledges, assigns, transfers, delivers and grants to Secured Party a security interest
in all right, title and interest of Pledgor that presently exists or that hereafter may arise in, to and
under (i) the Shares and all rights and privileges of Pledgor with respect thereto, (ii) all cash
dividends, noncash dividends, stock dividends, interest, cash, instruments and other property
from time to time received, receivable or otherwise distributed in respect of or in exchange for
any or all of the Shares, (iii) all subscriptions, warrants, options and any other rights issued upon
or in connection with the Shares, (iv) any additional shares of capital stock hereafter acquired by
Pledgor, including additional shares of the issuers of the Shares, (v) any and all certificates or
other instrument or documents representing any of the foregoing, and (vi) all cash and non-cash
proceeds of the foregoing (all such property, collectively, the "Pledged. Collateral'').

3.

Representations and Warranties
Pledgor represents and warrants to, and agrees with, Secured Party as follows:

Title. The Shares include all of the issued and outstanding capital stock of each of
3 .1
Universe (except for Directors' Qualifying Shares), Farmers, and AIAI. The Shares are legally and
beneficially owned by Pledgor on the date hereof: free and clear of all liens, encumbrances, claims
or demands arising through Pledgor whatsoever (other than the security interest created hereby and
the existing lien of First Interstate Bank ofldaho, N.A. ("First Interstate") upon the capital stock of
Universe (the "First Interstate Lien")). All of the Shares were duly authoriz.ed and validly issued,
and are fully paid and nonassessable.
3 .2
Power and Authority. Pledgor has all requisite power and authority and full legal
right to execute, deliver and perform all ofPledgor's obligations under this Agreement and to
pledge and grant a security interest in the Pledged Collateral in the manner and for the purpose
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contemplated by this Agreement, and has the right to grant Secured Party a security interest in
such Pledged Collateral, subject to the rights of First Interstate in the stock of Universe.

Execution; Binding Contract. This Agreement has been duly executed and
3.3
delivered by Pledgor and constitutes the legal, valid and binding obligation of Pledgor,
enforceable against Pledgor in accordance with its terms, except as enforceability may be limited
by bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization or other similar laws affecting the enforcement of
creditors' rights generally or the availability of equitable remedies subject to the discretion of the
court.
No Violation. The pledge of and the grant of a security interest in the Pledged
3 .4
Collateral by Pledgor in the manner and for the purpose contemplated by this Agreement does
not and will not (i) violate any law, rule, regulation, order, judgment, settlement agreement or
decree (including, without limitation, any of the foregoing arising out of any regulatory activity
of any insurance regulatory agency or governmental authority of any state) applicable to Pledgor
or (ii) result in or require the creation or imposition of (except as granted to Secured Party by this
Agreement) any lien, security interest, encumbrance or right of others of any nature upon, or with
respect to, any of the Pledged Collateral.
3.5
Protection ofSecurity Interest. To Pledgor's knowledge, the Pledged Collateral is
not subject to .any option, agreement, assessment, charge or other contractual restriction of any
nature that might prohibit, impair, delay or otherwise affect the pledge of the Pledged Collateral
hereunder or the sale or disposition of the Pledged Collateral pursuant hereto by Secured Party.
Secured Party acknowledges that insurance regulations may require Form A approval prior to
strict foreclosure upon or sale of insurance company stock. Pledgor will not suffer or permit any
lien or encumbrance of any nature, other than those granted to Secured Party and the First
Interstate Lien, to attach to the Pledged Collateral. Pledgor will fully and punctually perform any
duty required of it in connection with the Pledged Collateral and will not take any action that will
impair, damage or destroy Secured Party's rights with respect to the Pledged Collateral. Pledgor
will remain the sole shareholder of all of the outstanding capital stock of Universe, Farmers and
AIAI, and Pledgor will not permit Universe, Farmers or AIAI to issue any additional capital
stock, and any attempt to issue additional shares of such capital stock shall be invalid.
4.

Delivery of Pledged Collateral

Pledgor agrees to deliver to Secured Party on the date of this Agreement all instruments
and stock certificates pertaining to the Pledged Collateral now owned, except for those Shares of
Universe in the possession of First Interstate and subject to the First Interstate Lien (the "First
Interstate Shares"), and to deliver to Secured Party promptly upon receipt all instruments and
stock certificates pertaining to the Pledged Collateral acquired in the future. Without limiting the
foregoing, if Pledgor shall purchase or otherwise become entitled to receive or shall receive, in
connection with any of the Pledged Collateral, any: (i) stock certificate, including without
limitation any certificate representing a stock dividend or in connection with any increase or
reduction of capital, reclassification, merger, consolidation, sale of assets, combination of shares,
stock split, spin-off, split-off, split-up or liquidation; (ii) option, warrant, or right, whether as an
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addition to or in substitution or in exchange for any of its securities, or otherwise; (iii) non-cash
dividend or distribution, including securities issued by other than Universe, Farmers or AIAI; or
(iv) any certificate representing the First Interstate Shares, then Pledgor shall accept it in trust for
Secured Party and shall immediately deliver it to Secured Party in the exact form received, with
Pledgor's endorsement when necessary, or appropriate stock powers duly executed in blank to be
held by Secured Party as part of the Pledged Collateral. Pledgor shall deliver to Secured Party on
the date of this Agreement instructions, in form and substance acceptable to Secured Party,
signed by Pledgor and First Interstate, requiring that the certificates representing the First
Interstate Shares be delivered promptly and directly to Shareholder upon the satisfaction of any
currently outstanding obligations secured by the First Interstate Shares, and prohibiting any
action which would increase the amount of Pledgor's monetary obligations to First Interstate.
5.

Assignments

Contemporaneously with the signing of this Agreement, Pledgor shall deliver to Secured
Party Assignments Separate from Certificate ("Assignments"), in the form attached as
Exhibits A-1, A-2 and A-3 to this Agreement, covering all the Shares. Such Assignments shall
be endorsed in blank by Pledgor before delivery to Secured Party. Secured Party may not use
such Assignments to transfer the Pledged Collateral except in realization on its security interests
in the Pledged Collateral after the occurrence, and during the continuance, of a Default (as
defined in Section 8 hereof), and a legend to such effect may be added to the certificates
evidencing the Pledged Collateral.
6.

Pledgor's Voting Rights

So long as no Default under this Agreement has occurred and is continuing, Pledgor shall
be entitled to exercise any voting rights incident to the Pledged Collateral, subject to any
restriction on such voting rights contained herein or in the Redemption Agreement. Upon the
occurrence and continuation of a Default, Pledgor' s right to exercise such voting rights shall
immediately cease and terminate and all voting rights with respect to the Pledged Collateral shall
rest solely and exclusively in Secured Party. The foregoing sentence shall constitute and grant to
Secured Party an irrevocable proxy coupled with an interest to vote the Pledged Collateral upon
the occurrence and continuation of such a Default, and any officer of Universe, Farmers, or
AIAI, as the case may be, may rely on written notice from Secured Party as to the existence of a
Default and Secured Party's right to vote such Pledged Collateral.
7.

Appointment of Secured Party

Pledgor hereby designates and appoints Secured Party its true and lawful attorney with
power irrevocable, for it and in its name, place and stead, at any time after the occurrence of a
default on this Agreement shall have occurred, to ask, demand, receive, receipt and give
acquittance for any and all amounts that may be or become due or payable to Pledgor with
respect to the Pledged Collateral, and in Secured Party's sole discretion to file any claim or take
any action or proceeding in its own name or in the name of Pledgor, that Secured Party deems
necessary or desirable in order to carry out the provisions of this Agreement and to accomplish
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the purposes hereof. Nothing in this Agreement shall obligate Secured Party to perform any
duty, covenant or obligation required to be performed by Pledgor in connection with the Pledged
Collateral.
8.

Default

Any one of the following events shall constitute a default by Pledgor under this
Agreement (a "Default"):
(a)
Failure of Pledgor promptly to pay within five (5) days of the date due, or
declared due, any interest under the Note; provided that such failure shall not constitute a Default
hereunder unless such failure cannot be cured by transfer of funds from the Collateral Account in
accordance with Section 6.2.1 of the Security Agreement because insufficient funds exist in such
account or for other reasons outside of Secured Party's sole control; or
(b)
Failure to pay within five (5) days of the date due, or declared due, any
principal under the Note; or

(c)
Breach of any representation, warranty, term or condition contained in this
Agreement which breach materially and adversely impairs the value of the Pledged Collateral or
the ability of Secured Party to enforce the Note or realize upon the Pledged Collateral, and which
default continues after notice and a thirty (30) day opportunity to cure; or
(d)
Failure of Pledgor fully and timely to perform and observe any of the
terms, conditions and provisions contained in the Redemption Agreement, Note, Security
Agreement, or any other instrument or agreement between Pledgor and Secured Party relating to
the sale, redemption, transfer or other disposition of Secured Party's stock in Pledgor, as such
terms are defined in the Redemption Agreement, which failure materially and adversely impairs
the value of the Pledged Collateral or the ability of Secured Party to enforce the Note or realize
upon the Pledged Collateral, after any applicable opportunity to cure (if any) within the
applicable agreement; or
(e)
Any levy, attachment or execution on, or seizure of, any of the Pledged
Collateral or the appointment of a receiver to take possession of any of the Pledged Collateral; or;
(f)
Dissolution, termination of existence, insolvency or bankruptcy of Pledgor
or any of its material Subsidiaries; provided that the dissolution or termination of existence of a
Subsidiary (in the absence of insolvency or bankruptcy) shall not constitute a Default if all of the
net proceeds are applied to the purchase of Bonds meeting the requirements of Section 10.

9.

Remedies

General. In the event of a Default by Pledgor under this Agreement, Secured
9.1
Party may, at its election and in its sole discretion, without further notice of such election and
without demand upon Pledgor, do any one or more of the following:
-5-
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(a)

Declare the Secured Obligations immediately due and payable.

(b)
Subject to the receipt of all necessary regulatory approvals, sell all or any
part of the Pledged Collateral at public auction or private sale in accordance with the laws of the
United States or other applicable law, for cash or credit at the election of Secured Party, Pledgor
to be credited with the amounts of any such sale only when the cash proceeds are actually
received by Secured Party. Under no circumstances shall Secured Party be required to expedite
or delay sale of all or any part of the Pledged Collateral due to prevailing or expected conditions
in the market for such Pledged Collateral. Each purchaser at any such sale shall hold the
property sold absolutely free from any claim or right on the part of Pledgor, and Pledgor hereby
waives (to the extent permitted by applicable law) all rights of redemption, stay and/or appraisal
which it now has or may at any time in the future have under any rule of law or statute now
existing or hereafter enacted. Secured Party shall not be obligated to make any sale of Pledged
Collateral regardless of notice of sale having been given. Secured Party may adjourn any public
or private sale from time to time by announcement at the time and place fixed therefor, and such
sale may, without further notice, be made at the time and place to which it was so adjourned.
(c)
Exercise all of the rights and remedies available under the Uniform
Commercial Code as enacted in the applicable jurisdiction or under other applicable law.
9.2
Agent. For the purposes set forth below, Pledgor does hereby irrevocably make,
constitute, designate and appoint Secured Party (and any agent which may be designated by
Secured Party) as Pledgor's true and lawful attorney-in-fact and agent. In the event of any
Default by Pledgor under this Agreement, such agent shall have full power and authority for and
in the name of Pledgorto arrange for the transfer of the Pledged Collateral on the books of
Universe, Farmers, AIAI, or any other issuer of the Shares, to the name of Secured Party, or any
purchaser from or nominee of Secured Party.

Sale ofPledged Collateral. Pledgor recognizes that, subject to the receipt of all
9.3
required regulatory approvals, Secured Party may sell all or any part of the Pledged Collateral
pursuant to Section 9.1 above, as and when applicable by means of one or more private sales to a
restricted group of purchasers who will be obligated to agree, among other things, to acquire
such securities for their own account, for investment and not with a view to distribution or resale.
Pledgor acknowledges that any such private sale or sales may be at places and on terms less
favorable to the seller than if sold at public sales and agrees that such private sales shall be
deemed to have been made in a commercially reasonable manner, and that Secured Party has no
obligation to delay the sale of any such security for the period of time necessary to permit
Universe, Farmers, AIAI, or any other issuer of the Shares to register such securities for public
sale under any applicable securities laws or regulations. In the event any notice is required to be
given to Pledgor with respect to any such sale or disposition of any of the Pledged Collateral, ten
( l 0) calendar days notice of any such action shall be deemed to be a sufficient and commercially
reasonable notice.

-6-

001050

---------

9.4
Liability ofSecured Party. Neither Secured Party nor any employee, attorney,
accountant, underwriter or other agent of Secured Party shall be liable for any action taken or
omitted to be taken in connection with this Agreement, except for its or their own recklessness or
willful misconduct. Secured Party shall not be liable for any claims, demands, losses or damages
made, claimed or suffered by Pledgor, except any that may be caused by Secured Party's
recklessness or willful misconduct. Pledgor shall reimburse Secured Party, on demand, for all
costs and expenses incurred by Secured Party in connection with the administration and
enforcement of this Agreement and for all costs and expenses of the enforcement of th.is
Agreement, and agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Secured Party and the other persons
named above from and against any and all liability incurred in connection with this Agreement

unless such liability is due to their gross negligence or willful
10.

misco::., f ( (If-'-'"' i,
~,,.._..,.

SubstitutionandReleaseofSecurity

/[~

In the event
is able to obtain for the benefit of Secured Party (i) one or more
bonds the
of which are equal to Six Million Dollars ($6,000,000) and which mature
on the maturity date of the Note, or (ii) one or more zero-coupon bonds which have a future
value, as of the maturity date of the Note, equal to Six Million Dollars ($6,000,000), then
Secured Party will allow Pledgor to substitute such bonds for the Pledged Collateral, provided
that the following conditions are satisfied:
(a)
The bonds are marketable and are issued by the U.S. Government or an
obligor approved by Secured Party;
(b)

the bonds are made to secure the Secured Obligations;

(c)
Secured Party receives a first priority security interest in such bonds which
is perfected prior to or simultaneous with the release of the Pledged Collateral;
(d)
Unless such requirement is waived by Secured Party, Pledgor provides an
opinion of legal counsel th.at Secured Party will have a first-priority perfected security interest in
the bonds; and;
(e)
such arrangements are evidenced by executed documents, including a
Bond Pledge Agreement, in form and substance acceptable to Secured Party and Secured Party's
counsel.

If such conditions are met, Secured Party will release the Pledged Collateral and return
any and all certificates and instruments representing or evidencing the Pledged Collateral to
Pledgor.

-7-
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11.

Miscellaneous

11.1 Survival. All representations, warranties and agreements made in this Agreement
or in any related documents shall survive the execution and delivery of this Agreement and any
such related documents.
11.2 Further Assurances. Pledgor will sign such additional documents relating to the
Pledged Collateral as Secured Party may reasonably request in order to provide Secured Party
with the full benefit of this Agreement. Pledgor hereby grants to Secured Party a power of
attorney to execute any such documents as Pledgor's attorney-in-fact. Such power of attorney is
coupled with an interest and shall be irrevocable until the Secured Obligations have been fully
and finally paid.
11.3 Amendment. This Agreement, the Redemption Agreement, and the documents,
instruments, pledge agreements, and other agreements (and all exhibits thereto) entered into in
connection with, and listed within, the Redemption Agreement, contain the complete and final
expression of the entire agreement of the parties. No provision of this Agreement may be
amended, modified, waived, or supplemented, except by a writing signed by the parties to this
Agreement. No waiver by Secured Party of any default shall be a waiver of any other default.
11.4 Remedies Cumulative; Waivers. All rights and remedies of Secured Party shall be
cumulative and may be exercised at such times and in such order as Secured Party determines.
The failure of Secured Party to insist upon or enforce strict performance of any provisions of this
Agreement, the Redemption Agreement, the Note, or the Consulting Agreement, or to exercise
its rights or privileges hereunder or thereunder or any of its rights as provided by statute or law or
in equity or otherwise, shall not impair, prejudice or constitute a waiver of any such right, power,
remedy or privilege or be construed as a waiver of any Default or as an acquiescence therein or
preclude the exercise or enforcement thereof at a later time. Nor shall any single or partial
exercise of any such right, power, remedy or privilege preclude any other or further exercise
thereof or the exercise of any other right, power, remedy or privilege.
11.5 Effectiveness. This Agreement shall remain in full force and effect until the
earlier of (i) the substitution of bonds for the Pledged Collateral in accordance with Section 10
hereof, or (ii) the indefeasible performance or payment in full in cash of the Secured Obligations,
or (iii) the termination of this Agreement in writing by Secured Party_
11.6 Severability. If any of the provisions of this Agreement shall be or become illegal
or unenforceable, the other provisions shall remain in full force and effect.
11. 7 Notices. Any notice under this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be given
as provided in the Redemption Agreement.
11.8 Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in
accordance with, the laws of the State of Idaho, without giving effect to its provisions or
principles regarding conflict of laws.
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11. 9 Headings. Headings used herein are for convenience only and shall not in any
way affect the construction of, or be taken into consideration in interpreting, this Agreement.
11.10 Assignment. This Agreement is not assignable by Pledgor. Secured Party may
assign its rights hereunder to any holder of the Note. All the terms and provisions of this
Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of and be enforceable by the
parties hereto and their respective successors and permitted assigns.

IN WI1NESS WHEREOF the parties have duly executed and delivered this Agreement as
of the date first written above.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION

PLEDGOR:

By ·.

il

(I

~~\

~~?~-=~"~-.-~-~--~~~
Its: -r?'"'-~............,..~-3~-·- - - - ·.1

SECURED PARTY:

STATE OF IDAHO

)

COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

)

) SS.

e. J.L.

. On this day personally appeared before me
~'UJ;
to me known to be
of A<A ~
the corporation that execut d the within and foregoing
instrument, and acknowledged the said instrument to be the free and voluntary act and deed of
said corporation, for the uses and purposes therein mentioned, and on oath stated that h~ is
authorized to execute said instrument and that the seal affixed, if any,. is the corporate seal of said
corporation.

'"";)

I~

<hp.,

GIVEN under my hand and official seal this _1].aay of

I.,,-;

~

, 1995.

~~

(Print name of notary)
NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the State of
Idaho, residing at _~_E-_w_,_,,_r_~------
My commission expires 7- Z..3 - '7 8
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Exhibit A-1
To
Stock Pledge Agreement

ASSIGNMENT SEPARATE FROM CERTIFICATE
[UNIVERSE]
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned hereby assigns and transfers to Reed J.
Taylor f'i'i, 'l'ii shares of the common stock standing in the name of the undersigned on the
books of Universe Life Insurance Company and represented by certificate(s) no. L_ herewith,
c,.. as attorney to transfer that stock
and hereby irrevocably constitutes and appoints :lee
on the books of such corporation with full power of su stitution in the premises. This
assignment is made pursuant to the Stock Pledge Agreement dated as of the date hereof and in
l l - , 1995, between the
connection with the Stock Redemption Agreement dated 3"'IA\
undersigned and Reed J. Taylor, and may be used to transfer the~ve-described shares of stock
after a Default as such is defined under said Stock Pledge Agreement.

ttJlJU

[i;;

._. . __,.
1

. . . . .\. .
DATED this l- L day of_l.__

1995.

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION
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ExhibitA-2
To
Stock Pledge Agreement

ASSIGNMENT SEPARATE FROM CERTIFICATE
[Fanners Health Alliance Administrators, Inc.]
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned hereby assigns and transfers to Reed J.
Taylor / o in~
shares of the common stock standing in the name of the undersigned on the
books ofFanners Health Alliance Administrators, Inc. and represented by certificate(s) no. _l_
herewith, and hereby irrevocably constitutes and appoints S"ec::. ij F~A as attorney to transfer
that stock on the books of such corporation with full power of substitution in the premises. Th.is
assignment is made pursuant to the Stock Pledge Agreement. dated as of the date hereof and in
connection with the Stock Redemption Agreement dated .:J~(} l,..L...
, 1995, between the
undersigned and Reed J. Taylor, and may be used to transfer the ~hove-described shares of stock
after a Default as such is defined under said Stock Pledge Agreement.
DATED this "'l-1-- day of_J
......' /A...,........
£\.,_\_

_..,

1995.

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION
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ExhibitA-3
To
Stock Pledge Agreement

ASSIGNMENT SEPARATE FROM CERTIFICATE

[AIAI]
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned hereby assigns and transfers to Reed J.
Taylor ~ 2.11 ·
shares of the common stock standing in the name of the undersigned on the
books of AJA Insurance, Inc. and represented by certi:ficate(s) no.Co, " herewith, and hereby
as attorney to transfer that stock on the
irrevocably constitutes and appoints s;2c,. 4 Pr r #r [
books of such corporation with full power of substitution in the premises. This assignment is
made pursuant to the Stock Pledge Agreement dated as of the date hereof and in connection with
, 1995, between the undersigned
the Stock Redemption Agreement dated ~ -z,-z....
and Reed J. Taylor, and may be used to transfer the above-described shares of stock after a
Default as such is defined under said Stock Pledge Agreement.
DATED this

z_ ).}'171day of__.=r__.l.._~_..·"+------'' 1995.

'

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION

13568 IB.M44
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Exhibit C
SECURITY AGREEMENT
This SECURITY AGREEMENT is entered into as of -:f tA I y '2.. '- , 1995 by and
among Reed J. Taylor (the "Secured Party"), AIA Services Corporation, an Idaho corporation
("Company"), and Universe Life Insurance Company, an Idaho domestic insurance company,
Farmers Health Alliance Administrators, Inc., an Idaho corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., an
Idaho corporation, and Great Fidelity Life Insurance Company, a stock life insurance company
domiciled in Indiana (together with Company, the ''Companies").

RECITALS
A.
Company and Secured Party are parties to that certain Stock Redemption
Agreement dated as .::lc.t l 'l L '-- , 1995 (the "Redemption Agreement"), pursuant to which
Company will redeem 613,494 shares of its Common Stock held by Secured Party in exchange
for, in part, a Promissory Note of even date herewith in the principal amount of $6,000,000 (the
'"Note"). Company and Secured Party are also parties to that certain Stock Pledge Agreement
(the "Stock Pledge Agreement"), that certain Consulting Agreement (the "Consulting
Agreement") and that certain Noncompetition Agreement (the "Noncompetition Agreement"), all
of even date herewith.

B.
As a condition of Secured Party's entry into the Redemption Agreement, Secured
Party has required that Companies grant it a security interest in all commission revenues received
by or on behalf of Companies and/or their direct or indirect Subsidiaries.
C.
Secured Party desires, and Companies agree to grant to Secured Party, as security
for the Secured Obligations (as defined below) and on the terms and conditions hereinafter set
forth, a security interest in all right, title and interest of Companies in the Commission Collateral
(as defined below).
AGREEMENTS
NOW, TIIEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, and for other
good and valuable consideration the sufficiency and receipt of which are hereby acknowledged,
Secured Party and the Companies agree as follows:
1.

Definitions
As used in this Agreement:

"Account Debtor" means any person or entity having any debt, liability or obligation to
any of the Companies with respect to Commission Collateral.
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"Commission Collateral" means all commissions from the sale of insurance or related
services received by or on behalf of, or payable to, any of the Companies or any of their
Subsidiaries, and any interest thereon.
"Collateral Account" has the meaning given such term in Section 4 of this Agreement.
"Default" means any event referred to in Section 5 of this Agreement.
"Secured Obligations" means the punctual payment and performance by Companies of
any and all obligations, liabilities and amounts now or hereafter owing, due or not due, direct or
indirect, liquidated or contingent, to Secured Party pursuant to any or all of the Redemption
Agreement, the Note, and the Stock Pledge Agreement, including, without limitation, any and all
amounts payable to Secured Party hereunder or thereunder, and prompt observance and
performance by Companies of their covenants, agreements and obligations hereunder and
thereunder.
Capitalized terms used in this Agreement and not otherwise defined shall have the
meanings given to them in the Redemption Agreement.

2.

Security Interest

As collateral security for the prompt and unconditional payment and performance of the
Secured Obligations, Companies hereby grant to Secured Party a security interest in all of their
right, title and interest in and to the Commission Collateral.

3.

Covenants, Representations and Warranties
Companies represent and warrant to Secured Party as follows:

3. J.
Absence of Liens and Interests. Companies are the sole owners of the
Commission Collateral, free of any liens, security interests, claims or other encumbrances of any
kind, except for the liens and security interests granted to Secured Party in this Agreement.
3. 2.
Power arul Authority. Each of the Companies has all requisite power and
authority and full legal right to execute, deliver and perform all its obligations under this
Agreement and to grant a security interest in the Commission Collateral in the manner for the
purpose contemplated by this Agreement, and has the right to grant Secured Party a security
interest in such Commission Collateral.
3. 3
Execution; Binding Contract. This Agreement has been duly executed and
delivered by Companies and constitutes the legal, valid and binding obligation of Companies,
enforceable against Companies each of them in accordance with its terms.
3.4
No Violation. The grant of a security interest in the Commission Collateral by
Companies in the manner and for the purpose cont~mplated by this Agreement does not and will
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not (i) violate any law, rule, regulation, order, judgment, settlement agreement or decree
including, without limitation, any of the foregoing arising out of any regulatory activity or any
insurance regulatory agency or governmental authority of any state, applicable to any of the
Companies, or (ii) result in or require the creation or imposition of (except as granted to Secured
Party by this Agreement) any lien, security interest, encumbrance or right of others of any nature
upon, or with respect to, any of the Commission Collateral.
Companies shall, at their own expense, keep the Commission Collateral free of all
liens and encumbrances except the security interest of Secured Party. Companies shall not make
or agree to make any discount, credit, rebate, set-off or other reduction in the original amount
owning with respect to Commission Collateral other than in accordance with its present policies
and in the ordinary course of business. Companies shall collect and enforce all commission
receivables.
3.5.

3.6.
Sale or Disposition. Without the prior written consent of the Secured Party,
Companies will not sell, use or encumber any portion of the Commission Collateral in violation
of this Agreement.
3. 7.
Government Receivables. If any Commission Collateral arises out of contracts
with the United States or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, Companies will
immediately notify Secured Party in writing and execute any instruments and take any steps
required of Secured Party in order that all amounts due and to become due shall be assigned to
Secured Party and notice thereof given to the United States in compliance with the Federal
Assignment of Claims Act of 1940, as amended.
3. 8
Access and Review. Companies will keep adequate records and books of account,
in which complete entries will be made in accordance with GAAP consistently applied, reflecting
all Commission Collateral and related transactions. As soon as possible, and in any event within
15 days after the end of each calendar month, Companies will furnish to Secured Party
commissions statements showing all commissions earned in such month. Companies will permit
Secured Party to have reasonable access upon reasonable notice and during regular business
hours, to its premises and to all books and records, and to furnish Secured Party and its
representatives such financial and operating data and other information with respect to each such
company's business as Secured Party or its representatives may from time to time request.
3.9
Information Regarding Account Debtors. Companies shall from time to time,
upon request by Secured Party, provide Secured Party with a list of all Account Debtors, together
with their current addresses, telephone numbers, contact persons and balances owed to
Companies, together with copies of all documents relating thereto. Companies hereby authorize
Secured Party to contact Account Debtors to verify account information.
4.

Collateral Account

All Commission Collateral shall be received and held by Companies in trust for Secured
Party, and shall be immediately, upon receipt, deposited in a special bank account (the
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"Collateral Account"). Companies shall, immediately upon execution of this Agreement, notify
the bank or other financial institution with which it maintains the Collateral Account of the
security interest granted to Secured Party hereunder. Companies shall not commingle any
Commission Collateral with any of Companies' other funds or property, but will hold them
separate and apart from any other funds or property and upon an express trust for Secured Party
until deposit thereof is made in the Collateral Account. Companies shall immediately execute
and deliver to Secured Party an irrevocable lock-box agreement in a form acceptable to Secured
Party, which agreement shall be accompanied by the acknowledgment of the bank or financial
institution at which the Collateral Account is located of the lien of Secured Party created
hereunder, and of irrevocable instructions to transfer to a special account controlled solely by the
Secured Party, all amounts collected therein to a special account controlled solely by Secured
Party upon receipt of a written request from Secured Party to do so, all amounts collected aa11i.il
to which Secured Party is entitled under Section 6 of this Agreement. None of the Companies
may amend the lock-box agreement or move or replace the Collateral Account without the
written consent of Secured Party. Unless and until there shall have occurred a Default as set
forth in Section 5 hereof, Companies may apply any portion of the balance of the Collateral
Account to the payment of the Secured Obligations or for other corporate purposes.

5.

Defaults
Each of the following shall be a default ("Default") under this Agreement:

(a)
Failure of Company to pay within five (5) days of the date due any principal or
interest under the Note; or

(b)
Breach of any representation, warranty, term or condition contained in this
Agreement which breach materially and adversely impairs the value of the Commission
Collateral or Secured Party's ability to enforce his rights with respect thereto, and which breach
continues after notice and a thirty (30) day opportunity to cure; or
( c)
Failure of Company to fully and timely to fully perform and observe any terms,
conditions and provisions contained in the Redemption Agreement, Note, Stock Pledge
Agreement, or any other instrument or agreement between Company or any of the Companies
and Secured Party relating to the sale, redemption, transfer or other disposition of Secured
Party's stock in Company, as such terms are defined in the Redemption Agreement, following
any applicable opportunity to cure (if any) within the applicable agreement; or

(d)
Collateral;

Any levy, attachment or execution on, or seizure of, any of the Commission

(e)
Dissolution or termination of existence of Company or any of its material
Subsidiaries; provided that the dissolution or termination of existence of a Subsidiary (in the
absence of insolvency or bankruptcy) shall not constitute a Default if all of the net proceeds are
applied to the purchase of Bonds meeting the requirements of Section 10 of the Stock Pledge
Agreement; or
-4-
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(t)

Insolvency or bankruptcy of any of the Companies or the appointment of a
receiver to take possession of any of the Commission Collateral.

6.

Rights and Remedies of Secured Party
6.1.

General. In addition to the rights and remedies granted to Secured Party in this
Agreement, Secured Party may exercise its rights and remedies in the Redemption Agreement,
the Stock Pledge Agreement, the Consulting Agreement or the Note, and shall at all times have
the rights and remedies of a secured party under the Uniform Commercial Code as enacted in the
State of Idaho and under all other applicable laws. Companies hereby acknowledge and agree
that Secured Party is not required to exercise all rights and remedies available to it equally with
respect to all the Collateral and that Secured Party may select less than all the Collateral with
respect to which the rights and remedies as determined by the Secured Party in its sole discretion
may be exercised.

6. 2.

Remedies

6.2.1 Remedies for Default in Payment of Interest. In the event of a Default
solely in the payment of interest under the Note, Secured Party's sole remedy with respect to the
Commission Collateral shall be to transfer, on behalf of Companies, the sum equal to the pastdue interest from the Collateral Account to the special account controlled by Secured Party;
provided that if there are insufficient funds in the Collateral Account to cure such default,
Secured Party shall have all of the rights and remedies described in Section 6.2.2 hereof.
6.2.2 Remedies for Other Defaults. After the occurrence, and during the
continuance, of a Default, Secured Party may at its election in its sole discretion, without further
notice of such election and without demand upon Companies, take any one or more of the
following actions:
(a)

Declare all or any part of the Secured Obligations due and payable.

(b)
Transfer Commission Collateral from the Collateral Account to an account
controlled solely by Secured Party, any amount to which the Secured Party is entitled to less the
market value of the Bond Fund.
( c)
Endorse any note, draft, check or other instrument or document with
respect to the Commission Collateral, as the attorney-in-fact for Companies, with full power of
substitution.
(d)

Take possession of, open and dispose of all mail addressed to the

Companies.
(e)
Accept and receive payment of, receipt for or defend, settle, compromise
or adjust any claim, suit, action or proceeding with respect to the Commission Collateral. In
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doing so, any determination made by Secured Party as to the risks of litigation and collectibility
shall be deemed to be commercially reasonable unless made in bad faith.

6.3.
Notification ofAccount Debtors. Secured Party may at any time after a Default
notify any or all Account Debtors that they shall, after receipt of such notice, be required to pay
all amounts owed to any of the Companies directly to Secured Party for application to the
Secured Obligations. Any such written notice given by Secured Party may be given on Secured
Party's letterhead and may include the following language and/or such additional or different
language as Secured Party may elect in its sole discretion:
The undersigned holds an assignment of all the commissions receivable of [Name
of Company]. You are hereby notified that all amounts you owe to such parties
are hereafter to be paid to the undersigned at the following address: [Secured
Party's Address].
Any payments made other than as directed in this letter will not be recognized and
will not be credited to your account.
Please do not hesitate to contact the undersigned if you have any questions.

7.

Power of Attorney

Each of the Companies hereby appoints Secured Party, or any person or entity whom
Secured Party may from time to time designate, as such Company's attorney-in-fact, with power,
at any time after the occurrence of a Default to: (a) notify the post office authorities to change
the address for delivery of such Company's mail to an address designated by Secured Party;
(b) receive, open and sort all mail addressed to such Company; (c) send requests for verification
of commission accounts receivable to Account Debtors; (d) qualify such Company to do business
in any state or other jurisdiction as necessary or appropriate to enforcement of Secured Party's
interest in the Commission Collateral; and (e) do all other things that Secured Party is permitted
to do under this Agreement or that are necessary to carry out this Agreement or other agreements
between Company or any of the Companies and Secured Party. Secured Party shall not be liable
for any acts of commission or omission or for any error in judgment or mistake of fact or law,
unless the same shall have resulted from his gross negligence, recklessness or willful
misconduct. This power, being coupled with an interest, is irrevocable sa long as this Agreement
remains in effect.

8.

Revival of Security Interest

To the extent Company makes a payment to Secured Party, which payment is later
invalidated, declared to be a fraudulent transfer or preference, set aside or required to be repaid
under any bankruptcy law, other law or equitable principle, Secured Party's interest in the
Commission Collateral shall be revived and continue as if the payment or proceeds had never
been received by the Secured Party.
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9.

Miscellaneous

9.1.
Financing Statements, Etc. Companies will sign any financing statements and
other filings with governmental offices or agencies, and other documents relating to the
Commission Collateral that Secured Party may request. Secured Party is nevertheless authorized
to file such documents without Companies' signatures and Companies hereby grant to Secured
Party a power of attorney to execute any such documents as Companies' attorney-in-fact. Such
power of attorney is coupled with an interest and shall be irrevocable until Secured Obligations
have been fully and finally paid. Companies will reimburse Secured Party upon demand for all
expenses incurred for the perfection and continuation of perfection of Secured Party's security
interest in the Com.mission Collateral.
9. 2.

Amendment. This Agreement and the other written documents, instruments and
agreements entered into in connection with the Secured Obligations contain the complete and
final expression of the entire agreement of the parties. No provision of this Agreement may be
amended, modified, waived or supplemented, except by a writing signed by the party sought to
be charged with the amendment, modification, waiver or supplementation. No waiver by
Secured Party of any Default shall be a waiver of any other Default.

9.3.

Remedies Cumulative. All rights and remedies of Secured Party shall be
cumulative and may be exercised at such times and in such order as Secured Party determines.
The failure of Secured Party to insist upon or enforce strict performance of any provisions of this
Agreement, the Redemption Agreement, the Stock Pledge Agreement, the Consulting Agreement
or the Promissory Note, or to exercise its rights or privileges hereunder or thereunder or any of
its rights as provided by statute or law or in equity or otherwise, shall not impair, prejudice or
constitute a waiver of any such right, power, remedy or privilege or be construed as a waiver of
any Default or as an acquiescence therein or preclude the exercise or enforcement thereof at a
later time. Nor shall any single or partial exercise of any such right, power, remedy or privilege
preclude any other or further exercise thereof or the exercise of any other right, power, remedy or
privilege.

9. 4.

Effectiveness. lbis Agreement shall remain in full force and effect until the
earlier of (i) the substitution of Bonds for the other Collateral in accordance with Section lO(i) of
the Stock Pledge Agreement, or (ii) the indefeasible performance or payment in full in cash of all
of the Secured Obligations, or (iii) the termination of this Agreement in writing by Secured
Party.

9.5.
Notices. Any notice under this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be given
as provided in the Redemption Agreement.
9.6.

Governing Law. This Security Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in

accordance with the laws of the State ofldaho.

9. 7.

Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts

and by each party on a separate counterpart, each of which when so executed and delivered shall
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be deemed an original and all of which taken together shall constitute but one and the same
instrument.
IN WI1NESS WHEREOF the parties have duly executed and delivered this Agreement
as of the date first written above.
COMPANY:

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION

By:

____._K~~-L..--,Q.~.\1_11- __......t;;;f-=----...=......-·- - - - - - -

Its: _

UNIVERSE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

By:

Its:

A<--ll
"- ii
f{=-fh •' lh=¥--=
(:

FARMERS HEALTII ALLIANCE
ADMINISTRATORS, INC.

By:

d',.'( t I <li-J
a'
,--jz,v-..

Its:

(

v

AIA INSURANCE, INC.

By:

Its:

· criy'1
d;J·cJ.l~

u,

bl •

,?f=

GREAT FIDELITY LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY

By: Its:

1f~l1 0 --·.:,/

If_

~ ~l"-' '

1

l

l/r~ Uu:;:::_

-8-

001064

SECURED PARTY:

355008C.M44
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AMENDED AND RESTATED STOCK PLEDGE AGREEMENT

This Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement is entered into as of July 1, 1996, by
and between AIA Services Corporation, an Idaho corporation ("Pledgor''), and Reed J. Taylor
("Secured Party'').
RECITALS
A.
Pledgor and Secured Party are parties to that certain Stock Redemption Agreement,
dated as of July 22, 1995 (the "Redemption Agreement"), pursuant to which, Pledgor redeemed
613,494 shares of its Common Stock held by Secured Party in exchange for, in part, a promissory
note in the principal amount of$1,500,000 (the ''Down Payment Note") and a promissory note in
the principal amount of $6,000,000 (the "$6M Note"). Pledgor and Secured Party also entered into
a Stock Pledge Agreement (the "Stock Pledge Agreement") and a Security Agreement (the "Security
Agreement"), each dated July 22, 1995, granting a security interest in certain collateral to secure
payment of the $6M Note. Pledgor and Secured Party also entered into a Consulting Agreement (the
"Consulting Agreement") and a Noncompetition Agreement (the ''Noncompetition Agreement"),
both dated July 22, 1995.
B.
The Universe Life Insurance Company, an Idaho domestic insurance company
(''Universe"), Farmers Health Alliance Administrators, Inc., an Idaho corporation ("Farmers"), and
AIA Insurance, Inc., an Idaho corporation ("AIAI''), are wholly owned subsidiaries of Pledgor.
Great Fidelity Life Insurance Company, an Indiana domestic insurer ("GFL"), is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Universe. Universe is in rehabilitation under the laws of the State of Idaho; and GFL
is under supervision under the laws of the State of Indiana. Pledgor, AIAI, Farmers, Universe and
GFL are collectively referenced herein as the "Companies".
C.
Pursuant to the Stock Pledge Agreement, Pledgor pledged all of the shares of capital
stock of each ofUniverse, Farmers and AIAI (collectively, the "Pledged Shares") as security for the
$6M Note and other obligations of Pledgor to Secured Party arising under the Redemption
Agreement.
D.
Concurrent with the execution of this Agreement, Pledgor and Secured Party have
entered into that certain Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement (the "Restructure Agreement")
pursuant to which the obligations and agreements referred to above have been restructured (the
"Restructure").
E.
As a part of the Restructure, Pledgor and Secured Party have agreed to amend and
restate the Security Agreement (as amended, the "Amended Security Agreement") and to amend and
restate the Stock Pledge Agreement to provide, among other things, security for the Down Payment
Note (as amended pursuant to the Restructure, the "Amended Down Payment Note"), to modify
provisions relating to the substitution of bonds for the Pledged Shares, to allow partial or complete
prepayment of the $6M Note and to provide for partial release of Pledged Shares upon partial
prepayment of the $6MNote.

F.
As part of the Restructure, Pledgor and Secured Party have agreed to simplify and
consolidate the Restructure default and remedy provisions.
Page I
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G.
Agreement.

This Agreement amends, restates, supersedes and replaces the Stock Pledge

H.
Capitalized terms used herein but not herein defined have the meanings ascribed to
them in the Restructure Agreement or the Amended Security Agreement.
AGREEMENTS
NOW, TIIEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, and for other good
and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the
parties agree as follows:

1.

Secured Obligations

This Agreement is made to secure the punctual payment and performance by Pledgor of any
and all obligations, liabilities and amounts now or hereafter owing, due or not due, direct or indirect,
liquidated or contingent, to Secured Party pursuant to the Amended Down Payment Note and the
$6M Note and the prompt observance and performance by Pledgor of its covenants, agreements and
obligations hereunder (collectively, the «Secured Obligations").

2.
------

Pledge

As collateral security for the payment and performance in full of the Secured Obligations,
Pledgor hereby pledges, assigns, transfers, delivers and grants to Secured Party a security interest
in all right, title and interest of Pledgor that presently exists or that hereafter may arise in, to and
under (i) the Pledged Shares and all rights and privileges of Pledgor with respect thereto; (ii) all cash
dividends, noncash dividends, stock dividends, interest, cash, instruments and other property from
time to time received, receivable or otherwise distributed in respect of or in exchange for any or all
of the Pledged Shares; (iii) all subscriptions, warrants, options and any other rights issued upon or
in connection with the Pledged Shares; (iv) any additional shares of capital stock of the issuers of
the Pledged Shares hereafter issued; (v) any and all certificates or other instrument or documents
representing any of the foregoing; and (vi) all cash and noncash proceeds of the foregoing (all such
property, collectively, the "Pledged Collateral").

3.

Representations and Warranties
Pledgor represents and warrants to, and agrees with, Secured Party as follows:

3.1
Organization and Good Standing. Each of Pledgor, AIAl and Farmers is a
corporation duly organized, validly existing and in good standing under the laws of the State of
Idaho and has all requisite power and authority to own, lease or operate its properties and to carry
on its business as it is now being conducted. Universe is a domestic insurance company duly
organiz.ed and validly existing under the laws of the State of Idaho, subject to the rights and powers
of the rehabilitator appointed by court order dated March 5, 1996 ("Rehabilitator"). Great Fidelity
is a stock life insurance company duly organized and validly existing under the laws of the State of
Indiana subject to the rights and powers of the supervisor appointed under Indiana law. Pledgor,
AIAI and Farmers are duly qualified to do business and are in good standing as foreign corporations
in all jurisdictions where the failure to be so qualified would materially adversely affect them. As
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of the date of this Agreement, Pledgor owns all of the outstanding capital stock of Universe ( excep
for Directors' qualifying shares), AIAI and Farmers; and, subject to the rights and powers of the
Rehabilitator, Universe owns all of the outstanding capital stock of Great Fidelity.
3 .2
Power and Authority. Pledgor and each of the other Companies has all requisite
power and authority to execute, deliver and perform the Restructured Obligations and to
consummate the transactions contemplated thereby. In particular, but without limiting the foregoing,
Pledgor and AIA have full requisite power and authority and full legal right to grant a security
interest in the Commission Collateral in the manner and for the purpose contemplated by the
Amended Security Agreement. Pledgor's Board of Directors has duly authorized the Restructured
Obligations and the execution and delivery thereof by the Companies and the performance by
Companies of their respective obligations thereunder, including (without limitation) the pledge and
grant to Secured Party of a security interest in the Pledged Collateral and the Commission Collateral
in the manner and for the purpose contemplated by this Agreement and the Security Agreement.
Pledgor has either obtained the consent of its shareholders to the execution and delivery of the
Restructured Obligations and the consummation of the transactions contemplated hereby, or it has
determined that no such consent is required.
3 .3
Binding Contract. The Restructured Obligations have been duly executed and
delivered by Companies and are legal, valid and binding obligations of Companies enforceable
against them in accordance with their terms, except as enforceability may be limited by bankruptcy,
insolvency, reorganization or other similar laws affecting the enforcement of creditors' rights
generally or the availability of equitable remedies subject to the discretion of the court.
3.4
Consents: Noncontravention. Except for any such violation or default which is
waived by the Series A Preferred Shareholder pursuant to the Series A Preferred Shareholder
Agreement, the execution and delivery of the Restructured Obligations and the performance of the
transactions contemplated thereby (including, without limitation, the pledge and grant to Secured
Party of a security interest in the Pledged Shares pursuant to this Agreement and the grant of a
security interest in the Commission Collateral pursuant to the Amended Security Agreement) will
not (i) result in a violation of any of the terms or provisions of the articles of incorporation or bylaws
of Companies or any amendments thereto, or (ii) constitute a violation or default under any
indebtedness, indenture, mortgage, deed of trust, note, bond license, lease agreement or other
material agreement or instrument to which Companies are a party or by which they or any of their
assets may otherwise be bound, or under any law (excluding, however, any law or regulation
pertaining to the Rehabilitator or the rehabilitation of Universe under the Idaho Insurance Code),
rule, license, regulation, judgment, order, ruling or decree governing or affecting the operation of
Companies in any material respect; nor will the same constitute an event permitting termination of
any material agreement or the acceleration of any indebtedness or other liability of Companies, with
or without notice or lapse or time, or result in the creation or imposition of any lien upon any
collateral granted to Creditor pursuant to the Restructured Obligations. No consent, authorization,
approval or exemption by, or filing with, any person, entity or authority is required in connection
with the execution, delivery and peiformance by Companies of the Restructured Obligations or the
taking of any action contemplated thereby.
3. 5
Title to Pledged Shares: Encumbrances. The Pledged Shares include all of the issued
and outstanding capital stock of each of Universe, Farmers, and AIAI. Pledgor owns beneficially
and of record all of the Pledged Shares, free and clear of all pledges, liens, encumbrances, security
interests, equities, claims, options or limitations on Company's ability to vote such shares or to
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transfer such shares to Secured Party, except for any interest in the Universe stock on the part of the
Rehabilitator and the liens in favor of Secured Party created in connection with the transactions
contemplated by this Agreement. Subject to the rights and powers of the Rehabilitator in connection
with the Universe shares, Pledgor has full right, title and interest in and to the Pledged Shares, and
full authority to pledge the Pledged Shares to Secured Party as security for performance of the
Secured Obligations. All. of the Pledged Shares have been duly authorized and validly issued, and
are fully paid and nonassessable. Secured Party acknowledges he has physical possession of the
certificates evidencing all of the Pledged Shares. Upon execution ofthis Agreement, Secured Party
will have a first priority, perfected security interest in the Pledged Shares. There are no options,
warrants, calls, subscriptions, rights, agreements, commitments or understandings of any nature that
call for the issuance, sale, pledge or other disposition of any Pledged Shares or which entitle any
person to acquire such shares, other than those rights arising under this Agreement.
3.6
Title to Commission Collateral. Companies are the sole owners of the Commission
Collatera1, free of any liens, security interests, claims or other encumbrances of any kind, except for
(i) standard rights of insurers to recover commissions paid on subsequently lapsed or cancelled
policies or certificates of insurance, (ii) the liens and security interests granted to Secured Party in
the Amended Security Agreement and (iii) a previously granted security interest granted to
Centennial Life Insurance Company ("Centennial").
3. 7

Protection of Security Interest.

(a)
Companies shall, at their own expense, keep the Commission Collateral free
of all liens and encumbrances except the security interests of Secured Party and Centennial.
Companies shall not make or agree to make any discount, credit, rebate, set-off or other reduction
in the original amount owing with respect to Commission Collateral other than in accordance with
its present policies and in the ordinary course of business. Companies shall collect and enforce all
commission receivables. Companies will keep adequate records and books of account, in which
complete entries will be made in accordance with industry practice, applied, reflecting all
Commission Collateral and related transactions.
(b)
To Pledgor's knowledge, the Pledged Collateral is not subject to any option,
agreement, assessment, charge or other contractual restriction of any nature that might prohibit,
impair, delay or otherwise affect the pledge of the Pledged Collateral hereunder or the sale or
disposition of the Pledged Collateral pursuant hereto by Secured Party. Secured Party acknowledges
that applicable insurance regulations may require regulatory approval prior to strict foreclosure upon
or sale of insurance company stock. Pledgor will not suffer or permit any lien or encumbrance of
any nature, other than those granted to Secured Party, to attach to the Pledged Collateral. Pledgor
will fully and punctually perform any duty required of it in connection with the Pledged Collateral
and will not take any action that will impair, damage or destroy Secured Party's rights with respect
to the Pledged Collateral. Pledgor will remain the sole shareholder of all of the outstanding capital
stock of Universe (other than Directors' qualifying shares), Farmers and AIAI. Pledgor will not
permit Universe, Farmers or AIAI to issue any additional capital stock~ and any attempt to issue
additional shares of such capital stock shall be invalid.

3.8
Financial Condition. The consolidated financial statements of Pledgor and its
subsidiaries for the years ended December 31, 1995, 1994 and 1993 and for the quarter ended March
31, 1996 attached hereto as Schedule 3.8, including any adjustments thereto reflected on Schedule
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3.8, present fairly the :financial condition and results of operations and changes in financial position
of Pledgor as of such respective dates and for the respective periods then ended in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") applied on a consistent basis, and Pledgor has
no actual knowledge of any change in the financial condition of Companies since March 31, 1996
which a reasonable person would consider likely to have a material adverse effect on the value of
Pledged Collateral or the Commission Collateral, or on Secured Party's ability to enforce its
remedies hereunder, except for matters already disclosed by Pledgor to Secured Party.

3.9
Compliance with Laws. Pledgor, AIAI and Farmers are in compliance in all material
respect with all federal, state and local laws, statutes, rules, regulations and orders of all
governmental authorities material to its business.
3. 10 Defaults. Except for any such violation or default which is being waived by the
Series A Preferred Shareholder in the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement, none of Pledgor,
AIAI or Farmers is in material violation of any of the terms or provisions of its articles of
incorporation or bylaws or any amendments thereto, or in violation or default under any
indebtedness, indenture, mortgage, deed of trust, note, bond license, lease agreement or other
material agreement or instrument to which any of such Companies is a party or by which it or any
ofits assets may otherwise be bound, or of any law, rule, license, regulation, judgment, order, ruling
or decree governing or affecting the operation of such Companies in any material respect.
3. 11 Litigation. There are no claims, actions, suits, proceedings or investigations pending
or, to the best of Pledgor's knowledge, threatened against or relating to Companies, at law or in
equity before or by any governmental authority, the adverse resolution of which a reasonable person
would consider to be likely to have a material adverse effect on the value of the Pledged Collateral
or the Commissions Collateral, or on Secured Party's ability to enforce its remedies hereunder,
except for matters already disclosed by Pledgor to Secured Party.
4.
Covenants. Pledgor hereby covenants to Secured Party that, until the earlier of (i) the
pledge of bonds having a fair market value equal to the principal amount of the $6M Note in
substitution for the Pledged Collateral and the Commission Collateral in accordance with Section
lO(a) ofthe this Agreement, or (ii) the payment in full of the Amended Down Payment Note and the
$6M Note, it will perform and observe the following covenants:

4.1
Pledgor will provide Secured Party with quarterly financial statements for the first
three fiscal quarters for each of the Companies, prepared in accordance with GAAP.
4.2
Pledgor will provide Secured Party with consolidating financial statements, if
available, or if such statements are not available, consolidated financial statements, for the first three
quarters for Pledgor and all of its direct and indirect Subsidiaries, prepared in accordance with
GAAP; provided that, if such statements have not been completed and made available to Pledgor's
management within 60 days of the end of fiscal quarter, Pledgor shall provide Secured Party with
quarterly financial statements on an estimated combined basis by such date; and Pledgor shall not
be deemed to have failed to satisfy this covenant if Pledgor delivers final consolidated financial
statements to Secured Party as soon as they are available to Pledgor's management.
4.3
Pledgor will provide Secured Party with annual audited consolidating financial
statements, if available, or if such statements are not available, consolidated financial statements,
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including the fourth quarter of Pledgor's fiscal year, prepared in accordance with GAAP; provided
that, if such statements have not been completed and made available to Pledgor's management within
180 days of the end of the fiscal year, Pledgor shall provide Secured Party with annual financial
statements on an estimated combined basis by such date; and Pledgor shall not be deemed to have
failed to satisfy this covenant if Pledgor delivers final annual audited consolidated financial
statements to Secured Party as soon as such statements become available to Pledgor's management.
4.4
Pledgor will provide Secured Party with monthly income statements for Pledgor on
an estimated combined basis as soon as they are available to Pledgor's management.
Pledgor will provide Secured Party with a weekly summary of new insurance
4.5
business submitted, showing weekly, month-to-date and year-to-date summaries.
4.6
Pledgor will provide Secured Party with monthly statements of commissions earned
by any of the Companies as soon as they are available to Pledgor's management, and copies of
AIAI's monthly bank statement for the Collateral Account and for Mark Twin Kansas Bank Account
No. 8613004124 or any substitute account immediately upon Company's receipt of such statements.
As of the last day of each fiscal quarter, Pledgor shall maintain retained earnings,
4. 7
calculated in accordance with GAAP, equal to or greater than retained earnings for Pledgor as of
December 31, 1995 as shown on Pledgor's audited annual consolidated financial statement for the
year ended December 31, 1995 attached hereto as Schedule 3.8.
4.8
Pledgor will not loan funds to any affiliate other than its wholly-owned Subsidiaries
or as authorized by its existing Articles of Incorporation, or except to pay loan reimbursement to
John Taylor for income tax liabilities attributable to the 1988 reorganization of the Pledgor incident
to Secured Party's divorce;
4. 9
Pledgor will not mortgage, pledge, subject to lien or other encumbrance, sell, assign
or transfer any collateral granted to Creditor pursuant to the Restructured Obligations.
4 .1 O Pledgor will use its best efforts to ensure that Creditor or his designee remains a
member of Pledgor's Board of Directors until full payment of the Amended Down Payment Note
and the earlier of (i) the pledge of bonds meeting the requirements of Section lO(a) hereof, or (ii)
the pledge of bonds meeting the requirements of Section 1O(b) hereof, or (iii) the substitution for
the Pledged Shares and the Commission Collateral of other collateral or security acceptable to
Creditor or (iv) the payment in full of the $6M Note.
4.11 Pledgor will ensure that no additional shares of capital stock are issued by Universe,
Farmers, AIAI or GFL;
4.12 Pledgor will use its best efforts to obtain and pledge to Secured Party, as soon as
possible, but in no event later than the consummation of a public offering by the Pledgor, bonds
meeting the requirements set forth in Section 10 of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement.
Pledgor shall have no obligation to prepare and provide to Secured Party any reports of
financial or other business information, other than information expressly required by this Section
4. With respect to the covenants set forth in Sections 4.4 and 4.5, if, as a result of future changes
Page6
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•
in Pledgor's structure or operations, any required information is no longer regularly prepared or
available to Pledgor's management, Pledgor and Secured Party shall negotiate in good faith to
substitute other reports of such equivalent information as may then be available.
Secured Party agrees that neither he nor any of his agents shall communicate with any of
Pledgor's personnel concerning the Pledgor's financial condition or results of operations, except
through Pledgor's president, chief financial officer or legal officer.

5.

Possession of Pledged Collateral; Assignments

(a)
On or before the effective date of this Agreement, Secured Party has obtained
physical possession of all instruments and stock certificates pertaining to the Pledged Shares.
Pledgor agrees to deliver to Secured Party promptly upon receipt all instruments and stock
certificates pertaining to the Pledged Collateral acquired in the future. Without limiting the
foregoing, if Pledgor shall purchase or otherwise become entitled to receive or shall receive, in
connection with any of the Pledged Collateral, any: (i) stock certificate, including without limitation
any certificate representing a stock dividend or in connection with any increase or reduction of
capital, reclassification, merger, consolidation, sale of assets, combination of shares, stock split,
spin-off, split-off, split-up or liquidation; (ii) option, warrant, or right, whether as an addition to or
in substitution or in exchange for any of its securities, or otherwise; or (iii) dividend or distribution
payable in cash or property, including securities issued by other than Universe, Farmers or AIAI;
then Pledgor shall accept it in trust for Secured Party and shall immediately deliver it to Secured
Party in the exact form received, with Pledgor's endorsement when necessary, or appropriate stock
powers duly executed in blank to be held by Secured Party as part of the Pledged Collateral.
(b) Pledgor has previously delivered to Secured Party Assignments Separate from
Certificate ("Assignments"), in the form attached as Exhibits A-1, A-2 and A-3 to this Agreement,
covering all the Pledged Shares. Such Assignments have been endorsed in blank by Pledgor before
delivery to Secured Party. Secured Party may not use such Assignments to transfer the Pledged
Collateral except in realization on its security interests in the Pledged Collateral after the occurrence,
and during the continuance, of a Default (as defined in Section 8 hereof).
6.

Pledgor's Voting Rights

So long as no Default under this Agreement has occurred and is continuing, Pledgor shall
be entitled to exercise any voting rights incident to the Pledged Collateral, subject to any restriction
on such voting rights contained herein. Upon the occurrence and continuation of a Default,
Pledgor' s right to exercise such voting rights shall immediately cease and terminate and all voting
rights with respect to the Pledged Collateral shall rest solely and exclusively in Secured Party. The
foregoing sentence shall constitute and grant to Secured Party an irrevocable proxy coupled with an
interest to vote the Pledged Collateral upon the occurrence and continuation of such a Default, and
any officer of Universe, Farmers, or AIAI, as the case may be, may rely on written notice from
Secured Party as to the existence of a Default and Secured Party's right to vote such Pledged
Collateral. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this Section 6, Secured Party's right to vote
the Universe shares is subject to all insurance regulatory requirements applicable to Universe and/or
GFL.
7.

Default
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Any one of the following events shall constitute a default by Pledgor under this Agreement
(a "Default"):
(a)
Failure of Pledgor to pay, either directly or through Bank pursuant to the
Escrow Agreement, within ten (10) days ofthe date due any principal or interest under the Amended
Down Payment Note or the $6M Note; or
(b)
Failure of Bank to transfer to the Secured Party Account (as defined in the
Escrow Agreement), within ten (I 0) days of the date due, any principal or interest under the
Amended Down Payment Note or the $6M Note, provided however that a Default under Sections
7(a) or 7(b) hereof shall not be deemed to have occurred if (i) the amount due is paid directly by
Pledgor or (ii) if Bank's failure to transfer such funds to the Secured Party Account results from
Bank's negligence or intentional malfeasance or any other reason not within Pledgor's control (other
than insufficiency of deposits into the Collateral Account) and, within five (5) days of Pledgor's
discovery of such failure to transfer such funds to the Secured Party Account, Pledgor instructs Bank
in writing to immediately transfer the amount then due to the Secured Party Account and, within
thirty (30) days of such discovery, either Bank or Secured Party pays Secured Party the amount then
due; or
( c)
Default by Company in the performance of any of its obligations pursuant to
Section 4 of the Amended Security Agreement or pursuant to the Lockbox Agreement which default
continues after notice and a three (3) day opportunity to cure; or
(d)
Breach of any representation, warranty, covenant, term or condition contained
in this Agreement which breach materially and adversely impairs the value of the Commission
Collateral or the Pledged Shares or Secured Party's ability to enforce its rights with respect thereto,
and which breach continues after notice and a thirty-day opportunity to cure; or
(e)
Any levy, attachment or execution on, or seizure of, any of the Commission
Collateral or the Pledged Shares which materially and adversely impairs the value of the
Commission Collateral or the Pledged Shares or Secured Party's ability to enforce his rights with
respect thereto, and which breach continues after notice and a thirty (30) day opportunity to cure;
or
(f)
Dissolution or termination of existence of Company or any of its material
Subsidiaries; provided that the dissolution or termination of existence of a Subsidiary (in the· absence
of insolvency or bankruptcy) shall not constitute a Default if bonds meeting the requirements of
Section IO(a) the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement are acquired and pledged to Secured Party
pursuant thereto; or
(g)
Insolvency or bankruptcy of Pledgor or any of its material Subsidiaries or the
appointment of a receiver to take possession of any of the Commission Collateral or the Pledged
Shares.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, rehabilitation, supervision or liquidation of Universe
and/or GFL under applicable insurance laws or the sale of Universe or GFL stock in connection
therewith shall not constitute a Default hereunder.
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9.

Remedies

9.1
General. In the event ofa Default by Pledgor under this Agreement, Secured Party
may, at its election and in its sole discretion, without further notice of such election and without
demand upon Pledgor, do any one or more of the following:
(a)

Accelerate and declare the Secured Obligations immediately due and payable

in full;

(b)
Subject to receipt of all necessary regulatory approvals, sell all or any part of
the Pledged Collateral at public auction or private sale in accordance with the laws of the State of
Idaho, for cash or credit at the election of Secured Party, Pledgor to be credited with the amounts
of any such sale only when the cash proceeds are actually received by Secured Party. Under no
circumstances shall Secured Party be required to expedite or delay sale of all or any part of the
Pledged Collateral due to prevailing or expected conditions in the market for such Pledged
Collateral. Each purchaser at any such sale shall hold the property sold absolutely free from any
claim or right on the part of Pledgor. Secured Party shall not be obligated to make any sale of
Pledged Collateral regardless of notice of sale having been given. Secured Party may adjourn any
public or private sale from time to time by announcement at the time and place fixed therefor, and
such sale may, without further notice, be made at the time and place to which it was so adjourned;
and/or
(c)
Exercise all of the rights and remedies available under the Uniform
Commercial Code as enacted in the State of Idaho or under other applicable law.

Sale of Pledged Collateral. Pledgor recognizes that, subject to receipt of all
9.2
necessary regulatory approvals, Secured Party may sell all or any part of the Pledged Collateral
pursuant to Section 9.1 above, as and when applicable by means of one or more private sales to a
restricted group of purchasers who will be obligated to agree, among other things, to acquire such
securities for their own account, for investment and not with a view to distribution or resale. Private
sales shall be proper if made in a commercially reasonable manner; and Secured Party has no
obligation to delay the sale of any such security for the period of time necessary to permit Universe,
Farmers, AIAI, or any other issuer of the Pledged Shares to register such securities for public sale
under any applicable securities laws or regulations. In the event any notice is required to be given
to Pledger with respect to any such sale or disposition of any of the Pledged Collateral, ten (10)
calendar days notice of any such action shall be deemed to be a sufficient and commercially
reasonable notice.
9.3
Sale of Substitute Collateral. The parties acknowledge and agree that, in the event
zero coupon bonds meeting the requirements of Section 1O(b) hereof are substituted for the Pledged
Shares, such bonds are intended to secure payment of the principal of the $6M Note at its stated
maturity date, and that the security interest in Commission Collateral granted in the Amended
Security Agreement is intended to secure Company's obligation to pay the interest on the $6M Note
prior to stated maturity. In the event of a Default occurring after zero coupon bonds meeting the
requirements of Section 1O(b) hereof are substituted for the Pledged Shares, Company shall convey
such bonds to Creditor in lieu of foreclosure; and such conveyance shall discharge Company's
obligation to pay the principal of the $6M Note at maturity. However, the Company's obligation to
pay the interest on the $6M Note shall continue in the form of a monthly annuity of $41,250 (or, if
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such Note has been partially prepaid prior to the Default, such lesser monthly amount of interest due
on the unpaid principal balance immediately prior to such Default) payable until the stated maturity
date of the $6M Note; and such obligation shall continue to be secured by the security interest in
Commission Collateral pursuant to the terms of the Amended Security Agreement.
9.4
Attorneys' Fees. In the event either party is required to retain the services of an
attorney in order to enforce the terms or provisions of this Agreement or any of the other
Restructured Obligations, the prevailing party in any litigation arising therefrom shall be entitled
to recover reasonable costs of collection and sale of collateral and reasonable attorneys' fees.

10.

Substitution and Release of Security

In the event that Pledgor is able to obtain for the benefit of Secured Party (a) bonds having
a fair-market-value equal to Six Million Dollars ($6,000,000) or (b) bonds the aggregate face
amount of which equals $6,000,000 as of August 1, 2005, then Secured Party will allow Pledgor to
substitute such bonds for the Pledged Collateral; provided that in either case the following
conditions are satisfied:
(i)

The bonds are issued by the U.S. Government or an obliger approved by

(ii)

The bonds are pledged to secure the Secured Obligations;

Secured Party;

(iii)
Secured Party receives a first priority security interest in such bonds which
is perfected prior to or simultaneously with the release of the Pledged Collateral;
(iv)
Unless such requirement is waived by Pledgor, Pledger provides an opinion
oflegal counsel that Secured Party will have a first-priority perfected security interest in the bonds;
(v)

The Amended Down Payment Note has been paid in full; and

(vi)
Such arrangements are evidenced by executed documents, including a bond
pledge agreement, in form and substance acceptable to Secured Party and Secured Party's counsel.

If such conditions are met, Secured Party will release the Pledged Collateral and return any
and all certificates and instruments representing or evidencing the Pledged Collateral to Pledger,
including, without limitation, the certificates for the Pledged Shares and the Assignments. In
addition, if and only if bonds meeting the requirements of Section 1O(a) are pledged to secure the
Secured Obligations and if Company otherwise meets the requirements of this Section 10, the
security interest in Commission Collateral granted in the Amended Security Agreement shall also
be released.
Pledger shall have the right, throughout the remaining term of the $6M Note, to prepay all
or part of the outstanding balance of principal and accrued but unpaid interest without premium or
penalty. In the event of any partial prepayment of the $6M Note after substitution of bonds for the
Pledged Collateral, Company may reduce the amount of bonds securing the $6M Note, provided that
the fair-market-value (in the case of bonds meeting the requirements of Section IO(a)) or the
aggregate face value (in the case of bonds meeting the requirements of Section I O(b) of the
001075
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remaining bonds shall not be less than 110% of the remaining principal balance of the $6M Note. ·

11.

Miscellaneous

11. 1 Survival. All representations, warranties and agreements made in this Agreement or
in any related documents shall survive the execution and delivery of this Agreement and any such
related documents.
11.2 Further Assurances. (a) Pledgor will sign such additional documents relating to the
Pledged Collateral as Secured Party may reasonably request in order to provide Secured Party with
the full benefit of this Agreement. Pledgor hereby grants to Secured Party a power of attorney to
execute any such documents as Pledgor' s attorney-in-fact. Such power of attorney is coupled with
an interest and shall be irrevocable until the Secured Obligations have been fully and finally paid.
(b) Upon the pledge of bonds under Section 10 hereof, Secured Party will deliver the
Pledged Shares and attendant Assignments to Pledger, and will sign such additional documents
relating to the Pledged Collateral as Pledgor may reasonably request in order to provide Pledgor
with the full benefit of this Agreement. Secured Party hereby grants to Pledgor a power of attorney
to execute any such documents as Secured Party's attorney-in-fact. Such power of attorney is
coupled with an interest and shall be irrevocable upon Pledgor's satisfaction of the conditions of
Section 10 hereof

11.3 Amendment. This Agreement amends, restates, supersedes and replaces the Stock
Pledge Agreement which shall hereafter have no further force or effect. This Agreement and the
other Restructured Obligations contain the complete and final expression of the entire agreement
of the parties. No provision of this Agreement may be amended, modified, waived, or
supplemented, except by a writing signed by the parties to this Agreement. No waiver by Secured
Party of any default shall be a waiver of any other default.
11.4 Remedies Cumulative: Waivers. All rights and remedies of Secured Party shall be
cumulative and may be exercised at such times and in such order as Secured Party determines. The
failure of Secured Party to insist upon or enforce strict performance of any provisions of the
Restructured Obligations, or to exercise its rights or privileges hereunder or thereunder or any of its
rights as provided by statute or law or in equity or otherwise, shall not impair, prejudice or constitute
a waiver of any such right, power, remedy or privilege or be construed as a waiver of any Default
or as an acquiescence therein or preclude the exercise or enforcement thereof at a later time. Nor
shall any single or partial exercise of any such right, power, remedy or privilege preclude any other
or further exercise thereof or the exercise of any other right, power, remedy or privilege.
11.5 Effectiveness. This Agreement shall remain in full force and effect until (i) all the
Secured Obligations have been indefeasibly performed or paid in full in cash, and (ii) this
Agreement has been terminated in writing by Secured Party.
11.6 Severability. If any ofthe provisions of this Agreement shall be or become illegal
or unenforceable, the other provisions shall remain in full force and effect.
11. 7

Notices.

All notices, requests, demands and other communications which are
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required to be or may be given under any of the Restructured Obligations shall be in writing and
shall be deemed to have been duly given when delivered in person or transmitted by telex, facsimile,
cable or telegram, or by certified or registered first class mail, postage prepaid, return receipt
requested, to the respective parties as follows:

If to Company, to:

AIA Services Corporation
P.O. Box 538
One Lewis Clark Plaza
Lewiston ID 83501
Attention: John Taylor

With a copy to:

Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &
McKlveen, Chartered
P.O. Box 1368
Boise ID 83701-13 68
Attention: Richard A Riley

Ifto Shareholder, to:

Reed J. Taylor
P.O. Box 1165
Lewiston ID 83501
Caimcross & Hempelmann
70th Floor, Columbia Center
701 Fifth Avenue
Seattle WA 98104-7016
Attention: W. Frank Taylor
Donna J. Taylor
clo
'5Zt Q TA- U:" /l

With a copy to:

If to Series A Preferred
Shareholder, to:
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) ·
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or to such other address as any party may have furnished to the others in writing in accordance
herewith, except that notices of change of address shall be effective only upon receipt.

11.8 Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in accordance
with, the laws of the State of Idaho, without giving effect to their provisions or principles regarding
conflict of laws.
11. 9 Headings. Headings used herein are for convenience only and shall not in any way
affect the construction of, or be taken into consideration in interpreting, this Agreement.
11.10 Assignment. This Agreement is not assignable by Pledgor. Secured Party may
assign its rights hereunder to any corporation or other entity controlled by Secured Party. All the
terms and provisions of this Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of and
be enforceable by the parties hereto and their respective successors and permitted assigns.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have duly executed and delivered this Agreement as
of the date first written above.
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PLEDGOR:

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION

By_-+----!~~->'4-'-A----
Its _ _~~~I-_!.._--SECURED PARTY:
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EXHIBIT A-3
TO
AMENDED AND RESTATED STOCK PLEDGE AGREEMENT

ASSIGNMENT SEPARATE FROM CERTIFICATE
[AJA INSURANCE,INC.]

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned hereby assigns and transfers to REED J.
TAYLOR 6,219 shares of the common stock standing in the name of the undersigned on the books
of AJA Insurance, Inc. and represented by Certificate(s) No. 10 and 11 herewith, and hereby
irrevocably constitutes and appoints the Secretary of AIA Insurance, Inc. as attorney to transfer that
stock on the books of such corporation with full power of substitution in the premises. This
assignment is made pursuant to the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement dated as of the
date hereof and in connection with the Stock Redemption Agreement dated July 22, 1995, between
the undersigned and Reed J. Taylor, and may be used to transfer the above-described shares of stock
after a Default as such is defined under said Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement.
DATED this 22nd day of July, 1995.

STATE OF IDAHO

)

:ss.
County of Nez Perce

)

On this _ _ day of
1995, before me, appeared
known or
identified to me to be the
of
the corporation that executed
the instrument and the person who executed the instrument on behalf of said corporation and
acknowledged to me that such corporation executed the same.
lN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day
and year in this certificate first above written.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at
Idaho
My Commission Expires: _ __
07/12/% 2:1 lpm/s
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EXHIBIT A-1
TO
AMENDED AND RESTATED STOCK PLEDGE AGREEMENT
ASSIGNMENT SEPARATE FROM CERTIFICATE
[UNIVERSE]

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned hereby assigns and transfers to REED J.
TAYLOR 999,995 shares of the common stock standing in the name of the undersigned on the
books of The Universe Life Insurance Company and represented by Certificate(s) No. 1 herewith,
and hereby irrevocably constitutes and appoints the Secretary of The Universe Life Insurance
Company as attorney to transfer that stock on the books of such corporation with full power of
substitution in the premises. This assignment is made pursuant to the Amended and Restated Stock
Pledge Agreement dated as of the date hereof and in connection with the Stock Redemption
Agreement dated July 22,1995, between the undersigned and Reed J. Taylor, and may be used to
transfer the above-described shares of stock after a Default as such is defined under said Amended
and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement.
DATED this 22nd day of July, 1995.
AJA SERVICES CORPORATION

By~~
Its~

)
:ss.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Nez Perce

)

On this _ _ day of
1995, before me, appeared
known or
identified to me to be the
of
the corporation that executed
the instrument and the person who executed the instrument on behalf of said corporation and
acknowledged to me that such corporation executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day
and year in this certificate first above written.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at
Idaho
My Commission Expires: - - -
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EXHIBIT A-2
TO
AMENDED AND RESTATED STOCK PLEDGE AGREEMENT

ASSIGNMENT SEPARATE FROM CERTIFICATE
[FARMERS HEALTH ALLIANCE ADMINISTRATORS, INC.]

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned hereby assigns and transfers to REED J.
TAYLOR 1,000 shares of the common stock standing in the name of the undersigned on the books
of Farmers Health Alliance Administrators, Inc. and represented by Certificate(s) No. 1 herewith,
and hereby irrevocably constitutes and appoints the Secretary of Farmers Health Alliance
Administrators, Inc. as attorney to transfer that stock on the books of such corporation with full
power of substitution in the premises. This assignment is made pursuant to the Amended and
Restated Stock Pledge Agreement dated as of the date hereof and in connection with the Stock
Redemption Agreement dated July 22, 1995, between the undersigned and Reed J. Taylor, and may
be used to transfer the above-described shares of stock after a Default as such is defined under said
Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement.
DATED this 22nd day of July, 1995.

STATE OF IDAHO

)

:ss.
County of Nez Perce

)

On this _ _ day of
1995, before me, appeared
known or
identified to me to be the
of
the corporation that executed
the instrument and the person who executed the instrument on behalf of said corporation and
acknowledged to me that such corporation executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day
and year in this certificate first above written.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at
Idaho
My Commission Expires: - - -
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~ AMENDEDANDRESTATEDSECURITYAGREE~XHIBIT .8
This Amended and Restated Security Agreement (the "Agreement") is entered into as of July
1, 1996, by and among Reed J. Taylor ("Secured Party"), AJA Services Corporation, an Idaho
corporation ("Company"), and AJA Insurance, Inc., an Idaho corporation ("AIAI") (together with
Company, the "Companies").
RECITALS
A
Company and Secured Party are parties to that certain Stock Redemption Agreement
dated as July 22, 1995 (the "Redemption Agreement"), pursuant to which Company redeemed
613,494 shares ofits Common Stock held by Secured Party in exchange for, in part, a promissory
note in the principal amount of$1,500,000 (the "Down Payment Note") and a promissory note in
the principal amowtt of$6,000,000 (the "$6M Note"). Company and Secured Party also entered into
a Security Agreement (the "Security Agreement") and a stock Pledge Agreement (the "Stock Pledge
Agreement"), each dated July 22, 1995, granting security interests in certain collateral to secure
payment of the $6M Note. Company and Secured Party also entered into a Consulting Agreement
(the "Consulting Agreement") and a Noncompetition Agreement (the "Noncompetition
Agreement"), both dated July 22, 1995.

_,...__

Concurrent with the execution of this Agreement, Company and Secured Party have
B.
entered into that certain Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement (the "Restructure Agreement")
pursuant to which the obligations and agreements referred to above have been restructured (the
"Restructure").
As a part ofthe Restructure, Company and Secured Party have agreed to· amend and
re&ate the Security Agreement to provide, among other things, for security for the Down Payment
Note (as amended pursuant to the Restructure, the" Amended Down Payment Note") and for new
ap-angements relating to the location and disposition of Commission Collateral.
C.

D.
AsapartoftheRestructure, Company and Secured Party have agreed to simplify and
consolidate the Restructure default and remedy provisions into an Amended and Restated Stock
Pledge Agreement ("Amended Stock Pledge Agreement").
E.

This Agreement amends, restates, supersedes and replaces the Security Agreement.

E.
Capitalized terms used herein but not herein defined have the meanings ascribed to
them in the Restructure Agreement.

AGREEMENTS

·

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, and for other
good and valuable consideration. the sufficiency and receipt of which are hereby acknowledged,
Secured Party and the Companies agree as follows:

-------
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1.

Definitions
As used in this Agreement:

"Commission Collateral" means all commissions from the sale of insurance or related
services received by or on behalf of, or payable to, any of the Company, A1AI or any of Company's
other Subsidiaries, and any int~rest thereon.
J

"Collateral Account" has the meaning given such tenn in Section 4 of this Agreement.
"Secured Obligafions" means the punctual payment and perfonnance by Company of any
and all monetary obligations., liabilities and amounts now or hereafter owing, due or not due, direct
or indirect, liquidated or contingent, to Secured Party pursuant to the Attorney Fee Reimbursement
Agreement, the Amended Down Payment Note and the $6M Note.
''Subsidiary" of a person means (i) any corporation 50% or more of the outstanding voting
securities having ordinary voting power of which shall at the time be owned or controlled,directly
or indirectly, by such person or by one or more of its Subsidiaries or by such person and one or more
ofits Subsidiaries, or (ii) any partnership, association, joint venture or similar business organizations ..... -·· ..... .
500/o or more of the ownership interests having ordinary voting power of which shall at the time be
so owned or controlled.

2.

Security Interest

As collateral security for the prompt and unconditional payment and performance of the
Secured Obligations, Companies hereby grant to Secured Party a security interest in all of their right,
title and interest in and to the Commission Collateral.

S.
4.

[Intentionally Omitted.]

CoUateral Account

All Commission Collateral shall be received and held by Companies in trust for
Secured·· Party, and shall be immediately, upon receipt, deposited in a special bank accouµt (the
"Collateral Account"). Companies shall segregate any Commission Collateral from any of
Companies' other funds or property, and will hold the Commission Collateral separate and apart
from any other funds or property and upon an express trust for Secured Party until deposit thereof
is made in the CoUateral Account. On or before the effective date of this Agreement, AIAI. Secured
Party and the depository institution at which the Collateral Account is maintained shall enter into
an irrevocable lock-box agreement (the "Lockbox Agreement") in the form reqtiired by the
Restructure Agreement. Funds in the Collateral Account shall be disbursed in accordance with the
tenns of the Escrow Agreement. Companies may, subject to applicable notice provisions in the
-...,_ Escrow Agreement, change the Collateral Account or change the Collateral Account depository as
long as the new account is subject to the terms of the Escrow Agreement or a lockbox agreement
with the new depository containing substantially the same tenns as the Escrow Agreement. In
addition, AIAI shall provide written instructions to Mark Twain Kansas Bank ("Bank") which
provide that Bank shall, in accordance with currently effective instructions and procedures, transfer
001083
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Bank. Further, Company;-·AIAI. Creditor and Bank shall enter into an agreement which provides.
that (i) Bank shall immediately notify Creditor of its receipt of any (a) instruction by AIAI or
Company to take any action which would interrupt or redirect the flow of Commission Collateral
into Account No. 86513004124 from any other account at Bank or the transfer of Commission
Collateral from such Account to the Collateral Account. or (b) request by AIA or Company to
amend that certain Iockbox agreement (the "Centennial Lock Box Agreement") dated June 1, 1995
among AIAI. Universe, The Centennial Life Insurance Company ("Centennial") and Bank. or any
pursuant thereto, or (c) request by AIAI or Company to move
notice or instruction delivered to
existing bank accounts or establish new bank accounts under the Centennial Lock Box Agreement;
and (u) Bank shall not implement any such implement any such instruction or request until the lapse
of thirty (30) days from delivery of such notice by Bank to Creditor or Bank's earlier receipt of
Creditor's written consent to such instruction or request.

Bank

5.
Defaults and Remedies. The circumstances constituting Defiwlts under this Agreement and
the remedies therefor shal~ for the purpose of the convenience .of having all such provisions
contained within a single document. be determined in accordance with the Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement. Secured Party shall have no recourse to the Commission Collateral in the event of a
non-monetary default under the Restructured Obligations; but nothing contained in this Agreement
shall affect Secured ·Party's rights and remedies under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement for
monetary or non-monetary defaults.

6.

Revival of Security Interest

To the extent . Company makes a payment to Secured Party, which payment is later
invalidated, declared to be a fraudulent transfer or preference, set aside or required to be repaid
under any banlauptcy law, other law or equitable principle, Secured Party's interest in the
Commission Collateral shall be revived and continued as if the payment or proceeds had never been
.;.received by the Secured Party.
,.

7.

Miscellaneous

?· 1 Fmancing Statements, Etc. Companies will sign any financing statements and other
filings with governmental offices or agencies, and other documents relating to the Commission
Collateral that Secured Party may reasonably request. Secured Party is nevertheless authorized to
file such documents without Companies' signatures· and Companies hereby grant to Secured Party
a power of attorney to execute any such documents as Companies' attorney-in-fact. Such power of
attorney is coupled with an interest and shall be irrevocable until Secured. Obligations have been
fully and finally paid. Companies will reimburse Secured Party upon demand for all expenses
inrurred for the perfection and continuation of perfection of Secured Party's security interest in the
Commission Collateral.
-~

7. 2
Amendment. This Agreement and the other Restructured Obligations entered into in
connection with the Secured Obligations contain the complete and final expression of the entire
agreement of the parties. No provision of this Agreement may be amended. modified. waived or
supplemented, except by a writing signed by the party sought to be charged with the amendment.
modification, waiver or supplementation.
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7.3

Remedies Cumulative. All rights and remedies of Secured Party shall be cumulative
and may be exercised at such times and in such order as Secured party determines. The failure of
Secured Party to insist upon or enforce strict performance of any provisions of this Agreement, or
to exercise its rights or privileges hereunder or any ofits rights as provided by statute or law or in
equity or otherwise, shall not impair, prejudice or constitute a waiver of any such right, power,
remedy or privilege or be construed as a waiver of any Default or as an acquiescence therein or
preclude the exercise or enforcement thereof at a later time. No waiver by Secured Party of any
Default shall be a waiver of an~ other Default. Nor shall any single or partial exercise of any such
right, power, remedy or privilege preclude any other or further exercise thereof or the exercise of
any other right, power, remedy or privilege.
7. 4
Effectiveness. This Agreement shall remain in full force and effect until the earlier
of(i) the pledge of fair market value bonds for other Collateral in accordance with Section 10(a) of
the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, (ii) the indefeasible performance or payment in full in cash
ofall the Secured Obligations, or (iii) the termination of this Agreement in writing by Secured Party.

7.5

Tennination; Further Assurances. This Agreement and the Escrow Agreement shall
terminate and be of no further force or effect upon the earliest to occur of the events set forth in
Section 7.4 hereof. .SecureclParty's security interest in.the Commission Collateral. shall thereupon ....
cease; and Secured Party shall execute and deliver any and all additional papers, documents and
other instruments (mcluding. without limitation, UCC termination statements), and shall do any and
all acts and things reasonably necessary in connection With the perfonnance of his obligations
hereunder and to carry out the intent of the parties as expressed in this Agreement.
7. 6
Notices. Any notice under this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be given as
provided in the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement

,

7. 7

Governing Law. This Security Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in

iccordance with the laws of the State of Idaho.

7.8
Cotmterparts. This Agreement may be executed in any nwnber of counterparts and
by each party on a separate counterpart, each of which when so executed and delivered shall be
deemed an original and all of which taken together shall constitute but one and the same instrument.

7.9
Restaiement of Security Agreement. The Security Agreement is hereby am~ded,
restated, superseded mi replaced in its entirety and shall hereafter have no force or effect. Ssecured
Party hereby waives any and all right to claim any breach of the Security Agreement or to exercise
any remedy thereunder.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have duly executed and delivered this Agreement as
of the date first written above.

COMPANY:

SECURED PARTY:

....
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AIA SERVICES CORPORATION
REED TAYLOR LONG TERM NOTE ·ACCT #1951-00-0
1213112006

YIE Bal. 12/31/20111

January.()6
February-Ge

Man:h-06

APrit-os
May-06
J11ne-06
July-06
August-06

September-o&
Odober-06
Nowrnber-06
Oecember-06
2006 Entry
2Q06 Entry
4Q06 Entry

Subtulala

L-T Note

Prine

Accrt,cd

Int Paid

Int Poid

Principal
5,692,729

· 1,976,1143

5.692,729
5,892.729
5,892,729
5,892,729
5,692,729
~.e92.729

5,692,729
5,892,729
5,692,729
5,692.729
5,692,729
5.692,729

5.892.729

A
Prlnclpal
VIE Bal. 12131/2006

5,692,729
A

,-.._.

TOTAL DUI! Rl!ED

&

LT Int
l T r<otc

Airplane/

Misc.

~~@.nat;11on

lnterw&t

41,250
41,250
41.250
41,250
41,250
41,250
41,250
41,250
41,250
41,250
41.250
41,250

2.471,843

B

lntarwt
2,197.114

15,000
7,500
7,500
15.000
15.000
15.000
15,000
15,000
15,000
7,500
15,000
15,000
7,500
28,123
81.808
274,729

15,000
7,500
7,500
15,000
15,000
15,000
15,000
15,000
15,000
7,500
15,000
15,000
7,500
28,123
81.606
274.729

111/05 Payment paid by AJA Inc
AJA 12131/05 bmlanm Of ReQlvable due from Reed
AIA 12131 I06 balance or Receivable d11e trom Reed

c

.

B.c

____

..,,
:;;,,,,
r''7,a'U;iU1

Z:\Acct\Services\2006 Reed Payments.xis

- - - - -----
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AIA SERVJCES CORPORATION
REED TAYLOR LONG TERM NOTE - ACCT #1951-00-0
12131/2006

l T N_ot_c

Prineipal ·
YIE Bal. 1Z/31/2004

January-OS
Febrwuy..OS
Marcll-05

Apll-05
May-OS

June-OS
July-OS
August.OS

Seplember-05

October-OS
November-OS
Oecember-05
Sublotltls

r'rllH.:: &

Airplane/

Int__ Paid

Int Paid

Misc.

5,692,729
5,692.729
5,692.729
6,692,729
5,692,729
5,692,729
5,692,729
5,692,729
5,692,729
5,692,7211
5,692,729
5,692,729
5,692,729

41,250
41,250
41,250
41,250
41,2SD
41,250
41,250
41,250
41,25()
41,250
41,250
41,250
2, 149,:143

Prlnclplll
5,892,729

ExpLc1n.itc•1on

lnc.twt
1,664,3-43

A
TOTAL DUE REED

LT N'Jtc

S.692,729

A
VIE 8111. 1213112005

LT Int
6~I!Je-9

B

lnwrea
1,976,843

7,500
15,000
15,000
15,00D
15,DOO
15,DOO
15.000
15,000
15,000
15,000
15,000
15,000
1n.soo

7,500
15,000
15,000
15,0DO
15,DOO
15,000
15,000
15,000
15,000
7,500
15.COO
15,000
165,000

c

.

B.c

r-T,'IU)ff"?

.-·-·-·"'-'

Z:\l\cct\Services\2005 Reed Payments.xis
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AIA SERVICES CORPORATJON
REED TAYLOR LONG "l'ERM NOTE - ACCT #1951-00-0
12/31/2004

LT Nntr

LT lrit

L-T Note

Pnnc &

Airpl.:uw/

An rued

Int Paid

Int Paid

M1s_c

PrlnGlpal
6,692,729

lnbr198t
1,364,343

Janu.ry-04
February-04
March-04
Apll-04

5,692,729
5,892,729
5,892,729
5,692.ns

May-04

5.~729

June-04

5,692,729
5.692,729
5,692,ne
5,692,729
5,692,729
5,692,729
.5,892,729

41.250
41,2.50
41,250
41,250
41.250
41,250
41,250
41,250
41,250
41,250
41.250
41,250

YIE Bal. 12131/2003

July-04
August-04

~
Oclobef.o4
November-04
Oecember-04
Y/E Adjulllment
VIE Adjustment
Subtotal&

Y/E S.1.1213112004

5,692,729
A
Principal
5,692,729
A

1.859,343
B

Exp1;;nat.11on

Allp.. ne
32,601

45,000
-

45,000

-

45,000

-

-

-

45,000

-

.
45,000

-

-

45,000

-

45,000

45.000

25,000
205,000

25,000
205,000

c

{32,801) Per John - Mcrva ID /IJA Airplane Liabilities #200057 402004
402004 Mvance

-

rm.net
1,864,343

a.c

TOTAL DUE REED [!:~~!~

Z:\Acct\Services\2004 Reed Paymentsrjt.xls
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AIA SERVICES CORPORATION
REED TAYLOR LONG TERM NOTE· ACCT #1961-00-0
12131/2003

L_J Note

VIE Bal. 1213112GOZ
January-()3
February-G 3
Mardl-03
Apri-03

May-03

June-<13
J"Y-Q3
August-03

September-G3
October-G3
November-03

Oecember-G3

LT i11t

I 1 NntL

Prine: &

A1rpl~rncJ

A\.Cr1wd

Int l-\-11c1

Int P,1rd

f,]f'::iC

Principal
1,612,721

1,0CM,343

5,692,729
5,692,729
5,892,729
5,882,729
5,8112,729
5,692,7211
5.692,729
S,692.729
5,892,729
5,892,729
5,692,729
5,692,729

41,250
41,250
41,250
41,250
41,250
41,250
41,250
41,250
41,250
41.250
41.250
41,250

AitplaM

lnterHt

51,624

6,000
-

-

6,000
.
.

39,000

39,0QO

45,000

.
45,000
.

-

45.000

.

-

45,000

Y/E Adjuatment
YIE Adjuatmen t
S11btotala

Y/E. Bal. 12/31/2003

5.892.729
A
Principal
5,892,729
.A

1,499,343
B
lnt9rwt
1,364,343
B-C

Explanata1on

135,000

c

135,000

(86.948) Bob, Dan &Jud(1/4) 5alaty and Baneftts for 2003
87,925 2003 Airplane/lodge Charges
32,601
D
AlrpllM
32,&01
D

TOTAL DUE REED

.·~

Z:\Acct\Servlces\2003 Reed Paymentsrjt.xls
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AIA SERVICES CORPORATION
REED TAYLOR LONG TERM NOTE ·ACCT #1961-00-0
12131/2002

LT Noto

YIE Bal. 12/31l2001
January..Q2
Februery.O2

March-02
Apri-02
May-02
June-02
July-02
August-02
September-02
Oclober-02
Nowmber-02
December-02
YIE Adju&lment
YIE Adjustment

Subtotalt

Prine &

A1rpL1n('/

Int Pc11d

Int Palll

M1~c

lnt.R.t
609,343

5,692.7l!9
5.692.729
5,692,729
5,892,729
5,892.729
5,692,729
5,692,729
5,692.729
5,692,729
5.692,729
5,692,729
5,692,729

41,250
41,250
41,250
41,250
41,250
41,250
41.250
41,250
41,250
41,250
41,250
41.250

Expl~2ata1_on

Alrplant
67.888
20,000
20,000
20.000

20,000

-

20.000
20,000
20,000

20,000

-

20,000

20,000

.
-

.

-

.

-

(72.520) Bob and Dan Salary and Benelita for 2002
56,256 2002 Airplane/lodge Charges
5,692,729
Principal
5,692,729

A

TOTAL DUE REED

L I Note

Prlnclpal
1,112,729

A

YIE BaL 1213112002

LT Int.
~c~r~ed

1,104,343
B

im....t
1,004,343

B-C

100,000

c

100,000

51,1%4

0

Alri>lan•
51,624
D

C!C~'!g

Z:\Acct\Services\2003 Reed Paymentsrjt.xls
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CONSENT IN LIEU OF
SPECIAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS OF
AJA INSURANCE, INC.
The undersigned, being the exclusive person entitled to vote all of the outstanding shares
pledged to him of AIA Insurance, Inc. (the "Corporation") pursuant to the right vested in the
undersigned because of the various defaults under the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement
dated July 1, 1996, the $6 Million Promissory Note dated August 1, 1995, the Amended and Restated
Security Agreement dated July 1, 1996, and Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement dated July 1,
1996, hereby consents to the following corporate actions without holding a formal Special Shareholder
Meeting of the Corporation.
Removal of Directors
Effective immediately, the following individuals are unanimously removed from the Board of
Directors of the Corporation:
R. John Taylor
JoLee Duclos
Bryan Freeman
Election of Director
Effective immediately, the following individual is unanimously elected to the Board of
Directors, to serve in that capacity until the next annual meeting of the Corporation or until removed or
replaced pursuant to the provisions contained in the Bylaws of the Corporation:
Reed J. Taylor

DATED: February 22, 2007.

~~'
-1-
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CONSENT IN LIEU OF
MEETING OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
AIA INSURANCE, INC.
- - - - ----------·----------·---------

The undersigned, being the sole member of the Board of Directors of AIA Insurance, Inc. (the
"Corporation"), hereby consents to the following corporate actions without holding a formal Board
Meeting of the Corporation.
Removal of Officers
It is resolved that, effective immediately, the following individuals are unanimously removed

from the corporate office or position set forth opposite their respective names:
President
Secretary
Treasurer
Vice-President

.~.

R. John Taylor
JoLee Duclos
Martin Hanna
Bryan Freeman

Election of Officers
It is resolved that, effective immediately, the following individual is unanimously elected to the
corporate offices set forth below to serve as such until the first annual meeting or the election and
qualification of their successors:
President
Secretary
Treasurer

Reed J. Taylor
Reed J. Taylor
Reed J. Taylor

R. John Taylor
It is resolved that, effective immediately and in addition to being removed as an officer of the
Corporation, R. John Taylor is terminated as an employee of the Corporation and all payments to him
shall cease, including, without limitation, all payments to R. John Taylor for alleged lease payments on
-----;e parking lot. R. John Taylor shall not be permitted in the Corporation's offices at 111 Main Street,

-1-
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Lewiston, Idaho for any reason. All ofR. John Taylor's personal property located at the Corporation's
Afices at 111 Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho shall be locked up in stored there until delivery can be
arranged to R. John Taylor. No papers, files, documents, draft documents, electronic files, email or
any other information shall be released to R. John Taylor until it is ascertained that it owned by him
and not the property of the Corporation.
Change of Locks
It is resolved that a locksmith shall be hired to replace and/or change the locks on all doors at

the Corporation's offices located at 111 Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho.

The locksmith shall also

attempt if possible to change/replace/install a separate lock on the door to R. John Taylor's personal
office to secure his personal property until delivery of his personal property can be arranged. The
locksmith may rely on these Resolutions as full and complete authority to enter the premises and
change/replace/install the locks described above as the Corporation's offices located at 111 Main
lreet, Lewiston, Idaho.

Keys shall only be issued to personnel authorized in writing by the

· undersigned.
Security Guard
It is resolved that a security guard shall be posted outside the offices of the Corporation at times

deemed appropriate by the undersigned.

The security guard shall ensure that no unauthorized

personnel enter the Corporation's offices, including, without limitation, R. John Taylor or any person
acting on his behalf.

All security guards may rely in this Consent as full authorization by the

undersigned to comply with and/or enforce all of the Resolutions.
Security System
It is resolved that the code for the security system shall be changed to a code only known to the
undersigned. The undersigned may provide the security code to other officer(s) or employee(s), but
---..,_ ly upon written consent from the undersigned.

-2-
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Authority to Bind Corporation
It is resolved that the undersigned shall be the only authorized signatory authorized to act on

behalf of the Corporation to transfer funds, sign checks and/or execute contracts.

Effective

immediately, R. John Taylor is removed as an authorized signatory to transact any business on behalf
of the Corporation. R. John Taylor is removed and not authorized to act as an authorized signatory on
any and all of the Corporation's bank accounts, credit card accounts, open accounts, and is stripped of
all authority to act in any way on behalf of the Corporation. All banks and financial institutions may
rely on these Resolutions to remove R. John Taylor from all accounts and add the undersigned as an
authorized signatory.
DATED: February 22, 2007.

-3-
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Gaty D. Babbitt ISB No. 1486
D . .John Ashby ISB No. 7228
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: (208) 344-6000
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829 ·
Email: gdb@hteh.com
jash@hteh.com
Attorneys for Defendants AJA Services Co1poration
and AIA Insurance, Inc .
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STAIE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED .L TAYLOR, a single person,

)
)
Plaintiff;
)
)
vs.
)
)
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho )
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
)
Idaho co1poration; R. .JOHN TAYLOR and
)
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
)
community prope1ty compiised thereof;
)
BRYAN FREEMAN a single pe1·son; and
)
.JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person,
)
)
Defendants
)
)

Case No CV-07-00208
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)
I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
According to Plaintiff's complaint, which must be assumed as true for pwposes of a
motion to dismiss, Plaintiff; the former founde1· and majority shateholde1 of AIA Services,
entered into various agreements with AIA Services to have his 613,494 shat es of common stock

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IO DISMISS - 1
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in AIA Services redeemed. Second Amended Complaint, ii 2 .5 The original contracts -- the
Stock Redemption Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, and Secmity Agreement -- were
executed on or about July 22, 1995. Id. at ii 2 .7. Then, in 1996, Plaintiff entered into various
amended agreements, including the Stock Redemption Restmctme Agr·eement, Amended and
Restated Stock Pledge Agreement, and the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement
(collectively, the "Amended Agreements"). Id. at ii 2 10. According to Plaintiff; those contracts
provided that AIA Services would, among various other contractual obligations, make monthly
interest payments on the $6,000,000 principal debt Id. at ii 2. 11 .
Plaintiff further asserts that, according to the terms of the various Amended Agreements,
AJA Services would be in default if it failed to make timely interest payments; became insolvent;
failed to maintain a Lock Box to hold insmance commissions; failed to keep Plaintiff on AIA
Services' Board of Directors; or several other events of default Id at ii 212 .
According to the Complaint, AIA Services has never been in compliance with the terms
ofthe various agreements, and has been in breach since the Amended Agreements were entered
into Id. at iii! 2. 13 - 216 For example, Plaintiff alleges:
Under the terms of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Reed
was required to be a member of the board of directors ofAIA
Services until Reed was paid in full or sufficient secmity was
posted to enswe the payment of the Promissory note AIA
Services never· posted bonds or other secmity for the payment of
the Promissory Note. In excess of six years, AIA Services, John
Duclos and/or Freeman have intentionally refused to appoint Reed
to the Board as required.

Id at ii 2..13.
Indeed, Plaintiff further alleges that AIA Services has been in breach of the various
contractual obligations ever since the contract was entered into:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 2
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Because AIA Services has failed to timely and properly pay Reed
as required during all relevant times, .John Duclos and/or Freeman
owe Reed special obligations because of his status as AIA
Sezvices' largest creditor.
. . . Dming all relevant times, the value of A.IA Services was less
than the aggregate amount of its debts, which constitutes A.IA
Services' insolvency. During all relevant times, AIA Services was
in default of various provisions of the agreements with Reed,
insolvent and/or unable to timely pay its debts to Reed. Dwing all
relevant times, AIA Services has failed to comply with the tezms of
the promissmy note.

Id

at~~

214 - 2.16 (emphasis added)

Despite that fact that Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have been in breach of the various
contractual provisions since 1996, Plaintiff waited until January 29, 2007 -- more than 10 years
after the alleged breaches, to file his complaint. Plaintiff's breach of contract cause of action
accrued ten years ago and has long since been barred by the five-year statute oflimitations for
breach of contract.
Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety because all of Plaintiffs causes
of action hinge on the underlying claim that Defendants are in breach of the Amended
Agreements.
Moreover, although Plaintiff's Complaint contains ten separate causes of action, the
remaining causes of action should be dismissed for a variety of reasons particular to those causes
of action. Those causes of action ar·e no m01e than an improper attempt to tum a simple breach
of contract claim into something that it is not, and several of the so-call "causes of action" are
not causes of action at all.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 3
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II. ARGUMENT

1.

First Cause Of Action Alleges Br·eacbes of Contract Which Are Baned By
The Statute Of Limitations.

Plaintiff's "breaches of contract" cause of action is baned by the applicable statute of
limitations because Idaho Code§ 5-216 provides that any "action upon any contract, obligation
or liability founded upon an instrument in writing" must be brought within five years from the
time the cause of action accrues. A cause of action for breach of contract accrues upon the
breach of the contract. Balivi Chemical Corp. v. Industrial Ventilation, Inc., 131Idaho449, 451,
958 P.2d 606, 608 (Ct. App 1998). Stated differently, ''The cause of action [for breach of
contract] accrues, and the statute oflimitation begins to run, when a pmty may sue another."
Galbraith v Vanga.s, Inc 103 Idaho 912, 915, 655 P.2d 119, 122 (Ct. App. 1982).. Indeed the
cause of action accrues upon the breach even though no damage may occur until later "Mason v
Tucker and Associates, 125 Idaho 429, 436, 871 P .2d 846, 853 (Ct App . 1994) (concluding that
the statute oflimitations began to tun when an etroneous transcript "was first delivered" because,
"At that time, Mason could have brought an action for specific performance")..
In this case, the alleged breaches of contract occuned much more than five yems before
Plaintiff .filed his Complaint Here, Plaintiff's own complaint alleges that AIA services was in
breach ofvmious provisions of the Amended Agreements virtually since the time they were
executed in 1996. See Second Amended Complaint, iii! 2.15 - 2.16 ("AIA Services has failed to
timely and properly pay Reed as required during all relevant times"; ''Dwing all relevant times,
AIA Services was in default ofvmious provisions of the agreements with Reed, insolvent and/or
unable to timely pay its debts to Reed"); see also id. at if 2 .13 ("In excess of six years, AIA
Services, John, Duclos and/or Freeman have intentionally refused to appoint Reed to the Bomd
as required ") (emphasis added).

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 4
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Although Plaintiff alleges that AIA Services has been in breach of the Amended
Agreements and otherwise in default for over ten yea.rs, Plaintiff failed to bring suit until January
29, 2007, well beyond the five-year statute oflimitations. Plaintiff's b1each of contract cause of
action is, therefore, barred.
The Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Skaggs v Jensen, 94 Idaho 179, 484 P .2d 728
(1971) is controlling here. In Skaggs, the parties entered into a written leasing agreement in
1961 for the rental of an appliance store in the Overland Shopping Center located in Bur'ley,
Idaho. The leasing agreement contained a restrictive provision prohibiting the lessors from
renting space in their shopping center to any other party engaged in the sale of major appliances .
In 1962, the lessors, the .Jensens, leased a portion of their property to a Montgomery Ward Store
which sold appliances and, in 1969, the lessors entered another leasing agreement with Sears
Roebuck and Co , which also sold appliances. Despite the fact that the lease had been violated
since 1962, the lessees, Skaggs, did not file suit until 1969.. In affirming the lower court's
holding that the statute of limitations barred the action related to the lease to the Montgomery
Ward Store, the Idaho Supreme Comt explained:

In 1962, the .Jensens rented space to Montgomery Ward in
violation of the first leasing agreement. Suit was not commenced,
however, until 1969. Thus it is evident that more than five years
elapsed between the time the cause of action accrued and the time
suit was instituted The Jensens (lessors) wer·e entitled to rely on
the statute of limitations as a defense to the Skaggs' (lessees') claim
since actions in contiact must be brought within five years in this
jurisdiction. See also Toe/Iner v. McGinnis, 55 Wash 430, 104 P
641 (1909) where the Washington Supreme Cowt held an action
on a lease covenant was barred after six years even though the
lease itself was intended to nm for fifteen.. In view of' the length of

time that Skaggs r·ested on their· rights, it would be inequitable
in this Court's opinion to allow them to now bring suit. By
failing to object within a reasonable time after· they felt their
rights were being violated, they ratified and modified the
r·estl'ictive provision, thus vitiating its force.
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Id, 94 Idaho at 180, 484 P . 2d at 729 (emphasis added).
Here, Plaintiffs breach of contract claim alleges that Defendants have been in breach at
all times for fru: more than the five-yeru: statute of limitations. Nevettheless, Plaintiff's did not
bring suit to enforce their rights within five years of the alleged breaches. By failing to do so,
they are now bru:red fiom bringing those claims by the statute oflimitations . In the words of the
Idaho Supreme Court, "By failing to object within a reasonable time after they felt their rights
were being violated, they ratified and modified the restrictive provision[sl. thus vitiating [their]
force." Id. (emphasis added)..1

A.

The Second Thrnugh Tenth Causes Of Action AJ·e Also Barnd
Because Each Cause Of Action Hinges On Claims Occuning More
Than Five Years Ago.

The remainder of Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed for the same reason as the breach
of contract claim. Idaho Code § 5-216 provides that any "action upon any contract, obligation or
liability founded upon an instrument in Wiiting" must be brought within five years from the time
the cause of action accrues. All of Plaintiff's causes of action ru:ise from the alleged breach of
obligations set forth in the Amended Agreements. As set forth above, Plaintiff is bru:red by the
statute oflimitations from now asserting that those contractual obligations have been breached.

1

The Skaggs decision makes clear that a breach of contract cause of actions arises from the
time of the first breach . See also Ma.son v Tucke1 and Associates, 125 Idaho 429, 436, 871
P.2d 846, 853 (Ct App . 1994) (concluding that the statute oflimitations began to run when
an etroneous transcript ''was first deliveted" because, "At that time, Mason could have
brought an action for specific performance") (emphasis added); Hoglan v First Sec Bank of
Idaho, NA., 120 Idaho 682, 819 P2d 100 (1991) ("An action on a wtitten contract must be
commenced within five years. IC. § 5-216.. The earliest act which could be considered the
basis for a breach of contract claim occuued in March of 1983, when First Security stopped
sending the monthly statements") (emphasis added).
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•
For example, the Second Cause of Action for fraudulent tiansfer alleges that Defendants
fraudulently transferred assets to avoid paying Plaintiff the money due under the Amended
Agreements. Given that Plaintiff cannot enforce the alleged obligations under the Amended
Agreements, Defendants cannot face liability for fraudulent transfer..
Another example of a contract-based action is Plaintiff's Tenth Cause of Action for
"Enforcement of Rights." Defendants presume that this is an attempt to plead a declaratory
judgment cause of action That cause of action seeks declaratory relief based on contract
b1eaches along the following lines:
Under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. Amended Secwity
Agreement. and Restructure Agreement. Reed is entitled to vote
the pledged shares of AIA Insurance (and all ancillary rights,
including, without limitation, to vote the shares to remove the
board and take all actions related in any way to his tight to vote the
pledged shares), sell that shares ofAIA fusurance at public or
private sale, judicially sell the pledged shares in AIA fuswance,
entitled to timely receive audited financial statements and financial
information, and/or seize all of the AIA Insurance and AIA
Services' commissions in the required Lock Box.. When AIA
Services became in Default, it lost its right to vote the pledged
shares of AIA Insurance and the right vested exclusively in Reed
Second Amended Complaint, if 1.3.2 . (emphasis added)
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Plaintiffs Tenth Cause of Action, like the others, is founded on alleged breaches of the
written agreement that first occurred over ten yeats ago, and the cause of action is now barred by
the statute oflimitations . 2
A cursory review of the causes of action show their dependence and reliance on breaches
of contract. There are, however, substantial legal defects with the other causes of action which
will also be briefed next.

B.

Third Cause of Action - Misr·epr·esentation/Fr·aud.

I R.CP 9(b) provides that "[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, or violation of civil or
constitutional rights, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake, or violation of civil or
constitutional rights shall be stated with particularity. " The Idaho courts explain that "[t]he party
alleging fraud must support the existence of each of the elements of the cause of action for fraud
by pleading with particularity the factual circumstances constituting .fraud" Estes v. Bany, 132
Idaho 82, 86, 967 P 2d 284, 288 (1998) Failure to plead fraud with patticularity results in
dismissal of the fraud cause of action See, e.g., Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp, 141 Idaho 233,
240, 108 P 3d 380, 387 (2005) (dismissing fraud cause of action where ''there were no facts
alleged which demonstrated Latry's reliance on any representations made to him, which in tum,
resulted in some injury''); Dengler v. Hazel Blessinger Family Trust, 141 Idaho 123, 127, 106
P.3d 449, 453 (2005) (dismissing fraud cause of action that contained only "utterly general

2 Indeed, all of Plaintiffs causes of action ate founded on alleged breaches of contract that
occurred over ten years ago, requiring that every single cause of action be dismissed. This
brief uses the Second and Tenth causes of action as exatnples to demonstrate that all causes
of action rely on the time-barred alleged contractual breaches Moreover, this biiefuses the
Second and Tenth causes of action as exatnples because the Third through Ninth Causes of
action should each be dismissed for independent reasons as set forth below, in addition to
their reliance on time-barred alleged contractual breaches.
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averments" directed at :fi:aud and "fail[ed] to allege anything other than the elements ofthe prim.a
facie case of fraud.").
The Ninth Circuit describes the strictures of the nearly identical federal rnle as follows:
Rule 9(b) demands that .. the circumstances constituting the
alleged fraud be specific enough to give defendants notice of the
particular misconduct so that they can defend against the char·ge
and not just deny that they have done anything wrong. Averments
of fraud must be accompanied by the "who, what, when, where,
and how" of the misconduct char·ged . A plaintiff must set forth
more than the neutral facts necessary to identify the transaction .
The plaintiff must set fotth what is false or misleading about a
statement, and why it is false.
Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F..3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted).

Put differently, the complaint must set forth the "time, place, and specific content of the false
representations as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentation. " Edwards v.

Marin Park, Inc., 356 F..3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir 2004)
Here, Plaintiff's complaint does not contain any specific allegations of fraud. Plaintiffs
complaint does not allege even a single specific representation, much less explain the falsity of
any representations

01

how Plaintiff relied on any representations to his detriment The third

cause of action should, therefore, be dismissed for failwe to plead fraud with particularity.

C..

Fourth Cause of Action - Convenion.

Plaintiffs conversion cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted Conversion is defined as "a distinct act of dominion wrongfully asserted over another's
personal property in denial of or inconsistent with rights ther·ein. Peasley Transfer & Storage Co.

v Smith, 132 Idaho 732, 743, 979 P.2d 605, 616 (1999) .
Plaintiffs complaint makes it clear that Plaintiff's relief, if any, lies in a breach of
contract claim, but not for conversion. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants have taken
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anything from Plaintiff's possession, but, rather, that Defendants have not paid Plaintiff money
allegedly due to him under the various contracts cited in Plaintiff's complaint See Second
Amended Complaint, ii 6 .2 ("AIA Services, AIA InsW"ance, John, Duclos and/or Freeman's
conduct constitutes willful interference with Reed's property and money which should have been
paid to him, without lawful justification, which deprived Reed of the possession of such money
and/or property. ") (emphasis added) .
The failure to pay money due under a contract is actionable in contract, but, as a matter of
law, does not constitute conversion. See, e. g.., SouthTrust Bank v Donely, 925 So 2d 934, 942
(Ala. 2005) ("Donely has alleged that SouthTrnst has failed to pay her· a debt, and the proper
action for that claim is a breach-of-contract action, not a conversion action . "); Alex Hoftichter,

PA v. Zuckerman & Venditti, P.A, 710 So 2d 127, 128, n.3 (Fla. App . 1998) ("a mer·e refusal to
pay money owed under a contract does not, without more, amount to conversion or civil theft . ")..
A cause of action for conversion requires and affirmative act, i . e . , that the defendant takes
property from the plaintiffs possession.. See e.g, Peasley Transfer & Storage Co., 132 Idaho at
743 ("A [conversion] right of action accmes in favor of the owner of property as soon as the
property is wrongfully taken from his possession 01 wrongfully converted.") (emphasis added);
18 AM . .JUR 2D Conversion§ 21 ("Some affiimative act on the part of the defendant is usually
regarded as necessary to constitute a conversion... Even where it results in the loss of the
property, the failure to perform an act made obligatory by contract will not amount to a
conversion.").. Here, plaintiff alleges that he was not paid funds due to him, not that any property
has been taken from his possession.
Plaintiffs remedy, if any, lies in his breach of contract action, and his conversion cause
of action must be dismissed .
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D.

Fifth Cause of Action -- Alter Ego.

Plaintiffs Fifth Cause of action -- "Alter Ego" -- is not a cause of action at all, and must
be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. As set forth in the
leading treatise on corporations:
A claim based on the alter ego theory is not in itself a claim for
substantive relief~ but rather to disrega.td the corporation as a
distinct defendant is procedural.. A finding of fact of alter ego.
standing alone, creates no cause of action.. It merely furnishes a
means for a complainant to reach a second corporation or
individual upon a cause of action that otherwise would have
existed only against the first corporation. An attempt to pierce the
corporate veil is a means of imposing liability on an underlying
cause of action, such as a tort or breach of contract..
Fletcher, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS, § 4L10 ( 1999).
Courts consistently hold that "alter ego" is not a cause of action. See, e g, Local 159,

342, 343 & 444 v.. Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc, 185 F.Jd 978, 985 (9th Cir. 1999) ("A request to
pierce the corporate veil is only a means of imposing liability for an underlying cause of action
and is not a cause of action in and ofitself."); Gallagher v McClure Bintliff, 740 S. W 2d 118,
119-120 (Tex. App. 1987) ("An attempt to pierce the cmporate veil, in and ofitself, is not a
cause of action but rather is a means of imposing liability on an underlying cause of action such
as a tort or breach of contract"); Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v.

Brumm, 264 F . Supp.2d 697, 701 (ND Ill 2003) ("Piercing the corporate veil, however, is a
doctrine to be applied in an underlying cause of action; it is not an action itself.") .
Given that alter ego is not an independent cause of action, Courts routinely dismiss "alter
ego" causes of action and permit the factual allegations of alter ego to be pied as pa.tt of the
underlying causes of action. See, e.g., Green Atlas Shipping SA v U.S., 306 F..Supp.2d 974,
977 (D. Or. 2003) ("[P]ierced corpmate veil is not a separate cause of action and I will dismiss
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the fifteenth claim but allow the United States to make its alter ego allegations in the context of
the remaining underlying substantive claims for liability in this action.''); Fiber Co11Sultants, Inc.

v. Fiber Optek Interconnect Corp .., 792 N . Y.S.2d 89, 91 (N.YAD 2005) (dismissing separate
alter ego cause of action because it is not a separate cause of action, and granting leave to assert
facts to support alter ego liability as part underlying causes of action}.
He1e, even if alter ego were a separate cause of action, the complaint does not state a
claim for alter ego liability.. In general, the stockholders of a corporation are not personally
liable for corporate obligations, and the corporate veil will be pierced only under limited
cucwnstances. "[T]wo requirements for application of the [alter ego] doctrine are (1) that there
be such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and
the individual no longer exist and (2), that if the acts are treated as those of the corporation an
inequitable result will follow." Chick v Tomlinson, 96 Idaho 483, 485, 531 P.2d 573, 575

(197 5). "Factors which influence whether· the corporate veil will be pierced (and a subsidiary
deemed an 'alter ego' of the par·ent) include the obvious under·-capitalization of the subsidiary;
the failure of either the par·ent or subsidiary to adhere to corporate formalities; and the formation
of the subsidiary to perpetrate a fraud" Ross v. Coleman Co, Inc., 114 Idaho 817, 845, 761 P.2d
1169, 1197 (1988)
Plaintiff does not allege any reason for which the corporate veil should be pierced .
Rather, he merely asserts that "Because of the :fraudulent, wrongful and/or inappropriate acts
and/or omissions of John, Duclos, Freeman and/or other shareholders of AJA Services, the
corporate veil of AIA Services should be pierced thereby holding John, Duclos, and/or Freeman
and/or certain shar·eholders ofAIA Services personally liable for alJ indebtedness to Reed as
equity requires such action." See Second Amended Complaint, if 5 .2.
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Thus, Plaintiff asserts that the alter· ego theory permits him seek recovery from individual
shareholders for the contractual obligations of the corporations. Plaintiff's cause of action under·
the alter· ego theory is for breach of contract. However, as set forth in Fletcher, CYCLOPEDIA OF
CORPORATIONS,

§ 41 . 85, courts are very reluctant to pierce the corporate veil in contract causes

of action:
The alter· ego doct:Iine and its criteria are applicable to impose
substantive liability whether that liability is in causes of action in
to1t, in cont:Iact, or both, although mere breach of contract is
generally not sufficient to justify a disregard of the corporate
entity. In other words, cowts usually apply more st:Iingent
standards to piecing the corporate veil in a contJact case than they
do in tort cases. This is because the party seeking relief in a
contract case is presumed to have voluntarily and knowingly
entered into an agreement with a corporate entity, and is expected
to suffer· the consequences of the limited liability associated with
the corporate business form, while this is not the situation in tort
cases . Further, one who has contJacted with a selected party and
received the promise bargained for should not be allowed to look
to another merely because he or she is disappointed in the selected
party's performance Thus, under contract law, the disappointed
one may not hold the other liable without additional compelling
facts .
Id. at p . 691-93.
"[A] finding of .fraud is an essential element of an alter ego determination in contract
cases, while no finding of fraud is required in tort cases . " Id. at p. 693. This is because, unlike
in a tort claim, ''the injUI'ed party in contract cases had the oppo1tunity to select the entity with
whom he or she contracted . . . Accordingly, absent very compelling equitable considerations,
comts should not rewrite cont:Iacts or distmb the allocation ofrisk the parties have themselves
established " Id Two central factors courts consider to determine whether a Plaintiff in a
cont:Iact cause of action should be permitted to pierce the corporate veil ar·e: ( 1) the sort of
contract involved -- i e , small creditors, like consumers, ar·e unlikely to do a full investigation or
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negotiate guruantees, but a large creditor should be expected to do so; and (2) "is the nature of
the activity complained of something of which the plaintiff can be considered to have assumed
the risk" Id. at p. 694.
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege the fundamental requirements to pierce the corporate veil.
He does not allege inadequate capitalization, nor does he make (much less with the requisite
pruticulruity) any allegations of fraud that wrurant piercing the corporate veil. Moreover, if ever
there were a plaintiff that entered into contractual obligations with a corporation with full
knowledge of the risk associated with the contract, it is Plaintiff here. As set forth in Plaintiff's
own pleadings, Plaintiff"was the founder and majority shrueholder ofAIA Services" See
Second Amended Complaint, 1f 2..5.. Plaintiff entered into certain contractual obligations (over
$7.5 million according to Plaintiff) with AIA Inswance and AIA Services, not with any
individual shru·eholders and without any individual guru·antees. More than anybody else,
Plaintiff himself was intimately familiru· with the financial status of the corporations, the extent
to which they were fully capitalized, and their ability to pay a $6 million debt. Especially given
Plaintiff's familiarity with the financial position ofAIA Services and AIA Insmance and failme
to state a claim for fraud, Plaintiff fails to state any basis for alter ego liability or otherwise
permit him to pierce the co1porate veil.
This case involves no more than a claimed breach ofcontactual obligations to pay a debt
and Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action (if one even existed) to pier·ce the corporate veil.

E.

Sixth Cause of' Action -- Equitable Indemnification.

Plaintiff's cause of action for equitable indemnification fails as a matter of law.
Equitable indemnification is a tort cause of action that simply does not apply in this contract
case Equitable indemnification provides a remedy whereby one to1tfeasor seeks indemnity from
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another tortfeasor See, e. g., Mitchell v. Valerio, 124 Idaho 283, 285, 858 P.2d 822, 824 (Idaho
App . 1993) ("An indemnity relationship between tortfeasors exists when the parties shar·e a
common liability for the same harm''); Miller v. Ellis, 103 Cal App.4th 373, 379-380, 126
CaLRptr .2d 667, 672 (2002) (''The doctrine of equitable indemnification allows liability to be
apportioned between wrongdoers based on their relative culpability. It is premised upon the
principle that as a matter of fairness, joint tortfeasors should share the bmden of discharging the
legal obligation to the injm·ed party for the damages caused by their mutual negligence ")
The doctrine of equitable indemnity does not apply unless both parties ar·e jointly liable to
a third party in tort See, e g, 41 AM . TUR. 2D Indemnity, § 20 ("For indemnification implied-inlaw, more an equitable remedy than an action in and of itself, thexe must be an underlying injury
sounding in tort, and the party seeking indemnity must have imputed or dexivative liability for
the tortious conduct from which indemnity is sought ..... The doctiine of equitable indemnity
applies only among defendants who ar·ejointly and severally liable to the plaintiff").
Plaintiff's cause of action fails for at least two reasons.. First, Plaintiff and Defendants
are not joint tortfeasors in any way, nor does Plaintiff allege that they are. Ibis is yet another
example of Plaintiff attempting to create a cause of action where, other than his breach of
contract claim (which, itself; is time-barred), one does not exist As stated by one court:

In short, "This is an improper attexnpt to recast a breach of contiact
cause of action as a tort claim. Nor is there any social policy that
would demand resort to tort remedies. Without any action
sounding in tort, there is no basis for a finding of potential joint
and several liability on the part of [cross-]defendant[BTMG],
thereby precluding a claim for equitable indemnity."

Stop Loss Ins Brokers, Inc v Brown & Toland Medical Group, 143 Ca1App.4th 1036, 1041-42,
49 Ca1Rptr.3d 609, 613 (2006).
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Second, even if equitable indemnification were an applicable legal theory, an equitable
indemnification cause of action does not arise until Plaintiff makes payment to the underlying
injured party See May Trucking Co v International Harvester Co, 97 Idaho 319, 322, 543
P 2d 1159, 1162 (1975) (explaining that an indemnity cause of action arises at ''the time of
payment m settlement by the indemnitee," and that, "(i]n this case the record is unclear· as to
when, if ever, May Trucking Company paid Farmer for the damage"). Here, Plaintiffs own·
complaint admits that Donna I aylor has yet to be paid:
8. 2
Donna Taylor is the holder of Series A Prefell'ed Shar·es in
AIA Services, and such shares were issued to her as a result of a
dissolution action between her and Reed. If not for AIA Services,
AIA Insurance, John, Duclos, and/or F1eeman's fraudulent,
wrongful and/01 inappropriate acts, Donna Taylor's Series A
Prefell'ed Shares would have been redeemed by AIA Setvices
and/or AIA. As of the date of this Second Amended Complaint,
over $500,000 must be paid to Donna I aylor to redeem her Series
A Preferred Shares.
8..3
Reed is entitled to be equitably indemnified by AIA
Services, .John, Duclos, and/or Freeman for any sums owed to
Donna Taylor because of AIA Services' failure to timely redeem
her Series A Prefened Shar·es as required .

See Second Amended Complaint, iii! 8.2, 83 (emphasis added)
Plaintiffs cause of action for equitable indemnification should be dismissed both because
there is no joint tortfeasor relationship and because any indemnity cause of action has yet to
arise

F.

Seventh Cause of Action - Account Stated/Monies Due.

Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of' Action -- "Account Stated/Monies Due" -- should be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff calls this an
"account stated" cause of action, but Plaintiff's own complaint establishes that his claim does not
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fit within the elements of the account stated cause of action.. Idaho Cowts require specific
elements to establish a cause of action for an account stated:

An account stated is "a document. a writing, which exhibits
the state of account between parties and the balance owed one to
the other, and when assented to, eithe1 exp1essly or impliedly, it
becomes a new contract. . . . [T]he account, in order to constitute a
contract, should appear to be something more than a mere
memo1andum; it should show upon its face that it was intended to
be a final settlement up to date. and this should be expressed with
clearness and ce1tainty " . . . The transaction must be understood
by the parties as a final adjustment ofthe respective demands
between them and of the amount due .
Modern Mills, Inc v. Havens, 112 Idaho 1101, 1105-06, 739 P 2d 400, 404-05 (Ct App . 1987)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
A casual perusal of Plaintiff's complaint finds that several of these elements are lacking.
First, although an account stated cause of action requires a writing, Plaintiff does not allege that
any writing exists at all, much less a writing that shows "upon its face that it was intended to be a
final settlement up to date." Id.; see also Kugler v. Northwest Aviation, Inc., 108 Idaho 884, 887,
702 P2d 922, 925 (Ct App. 1985) (noting that "[a]n account stated requires a writing," and
concluding that ''the theory of an account stated is inapposite here" because "[n]o such w1iting
apperus in the record''}.
Moreover, an account stated cause of action requires that the writing demonstrate mutual
assent between the parties and a "final adjustment of the respective demands between them and
of the amount due." Modern Mills, 112 Idaho at 1106 (emphasis added). Rather than allege that
the parties reached a written agreement as to any specific amount due, the complaint alleges that
the account stated "remains unpaid, along with any others which may have occuued but which
Reed is unawar·e of at this time, the dates and exact amount of which will be proven at trial" See
Second Amended Complaint, , 9..2 . Plaintiff's complaint makes clear· that there is no writing
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setting forth a specific amount due.. Rather, it admits that Reed is not aware of any wiiting and
that he is not even awru:e of the exact ru:nount allegedly due
The Sixth Cause of action fails to state a claim for account stated, and must be dismissed.

G.

Seventh Cause of Action - Unjust Enrichment.

Plaintiff's unjust eruichment cause of action should be dismissed for several reasons .
First, Plaintiff fails to satisfy the elements of unjust emichment. The required elements of an
unjust emichment claim ru:e that: "(l) a benefit is confened upon defendant by plaintiff; (2)
appreciation by the defendant of the benefit, and (3) acceptance of the benefit under
circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment
of the value thereof" Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 88, 982 P . 2d
917, 923 (1999) (emphasis added).
Here, no benefit has been confetred upon AIA Services, AIA Inswance, or any other
defendant by Plaintiff. See also Holladay v.

Lin~ay,

152 P . 3d 638, 641 (Ct.. App. 2006) ("The

essence of a cause of action for unjust emichment is 'the claim that the defendant has been
emiched by the plaintiff and that it would be inequitable for the defendant to retain that benefit
without compensating the plaintiff for the value of the benefit.."') (emphasis added) (quoting
Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch, 101 Idaho 663, 666, 619 P 2d 1116, 1119 (1980)).. Rather,

Plaintiff asserts that:
AIA Services, AIA Insurance, John, Duclos, and/or Freeman have
retained the benefit of their fraudulent, wrongful, improper and/01
overreaching conduct and/or transfers.
John and/m any one or more of the other Defendants would be
~justly emiched if allowed to 1etain the benefit of the assets,
secwities, loans, advances and/or other services received through
AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance, all of which funds should
have been paid to Reed.
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See Second Amended Complaint, ii 10. 2 (emphasis added}.
Plaintiff does not allege that he conferred a benefit upon Defendants Rather, he is
simply alleging that funds "should have been paid to Reed." As is the case with many of the
other causes of action, Plaintiff is attempting to squeeze a simple breach of contt act cause of
action into something that it is not.
Second, Plaintiff is precluded from bringing an unjust enrichment cause of action because
Plaintiff alleges that there is a valid contract between the parties governing the Defendants'
obligations to Plaintiff (see generally Second Amended Complaint, setting foxth the various
agreements under which Plaintiff alleges he is entitled to payment). The precise issue presented
here was addressed as follows in Wilhelm v. Johnston, 136 Idaho 145, 152, 30 P 3d 300, 307 (Ct
App. 2001):
A right ofrecovery in quasi-conttact, also known as unjust
emichment, occurs where ..the defendant has received a benefit
which would be inequitable to retain at least without compensating
the plaintiff to the extent that retention is unjust" ..... This doctxine
may not be appropriately applied in the present case because~
1ecovery for unjust entichment is not permissible where there is an
enforceable express contxact between the parties covering the same
subject matter. .... Here, the existence of an enforceable
promissory note and deed of ttust, which define the parties' rights
and responsibilities, precludes application of the unjust eruichment
docttine .
Id.

.Just like in Wilhelm, various agieements govern the rights of the respective parties in this
action, and a claim for unjust emichment is, therefore, precluded.. See id, Mannos v. Moss, _
Idaho_ (February 22, 2007) (''where parties have entered into a contract, a claim for unjust
emichment will be precluded''); Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 191,
108 PJd 332, 338 (2005) ("Because quantum meruit is a species of implied contxact, such
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recovery will not normally lie where there is an express contract governing the relationship of
the parties''); Iron Eagle Development v. Quality De.sign Sys, 138 Idaho 487 (2003) ("When
parties enter into an express contract, a claim based in equity is not allowed because the express
contract precludes enforcement of equitable claims . ") .

H.

Eighth Cause of Action - Constructive Trust.

Plaintiffs cause of action for constructive trust must be dismissed for the same reasons as
the "alter ego" cause of action. "Constructive trust" is not a cause of action at all, but, rather, a
remedy. See, e. g., GulfStates Steel, Inc v Lipton, 765 F.Supp . 696, 704 (N..D Ala . 1990) ("In
fact, the comt's research has revealed no case in any jmisdiction that supports GSS' ar·gument
that constructive trust constitutes a cause of action. Rather, the case law indicates unanimously
that a constructive trust is a remedy imposed to prevent the enjoyment of a fraud or of a breach
ofa fiduciary duty."); Stansfield v. Starkey, 220 Cal App.3d 59, 76 (1990) ("In their third
amended complaint appellants alleged, as causes of action, a resulting trust and a constructive
trust But neither is a cause of action (5 WIT.KIN, CAL

PROCEDURE

§§ 788-791, pp . 232-235), only a remedy."); Marion v.

Benistar~

(3d ed. 1985) Pleading,

Ltd, 2005 WL 563698, *l

(ED. Pa. 2005) ("The claim based upon the assertion of a constructive trust, in Count II, will
also be dismissed . A constructive trust is a remedy, not an independent cause of action.").
Like the other improper causes of action, the constructive fraud cause of action should be
dismissed, leaving Plaintiff with the option of seeking the remedy ifhe prevails on any causes of
action that would entitled him to the remedy of a constructive trust. See, e g, Fujisawa

Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Kapoor, 16 F.Supp.2d 941, 952 (N.D. Ill 1998) ("A constructive
trust is an equitable remedy, not an independent cause of action. .... Accordingly, while the
claim is dismissed, it is understood Fujisawa may attempt to prove a constructive trust is an
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appropriate equitable remedy should it prevail on other claims."); 3Com Corp v.. Electronics

Recovery Specialists, Inc .., 104 F . Supp..2d 932, 942 (N..D . Ill 2000) (''Therefore, if plaintiff
prevails on claims for which constructive trust is an appropriate remedy, it is free to argue that
such a remedy should be imposed. . . Insofar as plaintiff alleges constructive trust as a separate
cause of action in count IX, that count is dismissed . '') .

I.

Ninth Cause of Action - Dil'ector· Liability.

Plaintiff's Ninth Cause of Action for "Director Liability" should be dismissed for failure
to state a claim. As an initial matter, "director liability," just like "alter ego" or "constructive
trust" is not a cause of action, but rather is a mechanism to hold directors individually liable for
the actions of a corporation. For that 1eason alone, the "director liability'' cause of action should
be dismissed.
Second, Plaintiff's complaint does no more than assert the bald allegation that certain
directors should be held liable See Second Amended Complaint,, 12.2 ("John, Duclos, and
Freeman should be held personally liable for all :fraudulent, wrongful, improper, oveneaching
transactions, transfers, loans, advances, loan guarantees and fraudulent conveyances which
occuned dwing their tenure as member of the Board of Directors and as officers of AIA Services
and AIA lnslll'ance . "). Plaintiff's simple assertion that certain directors are individually liable,
absent any allegation setting forth a basis under· which they should be held liable, does not state a
claim upon which relief should be granted.

III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs entire action is a belated attempt to recover under a contract that Plaintiff
alleges was breached over ten years ago. The entire action is barrnd by the five year statute of
limitations applicable to actions based upon "obligation or liability founded upon an instrument
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in writing . " Additionally, most of the remaining causes of action either fail to state a claim
against Defendants or are not causes of action at all
RE SPEC I FULLY SUBMITTED THIS

26 day of May, 2007..

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

By~~~7228

: : y s for Defendants AJA Services
Corporation, AIA Insu1ance, Inc . and
R.. .John Taylor
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-07-00208

v.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
Idaho corporation; AIA INSURANCE,
INC., an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN
TAYLOR and CONNIE TAYLOR,
individually and the community property
comprised thereof; BRYAN FREEMAN,
a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS, a single
person; CROP USA INSURANCE
AGENCY, INC., an Idaho Corporation; and
JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK,
individually and the community property
comprised thereof;
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I. INTRODUCTION
AIA Services Corporation is in default of the $6,000,000 Promissory Note to
Reed Taylor and over $8,250,000 in principal and interest is past due. In response to
Reed Taylor's Complaint and demands for payment, AIA Services Corporation, by and
through John Taylor, has alleged that the $6,000,000 Promissory Note and related
Agreements were orally modified.

But the evidence and testimony of John Taylor

demonstrates that the alleged oral modification fails as a matter of law. Regardless, AIA
Services Corporation is in default under any possible scenario-including its own alleged
oral modification-and the Court should enter an order of partial summary judgment in
favor of Reed Taylor on the default of the $6,000,000 Promissory Note.
II. RELIEF REQUESTED

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed") submits this Motion for Partial Summary against
AIA Services Corporation ("AIA Services") as to the default under the $6,000,000
Promissory Note ("Note") entered into between AIA Services and Reed Taylor, which
was due in full on August 1, 2005. Reed Taylor requests that the Court enter an order
finding: (1) that the Note is valid and enforceable contract under its terms; (2) that the
Note is in default; (3) that $6,000,000 in principal plus all accrued interest is due and
owing; (4) that there has been a default under the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge
Agreement because the Note was not paid when due; and (4) that the Note and Amended
and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement have not been orally modified.
Summary judgment is appropriate and warranted in this case because AIA
Services cannot meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the
Note has been orally modified.

Even if AJA Services is able to prove the oral
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modification by clear and convincing evidence, the modification is nonetheless
unenforceable as a matter of law because there was no agreement to extend the due date
of the Note for a definite and certain period, the modification was not supported by
consideration, there was no mutual assent, and the modification lacks mutuality of
obligation because AIA Services is under no obligation to repay the note as modified.

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

The $6 Million Promissory Note and the Related Agreements.
In July 1995, Reed was the owner of 613,494 shares of common stock in AIA

Services and its majority shareholder. R. John Taylor ("John") sought to purchase all of
Reed's shares by entering into a series of agreements through which AJA Services would
repurchase Reed's shares through a Stock Redemption Agreement. See March I, 2007,
Preliminary Injunction Hearing ("Hearing"), Ex. Z.

Under the terms of the Stock

Redemption Agreement, AJA Services 1 agreed to execute a Sto'ck Pledge Agreement,
Security Agreement, and the $6,000,000 Note in favor of Reed. 2 See Hearing, Exs. A, Z,
AA, and AB.
Under the terms of the Note, the $6,000,000 principal balance plus any accrued
interest was due and payable on the tenth anniversary of the Note. See Hearing, Ex. A.
Interest on the $6,000,000 Note accrued at the rate of 8.25% per annum and was to be
paid in monthly installments. Id. The Note was secured by the Stock Pledge Agreement
and Security Agreement See Hearing, Ex. A, AA and AB.

Ill
1

AIA Insurance, Inc. was also a party to the Security Agreement because it, like AIA Services,
granted Reed Taylor a security interest in all commissions and related receivables.
2
As further consideration for the transaction, AIA Services also executed a $1,500,000 Down
Payment Promissory Note (which was later paid), transferred certain assets to Reed, and forgave certain
indebtedness.

REED TAYLOR'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PROMISSORY NOTE- 3

001121

In 1996, AIA Services defaulted on its obligations to Reed. By letters dated April
18, 1996, April 25, 1996 and June 4, 1996, Reed provided AJA Services with notice of
the various defaults. Id., Ex. B, ~ D.
Rather than accelerate payment of the Note and initiate a legal action against his
brother, Reed and AIA Services agreed to modify the agreements in writing by executing
the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement, Amended and Restated Security
Agreement and the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement ("Amended Stock
Pledge Agreement"). 3 See Hearing, Exs. B, C, and E. These agreements were entered
into in July 1996 and superseded all other agreements of the original transaction, except
the Note, which remained valid and enforceable See Hearing, Ex. B. As a result of the
defaults, AIA Services agreed to pay Reed's attorneys' fees.

See Hearing, Ex. B.

Although the amended agreements originally contemplated that Donna Taylor's Series A
Preferred Shares would be redeemed prior to the payment of the principal on the Note,
Donna Taylor subordinated all of her rights in favor of Reed. See Affidavit of Roderick
Bond filed on February 26, 2007, Ex. 0.
B.

AJA Services' Defaults.

1.

AJA Services' Default of the Note and Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement.

The $6,000,000 principal balance of the Note and all accrued interest were due
and payable to Reed on August 1, 2005 (the tenth anniversary of the Note). See Hearing,
Ex. A, p. 1. AIA Services failed to pay the $6,000,000 principal balance and accrued
interest on the Note to Reed on the due date. See Affidavit of Aimee Gordon dated
3

It is noteworthy that-the agreements all contained provisions requiring all modifications to be in
writing. Moreover, John is a sophisticated business man, licensed attorney and member of the board of
directors of the publicly traded Avista Corporation.
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February 28, 2007,

~

5 (Ms. Gordon testified that, as accounting manager for AIA

Services, Reed was owed $8,189,614 as of December 31, 2006). Although AIA Services
was provided notice of default and demand for payment, the Note remains unpaid and has
accrued additional interest. Id.; Hearing, Ex. F. Because AIA Services failed to pay full
monthly interest installments in the amount of $41,250 (8.25% per month), there was
accrued interest also due on August 1, 2005. See Hearing, Ex. A.
Reed provided AIA Services with written notice of the defaults by letter dated
December 12, 2006. See Hearing, Ex. F. The letter provided notice of the default on the
Note for failure to pay the principal balance and interest, together with notice of defaults
under the related agreements. Id. AIA Services' failure to pay the Note when due also
constituted a breach of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, which listed a failure to
pay the Note as a default. See Hearing, Ex. C, p. 5,

~

7(a) ("Failure of Pledgor to

pay ... within ten ( 10) days of the date due any principal or interest under ... the $6M
Note.") The letter also notified AIA Services that Reed intended to vote the shares of
AIA Insurance, Inc. (all of which were pledged to Reed as security for payment of the
Note), pursuant to Section 6 of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. See Hearing, Ex.
C, p. 5,.p. 4,

~

6. However, AIA Services failed to pay the $8,189,614 due as of

December 31, 2006 (a substantial amount of additional interest has accrued since this
time). Thus, at the time Reed filed suit in this action, AJA Services was in default of the
Note and the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement.
Ill
Ill
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C.

The Alleged March 2003 Oral Modification.

1.

John's First Allegations of the March 2003 Oral Modification and the
Inconsistent and Unclear Terms of the Alleged Oral Modification.

In John's Affidavit dated February 28, 2007, he testified for the first time that
Reed agreed to "defer his receipt of the unpaid principal and interest on his note until
the companies were financially able to be restructured and to redeem his note."
Affidavit of R. John Taylor dated February 28, 2007. John further testified that "at
about $35 million in new business placements, the companies could begin catching up
on accrued interest payments.

When the companies achieved $60 million in new

business placements, the companies would be able to retire his note ... " Id.
2.

John's Testimony Regarding the Alleged Oral Modification at the
March 1, 2007 Hearing.

During the Hearing held on March 1, 2007, John for the first time alleged that the
Note had been orally modified in March 2003:
A. The last - we had a long period of renegotiation and all these documents and
these entire loan documents from 2000, 2001 to clear to 2003. We finally settled
on a deal in March of 2003, and that's the deal we have been working under ever
smce.
Q. Okay. And as of 2003, you had a deal with your brother [Reed]?
A. Yes.

Q. And was that deal memorialized in writing?
A. No, not to the extent of these type of documents, no.

Affidavit of Paul R. Cressman, Jr. ("Cressman Aff. "), Ex. B, p. 67, 11. 5-14. John would
later testify there were no written documents regarding the alleged oral modification. At
the Hearing, John testified regarding the tenns of the alleged oral modification:
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Q. What were the terms of the deal in '03?
A. Terms of the deal in '03 is that the company would dig itself out of the hole,
work together to dig itself out of the hole with Crop USA, rebuild its agency
force. I think I indicated in my affidavit, rebuild its agency force and that we
would likely be able to begin catch-up on the interest as soon as we hit around

thirty million of premium. And that we would again be able to restructure
and begin paying off AJA and this debt as soon as we bit sixty to seventy
million in premium and that was our goal.

Q. Any other terms?
A. We would pay Reed fifteen thousand dollars a month plus continuing paying
for about ten thousand dollars in other expenses during that interim period ...

Q. Okay. Any other terms?
A. Those are all I recall right now.
Q. So that was the deal between your brother and AIA Services in 2003?
A. Yes.
Cressman Aff., Ex. B, p. 70, 11. 4-25 (emphasis added).
John further testified that the "sixty to seventy million" premium goal was to be
met by AIA Insurance, Inc. (AIA Services wholly owned subsidiary) and Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc. ("Crop USA") (an unrelated entity). Cressman Aff., Ex. B, p. 78,
11. 1-7. In contradiction to John's Affidavit dated February 28, 2007, John testified that
they would begin paying Reed's debt, instead of the earlier testimony that the Note would
be redeemed. Id.
Later at the Hearing, John testified that there was no fixed date to pay Reed the
$6,000,000 principal balance of the Note and the accrued interest and that Reed would be
paid all principal and interest:
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Q. And I'm trying to understand was there or was there not a fixed date when
your brother was going to be paid in your agreement with him in March
2003?

A. I will repeat again based upon the budgets we presented in 2003 and as
modified more recently, they were - it was - be was to be paid when we hit
sixty million dollars in premium.
Cressman Aff., Ex. B, p. 79, 11. 3-8 (emphasis added). John contradicted his earlier
testimony at the Hearing of sixty to seventy million in premium by changing his
testimony to sixty million. Cressman Aff., Ex. B, p. 78, 11. 6-7. Under either scenario,
Reed would only be paid if AIA and Crop USA met the "premium goals." Id. There was
no specific date when Reed would be paid and payment depended solely upon whether
AJA Services and Crop USA met certain premium targets that may never be met.
Moreover, there was uncertain, unclear and contradictory testimony of exactly how much
would be paid and when such payments would be made. See Cressman Aff., Bxs. A-B.

3.

John's Inconsistent Testimony during the IRCP 30(b)(6) deposition of
AIA Services.

John also provided a different account of the alleged oral modification during the

IRCP 30(b)(6) deposition of AJA Services. John was designated by AJA Services as the
testifying witness for AIA Services regarding the alleged oral modification. Cressman
Aff., Ex. A, p. 6, 11. 19-24. John testified, on behalf of AJA Services, that Reed would
not be paid when Crop USA and AIA Services reached "sixty to seventy million in
premium," but he would be paid when AIA Services and Crop USA was "financially

able to pay him:"
Ill
Ill
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Q. Do I understand correctly that it's your contention that you orally modified
your arrangement with your brother [Reed] that interest and principal was to be
repaid upon Crop USA achieving certain financial results?
A. I think I've stated clearly, my contention is that we've orally modified the
agreement to Reed extending the payments.
Q. Based upon financial results -

Mr. McNichols: Now, you interrupted his answer, Counsel. You have to permit
him to complete his answer.
Q. (By Mr. Cressman) Please continue.

A. Until we're financially able to pay him.
Cressman Aff., Ex. A, p. 83, IL 14-25; p. 84, II. 1-2 (emphasis added). 4 John later
clarified that AIA Services would be "financially able to pay him" when the companies
were "economically viable," but he still did not identify a date certain when the Note
would be repaid or other material terms such as payment amounts.
Q. Okay. When would he be entitled to be paid under such circumstances Q. - based on your agreement?
A. When the companies were economically viable.
Q. What does "economically viable" mean?
A. And able to borrow the amount of money to pay Reed off.
Q. Okay. So, is it your testimony that your agreement with Reed was, he would

be repaid accrued interest and principal when the companies were able to borrow
sufficient funds to pay him off?
A. A combination of borrow or current assets, yes.
Q. That was your agreement with your brother?
A. Yes.

4

John testified at numerous occasions in the IRCP 30(b)(6) deposition that the oral agreement was
that AJA Services would pay Reed "when it was financially able to pay him." Cressman Aff., Ex. A, p. 84,
I. 2; p. 85, II. 19-20; p. 86, II. 1-3; p. 90, I. 25; p. 91, II. 1-5; and p. 133, II. 8-11.
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Cressman Aff., Ex. A, p. 86, 11. 8-24 (emphasis added). Again, John did not testify that
there was a definite or certain date when the Note would be paid, and, again, John
changed his testimony and contradicted his earlier testimony. Id.
The circumstances of the alleged modification claimed by John are also not
indicative of the parties' prior dealings.

In July 1996, the parties modified the

agreements that provided Reed security for AIA Services' obligation under the Note, and
they did so through a series of written agreements that totaled over 20 pages. However,
the March 2003 agreement that allegedly supplanted all previous agreements was not
even confirmed with an email. Cressman Aff., Ex. A, p. 146, 11. 23-25; p. 147, 11. 1-4.
John also testified that he did not reduce the March 2003 agreement to writing because he
was "very busy the last couple of years."

Id. at p. 147, 11. 1-2.

The alleged oral

modification was also not approved by the board of directors of AIA Services or AIA
Insurance. Id. at p. 87, 11. 22-25, p. 88, 11. 1-3.

4.

John's Email to Ernie Dantini in October 2005.

Although John alleges that the oral modification of Reed's debt occurred in
March 2003, John sent an email to Reed's accountant, Ernie Dantini, that discussed a
proposal to modify AIA Service's debt to Reed in October 2005 (two months after the
maturity date of the note), but made no mention of the alleged March 2003 oral
modification. In his email, John stated "I hope that you and [Reed] can come up with

some specific proposals to modify the debt and move us toward putting the two
companies back together ... I am willing to explore all options, but will need a written

proposal." Affidavit of Ernie Dantini ("Dantini Aff."), Ex. A (emphasis added). Most
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significantly, however, is the fact that John's email was sent to Reed's accountant only
two months after the maturity date of the Note on August 1, 2005.
Nowhere in the October 2005 email did John mention or confirm the alleged oral
modification in March 2003. John's email compels the question:

Why would AIA

Services discuss modifying the Note in October 2005 if it had already done so in March
2003? The only reasonable answer (based upon the evidence, John's testimony and his
email to Ernie Dantini) is because the parties never agreed to orally modify the Note in
March 2003 and AIA Services was in default for failing to pay the $6,000,000 in
principal and accrued interest that was due on August 1, 2005.

IV. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
A.

Whether Reed is entitled to partial summary judgment on AIA Services'

defaults under the Note and Amended Stock Pledge Agreement?
B.

Whether the oral modification as likely will be alleged by John is an

unenforceable agreement as a matter of law when: ( 1) the alleged oral modification of the
terms and extension of the due date of the Note is not for a "definite and certain time";
(2) the alleged modification is not supported by consideration; (3) there is no evidence of
mutual assent as to the terms of the alleged oral modification; and (4) the alleged oral
modification is lacking mutuality of obligation because AIA Services is under no
obligation to repay the note under the tenns alleged by John?
C.

Whether AIA Services can meet its burden of proving an oral modification

of the Note by clear and convincing evidence when: (1) the only evidence of the oral
modification is John's own contradicted testimony; (2) John has provided numerous
inconsistent versions of the alleged oral modification; (3) the oral modification was not
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
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approved by the Board of AIA Services; and (4) John's email to Reed's accountant in
October 2005 is void of any evidence that the Note had not been modified and discusses

in detail the value of AIA Services based upon default and the fact that all payments to
Reed could be frozen because of a default?
D.

Assuming, arguendo, that the parties agreed to the oral modification

alleged by John (which Reed denies and the evidence does not support), whether AIA
Services can that it is not in default of the Note?
E.

Assuming the parties agreed to an oral modification, whether AIA

Services can avoid the unenforceability of an oral modification that changes or eliminates
material terms?
V. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
I.R.C.P. 56(c). "Once the moving party has provided sufficient evidence to support the
motion, the party against whom a motion for summary judgment is sought may not
merely rest on allegations contained in the pleadings, but must come forward and produce
evidence by way of deposition or affidavit to contradict the assertions of the moving
party and establish a genuine issue of material fact." Post v. Idaho Farmway, Inc., 135
Idaho 475, 478, 20 P.3d 11, 14 (2001) (citing I.R.C.P. 56(e); McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho
765, 770, 820 P.2d 360, 365 (1991)). "Such evidence must consist of specific facts,
and cannot be conclusorv or based on hearsay." Id. (emphasis added).
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"The moving party is entitled to judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."

Thomas v. Medical Center

Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 205, 61 P.3d 557, 562 (2002) (citing Celotex v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).

A. Reed Is Entitled to Partial Summary Judement on AIA Services' Default of
the $6,000,000 Note.
The Court may make a finding of default and/or enter an order of partial summary
judgment on a promissory note. Markham v. Anderton, 118 Idaho 856, 858-59, 801 P.2d
565 (1990). Partial summary judgment is also appropriate for a promissory note even if
all claims between all parties have not been resolved. Id.; l.R.C.P. 54.
Here, it is undisputed that John executed the Note, Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement, and related agreements on behalf of AIA Services. It is undisputed that Reed
has a security interest in all of the shares of AJA Services' wholly owned subsidiary AJA
Insurance, Inc. It is undisputable that $6,000,000, plus all accrued interest was due in full
on August 1, 2005. It is undisputed that Reed was owed $6,000,000 in principal and
$2,189,614 in accrued interest under the terms of the Note as of December 31, 2006. It is
undisputed that Reed is presently owed over $8,250,000 in principal and accrued interest.
It is undisputable that AIA Services is in default of the Note, and as a consequence, in

default of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement.
As a matter of law, Reed Taylor the Court should enter an order of partial
summary judgment for AJA Services' defaults of the Note and Amended Stock Pledge
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5

Agreement, regardless of the alleged oral modification of March 2003. Even if all other
claims and counterclaims are unresolved between AIA Services (or any of the other
defendants) and Reed, he is still entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of the
defaults. See Markham, 118 Idaho at 858-59.
B. Assuming AIA Services Responds to Reed's Motion by Asserting that the
Note Has Been Orally Modified as Alleged by John, the Alleged Oral
Modification is Unenforceable as a Matter of Law.
It is anticipated that AIA Services will argue that the Note was orally modified as
alleged by John. However, even if John was permitted to unilaterally select the most
favorable terms and conditions from his testimony, there could be no oral modification as
a matter of law for the reasons articulated below.
1.

The Alleged Oral Modification is Unenforceable as a Matter of Law
Because It is Too Indefmite and Uncertain to Constitute an
Enforceable Obligation.

The majority of courts across the country, including Idaho courts, have
consistently held that an oral agreement to extend the time to pay is not enforceable
unless it is for a definite period of time:
The time for payment of a note may be extended by agreement of the
parties. In order to be valid and enforceable. an agreement to extend
the time of payment of a negotiable instrument must contain all of the
elements of a contract. A consent to an extension set forth in an
instrument is, unless specified otherwise, a consent to a single extension
only, and then for no longer a period than that of the original instrument.
In addition, for an extension of time for payment of a note to be
binding on the parties, it must be for a def'mite period of time.
11 Am. Jur. 2d Bills and Notes § 198 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added); see

also Pavey v. Collins, 31 Wash.2d 864, 870-71, 199 P.2d 571, 574 (1948) ("An
5
As discussed below, even if the oral modification existed and was valid (which Reed denies),
Reed is still entitled partial summary judgment on the Note because AJA Services would be in breach of
the terms of John's alleged oral modification.
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extension, to be binding, must be for a time that is definite and certain or capable of being
made so by some future event which is sure to occur."); Mack v. Hendricks, 126 Or. 400,
403, 270 P. 4 76, 4 77 ( 1928) ("It is the general rule, and it has been adopted in this state,
that an agreement to extend the time for payment, in order to be valid, must be for a
definite time."); Martin v. Fannin Bank, 389 S.W.2d 724, 726 (Tex.Civ.App.1965) ("For
an extension of time for payment of a note to be binding, it must not only be supported by
consideration but the extension must be to a time certain."); Mitchell v. Peterson, 97
Ill.App.3d 363, 367, 422 N.E.2d 1026, 1030 (Ill.App., 1981) ("For an extension of the
payment of a note to be binding on the parties, it must be for a definite period and must
be supported by consideration.").
The significant requirements of definiteness and certainty as a condition for the
enforceability of oral agreements to repay money were specifically explained in Irwin
Rogers Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Murphy, 122 Idaho 270, 833 P.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1992).
In Irwin Rogers, an insurance agency, Irwin, brought suit against the insureds, the
Murphys, for failure to pay a promissory note obligating the Murphys to pay unpaid
premiums. Irwin Rogers, 122 Idaho at 274-75. The Murphys argued that the promissory
note was invalid because there was a prior oral payment plan agreement between the
Murphys and Irwin that gave Murphys the right to repay the money "as funds became
avaiJable." Irwin Rogers, 122 Idaho at 274-75. (emphasis added).

In following the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Black Canyon Racquetball
Club, Inc. v. Idaho First, 119 Idaho 171, 173, 804 P.2d 900 (199l)(upholding summary
judgment based upon the lack of definite and certain terms), the Idaho Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the Murphys breach of the duty of the covenant of
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good faith and fair dealing claim on summary judgment because the tenns of the
underlying alleged oral agreement were not definite and certain as required to constitute
an enforceable contract right:
The Murphys contend there exists a genuine issue of material fact whether
the insurance agency breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing when it procured a promissory note that altered the tenns of the
oral pay plan agreement. They argue, essentially, that the insurance
agency's attempt to obtain the promissory note, which was payable in full,
with interest, upon demand, unfairly deprived the Murphys of the benefits
of an alleged oral agreement which allowed them to make irregular
payments on their account. We disagree.
In order to establish the impairment of a contractual right or benefit, the
party asserting the breach of the covenant must first establish that such a
right or benefit existed. In this case, the Murphys contend that the oral

agreement gave them the right to pay their accounts "as funds became
available." Even if actually agreed to by the parties. these terms are
too indefmite and uncertain to constitute an enforceable contract
right. See Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'/ Bank,
N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 173, 804 P.2d 900, 902 (1991). We therefore
conclude that the impairment of such an alleged right or benefit is
insufficient upon which to base an action for breach of the covenant of
good faith. Accordingly, the district court did not err when it dismissed
that claim.
Irwin Rogers, 122 Idaho at 274-75 (emphasis added).

In Black Canyon, 119 Idaho 171, the plaintiff alleged that Idaho First entered into
an enforceable oral contract to provide a loan. Id. at 173. As with Reed, Idaho First
denied the existence of an oral agreement and asserted that even if the oral agreement did
exist, it was unenforceable because the "essential terms were indefinite." Id. (emphasis
added).

The district court agreed and granted summary judgment.

Id.

The Idaho

Supreme Court affinned the trial court's order granting summary judgment based upon
the "well-established rule that the terms of a contract must be sufficiently definite and
certain in order to be enforceable." Black Canyon, 119 Idaho at 173 (citations omitted).
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Moreover, as in Black Canyon, 119 Idaho at 173, Reed has demonstrated that John
contradicted his own testimony when he testified regarding the tenns of the alleged oral
modification (See subsection 3 below for an un-exhaustive analysis of John's significant
contradictions, which are incorporated by reference into this subsection and subsection 2
below).
According to John's testimony in the 30(b)(6) deposition of AIA Services, there is
no deadline when AIA Services must repay the Note under the alleged oral modification. 6
AIA Services would pay the principal balance on the Note and accrued interest
when it was "financially able to pay him." Cressman Aff., Ex., A, p. 83, 11. 14-25; p. 84,
11. 1-2. Even if it is assumed that this oral modification was made, which Reed denies,
the oral modification is unenforceable as a matter of law because the extension of the
time for payment of the Note was not for a definite or certain period of time.
The facts pertaining to the oral agreement alleged by the Murphys in Irwin Rogers
and the oral agreement alleged by AIA Services in the present case are unmistakable. In
this case, John alleges that under the oral agreement with Reed, AIA Services would
repay the Note when AJA Services was "financially able to pay him." Cressman Aff.,
Ex. A, p. 83, 11. 14-25; p. 84, 11. 1-2 (emphasis added). In Irwin Rogers, the Murphys
alleged that the debt would be paid "as funds became available." Id, 122 Idaho at 274275 (emphasis added).
Like the oral agreement alleged by the Murphys in Irwin Rogers, the oral
modification alleged by AIA Services is too indefinite and uncertain to create an
6

The one consistency in John's contradicted testimony is that all of the alleged events that imply
some form of payment will be made to Reed on the Note do not have a definite due date. John testimony
provided no definite due dates or definite payment amounts under the terms of the alleged oral
modification.
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enforceable contractual obligation as a matter of law. There is no obligation on the part
of AIA Services under the alleged oral modification because its performance is at the
discretion of AIA Services. Moreover, John's own testimony demonstrates that it is
impossible to determine when Reed would be paid or when he is entitled to be paid. AIA
Services may, at its own choosing, create a situation where it is never "financially able to
pay" the Note or that the companies may never reach certain revenue or premium targets.
Moreover, John's testimony is contradictory as to exactly how much is paid and whenif and when the contradicted premium goals are met.
Because the alleged oral modification of March 2003 contains too uncertain and
indefinite terms, it fails as a matter of law and the Court should enter an order of partial
summary judgment in favor of Reed on AIA Services' defaults of the Note and Amended
Stock Pledge Agreement.
2.

The Oral Modification is Unenforceable because it Jacks Mutuality of
Obligation and is not supported by Consideration.

The oral agreement alleged by John, on behalf of AIA Services, also fails as a
matter of law because it lacks mutuality of obligation and consideration:
That mutuality of obligation is an essential element of a contract has been
recognized repeatedly by this court. Wormward v. Taylor, 70 Idaho 450,
221 P.2d 686, and cases therein cited; Thomas v. Cate, 78 Idaho 29, 296
P.2d 1033. Mutuality of obligation as pertains to an executory contract
requires that each party to the agreement be bound to perform; if it
appears that one party was never bound on his part to do the acts
which form the consideration for the promise of the other, there is a
lack of mutuality of obligation, and the other party is not bound.
Houserv. Hobart, 22 Idaho 735, 127 P. 997, 43 L.R.A.,N.S., 410; Zaring
v. Lavatta, 36 Idaho 459, 211 P. 557. This doctrine is interwoven with the
basic requirement for consideration to support a binding agreement; if one
party is not bound to perform his promise, the consideration for the other
party's agreement is lacking, 12 Am.Jur., Contracts§ 13; 17 C.J.S.
Contracts§ 100.
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McCandless v. Schick, 85 Idaho 509, 518, 380 P.2d 893, 897-898 (1963) (emphasis

added).
Moreover, an oral agreement, like all other agreements, must be supported by
consideration to be enforceable. Rule Sales and Service, Inc., v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 133
Idaho 669, 674, 991 P.2d 857 (1999). Consideration for a promise may take the form of
an act by the promisee that is bargained for and given in exchange for the promise. Day

v. Mortgage Ins. Corp., 91Idaho605, 607, 428 P.2d 524 (1967).
In Thomas v. Cate, 78 Idaho 29, 296 P .2d 1033 (1956), the plaintiff and defendant
had entered into a lease agreement whereby plaintiff leased a truck to defendant and the
only obligation assumed by the defendant was to pay for the use of the truck and
plaintiffs services in operating the truck if defendant used the truck. Id. at 30-31. The
Idaho Supreme Court held that the lease agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law
for lacking mutuality of obligation and consideration because defendant assumed no
obligation to use the truck "to any extent or at any time." Id. at 32 ("[AJ reservation to
either party to determine the nature and extent of his performance renders this
oblieation too indef'mite for legal enforcement, making it, as it is termed, merely
illusory.") (emphasis added).
John alleges that under the terms of the oral modification, Reed agreed to

postpone enforcement of the Note and AIA Services agreed to pay the Note when it was
"financially able to pay him." Cressman Aff., Ex. A, p. 83, 11. 14-25; p. 84, 11. 1-2.
Under this alleged modification, AJA Services was under no obligation to perform but
could perform at its discretion. There is no promise that was made by AIA Services to
meet the requirements of mutuality of obligation and no consideration to create an
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enforceable modification. John testified that, other than the payment of a portion of the
$41,250 in monthly interest payments under the Note, Reed received nothing.

See

Cressman Aff., Ex. A, p. 86, I. 25; p. 87, II. 1-12. There is no point at which Reed can
determine that AIA Services breached the oral agreement because performance is at AIA
Services' discretion.

AJA Services has the unilateral right to determine when it is

"financially able to pay him" and it may, for example, choose not to pay him at all (as it
currently has done). There is no reasonably basis to explain why Reed would accept such
a modification. Therefore, the oral agreement alleged by AJA Services is unenforceable
as a matter of law because it is lacking mutuality of obligation and consideration.

3.

AIA Services Bas Not and Cannot Meet its Burden of Proving an Oral
Modification of the Note by the Required Clear and Convincing
Evidence and with the Required Mutual Assent.

Even if the Court finds that the oral modification does not fail as a matter of law
on any of the above arguments, the Court should nevertheless grant the Reed's motion
because AIA Services cannot meet it burden of proving an oral modification.
For an oral agreement to be valid (or any agreement), there must also be a
meeting of the minds of all tenns before a contract is fonned and proof of a meeting of
the minds "requires evidence of mutual understanding as the terms of the agreement and
the assent of both parties." Potts Const. Co. v. North Kootenai Water Dist., 141 Idaho
678, 681, 116 P.3d 8 (2005)(The Idaho Supreme Court

~pheld

the order granting

summary judgment on an alleged oral contract where there was a the lack of
consideration, no specific duration, and no purpose for entering into the oral contract). If
there is no distinct understanding between the parties to a contract, summary judgment is
appropriate based upon the lack of mutual assent.

Wolford v. Tankersley, 107 Idaho
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1062, 1064-65, 695 P.2d 1201 (1984) (The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the trial court's
granting of summary judgment on the finding of no mutual assent because the purchase
price was not set forth on the agreement when the buyers signed).
Even if a party can prove the existence of basic contract principals, the Idaho
Supreme Court has consistently held that "ftlhe party asserting an oral modification of
a written contract has the burden of proving the modification by clear and
convincing evidence." Scott v. Castle, 104 Idaho 719, 724, 662 P.2d 1163, 1168 (1983)

(holding that party had failed to meet its burden of proving an oral modification by clear
and convincing evidence and affirming trial court's dismissal of oral modification claim)
(citing Kline v. Clinton, 103 Idaho 116, 645 P.2d 350 (1982)) (emphasis added).
Here, it is impossible for mutual assent to exist because there is no evidence of
individual assent by John. There can be no meeting of John and Reed's minds because
there is not even a meeting in John's mind as to the terms of the alleged oral
modification. John has failed to testify to the existence of distinct and consistent terms of
the alleged oral modification. There is no mutual assent as to the dates or amounts that
principal and accrued interest is due, let alone mutual assent as to other significant terms
as discussed in detail below.
Moreover, John's account of the alleged oral modification of Reed's Note has
been anything but clear and convincing.

Below is a summary of a portion of the

inconsistencies in John's own testimony regarding the alleged oral modification:
•

Changing terms of the alleged oral modification. John stated in the March 1,
2007 Hearing that interest would be "caught up" when AIA and Crop USA
reached "around 30 million in premium" and that the Note would be repaid
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when AIA Services and Crop USA reached "sixty to seventy million in
premium." Cressman Aff., Ex. B, p. 70, II. 5-13. At the Hearing, when asked
what would be paid when the companies reached sixty million in premium,
John testified that "[t]he balance of the note six million plus accrued interest."
Cressman Aff., Ex. B, p. 79, 11. 6-11.
At his deposition, John testified that [t]he terms of the deal in '03 is
that ... we would likely be able to catch up on the interest as soon as we hit
around thirty million dollars of premium and that we would be able to
restructure and begin paying off [the] debt as soon as we hit sixty to seventy
million of premium, that was our goal." (emphasis added). Cressman Aff.,
Ex. A, p. 147, 11. 21-25; p. 148, 11. 1-11. Then later in his deposition, when
asked if Reed's Note would be paid off when the companies reach sixty
million in premium, John responded "[e]ssentially yes." Ex. A, p. 153, 11. 1523. Yet John testified earlier at his deposition that the Note would be repaid
only when AIA Services was "financially able to pay him." Cressman Aff.,
Ex. A, p. 83, 11. 14-25; p. 84, 11. 1-2.
•

Does Reed still have a security interest? In his deposition, John was initially
unsure whether Reed still had his security for the Note in AJA Insurance,
Inc.' s stock, "I think that he still had a secured [sic] interest in the stock of
AIA." Cressman Aff., Ex. A, p. 140, 11. 2-3. Later in the same deposition,
John stated Reed had a security interest in AJA Insurance's shares. Cressman
Aff.,Ex.A.,p.176,11.17-19.
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Regarding the security interest in the commissions, John testified that
Reed had a security interest in the commissions. Cressman Aff., Ex. A., p.

140, II. 4-8. John then admitted that "[the commissions] were not discussed,
but I would assume that they would remain." Cressman Aff., Ex. A., p. 140,

11. 4-8.
Significantly, John did not mention any security interests in either the
commissions or the shares of AJA Insurance at the Hearing on March l, 2007.

See Cressman Aff., Ex. B, p. 70, II. 4-25.
•

The place of the alleged oral modification. At the Hearing, John testified that
the agreement was made in AIA's offices and the only parties present were
him and Reed, no other person was present for the oral modification.
Cressman Aff., Ex. B, p. 71, II. 3-9 (emphasis added).

Later, at John's

deposition, he testified that the alleged oral modification was made "outside
[his] office." Cressman Aff., Ex. A, p. 85, II. 19-20 (emphasis added).

•

What were Reed's remedies in the event of a default of alleged oral
modification? When questioned about what Reed's remedies would be in the
event of a default in the March 2003 alleged oral modification, John testified
"I don't know." Cressman Aff., Ex. A, p. 143, 11. 12-19. When asked shortly
thereafter if he discussed remedies with Reed, John testified "I would imagine
we did." Id. at p. 144, 11. 18-22. Then when questioned when Reed would be
able to realize on his security interest, John Testified "If we didn't pay him
back, if [AJA] Services did not pay him back." Id at p. 145, 11. 5-12. When
questioned further John stated that Reed would have a right to realize on his
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security interest "[a]t a point in time after the companies were abJe to pay his
note but don't." Id. atll.13-17.
When questioned regarding what rights Reed would have if the companies
were never economically viable to pay him, John testified that he didn't
believe the issue was discussed. Id. at p. 146, 11. 9-12. Yet earlier John
Testified that if the companies did not reach the revenue targets, "[Reed]
would have the same rights and privileges he had at that time." Cressman
Aff., Ex. A., p. 85, 1. 25; p. 86, 11. 1-7.
•

Ernie Dantini's, Reed's accountant, involvement in the oral modification.
John testified that "Ernie Dantini was intricately involved" in the oral
modification. Cressman Aff., Ex. B, p. 71, 11. 10-12.

Yet John (a licensed

attorney, accountant and member of the board of Avista Corporation) never
sent confirming correspondence or even sought to obtain a written agreement
confirming the tenns of the alleged oral modification.
•

John's email to Ernie Dantini dated October 5, 2005. John sent an email to
Mr. Dantini on October 7, 2005 requesting proposals to modify the Note.
Dantini Aff., Ex. A.

The subject line of the email stated "Reeds note."

Dantini Aff., Ex. A.

John stated that "[m]andatory redemption will not

work ... no help to [financial statement]." Id.

John also discussed how

payments to Reed would freeze up in the event of default. Id. It makes no
logical sense why AJA Services would neeq to modify the Note again if it was
not in default on October 7, 2005, and was only obligated to pay Reed's Note
if it was "financially able to pay him." Cressman Aff., Ex. A, p. 83, 11. 14-25;
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p. 84, IL 1-2. Why would John discuss Reed wanting all of his accrued
interest? There only one reasonable explanation for sending the email: John's
email has all the makings of an individual trying to paint a bleak picture to a
creditor (Reed) who holds the legal right vote the shares and take control of
the company. Certainly, if there was ever a time to confirm the alleged oral
modification, John's October 2005 email to Reed's accountant would have
been the ideal and warranted time.
•

The parties' course of performance regarding modifications of their
agreements. The parties modified the agreements that acted as security for the
Note in 1996, one year after entering into the prior agreements, through a
another set of sophisticated agreements consisting of over 30 pages of
documents and costing Reed tens of thousands of dollars in attorneys' fees.

See Hearing, Exs. B, C and E. In John's October 2005 email to Ernie Dantini,
John confirmed the parties' course of dealing by stating "I am willing to
explore all options, but will need a written proposal." Dantini Aff., Ex. A.
Thus, not only is it outside the parties'

cours~

of dealing, John did not even

bother to confirm the alleged oral modification with an email or otherwise
attempt to memorialize the alleged oral modification in writing. Cressman
Aff., Ex. A, p. 146, 11. 23-25; p. 147, 11. 1-4.
•

John's explanation of why the agreement was not reduced to writing. In his
deposition, John testified that he did not put the agreement in writing because
he was ''very busy the last couple of years." Cressman Aff., Ex. A, p. 146, IL

23-25; p. 147, 11. 1-4.
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•

Agreement not approved by Board of Directors or shareholders of A1A
Services. John, a member of the Board of Directors of Avista Corporation
(including the governance committee of the Board), testified that the oral
modification had not been approved by the Board of Directors of AIA
Services. Cressman Aff., Ex. A, p. 87, II. 22-25, p. 88, 11. 1-3.

AJA Services cannot meet its burden of proving an oral modification by clear and
convincing evidence as required by the Idaho Supreme Court. John's testimony provides
the only alleged terms and conditions of the alleged oral modification. John has failed to
provide a consistent or clear account of the alleged oral modification, including the date
the modification occurred and the terms of the modification. AIA Services cannot show
mutual assent or a meeting of the minds because the alleged terms are unclear even in
John's mind as evidence by his contradictory and unclear testimony.
Based on the totality of the testimony and the evidence presented by AJA
Services, it cannot prove an oral modification as a matter of law and the Court should
grant Reed's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Note.

C. Assuming, Arguendo, that the Oral Modification Is Valid, AIA Services Is in
Default and Reed Is Still Entitled to Partial Summary Judgment.
Summary judgment on a default of a promissory note may be granted even in
instances in which all claims are not resolved. Markham, 118 Idaho at 859.
In his deposition on behalf of AJA Services, when questioned how Reed's Note
could have value if orally modified as alleged, John testified that other than the alleged
modifications the remaining terms of the Note remained unchanged. See Cressman Aff.,
Ex. A, p. 163, 11. 3-25. Under the terms of the Note, AJA Services is in default if it fails
to pay monthly interest payments and the entire balance may be accelerated if a default in
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monthly interest installments is not cured within 5 days of the notice of default. See
Hearing, Ex. A.
Significantly, at the Hearing on March 1, 2007 (which was heard over 2~ months
after Reed's notice of default), John testified regarding the $15,000 in monthly interest
payment that was not paid to Reed:
You know the records indicate that we paid fifteen thousand dollars in cash
payments to Reed each month plus these other benefits, and I think that there was
one month where we didn't pay - I didn't pay ... I told Reed that I would catch
up with him this year Jon the missed pavmentl.
Cressman Aff., Ex. B, p. 121, 11. 14-25 (emphasis added); see also Hearing, Ex. AJ. Thus,
John's testimony provides demonstrates that AIA Services was even in default of the
terms of the alleged oral modification.
Accordingly, Reed's notice of default and demand for payment dated December
12, 2006, also constituted notice of default and acceleration of payment for any alleged
oral modification of the Note. See Hearing, Ex. F. Thus, as a matter of law, Reed is
entitled to partial summary judgment on the Note, even if it was orally modified as
alleged by John.

D. AIA Services' Alleged Oral Modification Would Change Material Terms and
Be Unenforceable Under the Statute of Frauds.
Under Idaho law, agreements that require more than one year to perform must be
in writing. LC. § 9-505.
Oral modifications that change material terms of an agreement required to be in
writing violate the statute of frauds and are unenforceable. Idaho has also followed the
rule that a party may orally extend time of performance of a contract that is required to be
in writing only if "no other material term is changed." Kelly v. Hodges, 119 Idaho
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872, 875, 811 P.2d 48 (App. Ct. 1991); see also Foster v. Mutual Saving Association, 602
S.W. 2d 98 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (holding than an oral modification of the amount of
installments is unenforceable).

In Kelly, the Idaho Court of Appeals followed the

majority rule that material terms may not be changed:
The authorities examining this issue are not unanimous. Some jurisdictions apply
the general rule that a contract within the statute of frauds cannot be orally
modified, and hold that a parole agreement extending time for performance of
such a contract is unenforceable. However, most of the recent cases addressing
the issue recognize that an oral agreement to substitute the mode or time of
performance of an executory contract required to be in writing is valid and
binding, provided that no other material term is changed and the agreement is
made before the expiration of the written contract. The cases employing this rule
generally draw a distinction between the contract, which the statute of frauds
requires to be in writing, and its performance, to which the statute does not apply.

In our opinion, this latter rule constitutes the better view, allowing the
parties to orally extend the time for performance of their agreements, so long
as no other material term is changed and the agreement is made before the
underlying contract's expiration.
Kelly v. Hodges, 119 Idaho at 875 (internal footnotes and corresponding cases

omitted)(emphasis added).
Here, AIA Services executed the Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Stock
Restructure Redemption Agreement, and Amended Security Agreement. 7 All of these
agreements required performance for over one year and were required by the statute of
frauds. At his deposition, John testified that the alleged oral agreement resulted in Reed
agreeing to materially change the monthly payments under the Note from the required
$41,250 to $15,000 in cash and the payment of certain other expenses of less than
$10,000 per month (the total of such monthly payments were substantially less than the
$41,250 required by the Note):

7

AIA Services' wholly owned subsidiary AIA Insurance, Inc. was also a party to the Amended
Security Agreement because its commissions and related receivables were pledged to Reed.
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Q. What were the terms of the deal in '03?
A. Terms of the deal in '03 is that the company would dig itself out of the hole,
work together to dig itself out of the hole with Crop USA, rebuild its agency
force. I think I indicated in my affidavit, rebuild its agency force and that we
would likely be able to begin catch-up on the interest as soon as we hit around
thirty million of premium. And that we would again be able to restructure and
begin paying off AIA and this debt as soon as we hit sixty to seventy million in
premium and that was our goal.
Q. Any other terms?

A. We would pay Reed fifteen thousand dollars a month plus continuing
paying for about ten thousand dollars in other expenses during that interim
period ...
Q. Okay. Any other terms?
A. Those are all I recall right now.
Q. So that was the deal between your brother and AJA Services in 2003?
A. Yes.
Cressman Aff., Ex. B, p. 70, 11. 4-25 (emphasis added). Obviously, a reduction from
$41,250 per month in interest payments to approximately $25,000 in monthly interest is a
material change in the terms. See also Hearing, Ex. AJ.
The same holds true with the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement where under
John's alleged oral modification all remaining terms were eliminated (including the
numerous material terms such as a board seat, right to vote the shares, right to financial
information, the right to prevent dividends, etc.). Again in his deposition, John testified
that Reed only retained a security interest in the commissions and the shares of AIA
Insurance and all other terms went away. See Cressman Aff., Ex. A, p. 140, II. 13-25; p.
141, 11. 1-2.
The only way that AJA Services' alleged modification could have been
enforceable was to be through a written agreement signed by the parties to be bound. It is
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entirely irrelevant whether or not Reed even agreed to the alleged oral modification.
Therefore, the oral modification as alleged by John is unenforceable as a matter of law.

VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated above, the Court should grant Reed Taylor's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment.
DATED: This 151h day ofNovember, 2007.
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC

AHu:&~
By,;._
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Brett M. Hill
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and
correct copy of Reed Taylor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Promissory
Note, Notice of Hearing, Affidavit of Ernie Dantini with exhibit, and Affidavit of Paul R.
Cressman Jr. with exhibits on the following parties via the methods indicated below:

David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Attorney for Defendants JoLee Duclos and
Bryan Freeman
Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for R. John Taylor

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for Connie Taylor, James Beck and
Corrine Beck
Gary D. Babbitt
D. John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
Attorneys for AJA Services, AJA Insurance, and
Crop USA Insurance Agency

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)
Via:
( )
( )
( )
( )
(X)

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)
Via:
( )
( )
( )
( )
(X)

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Email (pdf attachment)

Signed this 15th day of November, 2007, at Lewiston, Idah .
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Gary D Babbitt ISB No 1486
D John Ashby ISB No. 7228
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.0 Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: (208) 344-6000
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829
Email: gdb@hteh.com
jash@hteh.com
Attorneys for Defendants AIA Services Cmpmation
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Defendants AJA Services Corporation ("AIA Services'') and AJA Insmance, Inc. ("AIA
Insurance"), by and through their counsel ofrecord, Hawley Troxell Ennis and Hawley LLP,
submit this Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

I. INTRODUCTION
Reed Taylor (''Reed") enoneously asserts that AIA Services is in default of a Promissory
Note (the "Note") executed by AIA Services on August 1, 1995. AIA Services Corporation is
not in default of the Note because the Note was modified by the parties in Mar·ch of2003, and
AIA Services in compliance with the terms of that modification . Although Reed now denies that
he ever agreed to the modification, his actions from 2003 through the present in accepting
reduced interest payments and not ever serving Wiitten notice of any default demonstrate that he
did agr·ee to the modification . At the very least, material issues of fact preclude summary
judgment

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.

The Six Million Dollar Prnmissory Note.
AIA Services and Reed enter·ed into a series of agreements starting in July of 1995 for the

redemption of Reed Taylor's common stock in AIA Services See Preliminary Injunction
Hearing (''Hearing"), Exs . A-E, Z, and AA-AD . Part of the consideration for the agr·eements was
the $6 million Note executed by AJA Services on August 1, 1995. See Hearing, Ex. A. The
Note provided that it would accrue interest at 8 14%, and that payments ofinterest would be
made monthly ($41,500).. The principal would be due on the tenth anniversm:y of the date ofthe
Note, which would be August 1, 2005. The Note was secured by a Stock Pledge Agreement and
Secwity Agreement (Hearing Exs. AA, BB), which were later amended (Hearing Exs. C-E).
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B.

Amendment Of The Note In March of 2003.
By March of2003, AIA Services experienced difficulty complying with the te1ms of the

Note . Rather than declare a default of the Note and pursue his remedies under the Note, Reed
agreed with John Taylor ("John"), as President of AIA Se1vices, to modify the Note . 1he terms
of the modification are set fmth in the February 28, 2007 Affidavit of John 1aylor (''Feb. 28,
2007, John Ail."):
15
From 2000 to 2003, plaintiff and I negotiated and
renegotiated the te1ms of the redemption agreeinent and payment
of the interest and principal to plaintiff. Finally, after nearly three
years, plaintiff decided to keep his note from AIA Insurance,
forego any equity position in the companies, and have AIA
Services accrue any unpaid interest. In addition, plaintiff agreed to
accept partial interest payment of $15,000 per month, plus other
payments on his behalf for his pilot and ranch hand of
approximately $10,000 per month, for a total of nearly $25,000 per
month. We agreed that no principal was to be paid to plaintiff on
his rethement note until the redemption of all the Series A
Preferred Stock held by Donna Taylor (See attached Exhibit A) I
fiuther· agreed to guar·antee the redemption of Donna Taylm's debt
with plaintiff. Owing this period, I was not taking a monthly
salary in order to assist in conserving cash.
16.
Additionally, the plaintiff agr·eed to defer his receipt of the
unpaid principal and interest on his note until the companies were
financially able to be restructured and to redeem his note. He was
provided written business plans and budgets outlining the plans
and he agreed to the objectives When the plan achieved
breakeven status, at about $35 million in new business placeinents,
the companies could begin catching up on accrued interest
payments. When the companies achieved $60 million in new
business placements, the companies would then be able to retire
his note and redeem all the outstanding preferred shar·es of AIA
Services.
Id,~

15-16.
Although Reed now denies that he agreed to the above-described modification, his

actions speak louder than his words . While the original terms of the Note required monthly
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interest payments of $41,500, as of March of2003 AIA began making monthly payments of
$15,000 to Reed, plus monthly payments to Reed's pilot and ranch hand of approximately
$10,000. See Cressman Aft, Exh B, p. 121, LL.. 16-19. Reed accepted those monthly payments
eve1y month, without objection and without declaring any default under the Note. AIA Services
did not pay the principal balance of the Note on August 1, 2005, as would have been required by
the 01iginal terms of the Note. Reed, however, did not give notice of default at that time, which
is consistent with the fact that the Note was modified to extend the date of payment of principal
until new business placements of $60 million had been reached. Reed's conduct in accepting the
differ·ent interest payments without objection and not providing notice of default at the time the
p1incipal would have been due under the 01iginal tenns of the Note establishes that the parties
modified the Note in March of2003 .
Not only did Reed act consistent with the terms of the March of2003 modification, but
so did AIA Se1vices. AJA Services made the reduced inte1est payments each month after March
of2003, thus allowing additional interest to accrue . In reliance on Reed's agreement not to be
paid the ptincipal under the Note until new business placements of$60 million had been reached,
AJA was not prepar·ed to pay the principal on August 1, 2005 (ie . , AIA had not obtained the
financing necessary to retire Reed's Note)..
Despite agreeing to the modification, accepting the teduced payments, not declai:ing any
default in March of 2003 or on the otiginal due date, and otherwise acting consistently with the
modification, Reed has now changed his mind and denies that he ever agreed to the modification
On December 12, 2006 (almost a year· and a half after the original due date under the Note),

Reed provided a written notice of default. See Heating, Ex. F.
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Reed filed suit in January of2007, asse1:ting that AlA Services is in default under the
01iginal terms of the Note Reed now seeks summary judgment on the issue of whether AIA
Services is in default under the original terms of the Note.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STAND ARD
A motion for summary judgment may be granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissio.ns on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show ther·e is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" LRC .P.
56(c).. The Court "liberally construes the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing
the motion, drawing all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor." Thompson

v. Pike, 125 Idaho 897, 899-900, 876 P . 2d 595, 597-98 (1994). Where the record, when so
constrned, would permit a reasonable person to find for the non-moving party, the Court must
deny the motion. See id. at 900, 876 P .2d at 598 . In other wo1ds, if reasonable people could
teach different conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the record, then summary
judgment is not appropriate . Zimmerman v Volkswagen ojAmerica, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 854,
920 P2d 67, 70 (1996)..

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Material Issues Of Fact Exist As To Whether There Has Been A Modification
Reed moves for partial summary judgment, arguing that AlA Services is in default under

the Note. Summary judgment is not appropriate because the Note was subsequently modified in
March of2003, and AIA is in compliance with the terms of the modification

1.

The Question of Whether There Has Been An Oral Modification Is A
Question Of Fact For The Jury

Reed inappropriately asks this Court to determine, as a matter oflaw on summary
judgment, that there has been no oral modification of the Note The question of whether there
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT-5
40005.0006 1100567 2

001154

has been an oral modification of the Note is not a question oflaw for the Cowt to determine.
Rathet, Idaho cowts have consistently held that '"whether a contract exists between the parties is
a question for the ttier of fact.." Johnson v. Allied Stores Co1p . , 106 Idaho 363, 369, 679 P .2d
640, 646 (1984) This is the case even if the evidence of the contract is conflicting. Id ("When
the existence of a contract is in issue, and the evidence is conflicting or admits of more than one
inference, it is for the jwy to decide whether a contract in fact exists. ") (emphasis added).
The question of whether a contract has been modified, orally 01 otherwise, is also a
question of fact for the jmy. Dennett v Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21, 26, 936 P.2d 219, 224 (Ct App .
1997) ("The question, however, of whether such an oral modification has been proven is one fo1
the trier of fact "). Again, the question is for the jury to resolve, even where the evidence of the
modification is conflicting, and even whe1e the tetms of the modification are equivocal or
unce1tain. As explained by the Idaho Supreme Coutt:
Whethe1 a contract has been modified by the pa1ties thereto is
ordinarily a question of fact for the triei· of fact, as wher·e the
evidence is conflicting or the terms of the agreement ue
equivocal or· uncertain.

Johnson v Allied Stores Corp .., 106 Idaho 36.3, 368, 679 P.2d 640, 645 (1984) (emphasis added)
(quoting 17 Amfut.2d Contracts§ 465 (1964), and citing Molyneux v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 54
Idaho 619, 35 P.2d 651 (1934)) .

2.

The Ornl Modilication Is Supported By Substantial Evidence, Including
Reed's Conduct Consistent With The Modification

"It is well settled in Idaho that parties to a wtitten contract may modify its tetms by
subsequent oral agreement or may contract further with tespect to its subject matter" Scott v.

Castle, 104 Idaho 719, 724, 662 P . 2d 1163, 1168 (Ct.. App. 1983) . Such an oral modification is
often implied by the parties' coutse of conduct. As explained in Ore-Ida Potato Products, Inc v.
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Larsen, 83 Idaho 290, 296, 362 P 2d 384, 387 (1961), an oral modification "may be implied from
a cow-se of conduct in acco1dance with its existence and assent may be implied from the acts of
one party in accordance with the terms of a change proposed by the other."
For example, in Great Plains Equipment, Inc . v. Northwest Pipeline C01p. 132 Idaho
754, 769, 979 P.2d 627, 642 (1999), the Cowt found that the bid p1ice of a contract had been
modified based on the conduct of the parties where, after a bidding subcontractor explained that
it could not complete the contract at the original bid price, the contractor "did not commence or
threaten to commence any action legal or otherwise," but instead continued with the contract
Similarly, in Spencer v Al/press Logging, Inc., 134 Idaho 856, 860, 11P3d 475, 479 {2000), the
Court found that a contract had been orally extended beyond its required completion date where
the parties continued to act under the contract beyond the completion date.. In reaching this
conclusion, the Comt explained that, when one party had not fully performed his part of the
contract as of the contract termination date, the other party "had the option of suing for breach of
contract or extending the contract to allow Schilling time to complete perfo1mance ..... The
conduct of the parties points overwhelmingly to the conclusion that they intended to extend the
time for performing the contract" Id.
Here, the original terms of the Note provided for monthly interest payments of $41,500
In March of 2003, AIA had difficulty making these payments. Reed could have declared a
default at that time, but he chose not to. Rather than declare a default and pwsue his remedies at
that time, Reed agreed to modify the terms of the Note. Under the terms of the modification,
Reed was to receive $15,000 per month and AJA was to make additional monthly payments to
Reed's pilot and ranch hand of approximately $10,000 per month for a total of$25,000 per
month .
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Reed now denies that he agreed to the modification, but his conduct demonstrates
otherwise Although the Note required monthly inte1est payments of $41,500, as of March of
2003 AIA began making payments consistent with the modification on a monthly basis. Reed
has accepted those same payments every month since then, without objection and without
declating a default Moreover, the Note p10vided that the entire principal would be due on
July 1, 2005. Despite the fact that the principal was not paid on July 1, 2005 (consistent with the
extension of time prnvided for in the modification), Reed did not provide notice of default at that
time.. Indeed, Reed did not provide any notice of default until December· 12, 2006, almost a year
and a half after the original due date.
Reed's conduct in accepting the different interest payments without objection and not
providing notice of default at the time the principal would have been due under the original te1ms
of the Note establishes that the parties modified the Note in March of2003 . See Ore-Ida Potato

Products, 83 Idaho at 296, 362 P 2d at 387 (explaining that an oral modification ''may be
implied from a cow-se of conduct in accordance with its existence and assent may be implied
from the acts of one patty in accordance with the terms of a change prnposed by the other"). At
the very least, these facts, which must be construed in favor of AIA as the non-moving party,
establish a material issue of fact as to whether the Note was modified in March of2003,
precluding sw-nmary judgment.

.3.

John's Testimony Is Consistent, And Any So-Called Inconsistencies Go To
The Weight Of' The Evidence

In seeking summary judgment, Reed focuses on the pwported inconsistencies in John's
testimony, most of which is misconstrued and taken out of context For example, Reed focuses
on a few p01tions of John's testimony in which John Tefers to retiring the Note when the
companies were "financially viable" or when they were otherwise financially able to do so .
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Reed appears to be contending that these statements are inconsistent with John's February 28,
2007 affidavit explaining the $35 million and $60 million benchmarks.
The testimony dealing more genei:ally with AIA retiiing the note when it is financially
able to do so is in response to questions from Reed's counsel eliciting testimony as to the
assumptions underlying the specific terms of the agreement. For example, during the Mar'Ch 1,
2007 preliminary injunction hearing, John testified as follows:
A.
Based upon cwrent assumption and the marketing plan that
we put togethei: back in 2003, it would be due and payable about
2000 - August 2009.

Q..

About or exactly how?

A.
Well the payment of both the, A, prefeued shares which
has to be paid first and the - this note is payable upon the ability to
finance the - based upon the amount of premium that is wiitten
and under our· current plans and under our current projections, that
would be August of2009 .

CressmanAff., Ex . B, p. 77, LL 6-15; see also, Feb 28, 2007, John Aff, ii 16 (explaining that,
in reaching the agreement relating to the $35 million and $60 million benchmarks, Reed "was
provided wiitten business plans and budgets outlining the plans and he agreed to the
o~jectives

") .

The discussion ofretiring the Note when the companies were financially viable (as
background to the specific terms of the modification) makes sense in light of the circumstances
At the time of the modification, Reed was the Sales Manager ofAIA Sei:vices and had intimate
knowledge ofAIA's business plans. Thus, Reed had an undei:·standing of what kind of sales
benchmarks would be required to return AIA to a financially viable position in which it could
retire the Note See Feb . 28, 2007, John Aff.:, ii 11.. John did not testify, however, that the tei:ms
of the agreement were simply that Reed would be paid the principle whenever the companies
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT-9
40005 0006 1100567 2

001158

were able to pay it. Rather~ he consistently testified that the teims of the agreement were based
on the new business placement benchmruks:

Q..
And I'm trying to understand was thei·e or was there not a
fixed date when your brothei· was going to paid in your agreement
with him in March of 2003 .
A..
I will repeat again based upon the budgets we presented in
2003 and as modified more recently, they were - it was - he was to
be paid when we hit sixty million dollrus in premium.
Q..

And what was he to be paid?

A.
The balance of his note six million plus accrued interest
Any unaccmed interest
Cressman Aff ., Ex. B, p. 79, LL 1-11 .
A fair and complete reading of John's affidavits and his testimony at the Preliminruy
Injunction hem:ing and the subsequent 30(b)(6) deposition (Cressman Aff., Ex. A) show that
John consistently describes the terms of the modification. By taking selected portion of the
testimony out of context, Reed attempts to show some pwported inconsistencies in John's
testimony. Those purported inconsistencies, however, go only to the weight of the evidence.
Reed's counsel is certainly free to cross-examine John at trial and attempt to point out any
inconsistencies to the jury Any inconsistencies in deposition testimony as to the terms of the
modification, however, m:e not relevant for purposes of summm:y judgment because the question
of whether there has been an oral modification is a question of fact for the jury, even wher·e there
is conflicting evidence, and even where the te1ms m:·e equivocal or uncertain:
Whether a contract has been modified by the patties thereto is
ordinarily a question of fact for the trier of fact, as wher·e the
evidence is conflicting or the terms of the agreement are
equivocal or uncertain .

Johnson, 106 Idaho at 368, 679 P.2d at 645 (emphasis added)..
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B.

The Oral Modification is Enfor·ceable
1.

The Modification is Sufficiently Definite

Reed contends that the terms of the 2003 modification are not sufficiently definite to
constitute an enforceable agreement. In making this argument, Reed again misconstrues John's
testimony regarding the te1ms of the modification. As set forth above, and as John has
repeatedly testified, Reed agreed to a modification under which AIA services would pay
approximately $25,000 per month instead of the $41,500 per month required under the 01iginal
terms of the Note . The unpaid interest would accme, and AIA Services would begin catching up
on the accrued interest payments upon reaching the threshold of $35,000 in new business
placements . With regard to the payment of the p1incipal, the modification extended the time for
payment of the p1incipal until new business placements reached $60 million, as opposed to the
August l, 2005 date under the 01iginal terms of the Note .
Reed cites cases standing for the proposition that a mere proinise to make payments "as
funds become available," is not sufficiently definite to create an enforceable modification .
Reed's argument is flawed First, as set fo1th above, the 2003 modification did not involve a
mere agreement to make payments "as funds become available . " Instead, the modification is
based on ce1tain specific thresholds in new business placements.. John testified that these
thresholds of $35 million and $60 million were based on ce1tain assumptions of when AlA
would be financially able to retire Reed's Note. However, those assumptions of being
financially viable are me1ely the background and explanation of financial ability for the
modification. The terms of the modification are definite in that payment of the Note is niggered
upon specific benchmarks in new business placements
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More importantly, the general contract requirement of certainty and definiteness relied
upon by Reed is not nearly as far reaching as he argues. All contracts, be they original contracts
or modifications of those contracts must satisfy cettain basic contract requirements, like mutual
assent, consideration and certainty in terms The requirements for a modification are the same as
the requirements for an original contact. See, e g., Lunceford v Haught/in, 170 S. W.Jd 453, 464
(Mo . App . 2005) ("Contract modification entails meeting the same elements as required for
formation of the original contract"); Singing River Mall Co v. Mark Fields, Inc., 599 So.2d 938,
947 (Miss . 1992) ("Since a contract modification must have the same essentials as a contract, a
binding post-contract agreement must fulfill the requirements of a contract regardless of whether
a party characterizes it as a modification or a stand-alone contract").
Here, the contract is in the form of a promissory note. Like any contract, a promissory
note must be sufficiently definite as to the time of payment. If the payment date under the
promissory note is extended by modification, that extension must also be sufficiently definite.
As explained in 10 C.J.S. Bills and Notes§ 110 (West 1995), "In order for an extension of time

to be binding, the time to which payment is extended must be as definite as is required in a
promissory note when originally made." (emphasis added)
Here, the time for payment of the principal under the note is sufficiently definite It is
fixed at the time in which new business placements reach $60 million. Reed contends that this
term is not sufficiently definite because it is unclear when that benchmark would be reached, if
ever . Such an argument has been rejected by other courts. For example, in Hamlin v Steward,
622 N.E.2d 535 (Ind . App. 1993), the court held that an oral modification to extend the time for
payment of a prnmissory note until the debtor was able to effectuate a certain sale is a valid and
enforceable agreement In Hamlin, the Stewards executed a note payable to the Hamlins for the
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remainder of an unpaid loan. The parties later agreed to allow the Stewards to pay the loan
according to an amortization schedule . Id at 537. When the Stewards were unable to make the
first annual payment, the Hamlins agreed to forbear· from collecting installments and told the
Stewards that they could pay the note in full in a single payment upon the sale of the Stewards'
motel. In reliance on the agreement, the Stewards did not pay the annual installments for three
years . Id. at 538 The Hamlins filed suit on the note, ar·guing that the oral modification was
invalid.. At the trial, the Stewards maintained that the Hamlins waived their right to installment
payments on the note and had agreed instead that the Stewards could pay the note in full upon
sale of their motel.. The trial cowt held in favor of the Stewards, and the court of appeals
affitmed the validity of the modification. Id.
The cowt explained that the oral modification created a condition precedent and qualified
the Stewards' duty to pay the note. Id. at 539. The court found that the Hamlins made an 01al
agreement to modify the note which extended the time and manner of payment, subject to the
occurrence of a new condition, sale of the motel. Id. This oral modification to extend, although
it contained a condition precedent, contained all the requisite elements of a contract, and was
therefore enforceable Id. at 540..
The court in Hamlin was faced with the same type of modification of a promissory note
as that presented here - a modification extending the payment date of principal :from a date
certain to a certain futme event Just like Reed ar·gues here, the Hamlins argued that the
modification was unenforceable because the contingency that triggered payment was not
absolutely certain to occw on a particular date, if ever. The court r~jected this argument by
relying on the general principle that "[w]here a debt exists and payment is postponed until the
occwrence of a contingency which does not happen, the law 1equires that payment be made
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within a reasonable time." Id. "What constitutes a reasonable time under the circumstances is a
question of fact" Id Accordingly, the cowt remanded the case to determine whether the
Stewards had reasonable time under the circumstances to fulfill the condition..
Just as was the case in Hamlin, Reed extended the promissory note principal payment to a
ce1tain contingent event, the benchmark of $60 million in new business placements.. Based on
business plans, the parties contemplated that this contingency would occw in approximately
2009. Cressman Aff., Ex. B, p. 77, LL 6-15. This agteement is sufficiently definite. In the
event that the contingency does not occur, AIA Se1vices is not relinquished of its obligations
under the Note Rather, the law will require AIA Services to pay the Note within a reasonable
time.. See also 11 Am Jur 2d Bills and Notes § 192 (1997) ("[W]here an instrument is payable
upon the happening of an event which is wholly or partially within the control of the promiso1,
and the surrounding circumstances show that the debt is an absolute one, it is supposed that the
parties intended that a reasonable effort would be made to cause the event to happen within a
reasonable time Thus, where an obligation is to be performed when certain property of the
obligor is sold, it becomes due when a reasonable time has elapsed for the making of the sale,
even though the property has not yet been sold."). 1
The 2003 modification provides for payment upon the happening of a certain event The
modification is enforceable, just as it would be if the original Note had provided for payment
upon reaching the new business placements

1

Plaintiffs reliance on Irwin Rogers Insurance Agency, Inc. v Murphy, 122 Idaho 270, 833
P .2d 128 (Ct App . 1992), is not on point. There, the Cowt simply rejected a contract based
only on a promise to pay an account "as funds became available." Such a promise is not a
ce1tain contingency like that involved in the modification between Reed and AIA Services.
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2. Mutuality of Obligation
Reed next contends that the modification is unenforceable for lack of mutuality of
obligation. In making this argument, Reed again misconsnues John's testimony as stating that
AIA's only obligation was to pay Reed as funds became available. Reed argues that, under this
misreading of the facts, "AIA Setvices was under no obligation to perfotm but could petform at
its discretion." This assettion is factually inconect Under the terms of the modification, AIA
was required pay the principle under the Note when new business placements reached $60
million Id. See Februaty 28, 2007, Tohn Aff, iMf 15-16.
As explained above, if these certain contingencies az·e not met, the law would require
AIA Services to pay the Note within a reasonable time, and what constitutes that reasonable time
would be determined by the trier of fact. It does not constitute an illusory promise .

.3. Considel'ation
Reed contends that the modification is unenforceable for lack ofconsideration. As an
initial matter, "it is the established rule that Courts will not inquire into the adequacy or
sufficiency of the consideration bargained for by the patties" Enders v. Wesley W Hubbard &

Sons, Inc. 95 Idaho 590, 593, 51.3 P 2d 992, 995 (1973).. Consideration to modify the terms of a
contract can come in the form of any benefit to the creditor or any detriment to the debtor.. The
adequacy ofthe consideration is in the discretion of the parties, however slight the value to the
promisor or the detiiment to the promisee. See 17A Am Jur·. Contracts § S 18 (2nd ed. 2004)..
At the time ofthe modification, Tohn was not taking a monthly salaty in order to assist in
conserving cash. See Feb. 28, 2007, John Aff; ~· 1S. This served as a detriment to AIA Setvices

in that it was not exercising its tight to pay its president a monthly salary and served as a benefit
to Reed in that it freed up cash to make interest payments to Reed
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Even if there were no consideration for the modification, Idaho courts do not require
consideiation where the elements of promissory estoppel are satisfied:
Even in the absence of considezation, however, the law recognizes
that in some circumstances a promise may become enforceable by
reason of the promisee's having justifiably relied upon it.. "A
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forebearance on the part of the promisee or a third person
and which does induce such action or forebearance is binding if
injustice can be avoided only by enforcement ofthe promise "
Smith v.. Boise Kenworth Sales, Inc, 102 Idaho 63, 67-68, 625 P .2d
417, 421-22 (1981) (quoting restatement (Second) of Contracts§
90(1) (1973)).

Rule Sale.sand Service, Inc. v US Bank Nat. Ass'n, 133 Idaho 669, 674, 991 P . 2d 857, 862 (Ct..
App. 1999)
Promisso1y estoppel requires the following elements: (1) the detriment suffered in
reliance on the promise was substantial in an economic sense; (2) the substantial loss to the
promisee acting in reliance was or should have been foreseeable by the promisor; and (3) the
promisee must have acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on the promise made. Id.
The elements of promissory estoppel are satisfied he1e. At the time of the March of2003
modification, Reed could have declared a default and obtained at that time any remedies
available to him fiom AIA Se1vices. Understanding that AIA Seivices did not have adequate
resources to pay the note in full at that time, Reed agreed to a modification that would allow him
to be paid some of the acczued interest on a monthly basis and the entire ptincipal when new
placements reached $60 million.. He then accepted the monthly payments of approximately
$25,000 ($15,000 to Reed and an additional approximately $10,000 to Reed's pilot and 1anch
hand), without OQjection and without declaring a default, through December of 2007.. These
payments total approximately $1 . l million (44 months x $25,000)..
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In addition to Reed receiving the benefit of$1 1 million in monthly payments, AIA relied
on Reed's agreement that he would not be paid any principal until new business placements of
$60 million were reached. Having acted under that understanding, AIA obviously was not able
to pay Reed's Note in full either on August 1, 2005 or upon Reed's demand because AIA acted
in reliance on Reed's promise that it did not have to.

C.

Ther·e Is No Default Under The Modification
Reed contends that there is a default under the 2003 modification This contention arises

out of John's testimony at the preliminary injunction hearing that a payment was partially paid
ar·ound March of2006. John informed Reed that the partial payment would be made up in 2007

See Cressman Aff, Ex. B. p. 121, LL. 14-25.. Reed did not insist on the partial payment being
made up immediately.. Reed's actions in never serving written notice of default relating to the
2006 partial payment demonstrate his consent that AIA could make up the payment in 2007 .
The missed 2006 payment does not constitute a default under the Note. The Note
provides for default related to monthly interest payments only under specified conditions as
follows:
It is expressly provided that if (i) a default is made in the punctual
payment of monthly interest her·eunder and continues for more
than five (5) business davs after the receipt of written notice of
such default . . .then the entire remaining unpaid balance of
principal and all interest accrned thereon may, at the option of the
holder hereof~ be declar·ed to be immediately due and payable
without notice (the "Acceleration") and the lien given to secure its
payment may be foreclosed.

See Preliminary Injunction Hearing, Ex. A
Reed has never provided AJA with a written notice of default demanding that AIA catch
up on the missed 2006 partial payment Reed's notice of default dated December 12, 2006 (see
Preliminary Injunction Hearing, Ex . F), generically asse1ted that AIA was in default, but
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references only the entire balance of the Note, not the missed 2006 payment under the
modification. As of December 3, 2007, AIA has now paid the missed 2006 payment, curing any
deficiency under the modification prior to any notice of default. See Affidavit of Cori Cleveland,
filed concurrently herewith, if 3 This action is consistent with Reed's consent to AIA catching
up on the missed payment in 2007.

D.

The Statute of'Frnuds Does Not Bu The Orn1 Modification
Reed contends that the oral modification is barred by the statute of frauds.. This argument

contains several flaws. Idaho Code § 9-505 provides that certain contracts must be in writing,
including "[a]n agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year· from the making
thereof." This provision "has been narrowly construed by our Supreme Court" Whitlock v

Haney Seed Co, 110 Idaho 347, 348, 715 P . 2d 1017, 1018 (Ct. App. 1986). The statute does not
govern an oral contract that "might have been fully performed and terminated, within a year . . "

Id. (citing Restatement (Second) Contracts§ 130, comment A}. ••1hus, even if a contract
appears on its face to anticipate performance for more than one year·, it may fall outside the
statute ifit is subject to a condition or contingency that could occur within a year, terminating
further performance." Id.
The oral modification provides for payment of the principal due under the Note when
new business placements reach $60 million. When the parties agreed upon this modification,
they anticipated that premiums would reach $60 million around 2009 . Cressman Aff., Ex . B, p.
77, LL 6-15.. However, there remained a possibility that the modification could be fully
performed within one year· In fact, despite Reed's counsel's repeated attempts dwing the
30(b)(6) deposition of John on August 29, 2007 to get John to testify to the contrary, John
testified that it would have been possible (although not likely) to achieve the $60 million in new
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placements within one year of the modification. See Affidavit ofD.. John Ashby, filed
concurrently herewith, Ex A, p. 136, LL. 5-1 L
Even ifthere were no possibility of the modified agreement being completed within one
year, the statute of frauds still would not bar the oral modification.. Idaho courts have repeatedly
held that the statute of frauds will not be applied where a party has detrimentally relied on the
other party's oral promises. See, eg, Idaho Migrant Council, Inc. v. Northwestern Mut Life Ins

Co., 110 Idaho 804, 806-07, 718 P.2d 1242, 1244-45 (Ct App. 1986) ("A defendant who is
induced to rely on an oral agreement and who changes position to his own detriment cannot be
defrauded by a plaintiff who interposes the Statute of Frauds to declare the agreement invalid '').
As explained above (Section B 3), AIA Services has dettimentally relied on Reed's promise that
he would not receive payment until new business placements reached $60 million, resulting in
AIA not being prepar·ed to pay the principal on August 1, 2005

E.

The Doctrines of' Waiver·, Estoppel And/01' Quasi-Estoppel Pl'eclude A Summary
Judgment Determination That AIA Is In Default Under· The Note
Even in the unlikely event that the Court finds a deficiency in AIA's modification

defense, the doctrines of waiver, estoppel and/or quasi-estoppel still preclude a summary
judgment determination that AIA is in default under the Note. The same facts that establish the
March of 2003 modification also satisfy the doctrines of waiver~ estoppel and/or quasi-estoppel.

1. Waiver
Waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right Minidoka County v. Krieger,
88 Idaho 395, 411, 399 P .2d 962, 972 (1965) A waiver need not be express but may be implied

from conduct More specifically, an implied waiver occurs where a party's neglect to insist upon
enforcing a right results in p1ejudice to another party. Idaho Migrant Council, 110 Idaho at 806,
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718 P 2d at 1244. Waiver consists of two elements: (1) direct and unequivocal conduct
indicating a waiver, and (2) reliance by the party seeking to assert a waiver. Id.
Both elements are satisfied here. Reed unequivocally agreed that he would accept the
reduced monthly interest payments and that he would not receive any principal under the Note
until the benchmark of $60 million in new placements was reached.. Reed then demonstrated by
his conduct that he intended to waive his rights under the agreement to receive monthly interest
payments of any more than $15,000 (plus payments of approximately $10,000 to his pilot and
ranch hand) by accepting the reduced interest payments every single month for three and a half
years without objection and without declaring a default under the Note He further demonstrated
his intent to waive his right under the Note to be paid the principal on July 1, 2005 by not
providing notice of default at that time.. AIA justifiably relied on Reed's promises. Rather than
pay the originally required $41,500 per month, AJA paid only approximately $25,000 per month,
which 1esulted in more interest being accrued . In reliance on Reed's agreement not to require
payment of the principal until reaching the $60 million new business placement threshold, AIA
was not prepared to pay the entfre principal on July 1, 2005 when it originally would have been
due under the Note.

2. Estoppel
Equitable estoppel is based on the concept that it would be inequitable to allow a person
to induce reliance by taking a certain position and, thereafter, take an inconsistent position when
it becomes advantageous to do so. Regjovich v. First Western Investments, Inc., 134 Idaho 154,
158, 997 P2d 615, 619 (2000).. The elements of equitable estoppel ar·e (l) a false representation
or concealment of a material fact with actual or constructive knowledge'ofthe truth, (2) the party
asserting estoppel did not know or could not discover the truth, (3) the false representation or
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concealment was made with the intent that it be relied upon, and (4) the person to whom the
representation was made or from whom the facts were concealed, relied and acted upon the
iepresentation or concealment to his prejudice . Id These elements are satisfied for pwposes of
summary judgment
Reed promised that he would not receive payment of the principal until the $60 million
new business placement threshold, a promise that now appears to be false. In reliance on Reed's
promise not to iequire payment of the principal until teaching the $60 million threshold, AIA
was not prepared to pay the entire principal on July 1, 2005 when it 01iginally would have been
due under the Note By changing its position in 1eliance of Reed's promises and conduct, AIA
was not in a position to pay the balance of the Note on July 1, 2005.

3. Quasi-estoppel
Quasi-estoppel is a broad remedial doctrine "designed to prevent a party from reaping an
unconscionable advantage, or ftom imposing an unconscionable disadvantage upon another, by
changing positions . " Dennett v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21, 26-27, 936 P 2d 219, 224-25 (Ct App.
1997}. Un1ike equitable estoppel, quasi estoppel does not require mis1epresentation by one paity
or actual reliance by the other . This doctrine applies when: "(1) the offending party took a
different position than his or her 01iginal position and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an
advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change
positions; or (c) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an
inconsistent position from one he or she has ah·eady de1ived a benefit or acquiesced in." Id.
Reed has now altered his position that he would not 1eceive payment of the principal until
$60 million in new business placements is reached. As explained above, AIA detiimentally
relied on Reed's promise/agreement. Moreover, Reed obtained a substantial advantage through
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his change in position. As of March of2003, Reed could have declared a default and pursued his
remedies against AIA Services.. However, Reed knew that he would not be able to receive the
entire principal value of his Note at that time . For that reason, he agreed to accept the reduced
inte1est payments and extend that due date of the principal. By doing so, Reed was able to
receive from AIA Services $1 1 million in interest payments through December of 2007. He
now seeks to obtain a default under the original terms of the note, which would allow him to
pursue certain remedies in addition to having already received $1.1 million in interest payments
after March of 2003. For example, Reed contends that the default will allow him to take control
of AIA Insurance .
More importantly, by delaying the default until 2007, Reed would be able to take control
of AlA Insurance at a time in which it is stionger· than it would have been in 2003 because ofits
marketing alliance with C1opUSA. Beginning in 1999, CropUSA Insmance Agency, Inc was
formed to explore the possibility of marketing crop insmance to the same client base to which
AJA insurance markets. See Feb . 28, 2007, John Aff, 1 14 CropUSA raised funds
independently of AIA lnsmance to operate, but agr·eed to assist AJA Insurance with overhead
and agency costs and to reimburse AIA Inswance fot salaries, rent, office space, and other costs
when approp1iate . Id. AIA and CropUSA planned to work together· to build a revitalized sales
team. Id. In addition to assisting AJA Insmance in rebuilding its agency force and sales staff;
AIA would receive an exclusive right to market health and disability products to CropUSA
insmance clients. Id.
By delaying default until 2007, Reed received not only the benefit ofthe $1 I million in
monthly interest payment that he would not have received had he declared a default in March of
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2003, but he stands to take control of AIA insurance at a time in which it is stronger than it was
in 2003..
Each of these equitable doctrines precludes Reed from backing out on his agreement and
promises pertaining to the Note and precludes a summary judgment determination that AIA
Services is in default

V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Reed's motion for partial summary judgment should be
denied

DATED THIS

s

(tl day of December, 2007.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

By~~
~neys

. . ohn~7228
for Defendants AIA Services
Corporation and AIA Inswance, Inc .
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

v.

)
)
)
)

)

)
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho )
)
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
)
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
)
community property comprised thereof,
)
BRIAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
)
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person; CROP
)
USA INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an
)
Idaho corporation; and JAMES BECK and
)
CORRINE BECK, individually and in the
)
community property comprised thereof;
)
)
Defendants.
)

CASE NO. CV07-0020S
OPINION AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND MOTION FOR INJUNCTION

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.)

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
Motion for Injunction. A hearing on the motions was held December 13, 2007. Plaintiff Reed
Taylor was represented by attorneys Ned Cannon and Roderick C. Bond. Defendants AIA
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Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. were represented by attorneys Gary D. Babbitt and
D. John Ashby. Defendant R. John Taylor was represented by attorney Michael E. McNichols.
Defendant Connie Taylor was represented by attorney Jonathan D. Hally. The Court, having read
the motions, briefs, and affidavits submitted by the parties, having heard oral arguments of
counsel and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendant AJA Insurance is a business founded by Plaintiff Reed Taylor operating under
the umbrella of Defendant AJA Services Corporation. The Plaintiff's brother, Defendant R. John
Taylor, eventually joined the business and together, the brothers developed the parent company
into a holding for numerous diversified insurance businesses. In 1995, Plaintiff Reed Taylor
decided to retire. In order to effectuate his retirement, Reed Taylor and AIA Services, along
with counsel for the respective parties, entered into a stock redemption agreement. The
agreement included a Promissory Note payable to Reed Taylor in the amount of $6,000,000.00
plus interest, which was executed on August l, 1995. 1 In 1996, the agreement was arnended2
after Reed Taylor placed AIA on notice that it was in default of several terms of the original

1

Plaintiffs Exhibit A, admitted into the record on March I, 2007.
Plaintiffs Exhibit C and Exhibit E, admitted into the record on March 1, 2007. The 1996 Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement states in 'If D that Notices of Default were presented to AJA for its (a) failure to pay a
$1,500,000.00 Down Payment Note as due October 21, 1995, (b) failure to pay interest amounts on the $6 million
Promissory Note, (c) failure to provide required financial information to Creditor Reed Taylor, (d) failure to pay
Creditor Reed Taylor's attorneys' fees, (e) failure to comply with terms of the Security Agreement in regard a
commission collateral account, and (0 failure to pay funds relative to certain stocks held by Creditor Reed Taylor.
The 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement states in ii E that as a result of the various defaults, the parties
were agreed to make the following adjustments to the agreement: (a) adjust the principal amount of the Down
Payment Note, extend its maturity date, provide for interest to accrue on the principal, require monthly payments of
principal and interest, and provide security for the Down Payment Note; (b) terminate a Consulting Agreement that
was a term of the original agreement, revise a Noncompetition Agreement that was a term of the original agreement,
and terminate AJA 's obligation to pay Creditor Reed Taylor a monthly salary as was a term of the originaJ
agreement; (c) amend terms of the Security Agreement and the Stock Pledge Agreement; (d) revise certain
representations, warranties and covenants contained in the original Stock Redemption Agreement; and (e) simplify
and consolidate various default provisions and remedies in the agreements.
2
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agreement. Under the terms of the amended and restated agreements, the date for full payment
of the $6 million Promissory Note remained August 1, 2005, though certain interim payments
relative to the Note were restructured. The Note was not paid on the due date and, as of the date
of this writing, remains outstanding.
In a letter dated December 12, 2006, Plaintiff Reed Taylor's attorney notified Defendants
AIA and John Taylor that AIA was in default under several sections of the Amended Stock
Pledge Agreement, including but not limited to failure to pay the $6 million Promissory Note. 3
The letter further notified the Defendants that Plaintiff intended to exercise his right to vote the
redeemed shares pursuant to a reversion of voting rights upon default as provided for in the
Pledge Agreement. Included in the letter was Plaintiff's demand for a special shareholders
meeting for the purpose of electing a new board of directors. Plaintiffs demand for a December
26, 2006 special shareholder's meeting was rejected. On January 29, 2007, Plaintiff Reed Taylor
filed the above-entitled action seeking recovery of amounts owed under the Promissory Note4 .
Since the bringing of his action, Plaintiff has amended his Complaint several times, adding
defendants and causes of action. The record currently contains Plaintiffs Fifth Amended
Complaint.
During a motion hearing on March 1, 2007, the Court heard testimony from Plaintiff
Reed Taylor and from Defendant John Taylor. Defendant John Taylor conceded in his testimony
that the Promissory Note had originally been due August 1, 2005, but had not been paid. 5
However, Defendant John Taylor asserted he and Plaintiff Reed Taylor reached an oral
agreement in March 2003 that eliminated a date certain for payment of the Note. 6 The terms of

3

Plaintiffs Exhibit F, admitted into the record on March l, 2007.
Plaintiffs Complaint asserted claims for breach of contract and constructive trust.
'Hrg. Tr. p.68, Exh. B to the Aff. of Paul R. Cressman, Jr. filed November IS, 2007.
6
Hrg. Tr. p.67, Exh. B to the Aff. of Paul R. Cressman, Jr. filed November 15, 2007.
4
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payment, according to Defendant John Taylor, were that Reed Taylor would be paid the principal
and all unpaid and accrued interest if and when AIA and Crop USA 7 reached certain financial
goals. Defendant Taylor further testified that in the interim, Reed Taylor was to receive set
monthly interest payments of $25,000.00, distributed as $15,000.00 per month to Reed Taylor
and $10,000.00 per month in payments to Reed Taylor's employee. 8 John Taylor, however,
conceded that in March 2006, AIA failed to pay $15,000.00 of the $25,000.00 monthly payment
and the shortage remained unpaid at the time of hearing. The shortage was paid several months
later, in December 2007. 9
The deposition of Defendant John Taylor was taken on August 29, 2007. Portions of that
deposition were filed as Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of Paul R. Cressman, Jr. in Support of
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Promissory Note. 10 In his deposition, Defendant
John Taylor testified that he and Plaintiff Reed Taylor agreed in March 2003 that the Promissory
Note would not be paid until such time that AIA and Crop USA were economically viable, a
term defined by Defendant John Taylor as having sufficient assets or borrowing power to pay the
Note. 11 Defendant John Taylor further stated that the benefit received by Plaintiff Reed Taylor
for entering into the oral modification was "reinstatement" of monthly interest payments. The
"reinstatement" of interest payments was at a significantly reduced amount. Rather than the
approximately $41,000.00 monthly interest payment due under the written agreement, Reed

7

CropUSA is a separate entity engaged in the crip insurance business under the AIA Services Corporation umbrella.
Hrg. Tr. p.70, Exh. B to the Aff. of Paul R Cressman, Jr. filed November 15, 2007. Under the original terms of
the agreement, Reed Taylor was to be paid all of the monthly interest, an amount in excess of$40,000.00 per month.
9
Hr. Tr. pp. 121-122, Exh. A to the Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond filed March 26, 2007. The shortage was
subsequently paid to Reed Taylor on December 3, 2007, some nine months after John Taylor testified to the
nonpayment. See A ff. of Cori Cleveland filed December 3, 2007.
1
Filed November 15, 2007.
11
Depo. of John Taylor at pp. 85-86, Exh. "A" to the Aff. of Paul R. Cressman, Jr. filed November 15, 2007.
8

°

Taylor v. AJA
Opinion on Motion/or Partial SJ & Injunction

4

001177

Taylor was to receive $25,000.00 per month, $10,000.00 of which was to be paid to the
Plaintiff's pilot and ranch hand. 12
During his testimony, Defendant Taylor was asked ifhe presented the oral modification
to the boards of directors for AIA and/or Crop USA, and he responded he had not. Nevertheless,
John Taylor insisted the board members of both companies knew Plaintiff Reed Taylor was
being paid $25,000.00 per month though Defendant John Taylor was unable to state how the
board members of AIA and Crop USA received the information. 13 Plaintiff Reed Taylor, who
testified at the March 1, 2007 hearing, has at all times maintained he at no time agreed to orally
modify the 1996 agreements and/or the $6 million Promissory Note. 14
On November 15, 2007, Plaintiff Reed Taylor filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on the Promissory Note along with supportive briefing and affidavits. In response,
Defendants filed briefs and affidavits. On November 29, 2007, Plaintiff Reed Taylor filed a
Motion and Memorandum of Law for Preliminary Injunction along with supportive affidavits.
Briefs and affidavits in objection were filed by Defendant AIA. On December 13, 2007, the
Court heard oral arguments on the two motions.

<D PROMISSORY NOTE
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery
documents on file with the court, read in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving
party is entitled to ajudgment as a matter of law." Thomson, 137 Idaho at
476, 50 P.3d at 491; see also I.R.C.P. 56(c); Badel/ v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101,
102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988). In determining whether the record presents an
issue of material fact, "all allegations of fact in the record, and all reasonable
12

Depo. of John Taylor at pp. 86-87, Exh. "A" to the Aff. of PauJ R. Cressman, Jr. filed November I 5, 2007
Depo. of John Taylor at pp. 87-89, 99 & 165, Exh. "A" of the Aff. to Paul R. Cressman, Jr. filed Nov. 15, 2007
14
Hr. Tr. pp. 159-160, Rxh. A to the Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond filed March 26, 2007.
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inferences from the record are construed in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion." City of Kellogg v. Mission Mountain Interests
Ltd., Co., 135 Idaho 239, 243, 16 P.3d 915, 919 (2000).
The burden of proving the absence of material facts is upon the moving party.
Thomson, 137 Idaho at 476, 50 P.3d at 491; see also Petricevich v. Salmon
River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 452 P.2d 362 (1969). The adverse party,
however, "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings,
but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." l.R.C.P.
56(e). The moving party is therefore entitled to a judgment when the
nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial. See Thomson, 137 Idaho at 476, 50 P.3d at 491;
Badell, 115 Idaho at 102, 765 P.2d at 127.
Moreland v. Adams, 143 Idaho 687, 688-689, 152 P.3d 558 (2006).

"Creating only a slight doubt as to the facts will not defeat a summary judgment motion;
a summary judgment will be granted whenever on the basis of the evidence before the court a
directed verdict would be warranted or whenever reasonable minds could not disagree as to the
facts." Snake River Equipment Co. v. Christensen, 107 Idaho 541, 549, 691 P.2d 787
(CtApp.1984).

ANALYSIS
The question of whether AIA has defaulted on the Promissory Note requires a layered
analysis. The parties concede the Note is in default under the 1996 written terms of the
agreement. However, the Court must determine whether there was an enforceable oral
modification. If so, then the Court must determine whether the Note is in default under the terms
of that oral modification.
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(1) DEFAULT UNDER THE WRITIEN PROMISSORY NOTE LANGUAGE

Defendant AIA does not dispute that, under the 1996 written terms of the agreement and
the language in the Promissory Note, all principal and accrued interest on the Note was due in
full on August 1, 2005. In addition, Defendant AIA does not dispute Plaintiffs claim that the
Note was not paid in full on August l, 2005. Rather, Defendant contends the terms relative to
payment of the Note were orally modified in March 2003 as the culmination of nearly three years
of negotiations between Plaintiff Reed Taylor and Defendant John Taylor.

(2) LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF THE ALLEGED ORAL MODIFICATION
Assuming, arguendo, there was an oral modification of the payment terms of the Note,
the Court must determine whether the oral modification as alleged sufficiently meets the
requirements to form a legally enforceable contract. The integrated agreement between AIA and
Reed Taylor clearly requires all amendments, modifications, waivers and/or supplementations to
the agreement be placed in a writing and be signed by the parties to the agreement. The 1996
amended and restated Agreement includes the following language:
This Agreement is made to secure the punctual payment and performance by
Pledgor of any and all obligations, liabilities and amounts now or hereafter owing,
due or not due, direct or indirect, liquidated or contingent, to Secured Party
pursuant to the Amended Down Payment Note and the $6M Note and the prompt
observance and performance by Pledgor or its covenants, agreements and
obligations hereunder (collectively, the "Secured Obligations").

ill of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement.
This Agreement amends, restates, supersedes and replaces the Stock Pledge
Agreement which shall hereafter have no further force or effect. This Agreement
and the other Restructured Obligations contain the complete and final expression
of the entire agreement of the parties. No provision of this Agreement may be
amended, modified, waived, or supplemented, except by a writing signed by the
parties to this Agreement. No waiver by Secured Party of any default shall be a
waiver of any other default.
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1 11.3 of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement.
Nearly identical language appears in the 1996 Amended and Restated Security
Agreement.
This Agreement and the other Restructured Obligations entered into in connection
with the Secured Obligations contain the complete and final expression of the
entire agreement of the parties. No provision of this Agreement may be amended,
modified, waived or supplemented, except by a writing signed by the party sought
to be charged with the amendment, modification, waiver or supplementation.

if 7.2 of the Amended and Restated Security Agreement.
Despite the unambiguous language requiring all modifications be placed in writing (as
was done in 1996), Defendants AIA and Jolm Taylor contend an oral modification of material
terms of the Promissory Note was entered into in March 2003 between Reed Taylor and John
Taylor, acting as the agent of AIA. "It is the general common law rule in this country that an
oral modification of a written contract may be enforceable, notwithstanding a clause prohibiting
unwritten modifications, at least in circumstances where one party has relied upon the
modification." Rule v. U.S. Bank National Association, 133 Idaho 669, 675, 991 P.2d 857
(Ct.App.1999).
In order for a modification to be enforceable, whether an oral or written modification, the
elements necessary to the formation of a valid contract must be met. "A valid modification of a
contract must satisfy all the criteria essential for a valid original contract, including offer,
acceptance, and consideration." 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 507 (2007); Caffrey Farms, Inc. v.
Williams Pipe Line Co., 739 F.2d 1366 (8th Cir. 1984); Nyhus v. Travel Management Corp., 466

F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Carlson, Collins, Gordon and Bold v. Banducci, 257 Cal. App. 2d
212, 64 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1st Dist. 1967); Anderton v. Business Aircraft, Inc., 650 So. 2d 473
(Miss. 1995); Zumwinkel v. Leggett, 345 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1961); Joel T. Cheatham, Inc. v. Hall,
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64 N.C. App. 678, 308 S.E.2d 457 (1983); Sauner v. Public Service Authority ofSouth Carolina,
354 S.C. 397, 581 S.E.2d 161 (2003).
When the modification is one to extend the time for payment on a promissory note, as is
asserted to have occurred in the instant matter, "the time to which payment is extended must be
as definite as is required in a promissory note when originally made." 10 C.J.S. Bills and Notes
§ 110 (2007). Defendant AJA contends all the elements required to create an enforceable

contract were met when the oral modification was entered into and that there is sufficient
certainty to the term setting forth when the Note would be paid to find the oral agreement
enforceable. The Court, however, finds the alleged oral agreement of modification lacks
consideration 15 and certainty and, therefore, fails as a matter of law.
Defendant AIA contends the element of consideration was met in the oral modification
when, in exchange for Reed Taylor agreeing to extend the time for payment of the Note, Reed
would receive $25,000.00 of each months interest rather than the approximately $40,000.00 per
month interest he was to be paid under the written terms of the agreement. "The promise of a
payment of a debt already due is not sufficient consideration for the promise of a creditor to
forbear or extend the time of payment." 0 'Brien v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 362 P.2d
455 (Wyo.1961).
An essential element of a contract is legal consideration. Detroit Trust Co. v.
Struggles, 289 Mich. 595, 599, 286 N. W. 844 (1939). Under the preexisting duty

rule, it is well settled that doing what one is legally bound to do is not
consideration for a new promise. Puett v. Walker, 332 Mich. 117, 122, 50
N.W.2d 740 (1952). This rule bars the modification ofan existing contractual
relationship when the purported consideration for the modification consists of the
15

Plaintiff Reed Taylor argues the agreement to modify fails for lack of consideration and lack of mutuality of
obligation. "'Mutuality of obligation' is simply another way of expressing the idea that there must be adequate
consideration in the fonnation of a contract. I S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
lOSA (3rd ed. 1957); J. CALAMARI AND J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 4·14 (2nd ed. 1977);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 79 (1981). Doughty v. Idaho Frozen Foods Corp., 112 Idaho
791, 794, 736 P.2d 460 (Ct.App.1987).
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performance or promise to perform that which one party was already required to
do under the terms of the existing agreement. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v.
Dep't of State, 433 Mich. 16, 22, n. 3, 444 N.W.2d 786 (1989).

Yerkovich v. AAA, 610 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Mich.2000).
Under the terms of the written agreement, Reed Taylor promised to relinquish all of his
AIA voting shares to AIA and, as consideration for his promise, AJA gave Reed Taylor a $6
million Promissory Note that obligated AIA to pay Reed Taylor approximately $41,000.00
interest monthly and to pay all of the principal and accrued interest on August l, 2005. Under
the alleged 2003 modification, Reed Taylor promised to extend the time for payment of the
principal and accrued interest on the Note to a date completely uncertain and, in consideration of
his promise, AIA was obligated to pay Reed Taylor approximately half of each months interest
on the Note with payment of the principal and accrued interest to be paid when and if AIA and
CropUSA reached certain financial goals.
The alleged oral modification provided Defendant AIA with multiple benefits. First, AIA
was no longer obligated to pay the Note on a date certain. Second, AIA's obligation to pay the
Note would only be triggered if AIA and CropUSA, an entity that had no obligation on the Note,
reached certain financial goals. Reed Taylor, on the other hand, received no benefit from the
terms of the alleged oral modification. Other than that consideration already owed to Reed
Taylor under the written terms of the Note, he received no consideration in exchange for the
benefits his promise provided AIA. To the contrary, he suffered detriment. The monthly interest
payments Reed Taylor was to receive were reduced substantially. In addition, there was no
certainty as to when, or if, Reed Taylor would be paid the $6 million in principal plus any
accrued interest. While the Court was unable to find any discussion of the preexisting duty rule
in Idaho case law, the Court did find jurisdiction after jurisdiction that acknowledged the rule as
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one well established in American jurisprudence. 16 Applying the preexisting duty rule to the case
at hand, the Court finds the 2003 oral modification of the agreement between AIA and Reed
Taylor fails as a matter oflaw for lack of consideration.
The Court also finds the oral modification fails as a matter of law for lack of certainty.

As was notesi by Defepdant AIA in its brief in opposition to Plaintiff's motion for nartja.!
summary judgment, in order for an extension of time to be binding, the new time for payment
must have the same certainty as existed in the original promissory note~

7

"For an extension of

the payment of a note to be binding on the parties, it must be for a definite period and must be
supported by consideration." Mitchell v. Peterson, 422 N.E.2d 1026, 97 m.App.3d 363
(Ill.App.1981 ). "Granting that the time of payment may be extended by a definite and binding
oral agreement (Oliver v. U.S. Fidelity Co., 176 N.C. 598, 97 S.E. 490), we are confronted by the
general rule that such an agreement must fix a definite time when payment is to be made. The
time thus agreed on should be as definite as that which is required when the note is originally
executed; the elements of the agreement being certainty, mutuality, and consideration." Wrenn

v. Lawrence Cotton Mills, Inc., 150 S.E. 676, 678, 198 N.C. 89 (N.C.1929). While some courts
have stated that the rule does not require a precise date to be fixed for the agreement to be valid,
those courts have, nonetheless, held that that the time must be readily ascertainable by an event
that is certain to occur and not one that is contingent. West Texas Loan Co. v. Montgomery, 200
P. 681, 27N.M. 296 (N.M.1921).

16

Jurisdictions that were reviewed include Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia.
17
"In order for an extension of time to be binding, the time to which payment is extended must be as definite as is
required in a promissory note when originally made." l 0 C.J.S. Bills and Notes § 110. "[F]or an extension of time
for payment of a note to be binding on the parties, it must be for a definite period of time." 11 Am.Jur.2d Bills and
Notes§ 198.
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The Promissory Note 18 in the instant matter is dated August 1, 1995 and reads in relevant
part:
Payments of interest only shall be made monthly in lawful money of the United
States in immediately available funds commencing one month from the date hereof
at the address of Payee to which notices are to be sent pursuant to the terms of the
Redemption Agreement, or at such other place as the holder hereof shall designate
in writing. The entire balance of all principal and any accrued but unpaid interest
shall be due and payable on the tenth anniversary of the date of this Note.

Under the original terms of the Promissory Note, the time for payment of the principal
'

and accrued interest was a date certain -the tenth anniversary of the date of the Note, i.e. August
1, 2005. Under the terms of the alleged oral modification, there is no certainty to the term for
payment of the Note, since it was payable upon an entirely contingent event rather than an event
that was certain to occur. It was the testimony of Defendant John Taylor during the March 1,
2007 hearing that, under the terms of the oral modification, the Note would become due when
AIA and CropUSA reached sixty to seventy million dollars in new premiums. 19 When his
deposition was taken, Defendant John Taylor testified that, under the terms of the oral
modification, the Note would be due when AIA and CropUSA achieved sixty million in new
premiums in a single year. 20 The event that is to trigger payment is not readily ascertainable as it
is an event that may never occur and that is not readily ascertainable by the holder of the Note,
Reed Taylor. 21 Contrary to the arguments of Defendant AIA, the time of payment under the

18

Plaintiff's Exhibit A as admitted into the record on March l, 2007.
Hr. Tr. pp. 70 and 78-79, Exh. A to the Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond filed March 26, 2007.
20
Depo. of John Taylor at pp. 134-135, Exh. "A" to the Aff. of John Ashby filed December 3, 2007.
21
Defendant AJA contends the instant matter is analogous to Hamlin v. Steward, 622 N.E.2d 535 (Ind.App.1993).
AIA contends the Hamlin Court held an extension of time to pay a promissory note was enforceable when the
modification allowed for payment upon the sale of the Stewards' motel. AJA then argues that the payment
extension in the instant case has the same certainty as that in Hamlin and should be held sufficiently certain to create
an enforceable modification agreement. The Court disagrees. In Hamlin, the Stewards borrowed money from the
Hamlins to remodel the Stewards' motel in preparation for selling the motel. The Hamlins expected to be repaid
upon the sale of the motel. The Stewards made several payments toward the loan then executed a promissory note
for the remaining bnlance. The Stewards subsequently sold the motel but did not receive enough down payment to
19
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terms of the oral modification lacks sufficient certainty to create a valid and enforceable
modification agreement.
Finally, the Court must address Defendant AIA's assertion that any insufficiencies in the
oral modification, a modification that Plaintiff has at all times denied entering into, are overcome
by AIA's reliance on the agreement, i.e. the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
The elements of promissory estoppel are as follows: " '(1) the detriment suffered
in reliance was substantial in an economic sense; (2) substantial loss to the
promisee acting in reliance was or should have been foreseeable by the promisor;
and (3) the promisee must have acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on the
promise as made."' Mitchell v. Bingham Memorial Hosp., 130 Idaho 420, 942
P.2d 544 (1997) (quoting Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First
Nat'l Bank, 119 Idaho 171, 178 n. 2, 804 P .2d 900, 907 n. 2 ( 1991)) (quoting
Mohrv. Shultz, 86 Idaho 531, 540, 388P.2d1002, 1008 (1964))).
Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates, L.L.C., 138 Idaho 27, 29, 56 P.3d 1277 (2002).

Defendant AIA has failed to show AIA suffered any economic detriment because of its
reliance on an extension of time to pay the Promissory Note or that AJA suffered a substantial
loss because of its reliance on an extension to pay the Note. It is the position of AIA that it
sought an extension because it was struggling financially and feared the Note would go into
default. However, AIA has produced no evidence that its difficult financial position, if it is in
one, was in part or in whole the result of reliance on an extension of time to pay the $6 million
dollar Note. 22 Therefore, the Court finds Defendant AJA has failed to establish the elements of

•.

pay the note. The Hamlins and Stewards then agreed the note could be paid in ten installment payments. However,
the buyers of the motel defaulted on the contract and abandoned the motel. When the Stewards were then unable to
make the next installment payment, the Hamlins agreed, for a second time, that the note could be sold upon the sale
of the motel. The facts in Hamlin and the Court's ruling are consistent with the rule that an extension of time must
be as certain as the original payment term of the note and, more importantly, the facts in Hamlin are distinguishable
from the facts in the instant case. Defendant AIA further argues that Plaintiffs reliance on Irwin Rogers Insurance
Agency, Inc. v. Murphy, 122 Idaho 270, 83 3 P .2d 128 (Ct.App.1992) is misplaced as the facts in Murphy are not on
point. The Court, however, finds the Idaho case more analogous to the instant matter than the Hamlin case, cited by
Defendant AIA, though neither case is on point.
22
AIA argued reliance based on John Taylor's testimony that he took no salary from AIA for a period of time based
on his reliance that Reed Taylor agreed to extend the time for payment of the Note. The Court would first not there
is some dispute over John Taylor's claim that he took no salary from AIA. However, assuming his statement to be
true, the Court nonetheless fails to see how that shows reliance on the part of AIA.
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promissory estoppel.
The Court, having found the alleged oral modification invalid and wienforceable for lack
of consideration and certainty, need not address the factual question of whether an oral
modification was entered into by AIA and Reed Taylor in 2003 and need not determine whether
the Note is in default under the terms of the oral modification. The original terms of the Note
are, therefore, applicable. Defendant AIA having conceded it is in default under the original
terms of the Note, the Court grants Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Motion for Partial Swnmary

..

Judgment on the PromisSOQ: Note, as it appears, based on the evidence before the Court, that a

directed verdict for Plaintiff would be warranted.

(II) PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
STANDARD
"Entitlement to injunctive relief depends upon the presentation of evidence by the
applicant, establishing the right to such relief." Balla v. Murphy, l 16 Idaho 257, 259, 775 P.2d
149 (Ct.App.1989). The decision to grant or deny an injunction is within the discretionary
decision making of the court. Hayden Lake Fire Protection District v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388,
405, 111 P.3d 73 (2004).

ANALYSIS
Plaintiff Reed Taylor, by way of a motion, asks the Court to enter a preliminary
injunction ordering: (1) all commissions and related receivables of AIA Services and AIA
Insurance be deposited with the Court and placed in an interest bearing account; (2) the original
of a promissory note from Washington Bank Properties payable to Universal Life Insurance
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Company be deposited with the Court along with all payments received on the Note; and (3) that
AIA Services and AIA Insurance be barred from encumbering, selling or transferring any assets.
Plaintiff contends AIA is insolvent under either definition of insolvency as found in I.C. §
55-911. Plaintiff further asserts that, pursuant to a proceeding by a creditor, a corporation found
to be insolvent may be subject to judicial dissolution under LC.§ 30-1-1430. While Plaintiff
cites the Court to I.C. § 30-1-1430 as authority under which the Court may grant Plaintiff's
motion for a preliminary injunction, the Court finds the statute inapplicable. The statute reads in
relevant part:
The Idaho district court designated in section 30-1-1431 (1), Idaho Code, may
dissolve a corporation:
(3) In a proceeding by a creditor if it is established that:
(a) The creditor's claim has been reduced to judgment, the execution on
the judgment returned unsatisfied, and the corporation is insolvent; or
(b) The corporation has admitted in writing that the creditor's claim is due
and owing and the corporation is insolvent;
Idaho Code§ 30-1-1430(3).

In the instant case, there has been no determination by the Court that AJA Services and/or
AIA Insurance, Inc. is insolvent, nor can the Court make such a determination at this time23 . In
addition to the unresolved question of insolvency, there is no creditor's claim that has been
reduced to judgment and, without a judgment, there can be no claim reduced to judgment that
has been returned unsatisfied upon execution. The Court clearly has no authority at this juncture
to judicially dissolve Defendant AJA Services and/or AIA Insurance, Inc.
Plaintiff's requested preliminary injunction would unquestionably have the effect of
putting Defendants AIA into dissolution by depriving the company of all operating capital. The

23

It is not enough that Plaintiff asserts AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. are insolvent. While the record
contains certain of the companies' financial records, the Court has at no time had the issue of insolvency put before
it for determination.
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·e
Court, having found it has no authority under LC.§ 30-1-1430, must deny Plaintiffs motion for
preliminary injunction.

ORDER
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Promissory Note is hereby
GRANTED.
Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED.

Dated this

Taylor v. AIA
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day of February 2008.
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AJA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho )
corpmation; and AJA INSURANCE, INC., an )
)
Idaho corporation,
)
Counterclaimants,
)
w.

)
)
)
)
)

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Counter defendant

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~·)
Defendants AIA Se1vices Cmporntion and AIA Insurance Inc . (collectively, "AJA" 01
"these Defendants"), by and thtough their counsel of record, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley
LLP, submit this First Amended Answer to Plaintiff's Fifth Amended Complaint, Counterclaim,
and Demand for Jmy Trial This amended pleading is submitted as a matter of tight pursuant to
I R.C.P. 15(a) because Reed J. Taylor has not yet se1ved a responsive pleading. These
Defendants respond to Plaintiffs Fifth Amended Complaint (the "Complaint") as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiffs Fifth Amended Complaint, and each and every claim and allegation thereof~
fails to state a claim against these Defendants upon which 1elief can be gi:anted.
SECOND DEFENSE
Defendants deny each and every allegation contained in Plaintiffs Complaint unless
expressly and specifically admitted herein
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE
L

These Defendants admit the allegations in paragi:aph 11 of the Complaint.

2.

These Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 1.2 of the Complaint.

J.

These Defendants admit the allegations in parngi:aph 1 3 of the Complaint.

4.

These Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 1.4 of the Complaint.
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5..

Answering pruagtaph 1 5 of the Complaint, these Defendants admit that R John

I aylo1 ("John I aylor") and Connie T aylot were husband and wife until on 01 about
December 16, 2005, and at all relevant times wete residents of Lewiston, Nez Perce County,
Idaho. These Defendants deny all othe1 allegations in pruagtaph 1.5 of the Complaint not
otherwise specifically admitted herein.
6

These Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 1.6 of the Complaint.

7.

These Defendants admit the allegations in pruagraph 1.7 of the Complaint.

8.

These Defendants admit the allegations in pruagraph 1 8 of the Complaint

9..

Answering paiagtaph l 9 of the Complaint, these Defendants admit that James

Beck and Conine Beck are residents of the State of Minnesota and deny all othe1 allegations in
pruagraph 1.9 of the Complaint not otherwise specifically admitted herein
10

Pruagraph 1 10 of the Complaint states a legal conclusion to which no response is

1equired.

11..

Paragraph I .11 of the Complaint states a legal conclusion to which no response is

required

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
12.

Answering pruagtaph 2.1 of the Complaint, these Defendants admit that John

I aylor was, at all 1elevant times, an officer and directo1 of AJA Se1vices, AIA Insmance, and
Crop USA, and that he owns approximately 40% of the outstanding shares of Crop USA. These
Defendants deny all other allegations in patagraph 2 .1 of the Com plaint not othe1wise
specifically admitted herein
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13..

Answe1ing paragraph 2 2 of the Complaint, these Defendants admit that John

I aylo1 and Connie I aylor were divorced through an interlocuto1y decree on or ru:owid
December 16, 2005, but these Defendants deny all other allegations in parag1aph 2 2 of the
Complaint
14

Paiagiaph 2 3 of the Complaint does not state any allegations as against these

Defendants to which a response is required Io the extent a response is required, these
Defendants deny the allegations in paragrnph 2.3 of the Complaint
15

These Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 2 4 of the Complaint.

16.

Answering paiagraph 2.5 of the Complaint, these Defendants admit that JoLee

Duclos ("Duclos") is an officer of AIA Services, AJA Insurance, and Crnp USA, and that she is
a shareholder in C1op USA. These Defendants deny all other allegations in pa1agraph 2.5 of the
Complaint not otherwise specifically admitted he1ein.

17

Answering paragraph 2 6 of the Complaint, these Defendants admit that Btyan

Freeman (''Freeman") was a director of AIA Se1vices, AIA Insurance, and Crop USA, and that
B1yan Freeman is a shareholder in Crnp USA These Defendants deny all othei allegations in
paragraph 2 . 6 of the Complaint not otherwise specifically admitted hetein
18..

These Defendants admits that CropUSA cooperated with AIA pursuant to ce1tain

agreements, and deny all deny all othet allegations in paiagiaph 2 7 of the Complaint not
otherwise specifically admitted herein.
19.

These Defendants admit the allegations in paiagiaph 2 8 of the Complaint

20.

Answeting paiagiaph 2.9 of the Complaint, these Defendants admit that James

Beck is a shareholder of AJA Services and Crop USA and that, during certain times, James Beck
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was a member of the boards of directors for AIA Insurance and AIA Se1vices These Defendants
deny all othe1 allegations in paragraph 2 . 9 of the Complaint not otherwise specifically admitted
herein.

21.

Answering parag1 aph 2 10 of the Complaint, these Defendants admit the first and

third sentences, allege that in 1995 Reed Taylor desired to retire and have AJA Services redeem
his stock, and deny each and every other allegation in paragraph 2. 10 not othetwise admitted
herein.
22

Answe1ing paragraph 2.11 of the Complaint, these Defendants admit that

AIA Inswance is a wholly owned subsidiary of AJA Se1vices and that AIA Inswance is a lessee
of the office building located at 111 Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho. These Defendants deny all
other allegations in paragraph 2.11 of the Complaint not othetwise specifically admitted herein
23.

Answering paragraph 2. 12 of the Complaint, these Defendants state that the

agreements speak for themselves.
24.

Answering pazagraph 2 . 13 of the Complaint, these Defendants state that the

documents speak for themselves, and deny all other allegations in paragraph 2.13 of the
Complaint not othe1wise specifically admitted he1ein .
25 .

Answe1ing paragi aph 2. 14 of the Complaint, these Defendants admit that the

Stock Redemption Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, and Security Agr·eement were
authmized by the Board of Directors of AJA Services. These Defendants state that the
agreements speak for themselves, and deny all othe1 allegations in paragraph 2.13 of the
Complaint not othe1wise specifically admitted he1ein.
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26

Answering paragraph 2.15 of the Complaint, these Defendants admit that in 1996

AIA Services and Plaintiff agreed to modify the Stock Redemption Agreement and executed the
Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement, an Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement,
and an Amended and Restated Secmity Agreement Those documents speak foi themselves, and
these Defendants deny all other allegations in paragraph 2.15 of the Complaint not otherwise
specifically admitted herein
27

Answering paragraph 2 .16 of the Complaint, these Defendants state that the

agreements speak for themselves, the agr·eements were amended at a later time, and these
Defendants deny all other allegations in paragraph 2 .16 of the Complaint not othe1wise
specifically admitted herein .

28..

Answering paragraph 2 17 of the Complaint, these Defendants state that the

Amended Stock Pledge Agreement speaks for itself~ and these Defendants deny each and every
allegation in pa.iagraph 2 .17 of the Complaint not otherwise specifically admitted herein
29.

Answering paragraph 2 18 of the Complaint, these Defendants state that the

Amended Stock Pledge Agreement speaks for itself. These Defendants admit that AJA Services
did not post bonds or other security for the payment of the Prnmissmy Note and deny all other
allegations in paragraph 2.18 of the Complaint not specifically admitted herein.
30.

Answering paragraph 2 .19 ofthe Complaint, these Defendants state that the

Amended Stock Pledge Agreement speaks for itself and deny all other allegations in
paragraph 2 . 19 of the Complaint not otherwise specifically admitted herein
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31..

Answering pa1 agraph 2 20 of the Complaint, these Defendants state that the

Amended Stock Pledge Agreement speaks for itself and deny all other allegations in
pruagraph 2 20 of the Complaint not otherwise specifically admitted he1ein.

32.

These Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 2..21 of the Complaint

33.

Answering paragraph 2..22 of the Complaint, these Defendants admit that Plaintiff

was, duling ce1tain relevant times, the largest creditor of AIA Services, and deny all other
allegations in paiagraph 2 22 ofthe Complaint not otherwise specifically admitted herein
34

These Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 223 of the Complaint

35..

These Defendants deny the allegations in pruagraph 2 24 of the Complaint

36.

These Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 2 25 of the Complaint

37.

Answering paragraph 2..26 of the Complaint, these Defendants admit that Plaintiff

claimed that AIA Se1vices was in default, and these Defendants deny all other allegations in
paragraph 2..26 of the Complaint not otherwise specifically admitted herein .
38.

Answering paragraph 2.27 of the Complaint, these Defendants admit that Plaintiff

had never attempted to accelerate any of the indebtedness due under the Promissory Note prior to
December 12, 2006, admit that AIA Services continued to make interest payments in an agreed
upon amount before and afte1 the date of Plaintiff's original complaint, and deny all other
allegations in paragraph 2.27 of the Complaint not otherwise specifically admitted herein
39.

Answe1ing paragraph 2..28 of the Complaint, these Defendants state that the

Amended Stock Pledge Agr·eement speaks fo1 itself; and these Defendants deny each and every
other allegation in paragraph 2 28 of the Complaint.
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40.

Answering paragraph 2.29 of the Complaint, these Defendants admit that Plaintiff

attempted to schedule a special shareholder meeting for December 26, 2006, admit that no
special shar·eholder meeting was held on that date, and deny each and every other allegation in
paragraph 2 29 of the Complaint.
41.

Answering paragraph 2 ..30 of the Complaint, these Defendants admit that the

quoted words are part of one of the sentences of a letter :ft.om R. John Taylor to Plaintiffs legal
counsel, and deny each and every allegation in paragraph 2 .30 of the Complaint
42..

Answe1ing paragraph 2 31 of the Complaint, these Defendants admit that Reed

1aylot demanded a special shareholde1 meeting fot February 5, 2007, admit that no special
shareholder meeting was held on that date, deny that Reed Taylor had a tight to call a meeting to
vote AIA Insurance Shares, and deny each and every allegation in paragraph 2 .31 of the
Complaint not otherwise specifically admitted herein
43

These Defendants deny the allegations in paragtaph 2 32 of the Complaint.

44.

Answe1ing paragraph 2 33 of the Complaint, these Defendants admit that Reed

Taylor executed a Consent in Lieu of Special Shareholder Meeting of AIA Insurance, and these
Defendants deny each and every allegation in paiagraph 2.33 of the Complaint not otherwise
specifically admitted herein
45.

Answering paragraph 234 of the Complaint, these Defendants admit that

AIA Insu1ance paid $1,510,69300 to purchase Series C Preferred Shares in AIA Services from
Crop USA These Defendants admit that AIA Se1vices' 401(k) Plan held Prefened C shares .
These Defendants deny all other allegations in patagraph 2.34 of the Complaint not otherwise
specifically admitted he1ein
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46.

Answering paragiaph 2 . 35 of the Complaint, these Defendants admit that John

Tayl01 purchased a pruking lot and deny each and every allegation in paragiaph 2 .3 5 of the
Complaint not otherwise specifically admitted herein .
47..

These Defendants deny the allegations in paragtaph 2.36 of the Complaint.

48.

These Defendants deny the allegations in paragtaph 2 ..37 of the Complaint

49

Answering paragiaph 2 .38 of the Complaint, these Defendants admit that Reed

1 aylor executed a Consent in Lieu of Board Meeting on or around Febmary 22, 200 7 and that

Defendants refused to recognize the Consent as binding on them. These Defendants deny all
other allegations in paragiaph 2.38 of the Complaint not othe1wise specifically admitted herein.

50.

These Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 2 ..39 of the Complaint..

51

Answering paragraph 2 40 of the Complaint, these Defendants admit that

Freeman and Duclos resigned as members of the Boa1d ofDirect01s of AIA Insurance and
AIA Services, admit that John Tayl01, as Chairman of the Board of Directors, appointed Connie
Tayl01 and James Beck as directors, and deny all other allegations in paragraph 2 .40 of the
Complaint not otherwise specifically admitted herein

52.

These Defendants deny the allegation in paragraph 2..41 of the Complaint

53..

Answering paragtaph 2..42 of the Complaint, these Defendants admit that Plaintiff

has an interest as provided for in the Amended and Restated Security Agteement, which
agreement speaks for itself, admit that Plaintiff has demanded that no funds in which he has a
security interest should be used to pay the legal fees of any Defendant, but deny all other
allegations in paragraph 2 42 of the Complaint not otherwise specifically admitted herein.
54..

These Defendants deny the allegations in paragtaph 2 43 of the Complaint..
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55.

Answe1ing par:agraph 2 .44, these Defendants admit that Crnp USA pW'chased

Sound Inswance and deny all othe1 allegations in par:agraph 2..44 of the Complaint not otherwise
specifically admitted herein .

56..

Answering parngraph 2..45 of the Complaint, these Defendants admit that Global

Ttavel was a tenant in AIA Insw·ance's office building and that Global Travel has relocated to a
different office building, but these Defendants deny all other allegations in par:agraph 2.45 of the
Complaint not otherwise specifically admitted herein
57

These Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 2 . 46 of the Complaint.

58

These Defendants deny the allegations in par:agraph 2 .47 of the Complaint.

59..

Answering patagraph 2 48 of the Complaint, these Defendants allege that

AIA Service and AIA Inswance are and were being opetated for the benefit of AIA Setvices and
AIA Insurance and deny all other allegations in paragraph 2 48 of the Complaint not otherwise
specifically admitted he1ein.

60.

These Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 2 .49 of the Complaint

61.

These Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 2.50 of the Complaint

62.

These Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 2. 51 of the Complaint.

63..

These Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 2 52 of the Complaint

64

These Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 2.53 of the Complaint

65.

These Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 2.54 of the Complaint

66..

Answering paiagraph 2 55 of the Complaint, these Defendants state that the

Executive Officer" s Agr·eement speaks for itself; and these Defendants deny all other allegations
in paragraph 2.55 of the Complaint not otherwise specifically admitted herein .
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67.

These Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 2.56 of the Complaint.

68.

These Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 257 of the Complaint.

69.

These Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 2.58 of the Complaint.

70

Paragraph 2 59 does not state any allegations against these Defendants to which a

response is required.. To the extent a response is required, these Defendants deny the allegations
in paragraph 2 .59 of the Complaint
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Bnaches of Contract
71.

These Defendants incorporate by reference their answers and denials set forth in

the preceding paragraphs .
72..

Answering paragraphs 3 .2 through 3 4 of the Complaint, these defendants state

that the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security Agreement,
and Restructure Agr·eement speak for themselves, and these defendants deny all other allegations

in paragraphs 3..3 through 3 4 of the Complaint not otherwise specifically admitted herein
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Fr·audulent Tnnsfers

73.

These Defendants incorporate by reference their answers and denials set forth in

the preceding pazagraphs of this Answer
74

These Defendants deny all allegations in paragraphs 4.2 through 44 of the

Complaint
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
Misrepresentations/Fraud
75..

These Defendants inco1porate by reference their answers and denials set fotth in

the preceding paragraphs of this Answer .
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76..

These Defendants deny all allegations in paiagraphs 5 2 through 5 .4 of the

Complaint
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Conversion
77.

These Defendants inco1porate by reference theiI answers and denials set fo1th in

the preceding paragraphs of this Answe1 .
78

These Defendants deny all allegations in pruagiaphs 6 2 thiough 6 3 of the

Complaint.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Altef' Ego/Pier·cing Corporate Veil [sic]

79.

These Defendants incorpoiate by reference their answers and denials set forth in

the preceding paragraphs of this Answer.
80

These Defendants deny all allegations in pruagraphs 7 2 through 7.5 of the

Complaint.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Constructive Trust
81..

These Defendants inco1p01ate by reference their answe1s and denials set forth in

the preceding paragiaphs of this Answe1 .
82.

These Defendants deny all allegations in paragiaphs 8.2 through 8.4 of the

Complaint
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Directof' Liability

83

These Defendants incotporate by reference theiI answers and denials set forth in

the preceding pruagiaphs of this Answer.
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84.

These Defendants deny all allegations in paragraphs 9.2 through 9.4 of the

Complaint.
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Specific Performance
85..

These Defendants incorporate by reference thei1 answers and denials set fo1th in

the preceding paragraphs of this Answe1
86

These Defendants deny all allegations inpatagiaphs 10.2 through 104 of the

Complaint
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Breach of Fiduciary Duties
87.

These Defendants inc01p01ate by reference theit answers and denials set forth in

the preceding paragraphs of this Answer.
88.

These Defendants deny all allegations in patagraphs 11 2 through 11 4 of the

Complaint
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
89.

These Defendants incorporate by reference their answers and denials set forth in

the preceding paragraphs of this Answer.
90.

These Defendants deny all allegations in paragraphs 12 .2 through 12 3 of the

Complaint
ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Civil Conspincy
91.

These Defendants incorporate by reference their answers and denials set forth in

the preceding paragraphs of this Answe1
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92..

These Defendants deny all allegations in paragraphs 13 2 through 13 3 of the

Complaint.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
93 .

Answering paragraphs 14 .1 through 14. 41, these Defendants deny that Plaintiff is

entitled to any of the relief prayed for in his Complaint

THIRD DEFENSE
On July 1, 1996, Plaintiff; AJA Services, and Donna J. I aylor entered into a Series A
preferred Shareholder Agreement, which provides that no principal payments may be made by
AJA Services to Plaintiff until the entire Series A Prefened Stock redemption price due Donna
I aylot is paid in full. The redemption price due Donna I aylor has not been paid in full.
Therefore, no principal payments are due to Plaintiff

FOURTH DEFENSE
At different times since the written agreements were executed, Plaintiff and these
Defendants have orally modified the written agreements. The modifications include, without
limitation, an agr·eement that the interest payable to Plaintifffiom AJA Services would be paid in
installments of $15,000 per month (together with the assumption of responsibility for other
expenses). AIA Services has paid Plaintiff the sum of$15,000 per month and has assumed
responsibility for the other agreed expenses in accordance with the modified agreements since
they were ente1 ed into, and Plaintiff has accepted those payments These Defendants are not in
default of the modified agreements.

FIFTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff's claims are baned by the applicable statute of limitations, including Idaho Code

§§ 5-216, 5-218, 5-224, 5-237 and 55-918
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SIXTH DEFENSE

Plaintiff is estopped from asserting his claims against these Defendants
SEVENTH DEFENSE

Plaintiff has waived his right to assert claims against these Defendants
EIGHTH DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims against these Defendants are barred by the equitable doctrine of unclean
hands .
NINTH DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claim in his THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION violates Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b).
TENTH DEFENSE

Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine oflaches.
ELEVENTH DEFENSE

Io the extent Plaintiff is attempting to state a claim against AJA Insurance, Inc. for a
shareholder's derivative action, Plaintiffs claims are barred for failure to give the required notice
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 30-1-742.
TWELFTH DEFENSE

Plaintiffs alleged damages are subject to the right of setoff.
THIRTEENm DEFENSE

On .July 1, 1996, AIA Se1vices Corporation ("Services") and Reed J. Iaylm executed a
Stock Redemption RestructUJe Agieement, Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement, and
related documents restating the 1995 agreements with Reed J, Taylor whereby Services acquired
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all his outstanding common shares (613,494) in exchange for $7 . 5 million and (i) three aircraft,
(ii) elimination of $570,000 owed to the Company, and (iii) miscellaneous fwniture and fixtures .
Revenues of Se1 vices and its subsidiaries declined sharply between 1994 and 1996:
$36,200,324, $10,996,753 and $9,758,226, respectively.
The basis for the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement and related Agreements
was that Services and its subsidiaries depended on its ability to sell health and life insurance.
Reed J. Taylor sold his controlling interest while Services was losing money and then continued
on the Board of Directors and participated in decisions promoting the Company's decline .
Neithe1 party, in 1996, could foresee the precipitous decline of Se1vices through government
regulation and market change.
With the consent and knowledge of Reed L Taylor as a member of the Board ofDirecto1s
of Services:
(a)

The Universe Life Insmance Company ("Universe") ente1ed into a Stipulation and

Order of Rehabilitation with the Idaho Department oflnsurance in the District Cowt of the
Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho ("District Cowt") on March 5, 1996.
(b)

An Amended Plan of Rehabilitation was approved by the Disttict Cowt on

October 7, 1997. Effective December 1, 1997, through the Amended Plan of Rehabilitation, all
of Universe's group health insmance certificate holde1s were transferred to Trusttnark Insurance
Company (" Trustmark")..
(c)

On December 4, 1998, the Distiict Couzt issued an Order of Liquidation and

placed Universe into liquidation, with assets and liabilities estimated to be $16. 1 million and
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$14 .3 million, respectively A liquidator was appointed to wind down business and pay
certificate holders, creditors, and shareholders .
Reed J. faylo1 knew and unde1stood that the health insurance business of Services
depended upon retention of the policies in Universe and Centennial that were transfened to
Irustmark, as well the continued ability to wiite new health insurance business.
By November 2001, Imstmark determined that it would no longer underwrite individual
health insurance and disallowed all new sales .
Reed J 1 aylor, based on his intimate involvement with Services, knew and understood
that changes in legislative and regulatory framework affecting health insurance laws had
substantially and permanently damaged Se1vices' health insurance business
While Reed J. Taylor was sales manager AIA Inswance's commissions declined every
yeai.
Reed J. I aylor has been paid several million dollars in interest and othe1 payments from a
company that has suffered unf01eseen ma1ket consequences and the loss of the consideration for
the sale of his stock. Given the unforeseeable supe1vening consequences, the actions of Reed
J. I aylor in the business and/or the substantial sums paid to him, it would be unconscionable to

continue to enforce the contzacts with Reed J, Taylor.. Neither party could have foreseen the
changes in regulation and attendant shiinking market of Services and loss of Universe and
Centennial. In the alternative, Services is entitled to a setoff equal to the value of Universe at the
time of signing the contract with Reed J I aylor .
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FOURTEENTH DEFENSE
Reed .L Taylor voluntarily relinquished and waived events of default under the Amended
Security Agreement and Amended Pledge Agteement, including but not limited to, default or
breaches arising from or relating to financial statements, board memberships, or insolvencies or
bankruptcies .

FIFTEENTH DEFENSE
Reed J I aylor voluntarily relinquished the payment provision of this 1996 Promisso1y
and accepted a modified monthly interest payment of $25,000 and future payment of p1incipal
upon placement of $60,000,000 in new business evidenced by his conduct, words and
acquiesces

SIXTEENTH DEFENSE
Reed J. Taylor is estopped from claiming a default or breach of the Amended Pledge
Agt·eement or the Amended Secwity Agt·eement, including but not limited to alleged defaults
related to or arising from financial statements, boa1d membe1ship, or insolvency or bankruptcy,
as it would be unconscionable to allow Reed l. Taylor to asse1t such rights to default based on
his p1ior positions and conduct.

SEVENTEENTH DEFENSE
Reed J Taylor 1epresented to AJA Se1vices by his conduct and comse of action and
silence that he was excusing and waiving any b1each of contract by accepting payments of
$25,000 a month since 2003; AIA Se1vices relied upon Reed J. Taylor's representation and
mate1ially changed its position to its detriment.

EIGHTEENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff has failed to join an indispensable pa1ty, Donna Taylor.
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RULE 11 STATEMENT

Defendants have considered and believe that they may have additional defenses but do
not have information at this time to assert such additional defenses under Rule 11 of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Pwcedure Defendants do not intend to waive any such defenses and specifically
assert their intention to amend this Answer if; pending 1esearch and after discovery, facts come
to light giving rise to such additional defenses

FIRST COUNTERCLAIM
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
Defendants/Counterclaimants AIA Insurance, Inc. and AIA Services Corporation, by way
of counterclaim against Plaintiff/Counterdefendant Reed I aylor, allege and complain as follows:

1

In 1995, Plaintiff was the

m~jority

shareholder ofAIA Services. AIA Services

was the sole shareholder of AIA Insurance
2..

In 1995, AIA Services redeemed Plaintiff's interest in AIA Services through a

corporate redemption of the Plaintiff's stock.
J.

After the purchase of Plaintiffs stock, Plaintiff intentionally, as a major creditor

of AIA Services, a Director of both entities, and Sales Manager of AJA Insurance, Inc.,
undertook a course of action which injured AIA Insurance and devalued the businesses of
AIA Services. Plaintiffs intentional course of action included intimidating and interfering with
the management and inducing AIA Insurance employees and agents to terminate their
employment and contiacts with AJA Insurance and to accept employment and contracts with
Plaintiff and/or organizations controlled by him Plaintiff; with the former employees and
former agents of AIA Insurance, engaged in business competitive with AIA Insurance which
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seriously damaged the business and value ofAIA Insmance and the value of the businesses of
AIA Services .

4..

Because of Plaintiffs interference with AIA Services' business relationships,

AIA Services was unable to pay Plaintiff all of the amounts of money due at times due, prior to
the amendment of the agreements Before the agreements were amended in 2003, Plaintiff
threatened to sue AIA Services and to foreclose and take over AIA lnsmance and threatened and
coerced Defendants into employing fiiends and relatives of Plaintiff and paying Plaintiff's
fiiends and relatives salaries and compensation substantially in excess of the value of their
services Plaintiff also told those friends and relatives that they were not obligated to report to or
take direction from AIA' s management

5.

Plaintiff has intentionally breached his fiduciary duty as a Director of AIA

Services and as an Officer of AIA Insurance, Inc , damaging Defendants in amounts to be proved
at trial.
6..

Based on the conduct of Reed J. Taylor alleged in this First Counterclaim,

Defendants will seek amendment of its prayer for relief and are entitled to punitive damages
pmsuant to IC. 6-1604.

SECOND COUNTERCLAIM
BAD FAITH BREACH OF IMPLIED COVENANT
OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
There is implied in every contract a covenant of good faith and fan dealing.
2

On July 1, 1996, AIA Services Corporation, Reed Taylor and Donna l Taylor

executed a Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement
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(a)

The recitals of this Agreement provided ''the Series A Prefened

Shareholde1 would have her stock in company redeemed in accordance with a specified payment
plan, and that cettain payments to creditor under the original document would be subordinated to
the company's obligation to pay Se1ies A PrefeIIed Shareholder Concwrent with this
Agieement, creditor, company and Series A Prefe1Ied Shareholder have entered into an
agreement ("Series A Prefeued Shareholder Agreement") which supersedes and replaces the
Series A PrefeII'ed Shar·eholder Letter Agreements."
(b)

According to Section 1. 8 of the Agreement, a subordination agieement

with the Series A Shareholder would be executed concunently with the Agi·eement whereby
Reed agieed to subordinate AJA Services' $6,000,000 Prnmissory Note for the redemption of
Reed's stock of Services to the full payment of the Series A Prefeued Stockholder, Donna J
Taylo1.
(c)

The Parties executed the Series A Prefell'ed Shareholder Agreement

(Exhibit G) on July 1, 1996.

3..

Payments to the Series A Prefeued Shar·eholder by AIA Services rue continuing

on a monthly basis.
4

The Series A Prefened Shareholder has not decla1ed a default in the payments to

her under the 1996 Se1ies A Prefeued Shareholder Agreement.
5.

Reed J. I aylor knew and understood in 1996 that the payment of principal to him

on the $6 million Note would be subordinated in full to the company's obligation to first redeem
the Series A Prefened Stock in fWL
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6.

In December 2006, Reed .J. Iaylm, without the consent or knowledge of

AIA Sezvices, persuaded Donna J. Taylor to execute a Subordination Agreement, whereby AIA
Setvices' obligation owing to Donna Taylor for the redemption of the Seties A Prefened Shares
would be subotdinated to the debt owed by AIA Se1vices to Reed .J I aylot for the redemption of
his common stock.
7.

On Febmary 22, Reed L I aylor executed a Consent in Lieu of Special

Shareholder Meeting of AIA Services and allegedly removed John I aylor, JoLee Duclos and
Bzyan Freeman from the Board of Directors and appointed himself as sole Boazd member.
8.

Reed .J. I aylor then broke into the offices of AIA Setvices in the eazly morning of

Sunday, Februaiy 25, 2007, and attempted to take over the offices and books and records of
AIA Services .
9.

Reed J. Taylor acted in bad faith and used the 2006 Subordination Agzeement

with Donna I aylor in ordet to manufactwe an alleged default of non-payment of ptincipal under
the Stock Redemption Restrnctwe Agreement, Amended Pledge Agreement, and Amended
Secwity Agzeement of 1996 to take over AIA Services
10

Based on the conduct of Reed Taylor alleged in this Second Counterclaim,

Defendants will seek amendment of its prayer for relief and are entitled to an award of punitive
damages pwsuant to IC § 6-1604.

THIRD COUNTERCLAIM
BREACH OF CONTRACT
1.

Defendants/Counterclaimants reallege and incorporate by reference

paragzaphs 1-9 verbatim of the Second Counterclaim as if set forth in full herein
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2.

As pa.it of the consideration for the Stock Redemption Restmcture Agreement of

1996, Reed Taylor agreed to subordinate the payment of principal on the $6,000,000 P1omissory
Note to Reed until the Se1ies A Prefelled Shareholder is paid in full..
3.

Reed Taylor has breached the Stock Redemption Restmcture Agieement and has

damaged AIA Se1vices.
4.

AIA alleges that the 2006 subordination agieement should be voided and

adjudged invalid, restoring the subordination provisions of the 1996 Series A Prefened
Stockholder Agreement as wtitten.

FOURTH COUNTERCLAIM
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
1.

On Sunday morning, February 25, 2007, without notice to any Defendants,

Plaintiff and several other individuals entered the offices of AIA Insurance and AIA Services at
111 Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho .
2

Accompanying Plaintiff and conspirators was a locksmith whom Plaintiff directed

to begin to change the locks on the offices of AJA Services and AJA Insurance for the purpose of
preventing access to those offices by their cwrent management and employees.

3..

The action and conduct of Plaintiff and his associates constitute a trespass upon

the property of AJA Services and AIA Insurance, which, if it had been successful, would have
caused irreparable injwy to both AIA Services and AIA Inswance
4.

Plaintiff should be enjoined from harassing and/or interfe1ing with the

management of AJA Inswance and AJA Services Plaintiff should be enjoined frnm entering
upon the premises of AIA Insurance and AIA Se1vices without the exp1ess permission of these
Defendants. Plaintiff should be enjoined from acting or attempting to act as a Directo1 or officer
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of AJA Insurance. Plaintiff should be enjoined from harassing or annoying, directly or
indirectly, any employee of AJA Services or AJA Insurance in person, by telephone, or by
written communications

FIFTH COUNTERCLAIM
RESCISSION OF 1996 STOCK REDEMPTION RESTRUCTURE
AGREEMENT AND 1995 STOCK REDEMPTION AGREEMENT
1.

On July 22, 1995, AJA Services and Reed J. Taylor executed a Stock Redemption

Agreement which provided for the redemption of 613,494 shares of common stock of AJA
Services Corporation ("AJA Services"), payable in the form of a short term $1,500,000 down
payment note and a long term note payable to Reed in the amount of $6,000,000, subordinated
however to the redemption of the Series A Preferred Stock to the prefened stockholder, Donna l.
Taylor Concurrent with the execution of the Stock Redemption Agreement, thereto AIA
Services and Reed Taylor executed a Promissory Note payable to Reed Taylor in the principal
amount of $6 million dated August 1, 1995. This Promissory Note states:
The Note is subordinate to the payment of the redemption
obligations owed by Company to Donna Taylor pursuant to that
certain Letter Agreement dated January 11, 1995, signed by
Company, Payee Donna Taylor and Cum.er Green
The January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement was executed by AIA Se1vices, Reed L Taylor
and Donna J Taylor The January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement provided:
Fmthe1, AJA Services Corporation's Note or any note payable to
Reed J. I aylor for the $6 million purchase p1ice fo1 his common
shares will be subordinated to the redemption rights of your client
so that Reed J. Taylor will receive no principal payments on said
Note until Donna Taylor's stock has been properly redeemed.
Reed J. Taylor will receive no interest payments on the Note
payable to him if payments to Donna Taylo1 ar·e in default
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The 1995 Letter Agreement was integral to and legally permitted Reed Taylor's
redemption of his common stock in the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement
2..

On July 1, 1996, AIA Services, Reed Taylor and Donna J Taylor executed a

Stock Redemption RestructW'e Agreement which provided for:
(a)

Adjusting the principal amount of the down payment note, extending its

maturity date and providing for interest to accrue on the principal balance of the down payment
note, 1equiring payments of p1incipal and interest under the down payment note, and providing
for secwity for payment of the down payment note;
(b)

f etminating the 1995 Consulting Agreement, revising the 1995

Noncompetition Agreement, and te1minating the Company's obligation to pay Reed Taylor a
monthly salary;
(c)

Amending the tetms of the 1995 Secwity Agreement and 1995 Stock

Pledge Agreement;
(d)

Revising ce1tain representations and wartanties and covenants in the 1995

Stock Redemption Agr·eement; and
(e)

Simplifying and consolidating various default provisions .

In exchange for 1estructwing the Company's obligations to Reed Taylor, Reed agteed to

waive and to forbeat from exercising any remedies he may have for any existing defaults under
the original 1995 documents . Also the parties executed a Seties A Preferred Shareholder
Agreement replacing the Series A Shar·eholder Letter Agreements.
(a)

I he recitals of this 1996 Restructw·e Agreement pt ovided ''the Series A

Preferred Shareholder would have her stock in company redeemed in accotdance with a
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specified payment plan, and that ce1tain payments to c1editor under the otiginal document would
be subordinated to AIA Services' obligation to pay Series A P1efeued Shareholder Concunent
with this Agreement, creditor, company and Series A Prefened Shareholder have entered into an
agieement ("Se1ies A P1efened Shareholder Agreement") which supe1sedes and replaces the
Se1ies A Prefeired Shareholder Letter Ag1eements . "
(b)

According to Section 1. 8 of the 1996 Resttucture Agreement, a

subo1dination agreement with the Series A Shareholder would be executed concw1ently with the
Agieement.
(c)

The Patties contemporaneously executed the Se1ies A Prefened

Shareholder Agreement (Exhibit G) on July I, 1996 subordinating the p1incipal payments to
Reed J. Taylor on the $6,000,000 P1omisso1y Note. Reed J Taylo1 agi·eed to complete
subo1dination ofptincipal payments until the Series A redemption was completed .
4.

Payments to the Se1ies A Prefeued Shareholder by AIA Services a1e continuing

on a monthly basis
5..

The Se1ies A Prefened Shareholder has not declaied a default in the payments to

her unde1 the 1996 Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement.
6

Reed J. Taylor knew and understood that the 1995 Stock Redemption

sub01dinated both p1incipal and interest payments and the 1996 Stock Redemption Restrnctw·e
Agreement p1incipal of the $6 Million Promisso1y Note and 1996 that the payment would be
subordinated in full to the company's obligation to redeem the Seties A P1efeued Stock fu·st
7.

On December 1, 2006, Reed J. I aylor, without the consent 01 knowledge of

AJA Se1vices, persuaded Donna .J. Taylo1 to execute a two pa1ty Subotdination Agieement,
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whereby the debt owing to Donna Taylor fiom redemption of the Series A Prefened Shares to
AIA Services would be subordinated to all the debt owed by AIA Services to Reed J Taylor.
(a)

The Subordination Agreement executed on December I, 2006, expressly

rescinded the subordination p10visions of the 1996 Series A P1efened A Shareholder Agieement,
the 1996 Stock Redemption Restiucture Agr·eement, the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, and
the January 11, 1995 Lette1 Agr·eement incorporated into AIA Services' $6,000,000 Promissory
Note payable to Reed:
"The effect of this Agr·eement shall be to pe1mit Reed to collect,
litigate, obtain judgment, and/01 enforce any and all rights and
remedies which relate in any way to the $6 million Promissory
Note, plus all accrued interest, costs, expenses and attorneys fees
owed to Reed through the vai:ious agreements set fo1th in Section 2
below. This Agreement may result in Reed obtaining payment,
assets, and/or judgments which represent some of all of the
amounts owed by him, while Donna's rights will be junior inferior
to Reed . . . (emphasis supplied)
(b)

Reed J. Iaylo1 in the December l, 2006 Subordination Agreement

expressly abrogated all of Donna Taylor's rights to pri01ity of payment of the Series A P1efened
Stock Redemption price including all p1io1 agreements relating back to the 1996 Stock
Redemption Restructure Agreement, the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and the January 11,
1995 Letter Ag1eement and exp1essly rescinded the Seties A Prefened Shrueholder Agreement
of 1996:
Donna expressly subordinates all amounts, rights, obligations and
remedies owed to her in favor of (and junior to) Reed J. Taylor
under the following agreements (including all claims, remedies,
tights, under such agreements):
(a) $6 million Promissory Note between Reed and AIA Se1vices
Corporation ("AIA Services") dated August 1, 1995; (b) Stock
Redemption Restructure Agr·eement between Reed, Donna and
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AlA Se1vices dated July 1, 1996; (c) Amended and Restated Stock
Pledge Agreement between AJA Se1vices and Reed dated .July 1,
1996; ( d) Amended and Restated Secmity Agreement between
AIA Services, AIA Inswance, Inc, and Reed dated July l, 1996;
(e) Letter between Reed, R. John Taylor and Donna dated Febma1y
27, 2001; (f) Series A. Prefeued Sha1eholder Agreement between
AIA Services. and Reed dated July 1. 1996; and (g) Any other
agreement. contiact or promise of any kind or natUI'e (emphasis
supplied}.
8

On Febmaiy 22, Reed J. Taylor executed a Consent in Lieu of Special

Shareholde1 Meeting ofAIA Se1vices and allegedly removed John Taylor, .JoLee Duclos and
B1yan Freeman from the Boa1d of Directors and appointed himself as sole Board member.
9.

Reed .J. Taylor then broke into the offices of AIA Services in the eaily morning of

Sunday, Februa1y 25, 2007, and attempted to take ove1 the offices and books and records of
AIA Se1vices.
10

Reed J.. Taylor in bad faith used the December 1, 2006 Subordination Agieement

with Donna Taylor in order to manufactUI"e an alleged default against AJA Se1vices of
non-payment of principal under the Stock Redemption RestrnctUI'e Agreement, Amended Pledge
Agi·eement, and Amended Security Agreement of 1996 to take over AIA Inswance based on a
sec1et nullification and rescission of the Series A Shareholder Agi·eement of 1996 and the
.Januruy 11, 1995 Shareholder Letter Agi·eement

1L

Plaintiff asserts that the December 1, 2006 Subordination Agieement between

Reed J. I aylor and Donna Taylor is effective and enforceable as against Defendants,
notwithstanding that the Agreement was obtained without the knowledge or consent ofAIA
Services.
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12

The Series A PrefeHed Shareholder Agreement dated July 1, 1996 is an integral

part of the Stock Redemption Resttucture Agteement of 1996 and was material consideration for
AIA Services executing the Stock Redemption Resttucture Agteement of 1996 Section 8(g) of
the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement pmvides in part:
Each provision of this Agi·eement is interdependent with and
inseparable fiom every other provision hereof; and each covenant
is given in consideration of every other covenant herein.. If any
provision of this Agi·eement is invalid, illegal, unenforceable or
inapplicable to any per son or circumstance to which it is intended
to be applicable, in whole or in pa.rt this entire Agreement shall be
void.
Because of the actions and conduct of Reed J. I aylor and as a result of the December l,
2006 Agreement, an essential and inseparable provisions of the Series A Prefeued Shar·eholder
Agreement have been rescinded resulting in a failure of considetation; and by its terms the Series
A Preferred Shareholder Agreement of 1996 is void. Voiding the Series A Prefened Shareholder
Agreement of 1996 by Reed J I aylor also effectively rescinds the 1995 Stock Redemption
Agreement for failure of material consideration on which the Redemption Agreement was based
13.

The January 11, 1995 Shareholder Letter Agr·eement was material consideration

for AIA Services executing the 1995 Shareholder Redemption Agi·eement and was integral to the
execution of the 1995 Shareholder Redemption Agreement and the delivery of the $6 million
Promissory Note (Promissmy Note) to Reed J . Taylor. The Promissory Note expressly refers to
and incorporates the January 11, 1995 Shareholder Letter Agteement subordination set forth in
the January 11, 1995 Shareholder Letter Agreement. Reed J Taylor agreed to the complete
subordination of principal and interest payments on Services' $6,000,000 Promissory Note
payable to Reed until the Series A Preferred shares were redeemed completely. Because of the
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actions and conduct of Reed J. Taylor, the January 11, 1995 Shareholder Lette1 Agreement has
been nullified and rescinded by the express terms of the Subordination Agreement of December
1, 2006. The rescission of the .January 11, 1995 Shar·eholder Letter by Reed J. Taylor effectively
1escinds the 1995 Stockholder Redemption Agreement for failure of material consideration on
which the Redemption Agreement was based.
14..

Defendant/Counterclaimants allege and claim that the Stock Redemption

Restructure Agreement in 1996, the Stock Redemption Agreement of 1995, the January 11, 1995
Letter Agreement and the $6M Note have been rescinded through the.deceitful course of conduct
and action by Reed J Taylor.
15

AJA Services hereby tenders to Reed J Taylor the equivalent of 613,494 shar·es of

AJA Se1vices Corporation common stock conditioned upon (and AIA Services hereby demands)
repayment by Reed of all amounts paid to Reed 01 on his behalf pursuant to the rescinded
agreements.

SIXTH COUNTERCLAIM
TRESPASS
L

In the early morning hours of Sunday, February 25, 2007, Plaintiff and several of

his associates entered the offices of AJA Services and AJA Insurance without notice and without
permission, which constitutes an intentional tr·espass on the property of AJA Se1vices and
AJA Insurance, which causes those corporations damages in amounts which will be proved at
trial
2.

Based on the conduct desc1ied in the preceding counterclaim Plaintiffs are entitled

to an award of punitive damages and will seek pe1mission to amend its property for 1elief
pursuant to LC 6-1604
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ATTORNEYS' FEES

These Defendants have been required to retain the services of Hawley Troxell Ennis
& Hawley LLP and are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees pmsuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120,

12-121, and/01 other applicable law..
NOTICE OF INTENT TO AMEND

These Defendants hereby give notice of their intent to amend this Answer and
Counterclaim to add additional claims, defenses and counterclaims, including a claim for
punitive damages, as discovery is conducted
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, these Defendants request the Cowt:
1.

To dismiss the Fifth Amended Complaint with prejudice;

2..

Io award these Defendants damages on their Counterclaims in the amounts to be

proven at trial for trespass and breach of contract;
3..

Io enter a judgment voiding the 2006 subordination agreement;

4.

Io enter an injunctive relief as set forth in these Defendants' Fomth

Counterclaim;
5..

To enjoin this Plaintiff from harassing and/or interfering with the management of

AJA Insurance and AJA Services, and to enjoin the Plaintiff fiom entering upon the premises of
AIA Insmance and AJA Services without the express permission of these Defendants, and to
enjoin the Plaintiff from acting or attempting to act as a Director 01 officer of AJA Insurance, and
to enjoin the Plaintiff from harassing or annoying, directly 01 indirectly, any employee of
AJA Services or AJA Insurance in person, by telephone, or by written communications.
6

Io enter an order:
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(a)

That Reed .J Taylor by executing the December 1, 2006 Subordination

Agreement rescinded and nullified the 1996 Prefened Series A Shru:·eholder Agreement, and that
the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement is void for failure of material consideration
upon which the redemption was based;
(b)

That Reed Taylor by executing the December I, 2006 Subordination

Agreement rescinded the January 11, 1995 Shareholder Letter Agreement and that the 1995
Stock Redemption Agr·eement is void for failure of material consideration upon which the
redemption was based;
(c)

That Reed .J. Taylor repay to AIA Services all sums plus interest paid to

him including the value of personal property transferred to him relating or incident to the 1996
Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement and the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement; and
(d)

Upon repayment of sums in paragraph (c), the AIA Services restore all

common stock formerly held by Reed J. I aylor taking into consideration stock increases or
decreases.

7.

For punitive damages as may be allowed.

8

For all costs and attorney fees as provided by contract or statute, including Idaho

Code§ 12-120 and§ 12-121 or other applicable law

9.

For such other and fiuther relief as the Court may find just and proper in the

cit cumstances.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc hereby demand a trial by a jury of
twelve (12).
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DATED THIS tlaayofMarch, 2008.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

-(By-- -v~ -

~sa1J'tusB No

~

'1486
£). Du:tkd

Attorneys fo1 Defendants AIA Services
Cotporation, AJA Insmance, Inc
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this@ay of Match, 2008, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing AJA SERVICES CORPORATION'S AND AJA INSURANCE INC .'S
FIRST AMENDED ANSWER IO PLAINTIFF'S FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT,
COUNTERCLAIM, AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL by the method indicated below, and
addressed to each of the following:
Roderick C.. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

_ _ U.S . Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
_:!_Email

David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A Gittins
P.O Box 191
Clrukston, WA 99403
[Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
_:!_Email

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor]

_ _ U.S . Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Ielecopy
_:!_Email

.Jonathan D. Hally
Clruk & Feeney
P.O Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Defendants Connie Taylor, James Beck
and Conine Beck]

_ _ U S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Ielecopy
_:!_Email

James L Gatziolis
Charles E.. Hrupe1
QUARLES & BRADY LLP
500 West Madison Street, Suite 3 700
Chicago, Illinois 60661-2511
[Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance]

_ _ US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Ielecopy
_:!_Email

. _.. -- - ----·-/

L ... ··

,

•

.....

·-

-~ -')

GaryD. Ba'{ib;
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DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho )
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
)
)
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
)
community property comprised thereof,
)
BRIAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
)
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person; CROP
)
USA INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an
)
Idaho corporation; and JAMES BECK and
)
CORRINE BECK, individually and in the
)
community property comprised thereof;
)
)
Defendants.
)

CASE NO. CV07-00208
OPINION AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OR,
IN THE ALTERNATNE, FOR
CERTIFICATION FOR
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' AIA Services and AIA Insurance Motion
for Reconsideration and Clarification and, in the Alternative, Request for Certification for
Interlocutory Appeal. A hearing on the motion was held March 13, 2008. Plaintiff Reed Taylor

TaylorvAIA

Opinion & Order on Motion for Reconsideration of PSJ
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was represented by attorney Roderick C. Bond. Defendants AIA Services Corporation and AIA
Insurance, Inc. were represented by attorneys Gary D. Babbitt and D. John Ashby. The Court,
having read the motion, briefs, and affidavits submitted by the parties, having considered the
record in the matter, having heard oral arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the
matter, hereby renders its decision.

BACKGROUND
The facts forming the background for the above-entitled litigation have been articulated
in a number of prior opinions entered by the Court and will not be repeated here. Instead, only
those facts relevant to the motion for reconsideration or the alternative motion for permission to
file an interlocutory appeal, filed by Defendants AIA Services and AIA Insurance (hereinafter
"Defendant AIA"), will be addressed.
In its brief in support of the motion for reconsideration, Defendant AIA argues for the
first time the effect of the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement on th~ payment terms of
the $6 million Note. The Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement was made part of the record
only when attached to the Affidavit of John Taylor in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and
Clarification and, in the Alternative, Request for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal filed
February 25, 2008. 1 The Court was, therefore, upon hearing the motion for summary judgment,
unable to consider what it did not have before it.
Defendants also contend on motion for reconsideration that the Court's analysis was
incomplete in that the Court failed to address the issue of waiver raised by the Defendants in

1

The original 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement had a number of attachments, including the Series A
Preferred Shareholder Agreement designated as Exhibit G. However, while the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure
Agreement was attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit of John Taylor filed February 26, 2007 and was admitted into
the record as Plaintiff's Exhibit B di.iring the March I, 2007 hearing, at no time did the document include the
exhibits noted in the body of the document nor was the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement made part of the
record as a separate document until it was attached to the Affidavit of John Taylor filed February 25, 2008.
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their opposition to Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment. The Court will consider the
Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement and the waiver issue now.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The decision to grant or deny a motion to reconsider rests within the sound discretion of
the trial court.
When considering a motion to reconsider under I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2), the district
court "should take into account any new facts presented by the moving party that
bear on the correctness of the interlocutory order." Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v.
First Nat'/ Bank ofN Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990). A
decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration generally rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court. Jordan, 135 Idaho at 592, 21 P.3d at 914. Abuse of
discretion is determined by a three part test which asks whether the district court
"(l) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to
the specific choices available to it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of
reason." Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho
761, 765, 86 P.3d 475, 479 (2004) (citations omitted).

Spur Products Corporation v. Stoel Rives LLP, 143 Idaho 812, 817, 153 P.3d 1158 (2007).
Idaho Appellate Rule 12 provides that a motion for permission to appeal an interlocutory
order may be granted by a district court if it finds there exists "a controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an immediate appeal
from the order or decree may materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation." I.AR.
12.

ANALYSIS
CA) CON SID ERATION AND CERTAINTY REQUIREMENTS
Defendant AIA contends the Court erred when it found the alleged oral modification
lacked consideration. It is AIA's position that the additional interest that wouJd be paid by the
extension of time for payment of the Note is sufficient consideration to make the agreement
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enforceable. In support of its argument, Defendant AIA cites to Rule Sales and Service, Inc. v.

US. Bank National Association, 133 Idaho 669, 991 P.2d 857 (1999) for the definition of
consideration. However, the Rule Court upheld the lower court's finding that the oral
modification extending the date for payment on a loan lacked consideration as the bank received
no benefit.

[W] note our agreement with the district court's conclusion that the alleged oral
agreement was not supported by consideration. Consideration for a promise may
take the form of an act by the promisee that is bargained for and given in
exchange for the promise. Day v. Mortgage Ins. Corp., 91 Idaho 605, 607, 428
P .2d 524, 526 ( 1967). Consideration may also consist of a detriment to the
promisee or a benefit to the promisor. Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Rose Chapel
Mortuary, Inc., 95 Idaho 599, 603, 514 P.2d 594, 598 (1973).
Rule Sales and Service, Inc. v. U.S. Bank National Association, 133 Idaho at 674.
The Rule Court did not discuss the fact that the balance due on the loan would continue to
accrue interest during the time extension, though clearly it would. The presumption that must be
drawn is that the Rule Court did not find additional interest to be sufficient consideration to
support an oral modification. This is consistent with the generally accepted understanding of
sufficient consideration. "The payment of interest due or past due at the time it is paid is no
consideration for a promise by the creditor to extend the time for payment of the debt." l 7A
Am.Jur.2d Contracts§ 523. Therefore, the Court rejects Defendant's argument.
Defendant AIA further asserts Reed Taylor received a benefit by waiving the time for
payment in the following manner. The extension of time would allow AIA and CropUSA to
work together to create a joint agency force, allowing both corporations to improve their
financial positions. AIA would then have sufficient assets to pay Reed Taylor's Note in full.
The Court is not persuaded. Foregoing the payment of a debt so that money can be spent making
a corporation more profitable is a benefit to the corporation, not the unpaid creditor. There can
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be no benefit to Reed Taylor from foregoing payment of over $6,000,000.00 so that CropUSA, a
corporation not liable on the Note, can improve its financial health. Nor does the benefit to AJA
meet the consideration requirement. "A debtor's promise to pay a debt for which he or she is
already obligated is not sufficient consideration to sustain an agreement to extend the time for
payment." 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 522.
Next, Defendant AJA asserts the Court erred in its earlier opinion by finding that the
certainty or definiteness requirement of a modification is higher than the agreed upon certainty in
the original contract. Defendant AJA appears to have misread or misinterpreted the Court's
opinion. Contrary to the arguments of Defendant AJA, the Court did not raise the certainty bar
for oral modification above the bar of certainty established in the original agreement.
Quoting Wrenn v. Lawrence Cotton Mills, Inc, 150 S.E. 676, 678, 198 N.C. 89 (N.C.
1929), this Court recognized the general rule that the time for payment may be extended by oral
agreement as long as the time for payment is as definite as in the original contract. "'Granting
that the time of payment may be extended by a definite and binding oral agreement (Oliver v.

US. Fidelity Co., 176 N.C. 598, 97 S.E. 490), we are confronted by the general rule that such an
agreement must fix a definite time when payment is to be made. The time thus agreed on should
be as definite as that which is required when the note is originally executed; the elements of the
agreement being certainty, mutuality, and consideration."' Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's

Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment and Motion/or Injunction entered February 8, 2008, at
page 11.
This Court's analysis did not end there, however. This Court went on to state, "While
some courts have stated that the rule does not require a precise date to be fixed for the agreement
to be valid, those courts have, nonetheless, held that the time must be readily ascertainable by an
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event that is certain to occur and not one that is contingent. West Texas Loan Co. v.

Montgomery, 200 P. 681, 27N.M. 296 (N.M.1921)." Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for Injunction entered February 8, 2008, at page 11.
The Court then took into consideration a less stringent certainty requirement but found "there is
no certainty to the term for payment of the Note, since it was payable upon an entirely contingent
event rather than an event that was certain to occur." Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for Injunction entered February 8, 2008, at page 12.
Defendant AIA fails to distinguish oral modification of an existing contract containing a
date certain for payment from a new contract where terms are being agreed upon for the first
time. In footnote at pages 24-25 of Defendant's brief in support, Defendant AIA postulates,
Again, the question is whether these terms would be enforceable if they were the
terms of an original promissory note. If the original Note provided for payment
upon reaching $60 million in new business placements, AIA could not be heard to
argue that the original Note was unenforceable. Instead, it would be enforceable
and payable within a reasonable time.
The Court agrees in theory. If reaching $60 million in new business placements had been
the agreed upon trigger for payment in the original Note, then that would have been the
'definiteness' bar the parties would have to meet upon a modification extending the time for
payment. However, Defendant's statement is little more than conjecture as that was not the
original payment term in the Note. The original payment term in the Note was a specific date,
contingent on nothing but the passage of time.
Certainty as to the alleged 2003 modified due date of the Note appears to have been
elusive even to John Taylor. In an October 2005 email to Reed Taylor's accountant, John Taylor
expressed his hope that an agreement could be reached that would reverse the ten-year old
transaction, would prevent Reed from declaring the Note in default, would allow AIA and
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CropUSA to be put back together and would allow all the parties to be on the same page. 2 At no
point in the email did he indicate an agreement had been reached in 2003 that extended the due
date of the Note. Later, in December 2006, John Taylor expressed a new understanding as to the
due date of the Note in his response to the notice of default from Reed Taylor's attorney.
Writing to attorney Patrick Moran on December 21, 2006, John Taylor contended an agreement
had been reached between John Taylor, Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor that extended the due
date of the Note until after Donna Taylor's stock was fully redeemed, an event estimated to
occur in 2012. 3
Reed Taylor eventually filed the above-entitled action for breach of the Note along with a
number of other claims. On February 28, 2007, John Taylor filed an affidavit in which he stated
Reed had agreed in 2003 to extend the due date of the Note to when AIA and CropUSA achieved
$60 million in new business placements. 4 On March 1, 2007, John Taylor testified before the
Court and stated the Note was to be redeemed when AIA and CropUSA "hit sixty million dollars
in premium." 5 Yet, in his deposition taken on August 29, 2007, he was asked several times
about the Notes due date under the terms of the alleged 2003 modification. John Taylor's
answers included, "until we're financially able to pay him ... our goal was to rebuild the agency
force of AIA and CropUSA ... We've always intended and indicated to Reed that we would be
able to pay his interest and principal once the companies were economically viable again ...
When the companies were economically viable ... and able to borrow the amount of money to

2

Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Ernie Dantini in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Promissory
Note filed November 15, 2007.
3
Plaintifrs Exhibit AE admitted March 1, 2007.
4
Affidavit of John Taylor filed February 28, 2007, at~ 16
5
Tr. of March I, 2007 hearing pp 77-78, attached as Exhibit B to the Aff. of Paul R. Cressman filed Nov. 15, 2007.
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pay Reed off ... When they [AJA and CropUSA] had sufficient assets or borrowing power to do
so."6
Finally, the Court notes that the cases and secondary sources cited by Defendant AIA in
support of its theory on the issue of certainty are distinguishable, as the citations do not address
modification of an already existing agreement or contract. Defendant's reliance on MacKay v.

Four Rivers Packing Co, 2008 WL 427789 (Idaho 2008) is particularly misplaced as the issue in
MacKay was whether the oral contract fell within the statute of frauds, not whether it was
sufficiently certain to be enforceable.
Upon reconsideration, the Court continues to be of the opinion that the oral modification
is unenforceable for lack of consideration and certainty.

(B) SERIES A SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT
In 1996, as part of the restructuring of the buyout agreement between AJA, Reed Taylor
and Donna Taylor7, a document entitled Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement was
executed. 8 The document superseded and replaced various letters of agreement exchanged
between attorneys for AJA and Donna Taylor and was incorporated into the Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement. 9 The Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement, which is nine pages in

6

Dep. of John Taylor, pp 83-86 and 93, Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Paul R. Cressman filed Nov. 15, 2007.
Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor had divorced or were in the process of a divorce at the time the various agreements
were entered. Donna Taylor's ownership of all of the Series A Shares of AIA represented her community property
interest in AIA.
8
See Exhibit B to the Affidavit of John Taylor filed February 25, 2008 and submitted in support of Motion for
Reconsideration and Clarification and, in the Alternative, Request for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal. The
document also appears in Exhibit A of John Taylor's Affidavit filed February 25, 2008 as an exhibit to the document
appearing Exhibit A.
9
1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement, page 2, Recital F and page 4, Agreement 1.8.
7
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length, details certain obligations owed by AJA to Donna Taylor 10 , the sole holder of AIA Series
A Preferred Shares, and discusses how those obligations are integrated with the obligations AIA
owes to Reed Taylor, who is referred to in the document as 'Creditor'.
As was noted by Defendant AIA in its motion for reconsideration, the Series A Preferred
Shareholder Agreement includes a subordination clause that reads:
Payment of principal to Creditor on the $6M Note (whether at maturity or at any
earlier time in accordance with any right of prepayment) shall be subordinated to
payment in full of Company's obligation to redeem the Series A Preferred Stock.
Company shall not pay any principal on the $6M Note until the Series A Preferred
Stock is completely redeemed (provided, however, that this limitation shall not
preclude Company from exercising any contractual or equitable right of offset
against the principal of the $6M Note).
Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement, page 4, Agreement 3.
Ten years later, on December 1, 2006, Donna Taylor and Reed Taylor executed a three
page document entitled Subordination Agreement 11 • The document states that Donna Taylor
agrees to "unconditionally and irrevocably subordinate all amounts and obligations owed to her
[by AIA] under the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement" 12 to those obligations, rights and
remedies owed to Reed Taylor by AIA. The document further states,
Donna [Taylor] expressly subordinates all amounts, rights, obligations and
remedies owed to her in favor of (and junior to) Reed J. Taylor under the
following agreements (including all claims, remedies, rights under such
agreements): (a) $6 Million Promissory Note between Reed [Taylor] and AIA
Services Corporation ("AIA Services") dated August I, 1995; (b) Stock
Redemption Restructure Agreement between Reed, Donna and AIA Services
dated July I, 1996; (c) Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement between
AIA Services and Reed dated July I, 1996; (d) Amended and Restated Security
Agreement between AIA Services, AIA Insurance, Inc., and Reed dated July 1,

10

Under the agreement, redemption of Donna Taylor's Series A Shares was subject to a ten-year amortization
schedule from the date redemption commenced, which appears to have been in 1995 or earlier. Accordingly, full
redemption of Donna Taylor's Series A shares should have occurred no later than 2005. See Series A Shareholder
Agreement, page 3, § l(a).
11
See Exhibit D to the Affidavit of John Taylor filed February 25, 2008 and Plaintiffs Exhibit 0 as admitted during
the March I, 2007 hearing in the above-entitled matter.
12
Exhibit 0 to the Affidavit of John Taylor filed February 25, 2008 - Subordination Agreement, page 1, ir l.
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1996; (and (e) Letter between Reed, R. John Taylor, and Donna dated February
27, 2001; (f) Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement between AIA Services,
Donna and Reed dated July I, 1996; and (g) any other agreement, contract or
promise of any kind or nature.
Subordination Agreement dated December 1, 2006, page 1, ~ 2.
Defendant AIA contends the 2006 Subordination Agreement, giving the $6 million Note
payment priority over the debt owed to Donna Taylor, is void and unenforceable as it was
entered into without the consent of AIA 13 • Defendants further contend that the only enforceable
subordination agreement is the 1996 agreement and, under it, AIA cannot be held in default on
the $6 Million Note as AIA is prohibited from paying the principal of the Note until Donna
Taylor has been paid in full for her Series A shares, a debt that remains outstanding 14 .
The Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement is a multifaceted document that
establishes certain contractual obligations between AJA and Donna Taylor and between AJA and
Reed Taylor. In addition, it includes a subordination agreement between AIA's creditors, Reed
Taylor and Donna Taylor, an agreement AlA needed the creditors to reach in order for AJA to be
in compliance with its articles of incorporation provision that protects Series A shareholders.
Defendants further contend that AJA was a party to the subordination agreement and that,
without its consent, Reed and Donna Taylor could not enter into a new subordination agreement.
Defendant AIA argues the 1996 agreement created a 'complete' subordination. The
Court agrees.
A subordination agreement may be "inchoate" or "complete." An inchoate
subordination is triggered by a future event specified in the agreement, such as
insolvency or bankruptcy of the debtor. When subordination is "inchoate,"
payment of the subordinated debt is not restricted unless and until the triggering

13
AJA contends it was a necessary party to the subordination agreement and, therefore, any subsequent
subordination agreement is void if AJA is not a party to the agreement.
14
Under the original terms of the Series A buyout agreement with Donna Taylor, the debt to Donna would have
been paid prior to August 1, 2005, the due date on the Promissory Note.
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event occurs. In contrast, a "complete" subordination permits no payment to be
made on the subordinated debt at any time while the senior debt remains
outstanding. In other words, a "complete" subordination is effective immediately.
Id. at 35.

Culp v. Tri-County Tractor, Inc., 112 Idaho 894, 897, 736 P .2d 1348 (Ct.App.1987).
In the instant case, the 1996 subordination agreement permits no payment of the
Promissory Note's principal until Donna Taylor has received full payment for her Series A
Shares. However, the question of whether the subordination agreement was complete or
inchoate is irrelevant to the question of whether Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor could enter into
a new subordination agreement without the consent of AIA. A subordination agreement requires
agreement between creditors, as the right affected is the creditor's right to be paid by the debtor.
We begin by noting the general thrust of a subordination agreement: "It is the
subordination of the right to receive payment of certain indebtedness (the
'subordinated debt') to the prior payment of certain other indebtedness (the 'senior
debt') of the same debtor." Calligar, Purposes and Uses ofSubordination
Agreements, 23 BUS.LAW. 33, 33 (1967).

Culp v. Tri-County Tractor, Inc., 112 Idaho 894, 897, 736 P .2d 1348 (Ct.App.1987).
Defendants rely on Culp for the premise that creditors cannot change a subordination
agreement without the consent of the debtor. The Court finds Defendants' position unsupported
by the language in Culp. The question before the Culp Court was whether subordinated
promissory notes could be deemed in default, and accelerated, while a senior creditor's
obligation was outstanding. Id. at 896. The holding in Culp is applicable to the instant case only
if the 2006 subordination between Donna Taylor and Reed Taylor is found to be invalid.
In Culp, Culp and Newton each loaned Tri-County Tractor, Inc. $20,000.00, the loans
being evidence by interest bearing promissory notes. Several weeks later, Tri-County Tractor
borrowed additional money from Idaho First National Bank and, as part of the loan transaction,
Culp and Newton signed agreements completely subordinating their notes to the bank loan.
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Three years later, when Tri-County Tractor failed to make certain payments on the notes, Culp
and Newton notified the bank they were terminating the subordination agreement and each
brought suit against Tri-County asserting the notes were in default and the debts accelerated.
The trial court agreed and entered judgments in favor of Culp and Newton. Tri-County
appealed.
On appeal, the Court found the subordination agreements were 'complete', thereby
prohibiting Tri-County from making payments on the notes ''unless the bank gave consent". 15
Culp at 897. The Court held that all of the creditors who were party to the subordination

agreement had to agree to any change. However, the Court at no time found the debtor had to
consent to a change in the subordination agreement. Only a creditor in superior position must
consent, and no superior creditor is present in the instant case.
In the instant matter, the subordination agreement was intended to protect Donna Taylor
as a creditor, not AIA as the debtor. AIA's obligations to Donna Taylor and to Reed Taylor were
not changed or altered because creditors Donna and Reed agreed to enter into a subordination
agreement. Creditors are parties to subordination agreements, not debtors. Therefore, the right
to change or terminate a subordination agreement rests with the creditors who are party to the
agreement. A senior creditor may consent to a junior creditor having payment priority at any
time and any such agreement supersedes a prior subordination agreement and/or language in

15
The Court repeated the words "consent of the bank" or "consent of the senior creditor" four more times in its
opinion.
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articles of incorporation 16 • Blickenstaff v. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572, 97 P.3d 439 (2004).
Under the theory asserted by the Defendant, AIA could prevent Reed Taylor from ever
having a legal remedy for non-payment of the $6 million Note by leaving as little as one cent
unpaid on the debt owed to Donna Taylor 17 . Such an interpretation would result in a legal
absurdity. The only parties whose rights are affected by the subordination agreement are Donna
Taylor and Reed Taylor and as such, it was within their legal right to enter into a new
subordination agreement and to do so without the consent, approval or participation of AIA. 18

CC) WANER
Defendant AIA contends the question of waiver is always an issue of fact to be decided
by a jury. Case law does not support such a contention.
Waiver is a mixed question of law and fact. Jones v. Maestas, 108 Idaho 69, 696
P.2d 920 (Ct.App.1985). A court first must determine whether the facts alleged to
constitute waiver are true. Id. The court then must decide whether these facts, as
a matter of law, suffice to show waiver. Id. Waiver will not be inferred except
from a clear and unequivocal act manifesting an intent to waive. Id.

Soloaga v. Bannock County, 119 Idaho 678, 682, 809 P.2d 1157 Ct.App.1990).
Defendants assert Reed Taylor's conduct evidences both an express waiver and an
implied waiver. Under either theory, the party asserting waiver has the burden of establishing a
clear intent to waive.
16

AIA directs the Court to Section 4.9 of its Articles oflncorporation and asserts it was a party to the 1995
subordination agreement because of its duty to limit its assumption of debt so long as there are outstanding Series A
shares. AIA then extends the argument to assert there could be no change in the subordination agreement without its
consent. The Court is not persuaded. Section 4.9 of the Articles oflncorporation protects Stated Value Preferred
Shareholders, i.e. Donna Taylor as the sole Series A shareholder, by requiring AJA to obtain Donna Taylor's
consent before it incurs certain debt. AIA met its obligation by obtaining Donna Taylor's consent to incur its debt to
Reed Taylor, as evidenced by her signature on the agreement documents. Nothing within the language of AIA's
Articles of Incorporation makes it a party to agreements reached between creditors regarding a subordination of their
rights as creditors. A debtor does not become a party to a subordination agreement merely because subordination is
a condition placed on the incurrence of the debt.
17
The consequence to AIA would be the potential for a default claim by Donna Taylor.
18
The 2006 agreement between the creditors regarding subordination of their rights did not, and could not, result in
noncompliance with the Articles of Incorporation.
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"A waiver is the intentional relinquislunent of a known right. It is a voluntary act
and implies election by a party to dispense with something of value or to forego
some right or advantage which he might at his option have demanded and insisted
upon". Crouch v. Bischoff, 78 Idaho 364, 304 P.2d 646, 649 ....
In addition to express waiver, this court has recognized a doctrine of implied
waiver, under which are consistently applied principles of estoppel. City of Coeur
d'Alene v. Spokane, etc., R. R. Co., 31 Idaho 160, 169 P. 930; Hawkins v. Smith,
35 Idaho 349, 205 P. 188.
"The dividing line between waivers implied from conduct and estoppels is
often shadowy as the two terms have come to be quite commonly used
inter-changeably; * * * when the term waiver is so used the elements of
estoppel almost invariably appear, and it is employed to designate not a
pure or express waiver, but one which has come into the existence of
effectiveness through the application of the principles underlying
estoppels." Independent Gas & Oil Co., v. TB. Smith Co., 51Idaho710,
10 P.2d 317, 320.
This doctrine has also been applied where the court has refused to find an implied
waiver. Neitzel v. Lawrence, 40 Idaho 26, 231 P. 423; Smith v. Faris-Kesl Const.
Co., Ltd., 27 Idaho 407, 150 P. 25, 32, where this court said: "What constitutes a
waiver is essentially a question of intention. * * * In order to establish a waiver
the intention to waive must clearly appear, and a waiver* * * will not be
presumed or implied, contrary to the intention of the party whose rights would be
injuriously affected thereby unless, by his conduct, the opposite party was misled,
to his prejudice, into the honest belief that such waiver was intended or consented
to."

Grover v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 83 Idaho 351, 357-358, 364 P.2d 167 (1961).
"The party asserting the waiver must show that he acted in reasonable reliance upon it
and that he thereby has altered his position to his detriment. To establish a waiver, the intention
to waive must clearly appear." [cites omitted]. Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho
253, 256, 846 P.2d 904 (1993). "Finally, to impose the equitable doctrine of waiver, there must
be 'direct, unequivocal conduct indicating a purpose to abandon or waive the legal right or acts
amounting to an estoppel by the party whose conduct is to be construed as a waiver'." Idaho

Migrant Council v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 110 Idaho 804, 806, 718 P.2d 1242
(Ct.App.1986), quoting Miln v. Anderson, 516 P.2d 109, 112 (Alaska I 978). "Waiver will not be
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inferred except from a clear and unequivocal act manifesting an intent to waive, or from conduct
amounting to estoppel." Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 256, 846 P.2d 904
(1993).
The waiver issue in the instant matter has two components: (1) did Reed Taylor waive,
expressly or impliedly, the term in the Promissory Note requiring AIA to pay Reed monthly
interest payments of approximately $41,500.00 and, (2) did Reed Taylor waive, expressly or
impliedly, his right to declare the Promissory Note in default until AIA and CropUSA reached
$60 million in new business placements rather than the date certain for payment of August 1,
2005. The burden of showing waiver by direct, unequivocal conduct rests with AIA as the
asserting party.
There is substantial evidence in the record to support Defendants' contention that Reed
Taylor, either expressly or impliedly, waived monthly interest payments on the Note from
approximately $41,500.00 per month ($498,000.00 per year) to $25,000.00 per month 19
($300,000.00 per year). Account records for interest payments on the Note were submitted to the
Court by Plaintiff Reed Taylor. 20 The records show that from 2002 through 2006, AIA paid
Reed Taylor less than the $41,500.00 per month (or $498,000.00 per year) due under the terms of
the Note. According to the records, in 2002 Reed received $100,000.00 in Note interest; in 2003
he received $135,000.00; in 2004 he received $205,000.00; in 2005 he received $172,500.00;
and in 2006 Reed received $274,729.00 in Note interest.
No evidence was presented by the Plaintiff or Defendants showing Reed Taylor at any
time contested the significantly reduced monthly interest payments. Reed Taylor's conduct, by

19

Evidence presented earlier indicated the $25,000.00 per month payment was to be distributed as $15,000.00 to
Reed Taylor and $10,000.00 per month to Reed's pilot and ranch hand.
20
Plaintiffs Exhibit AJ admitted March l, 2007. The Exhibit contains account records for the years 2002 through
2006, showing the amount ofNote interest paid to Reed Taylor each month by AIA.
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way of omission if not by agreement, supports Defendants' contention of waiver on the part of
Reed Taylor. However, a waiver by Reed Taylor of the term requiring monthly payments of the
Note's interest is not evidence of waiver on the term for payment of the Note's principal, as the
two are separate and independent terms of the Note. Therefore, the question of whether Reed
Taylor waived the time for payment of the Note's principal must be analyzed separately.
Defendant AIA contends Reed Taylor agreed to waive his right to receive payment of the
principal of the Note until AIA and CropUSA reached certain financial goals and that his waiver
is evident from his conduct. Defendant AIA first argues that Reed Taylor's conduct in waiting
until December 2006 before putting AIA on notice that it was in default is evidence of his
waiver. The Court is not persuaded. The Court found no authority establishing a standard that
requires a creditor give notice of default within a set period of time or risk having patience
interpreted as waiver. Nor has Defendant AIA provided any legal support for such an assertion.
Defendant AIA directs the Court to 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 636 for the statement, "An
unexplained delay in enforcing a contract may constitute evidence of waiver and acquiescence in
the manner of the other party's performance." However, in the same paragraph it also states,
However, since the waiver of a contractual right is largely a matter of intent, a
waiver will not be inferred from involuntary or compulsory acts. Nor will mere
silence amount to a waiver of performance, where one is not bound to speak.
Where a contract provides that the waiver of any breach must be in writing to be
effective, an alleged oral waiver of overdue payments is ineffective.
17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts§ 636.
When Defendant AIA entered into the Promissory Note in 1995 and the amended
agreements in 1996, it waived its right to assert delay as evidence of waiver on the part of Reed
Taylor. The Note at issue provides, "[T]he undersigned [AIA] and all endorsers and all persons
liable or to become liable on this Note hereby (a) waive diligence, presentment, demand, protest,
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and notice of any kind .... " Promissory Note dated August 1, 1995, § 7. 21 The provision in the
Promissory Note was not altered in any way by the amended 1996 agreements. Rather, the
amended agreements include provisions that coincide and/or enhance the provision in the Note.
The Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement provides that any waiver on the part of any party
to the agreement must be made in writing and that any waiver of a breach of any provision of the
agreement "shall not operate to be construed as a waiver of any subsequent breach". The
Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement is more detailed, stating,
All rights and remedies of Secured Party shall be cumulative and may be
exercised at such times and in such order as Secured Party [Reed Taylor]
determines. The failure of Secured Party to insist upon or enforce strict
performance of any provisions of the Restructured Obligations, or to exercise its
rights or privileges hereunder or thereunder or any of its rights as provided by
statute or law or in equity or otherwise, shall not impair, prejudice or constitute a
waiver of any such right, power, remedy or privilege or be construed as a waiver
of any Default or as an acquiescence therein or preclude the exercise or
enforcement thereof at a later time. Nor shall any single or partial exercise of any
such right, power, remedy or privilege preclude any other or further exercise
thereof or the exercise of any other right, power, remedy or privilege.
Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement 22 , page 11.
The parties to the agreements understood in 1995, and again in 1996, that this was more
than just a business agreement - it was also an agreement between brothers. Anticipating that
there might be a reluctance to assert certain rights under the agreements, the written documents
included provisions to prevent any such reluctance from being interpreted as a waiver of rights to
the detriment of Reed Taylor. Defendant AIA, through its agent John Taylor, was at all times
during negotiations and finalization of the agreements a sophisticated party represented by
counsel who voluntarily signed the agreements with full understanding of the terms and

21

Plaintiff's Exhibit A admitted March 1, 2007.
Plaintiff's Exhibit C admitted March I, 2007. The very same language is found in the Amended and Restated
Seclll'ity Agreement dated July 1, 1996. Plaintiff's Exhibit D admitted March 1, 2007.

22
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conditions contained therein. Defendant AJA is, therefore, bound by its agreement not to infer a
waiver of rights on the part of Reed Taylor based on a delay in asserting those rights.
Defendant AJA further asserts as evidence of an express or implied waiver of payment of
the Note's principaJ Reed Taylor's failure and/or delay in giving notice of default. However, as
stated in 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 636, mere silence does not amount to a waiver of
performance where one is not bound to speak. The Note, while including a notice requirement
relative to acceleration of the Note, specifically states that AIA waives diligence, presentment,
demand, protest, and notice of any kind as to a general default. Pursuant to the clear language in
the Note, any failure or delay by Reed Taylor to be diligent, present, demand, protest and/or
provide notice of any kind that the Note is due, was waived by AJA. As a result, Reed Taylor's
mere silence cannot be used against him to assert conduct consistent with waiver to extend the
time for payment of the Note.
Finally, there is the testimony of John Taylor that Reed Taylor expressly or impliedly
waived his right to declare the Note in default until AIA and Crop USA reached certain financial
goals. The Court finds John Taylor's testimony insufficient to create a genuine issue of material
fact when his statements are examined in light of the documentary evidence. "Creating only a
slight doubt as to the facts will not defeat a summary judgment motion; a summary judgment
will be granted whenever on the basis of the evidence before the court a directed verdict would
be warranted or whenever reasonable minds could not disagree as to the facts." Snake River
Equipment Co. v. Christensen, 107 Idaho 541, 549, 691P.2d787 (Ct.App.1984).
In December 2006, AJA and John Taylor received a Notice of Default letter from

attorney Patrick Moran who was representing Reed Taylor. 23 The letter gave notice regarding
numerous alleged defaults, including default on the $6,000,000.00 Note. John Taylor, as the
23

Plaintiffs Exhibit F admitted March l, 2007.
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president of AIA, responded by letter24 dated December 21, 2006. In his letter, John Taylor
asserted the due date on the Note had been extended by agreement between John Taylor, Donna
Taylor and Reed Taylor until Donna Taylor's stock was fully redeemed, which John Taylor
estimated would occur in 2012. Never in his response letter did John Taylor claim payment of
the Note had been extended by agreement until AIA and Crop USA reached certain financial
goals. This is especially telling where John Taylor states in the letter that he is providing
attorney Moran with all the pertinent facts as to why there was no default of any term within the
agreements and that he had reviewed the same information with Reed Taylor just days prior to
writing the letter.
John Taylor had an earlier opportunity to claim the due date on the Note had been
extended until AIA and CropUSA reached certain financial goals, yet he did not. In an October
2005 email 25 to Reed Taylor's accountant, Ernie Dantini, John Taylor acknowledges the Note
could be put in default 26 and invites Reed and his accountant to offer proposals to modify the
debt. Once again, the documentary evidence belies John Taylor's post-lawsuit claim that Reed
Taylor agreed to extend the time for payment of the Note. The letter and email written by John
Taylor evidence his understanding that the Note was due and are indicative of his efforts to reach
an agreement with Reed that would prevent Reed from exercising his right to declare the Note in
default. Only after Reed Taylor filed the above-entitled lawsuit did John Taylor assert he and
Reed had orally modified the due date of the Note, a process forbidden by the terms of the
agreements, to a time when AIA and CropUSA reached certain financial goals. When the record

24

Plaintiff's Exhibit AE admitted March I, 2007.
Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Ernie Dantini in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Promissory
Note filed November 15, 2007.
26
"Three of the four investor of crop know Reed personally .... If the note is put in default, I will not be able to
keep any [of] them on board to do any type buyout, merger or deal with Reed."
25
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is considered as a whole, the Court is wiable to find evidence of an intent by Reed Taylor to
waive the time for payment of the Note.
The second element of waiver is reliance. "Even though consideration is not necessary to
establish a waiver, it must appear that the adversary party has acted in reliance upon such a
waiver and altered his position." Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 734, 639 P.2d 429
(1981 ). Defendant AIA has failed to show it altered its position to its detriment in reliance of an
extension of time to pay the Note. Defendant AIA has attempted to show reliance by the
following acts: (a) AIA abandoned a new health insurance product that would have provided it
with a revenue source to pay off the Note; (b) AIA ceased its efforts to obtain financing to pay
off the Note and instead put its efforts into building up a joint agency force with CropUSA; (c)
AIA guaranteed over $15,000,000.00 in loans to CropUSA; (d) AIA altered its payments to
Donna Taylor; (e) AIA allowed Reed Taylor to continue on as sales manager even though it
would have preferred to terminate him.
AIA is a corporation with a board of directors and corporate officers. Decisions made by
the directors and officers are to be made with an eye toward increasing profits and maintaining
corporate viability for the benefit of the shareholders and others. Given the structure of the
corporation and the alleged reason for the waiver, it is disingenuous for AIA to contend it
abandoned a revenue producing product, guaranteed a $2,000,000.00 loan and a $15,000,000.00
line of credit for Crop USA, modified its payments to Donna Taylor, and allowed Reed Taylor to
stay on as sales manager because ofreliance on Reed Taylor waiving his right to declare the
Note in default.
Defendant AIA contends Reed Taylor waived his right to declare the Note in default in
order to allow AIA and Crop USA to reach certain financial goals that would put the corporations
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in a better financial position to honor AJA's debt obligation to Reed. Defendant AJA then says it
altered its position and, in reliance of the waiver, abandoned a revenue producing product and
guaranteed millions of dollars of debt incurred by CropUSA, all in reliance on Reed Taylor's
waiver. The conduct AJA attributes to reliance on the waiver runs counter to the very reason
AJA puts forward as the reason Reed Taylor allegedly agreed to a modification. A corporation
wanting to improve its financial health does not abandon revenue producing products and/or
significantly increase its debt obligations when it is unable to meet its current debts. While
AJA' s business decision may have been detrimental to the corporation, they are not decisions
that can logically be argued as being done in reliance of an extension of time to pay a long
standing debt.
AJA next contends it modified the payment schedule on its debt obligation to Donna
Taylor and begrudgingly retained Reed Taylor as sales manager, all in reliance on Reed Taylor's
waiver of payment on the Note. AIA, however, provides no logical explanation as to how these
two decisions were an altering of AIA's position based on reliance of Reed's waiver. The
impact of an extension of time to pay the Note should have been to free up funds to pay the debt
owed Donna Taylor, not reduce the availability of funds to pay any creditor. And, by contending
it felt coerced by Reed Taylor to abandon a revenue producing product and to retain Reed as
sales manager, Defendant AJA implies it knew Reed could declare the Note in default and was
attempting to keep Reed happy so he would forgo that right.
The Court is unable to find AJA altered its position in reliance of the alleged waiver.
Defendant AIA contends it sought a modification because it was financially unable to meet its
obligation on the Note. However, AIA has failed to reasonably connect its business decisions,
decisions that run counter to the goal of improving AIA's financial health, to reliance on a
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waiver of Reed Taylor's right to declare the Note in default until AJA and a corporation with no
obligation on the Note reached certain new business goals. Therefore, the Court finds Defendant
AIA has failed to make a prima facie showing of waiver, as AJA has not shown an intent on the
part of Reed Taylor to waive his right to payment of the principal of the Note and has failed to
show AJA altered its position, to its detriment, in reliance of the alleged waiver.

(D) INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
In the alternative, Defendant AJA moves for pennission to appeal the Court's Opinion
and Order entered February 8, 2008. Idaho Appellate Rule 12 allows a trial court to grant a
motion for permission to appeal an interlocutory order or decree if the court finds there is a
controlling question of law for which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and
that an immediate appeal may materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation. 1be
Court finds the issues ruled on by the Court in the instant matter meet the grounds set out in
Appellate Rule 12. Therefore, the Court grants Defendant AJA permission to seek interlocutory
appeal with the Supreme Court.

ORDER
Defendant AJA's Motion to Reconsider is hereby DENIED. Defendant AJA's alternative
Motion for permission to file an interlocutory appeal is hereby GRANTED.

'8
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I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants/Appellants AIA Services C01poration and AIA Insurance, Inc , by and
through their counsel ofreco1d, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, submit this memo1andum
in suppo1t of their Motion for Permissive Appeal pwsuant to l.A.R. 12(c). The Motion for
Pe1missive Appeal should be gianted because the District Court's orde1 granting Plaintiffs'
motion for summm:y judgment involves controlling questions oflaw as to which there is
substantial giounds for difference of opinion, and an immediate appeal will mate1ially advance
the orderly resolution of the litigation. An interlocutory appeal is necessm:y to correct two ei:rors
committed by the Distiict Court: (1) the District Court erred by determining for itself the
truthfulness of facts supporting waiver on summm:y judgment, thus removing the issue of waiver
and the general issue of credibility from the province of the jury; and (2) the District Court erred
by misapplying controlling Idaho case law to allow two parties to modify the terms of a threeparty agreement without the consent of all pm:ties.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.

The Parties

AIA Insurance Company ("AIA Insurance") is an insurance agency based out of
Lewiston, Idaho. AIA Insmance sells health, life and other insurance products to farmers and
membei:s of various giowers associations AJA Insurance is a wholly owned subsidiary ofAIA
Seivices Corporation ("AIA Services").. The two companies are sometimes collectively 1efeued
to as "AIA" The Plaintiff, Reed I aylor ("Reed"), was the founder and majo1ity shar·eholder of
AIA Services CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc . ("Crop USA"), is a sepm:ate corporation that
sells crop insurance to farmers and members of vm:ious growei:·s associations. Crop USA and
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AJA sell their respective insurance products through a combined agency force of independent
insurance agents that sell insurance products to farmers and members of growers associations .

B.

The Redemption Of Reeds Common Stock in AJA Services
On July 22, 1995, AIA Se1vices and Reed entered into a Stock Redemption Agreement

fot the redemption of Reed's common stock in AJA Services See March 11, 2008 Affidavit of
Gary D Babbitt ("Babbitt Aff"), Ex . D. Patt of the consideration for the Stock Redemption
Agreement was a $6 million Promissory Note (the "Note") executed by AIA Services on August
1, 1995. See id (attached as Exhibit A to the Stock Redemption Agreement and separately
attached as Exhibit A to the Affidavit ofD. John Ashby ("Ashby Affidavit") filed concurrently
herewith).. The Note prnvided that it would acctue inter·est at 8 Y<i%, and that paymc.mts of
interest would be made monthly ($41,500). Id The piincipal would be due on the tenth
anniversaty of the date of the Note, which would be August l, 2005 . The Note was secured by a
Stock Pledge Agreement and Security Agreement (attached as Exhibits Band C to the Stock
Redemption Agreement), pledging to Reed as collateral AIA Services' shares in AJA Insur·ance
The patties subsequently modified the above agreements and, on July 1, 1996, entered
into a Stock Redemption Restrncture Agreement (.see Febrnary 21, 2008 Affidavit of'John Taylor
("John Taylor Aff"), Ex . A), an Amended and Restated Security Agreement and an Amended
and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement (attached to the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement
as Exhibits B and D, 1espectively)..
At least according to Reed, in the event of a default of the tetms of the Note or the 1elated
stock redemption agreements, Reed would be permitted to vote AIA Services' shares in AIA
Insurance, essentially allowing Reed to take over control of AIA Insur·ance.
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C.

Much 2003 Waiver
By March of 2003, AIA Services expe1ienced difficulty complying with the payment

te1ms of the Note. Rather than declare a default of the Note and pursue any remedies then
available to him, Reed agieed with John Taylor ("John"), as President of AIA Services, to waive
ce1tain provisions of the Note . Reed expressly stated to John that Reed would accept reduced
interest payments of $25,000 per month without declw:ing a default of the Note or the related
Stock Redemption Restmcture Agreement. See John Taylor afi~ , 9.. Reed fi.uther· expressly
stated that he would not declare a default with 1egatd to the $6 million principal until AIA and
Crop USA collectively reached $60 million in new business placements. Id
Although Reed now denies that he waived any rights under the Note, his actions speak
louder· than his words. While the original terms of the Note required monthly interest payments
of$41,500, as ofMai·ch of2003 AIA began making monthly payments of $25,000 (consisting of
$15,000 to Reed and approximately $10,000 to Reed's pilot and ranch hand}. See id at, 10.
Reed accepted those monthly payments every month, without oqjection and without declating
any default under the Note. Id. AIA Se1vices did not pay the ptincipal balance of the Note on
August 1, 2005, as would have been required by the original terms of the Note . Reed, however,
did not give notice of default at that time Reed's conduct in accepting the differ·ent interest
payments without objection and not providing notice of default at the time the principal would
have been due under the original terms of the Note is further evidence of Reed's express waiver..
Despite expressly waiving certain 1ights under the Note, accepting the reduced payments,
not declaring any default in March of2003 or on the original due date, and otherwise acting
consistently with the exp1ess waiver, Reed has now changed his mind and denies that he ever
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waived any rights under the Note. On December 12, 2006, Reed provided a written notice of
default. See Ashby Aff., Ex. B.

D.

The Subordination Agreement
At all times televant to this litigation, AIA has been under the contractual obligation to

redeem AIA Services' Series A Prefened shares held by Donna Taylor, Reed's ex-wife . This
obligation is referred to in a January 11, 1995 Letter· Agreement executed by AIA Services,
Donna J Taylor and Cumer Green, Donna Taylor's attorney. See Babbitt Aff; Ex. C. The

Tanuary 11, 1995 Letter Agreement contemplates that AIA Services would soon be redeeming
Reed's common shar·es in AIA Se1vices and provides that any debt obligation to Reed arising out
of the redemption of his common shares would be subordinated to Donna Taylor's redemption
rights. Id.
The July 22, 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and the 1elated $6 Million Note
incorporate this subordination agreement The $6 Million Note specifically provides that it is
subordinate to Donna Taylor's debt:
This Note is subordinate to the payment ofthe redemption
obligations owed by the Company to Donna Taylor pwsuant to the
certain Letter Agreement dated January 11, 1995, signed by
Company, payee, Donna I aylor and Cumer· Green.
Then, in connection with the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructwe Agr·eement, AIA
Services, Donna Taylor and Reed all executed a Series A P:refer1ed Shareholder Agreement,
which reaffumed the subordination provision in the $6M Note:
Payment ofp1incipal to Creditor on the $6M Note (whether· at
matwity or at any earlier time in accordance with any right of
prepayment) shall be subordinated to payment in full of
Company's obligation to redeem the Series A Preferred Stock.
Company shall not pay any principal on the $6M Note until the
Series A Preferred Stock is completely redeemed . . .
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Thus, Reed has no right to payment of the principal under the $6 Million Note until AJA
Services has fully redeemed Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred shares . To date, the redemption
of Donna Taylor's Series A Prefeued shares is not yet complete . See John Taylor Aff,

~

6.

In spite of these agreements executed by all three parties (AIA Services, Donna Taylor
and Reed) that the $6 Million Note is subordinated to the full redemption of Donna Taylor's
Series A Prefeued shar·es, on December 1, 2006 Reed met secretly with Donna Taylor and
executed a Subordination Agreement which provided that any amounts owed by AIA Services to
Donna Taylor would be subordinate to all amounts owed by AJA Services to Reed.. See .John
Taylor Aff., Ex D. Mo1eover, despite the fact that the Series A Shar·eholder Agreement
specifically provides that it cannot be modified or amended "except by a wtiting signed by all
parties to this Agreement," the purported Subordination Agr·eement was executed unilaterally by
Donna Taylor and Reed without the consent of AIA Services The obvious intent ofthis
agreement was to circumvent the subordination requi1ements of the $6 Million Note and the
Series A Shar·eholder Agreement in an attempt to allow Reed to sue AIA for the principal
balance purportedly due under the $6 Million Note .

E.

Procedul'al Postul'e
Reed filed suit in .January of 2007, asserting that AIA Services is in default under the

terms of the Note Reed's complaint also asserts various other· causes of action against AIA,
Crop USA and several individual directors . Reed filed a motion for summary judgment on the
issue of whether AIA Services is in default of the Note The District Comt granted Reed's
Motion for Summary .Judgment See Ashby Aff, Ex . C. AIA then filed a Motion to Reconsider
and, in the Alternative, Motion for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal. On May 8, 2008, the
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District Court denied AIA's Motion to Reconsider, but granted AIA permission to seek
interlocutory appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12. See Ashby Aff., Ex. D.

III. STANDARD FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL
Idaho Appellate Rule 12 provides this Cowt with discretion to allow for an appeal of an
interlocutory orde1

OI'

decree of a district court if the order "involves a controlling question of

law as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an immediate
appeal from the order or decree may materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation"

IV. ARGUMENT
AIA requests leave to file a permissive appeal of the District Court's order granting
partial summary judgment on the issue of whether AJA is in default The District Court's order
raises two controlling questions oflaw as to which there ar·e substantial grounds for difference of
opinion: (1) whether it is appropriate for a trial court to determine for itself the truthfulness of
facts supporting waiver on summary judgment, thus removing the issue of waiver and the
general issue ofcredibility from the province of the jury; and (2) whether two parties can modify
the terms of a three-party agreement without the consent of the third party to the agreement.

A.

The District Court Ened By Making Cr·edibility Determinations And By Removing
The Issue Of' Waiver Fl'Om The Province Of The Jury
Waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right Minidoka County v Krieger,

88 Idaho 395, 411, 399 P 2d 962, 972 (1965) Waiver consists of two elements: "direct and
unequivocal conduct indicating a waiver," and (2) "reliance by the party seeking to assert a
waiver.." Idaho Migrant Council, 110 Idaho 804, 806, 718 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Ct. App . 1986).
Waiver of contractual provisions can be either express -written or oral- or implied by conduct.
In this case, AIA asserts both express and implied waiver
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1.

AJA has presented substantial evidence of both expl'ess and implied waiver

Reed has expressly waived certain rights under the Note. In March of 2003, Reed
expressly stated to John that Reed would accept reduced interest payments of $25,000 per month
without declaring a default of the Note or the related Stock Redemption Restructw·e Agreement

See John Taylor Aff, if 9. Reed fwther exp1essly stated that he would not declare a default with
regard to the $6 million principal witil AIA and CropUSA reached $60 million in new business
placements .1 Id. While Reed may deny making such an express verbal waiver, these facts must
be considered true for pwposes of summary judgment.. Sparks v. St.

Luke~

Regional Medical

Center, Ltd., 115 Idaho 505, 520, 768 P 2d 768, 783 (1988}.
In addition to the express verbal waiver, Reed's conduct both lends credibility to that
express waiver and creates a mateiial issue of fact as to an implied waiver by conduct.. The
original terms of the Note provided for monthly interest payments of$41,500 and payment of the
entire principal by August 1, 2005. By March 2003, AIA was no longer able to make these
interest payments . See February 21, 2001 John Taylor Afl., if 8. AIA Se1vices was in default,
and Reed was continuously threatening to declare a default and pwsue his rights under the Note .
Reed certainly could have declar·ed a default at that time, but he chose not to. Rather than
declare a default and pursue his remedies at that time, Reed agreed to waive his rights undet the
Note. Under this waiver, Reed agreed to receive only $25,000 per month in interest Reed's
conduct shows that he continued to act consistent with this waiver.. As of Mar·ch 2003, and all of

1 While this may seem like an odd benchmark, it makes sense in light of Reed's intimate
knowledge of the businesses Reed continued to work as the sales manager of both AIA
Inswance and Crop USA and understood that $60 million in new business placements would be
the approximate point at which :financing could be obtained to pay off Reed's Note in its
entirety, which was the purpose of Reed's waivet .
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the way thrnugh the August 2005 principal due date,2 AJA paid the $25,000 every month, and
Reed accepted it eve1y month without complaint Reed did not provide any notice of default,
and Reed did not ever give any wtitten notice that he was accepting the payments without
waiver See id. at if 10.
Then, even after August 1, 2005, the date on which the principal would have been due if
not for Reed's waiver, Reed did not give any notice of default Instead, Reed continued to accept
the reduced interest payments for another year and a half. Reed still did not complain about the
reduced interest payment, or even the failure to pay the $6,000,000 principal when due, and Reed
still did not provide any wtitten notice that his continued acceptance of payments was not a
waiver . Reed did not provide any notice of default until December 12, 2006, almost a year and a
half after· the principal would have been due if not for Reed's express waiver and three and a half
years after Reed began accepting reduced interest payments totaling approximately $1,050,000.
This evidence is more than sufficient to create a material issue of fact as to whether Reed
intentionally waived his rights under the Note.. See 17A AM. JUR 2D Contracts § 636 ("An
unexplained delay in enforcing a contract may constitute evidence of waiver and acquiescence in
the manner of the other party's performance.''); Seismic & Digital Concept.s, Inc . v.. Digital

Resources Corp, 590 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tex App . 1979) ("Waiver of strict performance may be
inferred from the circumstances or course of dealings between the parties. . A waiver may

2 For purposes of the waiver· ar·gument only, this section of the brief assumes that, but for Reed's
waiver, and but for the subordination issue discussed below, the payment of principal would
have been due on August 1, 2005. As discussed in section III B.. of this brief, because of the
subordination provisions of the Note and the Series A Ptefened Shareholder Agreement,
Reed could not demand payment of the principal until after AJA Services had fully redeemed
Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred shares .
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result from one pru:ty's express or implied assent to the continued performance of the other party
without objection to the delay.")

In addition to Reed's conduct explained above, there is additional evidence that
demonstrates Reed's waiver. On May 27, 2004, John, on behalf ofAIA, wrote a letter to Donna
Taylor, to which AlA Services owed approximately $740,000 at that time under· its agreement to
redeem her Series A preferred shar·es . See John Taylor Afl'., if 13; Ex. E At that time, Donna
Tayl01 had expressed concerns about AIA's ability to redeem her Series A Preferred Shares in
light ofits other financial obligations, including Reed's Note. Id. The May 27, 2004 letter
stated:
I will also tell you that I have made sw·e that no principal payments
or additional interest payments have been made to Reed dwing this
period of reorganization You may not know, but Reed also took a
65% cut in his monthly payment for these last several yeal's so that
we would have enough cash flow to get this reorganized.

Id.
This letter was not a secret to Reed. Rather, Reed not only knew about the letter~ but
helped draft it The payments to Donna were pwsuant to the Series A Shareholder Agreement a contract to which AIA, Donna Taylor, and Reed wer·e all parties. For that reason, Reed was
intdcately involved in the payments to Donna Taylor and any conespondence related to those
payments See id. at if 14. Despite the fact that the letter expressly states that Reed "took a 65%
cut in his monthly payment for these last several year·s" ($25,000 is approximately 65% of
$41,500 monthly payments required under the Note), Reed remained silent and did not deny the
truthfulness of the statement This is further evidence of Reed's volwita1y waiver of his rights
under the Note that creates a mate1ial issue of fact precluding summaiy judgment
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Notably, while the above evidence of Reed's conduct would, in and of itself; create a
material issue of fact as to an implied waiver, AIA does not rely merely on implied waiver.
Instead, AIA has presented affidavit evidence that in March of 2003 Reed expressly waived his
right to declare a default under the Note until AIA and CrnpUSA reached $60 million in new
business placements See id. at if 9.
Finally, while at first blush one might question why Reed would voluntarily waive his
tights under the Note, a more careful analysis of the situation makes it clear that Reed waive his
tights out his own financial best interest. As of March 2003, AIA was unable to make the full
interest payments to Reed. AIA had missed multiple payments and was in default under the
teims of the Note . See id. at if 8. Given Reed's continued wo1k for AIA thrnughout this time
and given his intimate familiarity with AIA's financial situation, Reed knew that AIA could not
make the full inteiest payments and would not be able to pay off the principal balance of the
Note on August 1, 2005. Reed also knew that, if he exercised his right to declare a default under
the Note, his remedy would be incomplete If Reed declared a default in Mar·ch of2003, he may
have been entitled to whatever remedies he was entitled to undei· the various agreements, but he
would not have been able to recover the entire principal balance of the Note and accrued interest.
In fact, on multiple occasions prior to Mar'Ch of 2003, John offered to voluntarily tum AIA
Insurance over to Reed. Id. 11 Reed, however, told John that he did not want AIA Insurance,
but instead wanted to figure out a way to be paid in full. Reed decided that the way to ultimately
be paid in full was for AIA to wo1k with CropUSA to build up a combined agency fot'Ce. Id.
When the parties entered into the Note and the subsequent 1996 Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement, AIA had an income stream from its health insurance products to provide
the revenue to pay off Reed's Note. However, subsequent to 1996, AIA's health insurance
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revenues declined substantially due to government regulation of health inswance and other
market changes Id.. at 12 In 2001, Irustrnark Insurance Company, the company that
underwrote AJA's individual health insurance products, determined that it would no longer
underwrite individual health insmance and disallowed all new sales . Thus, AJA's revenues were
limited to renewal premiums, unless AJA could find a new health inswance product to sell.
Given the change in regulation of health inswance, AIA's ability sell a new health inswance
product was severely hindered, which resulted in the attendant inability to bring in revenues
sufficient to finance the payoff of Reed's Note. Understanding this to be the case, Reed dil'ected

.John and AIA to work with CropUSA to build up a combined agency force of independent sales
agents This would allow revenues of both AJA and CropUSA to increase, which would allow
the companies to finance the payoff of Reed's Note Id
Thus, rather than exercise his right to declare a default, Reed waived his rights in order to
ultimately have a chance of being paid in full By waiving his rights instead of exercising them,
Reed was able to continue receiving $25,000 per month in interest payments . Reed received
well over $1 million in interest payments over the next three years Also, rather than exercise his
rights to declar·e a default of the principal that would have been due on August 1, 2005, Reed
instead continued working for AIA and CropUSA in an attempt to build the combined agency
force and build the businesses in an effort to ieach a point where Reed could be paid in full.

2.

AIA Has Presented Substantial Evidence That It Relied On Reed's Waiver·

In addition to the above showing that Reed voluntarily and intentionally waived his rights
under the Note, there is substantial evidence that AIA acted in reliance on that waiver. Under the
waiver, AJA would be allowed to make reduced monthly interest payments of $25,000 and Reed
would not require payment of the principal until the companies reached $60 million in new
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business placements AIA acted in detrimental reliance on this waiver. After I rustmark stopped
underwriting AIA's health insurance product, the only way for AIA to have the revenue to pay
off Reed's Note would be for AIA to develop a new health insurance product. However, when
AIA attempted to pursue new health insurance products, Reed (who was sales manager of both
AIA Insurance and CropUSA) insisted that AIA not develop a new health insurance product and
that the companies instead work together to build up a joint sales agency and focus more on the
sale of Crop insurance.. See John I aylor Aff, ~ 15.
AIA dettimentally relied on Reed's waiver in many ways. For example, in 2004 AIA
explOI'ed the possibility of selling a new line of health insurance products through American
Select Insurance Company American Select provided AIA with a Producer Agreement and
Master· Marketing Organization Commission Supplement. See id. at Ex . F. AIA believed these
new health insurance products would provide AIA with substantial revenue, which would also
help AIA finance the payoff of Reed's Note. However, Reed insisted that AIA not pursue this
new line of health insurance. Instead, Reed insisted the companies focus on building up the joint
sales force and on the sale of crop insurance through CropUSA.. Because of Reed's insistence,
and in reliance on Reed's waiver of his right to declare a default until the companies had reached
$60 million in new business placements, AIA elected not to sell this new health insurance
product This decision not to sell new health insurance products left AIA without a revenue
source to finance the payoff of Reed's Note AIA would not have abandoned the American
Select product if not for Reed's insistence and if not f01 Reed's waiver See id.

at~

15.

AIA further detrimentally relied on Reed's waiver by ceasing its efforts to obtain
financing to pay off Reed's Note. Prior to March 2003, AIA made several eff01ts to obtain
financing to pay off Reed's Note . In reliance on Reed's express waiver that he would not require
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payment of principal (or declare a default) until the companies reached $60 million in new
business placements, AlA ceased its efforts to obtain financing on its own. Instead AlA focused
on its efforts to build up the joint agency force with CropUSA, which would ultimately enable
the companies to increase their revenues and obtain financing to pay off Reed's Note . AIA
would not have ceased its efforts to obtain financing if not for Reed's waiver Id.

at~

16.

AlA also detrimentally relied on Reed's waiver by guaranteeing a $15,000,000 line of
credit from Lancelot to CropUSA Reed alleges that AIA's actions in guaranteeing the Lancelot
line of credit constitutes a fraudulent transfer. However, the truth is that AJA only did so
because of Reed's waiver and insistence that AIA work with CropUSA to build up a joint agency
force and ther·eby obtain the financing capability to pay Reed's Note in full AIA would not have
guaranteed the Lancelot line of credit if not for Reed's waiver. By guaranteeing the Lancelot
line of credit, AJA increased its contingent liabilities, which negatively affected AIA 's ability to
obtain other financing on its own, including financing to pay off Reed's Note. See id at iJ 17
Each of the above examples demonstrate how AIA altered its position in reliance on
Reed's waiver, leaving AIA in a worse position for purposes of complying with the terms of the
Note.

.3.

The District Court Applied An EJ'J"oneous StandaJ"d

The question of whether· Reed waived his right to declare a default under the Note is
generally a question of fact for the jury, not a question of law for the Court. Riverside
Development Co . v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 518, 650 P.2d 657, 660 (1982) (''The existence of

waiver ordinarily is a question of fact, and if there is any substantial evidence in the record to
support a waiver it is for the trier of fact to determine whether the evidence establishes such a
waiver·"). Thus, "[i]t is within the province of the trier of fact to determine whether the evidence
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in a paiticular case constitutes a waiver." C. l T Corp v. Hess, 88 Idaho 1, 9, 395 P.2d 471,
475-76 (1964) .
The District Court, however, did not follow the rule that waiver is an issue of fact where
substantial evidence in the record suppo1ts the waiver.. Instead, the District Court cited an oddly
worded Cowt of Appeals decision that, on its face, appears to instruct the District Cowt to
ascertain the ultimate tmth of a paity' s evidence suppo1ting waiver.
Waiver is a mixed question oflaw and fact Jones v. Maestas, 108
Idaho 69, 696 P .2d 920 (Ct. App. 1985).. A court nnt most
determine whethel' the facts alleged to constitute waivel' an
true Id The court then must decide whether these facts, as a
mattez oflaw, suffice to show waiver Id Waiver will not be
inferred except from a clear and unequivocal act manifesting an
intent to waive

See Opinion and 01der, p . 13 (emphasis added) (quoting Soloaga v Bannock County, 119 Idaho
678, 682 809 P . 2d 1157 Ct App 1990)..
Then, the District Court proceeded to do exactly what the Cowt of Appeals appai·ently
instructed it to do - the District Court determined for itself that it did not believe John's
testimony that Reed had expressly stated that he would not declare a default with regard to the $6
million p1incipal until AIA and CropUSA reached $60 million in new business placements.. In
refusing to accept as true John's testimony that Reed made express statements of waiver, the
District Cowt improperly decided as a matter oflaw an issue that is reserved for a jury to decide .
By deciding for itself that it did not believe .John's testimony of an express waiver~ the District
Court fwther violated the well-settled rule that issues of credibility are for the jury, not the trial
court, to decide. See G & M Farms v. Funk In Co, 119 Idaho 514, 530, 808 P.2d 851, 867
(1991) ("Credibility deteiminations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing oflegitimate
inferences from the facts are juty functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a
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motion for summary judgment or fot a directed verdict. The evidence of the non-movant is to be
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor."). Finally, the rule followed
by the Disttict Court that it should deteimine the trnth of facts alleged to suppott a waiver theory
stands in stark contrast to the mle that an summary judgment the ttial court is required "to
liberally construe the facts in favor of the non-moving party, to accept as true fact allegations
contained in the non-moving paity's affidavit, and to draw all reasonable infeiences from the
record in favor of the non-moving party" Sparks v St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, Ltd.,
115 Idaho 505, 520, 768 P.2d 768, 783 (1988).
The Disttict Court's error in judging credibility and deciding the issue of waiver as a
mater oflaw highlight the need fot an inteilocuto1y appeal in this case to clarify the trial court's
role with regaid to waiver issues on summaiyjudgment. Similarly, an interlocutmy appeal is
necessaiy to clarify that, conttary to the apparent conclusion of the Court of Appeals, the t:Iial
court's duty on summary judgment is not to "first .... dete1mine whether the facts alleged to
constitute waiver are true" Soloaga, 119 Idaho at 682 .
The source of the Comt of Appeals' erroneous explanation of the trial court's role in
deciding waiver issues on summary judgment is unclear·. Whether waiver is desctibed as a pure
question of fact or a "mixed question of fact and law," the Idaho Supreme Court has never held
that the trial court's responsibility is to decide the truthfulness of the facts asserted by the nonmoving party on summary judgment. Instead, the Court has explained on several occasions that,
in the case of a "mixed question oflaw and fact," the trial court's responsibility is to instruct the
jury on the law.. It is the jury's responsibility to determine the truthfulness of the facts asse1ted
and to apply the facts to the li:tw as insttucted.. As explained recently:
The dividing line between legal and factual questions is not always
a clear one, and often courts have seen fit to characterize certain
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questions as ''mixed questions of law and fact " . . , . Where
reasonable minds could differ as to the detei:mination of a mixed
question oflaw and fact, the ultimate answei:· must come from the
jury. But the court should instmct the jury in the legal standards
which should guide their determination .

Foster v. Johnstone, 107 Idaho 61, 66, 685 P.2d 802, 807 (1984) (citations omitted); see afro
Independent Gas & Oil Co . v. TB.. Smith Co , 10 P .2d 317, 322 (Idaho 1932) ("Waiver is a
mixed question oflaw and fact It is the duty of the court to charge and define the law applicable
to waiver, but it is the province of the jury to say whether the facts of the particular case
constitute waiver as defined by the court.'') .

B.

The District Court Ened By AUowing Donna Taylol' And Reed To Unilater·ally
Cil'cumvent The Subordination Pr·ovisions Of Various Three-Party Agl'eement
Without The Consent Of' AIA Services.
1.

History And Backgl'ound Of The Subol'dination Prnvisions

The 1987 Amended AIA Services Articles of Inco1poiation required AJA Services to
protect the interests of the Seiies A Prefened Shareholders (known as the "Stated Value
Prefened Stock" at that time).. Section 49(c) of the 1987 Amended Articles oflnco1poration
(and the subsequent 1996 Amended Articles of Incorporation) also limited AJA Services' ability
to incur· debt. See Babbitt Aff, Exs . A-B.
The 1987 Amended Articles of Incorpo1ation of AJA Services further p10vide the Seiies
A Preferred Shareholde1 with the tight to redemption of the Series A Prefened Stock in the event
of any b1each ofthe Articles of Incozpoiation:
The holdei: of the stated value ofprefelt'ed stock [subsequently
called Se1ies A Prefened Stock] shall have the right to 1equire the
corporation to redeem such stock from any legally available funds
upon breach of any covenant of the corpo1ation set forth in this
Article Fourth, but only to the extent such 1edemption shall not
violate the Idaho Business Corporation Act restrictions on the
co1poration's redei:nption of its own shares . This right maybe
exercised by giving the corporation written notice of the dei:nand
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL PURSUANT TO

JAR 12(C)- 16
40005 0006 1210788 2

001267

for redemption specifying the default and a redemption date not
less than 90 days from the date such notice is delivered from the
corporation .....

Id. at Section 4.3 (emphasis added)
Thus, the holder of Seiies A Prefeired shares had the tight to prevent AIA Services from
incuning new debt or redeeming the shares of any shareholder in a debt transaction. Donna
Taylor held 400,000 shares of Series A Prefeued Stock. Because there were Series A Prefeued
Shazes outstanding, AIA was prohibited by its Articles of Incorporation from incwring new debt,
which was contemplated in the transaction to redeem Reed's Common Stock (including a $1 . 5
Million Down Payment Note and the $6 Million Note).
On January 11, 1995, AJA Services, Reed, Donna Taylor and Cumer Gleen (Donna
Taylor's attorney) entered into a Letter Agreement (the ".January 11, 1995 Letter Agr·eement"),
contemplating redemption of Reed J. Taylor's common stock which made clear that any Note
payable to Reed would be subordinated to the redemption rights of the Series A Preferred
Shareholder:
Fwther, AIA Services' note or any note payable to Reed J.. Taylor
for the $6 Million purchase price for his common shares will be
subordinated to the redemption rights of yow· client so that Reed J.
Taylor will receive no principal payments on said note until Donna
Taylor" s stock has been completely redeemed.. Reed J. Taylor will
receive no interest payments on the note payable to him if
payments to Donna Taylor ar·e in default.
Babbitt Af'f, Ex. C
On July 22, 1995, the parties entered into the Stock Redemption Agr·eement. See id. at
Ex. D. An integral part of that agr·eement was the $6 Million Note given by AIA Services See

id at Section 2..1.2. The Note specifically incorpornted by reference the .January 11, 1995 Letter
Agr·eement's subordination provision:
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This Note is subordinate to the payment of the redemption
obligations owed by Company to Donna Taylor pmsuant to that
certain letter agreement dated January 11, 1995, signed by
Company, Payee, Donna Taylor and Cumer Green.
Ashby Aff, Ex A

It was important to AIA Se1vices to both comply with its Aiticles of Incorporation and to
not risk having the Seiies A Shareholder call a breach of the Aiticles oflncotporation, which
would have niggered the tight to complete redemption of the Series A Prefened Shares. AIA
did not want a suit or claim ofbreach ofits Aiticles of Incorporation, which would impeiil the
upcoming private placement specifically referenced in the J anuruy 11, 1995 Letter Agreement..
There were :financial reasons for the subordination of Reed's $6 Million Note In 1995,
AIA Services suffered a $10,650,150.00 net income loss. See Babbitt Aft:., Ex. E.
Consequently, it was to AIA Services' benefit to limit the amount of the Note payment to Reed
to interest from a cash flow standpoint.. A IO year amottization of the payment of both p1incipal
and interest on the $6 Million Note would be approximately $73,592.00 a month, however,
payments ofinterest only would be $41,250.00. AIA Services was in financial distt·ess and had
to 1educe the monthly cash drain, and at the same time AIA Services had comply with its
Articles of Incorporation.
Equally important to AIA Services was the natwe of the subordination in both the
.Januruy 11, 1995 Letter Agreement and the $6 Million Note . Both provided for the complete
and absolute subordination of the Promissory Note without reference to any due date, meaning
that AIA Services could not be required to pay the ptincipal under the Note until after it had fully
and completely redeemed Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred Shares . This provided financial
protection to AIA Services in the event of financial difficulties, as the exposure to AIA would be
limited to interest payments until Donna I aylor"s Series A Preferred shares were fully redeemed.
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Then. when the pru:ties amended the vru:ious agreements in 1996, the parties again made
cleru:· that the subordination was an integral part of the agr·eements The 1996 Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement superseded the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and specifically
referenced and incorporated as an exhibit the Series A Preferred Shru:eholder· Agreement:
Concwrent with this Agreement, Creditor, Company, and Series A
Preferred Shru:·eholder have entered into a new agreement ("Series
A Preferred Shru:eholder Agreement") which supersedes and
replaces the Series A Prefeued Shru:·eholder Letter Agreements

See John Taylor Aff, Ex. A, Section 1.8.
The Series A Preferred Shru:·eholder Agreement, to which AJA Services, Reed and Donna
I aylor were each parties, provides for subordination of Reed• s Note to the Series A Prefened

Shaieholder obligation for an indefinite period of time:
Payment of principal to Creditor on the $6M Note (whether at
maturity or at any earlier time in accordance with any right of
prepayment) shall be subordinated to payment in full of
Company's obligation to redeem the Series A Prefened Stock.
Company shall not pay any principal on the $6M Note until the
Series A Prefened Stock is completely rndeemed (provided,
however, that this limitation shall not preclude Company from
exercising any contractual or equitable right of offset against the
principal of the $6M Note )
Id. at Ex . B (emphasis added).

In sum, AIA ensured at every step of the way that it was in compliance with its Articles
oflnc01poration by making sure that any debt to Reed was subordinate to the Series A Prefeued
Shaieholder debt.. The importance to AIA to be in compliance with its Articles ofincmporation
and to ensw·e that the debt to Reed remained subordinated is fu.Ither evidenced by the specific
provision in the Series A Preferrnd Shareholder· Agreement that said agr·eement could not be
modified without the consent of all pru:ties:
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No provision of this Agreement may be amended, modified,
waived, or supplemented, except by a wiiting signed by all parties
to this A2r·eement..

See Id (emphasis added).
Indeed, the Series A Prefened Shareholder Agreement even provides that invalidation of
any part of said agreement would render the entire agreement void:
(g)
Each provision of this Agreement is interdependent with
and inseparable ftom eve1y other provision hereof; and each
covenant herein is given in considerntion of every other covenant
herein. If any provision of this Agreement is invalid, illegal,
unenfor·ceable or· inapplicable to any penon or· circumstance to
which it is intended to be applicable, in whole or in part. this
entire Agr·eement shall be void.

Id. at p. 8 (emphasis added).
2.

Reed Taylor Has Br·eached The Series A Shneholder Ag1·eement And The Stock
Redemption Agr·eement of 1995 And The Stock Redemption RestJ"Uctur·e Agr·eement
of 1996.
Reed knew and understood that, in confmmance with the Series A Sbar·eholder

Agreement and the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agr·eement, all of which were signed by
Reed, AIA Services, and Donna Taylor, all payments under the Note were subordinated to the
company's obligation to redeem the Se1ies A Prefened Stock.. Thus, because AIA has not yet
fully redeemed the Series A Prefe1red shares, it cannot now pay Reed the p1incipal that he
alleges is due an owing.
Without the consent or knowledge of AIA Services, Reed secretly persuaded Donna
Taylor to execute a two-party subordination agreement on Decembe1 1, 2006 whereby the debt
owing to Donna Taylor from redemption of the Se1ies A Prefeued Shares to AJA Se1vices would
be subo1dinated to all the debt owed by AIA se1vices to Reed. See .John Taylor Aff, Ex D.
This covert Subordination Agr·eement between Reed and Donna Tayl01 breached the 1996 Stock
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Redemption Restructure Agreement and related Agreements by attempting to provide for
payment of the debt owed to Reed prior to the debt owed to Donna Taylor.
Reed's breach of all the related agreements between him and AIA Setvices is evidenced
by a consistent scheme to undue the three-party 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement
and the Series A Shareholder Agreement containing a clear· subordination followed by an
unremitting demand for payment of $6,000,000 and all acctued interest commencing with the
Notice of Default on December 12, 2006 alleging failure to pay all principal and interest "now in
excess of$7 . 7 Million." Ashby Aff., Ex. B.. Reed's Complaint alleges that the principal and
interest on the Note is now due and owing.. Consistent with the Complaints, Reed seeks
swnmary judgment on the entire p1incipal and interest, allegedly $8 5 Million. Reed even sought
to have the partial summary judgment certified as final pmsuant to IR GP . 54(b). Reed's
actions and judicial admissions stretching thmughout the litigation confirm that he has
intentionally breached all prior Agreements with AIA Services by seeking a final judgment on
$8.5 Million.
Reed not only breached the 1996 Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement, but the
Subordination Agr·eement expressly purports to supersede "any other agreement or contract, or
promise of any kind or nature" as follows:

Agreements Affected by Donna's Subordination. Donna
expressly subordinates all amounts, rights, obligations and
remedies owed to her· in favor of(and Junior to) Reed J. Taylor
under the following agr·eements including all claims, remedies,
rights under such agr·eements: (a) $6 Million Promissory Note
between Reed and AIA Services Corporation ("AJA Services")
dated August 1, 1995; (b) Stock Redemption Restructwe
Agreement between Reed, Donna and AIA Services dated July 1,
1996; (c) Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement between
AIA Services and Reed dated July 1, 1996; (d) Amended and
Restated Secwity Agr·eement between AIA Services, AIA
Insw·ance, Inc., and Reed dated July 1, 1996; and (e) letter between
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Reed, R. John Taylor; and Donna dated February 27, 2001; (f)
Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement between AIA Services,
Donna and Reed dated .July l, 1996; and (g) any other agreement,
contract or promise of any kind or nature
See John Taylor Aff., Ex. D.

Reed's execution of the 2006 Subordination Agreement caused a material breach of all
the prior agreements. The subordination provisions in the Note and related agreements were part
of the consideration to AIA Services in executing the agreements, and AIA Services would not
and could not have entered into these agreements except for the subordination of Reed's
principal to the redemption of the Series A Preferred Stock AJA Services specifically bar·gained
for an agreement allowing AIA services to have its Series A Preferred Stock redeemed prior to
paying its debt to Reed. Reed's subsequent agreement with Donna Taylor in 2006 to nullify her
priority and subordinate her· rights previously agreed to in all the agreements with AIA Services
is in clear violation of all the agreements with AIA Services
Reed cannot contend that the subordination was not intended to be part of the
agreements.. Reed signed the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement with the subotdination
provision and then signed again the 1996 Stock Redemption Restiucture Agreement with the
present subordination. Most importantly, Reed had the advice of and benefited from counsel
who participated in drafting the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement.. Reed knew full
well what he agreed to in 1996.

3.

The December 1, 2006 Subordination Agreement between Donna Taylor· and
Reed Taylor· is Unenfor·ceable For· Lack of Mutuality, And The District
Court Misapplied Controlling Idaho Case Law

The pmported 2006 Subordination Agr·eement between Donna Taylor and Reed is an
illicit attempt at modifying the 1996 Stock Redemption Restmct:Ul'e Agreement of 1996, the 1996
Series A Preferred Shar·eholder Agreement, the .January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement and the $6
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Million Note.. Each of these documents ensured that AIA was in compliance with its Articles of
Incorporation and protected against any calling of a breach by subordinating Reed's debt to the
Series A Prefeued Shm:eholder obligations. The 2006 Subordination Agreement is
unenforceable for lack of mutual assent by all the patties: AJA Services, Donna Taylor and Reed .
A contract cannot be modified without the assent of all parties to the contract.. See Scott
v. Castle, 104 Idaho 719, 724, 662 P.2d 1163, 1168 (Ct. App . 1983) ("It is well settled in Idaho
that parties to a wiitten contract may modify its teims by subsequent oral agreement or may
contract ftuther with respect to its subject matter . . . However .... one patty to a contract cannot
alter its terms without the assent of the other and the minds of the patties must meet as to any
proposed modification ...) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) It is equally clear that a threepaity contract cannot be amended by two parties without the assent of the third pmty.. As
explained in Hening v. Maynard, 313 S . E.2d 379, 382 (Va 1984):
In the absence of an agreement to the contraty, existing restrictions
cannot be amended or terminated unless all pmties affected by the
restrictions, 01 their successors, agree to the amendment or
termination .... The 1936 Agreement made no provision for
modification by less than all the parties . The 1945 Agreement was
not executed by all parties to the 1936 Agreement, or their
successors. Likewise, all of the pmties to the 1945 Agreement, or
their successors, were not pmties to the 1956 Agreement Clem'ly,
therefore, the 1936 Agreement could not be modified by the 1945
Agreement, and the 1956 Agreement could not terminate the 1945
restrictions.
Id. (emphasis in original); see also Fast v Kahan, 481P.2d958, 961 (Kan. 1971) ("Modification
requires the assent of all the pmties to the contract.''). Indeed, the Series A PrefeII'ed
Shateholder Agreement, itself, specifically prnvides that it cannot be amended without the assent
of"all parties to this Agreement"
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Pmsuant to the clear te1ms of the Note and Agreement, AIA was prohibited from paying
Reed the p1incipal until after AIA Services has fully redeemed Donna Taylor's Seties A
PrefeHed shares, which has not yet occmred.. Thus, AIA Setvices could not be in default for
failing to pay Reed the principal. See Culp v Tti-County T1act01; Inc., 112 Idaho 894, 897 (Ct
App 1987) (holding that the failU1'e to make a payment prohibited by a complete subordination
provision cannot constitute a default) .
Despite the subordination provision in the Note and related agreements, the District Comt
concluded that AIA Services is in default and broadly held that Donna Taylor and Reed are
pe1mitted to alter the subordination rights of the parties. The Distiict Comt conectly stated that
creditors generally have the right to enter into agreements to subordinate debt However, the
Distiict Cowt failed to address the present situation, which is an agreement entered into by tluee
parties whereby in exchange for the subordination of Reed's payment to Donna Taylor's
redemption tights, AIA has assented to a stock redemption and restmctme agr·eement in keeping
with its Articles of Incorporation. Reed and Donna Taylor cannot contiact away the corporate
rights ofAIA Services to enter into agr·eements complying with its Articles of Incorporation by
ente1ing into a unilateral modification without the consent of AIA Setvices.. Because the
December 1, 2006 Subordination Agreement is an attempt by two parties to modify the
collective agreements entered into by all three parties, the December 1, 2006 Subordination
Agreement is unenforceable .
The Distiict Comt erred in determining that Culp v. Tri-County Tr act01; Inc. , 112 Idaho
894, 897, 736 P.2d 1348 (Ct App . 1987) is in applicable to the present circumstances. The
District Comt found that Culp addressed the issue of '"whether subordinated promissory notes
could be deemed in default, and accelerated, while a senior creditor's obligation was
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outstanding. " (Order at 11.) While the Culp decision did address such issue, the Culp cowt also
decided that equity prevented the court from finding a default in light of the particular
circumstances of that case .

In Culp, as in this case, there existed a subordination agreement entered into between
three parties; the debtor, the subordinated creditor and the bank, which was fust in priority.. The
agreement between the parties was contained not only in the subordination agr·eement between
the creditor and the bank, but was also embodied in the promissory notes The overall effect of
the three-party contract was that all parties were bound by the subordination agreements. Indeed,
the cowt found that both the creditors and the debtor signed the subotdination agreements and
agr·eed to comply with their terms.. Each agreement directed the debtor to make no payment to
the credit01s until the terms of the subordination agreements were satisfied. The debtor,
therefore, as a party to the subordination agr·eements, was entitled to invoke these agr·eements as
a defense to claims by the creditors that it defaulted. The cowt went on to find that the "[fJailw·e
to perform a prohibited act cannot be treated as an event of default." Id. at 897.. Because the
debtor was a party to the subordination agr·eements, the debtor was prohibited from paying the
creditors according to such agreements.
Notably, the Disttict Cowt reasoned in the ptesent case that AIA Services could not
enforce the subordination agr·eement because "the subordination agr·eement was intended to
protect Donna Taylor as a creditor, not AIA as the debtor." Opinion at 12 . However, this
reasoning was expressly rejected by the Culp court: "We concede that the agreements were
intended to protect the bank, but the fact remains that such protection was created by altering the
rights and duties embodied in the promissory notes" See 112 Idaho at 897 .
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AIA Services' case is even stronger than the debtor's case in Culp in that pm:1 ofits intent
in agreeing to the subordination was for its own protection, and not just for the protection of
Donna I aylor. AIA Services had a direct stake in complying with the 1987 Amended Articles of
Incorporation and that it could not be required to pay the principal due to Reed until after it had
fully redeemed Donna Taylor's PrefeII'ed Series A shares. However, even if the benefit of the
subordination agreement was intended to protect Donna Taylor, the fact remains that such
protection was created in an agreement entered into by all the parties, and, as held in Culp, AIA
Services was thus prohibited from paying Reed Taylor's note Because the failure to pe1fo1m a
prohibited act included in a three-party contract cannot be treated as an event of default, the
District Cowt ened in dete1mining that Donna Taylor and Reed could simply modify the
subordination provisions in the $6 Million Note and the Series A PreferTed Shareholder
Agreement and hold AIA Se1vices in default.
Moreover" the District Cowt's erred in dete1mining that AIA Services could prevent
Reed from ever having a legal remedy for non-payment. Reed knowingly, and with the
assistance of counsel, enter·ed into a "complete" subordination agieement, which permitted no
payment to be made on the subordinated debt at any time while the senior debt remains
outstanding. There is nothing to suggest that such an agieement was unconscionable or that
Reed entered into the agi·eement under duress.. Subordination agieements me routinely upheld
and do not preclude recove1y on debt; as the name suggests, subordination agi·eements merely
defer payment until the senior debt has been satisfied.
Finally, the District CoUit eried in determining that any senior creditor may consent to a
junior creditor having payment priority at any time . (Order at 12.) The Culp court rejected this
theory, when, under the circumstances, the pm:ties entered into a three-party contract The only
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reason the Culp court indicated that the creditors and the bank could unilaterally modify the
subordination agreement was because such unilateral modification was provided fot in the
subordination agreements signed by all parties: " 'as long as this agreement shall remain in
effect. no assets of the debto1 shall be transfeued and not payment shall be made to or received
by [the creditors] without the Wiitten consent of the bank being first obtained ..... ' " See 112
Idaho at 896 (Emphasis in original).. The holding in Culp is clearly applicable to the present
case, and the District Comt eII'ed in detennining that Donna Taylor and Reed could unilaterally
modify a three-party agreement as to subordination.

C.

An Interlocutory Appeal Is Appropriate
An interlocutory appeal pur·suant to I.AR. 12(a) is app1op1iate in this case because the

District Court's order involves controlling questions oflaw as to which there is substantial
grounds for difference of opinion and an immediate appeal from the order will mate1ially
advance the orderly resolution of the litigation.
The 01der involves a "controlling question oflaw" in that it resolves the central issue in
this litigation -whether AIA is in default of the Note More specifically, it raises two
controlling issues of law: (1) whethei it is appropriate for a trial court to dete1mine for itself the
truthfulness of facts supporting waiver on summary judgment, thus removing the issue of waiver
and the geneial issue of credibility from the province of the jmy; and (2) whethei· two parties can
modify the terms of a three-party agreement without the consent of the third party to the
agreement
As set forth in the argument above, "there is substantial grounds for difference of
opinion" with regard to the factual and legal issues resolved by the Comt
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Also, an immediate appeal ''may materially advance the otdeily resolution of the
litigation" in that an immediate appeal would completely resolve the central issue of this case
now, rather than leave the parties to litigate the secondaiy issues (i .e , fraudulent transfers,
director liability, pietcing the cotporate veil, etc.), only to dsk having the order on the ptimary
issue reversed on appeal, which would require a new tiiaL
Finally, as explained in Bude!/ v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2, 665 P.2d 701 (1983), one of the
fact01s the Comt should consider is the "impact of an immediate appeal upon the pwties." Here,
an immediate appeal is necessary to preserve the viability of AIA Insurance.. According to Reed,
the District Comt's finding of default will result in Reed having the tight to vote AJA Setvices'
shares in AJA Insurance, essentially allowing him to take over AIA Insurance. Reed has made
clear that his intent is to exeicise his asserted tight to tetminate John and other key AJA
Insmance employees and elect himself as the sole director and officer of AJA Insurance.. V eiy
few, if any, AIA InsW"ance employees will be willing to work for Reed and, having been out of
the business for some time now, Reed lacks the contacts and company knowledge to sustain the
company on his own . In short, AIA Insurance will not smvive under the direction of Reed

See

February 21, 2008 John Taylor Aff., 1[1[ 20-21.
Indeed, in ptior briefing to the Disttict Comt in support of Reed's motion to dissolve a
preliminary injunction entered against him, Reed threatened to simply abandon the company:
Reed is a seemed creditor owed over $8 Million. AIA Inswance is
pledged to Reed as collateral. Reed could simply close down AJA
lnsUI"ance if he elected . As a seemed creditor, he can sell the
shares of AIA Insmance, buy the shares himself at public auction
or simply keep the shar·es What Reed does with the business is
indevant..
An inteifocutory appeal is necessary to avoid exactly what Reed is threatening - to

"simply close down AIA Insurance. " With all due respect, what happens to AIA Insurance
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pending appeal is not "inelevant" to AIA's policy holders, directors and officers and those who
have worked for AIA up until this point.
Ifno immediate appeal is granted (and if Reed ultimately persuades the District Court
that he is now entitled to vote himself in as the sole officer and director of AlA Insurance), the
practical reality is that no appeal of this Court's Order will be taken until it is too late . By the
time the remainder of this case is tried, and by the time the usual appeal process runs its course,
Reed may have held control of AJA Insurance (if it sUivives) for approximately two years. By
that time, it would be too late for current management to step back in and repair what likely will
have been iueparable damage to AIA Insurance.

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, AIA respectfully asks this Court to grant AlA
permission to file a permissive appeal pursuant to IAR 12.

DATED THIS

2 2--day of May, 2008
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

~
,£).~~
Gfil)l£.Bab1J1J
ISB No . 1486
Attorneys for AIA Services Corporation,
AlA Insurance, Inc, and CropUSA
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

V.

)

)
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
)
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an Idaho )
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE )
TAYLOR, individually and the community
)
property comprised thereof; BRYAN
)
FREEMAN, a single person; CROP USA
)
)
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho
corporation; and JAMES BECK and CORRINE )
BECK, individually and the community property )
comprised thereof,
)

ORDER DENYlNG MOTION
FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL
Supreme Court Docket No. 99603
Nez Perce County Case No. CV07--00208

Ref. No. 08S-220

)

Defendants.
~-----------~-----~-----------~-----~-------~-AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; and AJA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation,
Counterclaimants,
v.

)

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,

)
)

Counterdefendant

)

A MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL PURSUANT TO I.A.R. 12(c), an
AFFIDAVIT OF D. JOHN ASHBY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL
PURSUANT TO I.A.R. 12(c) with attachment.s and MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR

PERMI~SIVE

APPEAL PURSUANT TO I.A.R. 12(c) with attachments were

filed by counsel for Defehdants AlA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and CropUSA
on May 22, 2008. Th~eafter, a MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSIDON TO AIA INSURANCE,
-~

INC. AND AlA SERVICES CORPORATION'S MOTION

FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL

~

PURSUANT TO I.A.R. 12{c) with appendix attached and AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C.
BOND IN OPPOSmON TO DEFEDANTS AIA rNSURANCE, INC. AND AIA SERVICES
ORDERDENYINGMOTIONFORPERMISSIVEAPPEAL-DocketNo.
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~

NO. 4339

P. 3

CORPORATION'S MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL PURSUANT TO I.A.R. 12(c) with
attachments were filed by counsel for Plaintiff Reed J, Taylor on May 29, 2008. The Court is

fully advised; therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Defendants AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance,
Inc., and CropUSA's MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL PURSUANT TO I.A.R. 12(c), be,

and hereby is, DENIED.
DATED this \ ~ day of June 2008.
By Order of the Supreme Court

cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Judge JeffM. Brudie
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James D. LaRue ISB #1780
Loren C. Ipsen ISB #1767
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
E & B File No. 7082-0013
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Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 08-01765
MEMORANDlJM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS

v.
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES 1-X,
unknown individuals;
Defendants.

Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Elam & Burke, P.A., hereby submit the
following memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This case presents the unusual issue of whether one party may sue another's attorneys for
decisions made during the course of litigation or for alleged malpractice. The plaintiff in this case,
Reed Taylor, is not and was not represented in connection with any of the events alleged in the
complaint by the defendants, the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley and individual
attorneys employed by that firm (the firm and its individual attorneys will be referred to herein as
"HTEH"). Lacking privity of contract, Reed Taylor cannot assert a direct claim for malpractice
against HTEH. Rather, he premises his complaint on positions advanced by HTEH on behalf of its
clients in the case of Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al.. Case No. CV-07-00208, in the
District Court of the State of Idaho, Nez Perce County (hereinafter referred to as the "Underlying
Litigation"). Additionally, he attempts to assert claims for malpractice against HTEH for advice
given or legal services rendered, not to him, but to clients of HTEH who are parties in the
Underlying Litigation.
Reed Taylor is suing AIA Services, Inc. ("AIA Services"), in the Underlying Litigation upon
a contract to redeem his stock.

He has also named as defendants AIA Insurance, Inc. ("AIA

Insurance"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of AIA Services, CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc.
("CropUSA"), and various officers and directors of the three corporations. HTEH represents AlA
Services and AIA Insurance and has appeared as local counsel for CropUSA in the Underlying
Litigation. The individual defendants are represented by counsel of their choice.

In vague and

conclusory terms, the complaint in the present action attempts to assert claims against HTEH for
malpractice or wrongful actions arising out of the defense of their clients in the Underlying
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Litigation or related matters. Reed Taylor has also filed sep~rate but substantially similar lawsuits
against counsel who have appeared in behalf of other defendants in the Underlying Litigation.

It cannot escape notice that by filing suits against opposing counsel, Reed Taylor implicates
ethical issues regarding whether they can continue to represent their clients in the Underlying
Litigation.

If the present lawsuit and the companion lawsuits against defense counsel are not

dismissed, defense counsel may be required to withdraw from representing their respective clients
in the Underlying Litigation after nearly a year and a half of proceedings. In effect, Reed Taylor
seeks to strip the opposing parties of their chosen counsel. See Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co.,

r 12 Idaho 441, 732 P. 2d 679 (Ct.App. 1987), noting that filing suit against opposing counsel may
have the effect of requiring them to withdraw because privileged matters between litigants and their
counsel may have to be revealed in order for counsel to defend themselves, thus possibly
jeopardizing the litigants' positions.
Shortly after filing this action, Reed Taylor moved to disqualify defense counsel in the
Underlying Litigation. 1

Strategies to disqualify opposing counsel are disfavored by the courts.

Tisby v. Buffalo General Hospital, 157 F.R.D. 157, 163 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) ("Motions to disqualify

opposing counsel must be viewed in the context of favoring a party's right to be represented by
counsel of its own choice, as opposed to disqualification as a strategic weapon."); Spence v. Flynt,
816 P.2d 77i (Wyo. 1991) ("Disqualification motions are often simply common tools oflitigation
process used for strictly strategic purposes.") (citations and internal quotations and ellipses omitted)

1

See Reed Taylor's Motion to Disqualify the Attorneys and Law Firms of Hawley Troxell Ennis &
Hawley LLP; Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A.; and Quarles and Brady LLP, dated September4, 2008.
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'

For the reasons discussed in this memorandum, it will be seen that the complaint against HTEH is
merely pretex.tual and fails to state a claim upon whiclr relief can be granted.
II. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION

Where a complaint contains no allegations which, ifproven, would entitle the plaintiff to the
relief claimed, it is subject to dismissal pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Wells
v. United States Life Ins. Co., 119Idaho 160, 804 P.2d 333 (Ct. App. 1991). ARule 12(b)(6)motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim, without affidavits or deposition testimony introduced into the
record either in support or in opposition, is addressed soley to the sufficiency of the complaint.
Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960, 962, 895 P.2d 561, 563 (1995). All inferences from

the facts pleaded in the complaint must be drawn in favor of the party opposing the motion; and the
issue presented is ''whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims."

Id.

However, the court need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 636 n. 3, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 1921 n. 3., 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980).

When ruling upon a Rule l 2(b)(6) motion, the question is whether the non.moving party has alleged
sufficient facts to support his claim which, if true, would entitle him to relief Rincover v. State of
Idaho, Dept. ofFinance, Securities Bureau, 128 Idaho 653, 917 P .2d 1293 (1996). For ex.ample,

standing is a preliminary question to be determined by the court as a matter of law; if the plaintiff
lacks standing to bring the claim, his complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
Young v. City ofKetchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002).
\\

\\
\\
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III. FIRST CAUSE(S) OF ACTION - AIDING AND ABETTING TORTIOUS ACTS
AND CNIL CONSPIRACY
A.

The Complaint Is Factually Deficient.

As a general rule, attorneys who represent clients in litigation cannot be held liable to their
clients' adversary based on the attorneys' conduct of the litigation. While there are exceptions to
the general rule, the plaintiff has failed to plead any facts which would fall within any of such
exceptions. Therefore, the plaintiff's first cause of action should be dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
A party may not rely on pleadings which assert only legal conclusions, but must allege facts
which, if true, state a claim for relief Resolution Trust Corp., v. Farmer, 823 F.Supp. 302, 309
(E.D.Pa. 1993). While well-pled facts alleged in the complaint are viewed in the light most·
favorable to the plaintiff, conclusory allegations are not accepted as true without specific factual
allegations to support them. Production Resources Group, L.L. C. v. NCT, 863 A.2d 772, 781
(Del.Ch. 2004); Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., Litigaton, 634 A.2d 319, 326 (Del. 1993) (articulating the
Rule 12 (b)(6) standard). If a factual basis for the relief is not alleged, then the pleading is subject
to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). In the case at bar, plaintiff merely states a number of conclusory
allegations but fails to plead any facts which would justify an award of damages against HTEH.
B.

The Complaint Fails to State a Cause of Action for Aiding and Abetting.

The first cause of action of the complaint is conceptually muddled because it attempts to plead
a cause of action for (1) civil conspiracy, or (2) aiding and abetting without distinguishing between
the two theories. In actuality, they are separate and distinct causes of action with different elements,
and each will be discussed below.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 5
G:\7082\0013\Pleadings\Motion to Dismiss - Merno\Motion to Dismiss - Memo ver_ll.wpd

001288

e.
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A claim for aiding and abetting the tortious act of another has three basic elements:
( 1)

the primary tort-feasor must commit a tort that causes an injury to the plaintiff;

(2) the defendant must know that the primary tort-feasor's conduct constitutes a
breach of duty, and
(3) the defendant must substantially assist or encourage the primary tort-feasor in
the achievement of the breach.
Ezzone v. Riccardi, 525 N.W.2d 388, 389 (Iowa 1994); see also Samuel M Feinberg Testamentary
Trust v. Carter, 652 F.Supp. 1066, 1082 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
The Idaho courts have recognized that a party may in certain circumstances be held liable for
aiding and abetting the tortious acts of another. For example, in Smith v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 909,
655 P.2d 116 (Ct.App. 1982), it was held that an employer was liable for aiding and abetting his
employee to burn down the plaintiffs' home where the employer urged the employee to commit the
arson and suggested it should be done while the employer was out of town.

In support of its

conclusion that the employer was liable for inciting the wrongful act of his employee, the Idaho
Court of Appeals cited the 1977 version of Restatement (Second) ofTorts § 876(b ). The employer's
liability was expressly based on the act of aiding and abetting the wrongful act rather the masterservant doctrine, since it was not part of the employee's job to burn houses.

In Price v. Aztec, 108 Idaho 674, 701P.2d294 (1985), the owner of a subdivision was held
liable for inciting a third party to destroy an irrigation ditch.

Relying in part on §876 of the

Restatement (Second) ofTorts, the court held that" 'all persons who command, instigate, encourage,
advise, countenance, co-operate in, aid or abet the commission of a trespass of another, are
cotrespassers with the person committing the trespass ... .' (citation omitted)." Id. at 677, 701 P2d.
at 297. The court noted that the comments to §876(b) of the Restatement provide that if the
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 6
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e.
encouragement or assistance of one person is a substantial factor in causing the resulting tort, then
the one giving it is himself a tortfeasor and is responsible for the consequences of the other's act.

Id. at 678, 701 P.2d at 298.
No Idaho case has been found dealing with the issue whether a lawyer can be found liable
for aiding and abetting the commission of an allegedly tortious act by giving advice to his or her
· client, whether in connection with litigation or otherwise. Other jurisdictions that have grappled
with the issue have predominantly (that is, with limited exceptions not applicable here) held that the
attorney-client relationship precludes aider-abettor liability.
Section 876(b) of the Restatement (Second) a/Torts (1979) states:
For harm resulting to a tlrird person from the tortious conduct of another, one is
subject to liability if he

*

*

*

(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial
assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself[.]
To state a cause of action, the plaintiff must also sufficiently allege that his injury was "a
direct or reasonably foreseeable result" of the conduct complained 0£ Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock,

Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 57,63 (2d Cir. 1985). Damages caused by the alleged tort must
be alleged and proved.

Britestarr Homes, Inc. v. Piper Rudnick LLP, 453 F.Supp. 521, 528

(D.Conn. 2006).
Plaintiff Reed Taylor's attempt to plead a cause of action for aiding and abetting fails at the
outset because he fails to plead facts which, if true, would constitute a tortious act or to allege
damages proximately caused by a tortious act of AJA Services, AJA Insurance or CropUSA. Merely
mislabeling alleged contractual breaches ~loes not convert them into torts. See Decker v. Massey-
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Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 1J.9 (2d Cir. 1981) (allegations of aider-abettor liability were
dismissed on the ground of being "so broad and conclusory as to be meaningless.").
Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the complaint sufficiently alleges the
commission of one or more tortious acts on the part of AIA Services, AJA Insurance or CropUSA,
it is still deficient because it fails to allege which of the HTEH attorneys allegedly aided and abetted
any particular act, what knowledge any of them had of any particular act, what assistance was
purportedly lent by any of them, or how the plaintiffs alleged damages were caused by them.
Furthermore, to the.extent the underlying purportedly wrongful acts are based on allegations offraud,
the plaintiff has failed to plead with particularity the elements of fraud as required by Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b).2
A case where the plaintiffs asserted claims strikingly similar to those in the present case is
Mann v. GTCR Golder Rauner, L.L.C., 351 B.R. 685 (D.Ariz. 2006), where suit was brought by

shareholders of a corporation against the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis ("K & E") for allegedly aiding
and abetting its clients, the parties in control of a corporation, to breach their fiduciary duties. The
shareholders also alleged that K & E committed professional malpractice and tortiously interfered
with the plaintiffs' contractual relations and prospective economic advantage. K & E moved for and
was granted summary judgment with respect to the aiding and abetting claim on the ground K& E

2

Rule 9(b) requires that all averments of fraud must be stated with particularity. The nine elements of
fraud are: (1) a statement of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the
speaker's intent to induce reliance; (6) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the
hearer; (8) the hearer's right to rely; and (9) consequent and proximate injury. Country Cove Development, Inc. v.
May, 143 Idaho 595, 600, 150 P.3d 288, 293 (2006);Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141Idaho233, 239, 108 P.3d
380, 386 (2005);Lettunich v. Key BankN.A., 141Idaho362, 368, 109 P.3d 1104, 1110 (2005).
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did no more than provide legal advice to its own clients. 3

The court found that K & E's act of

giving advice to its clients, even if such advice were faulty, did not constitute aiding and abetting the
alleged breach of fiduciary duty. 4
A plethora of cases have held that a lawyer acting on behalf of his or her client and within
the scope of the attorney-client relationship is not liable for assisting the client in conduct that
breaches the client's fiduciary duty.

See, e.g., Durham v. Guest, 142 N.M. 817, 171 P.3d 756

(2007), holding that an attorney who represented an insurer in a claim arbitration could not be held
liable for aiding and abetting the insurer's allegedly wrongful denial of the claim; Morin v. Trupin,
711 F.Supp. 97 (S .D.N.Y. 1989), holding that attorneys who represented their client in negotiations
regarding the collection of allegedly fraudulent promissory notes were not liable to an adverse party
for aiding and abetting their client in seeking to enforce the notes; Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d455 (81h
Cir. 1991), holding that a corporate attorney could not be held liable for securities fraud solely on
the basis of advice given to his client; and Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (1991), holding that
attorneys had no duty to disclose misrepresentations of their client in connection with the sale of
securities where the attorneys themselves did not make or assist in the making of misrepresentations.
See also, the U. S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific
Atlanta, Inc.. 128 S.Ct. 761, 169 L.Ed.2d 627 (2008), declining to hold alleged aiders and abettors

3

The CQurt also dismissed the malpractice claim because K & E had no attorney-client relationship with
the plaintiffs and the totious interference claims because "the mere act of giving legal advice to a client cannot
constitute tortious interference." Id. at 701.
4

K & E advised bringing in a so-called crisis manager. This turned out to be a disastrous decision, as the
crisis manager dissipated the corporation's assets and led to its demise. Id. at 691-692.
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liable for securities violations under §1O(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
lOb-5. 5
A third party's claim against a lawyer puts the lawyer at odds with bis or her client in a
manner which compromises the attorney-client relationship. Protecting that relationship protects
more than just an individual or entity in any particular case or transaction; it is fundamental to the
integrity of the judicial process itself As pointed out in Durham v. Guest, 142 N .M. 817, 823, 171
P .3d 756, 761 (2007), to permit claims against attorneys by adversary parties in civil litigation would
have a chilling effect on representation because:
[A]nytime a plaintiff alleged that a defendant had breached a fiduciary duty to the
plaintiff, an additional claim against the defendant's counsel for aiding and abetting
would with.stand a Rule [12(b)(6)] motion, even though the defendant's counsel had
simply been representing the client's position in an adversarial proceeding. Before
agreeing to represent a client, an attorney faced with this dilemma would have to
evaluate the merits of bis client's position and the attendant risks, then would have
to monitor the case during the representation in order to evaluate the risk ofliability.
This would have a detrimental effect on the representation....
Few rules, of course, are absolute. An attorney, even acting the course oflitigation, can be
liable for egregious conduct that amounts to an abuse of process or malicious prosecution. Kahala
Royal Corporation v. GoodsillAnderson Quinn &Stifel, supra, at270, 151 P.3d at751. However,

no factual allegations are contained in the complaint which support these exceptions. The plaintiffs
claims against HTEH for purportedly aiding and abetting its clients' actions relate only to advice

5

Recently, the Stoneridge holding has been extended to attorneys. See In re DVI Inc. Securities
Litigation, 249 F.R.D. 196, 216-218 (E.D.Pa. 1008), holding that attorneys of a corporation owe no independent
duty of disclosure to investors and cannot be held liable for failure to divulge or prevent a scheme on the part of their
client to violate§ lO(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act
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e·
rendered and positions taken in the course of zealous representation and, as such, must be dismissed
for failure to state a cause of action.

C.

Reed Taylor Has No Standing as a Creditor of AIA Services to Bring a Direct Cause
of Action Against the Directors of the Corporation for a Breach of Fiduciary Duty or
Against HTEB for Allegedly Aiding and Abetting any such Breach.
Liability for aiding and abetting does not exist in a vacuum; in order for to liability to attach,

the alleged aider and abettor must be found to have materially assisted in perpetrating the wrongful
act of another. If the predicate act is not actionable, there can be no cause of action for aiding and
abetting. Reed Taylor alleges that because he is a creditor of AIA Services, which is insolvent, the
directors of that company owe a fiduciary duty to him. He avers that HTEH aided and abetted the
directors in diverting funds of the corporation to other purposes, thereby precluding the corporation
from making payments to him. Assuming arguendo these allegations are true, they do not state a
claim against opposing counsel upon which relief can be granted.
It is often stated that directors stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation, hence, to the
stockholders. Hanny v. Sunnyside Ditch Co., 82 Idaho 271, 276, 353 P.2d 406, 409 (1960); Coeur
d'Alenes Lead Co. V. Kingsbury, 59 Idaho 627, 630, 85 P.2d 691, 692 (1938). It is said that should

the corporation become insolvent, this fiduciary duty runs also to the creditors of the corporation.
Torch Liquidating Trust ex rel. Bridge Associates, LLC v. Stockstill, 2008 WL 696233 (E.D.La.

2008). The reason for this is that directors have the task of attempting to maximize the economic
value of the company. "By definition, the fact of ~olvency places the creditors in the shoes
normally occupied by the shareholders - that of residual risk-bearers." Production Resources
Group, L.L.C. v. NCT, 863 A.2d 772, 791 (Del.Ch. 2004).
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e.

However, this does not mean that either shareholders or creditors have a direct cause of
action against the directors. See Weatherhead v. Griffen, 123 Idaho 697, 705, 851 P.2d 993, 1001
(Ct.App. 1993); McGivern v. AMASA Lumber Co., 77 Wjs.2d 241, 156, 252 N.W.2d 37, 378 (1977).

An informative case illustrating the current evolution of the law is North American Catholic
Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del.Supr. 2007). There,
the Delaware Supreme Court held that creditors of an insolvent6 corporation or a corporation
operating in the zone of insolvency7 could not bring a direct breach of fiduciary duty action against
such corporation's directors.
In Gheewalla, creditors of an insolvent, or at least financially challenged, corporation sought
to bring direct, not derivative, claims of breach of fiduciary duties against the directors for allegedly
causing the corporation to enter into improvident transactions, rather than preserving the assets of
the corporation for the benefit ofits creditors. The trial court entered judgment under Rule l 2(b)(6)
dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, noting:
It is well-settled that directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation. When a
corporation is solvent, those duties may be enforced by its shareholders, who have
standing to bring derivative actions on behalf of the corporation because they are the
ultimate beneficiaries of the corporation's growth and increased value. When a
corporation is insolvent, however, its creditors talce the place of the shareholders as
the residual beneficiaries of any increase in value.

6

The Gheewalla court noted that insolvency of a corporation"... may be demonstrated by either showing
(1) a deficiency of assets below liabilities with no reasonable prospect that the business can be successfully continued
in the face thereof, or (2) an inability to meet maturing obligations as they fall due in the ordinary course of
business." Id. at. 98, n. 17. (footnotes and internal quotations deleted)
7

This term does not appear to have been precisely defined by the courts but has been used to indicate that
the corporation is in the ''vicinity" of insolvency. Jewell Recovery, L.P. v. Gordon, 196 B.R. 348, 355 (N.D.Tex.
1996).
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Consequently, the creditors of an insolvent corporation have standing to maintain
derivative claims against the directors for breaches of fiduciary duties. The
corporation's insolvency makes the creditors the principal constituency injured by
any fiduciary breaches that diminish the firm's value. Therefore, equitable
considerations give creditors standing to pursue derivative claims against the
directorsofaninsolventcorporation.Individualcreditorsofaninsolventcorporation
have the same incentive to pursue valid derivative claims on its behalf that
shareholders have when the corporation is solvent. (internal quotations omitted;
emphasis in original)

Id. at 101-102.
The fact that a corporation has become insolvent does not tum derivative claims into direct
creditor claims. Id. at 102. "To recognize a new right for creditors to bring direct fiduciary claims
against... directors would create a conflict between those directors' duties to maximize the value
of the insolvent corporation for the benefit of all those having an interest in it...." Id. at 104, n. 46,
quoting Production Resources Group, L. L. C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d at 797. Thus, Reed

Taylor's attempt to assert a direct claim8 in the present case is ill-founded, particularly because he
seeks to bring a direct suit not against the directors, but against defendants who are one step further
removed, lawyers who allegedly advised the directors. 9 If he has no standing to sue the directors
directly, he certainly has no standing to sue the corporations' counsel directly.

D.

The Complaint Fails to State a Cause of Action for Civil Conspiracy.
The distinction, which plaintiff Reed Taylor ignores in his complaint, between civil

conspiracy and aiding and abetting is that an action for civil conspiracy cannot arise unless the
parties to the alleged civil conspiracy each independently owe a duty to the aggrieved party.
8

His complaint states at ii 10 that it is not a derivative action; rather, he is seeking to bring claims directly
against HTEH.
9

The plaintiff consistently fails to distinguish in his complaint between counsel for the corporations and
counsel for the individual directors.
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A civil conspiracy, however atrocious, does not per se give rise to a cause of
action unless a civil wrong has been conunitte<l resulting in damage. The elements
of an action for civil conspiracy are the formation and operation of the conspiracy
and damage resulting to plaintiff from an act or acts done in furtherance of the
common design.... In such an action the major significance of the conspiracy lies
in the fact that it renders each participant in the wrongful act jointly responsible as
a joint tortfeasor for all damages ensuing from the wrong, irrespective of whether or
not he was a direct actor and regardless of the degree of his activity.
A cause of action for civil conspiracy may not arise, however, if the alleged
conspirator, though a participant in the agreement underlying the injury, was not
personally bound by the duty violated by the wrongdoing and was acting only as the
agent or employee of the party who did have the duty. (citations and internal
quotations deleted)

Doctor's Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.3d 39, 44, 260 Cal.Rptr. 183, 185-186, 775 P.2d 508, 510511 (1989).
Thus, in the Doctor's decision it was held that an attorney retained to assist in the defense
of an insured against a third-party claim was not liable to the claimant for damages allegedly
resulting from a conspiracy to violate provisions of the state insurance code which made it an unfair
practice for an insurer to delay prompt and fair settlement of a claim where liability has become
reasonably clear. The court reasoned that"[ a]gents and employees of a corporation cannot conspire
with their corporate principal or employer where they act in their official capacities on behalf of the
corporation and not as individuals for their individual advantage." (Citations and internal quotations
omitted) Id. at 44, 260 Cal.Rptr. at 186, 775 P.2d at 511.

In Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whit.field, 231 Cal.App. 3d 692, 282 Cal.Rptr. 627
(1991 ), it was alleged that an attorney for a closely held corporation was liable for civil conspiracy
to conceal information from a minority shareholder. The California Court of Appeal, however, held
that, absent either

ai1

individual duty to the plaintiff or a personal financial interest, the attorney
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could not be held liable on a theory of civil conspiracy based on his actions as attorney for the
corporation. Id., at 711, 282 Cal.Rptr. at 640. Receipt by an attorney ofreasonable compensation
for legal services performed does not constitute such financial interest as will support a cause of
action for conspiracy to defraud. Id., at 710, 282 Cal.Rptr. at 639; see also Camp v. Dema, 948 F .2d
455, 463 (8th Cir. 1991).

Similarly, in Fischer v. Estate ofFlax, 816 A.2d 1 (D .C. 2003 ), it was held that an attorney
does not "conspire" with his own client merely by giving advice. The court stated, "To hold
otherwise would be akin to saying that 'a defendant could conspire with his right arm, which held,
aimed, and fired the fatal weapon.' "Id. at 5, n. 4. The complaint in the present case fails to state
a cause of action against HTEH for civil conspiracy. "[T]here can be no 'conspiracy' with a client
if an attorney merely acts within the scope of his employment as an advisor to, or an advocate on
behalf of, the client." Id. at 5.

E.

The Complaint Fails to State a Cause of Action for Interference with Contract
Plaintiff's first cause of action does not specifically allege intentional interference with

contract. However, the general allegations of the complaint contain averments that could be
construed as attempting to plead interference with contract. See, e.g., Complaint if 14, alleging
"intentional violation and interference with Reed J. Taylor's contractual rights" by, among other
things, obtaining a TRO and preliminary injunction in the Underlying Litigation.
Since the analysis of interference with contractual relations is similar to that of civil
conspiracy, HTEH will respond here to the allegations that they improperly interfered with one or
more contracts between their clients and Reed Taylor.
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The elements of the tort of intentional interference with contract are:
(a) the existence of a contract, (2) knowledge of the contract on the part of the
defendant, (3) intentional interference causing a breach of the contract, and (d) injury
to the plaintiff resulting from the breach.

Barlow v. International Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 893, 522 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1974).
A party cannot tortiously interfere with its own contract. Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mut.

Iris. Co. ofIdaho, Inc., 123 Idaho650, 654, 851P.2d946, 950 (1993). Theactionsofanagentacting
within the scope and course of his authority are imputed to the principal. In Ostrander, a former
emplQyee of Farm Bureau alleged that her supervisor, Hart, had interfered with her employment
contract by making an inaccurate evaluation of her performance which led to tennination of her
employment. The court held:
As an agent of Farm Bureau, Hart had the authority to evaluate Ostrander and
terminate her contract. Since Hart's actions with respect to Ostrander were within
the scope of his authority as an agent of Farm Bureau, there was no third party to the
contract. Accordingly, Ostrander has not stated a claim for tortious interference with
contract.

Id. at 950, 851 P.2d at 654.
In BECO Const. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 145 Idaho 719, 184 P.3d 844 (2008), a

contractor claimed that an engineering firm tortiously interfered with its contract with the City of
Pocatello by failing to approve its application for final payment until perceived defects in
construction were remedied. The court held the engineers were acting within the scope of their
authority as project engineers for the city.

Fulfillment of their duty to monitor the progress of

construction and advise the city progress payments did not constitute interference with contract:
Although J-U-B was not a party to the Construction Contract in the traditional sense,
it acted as the City's agent by fh:e very terms of the contract between BECO and the
City. Ths case falls within the purview of Ostrander where an intentional
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interference claim was found not to lie against an agent of a party who was acting
within the scope of his authority.

Id., 184 P.3d at 850.
Other cases in accord with Ostrander and J-U-B are Leon v. Boise State University, 125
Idaho 365, 870 P.2d 1324 (1994) (the chair of a university department could not be held liable for
interfering with a professor's employment contract); Gunter v. Murphy's Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho
16, 105 P .3d 676 (2005) (the managing member of a limited liability company was not liable for the
company's decision to terminate a contract); Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp. 141Idaho233, 108
P.3d 380 (2005) (former employee's managers were acting within the scope and course of their
employment and thus could not constitute third parties for purposes of a claim for intentional
interference with contract); Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 61 P .3d 557
(2002) (professional corporation could not be held liable for interference with its own contract);

Cantwell v. City ofBoise, 2008 WL 2757046 (Idaho 2008) (employee failed to establish claim for
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage when employee's supervisors
recommended termination of his employment contract).
The relationship between an attorney and his or her client is that of principal and agent. An
attorney cannot be held liable for interference with contract by giving advice to the client within the
scope of the attorney's representation of the client. Therefore, Reed Taylor's complaint fails to
plead

acause of action for intentional interference with contract.
IV. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION - CONVERSION
Plaintiff's second cause of action is for alleged conversion of an indeterminate sum of

money. Conversion has been defined as "a distinct act of dominion wrongfully asserted over
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another's personal property in denial [of] orinconsistent with [the] rights therein. " Torix v. Allred,
100 Idaho 905, 919, 606 P.2d, 334, 339 (1980); see also Peasley Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith,
132 Idaho 732, 743, 979 P.2d 605 (1999) reh 'g denied (citation omitted) "Conversion in the legal
senseappliesonlytopersonalproperty." Rowev. Burrup, 95 Idaho 747, 750, 518P.2d1386(1974).
Plaintiff cannot state a valid claim for conversion against HTEH, however, for three reasons:

(1) plaintiff does not own or have a possessory interest in the money claimed; (2) HTEH has not
wrongfully asserted dominion over the money claimed; and (3) the money claimed by plaintiffis not
identifiable as a specific chattel. Plaintiff's conversion claim therefore fails as a matter oflaw and
should be dismissed.

A.

Plaintiff Does Not Own the Sum of Money Claimed.
In order to state a valid claim for conversion, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she has

title to the property claimed, or a right of possession. Portland Seed Co. v. Clark, 35 Idaho 44, 4647, 204 P. 146, 146-47 (1922); Bowman v. Adams, 45 Idaho 217, 227, 261P.679, 682 (1927) reh 'g
denied (citation omitted).

"Generally, a plaintiff must establish legal ownership or right to

possession in the particular thing, the specifically identifiable moneys, that the defendant is alleged
to have converted." Macomber v. Travelers Propert and Casualty Corp., 804 A.2d 180, 199 (Conn.
2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted). No action for conversion of money may be
brought if the plaintiff did not have ownership, possession or control of the subject money. Flute,

Inc. v. Rubel, 682 F.Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
The allegations of plaintiff's complaint do not clearly identify what specific sum of money
plaintiffpurportedly owns or is entitled to. possess or control. It appears plaintiff is a creditor ofAIA
Services (Complaint,

iMf

51-55) whose right to payment of the debt has not been completely
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established and is currently at issue in the Underlying Litigation. (See Complaint, inf 15-16.) At
best, plaintiff has a claim to a swn of money. Until plaintiff's claim is adjudicated and his alleged
rights are affirmatively est.ablished, plaintiff has no right to any liquidated sum. Plaintiff therefore
cannot establish a necessary element of his cause of action for conversion.

B.

Defendants Have Not Wrongfully Asserted Dominion Over the Property.
A claim for conversion fails if the plaintiff cannot establish that the defendant wrongfully

exerted dominion over the subject personal property. See Torix v. Allred, 100 Idaho 905, 910, 606
P.2d 1334, 1339 (1980). "No conversion action can exist against a defendant who did not exercise
any form of dominion or control over the property that was allegedly converted." US. Claims, Inc.
v. Flomenhaft, 519 F.Supp.2d 532, 536 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
In this case, HTEH is not alleged to have taken any property directly from plaintiff. Instead,

plaintiff's complaint alleges HTEH was compensated for attorney fees and costs incurred in
defending its clients in the Underlying Litigation filed by plaintiff. (Complaint,

iI 54.) Idaho law

clearly petm.its corporations to hire attorneys to represent the corporations' interests and to
compensate those attorneys for their services. See I.C. § 30-1-302(1) (est.ablishing general corporate
power to defend in its name); LC. § 30-1-302(7) (est.ablishing general corporate power to make
contracts and to incur liabilities); LC. § 30-1-302(15) (establishing general corporate power to make
payments that further the business and affairs of the corporation); I..C. § 30-1-850 et seq.
(est.ablishing general corporate power to indemnify directors and advance litigation expenses); see

also Wayne v. Murphey-Favre & Co., 56 Idaho 788, 791, 59 P.2d 721, 722 (1936). AIA Services,
AIA Insurance and CropUSA are legally authorized to hire HTEH and to pay the attorney fees and
.--....,

costs incurred relating to the defense of the claims asserted against the corporations in the
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Underlying Litigation. Therefore, any exertion of dominion or control over the attorney fees and
costs paid to HTEH, whether by AIA Services, AIA Insurance, or CropUSA cannot be wrongful such
that a claim for conversion arises in favor of plaintiff.

C.

Plaintiff's Claimed Sum of Money Is Not Identifiable as a Specific Chattel.
Plaintiff's conversion claim against HTEH alleges only the conversion of an indeterminate

amount of money. "Normally conversion for misappropriation of money does not lie unless it can
be described or identified as a specific chattel." Warm Springs Properties, Inc. v. Andora Villa, Inc.,

96 Idaho 270, 272, 526 P.2d 1106 (1974) (emphasis added). "More particularly, if the alleged
converted money is incapable of being described or identified in the same manner as a specific
chattel, it is not the proper subject of a conversion action." High View Fund, L.P. v. Hall, 27
F.Supp.2d 420, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
An action for conversion of money is insufficient as a matter of law unless it is
alleged that the money converted was in specific tangible funds of which claimant
was the owner and entitled to immediate possession. An action for conversion does
not lie to enforce a mere obligation to pay money.

Ehrlich v. Howe, 848 F.Supp. 482, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citations omitted); see also Landskroner
v. Landskroner, 797 N.E.2d 1002 (Ohio App. 8 Dist., 2003). "In other words, an action alleging

conversion of money lies only where there is an obligation to deliver the specific pieces ofthe money
in question or money that has been specifically sequestered, rather than a mere obligation to deliver
a certain sum." SouthTrust Bank v. Donley, 925 So.2d 934, 940 (Ala. 2005) (citations and internal
quotations omitted) Even if Reed Taylor were a shareholder of AJA Services or AJA Insurance, he
would have no personal right to possess or exert dominion over the assets of either coiporation.
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V. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION - IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
Plaintiff's third cause of action is for an alleged violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection
Act (hereinafter the "Act"). Plaintiff, however, has not asserted- and indeed cannot assert- a valid
claim under the Act against HTEH because plaintiff had no contract with HTEH from which an
alleged claim could possibly arise. Accordingly, plaintiff's third cause of action must be dismissed

as a matter oflaw.
The Act, Idaho Code§§ 48-601 through48-619, prohibitsunfairmethodsofcompetitionand
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce within the State ofldaho.
The purpose ofthe Idaho Consumer Protection Act is "to protect both consumers and
businesses against unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive practices
in the conduct of trade or commerce, and to provide efficient and economical
procedures to secure such protection. It is the intention of the legislature that this
chapter be remedial and so construed." LC. § 48-601. Idaho Code § 48-603, which
contains a knowledge requirement, provides an enumeration of unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
commerce that the legislature declared to be unlawful. I.C. § 48-603C also declares
any unconscionable method, act or practice in thetradeorcomm.erceto bea violation
of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act whether it occurs before, during, or after the
conduct of the trade or commerce.

White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 890, 104 P.3d 356, 364 (2004).
Idaho Code §§ 48-603 and 48-603A set forth certain practices which are prohibited under
the Act. Idaho Code § 48-608(1) allows individuals to pursue a cause of action for an alleged
violation of the Act and provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Any person who purchases or leases goods or services and thereby suffers an
ascertainable loss ofmoney or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or
employment by another person ofa method, act or practice declared unlawful by this
chapter, may treat any agreement incident thereto as voidable or, in the alternative,
may bring an action to recover damages or one thousand dollars ($1, 000), which ever
is greater....
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LC.§ 48-608(1) (emphasis added).
Idaho case law limits claims under the Act to circumstances involving a clear and distinct
contractual relationship between the parties. See Has'/dn v. Glass, 102 Idaho 785, 640 P .2d 1186
(Ct.App. 1982). In Has'/dn, the parties entered into negotiations for the sale of real property. The
proposed sale never occurred and the buyers, who were renting the subject property at the time,
ultimately pursued damage claims against the sellers. The buyers later filed a motion to amend their
pleading to assert a claim against the sellers under the Act, claiming the sellers engaged in deceptive
acts or practices. The trial court denied the buyers' motion to amend, finding that no valid claim
could be asserted under the Act because no contract existed between the parties. On appeal, the
Idaho Court of Appeals ofldaho upheld the trial court's denial of the sellers' motion to amend, and
specifically held that a claim under the Act must be based upon a contract:
I.C. § 48-608(1) of the ICPA provides that "[a]ny person who purchases or leases
goods or services and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property,
real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of a method,
act or practice declared unlawful by... [the] act," may file an action for damages. We
do not construe this language to require that a purchase or lease be "completed" in
order for an action to be brought. However, we have reviewed the regulations
promulgated by the Idaho Attorney General pursuant to I.C. § 48-604(2), the
decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court interpreting the ICP A to date, and cases
reported under 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l), which are deemed guides to construction of the
ICP A under LC. § 48-604( 1). We find no authority for applying the ICPA to a
merely contemplated transaction, where there was no contract. We hold, as we
believe the trial court intended, that a claim under the ICPA must be based upon a
contract.
Haskin, I 02 Idaho at 788 (emphasis added).
Similar to the facts at issue in Haskin, there is no contract in the present case between
plaintiff and HTEH upon which plaintiff's claim under the Act can be based. The facts of this case
.--.......

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS:-- ,·.22
G:\7082\0013\Pleadiugs\Mot.~n to Dismiss - Memo\.\1otion to Dismiss - Memo ver_Jl.wpd

288

001305

· are even further removed from those at issue in Haskin because in this case plaintiff has not alleged
that any transaction was even "contemplated" between the parties.
Further, the Court of Appeals ofWashington recently held that allowing a plaintiff to sue his
or her adversary's attorney under a consumer protection act theory infringes on the attorney-client
relationship. Jeckle v. Crotty, 85 P.3d 931 (Wash.App.Div. 3, 2004). In support of that finding, the
court relied on Connecticut case law, holding as follows:
Providing a private cause of action under [the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices
Act] to a supposedly aggrieved party for the actions ofhis or her opponent's attorney
would stand the attorney-client relationship on its head and would compromise an
attorney's duty of undivided loyalty to his or her client and thwart the exercise of the
attorney's independent professional judgment on his or her client's behalf. Suffield
Dev. Assoc. Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'! Loan Investors, L.P., 260 Conn. 766, 783-84, 802
A.2d44.

Id., 85 P.3d at 384-85 (other citations omitted).

Not only is there a complete absence of any contract or consumer relationship between Reed
Taylor and HTEH which would form the basis for a claim, see LC. § 48-608(1 ); Haskin, l 02 Idaho
at 788, but Reed Taylor should not be permitted to sue his adversaries' attorneys under the Act.
VI. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION - LEGAL MALPRACTICE
A.

There Is No Attorney-Client Relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants.

The plaintiffs fourth cause of action is for legal malpractice.
To establish a claim for attorney malpractice/professional negligence, the
plaintiff must show: (1) the creation of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the
existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (3) the breach of the duty of the
standard of care by the lawyer; and (4) that the failure to perform the duty was a
proximate cause of the damages suffered by the client.
Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 526, 96 P.3d 623, 627 (2004), citing McColm-Tra.ska v. Baker, 139

Idaho 948, 951, 88 P.3d 767, 770 (2004); Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 590, 21 P.3d 908, 912
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(2001); Marias v. Marano, 120 Idaho 11, 13, 813 P.2d 350, 352 (1991); Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho
702, 652 P.2d. 650 (1982).
The first impediment to plaintiff's malpractice claim is the failure to allege the existence of an
attorney-client relationship - the so-called privity rule. The complaint does not allege that HTEH
represented the plaintiff in connection with any events alleged therein. 10 Ordinarily, one not in privity
of contract with an attorney cannot bring suit for legal malpractice against the attorney. Stated
otherwise, the care and skill an attorney owes his or her client ordinarily do not extend to third parties.
National Sav. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 205-206, 25 L.Ed. 621 (1879); Buscher v. Boning, 114

Hawai'i 202, 159 P.2d 814 (2007); Rhode v. Adams, 288 Mont. 278, 957 P.2d 1124 (1998); Lilyhorn
v. Dier, 214 Neb. 728, 335 N.W.2d 554, 555 (1983).
The reasons for the privity rule are manifold: "The scope of an attorney's contractual duty to
a client is defined by the purposes for which the attorney is retained." Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702,
703, 652 P.2d 650, 652 (1982). Absent the privity rule, "clients would lose control over the attorneyclient relationship, and attorneys would be subject to almost unlimited liability." Barcelo v. Elliott, 923
S. W. 2d 575, 580 (Tex. 1996). Allowing a broad cause of action in favor of third parties would create

a conflict of interest between an attorney's client and such third parties, thereby limiting the attorney's
ability to zealously represent his or her client. Id. at 578. "Attorneys owe fundamental duties to their
clients. Among the most important of these duties are the duties of zealous representation and loyalty."

10

In approximately 1987 Mr. Riley was employed by the firm of Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &
McKlveen, Chtd., a law fmn that represented Reed Taylor in connection with his divorce from Donna Taylor.
Incident to the divorce, Series A preferred stock in A1A Services was issued to Mrs. Taylor. The complaint does not
allege any act or omission of Mr. Riley in connection with the divorce or the issuance of the Series A preferred stock
as the basis for damages allegedly sustained by Reed Taylor. Even if such allegation were to be made, the applicable
two-year statute of limitation, Idaho Code§ 5-219, has long since run.
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Hefnze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 178 P.3d 597, 603 (2008). Those duties would be irrevocably
compromised if attorneys were required to temper their representation by taking into account the
economic interests of third parties. Finally, the attorney-client relationship, although based on contract,
involves a highly personal and confidential relationship''... more analogous to a contract of a personal
nature than to an ordinary commercial contract." Jackson v. Rogers & Wells, 210 Cal.App.3d 336,
342, 258 Cal.Rptr. 454 (1989). Imposing duties to non-clients would give rise to increased malpractice
suits and cause attorneys to practice in a manner calculated to protect themselves personally rather than
advance the interests of their clients.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004),
confronted the issue of whether a legal malpractice action must arise out of an attorney-client
..--..,

relationship. In that case disappointed heirs sought to bring a legal malpractice action against the
attorney who drafted a decedent's will and three codicils. Each of the two later codicils revoked prior
codicils. The heirs contended the codicils were intended by the testatrix to be cumulative. The court
acknowledged: "As a general rule, an attorney will be held liable for negligence only to his or her client
and not to someone with whom the attorney does not have an attorney-client relationship." Id. at 137,
90 P.3d at 887. However, the court held this is not an invariable rule and that in deciding whether to
recognize a new duty or extend a duty beyond the scope previously imposed the court would adopt what
it called a ''balance-of-the-harms" test.
The Harrigfeld test involves weighing the following policy considerations:
[T]he foreseeability of the harm to the plaintiff; the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury; the closeness of the connection between the defendant's
conduct and the injury suffered; the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct;
the policy of preventing future hann; the extent of the burden to the defendant and
consequences to the comm.unity of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting
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liability for breach; and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk
involved.

Id. at 138, 90 P.3d at 888.
Considering those factors, the court held that an attorney preparing testamentary instruments
owes a duty to the beneficiaries named in the instruments to effectuate the testator's intent. This is the

only instance to date in which the requirement of privity in a legal malpractice action has been
abrogated under Idaho law. The Harrigfeld court cautioned:
A direct attorney-client relationship is required to exist between the plaintiff and the
attorney-defendant in a legal malpractice action except in this very narrow
circumstance.

Id. at 139, 90 P.3d 884.
The reason for such cautionary limitation was aptly expressed by the Harrigfeld court, quoting

Pellam v. Griesheimer, 92 Ill.2d 13, 64 Ill.Dec. 544, 440 N.E.2d 96, 99-100 (1982):
While privity of contract has been abolished in many areas of tort law, the concern
is still that liability for negligence not extend to an unlimited and unknown number
of potential plaintiffs. In the area of legal malpractice the attorney's obligations to
his client must remain paramount. In such cases the best approach is that the
plaintiffs must allege and prove facts demonstrating that they are in the nature of
third-party intended beneficiaries of the relationship between the client and the
attorney in order to recover in tort. By this we mean that to establish a duty owed by
the defendant attorney to the nonclient the nonclient must allege and prove that the
intent of the client to benefit the nonclient third party was the primary or direct
purpose of the transaction or relationship.

Id. at 137, 90 P.3d at 887.
The Idaho Supreme Court, in a case decided after Harrigfeld, declined to create an additional
exception to the privity requirement. In Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005), the
Taylors, as remainder beneficiaries of a trust, attempted to sue the trustee's attorney for legal
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malpractice. After a thorough discussion of the Harrigfeld factors, the court affirmed dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6) of the claim of malpractice against the attorney:
The third count of the complaint asserts a professional malpractice claim
against Mr. Maile and this count is precluded by the general rule espoused in
Harrigfeld that an attorney-client relationship with the plaintiff is a prerequisite for
holding the attorney liable for negligence in the performance oflegal services.

Id. at 259, 127 P.3d 156.
The court in Maile also upheld dismissal of the claim of breach of fiduciary duty against the
attorney because he had assumed no fiduciary duty to them; he was acting as counsel for the fiduciary
rather than as a fiduciary himself - an important distinction. Cf. Jones v. Runft, Leroy, Coffin &

Matthews, 125 Idaho 607, 613, 873 P.2d 861.867 (1994), where an attorney assumed fiduciary duties
by agreeing to be the disbursing agent of money in a commercial transaction. In Maile, the court did
find that a constructive trust could be imposed on property the attorney purchased from the trust with
knowledge that the trustee was acting improperly. Taylorv. Maile, supra at259, 127 P.3d 156at162.
There is no allegation in the present case that HTEH improperly purchased assets from any party.

B.

Plaintiff Reed Taylor Lacks Standing to Bring Suit Against Opposing Counsel.
Plaintiff lacks standing to sue the attorneys for AIA Services, AIA Insurance and CropUSA.

Plaintiff concedes in his complaint that he is not bringing a shareholder derivative action (Complaint .
~

I 0) but rather seeks to plead a direct cause of action against the corporations' attorneys. His theory

seems to be that because he is an alleged creditor of one or more of the corporations, he is entitled to
bring suit directly against opposing counsel. 11

11

If this theory were valid, every action in which a debt is contested would devolve into a lawsuit against
the alleged debtor's counsel for having the temerity to represent their client in defending against the debt.
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A person wishing to invoke the court's jurisdiction must have standing. Van Valkenkenburgh

v. Citizens for Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 124, 15 P.3d 1129, 1132 (2000). As noted in Miles v.
Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 639, 778 P.2d 757, 761 (1989), the doctrine of standing is a
subcategory of justiciability. "Standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the
partywishestohaveadjudicated." Youngv. CityofKetchum, 137Idaho 102, 106,44P.3d 1157, 1159.
(2002). See also BoundaryBackpacke.rs v. Boundary County, 128 Idaho 371, 913 P.2d 1141 (1996).
The court in Young, supra, elucidated the applicable principle as follows:
To satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, a litigant must "allege or
demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood the relief requested will
prevent or redress the claimed injury." (Citations omitted) This requires a showing
of a "distinct palpable injury" and "fairly traceable causal connection between the
claimed injury and the challenged conduct." (Citations omitted)

,----._

Id. at 106, 44 P.3d at 1159.
The requirement of standing was further explicated in the case of Bowles v. Pro lndiviso, Inc.,
132 Idaho 371, 973 P. 2d 142 (1999) as follows:
In order to fulfill the standing requirement, the plaintiff must '"allege such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of the
court's jurisdiction." Bente!, 104Idaho at 135-36, 656P.2sat1388-89(quotingLife
ofthe Land, 623 P .2d at 43 8) (emphasis in original). The party seeking to invoke the
court's jurisdiction must allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure the concrete adversariness which sharpens the presentation
upon which the court so depends. See Miles, 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763
(quoting Duke. Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72, 98 S.Ct.
2620, 2630, 57 L.Ed. 2d 595 (1978). This "personal stake" requirement demands
that the plaintiff allege a distinct palpable injury to himself.

Id. at 377, 973 P.2d at 146.
Reed Taylor has failed to demonstrate a personal stake in any theoretically posited controversy
among AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA and their defense counsel. Accordingly, he lacks
standing to assert any direct claim for professional negligence against the defendants in this case.
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VII. THE CLAIMS OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE, AIDING AND ABETTING,
AND CIVIL CONSPIRACY ARE BARRED BY LITIGATION PRIVILEGE

It would be particularly pernicious and destructive of the attorney-client relationship if
attorneys in a litigated matter were held to have a duty of care or loyalty to the adverse party - in
effect, that they become co-counsel for the opponent. The defendants cannot possibly act as zealous
advocates of AIA Services, AIA Instrrance and CropUSA if they are also deemed to owe duties of care
and loyalty to Reed Taylor. "An attorney owes no duty to a third party in an adversarial relationship."

Bowmanv. Two, 104Wash.2d181, 188, 704P.2d 140(1085). "Existenceofadutytoanadversary
party beyond the courtesy and respect owed all participants in the legal process ... would interfere with
the undivided loyalty an attorney owes a client and would diminish an attorney's ability to achieve the
most advantageous position for a client." Id. at 189.

Accord, The Chapman Children's Trust v.

Porter & Hedges, L.L.P., 32 S. W.3d 419 (Tex.App. 2000); Rhode v. Adams, 288 Mont. 278, 957 P.2d
1124 (1998); Garcia v. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., 106 N.M. 757, 750 P.2d 118
(1988); Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, 312 N.W.2d 585 (1981).
Section 890 of the Restatement (Second) ofTorts (1979) provides: "One who would otherwise
would be liable for a tort is not liable if he acts in pursuance of and within the limits of a privilege of
his own or of a privilege of another that was properly delegated to him." The statements and conduct
of an attorney who participates in the judicial process are protected by the litigation privilege, or as
it is sometimes is called, litigation immunity. The privilege is not absolute; for instance, it does not
pennit a lawyer to steal documents, IBP, Inc., v. Klumpe, 101 S.W.2d, 461 (Tex.App. 2001), to
physically assault another party, Miller v. Stqiehenge/FASA - Texas, 993 F.Supp. 461 (N.D. Tex.
1998), or to commit acts which constitute abuse of process or malicious prosecution. Otherwise, the
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privilege is broad. "[T[he litigation privilege protects lawyers not only against defamation actions but
against a host of other tort-related claims." Loigman v. Middletown, 185N.J. 566, 889 A.2d 426, 436
(2006).

It was held in Loigman that an attorney who excluded a spectator and self-styled community
watchdog from a hearing on the allegedly specious ground that the person was a potential witness was
held to be immune from a 42 U.S.C. §1983 suit brought by the disgruntled watchdog. The court
observed that "[t]he common policy thread that runs through judicial, prosecutorial and witness
immunity is the need to ensure that participants in the judicial process act without fear of the threat
of ruinous civil litigation when performing their respective functions." Id., at 581, 889 A.2d at 436.
The privilege applies even where the theories advanced by counsel are new or innovative:
Typically, the litigation privilege has been invoked by attorneys to safeguard
them from defamation suits arising from comments made in the course of judicial
proceedings. However, to address creative pleading, courts have extended the
litigation privilege to cover unconventional and sometimes novel causes of action
against attorneys acting within the judicial process. As one scholar put it, as new tort
theories have emerged, courts have not hesitated to expand the privilege to cover
theories, actions, and circumstances never contemplated by those who formulated the
rule in medieval England. (Citations and internal quotations deleted)

Id. at 583, 889 A.2d at 435-436.
If attorneys must work in constantfear of civil liability, then the rights ofall clients will suffer.
Thus, it has been recognized that counsel owes no duty to a party opponent in litigation:
Historically, our court system has always been adversarial in nature. The role
of the attorney therein is to represent and advocate a client's cause of action as
vigorously as the rules oflaw and professional ethics will pennit. For that reason
an attorney's exclusive and paramount duty must be to the client alone and this duty
cannot run to the client's adversary. Not only would the adversary's interests
interfere with the client's interests, but the attorney's ongoing and justifiable concern
with being sued would detrimentally interfere with the attorney client relationship.
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Thus, an attorney in discharging professional duties on behalf ofhis client cannot be
held liable for negligence toward an adverse party. As a matter of public policy in
order to maintain and enforce the fidelity and duty of the attorney toward the client,
we cannot jeopardize the integrity of the adversarial system by imposing a
professional duty on an attorney toward an adverse party. (Citations omitted)
Garcia v. Rody, Dickason. Sloan, Akin & Robb, 106 N.M. 757, 761, 750 P.2d 118, 122 (1988).
Nor does violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility give rise to a private cause of
action, either in favor of the lawyer's own clients or third parties. "The rules are designed to provide
guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies.
They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability." Id. at 762, 750 P.2d 123.
Numerous reported cases support the proposition that the privilege attaches where attorneys
represent clients in litigation or other contested or adversarial matters. See, e.g., Alpertv. Crain, Caton
& James, P. C., 178 S.W. 2d 398 (Tex.App. 2005); CSX Transportation, Inc. v Gilkinson, 2007 WL

858423 (N.D.W.Va. 2007); Weaverv. Superior Court, 95 Cal.App. 3d 166, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1979);
Clarkv. Druckman, 281W.Va.417, 624 S.E. 2d 864 (2005); Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, 312
N.W.2d 585 (1981).
The case of Kahala Royal Corp. v. Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, 113 Hawai 'i 251, 151
P.3d 732 (2007), contains an extensive review of the authorities and the policy reasons for barring a
litigant's claim for civil damages against an opposing attorney for statements made or actions taken
in the course of the attorney's representation of an opposing party related to the civil litigation. The
policy reasons include:
(1) promoting the candid, objective, and undistorted disclosure of evidence; (2)
placing the burden oftesting evidence upon the litigants during trial; (3) avoiding the
chilling effect resulting from the threat of subsequent litigation; ( 4) reinforcing the
finality ofjudgments; (5) limiting collateral attacks upon judgments; (6) promoting
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9.
zealous advocacy; (7) discouraging abusive litigation practices; and (8) encouraging
settlement.

Id. at 268, 151 P.3d at 750. ·
The allegations in the present case relate to theories advanced, positions taken, comments
made and defenses raised by HTEH in litigation or related adversarial matters relating to disputed
control of closely held corporations. Those corporations are entitled to zealous representation by
attorneys of their own choosing, who should not be required to labor under constant threats of
vindictive and retaliatory litigation by the adverse party. The litigation privilege applies not only to
plaintiff's cause of action for professional malpractice, but to those of aiding and abetting and civil
conspiracy, which should be dismissed in their entirety on the ground that the actions of HTEH as
litigation counsel for AIA Services, AIA Insurance and CropUSA are privileged.

VIII. CONCLUSION
The complaint fails to state a cognizable claim. The plaintiffs cause of action for aiding and
abetting does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted because he fails to allege any facts
that, if true, would establish that HTEH owed any duty to him or that he has any standing to sue HTEH
directly. His claims of civil conspiracy and intentional interference with contract also fail because,
as a matter of law, an agent, such as an attorney, is incapable of conspiring with his principal or
interfering with the principal' s contract. His claim under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act fails as
a matter oflaw because he does not allege he has purchased any goods or services from HTEH. His
claim for conversion is legally deficient because he fails to allege any specific chattel of which he was
wrongfully dispossessed by HTEH. He fails to allege any facts which would show that he is in privity
with HTEH or has any standing to sue that firm or its attorneys for malpractice. Finally, plaintiffs

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 32
G:\7082\0013\fleadings\Motion to Dismiss- Memo\Motion to Dismiss- Memo vci:.J l.wpd

001315

e.
complaint is deficient because the actions of HTEH in connection with the Underlying Litigation are
protected by the litigation privilege.
DATED this

_2_ day of s;_p f-€.J'Y\ h eJ..

'2008.

ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By:~d7'k
D.LaRUe, Of the Firm

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the!}_ day of.S--e.o i-e m /J.e.,t.
, 2008, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to b~ served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 416
Spokane, VIA 99201

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
~ Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission (509) 455-7111

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 33
G:\7082\0013\Pleadings\Motion to Dismiss - Memo\Motion to Dismiss - Memo ver_l 1.wpd

29~9

001316

James D. LaRue ISB #1780
Loren C. Ipsen ISB #1767
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
E & B File No. 7082-0013
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DIS1RICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 08-01765
DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

v.
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X,
unknown individuals;
Defendants.

Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Elam & Burke, P.A., hereby submit the
following reply brief in support of their motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule l 2(b)(6) of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure. The law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP and its individual
attorneys who are named as parties to this suit will be collectively referred to ao:; ''HTEH".
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I. INTRODUCTION
A motion to dismiss under Rule l 2(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. For this
purpose, ''the court need not accept as true inferences unsupported by facts set out in the complaint
or legal conclusions cast as factual allegations." Potts v. Howard University, 240 F.R.D. 14, 17
(D.D.C. 2007).

''The well-pleaded facts must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. A plaintiff, however, must allege specific facts, not conclusory allegations. Conclusory
allegations and unwarranted deductions are not admitted as true." Scott v. Steinhagen Oil Co., Inc.,
224 F.Supp.2d 1084, 1085 (E.D.Texas 2002) (citations omitted). "[T]he complaint must contain
either direct allegations on every material po int necessary to sustain a recovery or contain allegations
from which an inference fairly may be drawn that evidence on these material points will be
introduced at trial. Conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions
will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss."

Myers v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. ofAmerica, 5

F.Supp.2d 423, 427 (1998) (citations and internal punctuation omitted). It is required that the
plaintiff must "set forth facts to support the legal theory forming the basis of the complaint." Tirey

v. Stecker, 2008 WL 171102, at *1 (D .Mont. 2008). The pleadings are not sufficient where the
plaintiff relies on "subjective characterizations or unsubstantiated conclusions" or on "bald
assertions, unsupportable conclusions and opprobious epithets." Fleming v. Lznd-Waldock & Co.,
922 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1990) (citations and internal punctuation omitted).
The basic difference between a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and a summary
judgment motion is that the former is a test oflaw rather than a test of facts. ''The moving party has
the option to test the law and to reserve a right to test the facts; i.e., by making a 12(b)(6) motion,
reserving a Rule 56 motion." Stewartv. Arrington Constr. Co., 92 Idaho 526,531, 446 P.2d 895,
DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 2
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900 (1968). "The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to allow a defendant to testwhether, as a matter of
law, the plaintiff is entitled to legal relief even if everything alleged in the complaint is true."· Klusty

v. Taco Bell Corp., 909 F.Supp. 516, 519 (S.D.Ohio 1005).
A motion to dismiss is the usual and proper method of testing the legal sufficiency
of the complaint. For purposes of the motion, the well-pleaded material allegations
of the complaint are taken as admitted; but conclusions of law or unwarranted
deductions of fact are not admitted. A complaint may be dismissed on motion if
clearly without any merit; and this want of merit may consist in an absence of law
to support a claim of the sort made, or of facts sufficient to make a good claim.

C &HConstr. &Paving Inc .. v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 85 N.M. 374, 376, 512P.2d 947, 949
(1973) (citations and internal punctuation omitted).

Il. THE MOTION TO DISMISS IS BASED UPON LEGAL, NOT FACTUAL, ISSUES
HTEH contends that the complaint in this action is legally insufficient and, therefore, should
be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The issues which mandate dismissal are not questions of
disputed facts, but legal issues which it is the function of the Court to determine at the outset of the
litigation. These include whether HTEH owes any duty to plaintiffReed Taylor, whether the statutes
upon which plaintiff relies are applicable, whether plaintiff has standing to sue, whether HTEH is
entitled to the litigation privilege, and whether the plaintiff may sue attorneys with whom he is not
in privity for legal malpractice.

Issues which require the application of law to fact are also

appropriate for resolution based upon the assumption, for the sake of argument, that the facts alleged

in the complaint are true. For example, giving the plaintiff every benefit of the inferences
legitimately to be drawn from his complaint, he has nonetheless failed to state a claim for
conversion, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting the commission of a tortious act, or intentional
interference with contract.
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A.

The Existence of a Duty Is a Legal Question.
''No liability arises from the law of torts unless the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff."

Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386, 389, 34 P.3d 1069, 1072 (2001). See also Hoffmann v.
Simplot Aviation, 97 Idaho 32, 539 P.2d 584 (1975).

"The existence of a duty is a question oflaw over which [an appellate] Court exercises free
review."

Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247, 985 P.2d 669, 672 (1999); "Generally, the

question of whether a duty exists is a question oflaw." Heath v. Honkers' Mini-Mart, Inc., 8 P.3d
1254, 1257, 134 Idaho 711, 714 (2000); Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 400,
987 P.2d 300, 312 (1999); Freeman v. Juker, 119 Idaho 555, 808 P.2d 1300 (1991). "The existence
of a duty is a question of law for this Court." 0 'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 51, 122
P .3d 308, 310 (2005). See also Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 139, 90 P .3d 884, 889 (2004)
(holding that "A direct attorney-client relationship is required to exist between the plaintiff and the
attorney-defendant in a legal malpractice action except in this very narrow circumstance.")
(emphasis added) The very narrow circumstance referred to in Harrigfeld is that "an attorney
preparing testamentary instruments owes a duty to the beneficiaries named or identified therein to
prepare such instruments, and if requested by the testator to have them properly executed, so as to
effectuate the testator's intent as expressed in the testamentary instruments." Id. at 138, 90 P .2d 888.
"The question of whether a legal duty in fact exists is a question of law for the court to
decide." Freeman v. Juker, 119 Idaho 555, 556-557, 808 P.2d 1300, 1301-1302 (1991). See also
Chavez v. Barrus, 2008 WL 3905436, at *5 (Idaho 2008); Estate ofBecker v. Callhan, 140 Idaho

522, 525, 96P.2d 3d623, 627 (2004); Daleiden v. Jefferson CountyJointSchoolDist.. No. 251, 139
Idaho 466, 468, 80 P.3d 1067, 1069 (2003); Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386, 389, 34 P.3d
DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 4
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1069, 1072 (2001); Boots ex rel. Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 179 P.2d 352, 356 (Ct.App.
2008). Whether Hawley Troxell or any ofits individual attorneys owed plaintiff Reed Taylor a duty,
the breach of which may give rise to legal liability, is a question of law which. can be decided under
Rule 12(b)(6).

B.

Statutory Construction Is a Question of Law.
"[T]he construction of a legislative act, such as the worker's compensation statutes, presents

a pure question oflaw for free review by the Court." Crawford v. Dept. of Correction, 133 Idaho
633, 635, 991 P.2d 358, 360 (1999).

See also Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141

Idaho 388, 398, 111 P .3d 73, 82 (2005). J. R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Com 'n., 120 Idaho 849,
853, 820 P.2d 1206, 1210 (1991). Cordova v. Bonneville County Joint School Dist. No. 93 , 144
Idaho 637, 167 P.3d 774, 778 (2007). "Determining the meaning of a statute and its application is
a matter oflaw over which this Court exercises fee review." J. R. Simplot Co. v. Western Heritage

Ins. Co., 132Idaho582,584, 977P.2d 196.198 (1999). Whetherthecomplaintinthepresentcase
states a claim upon which relief can be granted under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, Idaho
Code§§ 48-601through48-619, 1 is a legal question appropriately dealt with under Rule 12(b)(6).

1

In Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at p. 54, plaintiff argues that HTEH is in
violation of"Idaho's Unfair Trade Practices Act." However, Idaho has not adopted any legislative enactment thus
denominated. A similarly named statute, the Idaho Fair Trade Act, was repealed in 2000. See former Idaho Code §
48-301 et seq. Since plaintiff fails to cite to any statute, it is difficult to determine what law plaintiff is referring to.
In any event, it can be held as a matter oflaw that the Idaho Consumer Protection Act does not apply to the
allegations of plaintiff's complaint and that unfair trade practices acts adopted by other jurisdictions also do not
apply.
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c.

Standing Is a Question of Law..
The issue of whether the plaintiffhas standing to sue is a question oflaw. The Idaho courts

have in several cases upheld dismissal pursuant to Rule l 2(b)(6) oflawsuits where the complaint on
its face failed to allege facts that would show that the plaintiff had standing. See Thompson v. City
ofLewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002) (affirming dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of
taxpayer's complaint to invalidate adoption of urban renewal area plan); Young v. City ofKetchum,
137 Idaho 102, 44 P.3d 1157 (2002) (upholding Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of complaint of citizens
challenging validity of contract entered into by city); Osmunson v. State, 135 Idaho 292, 17 P .3d 236
(2000) (holding as a matter oflaw that school districts have no standing to sue the state under the
Constitutionally Based Education Claims Act, Idaho Code § 6-2201 et seq.); Student Loan Fund of
Idaho, Inc. v. Payette County, 125 Idaho 824, 875 P.2d 236 (Ct.App. 1994) (holding that landowner
lacked standing to challenge validity of agreement between city and county and certain
implementing ordinances).

Whether plaintiff Reed Taylor has standing to sue his litigation

adversaries' counsel for legal malpractice or other alleged causes of action is a question oflaw which
is appropriately determinable pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

D.

The Existence of a Privilege or Immunity Is a Question of Law.
HTEH is entitled to litigation privilege; i.e, Reed Taylor cannot sue HTEH for positions

advanced, statements made, or strategy adopted during the course oflitigation. The existence of a
privilege or immunity is a question oflaw. Nation v. State, Dept. of Correctiori 144 Idaho 177, 15 8
P .3d 953 (2007) (appellate court exercises free review over questions oflaw and, therefore, holding
oftrial court that Department of Correction is entitled as a matter oflaw to qualified immunity under
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42 U.S.C. § 1983 was affinned); Rincover v. State, Dept. ofFinance, Securities Bureau, 128 Idaho
653, 917 P.2d 1293 (1996) (Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal affirmed on growid of immunity); Smith v.

Reddy, 882F.Supp. 497 (D.Md. 1995) (qualified immunity protects government officials from civil
suits arising from their discretionary functions as a matter oflaw); Sanchez v. Coxon, 175 Ariz. 93,
854 P.2d 126 (1993); (absolute legislative immunity in defamation action is a question of law);

Darragh v. Superior Court, 183 Ariz. 79, 900 P.2d 1215 (Ariz.App. 1995) (appraiser's expert
testimony in judicial proceeding was absolutely privileged). "One of the most widely recognized
absolute privileges is that afforded participants in judicial proceedings. In various circumstances,
this privilege protects judges, parties, lawyers, witnesses and jurors. Whether the privilege exists
is a question oflaw for the court." Darragh, 183 Ariz. at 81, 900 P .2d at 1217. (Citations omitted)

E.

HTEH Is as a Matter of Law Entitled to the Defense of Lack of Privity.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "As a general rule, an attorney will be held liable for

negligence only to his or her client and not to someone with whom the attorney does not have an
attorney-client relationship." Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 13 7, 90 P .3d 884, 887 (2004).

Harrigfeld extended the attorney's duty to intended beneficiaries of testamentary instruments
prepared by the attorney. That is the only circumstance recognized by Idaho law where an attorney
owes a duty of care to parties with whom the attorney is not in privity. The issue of whether or not
to extend that duty to the circumstances of the present case is an issue of law to be decided by the
court, not an issue of fact for the jury. Plaintiff Reed Taylor argues a lawyer's duty of care should
be extended to the facts alleged in his complaint. Extended, expensive and contentious pre-trial
discovery will not shed more light on this issue. Whether the plaintiff can sue attorneys with whom
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he is not in privity for legal malpractice is an issue which is appropriate to determine under Rule
12(b)(6).

III. PLAINTIFF'S STANDING ARGUMENTS ARE WITHOUT MERIT

This case presents the unique and unusual issue of whether an individual may sue counsel
who have appeared in behalfof adverse parties in pending litigation. In support ofhis argument that
he has standing to bring a direct (not a derivative) action2 against other parties' attorneys, plaintiff
Reed Taylor advances eight different theories. Each theory can be shown to be without merit as a
matter oflaw.
A. Reed Taylor Is Not the Client ofHTEH.
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that many of Reed Taylor's arguments have the
cart before the horse; that is, they depend upon the assumption, although the complaint does not so
·--------

allege, that he has already prevailed in the lawsuit against AIA Services and AIA Insurance
(hereinafter the "Underlying Litigation") and has been awarded the reliefrequested in that litigation.
However, the Underlying Litigation involves vigorously contested issues oflaw and fact. It remains
to be seen whether, and to what extent, any of the parties will prevail in the Underlying Litigation.
Reed Taylor's basic assumption seems to be that anyone who opposes his litigation position in the
Underlying Litigation is acting wrongfully. Contrary to this basic misconception, the defendants
in the Underlying Litigation are entitled to due process. They are entitled to oppose Reed Taylor's
claims and to assert any defenses they have.

2

Plaintiff's counsel attempts to finesse this point by asserting that "Reed Taylor has standing to directly
bring certain derivative claims against Hawley Troxell." (Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p.
9) A direct derivative claim, of course, is an oxymoron.
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It should further be pointed out as a preliminary matter that Reed Taylor is not a creditor who
loaned money to a corporation and took a security interest in corporate assets as collateral. He
occupies the unique position of a redeeming shareholder who seeks payment .from an insolvent
corporation in preference to the rights of third-party creditors and other shareholders. His attempt
to place himself in the shoes of HTEH's clients is without merit and would be inimical to the
integrity of the judicial process because it would deprive HTEH' s clients ofthe right to independent
legal representation.

B.

Reed Taylor Lacks Standing to Sue Counsel for Opposing Parties.
"An attorney owes no duty to a third party in an adversarial relationship." Bowman v. Two,

104Wash.2d181, 188, 704 P.2d 140 (1085). "Existence of a duty to an adversary party beyond the
courtesy and respect owed all participants in the legal process ... would interfere with the undivided
loyalty an attorney owes a client and would diminish an attorney's ability to achieve the most
advantageous position for a client." Id. at 189.

As litigation counsel for the AIA Services, AIA

Insurance and CropUSA, HTEH owes no duty to represent the interests ofReed Taylor, and he has
no standing to object to the manner in which HTEH discharges its duties to its clients.

1.

Reed Taylor Bas No Standing to Sue BTEB Directly as a Stock Pledgee.

Reed Taylor's first theory is that he has standing to sue HTEH directly because stock in a
subsidiary corporation (AIA Insurance) is pledged as security for the payment of the redemption
price by the insolvent parent corporation (AIA Services). He asserts he may bring direct claims
against third parties to preserve his interest in the stock of AIA Insurance. However, this theory
disregards the obvious point that HTEH does not have possession of, or claim any interest in, such
stock. Nor does the complaint allege that such is the case. The complaint alleges only that HTEH,
DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 9
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acting as defense counsel, has asserted positions contrary to those espoused by Reed Taylor.

3

HTEH is entitled to represent its clients' legal positions in court and cannot be held liable to Reed ·
Taylor for doing so.
The cases cited by Reed Taylor are inapposite. For example, in Empire Life Ins. Co. of

America v. Valdak Corp., 468 F.2d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 1972), the court was careful to pointout that,

"It is, however, an established rule that if a plaintiff sues in a stockholder capacity for corporate
mismanagement, he must bring the suit derivatively in the name of the corporation." While some
courts have recognized an exception to the rule where the act complained of creates a cause of action

in favor of the shareholder, as an individual, "(t]hat exception to the general rule does not arise,
however, merely because the acts complained of resulted in damages both to the corporation and to
the stockholder, but is confined to cases where the wrong itself amounts to a breach of duty owed
to the stockholder personally." Id. at 335. As will be discussed in greater detail infra, HTEH owes
no duty to Reed Taylor. To the contrary, HTEH's duty is solely to advocate the legal position of its
clients, who dispute Reed Taylor's claims that he possesses an enforceable right to receive
preferential payment for his stock in AIA Services or is entitled to enforce his security interest in
assets of that corporation while it is insolvent or if doing so would render it insolvent.
In Gustafson v. Gustafson, 47 Wash.App. 272, 734 P.2d 949 (1987), relied upon by Reed
Taylor, the ex-spouse of a shareholder and the pledgee of the shareholder's stock as security for
amounts owing pursuant to a divorce decree was held to possess both a derivative and a direct cause
3

For example, par. 14 of Reed Taylor's complaint alleges that HTEH "engaged in inappropriate conduct in
assisting parties (including R. John Taylor) in obtaining and/or maintaining a restraining order and preliminary
injunction against Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, when Defendants knew there was no legitimate legal basis to do so, that
doing so was an intentional violation and tortious interference with Reed J. Taylor's contractual rights, and that the
assets and funds of AIA Insurance, Inc., were being misappropriated and/or not safeguarded."
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of action against the si1areholder for fraudulent dissipation of corporate assets. Gustafson did not
hold that the ex-spouse possessed a direct cause of action against either her former husband's
lawyers or the corporation's lawyers. In the present case, Reed Taylor does not allege that he has .
any direct contractual or other relationship with HTEH, as was the case between Mr. and Mrs.
Gustasfson.

Reed Taylor has no standing to bring suit against counsel for opposing parties in

pending litigation.

2.
Reed Taylor Has No Standing to Sue HfEH Directly because He Allegedly Is
Entitled to Become the Sole Shareholder of AJA Insurance.
Reed Taylor's second theory is that he has standing to sue HTEH directly because he "stands

in the shoes of the sole shareholder ofAIA Insurance." (Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss, p. 10) This argument is evidently predicated on the assumption that Reed Taylor is
entitled to repossess the stock of AlA Insurance and to become its sole shareholder. Reed Taylor
has the cart before the horse. The Court in the Underlying Litigation has not ruled that he is entitled
to exercise that remedy, and certainly has not ruled that he is entitled to regain ownership and resume
operation of AIA Insurance. If, in fact, Reed Taylor is a secured creditor, his obligation upon
repossession of any collateral is to dispose of such collateral in a commercially reasonable manner.
Idaho Code § 28-9-620 provides that a secured creditor may accept collateral in full or partial
satisfaction of a debt only if the debtor consents. The complaint does not allege that the debtor has
given such consent. In the absence thereof, the secured creditor is under a compulsory obligation
to sell t:lte collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. Idaho Code § 28-9-620.
Reed Taylor fails to explain how, as an insider who is attempting to redeem his stock in an
insolvent corporation, he purportedly has standing to sue litigation counsel for the corporation. True,
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HTEH has advocated in open court positions which are contrary to Reed Taylor's proposed course
·· of action, but they are fully entitled, and indeed ethically obligated, to do.so·. - ·
Reed Taylor also relies on the case of Steelman v. Mallory, 110 Idaho 510, 716 P.2d 1282
(1986), but that case holds only that a minority shareholder and director can sue other directors who
usurped a corporate opportunity. The Steelman holding was clarified by the subsequent case of
McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228, 61 P.3d 585 (2002), where the plaintiff contended that a
shareholder in a closely-held corporation can bring a direct action against corporate directors for
wrongs allegedly committed against the corporation. The trial court dismissed the complaint,
stating:
Plaintiff can bring an individual action where he has suffered a special injury distinct
from that of the other shareholders. [The alleged claims] do not affect Ron Mccann
specifically. Individual actions generally include claims to enforce shareholder's
rights to inspect books or vote or redeem stock; to compel dividends; to have the
corporation dissolved; and to enforce a shareholder's agreement. They generally do
not include suits alleging violations of duties by corporate officers, such as
negligence, mismanagement, self-dealing, excessive compensation or squeeze outs.
Id. at 233, 61 P .3d at 590.

The trial court in McCann concluded that the shareholder's claims were derivative in nature
and dismissed the complaint for failure to comply with the 90-day notice requirement foll>ringing
a derivative action. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, holding that "An action brought by a
shareholder is derivative ifthe gravamen of the complaint is the injury to the corporation or to the
whole body of its stock or property and not injury to the plaintiff's individual interest as a
stockholder." Id. at 233, 61 P.3d at 590.
McCann applies with double force to parties who are not corporate officers or directors, but
litigation counsel for the corporations. The acts and omissions alleged by Reed Taylor in his
DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 12
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complaint against HTEH do not aver the violation of any individualized duty owing by HTEH to
Reed Taylor. Indeed, that would·be impossible since HTEH does not owe any duties to him. Rather,
the complaint seeks to allege violations of duties ostensibly owed by HTEH to the corporations as
a whole. Reed Taylor may bring such claims against HTEH, if at all, only as a derivative action
subject to the 90-day notice requirement of Idaho Code § 30-1-742 and the independent panel
inquiry requirements ofldaho Code§ 30-1-744.

3.
Reed Taylor Has No Standing to Sue HTEH Directly as a Secured Creditor of
AJA Services.
Part of the intellectual murkiness of Reed Taylor's complaint in this action is the tendency
to conflate AIA Services and AIA Insurance with their litigation counsel. It does not follow that
Reed Taylor has standing to sue IITEH simply because of the existence of a justiciable dispute
between himself and the corporations.
Reed Taylor argues he is entitled to bring a direct suit against HTEH because he claims to
be a secured creditor of AIA Services and alleges that the corporation made an unauthorized
disposition of its collateral.

His complaint does not allege that HTEH made an unauthorized

disposition of such collateral or is in possession of the collateral, other than with respect to payment
of attorney's fees (which will be addressed infra).

Whether or not Reed Taylor as an alleged

secured creditor possesses a direct cause of action against the corporation is meaningless insofar as
he now seeks to sue HTEH directly.
\\

\\
\\
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4.
Reed Taylor Does Not Have Standing to Sue HTEH Directly as a Creditor of
AIA Services.
Reed Taylor's argument on this point is merely a repeat ofhis previously argument. Whether
he claims to be a secured or unsecured creditor makes no difference. He still lacks standing to sue
the attorneys of his litigation adversaries.

5.
Reed Taylor Does Not Have Standing to Sue HfEH Directly because He Is
Allegedly the Only Authorized Director and Officer of AIA Insurance.
The Court in the Underlying Litigation has not so ruled. It is entirely proper for the AlA
entities to retain counsel to represent their position in regard to this issue.

6.
Reed Taylor Does Not Have Standing to Sue HTEH Directly because He Is
Allegedly the Only Director and Shareholder of AJA Insurance.
The Court in the Underlying Litigation has not so ruled. It is entirely proper for the AIA
entities to retain counsel to represent their position in regard to this issue.

7.
Reed Taylor Does Not Have Standing to Sue HTEH Directly as a Third-party
Beneficiary.
The complaint does not allege that Reed Taylor is the third-party beneficiary of any contract,
and his brief is unclear regarding what contract, if any, he claims was entered into for his intended
benefit. Where the plaintiff has totally failed to allege any facts to support his theory, it is not the
task of the defendants or the court to speculate on whether such facts may exist.

8.
Reed Taylor Does Not Have Standing to Sue HTEH Directly as a Cumulative
Result of the Foregoing Seven Theories.
Seven erroneous and deficient theories, whether taken individually or cumulatively, still do
not amount to a showing that Reed Taylor occupies a position that would give rise to any duty on
the part of HTEH to protect or represent his interest.
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IV.

AJA SERVICES, AIA INSURANCE AND CROPUSA ARE
ENTITLED TO REPRESENTATION IN THE UNDERLYING
LITIGATION BY COUNSEL OF THEffi OWN CHOICE

The basic. and fatal assumption which undergirds the complaint in this action is that the
litigation strategy of HTEH as counsel for AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and CropUSA is wrongful
simply because it fails to meet the approbation of Reed Taylor. In bis view, any position espoused
by opposing parties or their attorneys in the Underlying Litigation which is contrary to his claims
somehow constitutes a tortious action. For example, if 14 of the complaint alleges that defendants
"engaged in inappropriate conduct in assisting interested parties (including R. John Taylor) in
obtaining and/or maintaining a restraining order and preliminary injunction." Paragraph 15 of the
complaint alleges in effect that defendants declined to abandon their litigation position after Reed
Taylor obtained partial summary judgment in the Underlying Litigation. Paragraph 16 alleges that
defendants have knowledge that Reed Taylor's allegations in the Underlying Litigation include
claims of breaches of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, fraudulent conveyance and fraud against R. John
Taylor and others. Paragraph 17 alleges that defendants appeared as counsel for the AIA Services
and AIA Insurance in the Underlying Litigation. Paragraph 18 alleges that defendants represent
AIA Services and AIA Insurance in the Underlying Litigation despite the demands of Reed Taylor's
Washington counsel, Roderick Bond. Paragraph 19 alleges defendants entered into a joint defense
agreement. Paragraphs 20, 21 and 22 allege defendants violated an ostensible duty not to represent
more than one party in the Underlying Litigation. Paragraph 22 alleges that it was improper for
defendants to enter into a joint defense agreement in the Underlying Litigation. Paragraph 23 alleges
defendants violated the Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to obtain the consent of unnamed
"interested parties" before undertaking the representation of parties in the Underlying Litigation.
DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 15
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Paragraph 24 alleges defendants improperly represented CropUSA in the Underlying Litigation.
And so the complaint goes on for another 20 paragraphs objecting to HTEH's actions as litigation
counsel in the Underlying Litigation.
It perhaps states the obvious that Reed Taylor is not the proper party to select counsel for his

adversaries in the Underlying Litigation or to dictate the litigation strategy of opposing parties. The
AIA entities as presently constituted are entitled to select counsel oftheir own choosing. Idaho Rule
of Professional Conduct 1.13(a) provides that a lawyer employed or retained by an organization
"represents the organization acting through its authorized constituents." Comment 1 states that
officers, directors and shareholders are the "constituents" ofthe corporate client Comment 5 makes
clear that "the organization's highest authority to whom a matter may be referred ordinarily will be
the board of directors." Idaho Code § 30-1-801(2) provides that "All corporate powers shall be
exercised by or under the authority of the of, and the business and affairs of the corporation managed
by or under the direction of, its board of directors."
It is within the purview of the boards of directors of AIA Services, AIA Insurance and Crop

USA to instruct their counsel of positions to be taken in the Underlying Litigation, and it is part of
the duty of loyalty and care of HTEH to their corporate clients to advise them regarding litigation
strategy. The theories advanced, positions taken, comments made and defenses raised by HTEH

in the Underlying Litigation are protected by the litigation privilege. See Alpert v. Crain, Caton &
James, P.C., 178 S.W. 2d 398 (Tex.App. 2005); CSX Transportation, Inc. v Gilkinson, 2007 WL

858423 (N.D.W.Va. 2007); Weaver v. Superior Court, 95 Cal.App. 3d 166, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745
(1979); Clarkv. Drockman, 281 W.Va. 417, 624 S.E. 2d 864 (2005); Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich.
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-1, 312 N.W.2d 585 (1981).

All allegations of Reed Taylor's complaint which find fault with

litigation stance of HTEH and its clients in the Underlying Litigation must be dismissed.

V.

A.

THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR
AIDING AND ABETIING OR CIVIL CONSPIRACY

Representation of a Client in a Lawsuit Does Not Constitute Aiding and Abetting.
Closely related to the issue of whether HTEH is protected from liability to Reed Taylor under

the litigation privilege is the question of whether that law firm can be held liable for "aiding and
abetting'' the acts and omissions of its corporate clients simply by representing its clients. It is clear
from the allegations of Reed Taylor's complaint that his principal, if not only, lament is the refusal
of the AIA entities, and by extension their counsel, to succumb to his demands. His pleading in the
present case is premised on the assumption that all his claims in the Underlying Litigation are
meritorious and the AIA entities have no right to raise any defenses or objections to those claims.
He is eager to dispense with the expedient of a trial of his case against the AJA entities and to transit
directly to a lawswt against their litigation counsel.
Chief among Reed Taylor's claims is that, as a redeemed shareholder, he is entitled to be paid
preferentially for the redemption of his stock, even though AIA Services is, and according to his
complaint has been since at least 2001, insolvent. By definition, ifhe were to prevail on this claim,
all other shareholders and all other creditors of AIA Services will receive nothing from the
liqwdation and distribution of the corporation's assets. In defense to this proposition, the AIA
entities have asserted that under Idaho law a corporation may not distribute its assets to a redeemed
shareholder when it is insolvent or would thereby be rendered insolvent. This defense is of more
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than academic interest to the directors of AIA Insurance because under Idaho Code § 30-1-48, as in
4

effect in 1996, they are personally liable for unlawful distributions to redeemed shareholders.

Idaho Code § 30-1-6, in effect in 1996 when Reed Taylor entered into the restructured stock
redemption agreement with AIA Services, authorized a corporation to redeem or otherwise acquire
its own shares only to the extent of"unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus available therefor,
and, " ... with the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of all shares entitled to vote thereon,
to the extent of unreserved and unrestricted capital surplus available therefor." The statute further
provided: ''No purchase or payment for its own shares shall be made at a time when the corporation
is insolvent or when such purchase or payment would make it insolvent." Idaho Code § 30-1-46,
as in effect in 1996, more generally authorized a corporation to distribute a portion of its assets to
its shareholders out of capital surplus, subject however to the condition that "[n]o such distribution
shall be made at a time when the corporation is insolvent or when such distribution would render the
corporation insolvent." Pursuant to the savings provision ofldaho Code§ 30-1-1703, effective July
1, 1997, the provisions of the Idaho Business Corporations Act in effect when the restructured
redemption agreement was entered into in 1996 continue to govern the validity of the transaction.
In re Lake Country Investments, LLC, 255 B.R. 588, 600 (2000).

Although Reed Taylor evidently demurs, theAIA entities and HTEH have raised the defense
in the Underlying Litigation thatAIA Services was insolvent or rendered insolvent by the agreement

4rdaho Code§ 30-l-48(b), as in effect in 1996 and thus applicable to the redemption of Reed Taylor's stock,
provided: "A director who votes for or assents to the purchase of corporation's own shares contrary to the provisions
of this act shall be liable to the corporation, jointly and severally with all other directors so voting or assenting, for
the amount of consideration paid for such shares whiph is in excess of the maximum amount which could have been
paid therefor without a violation of the provisions of this act." See Idaho Code § 30-1-833 for the corresponding
provision of the Revised Model Corporation Act, adopted in Idaho in 1997.
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-to redeem his stock. The insolvency of AIA Services can hardly have come as a surprise to him.
Who better than the chief executive officer and largest shareholder of AIA Services to understand
that he was rendering the corporation insolvent by redeeming his stock? Who better. to realize that
this would leave the remaining shareholders and creditors of the corporation in the lurch? The
unique structure ofthe promissory note payable to Reed Taylor (interest only for ten years) suggests
strongly he was aware the corporation was insolvent and, therefore, lacked funds to pay him.
While the Court in the Underlying Litigation has ruled that Reed Taylor's promissory note
is in default, his entitlement to payment has not yet been established. The AJA entities, through
their counsel HTEH, are entitled to raise the defense in the Underlying Litigation that payment of
the note is prohibited because the corporation was insolvent. This issue has not been resolved in the
Underlying Litigation. Indeed, the assertion of defenses, even if novel or innovative, are protected
by the litigation privilege. Reed Taylor possesses no cause ofaction against HTEH for its fulfillment
of its duty to represent its clients zealously in the Underlying Litigation.
B.

The Complaint Fails to State a Claim for Civil Conspiracy.
1.

A Complaint for Civil Conspiracy Must Allege an Underlying Wrongful Act or
the Commission of a Lawful Act to Achieve an Unlawful Objective.

"A civil conspiracy that gives rise to legal remedies exists only if there is an agreement

between two or more to accomplish an unlawful objective or to accomplish a lawful objective in an
unlawful manner." McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 395, 64 P.3d 317, 321 (2003). "An
agreement between two or more persons, to do or accomplish something which is in itselflawful and
does not contemplate or employ any unlawful means for its consummation, and which does not
injure or damage the prospective victim (so called), is not actionable. Such an agreement is not a
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conspiracy for the reason that an agreement can become a conspiracy only when it has for its purpose
the doing or accomplishing something that is criminal or unlawful, or some lawful thing in an
unlawful manner." Kloppenburg v. Mays, 60 Idaho 19 (1939).
Thus,"[ c]ivil conspiracy is not, by itself, a claim for relief." McPheters, 138 Idaho at 395,

64 P:3d at 321 (emphasis added). Rather, "civil conspiracy is a derivative tort that relies on an
underlying actionable wrong." Cunningham v. Jensen, 2005 WL 2220022, at *8 (Idaho 2005). If
a civil conspiracy is established, it has the effect of making all of the defendants liable for each
individual act of each of the other defendants. Dahlquist v. Mattson, 40 Idaho 378, 390, 23 3 P. 883,
887 (Idaho 1925).
The complaint in the present case is legally insufficient because it fails to allege either that

HTEH committed an unlawful act or it engaged in lawful conduct in order to achieve an unlawful
objective. Not only is in not lJ!llawful for attorneys to represent their clients zealously in litigation,
they are under a duty to do so. And the mere fact that the clients may not prevail in litigation does
not convert their defense counsel into co-conspirators.

2.

Agents Cannot Conspire with their Principal.

"[l]t is fundamental that an agent cannot conspire with his principal." Harvey v. Fearless

Farris Wholesale, Inc., 589 F.2d 451, 457 (9th Cir. 1978). The explanation for this rule is that,
"[s]ince a corporate entity cannot conspire with itself[,] a civil conspiracy is not legally possible
where a corporation and its alleged coconspirators are not separate entities, but, rather, stand in either
a principal-agent or employer-employee relationship with the corporation."

16 Am.Jur.2d

Conspiracy § 56 (1998) (emphasis added).
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Idahcf follows this "fundamental" principle of conspiracy law. See Afton Energy, Inc. v.
Idalio Power Co., 122 Idaho 333, 340, 834 P.2d 850, 857 (1992) ("A corporation cannot conspire
with its officers or agents to violate the antitrust laws.") Indeed, it follows logically froni the
requirement that a civil conspiracy consist of "an agreement between two or more to accomplish an
unlawful objective or to accomplish a lawful objective in an unlawful manner." McPheters v. Maile,
138 Idaho 391, 395, 64 P.3d 317, 321 (2003) (emphasis added). "[A]lthoughacorporation's agents
may render the corporation liable for torts committed in the scope of their employment, an agent or
multiple agents may not render the corporation liable for a civil conspiracy involving only corporate
agents." McClain v. Pactiv Corp., 602 S.E.2d 87, 90 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004) (citations omitted). "A
conspiracy cannot exist where the two or more persons involved in the alleged conspiracy were
merely interchangeable entities or were essentially conducting a single act as a single entity....
Similarly, a conspiracy cannot exist between a principal and an agent or servant." Israeli Aircraft
Indus., Ltd. v. Sanwa Bus. Credit Corp., 850 F. Supp. 686, 693-94 (N.D. ill. 1993).

In other words, Defendant and the agents through which it conducts business are legally
incapable of"conspiring" to harm Plaintiff. Plaintiff's attempt to avoid this reality by alternative
pleading is ineffectual. While he attempts, in the alternative, to pleading the existence of an agency
relationship, to deny the existence of such a relationship or to claim that the individual defendants
acted outside the scope of their agency relationship, these alternative allegations are wholly
conclusory.

3.

The Complaint Fails to Plead Conspiracy with Particularity.

Even if plaintiff's civil conspiracy claim were legally tenable, it is inadequately pleaded.
Where the "object of the alleged conspiracy is fraudulent," civil conspiracy must be pleaded with
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particularity. Wasco Prods., Inc. v. Southwall Techs., Inc., 435 F.3d 989, 990-92 (9th Cir. 2006).
Rule 9(b)'s pleading standards apply. Vess, 317 F.3d at 1103-04; MA. Deately Constr. v. City of

Lewiston, 2006 WL 980730, at *2 (D. Idaho 2006). In addition to pleading the circumstances of
fraud with particularity, the plaintiff is required to "plead at least the basic elements of the
conspiracy, especiallytheexistenceof anagreement." Wasco, 435 F.3d at990. In other words, "[t]o
successfully plead [a civil conspiracy] cause of action, plaintiff must more clearly allege specific
action on the part of each defendant that corresponds to the elements of a conspiracy cause of
action." Accuimage Diagnostics Corp v. Terarecon, Inc., 260 F. Supp.2d 941, 948 (N .D. Cal. 2003).
Here, however, plaintiffs civil conspiracy claim is devoid of any specific allegations
supporting even the basic elements of a conspiracy. To establish a civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must
prove "an agreement between two or more to accomplish an unlawful objective or to accomplish a
lawful objective in an unlawful manner'' and the commission of a civil wrong that injures or
damages the victim. McPheters, 138 Idaho at 395, 64 P.3d at 321. Rather than plead any facts
detailing the supposed conspiracy, including any conspiratorial agreement and the role each
individual played in the conspiracy, plaintiff merely makes conclusory assertions that a conspiracy
existed.

VI.

THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT

Notwithstanding plaintiff's arguments, the fact remains that a principal and agent are treated
as one for purposes of analyzing whether tortious interference with contract has occurred. It is a
legal absurdity to allege that an agent interfered with its principal' s contract. See BECO Const. Co.,

Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 145 Idaho 719, 184P.3d 844 (2008); Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp.
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141 Idaho 233, 108 P.3d 380 (2005); 'Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200,
61 P.3d 557 (2002); Leon v. Boise State University, 125 Idaho 365, 870 P.2d_ 1324 (1994);

Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, Inc., 123 Idaho 650, 654, 851 P.2d 946, 950
(1993).

VII.

THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR CONVERSION

The complaint fails to allege that HTEH exerted control over or possession of any
identifiable personal property belonging to Reed Taylor or in which he possessed a perfected
security interest. It is alleged only that HTEH accepted payment of attorney's fees and costs.5
There is nothing improper about AIA Services and AIA Insurance retaining counsel to
defend them in the Underlying Litigation or paying the fees of their defense counsel. The existence
of a claim by alleged secured creditor does not preclude a debtor from paying its legal bills or other
obligations as they fall due. If Reed Taylor's conversion theory were correct, then neither of the

AIA entities could pay the wages ofits employees, rent, taxes, operating expenses or amounts owing
to trade creditors. All payments to anyone other than the alleged secured creditor, Reed Taylor,
would be improper. Idaho Code§ 28-9-332 protects payees:
(a)
A transferee of money takes the money free of a security interest
unless the transferee acts in collusion with the debtor in violating the rights of the
secured party.

5

Paragraph 55 of the complaint alleges that defendants "assisted in the inappropriate titling and pledging of
a $1.2 Million Mortgage owned by AJA Services Corporation...." However, the complaint does not allege that
HTEH became the owner of the mortgage or that HTEH at any time possessed or controlled the note and mortgage.
Even if it could be inferred that Reed Taylor claims a perfected security interest in the mortgage, which is far from
clear, his security interest would continue despite any transfer or assignment of the mortgage. Idaho Code § 28-9201 (a).
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(b)
A transferee of funds from a deposit account takes the funds free of
a security interest in the deposit account unless the transferee acts in collusion:with
the debtor in violating the rights of the secured party.

Representation by an law firm of a party in a lawsuit cannot be said to constitute collusive
action to violate the rights of a secured party. The AIA entities are entitled to retain attorneys to
defend themselves and to compensate their attorneys for services rendered.

VIII. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR
VIOLATION OF THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
Evidently, Reed Taylor has abandoned this claim, since his brief does not cite any authority

in support of this contention that HTEH violated the Consumer Protection Act. Instead, he switches
his theory to violation of the "Unfair Trade Practices Act.,, (Plainti:frs Response to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss, pp. 53-55) There is no such act in effect in this State, and the laws of other
states are not entitled to extraterritorial application where none of the events alleged in the complaint
occurred in such states.

IX.

THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE
The elements of a cause of action for legal malpractice are well-established in this State:
To establish a claim for attorney malpractice/professional negligence, the plaintiff
must show: (1) the creation of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the existence of a
duty on the part of the lawyer; (3) the breach of the duty of the standard of care by
the lawyer; and (4) that the failure to perform the duty was a proximate cause of the
damages suffered by the client.

Estate ofBecker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 526, 96 P.3d 623, 627 (2004)
Plaintiff Reed Taylor's complaint is deficient because it fails to allege facts to establish an
attorney-client relationship between HTEH and himself, the existence of any duty on the part of
HTEH to him, or the breach of any duty owing by HTEH to him, and fails entirely to allege how any
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act or omission ofHTEH was the proximate cause of any damages allegedly suffered by him. Reed
Taylor's novel theory th.at he is entitled to direct the actions of his litigation opponents' attorneys
finds no support in law and should be rejected.· To the contrary, the actions ofHTEH in the course
of the Underlying Litigation and related adversarial matters is protected by the litigation privilege.

See, e.g., Robinson v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 940 F.2d 1369 (10th Cir. 1991); Garcia v. Rody,
Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, 106 N.M. 757, 761, 750 P.2d 118, 122 (1988).
X. LEAVE SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT
Because plaintiff has only stated his intent to move for leave to amend if the motion to
dismiss is granted and has not provided the Court or counsel with a copy of the proposed
amendment, it is difficult to respond to plaintifrs argument that he should be allowed to amend his
complaint. Defendants, however, entertain serious doubts that any conceivable set of facts can be
pleaded under the circumstances of this case which state a valid claim for relief. Whether to permit
an amended pleading is committed to the sound discretion of the Court, which is not obligated to
grant leave to amend when the amendment would be a futile act. "A court may consider whether
the allegations sought to be added to the complaint state a valid claim in determining whether to
grant leave to amend the complaint." Estate ofBecker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 527, 96 P.3d
623, 628 (2004). See also U. S. v. Union Corp., 194 F.R.D. 223, 237 (E.D.Pa. 2000) (An
"amendment is futile ifthe [pleadings], as amended would not survive a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."); Gragossian v. Cardinal Health Inc., 2008 WL
2157004, at *l (S.D.Cal. 2008) (It would be futile to allow leave to amend "where the proposed
complaint contained only conclusory allegations without supporting facts."); V. Mane Fils, S.A. v.

/-...._

International Flavors and Fragrances Inc., 2008 WL 2559345, at *2 (D.N.J. 2008) ("A proposed
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amendment is futile when it cannot withstand a motion to dismiss. To survive a motion to dismi~s •.
the complaint's factual allegations must be enough to-raise a right to relief ~ove the speculative :
level, on the assumption that all the allegations are true.") (citations and _internal punctuation
omitted); In re Everfresh Beverages. Inc., 238 B.R. 558, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("[E]ven liberal
oonstruction has its limits. '[F]or the pleading must atleast set forth s_ufficient information for the
court to determine whether some recognized legal theory exists on which relief could be afforded
the pleader.")

XI.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff Reed Taylor's complaint attempts to plead a set of unique propositions but is
deficient as a matter oflaw. Reed Taylor has no standing to sue HTEH for malpractice or any of the
related claims he attempts to allege. HTEH has a duty to represent its clients, not Reed Taylor. He
is not entitled to direct HTEH's actions or to require that HTEH represent his interest in pending
litigation in derogation of the interests of its clients.
Whether or not the complaint states a claim upon which reliefcan be granted is not a question
of fact to be decided by a jury, but a question of law to be determined by the Court. There are no
issues pled by the complaint which are entitled to proceed to trial, because even if all the factual
allegations of the complaint (as opposed to unwarranted legal conclusions and "opprobious
epithets") were assumed to be true, he simply has not stated a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Dismissal pursuant to I.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is appropriate.

\\
\\
\\
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DATED this

10

day of October, 2008.

ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the JD day of October, 2008, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner indicated
below:
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 416
Spokane, VIA 99201

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission (509) 455-7111
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James D. LaRue ISB #1780
Loren C. Ipsen ISB #1767
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 E. Front Street, SUite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701 ...
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
E & B File No. 7082-0013
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No. CV 08-01765

Plaintiff,

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND
COMPLAINT

v.
GARY D. BABBITI, an individual; D. JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES 1-X,
unknown individuals;
Defendants.

Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Elam & Burke, P.A., hereby submit the
following memorandum in opposition of plaintiff's motion of amend his complaint.
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INTRODUCTION
The Court has been provided briefs and heard oral arguments on Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to
Dismiss in this and the companion case filed by plaintiff against the Clements, Brown & McNichols
law firm. The Motions to Dismiss were based on the legal principles of lack of privity, lack of
standing, lack of duty, and the litigation privilege. Plaintiff's proposed amended complaintalleging
direct claims suffers from the same legal deficiencies as the original complaint. Insofar as plaintiff's
proposed amended complaint alleges derivative claims, these claims also fail as a matter oflaw.

AMENDING THE COMPLAINT WOULD BE A FUTILE ACT
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), when a party moves for leave to amend his
pleading "leave shall be freely given whenever justice so requires." Whether to permit an amended
pleading is committed to the sound discretion ofthe trial court. McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 22 8,

61P.3d585 (2002); Hinesv. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 934 P.2d20 (1997);Hinkle v. Winey, 126 Idaho
993, 895 P.2d 594 (Ct.App. 1995). In determining whether an amended complaint should be
allowed, the court may consider whether the new claims proposed to be inserted into the action by
the amended complaint state a valid claim or whether the opposing party has an available defense
to the newly added claim. Spur Products Corporation v. Stoel Rives LLP, 142 Idaho 41, 44, 122 P .3d
300 303 (2005); Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc., v. Idaho First Nat'/. Bank, 119 Idaho 171,
804 P.2d 900 (1991). See also Estate ofBecker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 527, 96 P.3d 623, 628
(2004) ("A court may consider whether the allegations sought to be added to the complaint state a
valid claim in determining whether to grant leave to amend the complaint.") See also Stonewall

Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 318, 971P.2d1142 (1998); Bissett v. State,
111 Idaho 865, 727 P.2d 1293 (Ct.App. 1986).

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSIDON TO
.... MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 2

. Lf55

001345

The trial court should decline to grant leave to amend where the amendment would be a futile
act. Wells

_v. United States Life Ins,. Co. 119 Idaho 160, 804 P.2d 333 (Ct.App. 1991). An

"amen~e_n.Hs futile _if the [pleadings], as amended, would not survive a motion.to::dismiss for - ·

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." U.S. v. Union Corp., 194 F.R.D. 223,_237
(E.D.Pa. 2000). See also Gragossian v. Cardinal Health Inc., 2008 WL 2157004, at ~l (S.D.Cal.
2008) (It would be futile to allow leave to amend ''where the proposed complaint contained only
conclusory allegations without supporting facts."); V. Mane Fils, S.A. v. International Flavors and

Fragrances Inc., 2008 WL 2559345, at *2 (D.N.J. 2008) ("A proposed amendment is futile when
it cannot withstand a motion to dismiss. To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint's factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption
that all the allegations are true.") (citations and internal punctuation omitted); In re Everfresh

Beverages, Inc., 238 B.R. 558, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("[E]ven liberal construction has its limits.
'[F]or the pleading must at least set forth sufficient information for the court to determine whether
some recognized legal theory exists on which relief could be afforded the pleader.")

AMENDING THE COMPLAINT WOULD BE FUTILE WHERE
THE PLAINTIFF CANNOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION
With respect to Reed Taylor's so-called direct claims, leave to amend should be denied
because, as a matter oflaw, Mr. Taylor has not and, indeed, cannot state a cause of action against
counsel for opposing parties. While the trial court cannot consider the sufficiency of the evidence
in deciding whether to allow the proposed amendment, Spur Products Corporation v. Stoel Rives

UP, 142 Idaho 41, 44,122 P.3d 300 303 (2005), sufficiency of the evidence is not an issue here
because the attempt to sue attorneys not in privity:with the plaintiff is barred as a matter of law.
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A.

As a Matter of Law, the Defendants Owed No Duty to Plaintiff

The question of whether a legal duty exists is a question of law for the court to decide.

Freeman v. Juicer, 119 Idaho 555, 556•5.S.-7~.808 P.2d 1300, 1301-1302 (1991); Chavez v. Barrus,
2008 WL 3905436, at *5 (Idaho 2008); Estate ofBecker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 525, 96 P.2d
3d 623, 627 (2004); Daleiden v. Jefferson County Joint School Dist. No. 251, 139 Idaho 466, 468,
80P.3d 1067, 1069(2003); Udyv. Custer County, 136Idaho386,389,34P.3d 1069, 1072(2001);

Boots ex rel. Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 179 P.2d 352, 356 (Ct.App. 2008). Except in the
narrow circumstance of an attorney drafting testamentary instruments, an attorney owes no duty
under Idaho law to third parties who are not his clients. Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 139,
90 P .3d 884, 889 (2004). The proposed amended complaint does not allege any facts that would
come within the Harrigfeld exception. Therefore, it should be held as a matter of law that the
defendants cannot be held liable to Mr. Taylor under any theory professional negligence.

B.

As a Matter of Law, Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Sue Other Parties' Counsel

The issue of whether the plaintiff has standing is a question oflaw. Thompson v. City of

Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002); Youngv. City ofKetchum, 137 Idaho 102, 44 P.3d
1157 (2002); Osmunson v. State, 135 Idaho 292, 17 P.3d 236 (2000); Student Loan Fund ofIdaho,

Inc. v. Payette County, 125 Idaho 824, 875 P.2d 236 (Ct.App. 1994). As a matter oflaw, Reed
Taylor lacks standing to sue lawyers who do not represent him for an alleged breach of duty. It
would be a futile act to grant leave to amend the complaint where it fails to allege a viable cause of
action for breach of duty, whether denominated legal malpractice or breach of :fiduciary duty.

In Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005), the Taylors, as remainder
beneficiaries of a trust, attempted to sue the trustee's attorney for legal malpractice. After a thorough
DEFENDANfS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 4
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discussion of the Harrigfeld factors, the Court affirmed dismissal under Rule l 2(b)(6) of the claim
of malpractice against the attorney:
·,ifiJ_. ··

,._,._

The third count of the complaint asserts a professiona.Ftiialpractice claim
against Mr. Maile and this count is precluded by the general rule espoused in
Harrigfeld that an attorney-client relationship with the plaintiff is a prerequisite for
holding the attorney liable for negligence in the performance oflegal services.
·· ·

Id. at 259, 127 P.3d 156.
The Court in Maile also upheld dismissal of the claim ofbreach of fiduciary duty against the
attorney because he had assumed no fiduciary duty to them; he was acting as counsel for the
fiduciary rather than as a fiduciary himself. In the present case, the amended complaint alleges no
facts which would give rise either to a duty of care or a fiduciary duty on the part of the defendants
to Mr. Taylor. It would be a futile act to grant leave to amend the complaint merely to assert
nonviable claims.

C.

As a Matter of Law, Plaintiff Lacks Privity with Defendants

The issue of whether plaintiff and defendants were in privity in the circumstances of the
present case is an issue of law to be decided by the court, not an issue of fact for the jury. In the
absence of privity, the plaintiffhas no cause ofaction against defendants for malpractice, Harrigfeld

v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 139, 90 P.3d 884, 889 (2004), or breach of fiduciary duty, Taylor v.
Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005). Since the proposed amended complaint fails to allege
any facts which would establish privity, leave to amend is not warranted.

D.

As a Matter of Law, Plaintiff Has No Cause of Action under the I.C.P.A.

Statutory construction is a pure question oflaw. Cordova v. Bonneville County Joint School

Dist. No. 93, 144Idaho 637, 167P.3d 774, 778 (2007);HaydenLakeFireProtectionDist. v.Alcorn,
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141Idaho388, 398, 111P.3d73, 82 (2005); Crawford v. Dept. ofCorrection, 133 Idaho 633, 635,
991 P.2d 358, 360 (1999); J. R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Com 'n ., 120 Idaho 849, 853, 820
P.2d 1206, 1210 (1991).

In the proposed amended complaint, plaintiff Reed Taylor attempts to allege a direct cause
of action for breach of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, Idaho Code §§ 48-601 through 48-619.
However, a private cause of action may be asserted under that Act only by a "person who purchases
or leases goods or services and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property...."
Idaho Code § 48-608. The amended complaint does not contain allegations that Reed Taylor
purchased goods or services from any of the defendants. Granting leave to amend to bring a fatally
flawed claim under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act would be a futile act.

E.

As a Matter of Law, Plaintiff's Purported Claims for Conspiracy and Tortious
Interference Are Deficient

Plaintiff seeks to allege causes of action in his amended complaint for tortious interference
with contract and civil conspiracy. However, the proposed amended complaint fails to allege that
the defendants acted in any capacity other than as counsel for their corporate clients.

The

relationship of attorney-client is one of principal and agent. Jarman v. Hale, 112 Idaho 270, 731
P.2d 813 (1986); Horwitz v. Holabird & Root, 212 lll.2d 1, 816 N.W.2d 772 (2004). As a matter
oflaw, an agent cannot conspire with his principal. Afton Energy, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 122
Idaho 333, 340, 834 P.2d 850, 857 (1992); Skarbrevikv. Cohen, England & Whitfield, 231 Cal.App.
3d 692, 282 Cal.Rptr. 627 (1991). An attorney does not "conspire" with his own client merely by
giving advice. ''To hold otherwise would be akin to.saying that' a defendant could conspire with his
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right arm, which held, aimed, and fired the fatal weapon."' Fischer v. Estate ofFlax, 816 A.2d 1,
5, n.4 (D.C. 2003).
Nor can the agent be held to have interfered with his principru 's· contract. BECO Const. Co.,

·-Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 145 Idaho 719, 184 P.3d 844 (2008); Jenldns v. Boise Cascade Corp.
· 141Idaho233, 108 P.3d 380 (2005); Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 61
P.3d 557 (2002); Leon v. Boise State University, 125 Idaho 365, 870 P.2d 1324 (1994); Ostrander

v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. ofIdaho, Inc., 123 Idaho 650, 654, 851 P.2d 946, 950 (1993).
Accordingly, the proposed amended complaint does not allege actionable claims against the
defendant attorneys for civil conspiracy or tortious interference with their client's contract with
plaintiff. Leave to amend should not be granted with respect to these ostensible claims.
F.

As a Matter of Law, Defendants _Are Shielded from Suit by the Litigation
Privilege

The existence of an immunity or privilege is a question of law. Nation v. State, Dept. of

Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 158 P.3d 953 (2007); Rincover v. State, Dept. of Finance, Securities
Bureau, 128 Idaho 653, 917 P.2d 1293 (1996); Smith v. Reddy, 882 F.Supp. 497 (D.Md. 1995)
Sanchezv. Coxon, 175 Ariz. 93, 854 P.2d 126 (1993);Da"agh v. Superior Court, 183 Ariz. 79, 900
P .2d 1215 (Ariz.App. 1995).
The defendants named in the proposed amended complaint are entitled to avail themselves
of the defense oflitigation immunity or privilege. "An attorney owes no duty to a third party in an
adversarial relationship." Bowman v. Two, 104 Wash.2d 181, 188, 704 P .2d 140 ( 1085). "Existence
ofa duty to an adversary party beyond the courtesy and respect owed all participants in the legal
process... would interfere with the undivided loyalty an attorney owes a client and would diminish
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an attorney's ability to achieve the most advantageous position for a client." Id. at 189. Accord, The

Chapman Children's Trust v. Porter & Hedges,.L.L.P., 32 S.W.3d 419 (Tex.App. 2000); Rhode v.
Adams, 288Mont,"278, 957-P.2d 1124(1998); Garc;iav. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin&Rob~P.A., ·
106 N.M. 757, 750 P.2d 118 (1988); Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, 312 N.W.2d 585 (1981).

As attorneys for parties adverse to Reed Taylor, defendants are not subject to suit by him for
their actions taken in connection with litigation. Insofar as the amended complaint attempts to state
claims based on defendants' litigation strategy, positions taken in open court, cooperation with cocounsel in defending against Mr. Taylor's claims, or other matters collaterally related to pending
litigation such as payment oflitigation expenses, resisting the opposing party's attempts to possess
property, or negotiating, or declining to negotiate, with opposing counsel, defendant's actions are
privileged as a matter oflaw. The proposed amended complaint is an exercise in futility because it
merely seeks to advance claims which cannot survive assertion of the defense oflitigation privilege.

G.

As a Matter of Law, Plaintiff's Purported Claim for Conversion Does Not State
a Claim upon which Relief Can Be Granted

Plaintiff attempts in his amended complaint to plead his claim for conversion in slightly
different terms, which are nonetheless insufficient to state a claim. Because plaintiff's conversion
allegations do not raise any justiciable issue, it would be futile to grant leave to amend.
Plaintiff's theory seems to be that the defendants can be held liable for conversion ifit can be
shown that their fees were paid with the proceeds of assets in which the plaintiff alleges he possesses
a perfected security interest. If plaintiff's conversio~ theory were to be accepted, every person who
accepts payment from a client or customer for services rendered would be subject to suit for
conversion by the secured creditor of such client or customer. The Uniform Commercial Code rejects

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 8
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e.
this approach. In Lake Ontario Production Credit Association ofRochester v. Grove Hogan, 138
A.D.2d 930, 526 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1988), a debtor sold cows in which the plaintiffpossessed a perfected
security interest. At least part of the proceeds from the sale of the cows was used to pay the debtor's .
attorneys. The court held that the secured creditor could trace the proceeds from the sale of the
collateral only insofar as such proceeds remained in the hands of the debtor. The law firm which
received payment from the sale of collateral took free of any claim by the secured creditor. While
the UCC has been amended and renumbered since the date of the Grove Hogan case, the concept
continues under current version of the Code. See Idaho Code§ 28-9-332 which makes it clear that
persons who in good faith receive payment of money from a debtor for services rendered take free
and clear of any security interest in such money.
With respect to assets remaining in the hands of Hawley Troxell's clients, any perfected
security interest plaintiff may have (assuming for the sake of argument that plaintiff possesses a
perfected security interest) is governed by existing commercial law principles. Either such security
interest is traceable to proceeds or not. depending on application of the provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Hawley Troxell is not liable for conversion simply because it acts as counsel for
one or more debtors who challenge the validity of the debt and the alleged security interest. Among
other things, the litigation privilege bars any claim for civil damages against opposing attorneys for
statements made or actions taken, including the assertion of defenses with which the plaintiff
disagrees, in the course of representation of an opposing party in litigation. Kahala Royal Corp. v.
Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, 113 Hawai'i 251, 151P.3d732 (2007).
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PLAINTIFF'S ATTEMPT TO FRAME ms AMENDED COMPLAINT AS A
DERIVATIVE ACTION IS INACCURATE AND UNAVAIT,ING

For the first time, plaintiff Reed Taylor alleges in the proposed amended complaint that he
--~--.;,

is entitledto bring not only direct claims on his own behalf, but also a shareholder's derivative action.
This is the primary and perhaps only substantive change to the complaint. 1 A "derivative proceeding''
is defined in Idaho Code § 30-1-740 as a civil suit on behalf of a domestic or, in limited
circumstances, foreign corporation. As discussed in greater detail below, Mr. Taylor improperly
tends to conflate his individual claims with the so-called derivative claims.
The shareholder's derivative action was developed as an extraordinary equitable device to
enable shareholders to enforce a corporate right that the corporation failed to assert on its own behalf.
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).

The nature of the derivative proceeding is two-fold. First, it is the equivalent of a
suit by the shareholders to compel the corporation to sue. Second, it is [a] suit by the
corporation, asserted by the shareholder on its behalf, against those who are liable to
it. The corporation is the real party in interest and the shareholder is only a nominal
plaintiff. The substantive claim belongs to the corporation....
13 W. Fletcher et al., Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations§ 5941.10 (1995 Rev.)
"Because a corporation exists as a separate legal entity, the shareholders have no direct cause
of action or right of recovery against those who have harmed it. The shareholders may, however,
bring a derivative suit to enforce the corporation's rights and redress its injuries when the board of
directors fails or refuses to do so." Grossett v. Wenaas, 12 Cal Rptr.3d 129, 135, 42 Cal.4th 1100,

1

~-

It is doubtful whether the purported derivative claims are properly classified as such. Paragraph13 of the
proposed amended complaint alleges that Reed Taylor is entitled to bring derivative claims but then asserts that he is
personally entitled to "recover and possess all funds, damages and/or property recovered from all direct and
derivative causes of action." It is a fundamental principle that derivative claims belong to the corporation, not the
shareholder(s) who bring the derivative action on the corporation's behalf.
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ll 08, 175 P.3d ll 84, ll 89 (2008). A shareholder may not maintain an action on his own behalf for
a wrong done by a third person to the corporation on the theory that such wrong devalued his stock
because such an action would lead to multitudinous litigation. Sutter v. General Petroleum Corp.,
28 Cal 2d 525, 530, 170 P.2d 898 (1946). "When a derivative action is successful, the corporation
is the only party that benefits from at any recovery; the shareholders derive no benefit 'except the
indirect benefit resulting from a realization upon the corporation's assets.,,,

Grossett v. Wenaas,

supra, 72 Cal Rptr.3d at 135, 42 Cal.4th at 1108, 175 P.3d at 1190 (2008).

A.

Reed Taylor Is Not a Shareholder

Idaho Code§ 30-1-741 provides that a person cannot commence or maintain a derivative
proceeding unless he "[w]as a shareholder at the time 'of the act or omission complained of or became
a shareholder through transfer by operation oflaw from one (I) who was a shareholder at that time."
The proposed amended complaint does not allege that Mr. Taylor was a shareholder at the time of the
acts complained of His status is that of former shareholder whose stock was redeemed and who now
seeks to recover the balance owing notwithstanding the insolvency of the .corporation. This does not
qualify him as a "shareholder." He ceased to be a shareholder when his stock was redeemed.
Whether or not he will ever again become a shareholder by operation oflaw or otherwise remains to
be seen. Nor does his security interest in the stock of AIA Insurance, Inc., make him a shareholder.
Whether or not his security interest is enforceable and, if so, whether he possesses any right other than
to sell the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner has not been adjudicated.
B.

Reed Taylor Does Not Fairly Represent the Interests of the Corporations

The second criterion ofldaho Code § 30-1-741 is that the shareholder bringing the derivative
action "fairly and adequately represents the interests of the corporation in enforcing the right of the
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT- 11
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-corporation." It is impossible to conceive of any way that Reed Taylor can be said to represent the
interest ofAIA Services or-AIA Insurance, or the larger community of shareholders. In every respect,

· _,;"' -~ ·his personal interest is adverse to the corporations and hostile to the inter~ts of other shareholders.
Payment of even a substantial portion ofthe balance due for the redemption ofhis stock will bankrupt
the corporations and leave nothing for other shareholders.2
Furthermore, because of the conflict ofinterest that Reed Taylor has with the corporations and
all other shareholders, his attorneys cannot property serve as counsel in a derivative action. See, e.
g., New Crawford Valley, Ltd. v. Benedict, 847 P.2d 642 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the

"existence of other litigation between a [derivative action] plaintiff and the same [derivative]
defendants in which that plaintiff seeks to have the defendants' assets applied to the satisfaction of
a personal claim, rather than transferred to the corporation, represents a serious conflict of interest"
and concluding that ''plaintiff's present counsel also have an irreconcilable conflict so that they
cannot continue to represent the other shareholders, including other named plaintiffs" in the derivative
action). See also Guenther v.Pac. Telecom Inc., 123 F.R.D. 341, 346-47 (D.Or. 1988) (explaining
that the court was "compelled to exercise [its] discretion in favor of disqualifying plaintiff's present
attorneys from representing the remaining plaintiffs" because of a similar conflict).
CONCLUSION

The proposed amended complaint adds nothing to Reed Taylor's ostensible direct claims.
Such claims still are not valid for a variety of reasons, including lack ofprivity, lack of standing, and

See, for e~ample, ii 17 of the proposed amended complaint, which alleges that the debt allegedly owing by
AIA Services to Reed Taylor exceeds its assets by $3 million, and iJ 29 of the proposed amended complaint which
alleges that AIA Services is insolvent and unable to pay the amount allegedly owing to Reed Taylor.
2

.-..,
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••
lack of a duty owed to him on behalf of the defendant attorneys, all of which are matters oflaw, not
contested facts. Also as a matter oflaw, Reed Taylor cannot sue directly under the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act because he «Iid-notpurchase goods or services from the defendants. Nor does he
. possess a cause of action against the attorney defendants for conspiracy or tortious interference with
contract because, as a matter oflaw, an agent cannot conspire with his principal or interfere with his
principal's contract. Under the UCC, the mere payment oflegal fees by the AIA corporations does
not constitute conversion. Finally, the litigation privilege as a matter oflaw precludes claims against
the attorney defendants named in the amended complaint based on their litigation-related actions.
Since all of the direct causes of action which Reed Taylor attempts to plead in his amended complaint
are deficient, it would be a futile act to grant his motion to amend.
With respect to Reed Taylor's purported derivative claims, the amended complaint is also
deficient. He is neither a shareholder nor a party who can be said to fairly represent the AIA
corporations. His interest is inimical to the interests of the corporations and to the interest of other
shareholders. Therefore, he is not a party qualified to bring a shareholder derivative action.

The

Court should decline to grant leave to amend the complaint where the amendment would merely be
a futile act.
DATED this _2_ day of November, 2008.

ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By:~
esiiLaRUe)Ofthe
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the_£_day of November, 2008, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner indicated
below:
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 416
Spokane, VIA 99201
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Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission (509) 455-7111
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8

7
(OCfOBER 16, 2008, 10:03 A.M.)

1

THE COURT: Alright.
MR. BI5.5ELL: Your Honor, if I may, there's also
another issue that got in front of the Court, I don't know if
time. It asks that the underlying litigation, the motion be

3
4
5

connected. The first of those CV 08-1763, which is entitled

2
3
4

Reed Taylor versus Mike McNichols and Clements, Brown and

5

6

McNichols. The second CV 08-1765, Reed Taylor versus.

7
8
9

Gary Babbitt, John Ashby, Patrick Collins, Richard Riley,

THE COURT: Good morning. We are on the record
this morning in a couple of cases that I guess I'll describe as

attorneys with the firm of Hawley Troxell, Ennis & Hawley.
These matters were filed back in August and are at

10

this time subjects of motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

11

Those motions have been extensively briefed by both sides in

12
13
14
15
16
17
18

these actions.
Mr. Bissell is present along with the Plaintiff
Reed Taylor. Mr. Janis is present in this matter representing
Mike McNichols of Oements, Brown and McNichols, CV 08-1763.
And you are?
MR. LARUE: Jim LaRue, your Honor, with Elam

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

the Court knows about it, but there was a motion to shorten
heard on Monday and some documents. So that would be -- I'm
not here to argue that, Mr. Bond would, but that's a much
shorter matter obviously, so I just want to make sure the
Court's aware of that.
THE COURT: Yes, I did not sign the order to
shorten time to hear that this morning. I barely had time to
see that it had been filed yesterday, so I did not order that
to be heard this morning.
Mr. Janis and Mr. LaRue, I guess I'll let you guys
decide who wants to go first.
MR. LARUE: May it please the Court, I'm

17

representing Hawley Troxell on their Motion to Dismiss. This
case presents the question of whether a plaintiff may sue his

19

MR. MEADOWS: Good morning, your Honor.

18
19

20

THE COURT: Good morning.

20

the course of defending their clients.

21
22
23

implicates certain ethical issues. The question of whether

& Burke, and Mr. Meadows with Hawley Troxell is here.

21
22

this morning. Mr. Bissell, I guess I'm going to leave it up to

23

you, do you want to respond collectively or one at a time?

24

We have some similar issues to be presented here

MR. BISSELL: I just assume do it after, you
know, collectively, your Honor.

24
25

adversary's attorneys for decisions made by those attorneys in
The Complaint, I think, obviously raises or
Hawley Troxell can continue as counsel for the client as long
as this case exists; and for that matter, whether if they
can't, any attorney could represent their clients because those

10

9
1
2

attorneys would presumably be subject to the same claims as my

3
4
5

Taken Plaintiffs theories to their logical

plaintiff Hawley Troxell is.
extreme, I may, in fact, be exposing my firm to a malpractice
claim by the very fact of arguing this motion today. If this

6
7

complaint is not dismissed, it seems to me that one of two

8
9

counsel for their clients or the underlying case has to be

10
11
12
13

things has to happen. Either Hawley Troxell has to withdraw as
stayed pending resolution of this case and perhaps the

1
2

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

McNichols case. As I understood in other pleadings, Plaintiff

10

is not yet through suing lawyers.

11
12

A 12(b) motion --

filed, but his adversaries are entitled to the zealous advocacy
of their chosen counsel. And as long as lawsuits exist against
those chosen counsel, seeking direct claims against them or
derivative claims against them or seeking to disqualify them
from their status as counsel for his adversaries, those lawyers
are put in a no-win situation in the underlying case.
Did I answer your question, your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes, Mr. LaRue, thank you.
MR. LARUE: In a 12(b)(6) motion, your Honor, the
Court need not accept inferences unsupported by the facts nor

with this case pending, I can't understand how Hawley Troxell
can run the risk of representing its clients. As I'll try to

17

pull together toward the end of this argument, an attorney

18

indicates and as I hope to be able to articulate today, this is

should not be in the position of having to have concerns of

19

a little bit different case.

19

20

self interest measuring those against zealous advocacy of their

20
21
22
23
24
25

24
25

case, stayed pending resolution of other lawsuits that he has

13
14
15
16

THE COURT: That case has to be stayed so

14
15
16
17
18

1
.J.
3

Plaintiff can't complain about having his case, the underlying

that this one can proceed?
MR. LARUE: If the underlying case proceeds

clients. As long as the malpractice cases exist against the
law firms defending Plaintiffs adversaries, the lawyers are
put in that position in the representation of their clients in
the underlying case.
And this is a mess that Plaintiffs making.

need the Court accept legal conclusions masquerading as factual
allegations. And while many times in a 12(b)(6) motion, even
if granted in part or in whole, the Court may decide to allow
the advancing party an opportunity to amend the complaint to
cure pleading deficiencies. But as our briefing hopefully

From a 12(b)(6) standpoint, the Complaint in this
case presents legal issues which can and should be determined
by the Court. For instance, this case raises the question of
whether or not Hawley Troxell or its individual attorneys owe
any duty to the Plaintiff. And duty is always a question of
law.
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12

11

t_

Other questions of law presented by this Complaint
are the application and meaning of statutes. Whether a

..

plaintiff has standing to sue, whether or not there is privity
between plaintiff and defendant's attorneys which will support

5

a malpractice claim. And whether the litigation privileges

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

16
17
18
19

20
21
22

23
24
25--

privilege and immunizes the defense attorneys against claims
stated in Plaintiffs Complaint. Those of all questions of law
which cannot change by adding additional facts. So I suggest
that the 12(b)(6) motion that we have filed can appropriately

1

a direct action against Hawley Troxell for his interest in the

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

stock and for their apparent failure to preserve that interest.

dispose of this case, and I will address in a few moments what

10

I think would be a futility of the amendment.

11

But this claim is misdirected because Hawley Troxell possesses
no interest or claim to the stock in Insurance.
The cases cited by the Plaintiff rely upon and
rest upon a duty owed by the Defendant to the Plaintiff.
Clearly Hawley Troxell owes Mr. Taylor no duty. They represent
Insurance, Services and Crop. So this status doesn't support a
standing or does not entitle Plaintiff to sue directly Hawley
Troxell.
The second is he claims to be entitled to become

12

the sole shareholder of insurance. But this is a position that

Complaint: One is standing, and the other is litigation

13

Plaintiff does not yet occupy. The Court has ruled that

privileges. And they run throughout the four or five causes of

14
15

Plaintiff is entitled -- the Court has not ruled, excuse me,

16

entitled to run or have operational control of the entity. As

that he believes entitles him to bring a direct claim against

17

I read this Court's May 31, '07, opinion, the Court denied

his adversary's attorneys. Under any of these categories, as

18
19

There are two systemic deficiencies in Plaintiffs

action enumerated in the Complaint.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims eight positions

litigation counsel for its Plaintiffs adversaries, Hawley
Troxell owed no duty to the Plaintiff. An attorney clearly

20

owes a duty to his client, but a plaintiff should have no

21

standing to object to the means and method by which that

22
23
24
25

attorney defends his adversaries.
Eight separate categories are listed. The first
is as a stock pledgee of Insurance he claims that he may bring

!hat Plaintiff is entitled to repossess the stock, that he's

Plaintiffs Preliminary Injunction in the Syringa matter,
finding that it was not willing to set aside due process
without first affording the Defendants the right to present
defenses against the claims.
The cases .cited by Plaintiff do not support his
position. He cites Steelman and he cites McCann. In Steelman
the Court determined that a shareholder may have under certain
circumstances a right to make a direct claim against the

14

13
1

2

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

cases do not stand for the proposition that a shareholder even

1
2
3

benefit the very person that sued them. They hired their
counsel to defend the claims registered in the underlying

corporations. In McCann that was refined as to whether it had
to be direct or derivative. But in any circumstances those

to the contract where the relationship between Hawley Troxell
and his clients. I doubt that AIA hired their counsel to

if that was a position occupied by plaintiff, has a right to

4

bring a direct claim against his adversary's attorneys. That

5

lawsuit by Plaintiff. So a third-party beneficiary status

status does not support standing.
This third and fourth categories are as a secured

6

cannot be pied or proven.
And the last position is if none of the individual

creditor and he's a creditor. And he claims as a secured
creditor that Services has made an unauthorized disposition of
collateral and wants to sue the attorneys for doing that. The

7
8
9

seven alone are enough, cumulatively they should be. But seven
deficient theories do not cumulative amount to a position that

10

creates a duty. And without a duty, there is no standing by
Plaintiff to bring a direct claim against Hawley Troxell.

11

attorneys had been paid their fee; but other than that, there

11

12
13
14
15

has been no disposition of collateral by Hawley Troxell.
Mr. Taylor standing to sue his adversary's attorneys.
His fifth and sixth position are he is the only

12
13
14
15

16

authorized director and officer of Insurance or is the only

16

taken in the furtherance of their representation of their

17

director and officer of Insurance. Those are positions he does

17

client. The policy behind the litigation privilege is that an

18
19

not yet occupy. Without first of occupying them, he has no

18
19

attorney or attorneys must be free to advise their client

standing to bring a claim against Hawley Troxell.

20

adversaries even if the advice given to clients turns out to be

party beneficiary to have standing to sue Hawley Troxell

21

wrong.

Third party beneficiary standing would require a pleading that
it was the intent of AJA to benefit Plaintiff when they entered
into an attorney-client relationship with their counsel.

22
23
24

adversaries and he cannot direct counsel's representation of
those clients. And it's the representation of the clients by

That's the only way he can claim third-party beneficiary status

25

Hawley Troxell that forms the basis of Plaintiff's Complaint

20
?"--

24
25

Consequently, neither the secured nor the creditors status give

The seventh position is he is entitled to third

The second deficiency that runs throughout all
causes of action is application of the litigation privilege.
Attorneys are immune from suit and are protected by a
litigation privilege for their conduct, advice and actions

without fear of reprisal or personal liability to their

Here Plaintiff cannot select counsel for his
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16

15

·-1
J

4
5

6
7
8
9

against Hawley Troxell, and they are entitled to a litigation

1

where the conduct for the representation given and advice given

privilege from claims of third persons where the actions, the

2
3
4

breaching a fiduciary duty to the other party. So even if
Hawley Troxell's conduct or advice or representation of its

5

client can be claimed to a -- to have created a breach of a

sufficiently sets out our position, but I'd like to touch on

6
7

cannot be sued for aiding and abetting by the adversary. The

them briefly until I get to the fourth and then spend a bit of

8

aiding and abetting must also fall for the reasons that I have

defenses they take, the representation of their client.
In the Complaint there are four distinct or pied
-- excuse me, causes of action. I don't want to go through
them in too much detail because I believe our briefing

to the client even if that advice results in his client

fiduciary duty owed by their clients to the Plaintiff, they

outlined earlier in the litigation privilege and in the

10
11

and abetting, conspiracy and a little intentional interference

9
10
11

12

with contract is thrown into the Complaint. While there are

12

state a claim; second, because Hawley Troxell owes no duty;

13
14
15

pleading deficiencies in the Complaint on aiding and abetting,
that isn't really the reason that the aiding and abetting claim
must be dismissed. The general rule is that attorney's act of
giving advice to clients does not constitute aiding and
abetting. While there is no statute that I have been able to
find in the State of Idaho that would begin to support this
claim, that is that an attorney of an adversary can be sued for
aiding and abetting by virtue of his representation, other
jurisdictions have dealt with the issue. We have provided
those to the Court, and they essentially stand for the

13
14
15

third, because Hawley Troxell is entitled to a litigation
privilege; and fourth, because Plaintiff has no standing, the

16
17
18
19

20

21
22
23
24

..!5

time on that.
The first cause of action is alleged as an aiding

proposition that a lawyer acting beyond -- excuse me, acting on
behalf of his client and within the scope of the
attorney-client relationship, cannot be liable to third parties

16
17

standing arguments.
Therefore because Plaintiff is first failed to

aiding and abetting claim should be dismissed.
The civil conspiracy. A civil conspiracy is not
by itself a stand-alone cause of action, but rather a

20

derivative tort that relies upon an actionable underlying
wrong. The cause of action arises in this instance for
conspiracy only if, one, as a participant Hawley Troxell owed a

21

duty to Plaintiff. And clear they owe no duty to a Plaintiff

18
19

22
23
24

25

when they are defending his adversaries. Or second, no cause
of action arises if the attorney is acting as the agent and the
principle. There is an interference with contract claim in the
factual portion of the Complaint, though it's not enumerated as

18

17
1
2
3
4
5

a stand-alone cause of action, but essentially a party cannot
interfere with his or her own contracts, and Hawley Troxell
cannot be found liable for interfering with any contracts
between Reed Taylor and the entities when they are acting as
the agent of their clients. In the law they are treated as

6

one.

7

8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15

The second cause of action is for conversion. In
order for a claim for conversion to arise, it requires a
distinct act or dominion wrongfully asserted over another's
personal property in denial of or inconsistent with the rights
therein. This cause of action must fail because, first, the
Plaintiff does not own the sum of money that he claims.
Current he is a creditor; second, Hawley Troxell has not
wrongfully asserted dominion or control over whatever money
Plaintiff claims to own; and third, a claim for conversion will

16
17

not stand for a general sum of money.

18
19

Protection Act. The Plaintiff has failed to identify what acts
Hawley Troxell or any of its attorneys performed that are
prohibited by the Acts, but beyond a pleading in sufficiency as
the Supreme Court and court -- excuse me, as the Court of
Appeals noted in Haskins versus Glass, a claim under the Idaho
Consumer Protection Act is based upon a contract, and Plaintiff
has no contract with Hawley Troxell. Thus this claim should be
dismissed as a matter of law.

20

3
24

25

The third cause of action is the Idaho Consumer

3
4

The fourth cause of action, your Honor, is for
legal malpractice. A claim -- there are four elements to a
claim for legal malpractice: First, is the creation of the
attorney-client relationship; second, is the existence of a

5

duty on the part of the attorney to the entity or parties with

6

whom he has formed the relationship; third, is a breach of that

7

duty and fourth are damages flowing from the breach. Without
an attorney-client relationship, there is no privity between

1
2

8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15

16
17
18
19

20

21
22
23
24

25

the lawyer and the other party. And without privity, the.
lawyer owes no duty to the other party. Without a privity
requirement in the relationship between an attorney and his
client, the client would lose control over their relationship,
the attorney would cons -- would be conflicted between advice
given to or the needs of his client and third persons and the
attorney would be required to compromise his or her advice.
It is a distinct and tight relationship. It is not to be
invaded by strangers.
There is one narrow exception recognized by the
courts in Idaho, and that is stated in Harrigfeld but that
exception doesn't apply here. In the Taylor versus Maile case
which followed the Harrigfeld case, the Idaho Supreme Court
made it clear that an attorney-client relationship is a
prerequisite for holding an attorney liable for claimed
negligence in the performance of legal services rendered.
There is no duty owed. There is no privity between Hawley
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20

19
1.

Troxell and Plaintiff. Without privity, there is no duty.

~-

Another reason the legal malpractice case must

.

fail is the litigation privilege which goes hand and hand with

5
6

relationship. And last, because no duty is owed to Plaintiff,

the privity and duty requirements of the attorney-client
Hawley Troxell may not be subject to direct claims from him.
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are all matters of law that can be addressed now without
wasting the Court or parties time in the amendment.
I would like to just point out, I guess in
closing, that this lawsuit cuts against the very fabric of our
legal system. If this lawsuit or lawsuits like it are allowed
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to be pursued or if this case is allowed to continue, it will
be at the expense of our legal system for the limited benefit
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I understand that there will probably be an effort
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-- I don't know how your Honor intends to handle these motions
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of one who is, in my view, chosen to abuse it. No attorney
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client. Because the more successful you are, the more likely
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you will be sued by the plaintiff. But every attorney will

after they have been argued today, and I don't pretend to tell
the Court how I think it should. It's my experience that
typically on 12(b)(6) motions, courts rule on the motion, and
in the ruling determine whether or not they will allow an
amendment to perhaps cure what may be pleading deficiencies
rather than having the Plaintiff acknowledge practically
pleading deficiencies by filing an amended complaint prior to
the 12(b)(6) hearing.
But as I started, this is not a case where I
believe adding additional facts will change the Court's
handling of the motions. Because in this case, no additional
facts are going to change the legal position that Plaintiff has
no standing to sue Hawley Troxell. No additional facts are
going to prove that Hawley Troxell owed a duty to Plaintiff.
No additional facts are going to show there is privily of
contract between Hawley Troxell and Plaintiff. And no
additional facts will show that Plaintiff has standing. Those

will be free as we are now obligated to be an advisor, an
advocate, an evaluator and a negotiator for our clients, and no
client will be free as we encourage them to be open and honest
in their relationship and in their communication with us.
If an attorney can be sued by his advocate excuse me, by his -- the adversary of his client, he will need
to parce out legal advice always looking over his or her
shoulder, not to be too successful in the representation of the

need to balance self interest which should never be a
consideration against zealous advocacy which is an attorney's
mandate.
Does the Court have any questions?
THE COURT: No, Mr. LaRue, thank you.
Mr.Janis.

:MR. JANIS: Thank you, your Honor. May it please

,....
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the Court and Counsel.
Your Honor, there are two separate lawsuits that
have been filed here, and I think the Court, as the judge in
the underlying case, knows a lot about the differing roles that
have been played by the two separate sets of defendants in both
cases. But what the Court said this morning is very much -- is
very accurate, th~t is the case are clearly connected.
In fact, the claims made in both of the cases are

very similar to each other. And if one compares the complaints
in both cases, most of the paragraphs in them are. word for word

identical. And similarly the arguments that are being raised
on this Motion to Dismiss, which is essentially raising
questions of standing, duty, litigation privilege and the like,
all legal issues are the same and applicable to both cases in
identical ways. So I very much appreciate the idea that we are
taking up both cases, both motions at the same time and for
counsel for doing so, and I'm going to try to honor that by not
just repeating the points already made by Mr. LaRue.
I would, however, say in recognition of the fact
that we are dealing with two separate cases, that I would adopt
the points, the arguments made in the briefs and in today by
Mr. LaRue and try hopefully not to repeat too much. I would

·-.

just like to make a couple of big picture points.
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On the point of this factual premise that they
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claim to enjoy the status as the sole shareholder who is or
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should be running these companies, Mr. LaRue pointed out the
Court's order in May, just an additional point to that, as I
understand the Court's rulings in that case, right from the get
go essentially enjoined the Plaintiff from acting as the
director or officer or having that status. I just think that
the Court's orders make it very very clear that that issue is
very much up in the air yet and he does not yet enjoy that
status and in cases being litigated below. To take that and
say - well, kind of ignore that and say, well, I do enjoy that
status and on that basis I can sue my adversary's lawyers, I

think it's just taking it way too far.
Secondly, this - all this -- all these issues
that are raised in the Motion to Dismiss as I see them all come
back to the singular issue of a legal duty. The claims being
made here are in tort such as malpractice. It is a fundamental
principle across the board in tort law that the first element
of any tortious cause of action is that you have to establish
that the defendant owes a legal duty of some sort to the
plaintiff. And in Idaho we actually do have case law dealing
with a non-client suing a lawyer for doing what they do as
lawyers, and we have some fairly bright line rules about that.
And that is what's going on here, there is no question that
this Plaintiff is suing the two defense law firms for their
role as defense counsel in the underlying lawsuit.
And in Idaho, this Court, as Mr. LaRue pointed
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out, the higher fed court carved out what they themselves, the
Supreme Court that is, said is the singular exception to the
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rule of not requiring privity. That is the situation where a
testator hires a lawyer to prepare a will and essentially says
I want that guy to get my money, and when that guy doesn"t get
his money, since he was the intended recipient or beneficiary
of the legal services, that guy, the Supreme Court says, is
entitled to have standing to sue. But they went out of their
way to say but this is it. This is the only situation that we
are going to have non-privity and allow plaintiffs to sue
lawyers.
The bottom line is if you add it all up, all this
case law that comes out of the appellate courts of Idaho, we
have a fairly bright line rule as to what circumstance allows a
non-client to sue a lawyer for their legal work, and this ain't
it. It's not even dose. This is about as opposite as you can

17

get because these defense lawyers have been the litigation
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adversary. On its face it's clear they owe no legal duty to
the Plaintiff. Which means then that Idaho law is completely
and entirely consistent with what Mr. LaRue refers to as the
litigation privilege which is universally recognized
everywhere. It's never been rejected to my knowledge. And it
basically holds point blank just a little more specifics to
this case, a party cannot sue the adversary party's lawyer.
They just can't do it. They enjoy an immunity from that and,
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of course, is very good reason for that.
The legal basis for the existence of that
litigation privilege or litigation immunity again comes back to
this duty point, the same point recognized by the Idaho Supreme

Court. If you haven't hired a lawyer, that lawyer does not owe
you a duty. And, of course, there's good reasons to have it
specifically apply in the context of lawsuits which are by
definition adversarial. And the lawyers on the other side of a
party by definition are going to the advancing positions
contrary to his or her client's adversary.
And if you - obviously we have one of the more
fundamental rules of lawyers is they have to zealously
represent the interest of their client, and it would run
completely counter to that to say, yep, you got to go do that
in lawsuits and you got to zealously represent the client you
represent in the lawsuit, but understand you might get sued by
the adversary. I mean you'd have to constantly evaluate your
own conduct, Judge, and say, well, am I doing what I'm doing
here that's in the best interest of my client or am I sitting
here worrying about getting sued down the road for something
I'm going to do. This is why we have the litigation privilege.
And it all comes back to, of course we can't have an
adversary's lawyer owe a duty to the person who is on the other
side of the lawsuit.
And this case, I would suggest, could very well
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serve as a poster child for why we need a litigation privilege
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arguing, well, this case is different, and I would suggest in

and why it should apply. Of course the lawyers who are
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representing Reed Taylor's adversaries are going to be
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it appears to be, a plaintiff is suing a defendant's lawyers

Mike McNichols is right in representing John Taylor's rights,
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they are all right, so you are wrong and we have to join the

23

plaintiff's lawyers. But where is it all going to end. And

24
25

advancing positions contrary to what Reed Taylor's arguing.
This Court has recognized that they have the opportunity or
that they have the due process opportunity to defend themselves
against those claims. That's what's going on. And if as
Mr. LaRue said, if this type of thing is allowed to go forward,

this is a Pandora's Box to beat the band and where is it all
going to end. Plaintiffs are going to be suing defense
lawyers, defendants are going to be suing plaintiff's lawyers,
I mean it has to work both ways.
And to sort of illustrate to an extreme length how
this could go, let's take this case for example. The factual
premise that they have for suing these two sets of defense
lawyers boils down to them saying, in effect, I'm right in the
underlying litigation, and since you lawyers are saying -preventing me from getting that right in my lawsuit, I can sue
you. So if that's true and it's allowed to go forward, a
lawsuit can be instituted against the lawyers and go forward,
then we apparently have to consider well no, no, no,

the reason -- I understand the Plaintiffs to essentially be

response to that simply that no, it isn't. It is exactly what
for the positions and that which is being done in the
underlying lawsuit. It is that simple and there is all the
reason in the world that we can't let that happen.
I'll close on this point about the amendment.

Because we received today -- I received just before -- today
before this hearing, that there was the proposed amendment to
the Complaint being filed tomorrow - or excuse me, yesterday.
And what I would say in response to that is there is nothing
you can do in an amended complaint that could change who these
parties are and what their relationship are to each other.
This motion to dismiss boils down to claims of standing,
privilege, immunity, duty, nothing about an amended complaint
can change anything about that. The plaintiff is who the
plaintiff is, the defense lawyers are who the defense lawyers
are. And so on that basis, your Honor, l would respectfully
request the Court move forward and issue a ruling on the Motion
to Dismiss. Thank you.
1HE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Janis .

Mr. Bissell.
MR. BISSELL: Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor,

one of the main issues here that is a factual issue that the
Defendants gloss over that kind of torpedoes 90 percent of
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their argument is the fact that, as alleged, and which must be
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claims that was bad advice, et cetera, et cetera, that's not

assumed as true in this case, is that -- and I will primarily

what we are talking about here. This is going another step.

refer to Hawley Troxell, but it's the argument's basically
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refer to Clements, Brown and McNichols also, is that they
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didn't have the authority to act on behalf of Insurance or
Services, so they don't have any protections or anything else.
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true because we allege for purposes of this 12(b)(6).
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They didn't have any authority to act which we must assume is
They don't get into all this stuff, litigation
privilege, et cetera, et cetera, they are just like Joe on the
street, they didn't have authority to act on behalf of Services
and Insurance. They were acting, of course, because they
forget who their client is, they think their client's
John Taylor.
Really the issue, your Honor, is whether a law
firm and its lawyers have any liability for knowingly assisting
a director or former director in tortiously raiding the coffers
of a corporation which they claim to represent because their
duty's to the corporation, not to the director. That's the
problem here.
And the problem is not that they just are
defending Mr. Taylor, the problem is they are assisting in the
continuing wrongful acts which they know are wrongful. That is
what distinguishes this case from other cases when apparently
an attorney has just provided advice, maybe the other side

Not only are they saying I can defend a bank robber, but I can
help them do more robberies. Not only can I defend a
corporation and find out that a director is stealing funds, but
I can also help that director continue to steal funds. And
clearly you can't do that and that would be horrible public
policy if lawyers could get away -- if they could use their
license as just a cart blanch immunity, I can do whatever I
want because I'm representing the guy.
Now, your Honor, here's some -THE COURT: Which funds are you referring to?
Funds that are being paid for attorney fees?
MR. BISSELL; No, I'm talking about in general the

funds of the corporation that are being taken from the
corporation for whatever -- unlawfully taken from the
corporation.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BISSELL: Here's what I consider some of the
most salient facts which again must be considered as true for
these motions, and these all relate to Hawley Troxell but it
goes both ways. Hawley Troxell knows Mr. Taylor, I'll refer to
him as Reed so we don't get confused, is owed over eight and a
half million by AIA Services and they are in default and they
are insolvent, Hawley Troxell knows that. Hawley Troxell knows
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know the value of the collateral is decreasing every day and

7
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the only thing out there is a two hundred thousand dollar bond.
They claim they represent Insurance and Services, all the while
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knowing they don't because they know the representation of
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Reed is the pledgee of all shares and of Insurance's
collateral. Hawley Troxell knows Reed has security interest in
all commissions and related receivables of Services and
Insurance. Hawley Troxell knows he properly voted the shares
of Insurance voting himself sole officer and director. They

Insurance was not authorized by Reed, and they know that the
representation of Services was not authorized because the
board was not properly constituted because Reed and Donna
Taylor should be on it.
They know they have got irreconcilable conflicts
of interest representing Crop USA, Insurance and Services.
They know that -- obviously they have got a joint defense
agreement, they are representing John Taylor and they know he
should be sued. They know that they are taking direction from
the individual who is wrongfully taking funds for whatever
purposes, diverting funds from their client, Services and

2'.1---.

Insurance. They know he's an uninterested directed, they know

#

that he's engaged in tortious acts in eluding of funds from the
corporations. They know that nobody else -- no disinterested
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individuals in the corporation, the highest authority which
would be the disinterested shareholders, are -- have been
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informed of what's going on. They have knowingly assisted
John Taylor in continuing to take funds unlawfully from the
corporation.
You can't find a case like this, your Honor, I
haven't been able to find a case like this out there with these
facts, these egregious facts. And, again, the defense is we
are lawyers, we can do whatever because we have got a license
to practice law. Everybody else may be held to a higher
standard but not us as lawyers, we can help people steal from
other people and we are fine because we have a license.
Your Honor, a couple notes I made, it's kind of a
seque here, but I don"t want to lose sight of them. Mr. LaRue
stated that we should solve the underlying litigation -- or
stay the underlying matter and continue with this one. Well,
your Honor, if you did that, it would solve nothing because
everything is still going to be tried, both -- really what you
-- maybe what should happen is they should be consolidated
because you are going to try the whole thing in this case.
TifE COURT: That's all I need is more claims in
that case, Mr. Bissell, that's all I need.
MR. BISSELL: Essentially you'd end up having to
try it twice. And just another comment, the Court's previous
rulings, as I'm sure we are all aware, are not final
determinations under the merits here, but let me continue on,
your Honor.
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As you read Defendant's materials and hear their
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argument which assumes certain things such as we had authority
to act for Services and Insurance, what they are doing is
asking the Court to make factual determinations, and we'd
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Now, not withstanding some of the -- as I pointed
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out, that the proposed amended complaint cures most of these
things, let me go through some other issues. And, again, your
Honor, it's important to keep these facts in mind because
frankly both sides have some law supporting their position.

6

they don't have authority and we layout the facts, therefore
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So, you know, what's the Court going to do, I submit that based
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they don't for purposes of this.
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upon these egregious facts, the cases that we cited are more --
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are closer to this situation than the others. None of them are
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respectfully submit that's improper in this situation. We pied

Now recently we did file a motion to amend the
Complaint, I just want to make it dear, we didn't file an
amended complaint, we filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint
which I believe -- I don't necessarily believe it was
technically necessary, but it does clear up a lot of things. I
think it takes care of many many of the issues that the Defense
have raised. And rm not going to go through all those, it's a
lengthy document as the Court can probably surmise. And so I'd
just point that that was out there, but also what it adds is
derivative claims. Because as of July -- October 21st, I
believe, and the corporation will not take any action, I'm
convinced, we can bring those derivative claims and that's what
we are going to do. And that's what's in that Proposed Amended
Complaint.
Furthermore, we planned that Donna Taylor will
probably join this matter as well. So then everything that's
out there, anybody that has a right to anything. will be
involved in this matter. She's the Preferred A shareholder.
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right on point, there's no question about it.
As Mr. LaRue pointed out, we bring a number of
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issues -- a number of bases for our standing to bring the
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claim. Again, we have the stock pledgee as standing to bring
the direct claims against third parties. The Gustavson case we
cited allow the pledgee to sue a bank and the pledgor to void a
transaction because the bank is helping to lute the
partnership, to cooperate with the pledgor, somewhat our
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situation.
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The Steelman case is still good law, and I say
it's been refined or changed or something by McCann, and this
has to do with whether a shareholder in a closely held
corporation can file a direct claim, but that's not true. It's
kind of interesting if you read the McCann case, the Court
talks about Steelman and then it just kind of moves on. It
doesn't really address Steelman again. So how it used that
case, we'd all have to guess, but the fact is that Steelman is
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still good law and Steelman says a shareholder in a closely
held corporation can file a direct action without bringing the
claims derivatively.
Also it's important to note here that in McCann
there were other shareholders, and so I think the court's
falling back on some of the -- you know, the basis for having
to bring derivative claims. That is there we don't want to
subject the corporations to multiple lawsuits from multiple
shareholders, et cetera, et cetera. Again, that's McCann,
that's not our case.
Mr. Reed Taylor has the right to -- is the pledgor
of all of the shares of insurance, all of them. I won't go
through all these in great detail, your Honor, because we do
cite them in our materials along with the supporting authority.
I will just go down, we have got the one, the secured

creditor's standing to bring claims. The next one that I want
to address a little bit in further detail is that the creditor
of insolvent corporation, in this case which is admittedly
insolvent, has standing to bring direct claims. Now they
rely-1HE COURT:
MR. BISSELL:
1HE COURT:
MR BISSELL:
1HE COURT:

Where is that admitted?
What's that, your Honor?
Where is that admitted?
That the -- that it's insolvent?
Yes.
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MR. BISSELL: Oh, they -- well, we say that.
1HE COURT: Oh, I know.
MR BISSELL: And I believe they do say that in
their answer, your Honor. I believe they do say that in their
answer. I don't think there's any dispute there.
1HE COURT: Alright.
MR. BISSELL: And they claim that a creditor can't
bring -- and again, we cite cases in our materials, so that we
can do that, they cite the Gheewalla case, that's saying we
can't do that. That despite our cases, we can't do that

15

because they were in the zone of insolvency. But here we are
not talking about the zone of insolvency, this is really
insolvent. I mean there's no question about insolvency.
There's not a zone, it is insolvent, way insolvent. And in any
event, that argument only applies if they leave a creditor of

16

an insolvent corporation to bring a direct action, not an

17

action by pledgee or secured creditor based upon the cases we
cite.
Now, with regard to a number of those -- of those
bases we cite for being able to have standing, they -- the
opposition says the court in the underlying litigation is not
so ruled, that's their response, that's their reply. I submit
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that that is irrelevant for this proceeding under a 12(b)(6) as
to the allegations we made, you got to consider them as true.
So there is a lot of things that haven't been decided factually
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scope of representation. No. 1, as we point out in our
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briefing, there is some irreconcilable unwaivable conflict, so
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they couldn't represent everybody all at the same time. And I
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and that's left -- that's another day.
Now, let me talk about the litigation privilege
for a minute, your Honor. The key here again, I go back to the
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first point I made, they don't have authority to act on behalf
of Services or Insurance, you don't get a litigation privilege,
there is no scope of representation. That's a question of fact
which we got to consider as true for today, but they don't have
authority to act so you don't even get into the litigation
privilege, your Honor. But even if we did talk about this
scope of representation or the other half of this - the
litigation privilege you have to have authority to act and it's
got to be within the scope of representation, okay. And I have
talked about the authority act. If you don't have the
authority act, you stop there.

So let's assume they did though, we can get into

know the Court's going to probably address this some more -- or
hear some more about this on Monday, but, therefore, all that's
beyond the scope of representation because they couldn't do it.
But the main one here, one of the main ones here
is this whole permission of tort, your Honor. And we cite a
number of cases where in our materials it says you can't behind
-- can't hide behind the client's direction to commit tortious

conduct. I mean it seems like somewhat of a no-brainer. The
fact that you have a law license doesn't mean you can conspire
or assist your client in defrauding somebody else. Again, that
would be a horrible situation. If you are immune because you
have a law license and you can do whatever you want, that's not
the case.
And, in fact, your Honor, and we cite three good
cases on that in our materials, and interestingly, Mr. Janis -or Mr. McNichols cites a case, Eustus case, Eustus v David
Agency and that's - and that - in that case the Court says
with regard to the attorney's liability, liability arises if
acted with fraud, malice, or has committed an intentional tort.
That's in the materials they cite, your Honor, they got that -as the Court may notice, there's one page there they have got
about 14 cases they cited. Well, I have looked at all of them
and that's what that case says. Most of those cases have to do
with the case where somebody's tried to sue - is trying to sue
the adversary's counsel for claiming that they gave negligent
advice or something. I mean not our case, our case is we are
saying you are helping this dude, aiding and abetting,
conspiring with him to commit these wrongful acts, and that's
what you can't do. And none of those acts - or none of those
cases refer to that.
Oh, another thing I wanted to point out, your
Honor, in Hawley Troxell's brief, they cite a number of cases
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And what they say in their brief is that - this is in Hawley
3
Troxell's opening brief, they say that the Court found that the
4
act of giving advice to clients, even if such advice were
5
faulty, did not constitute aiding and abetting the alleged
6
breach of fiduciary duty. That's a correct quote out of the
7
case, but it's incorrect on the fact that that's not what the
8
court found. The court said this is what they say, this is
9
what the parties says. This party says you don't have this
10
liability. The court didn't make that finding. That was the
11
defendant's position in the case. And what that all case was
12
about is somebody who's complaining that the crisis manager
13
that the law firm recommended was a dope and he screwed things 14
up and therefore they should be responsible for that. That's
15
what that case is about. None of the cases that Hawley Troxell
16
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cites and we - and I explained this a little bit in our
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that, does clarify a lot of the issues, and so a lot of them, I
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briefing, are applicable to this case based upon our facts.

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

believe, are going to fall by the way side. But a couple of

saying that they have no liability because working - they have

never even raised until a year after the lawsuit was filed.

no liability because they are just doing what the client said.

But even if it is considered, again that raises a question of

Now, your Honor, I have got to discuss this
illegality defense for a moment. And it was -- first of all,
I'd ask the Court not to consider it. Because it was raised
for the first time in Hawley Troxell's reply brief, so it
should not be considered. We didn't have an opportunity to
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respond to that. Also, it's never pied as an affirmative
defense. And interestingly, in the underlying litigation was

fact which can't be decided here. And if we did look deeper
into it, it's something that can only be raised by innocent
shareholders which they are not trying to do. And, you know,
even if - even if they are correct that the corporation was
insolvent or something, they have accepted the benefits for
over twelve years, and so they have waived or acquiesced to it.
Now we have got briefing and law on that, but the point is,
your Honor, the Court shouldn't even consider it, but if it
does consider it, those are factual determinations that the
Court can't make at this time.
Now with regard to some of the specific causes of
action, your Honor, again I'm not going to repeat all the
arguments in our briefing, and, again, our proposed amended
complaint, and we would ask the Court to grant us leave to do

things I will address. They say - the Defendants say an agent
can't conspire with the principle. Okay, the claim here is
that Hawley Troxell was conspiring with John Taylor.
Interesting they say the principle because our position they
continually forget who their client is, but he's not. And we
are not saying they conspired with AI.A, we are saying they
conspired with John Taylor. Hawley Troxell was not acting as
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an agent or hired as an attorney properly by Insurance or

1

owns everything. The shares, the whole ball of wax.

Services as I discussed.
Same goes, a state agent cannot interfere with the

2

Therefore, anything done for Hawley Troxell, if they really

3

were representing Insurance, be de facto the third party

principle's contract with someone else. Again, claims that

4

beneficiary. I mean there's nobody else, that's it. So he

5
6

they interfered with the contract between Services and

5

holds all the interest in Insurance, and we addressed that in

Reed Taylor, and Hawley Troxell is not an agent of Services.
Is not authorized to represent.

6
7
8
9

our materials.

7

3
4

8
9

Now, with regard to the CPA claim, your Honor, we
have not abandoned that claim, I notice that in the reply brief

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

filed by Hawley Troxell they apparently were under the

18
19
20

all these claims are brought derivatively also in our proposed
amended complaint, your Honor. Excuse me, I have to get a

21
22
23

24

impression that we had done so. We have not done so. The
proposed amended complaint lays out in detail the factual basis
for that, and we have also cited to the Connecticut case in
there under similar consumer protection act that talks about
that there is no protection for tortious acts and that sort of
thing.

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

So based upon that, your Honor, and the stuff

that's in our proposed amended complaint, 1 would ask the Court
to deny the motion. We request leave to amend and we have we have made the motion, let's let the facts play out. Again,
if we assume what we are claiming is true, which we have to,
then you don't even get very far because they don't have
authority to act period. And just to reiterate, your Honor, if
the Court is inclined to -- I would ask the Court to consider
carefully if it has any inclination to stay the underlying
matter while this one gets resolved because we are going to end
up with a lot of duplicative effort and perhaps consolidation

claim, your Honor, again that's discussed a little bit more in

17
18
19
20
21

our proposed amended complaint, but basically our reasoning

22

Honor, is they would have to take the matter -- and it's in the

there is the only one that was going to benefit from anything

23

-- it's in the Rules of Professional Conduct too. If you are

done for Insurance and Services lawfully, that would -- should

24
25

representing a corporation, and you become aware that
something's going on that's not supposed to be going on like

With regard to the malpractice claim and, again,

drink of water here. Okay. With regard to the malpractice

5

benefit from it is Reed Taylor. He is the guy. Insurance, he

1
2

the prime directors taking money or whatever, you have to go

3

4
5
6
7
8

would be the way to go. Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Tell me, Mr. Bissell, how someone
would become authorized to act for AIA.
MR. BISSELL: Well, what they would do, your

42

41

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
.1
2
3

24
25

-- you have got to bring that to some disinterested folks. In

1
2

On a 12{b)(6) motion, the Court need not accept
inferences unsupported by facts and the Court need not accept

this case it would have been disinterested shareholders and say

3

legal conclusions as factual allegations. That's what this

here's what's going on. You can't keep taking direction from
Or if that doesn't work, if you can't figure it
out, if there's nobody disinterested, it needs to come before

4
5
6
7

the Court. Because your obligation is to the entity, not to

8

that individual.

any of the specific individuals, and that's the problem here.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bissell.
Mr. LaRue.
MR LARUE: Thank you, your Honor. I'll touch on
only a few of the points raised by Mr. Bissell. The last one I
guess is one of the more curious ones for me. I don't know how
we could consolidate the underlying claim with these lawsuits.
THE COURT: That's unlikely to happen.
MR. LARUE: Thank you. It appears that the
principle argument to bar application of the litigation
privilege and to dent the attorney-client privilege is the
argument that Hawley Troxell really wasn't hired by the
corporation as they think they were, and that they have been
taking directions from someone other than the corporations.
First, and on -- and as I understand the argument,
because we say it's so, it's so, and the Court is bound to go
that what we say it's so, and that's not true.

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

argument is all about and is premised on that Hawley Troxell
didn't really-- wasn't authorized to represent their clients,
and they were taking direction from not their clients, but
rather John Taylor fir5t. That argument is based upon a
position that the Plaintiff in this case is still adjudicating
in the underlying case, that is that he has the authority to
hire lawyers for the entity because he is the director, officer
and sole shareholder. And same is true here, doesn't prevent a
12(b)(6) from being granted because that still is an
adjudicated position - excuse me, an un-adjudicated position
in the case below.
On the issue of Hawley Troxell taking directions

from John Taylor. Hawley Troxell represents its clients
through its authorized constituents. Officers, directors and
shareholders are authorized constituents of the corporation.
Boards instruct counsel on positions to be taken in
litigations; and once the attorney receives the instruction
from an authorized constituent with appropriate board
authority, they move forward. There isn't a way that Hawley
Troxell could walk into the building and talk to the
corporation, but they have been retained by the corporation.
As far as disinterested directors, that seems to be a term of
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art that I first heard in this case, and what a disinterested

..

to suing.

1

director is is somebody the Plaintiff hasn't yet gotten around

Mr. Bissell states that the amended complaint

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

states derivative claims, so the Court should take comfort in
the fact that you can dismiss, or however you handle this case,
the amendment will go forward.
I don't believe this Court has yet had an
opportunity to completely process the issue of derivatives
based on the July 21st, 2000, letter from Mr. Bis.sell
threatening a derivative claim. As I recall in the underlying
case, there was a threat, there's been a motion for the Court
to appoint a panel or person to do the investigation under the
statute. Unfortunately in the first part of September, the
Court had to stay that effort because Plaintiffs had filed and
were pursuing a motion to disqualify all -- practically, if not
all counsel defending in the underlying case. I'm merely
suggesting that a derivative claim is just a bit premature.
The four causes of action irrespective to what
labels you wish to put on them are direct claims by Plaintiff
against his adversary's counsel complaining about counsel's
representation of their client. The complaint before the Court
that's the subject of this motion that Mr. Janis' motion on
behalf of Mr. McNichols boils doWll to four issues of law and

2~

...

that's a 12(b)(6). The purpose of a 12(b)(6) may be to dismiss

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

a complaint if legally it cannot stand. And I'm suggesting
that legally this case stands or falls on four issues: Duty,
which is a question of law; privity, which is a question of
law; standing, which is a question of law; application and
litigation privilege. This Court does not need to see an
expanded complaint with new labels, this is a malpractice case
filed by the Plaintiff against his adversary's attorneys.
That's plain and simple all this case is, and we request you
dismiss it

TilE COURT: Mr. Janis.
MR JANIS: Thank you, your Honor. I was going to
make that exact same point, so I won't repeat it. But I will
address this one thing, just I thought I heard something today
that I find very surprising. It was to the effect that ifs
irrelevant that the Court in the underlying case has not yet
fully decided or adjudicated this issue of whether he's the
sole shareholder and the right to control the companies. And
that, in fact. since it's pied, you should accept their
allegation as true. Which is to suggest that you are to accept
something as true that you know not to be true since it is your
own rulings. This Court obviously can take judidal notice of
its own rulings. And as you can see, clearly the factual under
painting of a lot of this lawsuit is this notion that the
lawyers are acting without authority. And the factual premise
of that is the only person who has the authority to hire

'
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46

1
2
3
4
5

entitled to have lawyers, they are not entitled to defend

6

what it absolutely knows to be true that this Plaintiff has

1
2
3
4
5
6

thus far been enjoined as acting as the sole shareholder,

7

director and officer, that this Plaintiff has taken a shot at

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
~.

lawyers for the corporations or anybody else is the Plaintiff
which taken to its extension means these Defendants are not
themselves. It just simply makes no sense.
The fact of the matter is this Court can recognize

asking you to rule that he is, and you have said, no, not yet,
we are going to give everybody a due process fair opportunity
to be heard on this subject and it's not over yet.
And I would just make one other point, Judge.
Let's even assume hypothetically that whenever that underlying
case eventually gets resolved, which I understand it's taken a
long time, but eventually let's say he eventually wins that.
It will still, nevertheless, always be true that in October of

2008 it's undecided. It's still at issue and these defendants
have the right, the due process right to claim that he's not
right. And they have the right to have lawyers assert their
positions. And when all's said and done, as Mr. LaRue said,
this still boils down to plaintiff suing their adversary
defendant lawyer and that shouldn't be allowed.
Thank you, your Honor.

24

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Janis.

25

Counsel, I appreciate your respective arguments

this morning and the briefing that was submitted to me in
advance of this hearing. It is some very interesting issues to
be addressed.
At this point in time I'm going to take these
motions under advisement and I recognize, Mr. Bissell, that the
motions to - that are seeking leave to file the amended
complaint are now noticed up for hearing, I don't know how fm
going to handle that at this point in time, that's just
something I'm going to have to do as I evaluate this and make a
determination as to whether this is going to wait for that
hearing or what, so I don't really -- I don't know what I'm
going to -- how I'm going to approach that.
MR BISSELL: I was just going to suggest, your
Honor, I could just strike the date right now until the Court
instructs us what it wants to do on that.
THE COURT: No, let's leave it for now.
MR BISSELL: I think it's the 12th or the 13th.
THE COURT: I think it's the 13th of November. fm
going to leave it for now, Mr. Bissell, but it may change due
to circumstances beyond your control or mine because I have got
a murder trial starting November 3rd, and I can't work the 4th
and the I can't work the 11th, so I'm not sure when that's
going to end. So the circumstances may just take that away
from us anyway.
But whatever -- if I do choose to do something
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47
1

Anything else for the record today then,

1
2
3

CV 08-1765, Reed Taylor versus Gary Babbitt and other

MR. BISSELL: Nothing from the Plaintiff, your

4
5

Mike McNichols, Oements, Brown and McNichols. In both of

with that, I'll certainly notify all counsel and determine
where to go from there.

3
4

Mr. Bissell?

5

6
7
8
9
10
11
13
14
15

TifE COURT: This is two Nez Perce County cases
defendants. Second matter is CV 08-1763, Reed Taylor versus

6

these matters I have under advisement the Motions to Dismiss

THE COURT: Mr. LaRue?

7

filed by the Defendants that were argued back in October. At

MR. LARUE: Nothing further. Thank you, your

8

the time that we heard that matter, Mr. Bissell on behalf of

9

the plaintiffs in this case -- Plaintiff in this case had a

Honor.

Honor.

12

(December 4, 2008, 9:06 a.m.)

THE COURT: Mr. Janis?

10

pending motion seeking to amend the Complaint that was not

MR. JANIS: Nothing further, your Honor.

11

noticed up until February. I was -- excuse me, it was in the

THE COURT: Alright. Thank you, Counsel, we are

12

middle of November when that was originally noticed up for

17

13
14
15
16
17

18
19

18
19

from there rather than trying to do this in piecemeal fashion.

20

20

Amend the Complaints in these matters for today's date and time

in recess at this time.
(Thereupon, the hearing was concluded at 11:10
a.m.)

16

hearing. I was working on the Motion to Dismiss, and at the
time set for that original hearing on the Motion to Amend the
Complaint, I set that matter back at that point in time.
Through my continued review, I determined that I would rather
go ahead and hear the Motion to Amend the Complaint and proceed
So a couple weeks ago I re-noticed the Motion to

21

21

by way of telephone hearing. Mr. Bissell on behalf of the

22

22
23
24
25

Plaintiff Mr. Taylor in both matters is present by telephone.

23
24
5

Mr. Janis who represents McNichols' firm in 1763 is present by
telephone. And Mr. LaRue representing Mr. Babbitt and the
other Hawley Troxell defendants is present by telephone also.

50

49
1
2
3

Mr. Bissell, since we have the same -predominantly the same motions here, I decided to hear both of
these matters together, so I would ask you to address your

4
5

Mr. LaRue to respond. And then, Mr. Bissell, you will also

6

have the opportunity to reply to those arguments.

motions in both cases and then I'll allow Mr. Janis and

7

8
9

So, Mr. Bissell, I have reviewed, of course, the

documents that were already submitted, so I'll hear anything
else that you would like to say at this time.

10

1

has been made before and rests on the proposition that

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Reed Taylor is the only authorized officer and board member.
There is a theoretical problem with the argument and that is
that it presumes that Reed Taylor is the only person authorized
to retain counsel for his adversaries. And a more pragmatic
problem in that on May 31st, 2007, the Court entered a ruling
that it was unwilling and unable to find that Reed Taylor was
the sole shareholder and the only individual who may lawfully

run the corporations.

our -- the motion itself to amend, I don't have a whole heck of

10
11

12

a lot to add at this time, and I'd just - I guess I'll just

12

would -- has probably heard enough argument on direct claims,

13

wait and respond to what opposing counsel has to say in

and I would be glad to argue each if the Court wants to hear

14
15
16

argument to it if that works for the Court.

13
14

17

on 1763.

11

18
19

20
1

MR. BISSELL: Your Honor, I guess with regard to

As to the direct claims alleged in the proposed
amended complaint, I assume but don't know that the Court

argument, otherwise I would just reaffirm that as matter of law

THE COURT: That's fine with me.

15

the Plaintiff has not and cannot state a claim against its

Mr. Janis, I guess I will first hear from you then

16

adversary's counsel, and the claims are barred as a matter of

17

law.

18
19

about the derivative claims?

MR. JANIS I think Mr. LaRue is going to go first,
Judge, if that's okay.

Does the Court really probably want to hear more

THE COURT: Alright. Mr. LaRue.

20

THE COURT: That's up to you, Mr. LaRue.

MR. LARUE: Thank you, your Honor. There was one

21
22

MR. JANIS: I don't want to waste your time or

2

additional argument raised by Mr. Bissell with regard to the

3

direct claims, that is a position that Hawley Troxell is not a

24

lawful representative of the corporations and therefore not

25

entitled to any privileges previously asserted. This argument

23
24
25

Counsel's time re-arguing the direct claims, so 111 move to
the derivative claims.
THE COURT: That's fine.
MR JANIS: And I believe Hawley Troxell's
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51
position with regard to the direct claims in the pending
Complaint and in the Proposed Amended Complaint have already
been argued.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR JANIS: With regard to the derivative claims,
a derivative lawsuit is defined as a civil suit on behalf of
the domestic or in limited circumstances a foreign corporation.
It's an extraordinary device to enable a shareholder to enforce
a right of a corporation if the corporation has failed to
assert on its own behalf.
The shareholder compels the corporation to sue,
there is a suit by the corporation asserted by the shareholder
against those claimed liable to the corporation and the
substantive claim belongs to the corporation.
A shareholder may not maintain the derivative
claim on his own behalf to recover personal losses.
Corporation is the only party that benefits.
Under the proposed amended complaint, there are a
couple of technical failures to comply with derivative actions.
First under the proposed amended complaint in the caption
Mr. Reed claims to be bringing this action on behalf of
creditors and/or shareholders of Services and Insurance, and
recites that status in paragraph 3.
Under Idaho Code 30-1-740, a derivative proceeding
is a civil suit and the right of a domestic corporation. It is

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

not on behalf of creditors or shareholders.

is before the Court - or which the Court has been handling for

In the reply to Defendant's Memorandum in

Opposition of Motion to Amend, Mr. Taylor claims standing to
maintain a derivative action on four separate grounds. First
he claims that Services is in default to him. That merely
makes him a creditor. He claims that he is a secured creditor
of Services. He claims that he's a pledgee of all Insurance
shares, and he claims he stands in the shoes of a shareholder.
But nowhere does he - does he claim that he is a shareholder.
And with regard to his claim that he stands in the shoes of a
shareholder, the Court has already ruled on that argument back
in May of 2007.
There are three reasons why Mr. Taylor lacks
standing to bring derivative claims. First, he is not a
shareholder. And this is a requirement of both Idaho Code
30-1-741 and IRCP 23(£). And I reference IRCP 23(£) because in
moving papers or in the reply papers, Mr. Taylor refers to the
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, I will refer to the State.
The code limits standing to commence or maintain a
derivative proceeding to those filling the role of a defendant
who quote, "Was a shareholder at the time of the act or
omission complained of or who became a shareholder by operation
of law." Comment 3 to Idaho Code 30-1-741, makes it clear that
creditors, holders of options and others are not permitted to
commence a derivative proceeding.

54

53
IRCP 23(£) states certai~ requirements for

bring the derivative claim is he does not fairly represent the

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

17

interest of the corporation. Idaho Code 30-1-741 provides that

17

entitled to recover and possess all funds, damages and/or

18
19
20
21..--..
2

the shareholder bringing the derivative action must fairly and

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

property recovered from all direct and derivative causes of

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

derivative actions. It requires that the complaint shall
allege that the Plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the
time that the transaction to which the Plaintiff complains.
The Proposed Amended Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff
was a shareholder of either corporation, nor could it. A
former shareholder whose stock was redeemed ceased being a
shareholder in 1995. He is still not a shareholder through
operation of law. While on occasions some other jurisdictions
may allow persons holding the status of creditors, or debtors
or pledgees, the right to maintain a derivative action, under
the Idaho Statute and under the Idaho Rule of Procedure,
Plaintiff is not a proper party to bring a derivative claim
because he is not a shareholder.
The second reason Reed Taylor lacks standing to

adequately represent the interest of the corporation in
enforcing the right of the corporation. Also IRCP 23(£)
provides that the derivative action may not be maintained if it
appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately
represent the interests of the shareholders or members

24
25

similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation.
Under the facts of the underlying lawsuit, which

a number of years, and the positions taken by. Plaintiffs in
this case, it is clear the Plaintiff is not interested in
representing the corporation's interest or those of the
community of shareholders.
Mr. Taylor has sued the corporations for the very
same recovery he claims to represent them on derivatively in
the Proposed Amended Complaint Plaintiffs personal interest
is adverse to the corporation and other shareholders. As
alleged in the Proposed Amended Complaint, payment of these in
and a substantial portion of the balance claim due would
bankrupt the corporations as he alleges in paragraph 17 and 29
of the Proposed Amended Complaint.
And if one looks at the Proposed Amended Complaint
at paragraph 13, the last sentence, Mr. Taylor alleges that as
the sole pledgee of all shares of AIA Insurance, Reed Taylor is

action. And his own proposed complaint he seeks personally
payment for direct and derivative claim.
If one goes to the prayer of the Proposed Amended

Complaint, it begins at the bottom of page 43, Mr. Taylor lists
six paragraphs of damages, he seeks claims that have nothing -that are not on behalf of the corporation as required by the
statute or the shareholders in enforcing the right of the
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1

statute that requires a demand. In this case it's Idaho Code
71-742. The Quantum court found that the rule required that a

opposition and provided a copy of the Quantum case suggests

2
3

shareholder seeking to assert a claim on behalf of a

elements of evaluation -- of to evaluating considering whether

4

corporation must first exhaust intra-corporate remedies by

5

Mr. Taylor meets the requirements of the rule or statute to be

making a demand on the directors to obtain the action desired

6
7

a representative in a derivative action. Among those are
whether there's any economic antagonism between him and the

5
6
7

the purpose of the pre-suit demand is to assure that the

8

corporation and clearly there is. Plaintiffs vindictiveness

8

shareholder affords the corporation the opportunity to address

9

towards the Defendants, and clearly that occurs, and has in the

9

an alleged wrong without litigation. By making the demand,

1

corporation as required by the rule.
Plaintiffs own authority, which he cites in his

3
4

support a finding of utility.

none. But it's clear from the existence of the underlying

10
11
12

lawsuit and the allegations of the Proposed Amended Complaint

13

amended complaint failed to allege a wrongful refusal and

that Mr. Taylor will not under the statute or rule fairly and

14
15
16

granted a motion to dismiss the pending complaint. Here

10
11
12

from shareholders he purports to represent which there has been

13

14
15
16

adequately represent the interests of the corporation enforcing

17

which is why the demand was excused. The Court explained that

past, and the degree of support that Plaintiff has received

the rights.
The third standing argument is found in Rule 23, I

The Quantum court found that Quantum's first

Reed Taylor acknowledges the demand by the paragraph 18 of his
first amended - Proposed Amended Complaint, claims, quote, "No

17

actions have been taken." I don't believe that's correct
statement. On July 21st, 2008, Mr. Taylor wrote his demand
corporations filed - or dated 8-14--08, a petition for

18
19

the Federal Rule. IRCP 23(f) requires that the complaint shall

18
19

20

also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the

20

would cite to the Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure as opposed to

the shareholder tacitly acknowledges the absence of facts to

letter to the corporations. On August 14, 2008, the

21

plaintiffs to obtain the action which plaintiffs desires from

21

appointment of a panel or persons under the statute. On

22
23

the directors or comparable authority and necessary from the

September 4th, '08, Reed Taylor filed a response which agreed

shareholders and members, and the reasons for the plaintiffs

22
23

24

failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.

24

under heading Bl, states that AIA is correct that a

25

court-appointed panel is appropriate but only a panel that is

25

So the Quantum case, this appears to relate to the

with the proposition that a panel was appropriate at page 3

57

58

1

comprised of truly independent persons. And I believe on the

2
3
4

most or all the lawyers was heard and resolved.

4
5
6
7
8
9

5

6
7
8
9

1

preven~ng

11th of September, 2008, this Court stayed all pending matters

2

the shareholders in the derivative action.

in the underlying case until Reed Taylor's motion to disqualify

3

So a shareholder who makes a demand and agrees to
an independent inquiry cannot argue that the demand is excused
and then go out and file a complaint. So under the Quantum
authority, this Court will be authorized to dismiss the
derivative claims even if proposed amended complaint was filed.

10

Therefore, Reed Taylor lacks standing to bring this derivative

10

11

claim, and any one of those three arguments standing alone is

11

12

sufficient to deny the filing of the complaint.

12

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
1

z
3
24
25

personal claim rather than transfer to the corporation,

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Fourth, there are serious questions where the
Plaintiff and his present counsel had conflicts of interest in
pursuing the derivative claim. As we indicated to the Court in
our opposition, a plaintiff presently suing derivative
defendants, as Mr. Reed is here, in an underlying case, and who
seeks to have the derivative defendants assets applied to a

him or his firm from continuing to represent any of
But for the reasons stated in the memo in

opposition to the motion and the arguments made today, I
request that the Motion to Amend the Complaint be denied.
With regard to the direct claims stated in the Proposed Amended
Complaint, I believe the Court can deny it based on the
position that they would be subject to dismissal with prejudice
if the amendment was allowed. That is, it's a futile
amendment.
And as to the derivative claims, I believe the
Court should deny the motion to amend because Mr. Taylor fails
to meet the statutory or rule requirements to bring the
derivative action. He Jacks standing because he's not a
shareholder. He lacks standing because he would not fairly and
adequately represent the interest of the corporation, and he
lacks standing because he is not completed the demand process.
In addition to any one of those standing
arguments, we believe that Mr. Taylor is disqualified as a

represents a serious conflict of interest in pursuing a

20

derivative claim on behalf of those defendants and is

21

Does the Court have any questions?

sufficient to disqualify him as a shareholder if he filled that

22
23
24
25

THE COURT: No, I don't believe so, Mr. LaRue.

role representative in a derivative action.
And next, because of Mr. Taylor's conflicting
interest, present counsel has an irreconcilable conflict

representative to pursue a derivative action.

Thank you.
MR LARUE: Thank you.
THE COURT: Mr. Janis, anything that you would

001376

60

59
like to add on behalf of your client Mr. McNichols and his

firm?
MR. JANIS: Yes, thank you, your Honor. Just a

1
2
3

Mike McNichols and his law firm. the attorney who represented

they can't change the fact with factual pleadings that
the defendant AIA entities in the case brought by Reed Taylor

4

few things. We do have, of course, these are two separate

4

for about six weeks and John Taylor for that same six weeks and

5

cases, but as you pointed out, the issues presented in both the

6

motions that we are talking about here are substantively the

5
6

do so today. And that is the only relationship Mike McNichols

1

same. And I just want to on the direct - so-called direct

1

and his law firm has ever had with Reed Taylor, that is,

8
9

claims, I too would adopt the briefs and arguments for the most

8
9

representing his lawsuit's adversaries.

part previously made on the motion to dismiss. But just point

thereafter, has represented only John Taylor and continues to

And one other point that I think relationship-wise

10

out that since that motion was argued, this Proposed Amended

10

or legal status wise that is worth emphasizing that cannot -

11

Complaint does change the allocations to some degree on the

11

again, cannot be changed by any factual pleadings, in regards

12

direct claims but not all that much. But in any event,. there

13

is nothing in the amended -- Proposed Amended Complaint that

12
13

regard to these AIA entities. This has been a point of some

14
15

would even arguably affect the legal premise upon which our
previous motions to dismiss were based. Because those

14
15

controversy because he has been claiming repeatedly in a lot of
the briefs and the arguments that he presently enjoys the
rurrent status as the person who has the sole legal right to
run and manage these companies. And as such, it's that status

this legal status that Reed Taylor has and rurrently has with

16

arguments concerned who these parties are in relation to each

16

17

other, there is nothing that can or has been done in these

17

18
19
20

tweaking of the factual pleadings on the direct claims that can
change that.

18
19
20
21
22
23

sues which, of course, makes no sense; but in any event, it is

They can't, for example, change the fact that

that he uses as the premise to claim that he has a right to
pursue claims against these lawyers.

In other words, as Mr. LaRue pointed out, he's
claiming that he is basically the only one that is allowed to

21

Reed Taylor is the Plaintiff in the underlying case who has

22
23

sued these AI.A corporate entities and John Taylor in a case

24
26--..

so. They also cannot change who these defendant lawyers are

24

just undeniable that he does not enjoy that status at this

that they sued in separate cases. For example, in my case,

25

point.

1
2
3
4
5
6

Under the Court's rulings on the injunction order
and the motions filed by Reed Taylor, he has - he was and is
enjoined from acting as a director or officer, enjoined from

1
2
3

adequately represent the interests of the corporation and/or
shareholders in a similar position.

interfering with the management of the running of the

briefs, that there are cases from other jurisdictions that
sound in on this issue, but we are concerned with Idaho law,

declare that he is not determined to be the only shareholder

4
5
6

1
8

with right to run the companies at this point, and that all

1

as the Idaho Corporate Code 30-1-742 - or 741, that you must

those issues are yet to be determined. And that represents the
current status today as it has been for the last 18 months.

8
9

be an actual shareholder and he's not - well he is not, he has

9

that's still ongoing and has been for, what, 18 or 20 months or

hire the lawyers to represent the people or entities that he

62

61

10
11
12
13
14

companies, and under the Court's rulings on his motion may

So the fact of the matter is, he does not enjoy

not pied that and he is not and he hasn't been for at least ten
years.

11

these lawyers. And it's on this basis - these bases, I should

12
13
14

to thoroughly represent the interests of corporation, again,
it's the same points made by Mr. LaRue, but I would just add

15
16

and who these people are, it's really hard to come up with

say, that we have argued that he cannot under any
circumstances, no matter how he tweaks the factual pleadings,
he cannot get the legal right or standing to sue his

16

adversary's lawyers. They owe no duty to him that gives rise

17
18
19

to any possible cognizable cause of action and they, of course,
would have what we have previously argued as the almost
universally recognized litigation privilege that has as its

20

object stopping this very type of contact.
On the derivative claims I think Mr. LaRue has

17

On this subject of that he is statutorily required

that if we just look at the big picture of what's going on here
someone who would be in a worse situation to claim that they
actually could fairly and adequately represent the interest of
the corporation. He is the direct lawsuit adversary of the

18
19
20

He is about as adverse as he could possibly - in fact, the

21

adversity between these parties is palpable.

argument that he has made. I think the important point to make

22
23

it's clear under Idaho law there is two elements, you have to
be a shareholder and you have to fairly represent - fairly and

25

thoroughly reviewed the issues, and again I would adopt the

24

and Idaho law makes it clear in both the Idaho Rule 23, as well

the status that he claims as the premise upon which he can sue

15

25

10

And it is true, as Mr. Bissell has pointed out in

24

corporation and those other folks that are running the place.

And lastly I'd like to make just to take a step
back and think about what he's trying to accomplish here with
this lawsuit that's going on. He's trying to accomplish having
a lawsuit going against the corporate entities and their
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1

directors, including Mike McNichols' client John Taylor, and at

1

basically -- both require that somebody be a shareholder at the

the very same time, have a lawsuit going against the lawyers

we set forth in our documents as to, you know, what is that

time. But you need to go a little bit deeper than that here as

3

representing those lawsuit adversaries. I mean if we just

4

think about that for a second, the privilege issues that exist

2
3
4

5

if that's allowed to continue, it's just mind boggling and it's

5

be faced by -- by a court or the litigants at a certain point

6
7

hard to come up with something in my mind at least in the arena

6
7

and time.

8

about Services, your Honor, there is pretty clear under the

8

of corporate law and attorney malpractice that is more unfair
to parties on one side of the litigation than that.
And simply put, we would respectfully request the

actually mean depending on the specific circumstances that may

And first of a~ let me first point out, talking

9

Federal - the Federal interpretation of the rules that say you

10

same relief that Mr. LaRue requested, that is, in addition to

10

have to be a shareholder at the time, the Court said that -- in

11

granting the previously filed Motion to Dismiss, to deny this

11

fact, and this is a case that by the way, that the Defendant

12

Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint on futility grounds.

12

13
14

Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Janis.

13
14

cite in their briefing, they cite this Gheewalla case and
that's where this information comes from, so they use this case
themselves for other purpose. But in that case that they cite,

15

it goes through analysis and specifically says that, as I think

16

we have discussed before, when a corporation becomes insolvent,

9

Mr. Bissel~ I'll now hear from you, any response

15

16

you'd like to make.
MR. BISSELL: Yes, your Honor, thank you.

17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24
5

Again, I won't go over all the arguments with
regard to the direct claims and that sort of thing, your Honor,
we have already-- everybody's briefed that and discussed that
thoroughly. Just to say that it seems like the other counsel
are arguing the facts and that's obviously improper in a motion
to dismiss.
But moving on to the derivative claims,
your Honor. The Federal Rules and the State Rules are

17

there's kind of a change in the way things are looked at.

18
19

Instead of how the primary obligation at that point in time to

20
21
22
23

the shareholders and the corporation, well the creditors kind
of have come to have some kind of standing. And that's what
happens in a case like this when you are talking about a
derivative action. And that case that they cite, as we point

24

out in our materials, specifically states that creditors of an
insolvent, and that's the key here, your Honor, creditors of an

25

insolvent corporation have the same incentive to pursue

66

65
1
2
3

corporation is solvent. And so that's what they said needed to
happen in that case. And there's other Federal law, we cited

4

another case in there that production resources, which is also

1
2
3
4

5

cited in our materials, it says that the creditor of an

5

6
7

insolvent corporation has standing to bring the derivative
action.
Just FYI, Judge, the Court may or may not know,

6
7
8
9

What we are talking about here is the pledgee of the shares.
And the law is clear that in that circumstances a pledgee has

8

9

derivative claims on its behalf that shareholders have if a

Reed Taylor also has some shares in a 401(k) plan. But in any

specific amount. And a conversion right -- and I'm not sure
exactly what they are meaning here, but I believe that's when

circumstances.

they give someone like a bond company or something a right to
convert something to stock later depending on certain
But that's not what we are talking about here.

the same rights to protect the stock holder's equity as a

10

event, so there's adequate law interpreting the same sort of

10

pledgor. And I have cited cases in our materials and I found

11
12
13
14

rules that says creditor of insolvent corporation is able to
assert the deri va ti ve claim.
Now we talk about the -- as the pledgee. Now it
is true that the Idaho Rule, and I have to differ with

11

another case this morning just for the Court's advocatio11, it's
an FBIC case, FBIC versus Kerr, 637 F.Supp 828. It's an ·86
case that says the same thing. And in that case I think there

15

Mr. LaRue a little bit. The comments says that the rule

16

requires the plaintiff to be a shareholder and therefore does
not permit creditors, not to -- it doesn't talk about insolvent

17
18
19

20
1

2
3
24

25

creditors. Again, I previously discussed how that's been
interpreted by the Federal Courts. Who are holders of options,
warrants or conversion right to commence a derivative
proceeding. And Mr. LaRue stated it says, "holders of options,
warrants or and others." Wei~ that's not what it says. It
just says "options, warrants or conversion rights," and that's
not what we are talking about here. An option or warrant is
simply a right to purchase a stock at some future time at some

12
13
14
15

were 50 percent owner of the shares. Here, of course, Reed has
a hundred percent ownership of the shares but they were a 50

16

percent pledgee in that case, and that court said, well, the

17
18
19

outstanding is fifty percent pledgee.
THE COURT: Give me that cite again, Mr. Bissell.

20
21
22
23

versus Kerr, K-e-r-r.
THE COURT: Alright. Thank you.
MR. BISSELL: Now if we move on down to the fair

24

25

MR. BISSELL: 637 F.Supp 828, your Honor. FBIC

and adequate representation. Again, as I point out in our
materials, they have the burden of showing that that doesn't
exist here. And one comment by Mr. LaRue I found interesting,
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67

.

that Reed is a pledgee of all of the shares of Insurance, he is

5
6
7
8

And then moving on, as set forth in the material and as we

seem to claim that there is a per se rule to that extent, and

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9

that is simply not the case as we point out in our materials.

9

he said, well, Mr. Reed -- or Mr. Taylor's interest are not in
accordance with the community of shareholders. Well, recall

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
~

the community of shareholders. There's nobody there but him .
discussed, they seem to make the claim that if you cannot bring
a derivative claim and a direct claim at the same time, they

The law is very clear that one can bring a direct
and a derivative claim simultaneously. If contingent upon
being -- and being contingent upon -- and they need to be
contingent upon proof of the same facts which they are here.
The court in the Vogel case that we cite just says aU that
would give rise to it most as a potential conflict and that's
not enough.
THE COURT: Hang on a second, Mr. Bissell, my
court reporter is having a little difficulty keeping up with
you, so slow down a -MR. BISSELL: Alright, I'll slow down a little

bit.
In the Vogel case, your Honor, the Court says you
can bring direct and derivative claims, and when both
derivative and direct claims are contingent upon proof of the
same fact, and that only gives rise to a potential conflict.

And we were talking about the fair and adequate representation.
In order for there to be a sufficient conflict to disqualify

the representative, there has been a real and actual conflict,
and that doesn't exist here. It's at most it would be a
potential conflict and we argue that it's not - there is no
conflict at all because every - the corporation's interest and
Reed Taylor's interest are the same, and that is to maximize
the recovery to the corporations.
It's also important to point out, your Honor,

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

that, you know, as we point out, the Court should be wary when

17

inadequate because her claim is small compared to the size of

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

the derivative claim. But as we also point out in our

folks are trying to disqualify a representative when there
won't be anybody there to do it. There is nobody else will
have the -- in the position to do anything about it. And
that's essentially what we are here, there's nobody there
except perhaps Donna Taylor, your Honor, although her claim is
much smaller, I suppose they'd argue if she was in this, she's

materials, your Honor, she's -- she's going to intervene here
when we get an opportunity.
In any event, that needs to be taken into

consideration by the Court. And whether the recovery
ultimately goes to Reed does not necessarily create a conflict
of interest. The fact is, there is no reason to believe, and,
again, it's the Defendant's burden to show this, that Reed

70

69
1

would conduct the derivative suit in any manner inconsistent

2
3

with the stockholder's interest. And in any event, as we point
out in our materials, your Honor, whatever happens in the

4

derivative suit, the Court pretty much has to put its stamp of

5
6
7
8
9

approval on it and Reed has stated in his materials that any

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

money received he wiU deposit with the Court if necessary.
And then the Court can determine where that money's going to
go.
Now, the other argument that Mr. LaRue and

·~

24
25

was going to make at the end here, and Mr. LaRue pointed out at

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

some technical problems with the Amended Complaint that we have

the beginning that there are some, I think, typos and perhaps
to -- that we need to correct. Amongst those I think, and I
might be wrong, but I think that in the derivative action I
think we'd still have to name the corporation as a nominal
defendant, but I may be wrong there. But I was thinking about
that this morning, I think that might need to take place.
Also, your Honor, I would -- I would ask the Court

Mr. Janis, I guess he made it too, they made was the fact that

10

because we obviously -- we have talked about a lot of

we haven't made an appropriate -- haven't followed appropriate

11

information in the past in this case and in the other cases

statutory procedures prior to being able to make a derivative

12
13
14
15
16

claim on our own. First thing I'd say about that, your Honor,
is that's a new argument and first time I have heard it this
morning, and so it should not be considered by the court; and
if it is, we should get a chance to submit some briefing.

17

18
19
20

1
2

But I would say this, that I believe that under

17

continuing to do whatever they claim they are going to do.

18
19
20
21

That's what should occur. Dismissal would not be the

22

appropriate.

23
24
25

the statute -- under these circumstances, the proper action for
the corporation would be to stay this litigation, and they can
do that under the corporation statutes, while they are

I'm looking at a couple other things here. I
would -- I did note -- I have a note here, your Honor, that I

and, you know, a lot of the information in the other cases kind
of has an impact on this case. So I would ask the Court to
take judicial notice of everything that's been followed, argued
in those previous cases -- or in the other matter, the
underlying matter we might call it, the Reed versus AIA matter
which is 07--00208.
THE COURT: Well, that was actuaUy my intention,

Mr. Bissell, that's part of what I came to conclude is I really
can't discuss this and rule on the pending Motion to Dismiss
without the consideration of the underlying case, so that was
actually my intention.
MR. BISSELL: Okay, thank you, your Honor.

Let me just check a couple of my notes here. I
think that's all I have, your Honor. We think that based upon
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71

1

the -- we put a finer point on the law in the interpretation of
the law that based upon the law that we cite that Reed has

3
4

be a fairly and adequate representative of the corporation and

5

the shareholders.

6
7
8

this isa note to Idaho Code30-1-741, a comment, if the Court
was inclined, and I don't think it should dismiss anything. but

9

if it was even inclined to, it indicates in there that the

standing. clearly has standing and he clearly is one that would

I might also point out, your Honor, that -- and

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

addressed as soon as possible. I know this has been pending
for a while, so we need to get it moving one way or the other.

MR BIS.SELL: Your Honor, this is Mike Bissell,
can I add one more thing?
THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Bissell.

MR BISSELL:· We·· I understand that there is··
there is obviously a number of factual issues here that, you
know, for the - at least for the purposes of the motion,
technically speaking the Court has to, you know, assume are

10

courts are withheld from doing that pending an opportunity for

10

true, but I understand that those are also issues in the

11
12

other shareholders to intervene. And as I have stated,

11
12

Reed Taylor versus AI.A matter. And so we'd be willing to and

13
14
15
16
17

resolved in order so those factual determinations can be made.

13
14
15

Donna Taylor does, as the Court probably knows, I do represent
her, Donna Taylor does intend on intervening in this action.
Although I do not think that is necessary based upon the law
that we have just discussed.

16

That's all I have, your Honor. Thank you.

17
18
19

20
21
22

23
24

THE COURT: Alright. Thank you, Mr. Bissell.
Well, gentlemen, I did want to get this heard, and I appreciate·
everybody making themselves available so that we can get this
motion heard so that I can get the motions to dismiss fully
considered along with this so that we can kind of address
everything that's pending. I am going to take the inotion to
amend the complaints in these two matters under advisement at
this time. And I'm going to be a little busy for about the

may be appropriate to stay this action until that one's
I just throw that out for the Court's consideration.
THE COURT: Alright. Thank you.
MR LARUE: Does the Court want any comment from

either the Defendants on Mr. Bissell's last suggestion?

18
19

20
21
22

23
24
25

.5

next ten days in a criminal trial, but I do hope to have this

1
2

currently there are two, if [ understand there's been

3

4
5

clients know what their respective status is.

6
7

cases, although I'm sure it would be helpful to Mr. Taylor,

7

undermines all of Mr. Taylor's adversaries' opportunity to be

8

THE COURT: Yes, go ahead.

MR LARUE: It's like Mr. Bissell was putting the
cart ahead of the horse. The stay and complaint against an
attorney representing a defendant in the underlying case, until
the under the underlying case is resolved, ham strings that
lawyer's independent representation of his or her client in the
underlying case. When we argued the Motion to Dismiss, I
suggested that if the lawsuits against the attorneys, and

73

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

threatened to be more, I don't know if those have been filed or

hope to have you informed of what my rulings are so that we can

not, if those cases are allowed to be stayed or proceed, the

3

determine what the next procedures are going to be.

underlying case has to be stayed until the attorneys and their

4
5
6

at this time.

So Mr. Bissell's offer to stay the malpractice

represented as they should be by their attorneys and their

1

.2
3

24
25

Mr. Janis, anything from you?
MR JANlS: I would make the same point as

17

advice.
THE COURT: Well, thank you. It's kind of one of
the things that I have been trying to deal with in considering
both of these cases is exactly how we are going to be able to
proceed.

Mr. LaRue. It kind of illustrates the problems caused by

19

If you stay it, it's still there. The attorneys have to be

20
21
22

concerned about it, that's the very reason there's a litigation
aren't always looking over their shoulder worried about

23

exposure.

24
25

THE COURT: Yes. Alright. Well, thank you,

Thank you, gentlemen, we are going to be in recess
(fhereupon. court was in recess at 9:49 a.m)
(fhereupon. the requested appeal transcripts were
concluded.)

18

trying to have both of these cases going on at the same time.

privilege to begin with is so lawyers representing clients

gentlemen. I'm going to take these matters under advisement, I

9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

attorneys opportunity to fairly and independently give legal

17

18
19
20

74

1
2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, an individuaJ;
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 08-01765

v.

GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, unknow
individuals;

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

On April 3, 2009, this Court entered its Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for
Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs (''Opinion and Order"). Defendants now file this
Memorandum in support of their Motion for Reconsideration. Defendants request that this Court
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1

Exhibit - 20
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reconsider its Opinion and Order to clarify whether the factors set forth in Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(e)(3) were considered by this Court in detennining the cost and attorney fee award.
Defendants also request that this Court reconsider the amount of attorney fees awarded.

GOVERNING STANDARDS
"A decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration generally rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court." Spur Products Corp. v. Stoel Rives UP, l43 ldaho 812, 815, 153
P.3d 1158, citing Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21P.3d908 (2001). A motion for
reconsideration allows a party an opportunity to draw the trial court's attention to errors of law or
fact in the initial decision. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 473, 147 P.3d 100 (Ct.App.
2006). A motion for reconsideration does not require the presentation of additional facts,
especially where the motion is based on the initial evidence presented to the trial court. See Id.

ANALYSIS
I.

THE RECORD MUST REFLECT THAT THE FACTORS SET OUT IN IDAHO RULE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE S4(e)(3) WERE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING THE
AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY FEES TO BE AWARDED
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3) outlines the factors a trial court must consider
when detennining the amount of attorney fees to award to a prevailing party. While the trial
court need not make specific findings demonstrating how it employed any of the factors set forth
in Rule 54(e)(3), it must consider the stated factors in determining the amount of the fees.

Perkins v. U.S. Transformer West, 132 Idaho 427, 430, 974 P.2d 73 (1999). Moreover, the trial
court must demonstrate in the record that it considered each of the factors outlined in Rule
54(e)(3).

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 2
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The district court must, at a minimum, provide a record which
establishes that the court considered these factors. They include
such items as the time and labor required, the skill requisite to
perfonn the legal service properly, the amount involved, and the
results obtained, as well as "any other factor which the court deems
appropriate" in this case.
Building Concepts, Ltd. v. Pickering, 114 Idaho 640, 645, 759 P.2d 931 (Ct.App. 1988). When a
decision awarding attorney fees contains insufficient information to determine what standard the
trial court applied or whether it applied the Rule 54(e)(3) factors, the award may be vacated and
remanded for further consideration. Perkins, 132 Idaho at 430-31.
In this case, Defendants outlined and addressed each of the Rule 54(e)(3) factors in
support of their request for an award of attorney fees. (See Affidavit in Support of Defendants'
Costs and Attorneys' Fees.) However, the Opinion and Order does not appear to specifically
state that this Court considered all Rule 54(e)(3) factors in determining the amount of attorney
fees to award Defendants. To protect this Court's Opinion and Order of April 3, 2009, and to
clarify the record on appeal, Defendants requc::st that this Court modify its Opinion and Order to
reflect that all Rule 54(e)(3) factors were in fact considered by this Court.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY FEES
AWARDED TO DEFENDANTS
A malpractice action is a case-within-a-case, requiring the parties to analyze the facts in
the underlying action as well as the allegations in the malpractice action. Elam & Burke was at a
disadvantage at the outset of this case because it lacked a working knowledge of the facts and
issues in the underlying lawsuit - most of which were the basis for the claims asserted by
Plaintiff in this action. Accordingly, it was necessary for Elam & Burke to become familiar with

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 3
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the circumstances re1ating to the underlying lawsuit involving the AIA entities to fu.lly
understand and evaluate Plaintiff's claims in this case. As this Court is aware, the filings in the
AIA entities lawsuit are substantial to say the least.
Plaintiff's Complaint in this action was filed on August 18, 2008. Plaintiff's Complaint
covered virtually all of the allegations at issue in the AIA entities lawsuit, consisted of twenty-six
(26) pages, asserted four (4) causes of action, and sought damages ofS 10,500,000 against
Defendants. Plaintiff also filed his Motion to Amend Complaint on or about October 15, 2008.
Plaintiff's Proposed Amended Complaint included a significant number of new allegations,
consisted of forty-five (45) pages, asserted seven (7) causes of action, and continued to seek
damages of $10,500,000.
In addition, the proceedings in the AIA entities lawsuit were specifically applicable to the
issues raised in this action. Specifically, Plaintiff filed a motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell
Ennis & Hawley LLP as attorneys in the AIA entities action which was appreciably similar to the
allegations asserted by Plaintiff in this case. This required Elam & Burke to devote additional
time and effort to perform a detailed analysis of Plaintiff's substantial briefing and arguments
asserted in the underlying action.
Moreover, Plaintiff initiated a companion case against the law firm of Clements, Brown
& McNichols, P.A., and Michael E. McNichols individually, which involved allegations and

issues similar to those asserted by Plaintiff in this case. This required Elam & Burke to analyze
not only the allegations in this case and the AJA entities lawsuit, as well as the allegations and
claims asserted in the companion case to verify the allegations and arguments raised by Plaintiff
in each of the lawsuits were consistent.
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In addition to the substantial number of issues raised in Plaintitrs Complaint and related
issues raised in the underlying and companion cases, Plaintiff attempted to raise even more issues
in opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Defendants were required to conduct additional
research and analysis to address Plaintiff's arguments. While the briefing filed with this Court
relative to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was substantial, it was necessary to address the many
issues raised by Plaintiff and to demonstrate that Plaintiff's allegations against Defendants were
frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation in law or fact.
This Court issued its Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint on December 23, 2008, dismissing all claims asserted by
Plaintiff- including his substantial damage claim ofSlO,S00,000- and denying Plaintiff's
Motion to Amend Complaint. On January 6, 2009, Defendants filed their Memorandum of Costs
and Attorneys' Fees, seeking an award ofattomey fees in the amount of$43,912.50. (See

Defendant's Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees.) On April 3, 2009, this Court
detennined all claims asserted in Plaintiff's Complaint and alleged in his proposed Amended
Complaint were frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation in law or fact, and found that
Defendants were entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121. 1 (See
Opinion and Order.) However, this Court awarded less than haJf of the attorneys' fees requested
by Defendants. (See Id.) The Opinion and Order does not state why the attorney's fees requested
by Defendants were reduced. (See Id.)

1

This Court also determined Defendants were entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code§§ 30-1-746(2)
and (3), and 48-608(5). (See Opinion and Order.)
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Based on the foregoing, Defendants request that this Court re-evaluate Defendants' filings
in support of an award of costs and attorneys' fees, and reconsider its award of attorney fees.

Building Concepts, ltd, supra, l I 4 Idaho at 645.
CONCLUSION
Defendants respectfully request that this Court grant their Motion for Reconsideration and
clarify that all factors set out in Rule 54(e)(3) were considered. Defendants also request that this

Court reconsider the amount of attorney fees awarded.
DATED this __slL day of April, 2009.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By.

~

«:t:(~ ..

" ..
J~ LaRue, Of the Finn

Attorneys for Defendants

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 6

001387

21

05:05:33 p.m.

ELAM AND BURKE

04-21-2009

10110

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _d.J- day of April, 2009, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument be served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:

to

Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL BISSEU.. & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, Washington 99201

v

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(509) 455-7111

James . LaRue
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RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, VVA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Case No.: CV-07-00208
Plaintiff,

v.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and
CORRINE BECK, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;

AFFIDAVIT OF REED J. TAYLOR IN
OPPOSITION TO CONNIE TAYLOR AND
JAMES BECK'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.
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STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss:
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE )
I, Reed J. Taylor, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in court, the

plaintiff in the above-entitle action, and make this Affidavit based upon my personal
knowledge, my over 40 years of experience in the insurance industry, and belief based
upon the information available to me.
2.

I founded what is now known as AIA Insurance, Inc. ("AIA Insurance")

over 30 years ago.

From the date AIA Services Corporation ("AIA Services") was

incorporated through shortly after the redemption of my shares on July 22, 1995, I served
as Chairman and C.E.O. of AIA Services. From the time of incorporation through the
time that I sold my shares in 1995, I was responsible for sales and R. John Taylor ("John
Taylor") was responsible for the finances and legal aspects for AIA Services and its
subsidiaries. In fact, when John Taylor first joined me at AIA Insurance in 1976, he was
hired to run the office for me and handle financial and legal issues.

I have little

knowledge of financial issues, accounting and legal matter and have always relied upon
others (specifically John Taylor) for these areas of operation.
3.

The Defendants and the AJA Services 40l(k) Plan ("Plan") in this action

have stated that I forced the sale of my shares upon AIA Services Corporation ("AJA
Services") or the Defendants in this action. John Taylor, James Beck and the other
investors desired to take AIA Services a different direction and attempt to sell numerous
insurance products. They also wanted to take AIA Services public and I was never in
favor of a public offering. As a result, I agreed to sell my shares at the request of John
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Taylor and others in the original Preferred C Shareholder investment group. J was not
soliciting offers to sell my shares, rather John Taylor and Richard Campanaro (he was
part of the investor group with James Beck and Michael Cashman) were approaching me
to purchase my shares in AIA Services. I always believed that AJA Services should
focus on a few insurance products instead of trying to sell various different policies to
customers. As a result of these differences in opinion and my desire to slow down a bit, J
agreed to sell my shares.
4.

When I agreed to sell my shares, J relied upon John Taylor, AIA Services,

Richard Riley and Eberle Berlin's representations that the redemption of my shares in
1995 was a legal transaction and that AJA Services had the power and authority to
redeem my shares. J would never have sold my shares but for the representations made
by John Taylor, AJA Services, Richard Riley and Eberle Berlin that the redemption was
legal. The foregoing representations were made in Eberle Berlin's opinion letter (which
indicated that it was based upon the personal knowledge of Richard Riley) and the Stock
Redemption Agreement,

Stock Pledge Agreement,

Security Agreement,

Stock

Restructure Redemption Agreement, Amended and Restated Security Agreement,
Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement, August 16, 1995 Certification signed
by John Taylor, and other redemption related agreements and representations.
5.

AIA Services had $9,581,600 in commissions for the year 1994 as

reported on the financial statements for December 31, 1994 (this financial statement is
attached to the Affidavit of Connie Taylor in Support of Partial Summary Judgment).
Over the years of my insurance experience, insurance agencies typically sell policies
related on the commissions for 1 to 1Y2 times commissions. In the case of AIA Services,
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I have the ability to the see that the commission stream responsible for the $9,581,600
remained intact for many years, although it continuously lessened each year. As a result,
I believe that 2 or more times commissions would be an appropriate valuation of the
commission stream based upon my ability to see the tens of millions of dollars of
commissions generated from 1995 through 2006.

Consequently, based upon my 40

years+ experience in the insurance industry and as fonner CEO of AIA Services, I value
the commissions of AIA Services between $14,372,400 on July 22, 1995, and
$19, 163,200 on July 22, 1995. Because of the significant revenues also generated from
administering the policies, I believe that $19, 163,200 is the more appropriate valuation of
the commissions as of July 22, 1995. The commission streams and related revenues of
over $65,000,000 generated from 1995 through 2006, which I determined from the
financial statements of AIA Services that have been provided to all parties in this action.
It should also be noted that when purchasing or acquiring books of business based upon

commissions parties generally look to the commissions generated from the preceding
year.

I believe that 2 times commission would also be appropriate for valuing the

commission book of business in 1996 based upon the year-end numbers for December
31, 1995, which would value the book of commission revenues at $14,947,864 as of July
1, 1996, based upon year-end commission revenues reported for AIA Services as of
December 31, 1995 (this financial statement was Exhibit AL submitted at the Preliminary
Injunction Hearing held on March 1, 2007.
6.

AIA Services and/or its Subsidiaries also had exclusive contracts with

various growers and commodity associations that resulted in thousands of policies being
issued to members to the benefit of AIA Services and its Subsidiaries. These associations
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had thousands of members who purchase insurance from AIA. As of July 22, 1995, I
value these contractual relationships at $5,000,000. I beJieve this

sam~

$5,000,000 value

existed on July 1, 1996.
7.

Almost 14 years have gone by since I sold my shares in AIA Services in

1995. John Taylor, James Beck, and Michael Cashman have controlled AIA Services
and its subsidiaries since my shares were redeemed in 1995 and there is nothing that
could be done to replace the lost time. I have been deprived of my right to request to
have my shares returned because over 13 years has transpired and AIA Services business
has been substantially depleted under the management of John Taylor. I would also point
out that CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. has received millions of dollars from AJA
Insurance and/or AIA Services. Finally, John Taylor has been paid significant salaries
amounting to over $2,000,000 since I left my employment with AJA Services and sold
my shares. J would also point out that AIA Services and Subsidiaries sales decreased
under John Taylor's management and AJA Services has no marketable proprietary health
product to sell. Since J left, John Taylor has stated time and time again that AIA would
obtain a new proprietary health product, but he has never done so. Thirteen years cannot
be returned to me.
DATED: This 9th day of April, 2009.

,&~:

Reed J. T7i'J
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 9th day of April, 2009.

kt

Residing at: Lt'.Wl 5·
z
My commission expires: ..:=j/2~.201~
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RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, VIA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Case No.: CV-07-00208
Plaintiff,

v.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR., individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and
CORRINE BECK, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;

AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT T. BELL (1) IN
SUPPORT OF REED TAYLOR'S MOTIONS
FOR RULE 56(f) CONTINUANCE; (2) IN
SUPPORT OF REED TAYLOR'S PENDING
MOTIONS TO COMPEL DEPOSITIONS
AND DISCOVERY; (3) IN OPPOSffiON TO
CONNIE TAYLOR AND JAMES BECK'S
MOTIONFORPARTIALSUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND JOINDERS BY THE
401(k) PLAN AND OTIIER DEFENDANTS;
AND (4) IN SUPPORT OF REED
TAYLOR'S MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.
STATE OF VIASIIlNGTON
COUNTY OF KING

)
) ss:
)
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I, Scott T. Bell, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in court, and

make this Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge.
2.

..

In 1978, I obtained my undergraduate degree from University of Texas. I

attended law school at Harvard Law School and New York University School of Law and
obtained my J.D. in 1981. In 1981, I was admitted to practice law in Washington and
have continuously practiced law since that time.
3.

For over 25 years, I have emphasized my practice on corporate finance

and business transactions. My experience includes public and private offerings, business
mergers, share exchanges, recapitalizations, consolidations, and stock and asset
acquisitions.

The size of corporate transactions in which I have provided legal

representation range from several thousand dollars to over $100 million.
4.

In or about early 1995, Reed Taylor retained my firm, Cairn.cross &

Hempelmann, P.S. (''my firm"), to negotiate, draft agreements, and close the redemption
of his shares in AIA Services Corporation (''transaction").

From early in the

negotiations, I learned that R John Taylor and others were attempting to redeem Reed
Taylor's interest in AIA Services Corporation to take the company a different direction
and perhaps move toward a public offering or sale of the company. I also learned that R
John Taylor, as President, held extensive knowledge of the financial affairs of AJA
Services Corporation and its subsidiaries, while Reed Taylor held relatively little
knowledge in accounting, law or the financial affairs of the company. While I certainly
respected Reed Taylor for his apparent sales ability and knowledge in that realm, it
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seemed that Reed Taylor held inferior knowledge to R. John Taylor regarding the
financial affairs of AJA Service Corporation and its subsidiaries.
5.

Because of Reed Taylor's membership on the board of directors of AJA

SetVices Corporation, he and my firm supported the establishment of an independent
committee of the board of directors to negotiate and approve the terms of the redemption
of Reed Taylor's shares. Reed Taylor was not a member of this committee. Richard
Riley of Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered ("Eberle, Berlin'')
served as counsel to this committee and AJA Services Corporation in connection with the
redemption.
6.

R. John Taylor and the other investors suggested the redemption of Reed

Taylor's shares as a means to achieve their objectives.

Although Reed Taylor was

initially resistant to a redemption of his shares, he ultimately became willing to do so. At
no point did he force AJA Services Corporation, through his majority vote or otherwise,
to effectuate a preferential redemption of his shares over other shareholders. In addition,

as noted above, AJA Services Corporation established a special committee of its board of
directors to negotiate and approve the redemption tenns to prevent any potential conflicts
of interest.
7.

The negotiation of the tenns of the redemption and the redemption

agreements primarily involved Richard Riley and my firm. I believe that the other
investors had a Minnesota law firm involved in the transaction.

AIA Services

Corporation's general counsel, Daniel Spickler, was also involved in the transaction and
my firm corresponded directly with him on certain matters.
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8.

During the course of my firm's representation of Reed Taylor, my firm

detennined that, as a condition to the redemption, AIA Services Corporation's outside
counsel should deliver to Reed Taylor a written legal opinion regarding certain legal
matters surrounding the redemption. Reed Taylor agreed with this assessment. Eberle,
Berlin was in a position to analyze whether, with respect to AJA Services Corporation,
the transactions were authorized, complied with applicable

I~

laws, triggered

complications with third parties, etc. Without access to the confidential books, records

and proceedings of AIA Services Corporation, and not being a licensed Idaho lawyer, my
finn was not in a position to make these determinations. Moreover, in my experience, it
is customary for the party seeking to redeem shares and its counsel to carry out the "due
diligence" associated with d.etennining the legal viability of the redemption. Richard
Riley was extremely well-versed in the legal, financial and operational affairs of AJA
Services Corporation as a result of his long-standing relationship with the company.
With the advice from my firm, Reed Taylor determined that he should receive a legal
opinion from Eberle, Berlin, who had superior knowledge of AIA Services Corporation's
legal affairs, to confirm AIA Services Corporation's legal ability to honor its obligations
under the redemption. In my experience, a written legal opinion in these circumstances is
appropriate and normal. Mr. Riley and Eberle, Berlin agreed to provide the opinion. Mr.
Riley and I negotiated the content of the opinion.

9.

As discussed above, upon the advice of my firm, Reed Taylor sought to

obtain and did obtain an opinion letter from Eberle, Berlin for the purpose of confirming
the legality of the transaction, that the corporation had the legal power and authority to
enter into the transaction (among other things), that the redemption agreements were
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enforceable pursuant to their terms (among other opinions referenced in the opinion
letter), and that all of the opinions were provided by an attorney licensed in the state of
Idaho.
10.

The requirement of obtaining an opinion letter for the redemption of Reed

Taylor's shares was adhered to by my firm and not waived by Reed Taylor. Attached as
Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the opinion letter dated August 16, 1995, provided
to Reed Taylor by Eberle Berlin for the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares ("opinion
letter"). To my knowledge, Eberle Berlin's opinion letter was drafted by Richard Riley.

If the opinion letter had not been provided to Reed Taylor, my firm would have advised
Reed Taylor

run to close any transaction involving the redemption of his shares.

Eberle,

Berlin's opinion letter was issued on August 15, 1995 in connection with the required
documents and officer certification necessary to close the transaction. Reed Taylor relied
on the opinion letter as a necessary condition to closing the redemption of his shares.
11.

At no time did Richard Riley or any other party (including Daniel

Spickler, AJA Services Corporation's general counsel) advise me or my firm that AIA
Services Corporation had insufficient earned surplus and/or capital surplus to redeem
Reed Taylor's shares or that the transaction to redeem Reed Taylor's shares would
constitute a violation of any statute or law in Idaho, including, J.C. § 30-1-6. In fact,
Eberle, Berlin's opinion letter affirmatively rejects the notion that the redemption
agreements were illegal or violated Idaho law. Had I or my firm been advised by Richard
Riley or any other party that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares would violate any
laws or statutes in Idaho, or even that the risk existed, my finn would have advised Reed
Taylor not to enter into the redemption agreements or to close the transaction. Neither
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Reed Taylor nor my firm had any knowledge that there were any issues present that could
affect the legality or enforceability of the redemption.
12.

Based upon my extensive experience in drafting, reviewing, interpreting,

and relying upon opinion letters for corporate transactions, the opinion letter issued to
Reed Taylor supported the legality of the transaction, tlwt AIA Services Corporation had
the power and authority to enter into the transaction, and that the redemption agreements
were enforceable against AIA Services Corporation. I am perplexed as to why Richard
Riley• s new firm, Hawley, Troxell, et al., would assert arguments that contradict the
terms of the opinion letter he drafted when he was at Eberle, Berlin.
13.

If AIA Services Corporation had not agreed to (at signing) and warranted

(at closing) the terms, conditions and representations in the redemption agreements (as
executed), then my firm would have advised Reed Taylor nQ! to sign the redemption
agreements and nQt to sell his shares in AIA Services Corporation. If AIA Services
Corporation bad not provided the closing certificate, a true and correct copy of which is
attached as Exhibit B to this Affidavit, my firm and I would have advised Reed Taylor
nQ! to close the transaction for the redemption of his shares.

14.

I have been advised that AIA Services Corporation and other parties are

now asserting that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares in AIA Services Corporation
violated Idaho law in that AIA Services Corporation did not have sufficient earned
surplus to redeem Reed Taylor's shares. The avoidance of this kind of argument is
precisely why opinion letters are obtained in this kind of transaction.
15.

Based upon my interaction with Richard Riley in the negotiation and

drafting of the redemption agreements and related issues pertaining to the redemption of
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Reed Taylor's shares, I have no reason to believe that Richard Riley involved himself in
an illegal transaction or a transaction that violated an Idaho statute, particularly when his
own firm's opinion letter expressly stated that no laws were violated as a result of the
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. I have no reason to believe that Mr. Riley did not

consider all necessary facts and laws prior to authoring and issuing the opinion letter.

Mr. Riley impressed me as a very competent and honorable attorney.

th .

DATED:

Thls/tdayof_May,2009.~
SoottT.BeU

~

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this Jl..~y of May, 2009.

Notary Public for Washington
Residing at: 6
My commission expires: 7- "23-1 (

eJftfe
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•
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Roderick Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and
correct copy of the Affidavit of Scott T. Bell (w/ exhibits) on the following parties via the
method(s) indicated below:

David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Attorney for Defendants JoLee Duclos and
Bryan Freeman

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for R. John Taylor

David R. Risley
Randall, Blake & Cox
1106 Idaho St.
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for Connie Taylor, James Beck and
Corrine Beck

Gary D. Babbitt
D. John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
Attorneys for AJA Services, AJA Insurance, and
Crop USA Insurance Agency

James J. Gatziolis
Charles E. Harper
Quarles & Brady LLP
300 North LaSalle Street
Suite 4000
Chicago, IL 60654
Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance Agency

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)
Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)
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•
Via:
Charles A. Brown
Attorney at Law
324 Main Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneys for AIA Services 401(k) Plan

( )
( )
( )
( )
(X)

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered - Via Messenger
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Email (pdf attachment)

Signed this 12th day of May, 2009, at Lewiston, Idaho.
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•
RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, VIA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

v.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an Idaho
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE
TAYLOR, individually and the community
property comprised thereof; BRYAN
FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS,
a single person; CROP USA INSURANCE
AGENCY, INC., an Idaho Corporation; and
JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK,
individually and the community property
comprised thereof;
Defendants.

Case No.: CV-07-00208

PLAINTIFF REED TAYLOR'S
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND
CLARIFICATION OF THE COURT'S
OPINION AND ORDER ON
PLAINITFF AND DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONS TO STRIKE EXPERT
AFFIDAVITS AND DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT; OR, ALTERNATIVELY,
MOTION/REQUEST FOR RULE 54(b)
CERTIFICATION, MOTION FOR
ORDER TO PROTECT PROPERTY
AND MOTION TO STAY

Plaintiff Reed Taylor submits this memorandum of law in support of his Motions under
I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B), I.R.C.P. 54(b), I.C. § 13-202, l.A.R. 13(a), and 1.A.R. 13(b)(10):

Ill
Ill
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND CLARIFICATION
OR, ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR RULE 54 CERTIFICATION, MOTION FOR
ORDER TO PROTECT PROPERTY AND MOTION TO STAY - 1
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I. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENTS
In addition to the specific cites below, this Memorandum of Law relies upon the full
Affidavit of Scott Bell dated April 12, 2009, and incorporates by reference Reed Taylor's entire
Statement of Facts in Opposition to the Defendants' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment.

A. The Court should grant Reed Taylor's Motion for Reconsideration of the
Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
enforce the redemption agreements. 1
A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made at
any time within 14 days after the entry of final judgment. I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B).
A party making a motion for reconsideration is permitted to present new evidence, but is
not required to do so. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 147 P.3d 100 (Ct. App. 2006).
The court must liberally construe all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party, and
all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record will be drawn in favor of the
nonmoving party. Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 307, 160 P.3d 743
(2007). Summary judgment is improper "if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions
or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented." McPhheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho
391, 394, 64 p .3d 317 (2003).
The district court may grant summary judgment to a non-moving party even if the party
has not filed its own motion with the court. Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 677, 39 P.3d
612 (2001). For all of the reasons set forth below, the Court should vacate its order granting

1

To the extent necessary to support each argument below, all of the below arguments and facts are incorporated by
reference into each other. In addition, Reed Taylor's entire Statement of Facts filed on April 9, 2009, is
incorporated by reference into each argument below. All references to "redemption agreements" shall mean the
$6M Note, Redemption Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, Security Agreement and all ancillary documents and
later amended agreements. (Preliminary Injunction Hearing Exhibits ("Hearing, Ex.") A-E and Z-AD.)
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Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and enter partial
summary judgment in favor of Reed Taylor as previously requested.
1. AIA Services' shareholders' ratified, consented and/or acquiesced in the

redemption of Reed Taylor's shares and the related security interests
constitutes consent to use capital surplus pursuant to I.C. § 30-1-6.
Even if a corporation has insufficient earned surplus to redeem shares, capital surplus
may be utilized if the share buyback is approved by the shareholders.

LC. § 30-1-6.

If

shareholders waive formalities or acquiesce to a transfer made without ratification, they cannot
later challenge the transfer and this rule also applies to minority shareholders. Philips Petroleum

Co. v. Rock Creek Min. Co., 449 F.2d 664, 667-68 (9th Cir. 1971) (citing 19 Am.Jur.2d
Corporations § 1014)). "An affirmance of an unauthorized transaction can be inferred from a
failure to repudiate it." Restatement (Second) of Agency§ 94 (2008). "Generally, a corporation
which has received and retained the benefits and advantages of a contract or transaction may not
raise the defense of ultra virus in order to escape its obligations under the contract." 19 C.J.S.
Corporations § 677 (2008).
On March 7, 1995, and July 12, 1995, AIA Services' shareholders ratified the redemption
of Reed Taylor's shares, the security interests granted to Reed Taylor in all of the revenues of
AIA Services and the security interests granted to Reed Taylor in all of the stock and revenues of
AIA Services' subsidiaries. (Affidavit of JoLee Duclos dated February 11, 2009 ("Duclos Aff.")
Ex. B-F; Affidavit of Scott Bell dated May 12, 2009 ("Bell Aff.") Ex. B, p. 3.) In addition, every
shareholder had received several written notices of AIA Services and its operating subsidiaries'
security interests granted to Reed Taylor as security to pay the over $6 Million owed to him.

(See e.g., Duclos Aff., Ex. C, H-I; Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. B, pp. 1-2, 1[
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5.) The shareholders also received written notice of the payments made from capital surplus to
Reed Taylor and the security interests granted to him for many years through AIA Services'
financial statements. (Hearing, Ex. AL; Affidavit of Connie Taylor dated April 16, 2008, Ex. A;
Hearing Ex. AM; Hearing AN; Hearing Ex. AO; Hearing Ex. AQ; Hearing, Ex. X.)
On August 15, 2005, Richard Riley and Eberle Berlin certified to Reed Taylor that all

necessary approvals had been obtained by the shareholders:
The Company and its subsidiaries have full corporate power and authority to enter into.
execute and deliver the Transaction Documents and to perform their respective
obligations thereunder: all corporate action on the part of the Company and its
Subsidiaries, and their respective shareholders. necessary for the authorization, execution.
delivery and performance by Company and its Subsidiaries of the Transaction
Documents and the consummation of the transactions contemplated thereby has been
taken ... The Transaction documents constitute the valid and binding obligation of
Company and its Subsidiaries enforceable against them in accordance with their terms ...
(Bell Aff., Ex. A, p. 2.)
On August 16, 1995, John Taylor also personally certified that AIA Services'
shareholders had ratified the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares and that all of AIA Services'
representations were true and correct: "All representations and warranties of [AIA Services] are
true and correct ... "

(Bell Aff., Ex. B, p. 1,

if

(d) (emphasis added.))

"[AIA Services']

shareholders ratified the Stock Redemption Agreement and related transactions at a special
meeting on July 18. 1995." (Id. at p. 3 (emphasis added.))
The shareholders ratified and approved the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares and the
use of capital surplus to pay him by approving the security agreements and payments to him
knowing that AIA Services had insufficient earned surplus as represented in AIA Services'
financial statements. (Hearing, Ex. AL; Affidavit of Connie Taylor dated April 16, 2008, Ex. A;
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Hearing Ex. AM; Hearing AN; Hearing Ex. AO; Hearing Ex. AQ; Hearing, Ex. X.) Until April,
2007, no shareholder or party had attempted to repudiate or rescind the redemption of Reed
Taylor's shares. For almost 13 years, every shareholder in AIA Services has acquiesced in the
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares and the payments made to him from AIA Services' capital
surplus and has not complained or attempted to take action to repudiate or rescind the purchase.
Indeed, the shareholders' consent to the security interests granted to Reed Taylor is the
equivalent to the shareholders approval to dissolve the corporation under Idaho law. Such acts
all constitute the equivalent of an affirmative vote in favor of invading capital surplus to the
extent required under any interpretation of l.C. § 30-1-6. Thus, under any possible scenario, the
shareholders approved the use of capital surplus to pay Reed Taylor by voting for the redemption
of his shares and acquiescing in the use of AIA Services' capital surplus to make payments to
Reed Taylor for almost 13 years.

2. If the redemption agreements were illegal, the agreements should be
enforced because Reed Taylor was ignorant that the agreements violated
any law and the Defendants and their counsel represented to Reed Taylor
and his counsel that the agreements did not violate any laws.
An innocent plaintiff may recover on an illegal contract which is not declared void by

statute where such ignorance exists where the plaintiff is justifiably ignorant of the
circumstances causing the illegality. Williams v. Continental Life & Accident Company, 100
Idaho 71, 73-74, 593 P .2d 708 (1979) (a court of equity may enforce a contract in violation of a
statute that does not declare the contract void, provided the parties are not equally at fault);

Hedla v. McCool, 476 F.2d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1973). When determining the illegality of an
agreement, courts should balance competing public policies to determine the enforceability of an
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illegal transaction. Smith v. Idaho Hospital Service, Inc., 133 Idaho 608, 990 P.2d 1219 (Ct.
App. 1999). LC. § 30-1-6 does not declare a contract made in violation of the statute void nor
does it prohibit a corporation from redeeming its own shares, and, to the contrary, specifically
provides that a corporation has a right to redeem its shares. LC. § 30-1-6.
When the parties are not "in pari delicto," the innocent party may recover under an illegal
agreement. McShane v. Quillin, 47 Idaho 542, 277 P. 554, 559 (1929); see also Maudlin v.

Pacific Decision Sciences Corporation, 137 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1017, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 724, 735
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006). "This exception is particularly true where the prohibition of the statute .. .is
aimed at the act of the defendant, and not at that of the plaintiff." Id. "Stock redemption statutes
are designed to protect creditors and minority stockholders from corporate mismanagement of
assets."

The Minnelusa Company v. A.G. Andrikopoulos, 929 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Col. 1996)

(interpreting Colorado's stock redemption statute which is virtually identical to LC.§ 30-1-6).
In Maudlin, the California Court of Appeals relied upon the holding from the California
Supreme Court in Tri-Q, Inc. v. Sta-Hi Corp., 63 Cal.2d 199, 45 Cal.Rptr. 878, 404 P.2d 486
(1965) when it upheld a redemption contract that purportedly violated a redemption statute:
[T]he courts should not be so enamored with the Latin phrase 'in pari delicto' that they
blindly extend the rule to every case where illegality appears somewhere in the
transaction. The fundamental purpose of the rule must always be kept in mind, and the
realities of the situation must be considered. Where, by applying the rule. the public
cannot be protected because the transaction has been completed, where no serious moral
turpitude is involved, where the defendant is the one guilty of the greatest moral fault,
and where to apply the rule will be to permit the defendant to be unjustly enriched at the
expense of the plaintiff. the rule should not be applied.

Id. at 732 (quoting Tri-Q at pp. 218-29) (emphasis added).
Ill
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In Williams, the Idaho Supreme Court enforced an illegal contract that violated a contract
prohibited by statute:
Even assuming the decedent was aware of this limitation, there is no evidence to suggest
that he had any knowledge that the statutory limitation had been exceeded. Nor does
there appear any reason why the insured should not justifiably rely upon the superior
knowledge and expertise of the insurer for full compliance with the law.
Inasmuch as there is no statute declaring the [insurance] policies in this case void, it
seems only fair and just that the foregoing principals be applied and that appellant be held
estopped from asserting the illegality of its bargained for [insurance] policies.

Williams, 100 Idaho at 74 (emphasis added).
Here, LC. § 30-1-6 does not prohibit a corporation from redeeming its shares. There is
absolutely no evidence in the record to even suggest that Reed Taylor or his counsel had any
knowledge that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares could or did violate LC. § 30-1-6. In
fact, Reed Taylor and his counsel expressly required an opinion letter from Richard Riley
(general counsel for AIA Services) opining that the redemption agreements did not violate any
Idaho laws and required AIA Services and John Taylor to represent the same. (Bell Aff., pp. 4-5,

W8-11; Ex. A-B.)

Like the plaintiff in Williams, Reed Taylor bargained for an agreement to sell

his shares to AIA Services at the request of others, and, like the plaintiff in Williams, the
purchasers of Reed Taylor's shares and their counsel assured him that the redemption did not
violate any laws and were enforceable. Like the plaintiff in Williams, Reed Taylor should be
permitted to enforce the redemption agreements even if the buyback violated LC.§ 30-1-6.
Reed Taylor testified regarding his inferior knowledge of the financial affairs of AJA
Services and reliance upon the representations made by AIA Services, John Taylor, Richard
Riley and Eberle, Berlin, et al.:
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I was responsible for sales and R. John Taylor ("John Taylor") was responsible for the
finances and legal aspects for AIA Services and its subsidiaries. In fact, when John
Taylor first joined AIA Insurance in 1976, he was hired to run the office for me and
handle financial and legal issues. I have little knowledge of financial issues. accounting
and legal matterfsl and have always relied upon others (specifically John Taylor) for
these areas of operation.
(Reed Taylor Aff. dated April 9, 2009, ~ 2 (emphasis added.)) Reed Taylor further testified how
he was not attempting to sell his shares, that it was John Taylor and others who approached him
to have his shares redeemed and that the Defendants and their counsel represented the
agreements were valid and did not violate any laws:
I was not soliciting offers to sell my shares, rather John Taylor and Richard Campanaro
(he was part of the investor group with James Beck and Michael Cashman) were
approaching me to purchase my shares in AIA Services.
When I agreed to sell my shares, I relied upon John Taylor, AIA Services, Richard Riley
and Eberle Berlin's representations that the redemption of my shares in 1995 was a legal
transaction and that AIA Services bad the power and authority to redeem my shares. I
would never have sold my shares but for the rwresentations made by John Taylor. AIA
Services. Richard Riley and Eberle Berlin that the redemption was legal. The foregoing
representations were made in Eberle Berlin's opinion letter (which indicated that it was
based upon the personal knowledge of Richard Riley) and [redemption agreements] and
August 16, 1995 Certification signed by John Taylor ... 2
(Id. at ml 3- 4 (emphasis added.))

Reed Taylor's attorney for the negotiation of the redemption agreements, Scott Bell,
testified how John Taylor had superior knowledge to Reed Taylor and that he never forced the
sale of his shares upon AJA Services through his majority vote or otherwise:
I also learned that R. John Taylor, as President, held extensive knowledge of the financial
affairs of AIA Services Comoration and its subsidiaries. while Reed Taylor held
relatively little knowledge in accounting, law or the financial affairs of the company ...
(Affidavit of Scott Bell dated May 12, 2009 ("Bell Aff."), pp. 2-3, ~ 4 (emphasis added.))
2

This testimony is further corroborated by the testimony of Scott Bell. See Affidavit of Scott Bell.
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R. John Taylor and the other investors suggested the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares
as a means to achieve their objectives. Although Reed Taylor was initially resistant to a
redemption of his shares, he ultimately became willing to do so. At no point did he force
AIA Services Corporation, through his majority vote or otherwise. to effectuate a
preferential redemption of his shares over other shareholders. In addition, as noted
above, AIA Services Corporation established a special committee of its board of directors
to negotiate and approve the redemption terms to prevent any potential conflicts of
interest.
(Bell Aff. at p. 3,

~

6 (emphasis added.)) Mr. Bell further testified how he was not licensed to

practice law in Idaho and was not in the position to make certain required factual and legal
determinations that only counsel for AIA Services could conduct:
Eberle. Berlin was in a position to analyze whether. with respect to AIA Services
Corporation. the transactions were authorized. complied with applicable law. triggered
complications with third parties, etc. Without access to confidential books, records and
proceedings of AIA Services Corporation, and not being a licensed Idaho lawyer, !ID'.
firm was not in a position to make these determinations ... Richard Riley was extremely
well-versed in the legal. financial and operational affairs of AIA Services Corporation as
a result of his long-standing relationship with the company.
(Id. at p. 4, ~ 8 (emphasis added.))

At no time did Richard Riley or any other party (including Daniel Spickler. AIA
Services' general counsel) advise me or my firm that AIA Services Corporation had
insufficient earned surplus and/or capital SUI:plus to redeem Reed Taylor's shares or that
the transaction to redeem Reed Taylor's shares would constitute a violation of any statute
or law in Idaho, including, I.C. § 30-1-6. In fact, Eberle. Berlin's opinion letter
affirmatively rejects the notion that the redemption agreements were illegal or violated
Idaho law.
(Id. at p. 4, ~ 8 (emphasis in original and added.))

Had I or my firm been advised by Richard Riley or any other party that the redemption of
Reed Taylor's shares would violate any laws or statutes in Idaho, or even that the risk
existed, my firm would have advised Reed Taylor not to enter into the redemption
agreements or to close the transaction. Neither Reed Taylor nor my firm had any
knowledge that there any issues present that could affect the legality or enforceability of
the redemption.
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I am perplexed as to why Richard Riley's new firm, Hawley Troxell, et al., would assert
arguments that contradict the terms of the opinion letter drafted when he was at Eberle
Berlin.
(Bell Aff. at pp. 5-6,

~~

11-12 {emphasis added.)) Mr. Bell also specifically testified that he

would not have advised Reed Taylor to sell his shares or close the transaction but for the
representations being made by AIA Services and John Taylor:

If AIA Services Corporation had not agreed to (at signing) and warranted (at closing) the
terms, conditions and representations in the redemption agreements (as executed), then
my firm would have advised Reed Taylor not to sign the redemption agreements and not
to sell his shares in AIA Services Corporation. If AIA Services Corporation had not
provided the closing certificate ... my firm and I would have advised Reed Taylor not to
close the transaction for the redemption of his shares.
(Id. at p. 6, ~ 13 (emphasis in original.)) Mr. Bell was emphatic about obtaining an opinion letter
from AIA Services' counsel confirming that the transaction was legal and the agreements
enforceable:
During the course of my firm's representation of Reed Taylor. my firm determined that.
as a condition to the redemption. AIA Services Corporation's outside counsel should
deliver to Reed Taylor a written legal opinion regarding certain legal matters surrounding
the redemption. Reed Taylor agreed with this assessment.

(Id. at p. 4, ~ 8 (emphasis added.))
The requirement of obtaining an opinion letter for the redemption of Reed Taylor's
shares was adhered to by my firm and not waived by Reed Taylor ... If the opinion letter
had not been provided to Reed Taylor, my firm would have advised Reed Taylor not to
close any transaction involving the redemption of his shares .... Reed Taylor relied on the
opinion letter as a necessary condition to closing the redemption of his shares.

(Id. at p. 5, ~ l 0 (emphasis added.))
I have been advised that AIA Services Corporation and other parties are now asserting
that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares in AIA Services Corporation violated Idaho
law in that AJA Services Corporation did not have sufficient earned surplus to redeem
Reed Taylor's shares. The avoidance of this kind of argument is precisely why opinion
letters are obtained in this kind of transaction.
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(Bell Aff at p. 6, ~ 14 (emphasis added.)) The opinion letter provided to Reed Taylor and Scott
Bell specifically addressed Eberle Berlin's significant legal representation of AIA Services in the
transaction and that the redemption agreements did not violate any laws:
We have acted as general counsel for [AIA Services] in connection with the transactions
contemplated by the Agreement. As such general counsel, we have assisted in the
negotiation, and have examined the executed counterparties ... of the Agreement and other
Transaction Documents.
The Company and its subsidiaries have full corporate power and authority to enter into,
execute and deliver the Transaction Documents and to perform their respective
obligations thereunder: all corporate action on the part of the Company and its
Subsidiaries. and their respective shareholders. necessary for the authorization, execution,
delivery and performance by Company and its Subsidiaries of the Transaction
Documents and the consummation of the transactions contemplated thereby has been
taken ... The Transaction documents constitute the valid and binding obligation of
Company and its Subsidiaries enforceable against them in accordance with their terms ...
Neither the execution and delivery of the Transaction Documents by Company and its
Subsidiaries. or the consummation of the transactions contemplated thereby, will (a)
conflict with or violate any provision of their respective Articles of Incorporation or
Bylaws ... [or] violate any law, rule, license, regulation ....
(Bell Af£, Ex. A, pp. 1-3.)

Finally, Paul Pederson, Reed Taylor's expert witness who has

identified millions of dollars of undisputed improper transactions, even testified that it is possible
Reed Taylor should have been paid in full but for the significant corporate malfeasance at AIA:
[gliven the magnitude of AIA's pattern of questionable and prohibited transactions and
transfers of capital that have occurred over a 13 rs year period, it is conceivable that the
remaining obligation owed to Reed Taylor for surrendering his AIA stock could have
been satisfied in accordance with its terms.
(Amended and Restated Affidavit of Paul Pederson, p. 21, ii 29(d) (emphasis added.))

John Taylor also personally certified that AIA Services' shareholders had ratified the
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares and that all of AIA Services' representations were true and
correct: "All representations and warranties of [AIA Services] are true and correct..." (Bell Aff.,
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•
Ex. B, p. 1,

~

(d) (emphasis added.))

"[AIA Services'] shareholders ratified the Stock

Redemption Agreement and related transactions at a special meeting on July 18. 1995." (Id. at p.
3 (emphasis added.))
John Taylor was an attorney licensed to practice in the state of Idaho, an accountant, and
a member of the publically traded Avista Corporation. (Affidavit of Roderick Bond "Bond Aff."
dated April 9, 2009, A-C.) Connie Taylor was also a co-shareholder with John Taylor, former
law clerk for a judge, and an attorney licensed to practice law in Idaho. (Bond Aff. dated
September 4, 2008, Ex. A; Bond Aff. dated April 9, 2009, Ex. D.) JoLee Duclos had a paralegal
degree. (Bissell Aff. dated February 26, 2009, Ex. 33, Ex. 53, p. 23.) James Beck would not
invest in AIA Services unless Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed to his satisfaction, which was
a condition precedent required before he invested in AIA Services (Affidavit of Reed Taylor
dated May 9, 2008, Ex. E, p. 10, if9.). In contrast, Reed Taylor attended college, but never
obtained a degree. (Bond Aff. dated April 9, 2009, Ex. A.)
All of the individual Defendants are shareholders of CropUSA, the corporation were
millions of dollars in AIA Services funds were unlawfully transferred. 3

AIA Services

represented to Reed Taylor that it had the power and authority to redeem his shares, that the
agreements would not violate any laws, and that it would ensure the transaction was ratified to
the extent any further ratification was required. (Hearing, Ex. Z, p. 6 § 3.3; p. 7, § 3.4; p. 10, §
5.l(m).)
Ill

3

All of the foregoing facts are contained in Reed Taylor's Statement of Facts in Opposition to Connie Taylor and
James Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which is incorporated by reference in all the arguments
asserted herein.
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•
The Defendants and their counsel held an overwhelming advantage over Reed Taylor in
all aspects of the financial and legal affairs of AIA Services. John Taylor and Connie Taylor
were both attorneys licensed to practice in Idaho. Richard Riley and Eberle Berlin represented
AIA Services in the redemption negotiations, during the drafting of the agreements, and at the
closing of the transaction on August 16, 1995. (Bell. Aff., Ex. A-B.) Significantly, Richard
Riley and Eberle Berlin issued an opinion letter to Reed Taylor stating that the redemption did
not violate any

laws~

that AIA Services and its subsidiaries had the power and authority to

redeem the shares, and that all necessary shareholder approvals had been obtained as of August
15, 1995. The Defendants and their counsel all represented that no laws would be violated and
that AIA Services could close the transaction. The evidence. is overwhelming that Reed Taylor is
the least guilty party, that he was justifiably ignorant, and that he and his counsel exerted
reasonable efforts to ensure the redemption complied with Idaho law, including, without
limitation, requiring AIA Services' counsel to deliver Reed Taylor an opinion letter. (Bell Aff.,
Ex. A.) All of these facts are undisputed.
I.C. § 30-1-6 was not "aimed" at permitting a corporation and its minority shareholders
and others to engineer an improper share buyback scheme involving the majority shareholder
and then invalidate the agreement 14 years later after they have unlawfully transferred millions
of dollars out of the corporation. Public policy is not served by the Court invalidating the
redemption agreements based upon the illegality doctrine upon a finding that a portion of l.C. §
30-1-6 was not complied with. Public policy is not served by permitting AIA Services and the
individual defendants to escape their significant liabilities for misappropriating millions of
dollars for their own benefit by asserting the redemption agreements are illegal after 14 years.
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Thus, assuming the redemption agreements are illegal contracts, the Court should apply
one or more of the exceptions set forth above and find that the redemption agreements are valid
and enforceable, particularly since Reed Taylor is the less guilty party, was justifiably ignorant,
and was the individual recipient of countless representations and warranties by the Defendants
that the redemption agreements were valid, enforceable and did not violate Idaho law.

3. The redemption agreements are not illegal contracts and are enforceable
because I.C. § 30-1-6 does not prohibit a corporation from repurchasing
its shares.
"Since the consequences of a court finding a contract to be illegal are harsh, only those
contracts which involve consideration that is expressly prohibited by the relevant prohibitory
statute are void." Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 200 P.3d 1153, 1159 (2009). "Such
statutes must be narrowly construed, and only those contracts violating express provisions
thereof will be deemed illegal." Id (emphasis added). Whether a contract is against public
policy is a question oflaw for the court to determine from all the facts and circumstances in each
case. Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 566, 944 P.2d 695, 701 (1997). Public policy may be
found in statutes, judicial decisions or the constitution. Id (emphasis added).
In general. unless an agreement necessarily contemplates violating a statute, it is
enforceable, and if it is later performed in a way that involves some slight violation of
law, not seriously injurious to the public order, the person performing may recover. The
principal stated more broadly:
Where a bargain does not in terms necessarily involve a violation oflaw, the fact
the plaintiff performs it in a way not allowed by law, does not preclude recovery,
if not seriously injurious to the public order.
8 Williston on Contracts § 19:51 (4th ed.) (2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
l.C. § 30-1-6 does not expressly bar or prohibit a corporation from redeeming its shares. See LC.
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§ 30-1-6. Compare, LaVoy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 127, 369 P.2d 45 (1962)("A
corporation itself cannot have a stock repurchase agreement declared illegal, nor can creditors
who are not injured have a right to complain."); The Minnelusa Company v. A.G. Andrikopoulos,
929 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Col. 1996) (contract was not illegal even though it violated a statute
virtually identical to LC.§ 30-1-6.); Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. No 401, 147 Idaho
277, 207 P.3d 1008 (2009) (contract was illegal because the statute prohibited agreements
waiving rights under the Workers Compensation Act); Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 200
P.3d 1153 (2009) (a contract with an unlicensed architect was illegal); Trees v. Kersey, 138
Idaho 3, 6, 56 P.3d 765 (2002) (a contract with an unlicensed public works contractor is illegal);
Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 944 P.l2d 695 (1997)(a contract to refrain from informing
authorities of sexual improprieties with a child are illegal).
Here, the Defendants and Plan argue that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares violated
LC. § 30-1-6, and, consequently, the redemption agreements are void and unenforceable. The
Court agreed. However, a corporation's redemption of shares is not an express violation of LC.
§ 30-1-6, which is the requisite required under the standard in Trees, Farrell, Quiring, and
Wernecke. In addition, Idaho law is settled as forth in a judicial decision which has not be
overruled that certain parties, including the corporation, may not have a redemption declared
illegal or attack the transaction. LaVoy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120. Likewise, under
other judicial decisions, minority shareholders may not attack a stock redemption or have the
transaction declared illegal. The Minnelusa Company v. A.G. Andrikopoulos, 929 P.2d 1321,
1323 (Col. 1996).
Ill
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Under the Defendants and Plan's rationale and the rationale adopted by the Court, any
contract that violated LC. § 30-1-830 (a director's fiduciary duties to a corporation), would be
void and unenforceable if a director is found to have not discharged his duties properly. Under
this same rationale, any party contracting with the corporation would face a void and
unenforceable contract simply because the director or officer breached fiduciary duties, such as
the case with Reed Taylor based upon the Defendants' violation of LC. § 30-1-6. This rationale
is illogical and unsound and not the intent of the Idaho Legislature. 4 The Defendants and their
counsel are who violated Idaho law, to the extent any violation of I.C. § 30-1-6 occurred. This
illustrates why the cases relied upon by the Defendants, the Plan and the Court address statutes
pertaining to it being "unlawful" for professionals or contractors to not be licensed in the state of
Idaho and other statutes solely and expressly intended to protect the public as a whole. This
rationale also supports the finding that a violation of I.C. § 30-1-6, wherein no creditors or
shareholders were harmed as is the case in this matter, does not constitute an illegal agreement
and should be enforced as was the case in La Voy Supply Co. and The Minnelusa.
All of the above Idaho cases cited by the Defendants and the Plan (including Trees v.
Kersey, which the Court relied upon in its Opinion and Order) involve contracts or acts which

the Idaho Legislature has deemed "unlawful" or has expressly barred. Here, AIA Services is not
barred from redeeming its shares nor does I.C. § 30-1-6 expressly prohibit the redemption of
shares. To the contrary, LC.§ 30-1-6 sets forth that a corporation has the right to redeem shares.
Public policy is not served by invalidating the redemption agreements after the Defendants were
caught unlawfully transferring millions of dollars.
4

(Statement of Facts in Opposition to

See also Section A(4).
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Defendants Motions for Partial Summary Judgment dated April 9, 2009, pp. 53-55 and all
evidence cited therein.) Public policy would be best served by enforcing the agreements against
the Defendants. To rule otherwise would only foster other improper buyback schemes.

4. The Idaho Legislature did not intend for I.C. § 30-1-6 to be used as a
means for shareholders who consented and/or acquiesced in a
corporation's repurchase of shares to invalidate the redemption 13 years
later after they have transferred millions of dollars from the corporation.
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to
the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459,
462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999);

State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000). The language of a statute is
to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Burnight, l 32 Idaho at 659 (emphasis
added).

Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the

entire document and the statute should be considered as a whole with words given their plain,
usual and ordinary meaning. Westbergv. Andres, 114 Idaho 410, 403, 757 P.2d 664, 666 (1988).
When the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expresses intent of the legislative body
must be given effect. Payette River Prop. Owners Ass 'n v. Bd. of Comm 'rs ov Valley County,
132 Idaho 551, 557, 976 P.2d 477, 483 (1999). However, a statute is ambiguous when the
language is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. Porter v. Bd. of Trustees, 141
Idaho 11, 14, 105 P.3d 671, 674 (2004).
LC.§ 30-1-6 is unambiguous in that a corporation has a tight to redeem its shares. LC.§
30-1-6 (emphasis added).

LC. § 30-1-6 is unambiguous in that it does not state that an

agreement made in violation of the statute is void or that it is unlawful for a corporation to
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redeem its shares. I.C. § 30-1-6. Moreover, I.C. § 30-1-6 is unambiguous in that it does not state
that a corporation must obtain a shareholder vote through a shareholder resolution specifically
authorizing the use of capital surplus to redeem shares. Id. A shareholder vote approving the
buyback is all that is required under the plain and rational reading of the statute.
However, the ambiguousness and confusion of the earned surplus and capital surplus
requirements set forth in LC. § 30-1-6 was confirmed by the Legislature when it abandoned
earned and capital surplus requirements in 1997. LC. § 30-1-640 (1997). Finally, LC. § 30-1-6
does not state who, if anyone, may use the statute to attack a share redemption, whether minority
shareholders may utilize the statute to attack a redemption they approved or acquiesced, and
whether a violation results in a void or illegal transaction. See e.g., The Minnelusa Company v.
A.G. Andrikopoulos, 929 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Col. 1996) (interpreting Colorado's stock redemption

statute which is virtually identical to LC. § 30-1-6 and finding that certain parties may not attack
the agreement and that a violation of the statute still results in an enforceable agreement); La Voy
Supply Co., 84 Idaho at 127 (holding that a corporation may not attack a redemption or have it

declared illegal).
Most importantly, the intent of the Legislature was to protect innocent minority
shareholders and creditors from corporate mismanagement, not to provide minority shareholders
with a mechanism to steal the shares of a majority shareholder, unlawfully transfer millions of
dollar out of the corporation and then persuade a court of equity to find the transaction illegal to
escape liability. (Statement of Facts in Opposition to Defendants Motions for Partial Summary
Judgment dated April 9, 2009, pp. 53-55 and all evidence cited therein.) Here, the minority
shareholders were the guilty parties of mismanaging the assets of AIA Services and its
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND CLARIFICATION
OR, ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR RULE 54 CERTIFICATION, MOTION FOR
ORDER TO PROTECT PROPERTY AND MOTION TO STAY -18

001421

subsidiaries. The minority shareholders were the parties behind the redemption of Reed Taylor's
shares as a mechanism to remove him so as to attempt to take AIA Services public. (Affidavit of
Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. A, pp. 1-5; Affidavit of Michael Bissell dated February 26,
2009, Ex. 77, pp. 399-400.) The minority shareholders are the parties who wanted to obtain
operational control of AIA Services and become the majority shareholders. (Bond Aff. dated
September 3, 2008, Ex. 45, p. 1,

iJ 3; Bond Aff. dated April 9, 2009, Ex. A, p. 51, 11. 14-18.)

Moreover, no creditors have been harmed as all that were creditors in 1995 have been paid.
(Amended and Restated Affidavit of Paul Pederson.)
Nevertheless, the clear intent of LC. § 30-1-6 is to permit corporations to redeem shares.
At most, a violation of l.C. § 30-1-6 would and should only result in liability being imposed
upon the responsible parties to the transaction (i.e., John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck),
rather than a finding the redemption agreements are illegal and prejudicing the most innocent
party Reed Taylor-the same person who went to great lengths to ensure the redemption did not
violate any laws. (Bell Aff., pp. 1-7 and Ex. A-B.)

5. Contrary to the Court's finding, Reed Taylor asserted that John Taylor,
AIA Services and others fraudulently represented to him that the
redemption agreements were legal and that AIA Services had the power
to purchase the shares.
An illegal agreement may still be enforced when fraud has occurred. Trees v. Kersey,
138 Idaho 3, 10, 56 P.3d 765, 772 (2002). Idaho Courts have long recognized "constructive
fraud" as an alternative cause of action to common law "fraud" and that "constructive fraud"
does not require a plaintiff to plead the nine elements of common law "fraud." See e.g., McGhee
v. McGhee, 82 Idaho 367, 371, 353 P.2d 760 (1960) (Recognizing constructive fraud as an
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alternative cause of action to fraud and that the requirement of pleading and proving all nine
elements of fraud "is not the case" and intent to deceive is unnecessary to prove).
Reed Taylor testified regarding his reliance upon representations made by John Taylor,
AIA Services, Richard Riley and Eberle Berlin, et al.;
I was not soliciting offers to sell my shares, rather John Taylor and Richard Campanaro
(he was part of the investor group with James Beck and Michael Cashman) were
approaching me to purchase my shares in AIA Services.
When I agreed to sell my shares, I relied upon John Taylor, AIA Services. Richard Riley
and Eberle Berlin's representations that the redemption of my shares in 1995 was a legal
transaction and that AIA Services had the power and authority to redeem my shares. I
would never have sold my shares but for the representations made by John Taylor, AIA
Services, Richard Riley and Eberle Berlin that the redemption was legal. The foregoing
representations were made in Eberle Berlin's opinion letter (which indicated that it was
based upon the personal knowledge of Richard Riley) and [redemption agreements] and
August 16, 1995 Certification signed by John Taylor ...
(Reed Taylor Aff. dated April 9, 2009, mf 3- 4 (emphasis added.))
Eberle Berlin's opinion letter provided to Reed Taylor also specifically stated that the
redemption agreements did not violate Idaho law, that all consents and shareholder approvals had
been obtained, and that AIA Services had the power and authority to enter into the redemption
agreements. 5 (Bell Aff., Ex. A.)
Finally, AIA Services and John Taylor represented that the redemption agreements did
not violate any laws and that AJA Services had the power and authority to enter into the
agreements. (Hearing, Ex. Z, p. 6 § 3.3; p. 7, § 3.4; p. 10, § 5.l(m).)
With constructive fraud, intent is not necessary to prove fraud. The facts asserted above
is undisputed evidence of fraud committed against Reed Taylor.

5

See also all facts asserted in Section A(2), which are incorporated by reference herein.
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6. The Court did not address whether the Defendants and Plan are intended
beneficiaries of I.C. § 30-1-6 or address other arguments necessary for a
complete record on appeal.
In its Opinion and Order, the Court failed to address Reed Taylor's arguments that the
Defendants and Plan were not intended beneficiaries of LC. § 30-1-6. See e.g., The Minnelusa
Company v. A.G. Andrikopoulos, 929 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Col. 1996).

For purposes of the record on appeal, Reed Taylor requests that the Court make a finding
that the Defendants and Plan are not intended beneficiaries of LC. § 30-1-6, as asserted by Reed
Taylor in his Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Defendants and Plan's Motions for
Partial Summary Judgment. These finding, like others, will be important for Reed Taylor's
appeal.
7. JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman do not have standing to attack the
redemption agreements and are not intended beneficiaries.
Reed Taylor also asserted that JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman did not have standing to
attack the redemption agreements and are not intended beneficiaries of LC. § 30-1-6, however,
the Court did not address them in its Opinion and Order.

For purposes of appeal and

reconsideration, Reed Taylor requests that the Court make a finding that JoLee Duclos and
Bryan Freeman, as well as all shareholders, lack standing and are not intended beneficiaries of
LC. § 30-1-6 based upon the arguments asserted by Reed Taylor in his Memorandum and
Statement of Facts opposing the Defendants' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment.
Ill
Ill

Ill
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•
8. Rather than ruling that certain arguments raised by Reed Taylor are
moot, Reed Taylor requests the Court address the arguments so that the
record is complete on appeal.
In its Opinion and Order, the Court ruled that other arguments raised by Reed Taylor
were moot as a result of finding the redemption agreements were illegal. Reed Taylor requests
an order on all issues raised in his Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Partial Summary
Judgment so the record is clear on appeal. If the Court believes certain arguments are moot,
Reed Taylor requests that the Court make a specific determination why so as to prevent future
appeals.

B. If the Court denies Reed Taylor's Motion for Reconsideration granting partial
summary judgment, Reed Taylor moves the Court to reconsider and clarify its
Opinion and Order on Plaintiff and Defendants' Motions to Strike Expert
Affidavits.
A court's failure to determine the admissibility of evidence offered in connection with a
motion for summary judgment is error that may not be remedied on appeal, which is based upon
the admissibility of evidence being in the sound discretion of the trial court. Montgomery v.
Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 205 P.3d 650, 655 (2009). When the discretion exercised by a trial

court is affected by an error of law, the role of the appellate court is to note the error made and
remand the case for appropriate findings. Id.
As such, Reed Taylor requests that the Court specifically indentify the portions of the
Affidavits of Voth, Hooper and Pederson which were stricken and the basis for striking the
portions. He also requests the Court rule on all specific evidence objections raised in Reed
Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Defendants' Motions for Partial Summary
Judgment. Finally, Reed Taylor requests that the Court make a specific ruling on his oral Motion
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND CLARIFICATION
OR, ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR RULE 54 CERTIFICATION, MOTION FOR
ORDER TO PROTECT PROPERTY AND MOTION TO STAY - 22

001425

•
to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of John Ashby.
C. Motion/Request for Rule 54(b) Certification.
"The fact that the district court certifies a judgment as final and appealable under Rule
54(b) does not restrict the Court's right to review the matter." U.S. v. City of Challis, 133 Idaho
525, 528, 988 P.2d 1199, 1202 (1999) (citing Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 844, 908 P.2d 143,
146 (1995)). "In order for a partial summary judgment to be certifies as final and appealable
under Rule 54(b ), the order granting partial summary judgment must finally remove one or more
of the claims between some or all of the parties, otherwise, the certification is in error." Id
(citing Thorn Creek Cattle Ass'n, Inc. v. Bonz, 122 Idaho 422, 45, 830 P.2d 1180, 1183 (1992)).
Here, the Court's finding that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares constituted an
illegal transaction renders all claims for the collection and enforcement of the $6M Note
removed from this action. 6 Thus, the Court should enter an order certifying that Reed Taylor's
claims for the collection and enforcement of the $6M Note are removed from the action so that
an appeal may be pursued. By making a Rule 54(b) certification, the Court would permit an
appeal to resolve substantial issues in this case and prevent the unnecessary litigation of
alternative claims when one or more of such claims could be rendered moot by an appeal.
Reed Taylor requests that the Court enter an order pursuant to Rule 54(b) (a proposed
order will be submitted prior to or at the time of the hearing), after Reed Taylor's motion to
amend is ruled upon and Reed Taylor files his Sixth Amended Complaint.
6

Obviously, Reed Taylor's shares could have been purchased for no consideration or the payment terms (and
promissory note) severed from the redemption agreements. See Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 200 P.3d 1153,
1159 (2009). Thus, Reed Taylor still has breach of contract claims under the Redemption Agreement to assert
against AJA Services based upon breaches prior to closing the transaction as he had no knowledge of the illegality
until now. See e.g., Gust, Rosenfeld & Henderson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 898 P.2d 964 (Ariz. 1995);
Bauman v. Day 892 P.2d 817 (Alaska 1995) (applying the discovery rule to a breach of contract claim).
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•
D. The Court should grant Reed Taylor's Motion for Order Protecting Property.
1. An order protecting the property subject to appeal is warranted.

Even after an appeal has been filed, a district court still has authority to rule on a motion
to: "[m]ake any order regarding the uses, preservation and possession of any property which is
the subject of the action on appeal." I.A.R. l 3(b )(I 0).
If the Court denies Reed Taylor's Motion for Reconsideration or Reed Taylor files a

notice of appeal (whichever occurs first), it should enter an order protecting the property subject
to this appeal, specifically the funds and assets of AIA Services and AIA Insurance. The Court
has full knowledge of the millions of dollars of funds and assets unlawfully transferred from AIA
Services and AIA Insurance.

(Statement of Facts in Opposition to Defendants Motions for

Partial Summary Judgment dated April 9, 2009, pp. 53-55 and all evidence cited therein.) The
Court has found that most of the Defendants and Plan lack standing to attack the redemption
agreements. The Court is also fully aware of the limited assets and funds remaining at AIA
Services and AIA Insurance, which would be insufficient to pay any judgment should Reed
Taylor's appeal be successful. Moreover, the Court has found AIA Services in default of the
$6M Note. These facts have not been disputed by the Defendants and all warrant the Court to
order the property subject to the pending appeals protected.
As such, Reed Taylor (as the soon to be appellant and the holder of over $300,000 in
preferred C shares in AIA Services) requests that the Court, after Reed Taylor files a notice of
appeal, enters an order for the following actions to protect the property subject to this appeal: (I)
order the $200,000 bond and $400,000 funds held as security for the preliminary injunction
against Reed Taylor held in the Court registry pending the outcome of any appeal; (2) order that
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•
AIA Services and AIA Insurance may not make any distributions or dividends to any common
shareholders or preferred C shareholders without court approval; (3) order that Donna Taylor or
her representative be appointed to the board of AIA Services as required under the Articles of
Incorporation; (4) order that no loans or unusual bonuses or payments be made to any employees
or any of the defendants in this action without court approval; (5) order that Reed Taylor may
appoint a party to be an observer at any board meetings and that timely notice be provided to that
party in accordance with the corporation's bylaws; (6) order that the Lewis Clark Mortgage or
any proceeds or property received from such mortgage may not be pledged or sold without court
approval; (7) limit all employee salaries at AIA Services and AIA Insurance to set at no more
than 5% over the amount paid in 2008, with the exception of John Taylor, whose salary should
be set at $60,000 per year, unless court approval is obtained; (8) order that other than his yearly
salary of $60,000, no other compensation or loans shall be made or paid to John Taylor or any
party on his behalf with funds or assets derived from AIA Insurance, AIA Services or any assets
derived or received from any former subsidiary; (9) order that no loans or assets of AIA Services
or AIA Insurance may be loaned, pledged or

provided to CropUSA; (10) order that AIA

Services and AIA Insurance submit monthly reports and financial statements under seal to the
Court and all parties to this action (including Reed Taylor) detailing and itemizing the sales,
bank account balances, policy premiums and related income, expenses, income and financial
affairs of AIA Insurance, AIA Services and its assets and obligations; and ( 11) bar AIA Services
and AIA Insurance from paying its outside directors more than $5,000 per year to serve on the
boards of the corporations and bar John Taylor from receiving any compensation for acting as a
purported board member. This order should be entered and/or take effect only upon Reed Taylor
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•
filing a timely notice of appeal.

2. An order protecting property should be entered after Reed Taylor has
filed his notice of appeal.
The undersigned counsel has been retained to pursue an appeal of this action should the
Court not grant Reed Taylor's Motion for Reconsideration or any delay in deciding
reconsideration occurs. A notice of appeal is prepared and will be promptly finalized and filed
once the Court certifies the partial summary judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b).

E. The Court should grant Reed Taylor's Motion to Stay Proceedings.
1. A partial stay is required under Rule 54(b)(2) and warranted under other
authority.
"If a Rule 54(b) Certificate is issued on a partial judgment and an appeal is filed, the trial
court shall lose all jurisdiction over the entire action, except as provided in [1.A.R. 13]." l.R.C.P.
54(b). A stay of all action may be ordered by a district court upon appeal. LC. § 13-202; l.A.R.
13(a).

Here, a stay is warranted and mandated during the pendency of Reed Taylor's appeal
should the Court deny his Motion for Reconsideration or delay in deciding the motion. 7

2. A stay should not be entered until after Reed Taylor timely files his notice
of appeal and be subject only to all of Reed Taylor's pending motions.
As asserted in Section _

(2) above, the Court should first enter all required orders,

permit Reed Taylor to file his Sixth Amended Complaint, enter the Rule 54(b) order, and permit
Reed Taylor to file his notice of appeal before staying this action. A stay is appropriate as all
defendants will remain in this action regardless of the Supreme Court's ruling on any appeal
7

Under l.A.R. 13(b), the Court does not lose jurisdiction to decide Motions for Reconsideration pursuant to l.R.C.P.
l l{a)(2)(B). Thus, the appeal process can commence as is necessary based upon the ongoing corporate malfeasance
occurring at AIA.
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•
filed and pursued by Reed Taylor and will prevent unnecessary litigation should the Supreme
Court reverse.
F. Motion to Amend Complaint.
Reed Taylor will file his proposed Sixth Amended Complaint by July 15, 2009, along
with a Memorandum of Law supporting amendment. At that time, Reed Taylor will move to
shorten time and request the Court hear his Motion to Amend on July 17, 2009. Thus, the
Defendants and Plan's responses, if any, would be filed the day before the hearing, and Reed
Taylor would file his reply, if any, the next morning thereby providing the Court sufficient time
to review his reply. This would pennit the Court to enter an order on Reed Taylor's Motion to
Amend immediately thereby pennitting him to file an amended complaint before a decision is
rendered on his Motion for Reconsideration and Rule 54(b) certificate order.

II. CONCLUSION
The Court should grant Reed Taylor's Motion for Reconsideration, vacate its order
granting partial summary judgment to Connie Taylor and James Beck and enter an order granting
partial summary judgment to Reed Taylor holding that the redemption agreements are valid and
enforceable.
Ill
Ill
Ill
Ill
Ill
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In the alternative, the Court should enter an order certifying the partial summary
judgment as resolving all claims under the $6M Note pursuant to Rule 54(b) after Reed Taylor
has filed his Sixth Amended Complaint, stay this action, and enter an order protecting the
property subject to this appeal. 8
DATED: This 81h day of July, 2009.

By:

~oderick C. Bond
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

8

Pursuant to l.A.R. 13, the Court would still retain jurisdiction to rule on Reed Taylor's Motion for Reconsideration
to expedite the appeal process.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Melanie Hayes, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing and the Affidavit of Reed Taylor on the following parties via the
method(s) indicated below:
David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Attorney for Defendants JoLee Duclos and
Bryan Freeman

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for R. John Taylor

David R. Risley
Randall, Blake & Cox
1106 Idaho St.
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for Connie Taylor, James Beck and
Corrine Beck

Gary D. Babbitt
D. John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
Attorneys for AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and
Crop USA Insurance Agency

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)
Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)
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Via:
James J. Gatziolis
Charles E. Harper
Quarles & Brady LLP
Citigroup Center, 500 West Madison Street
Suite 3700
Chicago, IL 60661-2511
Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance Agency

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Charles A. Brown
Attorney at Law
324 Main Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneys for AIA Services 401(k) Plan

( )
( )
( )
( )
(X)

Via:
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered - Via Messenger
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Email (pdf attachment)

Signed this 9th day of July, 2009, at Spokane, Washington.

~J.ro;~~ _)

Melanie Hayes
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RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, WA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-07-00208

v.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an Idaho
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE
TAYLOR, individually and the community
property comprised thereof; BRYAN
FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS,
a single person; CROP USA INSURANCE
AGENCY, INC., an Idaho Corporation; and
JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK,
individually and the community property
comprised thereof;

PLAINTIFF REED TAYLOR'S REPLY
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

Defendants.

Plaintiff Reed Taylor submits this Reply in support of his Motions scheduled for hearing
on July 23, 2009:

Ill
Ill
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I. FACTS AS APPLICABLE TO ALL ARGUMENTS 1
Reed Taylor is 72 years-old and has no college degree. 2 (Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated
July 21, 2009 ("Reed Taylor Aff."),

~

2.) As a result of the Defendants' actions and the Court's

order, Reed Taylor has no steady or reliable source of income which is sufficient to support him.
(Id. at~ 4.) Reed Taylor was counting on the payment of his $6 Million Promissory Note for his

retirement. (Id.) At the time of the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares Connie Taylor was Reed
Taylor's sister-in-law and R. John Taylor was Reed Taylor's brother. (Id.

at~

2.)

R. John Taylor has served as the President of AIA Services since its formation and has
been in charge of all day-to-day decisions for AIA Services and its subsidiaries since that time.
(Id. at

ir

3.) R. John Taylor handled all legal and financial issues for AIA Services and its

subsidiaries. (Id.) Reed Taylor's position as C.E.O. was more of an honorary nature as R. John
Taylor was making all operational decisions for AIA Services and its subsidiaries. (Id.) In fact,
there were many times that Reed Taylor was out of town for many days or weeks selling
insurance and marketing to associations and agents. (Id.) Donna Taylor, Reed Taylor's ex-wife,
was issued her Series A Preferred Shares in AIA Services after they contributed virtually all of
the shares of AIA Insurance and other entities to AIA Services. (Id. at ii 7.)
Reed Taylor was relying upon the funds to be received from his $6M Note for his
retirement and would never had assumed the over $650,000 debt for the Cessna airplane
transferred to him as partial consideration for the redemption of his shares if he would have
known that the Defendants were going to unlawfully transfer millions of dollars and never pay
him. (Id. at iii! 5-6.)
1

The facts asserted herein are incorporated by reference into each argument below and the arguments asserted in
Reed Taylor's Memorandum in Support of Reconsideration.
2
Reed Taylor's Affidavit contains a typo stating his age is 73 when his age is 72.
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In 1995 and during the negotiations and redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, AIA
Services had in-house-counsel, Daniel Spickler, who was also ATA Services' Secretary and VicePresident. (Id. , 8 and Ex. A.) Richard Riley, the author of the opinion letter provided to Reed
Taylor, had also been ATA Services' long-time counsel, was intimately familiar with its legal
affairs, was licensed to practice law in Idaho, and the primary attorney representing AIA
Services for the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. (Id. at,, 8-9 and Ex. C; Bell Aff., Ex. A.)
AIA Services also had Mickey Turnbow representing it for the redemption of Reed Taylor's
shares and Mr. Turnbow, like Mr. Riley, was specifically referenced personally in the opinion
letter. (Reed Taylor Aff.,, 8; Bell Aff., Ex. A.)
Reed Taylor asserted all nine elements of fraud in his Affidavit. (Reed Taylor Aff.,, 10.)
Reed Taylor would have never agreed to sell his shares if he had been advised that the
redemption was illegal and was in fact persuaded to sell his shares by the Defendants in this
action. (Id. at ,, 4 and 11.) Reed Taylor had no knowledge that the redemption of his shares
violated I.C. § 30-1-6 or any other laws. (Id. at, 12.) Until the illegality defense was asserted in
this action, no one had explained to Reed Taylor or mentioned to him that LC. § 30-1-6 existed
or need to be complied with in any way. (Id.) Reed Taylor did not, and could not, have tricked
five attorneys licensed to practice law in Idaho into redeeming his shares so that he could
"pillage the village" as asserted by Connie Taylor and James Beck, two of the people guilty of
being the direct and indirect recipients of millions of dollars of funds and assets from AIA
Services and its subsidiaries. (Id at,, 7 and 12.)

Ill
Ill
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II. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENTS

A. The Court should grant Reed Taylor's Motion for Reconsideration of the
Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
enforce the redemption agreements.
1. AIA Services' shareholders' ratified, approved and/or acquiesced in the

redemption of Reed Taylor's shares as required by I.C. § 30-1-6.
Even if a corporation has insufficient earned surplus to redeem shares, capital surplus
may be utilized if the share buyback is approved by the shareholders. I.C. § 30-1-6.
l.C. § 30-1-6 does not specifically require shareholder approval for a corporation to
purchase shares and such an approval is only required to utilize capital surplus to redeem shares.
See l.C. § 30-1-6.

As asserted by Reed Taylor and found by the Court, AIA Services'

shareholders approved the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares prior to the redemption of his
shares on March 7, 1995, and R. John Taylor represented and warranted that the shareholders
approved the redemption.

(Hearing, Ex. AC; Bell Aff., Ex. B.)

Nevertheless, the Court

erroneously found that l.C. § 30-1-6 requires that shareholders approved the redemption of any
shares, but such is not the case by the clear reading of the statute-and the Defendants, including
R. John Taylor, have not testified otherwise. The only arguments asserted by the Defendants and
believed by the Court is that a specific shareholder consent has not been filed with the Court or
produced by Reed Taylor. 3

2. The shareholders had knowledge of the redemption terms before the
redemption agreements were signed and before the closing of the
purchase thereby waiving any voting formalities.
If shareholders waive formalities or acquiesce to a transfer made without ratification,

they cannot later challenge the transfer and this rule also applies to minority shareholders.
3
The Court made a finding that the Defendants have produced boxes and boxes of documents to Reed Taylor. Such
a finding is irrelevant if the requested documents are not produced and witnesses not ordered to testify at depositions
upon the filing of Reed Taylor's Motions to Compel.
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Philips Petroleum Co. v. Rock Creek Min. Co., 449 F.2d 664, 667-68 (9 1h Cir. 1971) (citing 19
Am.Jur.2d Corporations§ 1014)). "An affirmance of an unauthorized transaction can be inferred
from a failure to repudiate it." Restatement (Second) of Agency § 94 (2008). "Generally, a
corporation which has received and retained the benefits and advantages of a contract or
transaction may not raise the defense of ultra virus in order to escape its obligations under the
contract." 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 677 (2008).
AJA Services shareholders knew of the redemption terms and the security interests that
would be provided to Reed Taylor before the redemption agreements and $6M Note were
executed on July 22, 1995, and August 1, 1995, respectively. These facts are in the record and
undisputed. To the extent that a specific shareholder resolution was not obtained as argued by
the Defendants and the Court, the requirement was waived by the shareholders since the
redemption agreements were not signed until July 22, 1995, and the shareholders permitted the
redemption to proceed without taking action.

The Defendants, and the other shareholders,

waived any vote, whether specifically required by LC. § 30-1-6 contemplated thereby, by their
knowledge of the redemption terms and security interests months prior to the execution of the
redemption agreements and closing of the transaction on July 22, 1995, and August, 1995.
These facts are not disputed by the Defendants or the Plan.
3. If the redemption agreements were illegal, the agreements should be
enforced because Reed Taylor was ignorant that the agreements violated
any law and the Defendants and their counsel represented to Reed Taylor
and his counsel that the agreements did not violate any laws.

Reed Taylor asserted that the agreements should be enforced in any event because he was
the most innocent of the parties and based upon the fact that the Defendants and their attorneys
(including Hawley Troxell-the law firm asserting the illegality defense, with whom, Richard
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Riley is a partner) represented the redemption agreements did not violate any laws and were
approved by shareholders. See e.g., Williams v. Continental Life & Accident Company, 100
Idaho 71, 73-74, 593 P.2d 708 (1979); McShane v. Quillin, 47 Idaho 542, 277 P. 554, 559
(1929); see also Maudlin v. Pacific Decision Sciences Corporation, 137 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1017,
40 Cal.Rptr.3d 724, 735 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
As with many other of Reed Taylor's arguments, the Defendants and Plan skate around
the facts and fail to respond. The Defendants AIA Services and AIA Insurance have submitted
no factual or legal evidence in opposition to Reed Taylor's arguments. (See AIA's Brief, p. 5)
The other Defendants and Plan have submitted nothing. There is no issue of fact here. These
arguments were previously asserted and the Defendants and Plan failed to respond. (See Reed
Taylor's Memorandum in Opposition to Partial Summary Judgment, pp. 39-41, 43-44; Reed
Taylor's Reply and Supplemental Memorandum dated May 12, 2009, pp. 20-23).
Moreover, AIA Services also had in-house counsel licensed to practice law in Idaho, who
was also a Secretary and Vice-President of AIA Services at the time of the redemption. (Reed
Taylor Aff., pp. 4-5,

~

8 and Ex. A.) Richard Riley was AIA Services' primary attorney for the

redemption of Reed Taylor's shares and an attorney licensed in Idaho at the time of the
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. (Reed Taylor Aff., p. 5,

~~

8-9; Ex. C; Bell Aff., pp. 2-5

and Ex. A). Richard Riley also is now an attorney at Hawley Troxell--one of the law finns now
arguing the redemption was illegal. (Id) Finally, Mickey Turnbow was also an attorney for
AIA Services and was licensed to practice law in.the state ofldaho at the time of Reed Taylor's
redemption. (Reed Taylor Aff., p. 5, ~ 8 and Ex. B; Bell Aff., Ex. A.)
Instead, the Defendants assert that Reed Taylor now admits that he knew that AIA
Services had insufficient earned surplus.

Like other arguments and facts, the Defendants
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misconstrue Reed Taylor's argument. First, Reed Taylor has never submitted in an affidavit or
otherwise that he knew AIA Services had insufficient earned surplus to redeem his shares.
Second, Reed Taylor's arguments was merely that if he as a shareholder should be imputed with
knowledge that AJA Services had insufficient earned surplus, so should the other shareholders as
they all received AJA Services' financial information. Finally, even if true, Defendants AIA
Services and AIA Insurance's arguments are irrelevant to Reed Taylor's arguments.
There is not factual dispute as to both Reed Taylor being the most innocent party and the
fact that AIA Services, John Taylor and AIA Services' counsel made representations and
opinions to him that the redemption was legal and all consents and approvals were obtained. The
Defendants have not and cannot assert any evidence contradicting Reed Taylor's legal and
factual arguments. Partial Summary Judgment should be entered in favor of Reed Taylor.

4. The redemption agreements are not illegal contracts and are enforceable
because J.C. § 30-1-6 does not prohibit a corporation from repurchasing
its shares.
A contract in violation of a statutory provision generally is void or illegal only if the
legislative body enacting the statute evidences an intention that such contracts be considered
void or illegal. Ets-Hokin & Galvan, Inc. v. Maas Transport, Inc., 380 F.2d 258 (8th Cir. 1967);

Gardiner Solder Co. v. Supalloy Corp., Inc., 232 Cal.App.3d 1537, 284 Cal.Rptr. 206 (Cal.
1991).
Here, the Idaho Legislature did not include language in I.C. § 30-1-6 expressly stating
that any contract that violated the statute would be void. l.C. § 30-1-6. Moreover, the Idaho
Legislature made no express provision stating that shareholder approval must be in the form of a
shareholder resolution expressly authorizing the purchase of shares through capital surplus. Id.
Finally, the Idaho Legislature certainly never enacted l.C. § 30-1-6 with the intent that a
REED TAYLOR'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 7
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corporation, its shareholders, and its attorneys would enter into such a transaction with no hann
to creditors and after the corporation's counsel has provided an express legal opinion stating that
the transaction was legal. See e.g., Post v. Bregman, 349 Md. 142, 707 A.2d 806 (Md. 1998)
(Rules of professional conduct constitute an expression of public policy have the force of Jaw).
The Defendants have not and cannot dispute these facts.

5. It is not necessary for Reed Taylor to prove all elements of fraud to avoid
partial summary judgment.
Contrary to Defendants AIA Services and AIA Insurance's assertions (AIA's Brief, pp.
6-8.), an illegal agreement may still be enforced when fraud has occurred and there is no
distinction between fraud and constructive fraud as each pertains to the fraud exception. Trees v.

Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 10, 56 P.3d 765, 772 (2002). A shareholder owes another shareholder
fiduciary duties when the parties are dealing on unequal terms. Weatherby v. Weatherby Lumber
Co., 94 Idaho 504, 507, 492 P.2d 43, 46 (1972); Sewell v. Ladd, Mo.App., 158 S.W.2d 752 (Mo.

1942) (fiduciary duties can be found wherever there is trust).
R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor owed fiduciary duties to Reed Taylor as coshareholders holding superior knowledge of legal and/or financial affairs of AIA Services and as
family members to Reed Taylor. Thus, Reed Taylor need not prove all nine elements of fraud.
Reed Taylor argued in opposition to the Defendants' Motions for Partial Summary
Judgment the fraud exception to an illegal agreement.

(Reed Taylor's Memorandum in

Opposition to Partial Summary Judgment, pp. 51-52.) Neither the Defendants nor the Plan
responded to this defense.
Reed Taylor again asserted the fraud exception in his Memorandum of Law in Support of
Motion for Reconsideration. (Reed Taylor's Memorandum in Support of Reconsideration, pp.
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19-20.)

Previously, the Defendants had never addressed the fraud exception argwnent until

Reed Taylor re-asserted it in his Motion for Reconsideration.

Now, the Defendants AIA

Services and AIA Insurance assert that Reed Taylor must prove a11 elements of fraud and
constructive fraud to demonstrate an issue of facts exists as to the defense.
Once Reed Taylor raised the fraud defense, the burden is on the Defendants and Plan to
prove that no genuine issue of facts exists to the fraud defense and that Reed Taylor cannot
prevail on the defense as a matter of Jaw. I.R.C.P. 56. None of the Defendants or the Plan has
presented any evidence to rebut Reed Taylor's assertion of the fraud exception to enforce the
redemption agreement.

Nevertheless, to demonstrate that Reed Taylor is entitled to partial

summary judgment on the defense (as asserted in his Memorandum in Opposition to Partial
Summary Judgment), Reed Taylor testified as to all nine elements of fraud and the Defendants
are unable to rebut this testimony. (Reed Taylor Aff., pp. 6-7, ~ 10.)
Although previously asserted, the Defendants do not deny that R. John Taylor (as signer
of the redemption agreements and the person who certified that the shareholders had ratified the
agreements), AIA Services (by and through the redemption agreements) and Eberle, Berlin, et
al. 's opinion Jetter (as agent for AIA Services) all represented to Reed Taylor that shareholder
approval and consent were obtained, that the redemption agreements were enforceable, and the
redemption agreements would not violate any laws. (Hearing, Ex. Zand AC; Bell Aff., Ex. A.)
Now, the defendants have elected to rescind these representations to argue otherwise, but, once
given, representations may not be unilateral rescinded.

There is no dispute that material

misrepresentations were made to Reed Taylor by the Defendants.
Ill
Ill
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6. Under I.C. § 30-1-6, AIA Services has a right to redeem shares its shares
and the Defendants and Plan are estopped from asserting insufficiency of
earned surplus.
A corporation and shareholders who develop an improper scheme to acquire the
corporations' stock lack standing to raise, and are estopped from raising, the issue of
insufficiency of the corporation's earned surplus ...
19 C.J.S. Corporations § 663 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
A corporation has a right to redeem shares under I.C. § 30-1-6. However, the defendants
and Plan are estopped from asserting a lack of earned surplus as a defense. Thus, the only facts
properly before the Court are that AIA Services redeemed its shares as was its right under LC. §
30-1-6 and the only parties asserted insufficient earned surplus are those who have unlawfully
transferred and taken millions of dollars from AIA Services.

While Idaho law apparently

prohibits a party from asserting estoppel when he or she is an unlicensed contractor, unlicensed
architect or violates direct provisions of Idaho Code, Idaho law has not recently addressed a
slight violation of a statute in terms of a stock redemption statute, particularly when the
purported violation could have been prevented by the very parties asserting the illegality
argument. Idaho law should make an exception to the facts in this case.

7. The fact that the redemption agreements violated I.C. § 30-1-6 as found
buy the Court does not prohibit them from being enforced.
The fact that a contract violates a statute does not necessarily make the contract
unenforceable. Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 48 P.3d 918 (Utah 2002). The court must consider
whether holding the contract unenforceable is to the benefit or detriment of the parties the statute
is designed to protect. Id.
Here, even if the redemption agreements violated a portion of J.C. § 30-1-6, the
redemption agreements should still be enforced. Reed Taylor, a shareholder, is the intended
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beneficiary of LC. § 30-1-6, not the defendants who have unlawfully transferred and utilized
millions of dollars of AIA Services' funds and assets, and, only after they have been caught,
assert the illegality defense some 13 years later to avoid liability. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction improper corporate buyback schemes and other unlawful acts among and between
shareholders to the benefit of those most sophisticated or guilty of corporate malfeasance.

8. Redeeming shares is not the substance of the illegality argument as a
corporation has the right to redeem shares under J.C.§ 30-1-6.
The cases relied upon by the Court, the defendants and the Plan all involve acts which
violate the substance of the statute, i.e., conducting business as an unregistered contractor,
conducting business as an unlicensed architect, etc. See e.g., Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 56
P.3d 765 (2002).

The substance of a corporation redeeming shares is not an illegal act.

Moreover, the alleged illegal acts could, even as asserted by the Court, have been prevented by a
specific shareholder resolution authorizing the use of capital surplus and such a resolution could
have been voted on and passed by the very persons requesting that the Court find the agreement
illegal. 4

B. Exhibit 1 to Connie Taylor and James Beck's Response should be stricken and
excluded as evidence.
Portions of affidavits which are argumentative, speculative, conclusory, inaccurate,
unfounded, and/or unsupported should be stricken. Sprinkler Irrigation Company, Inc. v. John

Deere Insurance Company, Inc., 139 Idaho 691, 697, 85 P.3d 667 (2004).
Evidence must be relevant. l.R.E. 402. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its ... outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues ... or by considerations
4

As set forth in Reed Taylor's Statement of Facts, which is again incorporated by reference, along with all evidence
relied upon therein, into each and every argument asserted herein and in Reed Taylor's Memorandum in Support of
Reconsideration, John and Connie Taylor became the majority shareholders of AIA Services and could have voted
their shares in favor of using capital surplus after the redemption agreements were signed and the transaction closed.
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of delay, waste of time, or needless ... cumulative evidence." I.R.E. 403. Hearsay is not
admissible evidence. I.RE. 802.

"[A]ny redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous

matter" may be stricken by the court. I.R.C.P. 12(f).
Reed Taylor previously objected to Exhibit 1 to Connie Taylor and James Beck's
Response dated July 16, 2009, when it was submitted attached to the Affidavit of Aimee as
Exhibit W (See Connie Taylor and James Beck's Response, p. 7 and Ex 1.). However, Exhibit 1,
as does Exhibit W to the Gordon Affidavit is inadmissible. The Defendants' use of the dollar
amounts on Exhibit 1 are irrelevant since the amount of funds paid to Reed Taylor has no
bearing on any of the arguments. The dollar amounts include payments for the use of Reed
Taylor's airplane (Reed Taylor Aff., pp. 3-4,

iii! 5-6.)

The exhibit contains hearsay. The dollar

amounts also include debts assumed by Reed Taylor as admitted by the Defendants. Finally,
Exhibit 1 confuses the issues and unfairly prejudices Reed Taylor by misrepresenting the true
amounts that he received.

III. CONCLUSION
The Court should grant Reed Taylor's Motion for Reconsideration, vacate its order
granting partial summary judgment to Connie Taylor and James Beck and enter an order granting
partial summary judgment to Reed Taylor holding that the redemption agreements are valid and
enforceable.
DATED: This 21st day of July, 2009.
BY, PLLC

By: _ ____..__-=---.-----Roderick C. Bond
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, l served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing and the Affidavit of Reed Taylor (w/ Exhibits A-C) on the following
parties via the method(s) indicated below:

Via:
David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Attorney for Defendants JoLee Duclos and
Bryan Freeman

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for R. John Taylor

( )
( )
( )
( )
(X)

Via:
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
David R. Risley
Randall, Blake & Cox
1106 Idaho St.
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for Connie Taylor, James Beck and
Corrine Beck

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Gary D. Babbitt
D. John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
Attorneys for AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and
Crop USA Insurance Agency

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
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James J. Gatziolis
Charles E. Harper
Quarles & Brady LLP
Citigroup Center, 500 West Madison Street
Suite 3700
Chicago, IL 60661-2511
Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance Agency

Charles A. Brown
Attorney at Law
324 Main Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneys for AIA Services 401(k) Plan

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered - Via Messenger
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Signed this 21" day of July, 2009, at Lewiston, Idaho.

ll

Roderick C. Bond

l
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NEW BESTATIID BYLAWS
OF

All SERVICES CORPORATION
(an·Idaho corporation)

ARTICLE I

ORICBS
Sect::t.on 1.1
~gistered Office..
The registered office of the
corporation required by the Idaho Business Corporation Act to .be
maintained in the State of Idaho inay, but need not be, identical witht:Jie
principal off ice· in the State of Idaho; and the address of the registered
office may be changed from time to time by the Board of.Directors or the
President of the corporatiop. (Idaho Code Sections 30-l-12(a) and 30-113.)
Section 1. 2 Principa1 Office; Other Offices. The corporation shall
also h~ve and maintain an office or principal. place o.f business in
Lewiston, Idaho or at such other place as may . be. fixed by the Board of
Direetors, and may also have offices at such other places, both within and
without the State of Idaho, as tbe Board of Directors may from time to
time determine or the business of the corporation may require.

ARTICLE II

Section 2..1 Corporate Sea1. The corporate seal shall consist of
a die bearing the name of the corporat_ion and the ins·criJ?tion, "Corporate
Seal -- State of Idaho".
The seal may be us~ by causing it or a
facsimile thereof to be impressed or affixed or in any other manner
reproduced.
The seal may be altered at the pleasure of the Board of
Directors. (Idaho Code Section 30-l-4(c)).
·

ARTICLE III

Section. 3.1
Place of Meetings.
The Board of Directors may
designate any place, either within or without.the State of Idaho, as the
place of meeting for any annual meeting or for any special meeting of
stockholders called by the Board of :pirectors. A waiver of notice signed
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-ARnCLH V
OFlICKRS

Section 5.1 Officers Designated. The officers of the corporation
consist of. a president, one or more vice presidents (the number thereof
to be determined by the Board of Directors). a secretary, and a treasurer~
each of whom shall be elected by the Board of Directors. The order of
seniority of vice presidents shall be the order of their nomination,
unless otherwise determined by the Boared ·of Directors.
Such other
officers and assistant officers as may be deemed necessary may be elected
or appointed by the Board of Directors. Any two or more offices may be
held by the same person, except the offices of president and secretary.
(Idaho Code Section 30-1-50).
·

··~

Section 5.2 Tenure and Duties of Officers.
(a) Term of Office. All officers shall hold office at the
pleasure of the Board of Directors and until their successors shalL have
been duly elected and qualified, or until their ·resignation or removal.
If the office of any officer becomes vacant for any reqson, the vacancy
may be filled by the Board.of Directors. (Idaho Code-Section 30-1-50).

---::...

~-1·

;.

(b)
The Presi:Clent.
The president shall be the principal
executive officer of the corporation and, subject to the control of the
Board of Directors 7 shall in general supervise and control all. of the
business and affairs 'of the corporation. He shall, when present, preside
at all meetings of the stockholders and of the Board of Directors. He may
sign, with the secretary or any other proper officer. of the corporation
thereunder authorized by the Board of Directors, certificates for shares
.of the corporation, any deeds, mortgages, bonds, · contracts,. or other
instruments which the Board of Directors has authorized to be executed,
except in cases where the signing and execution thereof shall be expressly
delegated by the Board of Directors or by these Bylaws to some other
officer or agent of the corporation, or shall be required by law to be
otherwise signed or executed; and in general the president shall perform
all duties commonly in~ident-to the office of president and such other
. duties as may· be prescribed by the Board of Directors from ti.me to time.

(c) The Vice President. In the absence of the president or
in the event of his death, inability or refusal to act, the vice president
(or in the event there is more than one vice president, the vice
presidents in the order designated at the time of their election, or in
the absence of any designation, then in the order of their election) shall
perform the duties- of the president and, when so acting, shall hae all the
powers of and be subject to all the restrictions upon the president. Any
vice president may sign, with t;h.e secretary or an assistant secretary,
certificates for shares of the corporation; and the vice president shall
perform other duties commonly incdent to the office of vice president and
such other duties as from time to time may be assigned to him by the
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president or by the Board of Directors.

)

(d) The Secretary.
The secretary shall: (a) attend all
meetings and keep the minutes of· the proceedings of the stockholders and
of the Board of Directors in one or more books provided for that purpose;
(b) see that all notices are duly given in accordance with the provisions
of these Bylaws or as required by law; (c) be custodian of the corporate
records and of the seal of the corporation and see that the seal of the
corporation is affixed to all documents the execution of which on behalf
of the corporation under its seal is duly authorized; (d) keep a register
of the post off ice address of each sbareholder which shall be furnished
to the secretary by such shareholder; (e) sign, with the president, or a
vice president, certificates for shares of the corporation, issuance of
which shall have been authorized by: resolution of the Board of Directors;
(f) have general charge of the. stock transfer books of the corporation;
and (g) in general perform all duties commonly incident to the office of
secretary and such other duties as from time to time may be assigned to
him by the president or by the Board of Directors.
(e) The Treasurer. The treasurer shall: (a) have charge and
custody of and be responsible for all funds and securities of the
corporation; (b) receive and give receipts for monies-due and payable to
the corporation from any source whatsoever, and deposit all such monies
in the name of the corporation in such banks, trust companies or other
depositories as shall be .S"eiected in accordance with the provisions of
Article VI of these Bylaws; and (c) in general perform all of the duties
commonly incident to the office of t~easurer and such other duties as from
time to time may be assigned to h:ini by the president or by the Board of
D.irectors. If required by the Board of Directors 1 the treasurer shall
give a bond for the faithful discharge of his duties in such sum and with
such surety or sureties as the Board of Directors shall det.ermine.
(f)
Assistant Secretaries and Assist:ant Treasurers.
The
assistant secretaries, when authorized by the Board of Directors, may sign
with the president or a vice president certificates for shares of the
corporation the issuance of which shall have been authorized by a
resolution of the Board of Directors.
The assistant treasurers shall
respectively, if required by the Board of Directors, give bonds for the
faithful discharge of their duties in such sums and with such sureties as
the Board of Directors shall determine; The assistant secretaries aod
assistant treasurers, in general shall perform such duties as shall be
assigned to them by the secretary or the treasurer, or by the president
or the Board of Directors.

Section 5.3 Resigru!tions. Any officer may resign at any time by
giving written notice to the Board of Directors or to the president or to
the secretary. Any such resignation shall be effective when received by
the person or persons to whom such notice is given, unless a later time
is specified therein, in which event the resignation shall become
effective at such later time. Unless otherwise specified in such notice,
the acceptance of any such resignation shall not be necessary to make it
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effective.

_.

I..... .

Section 5.4 Removal. Any officer or agent may be removed by the
·Board of Directors whenever, in its judgment, the best interests of the
corporation will be served thereby; but such removal shall be without
prejudice to the contract rights, if any, of the person so removed.
Election or appointment of an officer or agent shall not of itself create
contract rights. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-51).
Section 5.5 Cmopensation. The compensation of the officers shall
be fixed from time to time by the Board of Directo~s. No officer shall
be prevented from receiving such compensation by reason of the fact that
such officer is also a director of the corporation.
ABTICLR VI
EXECUTION OF CORPoRATE INS'l.'RUMENTS ARD
VO'lillG 01' SECUlU'IlES <MtED BY THE COBPOBATION

·Section 6.1 Execution of Corporate Instruments.
The Board of
Directors may, in its discretion, determine tlie method and designate the
signatory officer or officers, or·other person or persons, to execute on
behalf of the corporation any corporate instrument or document, or to sign
on behalf.of the corporation the corporate name without limitation, or to
enter into contracts on belUiif of the corporation, except where otherwise
provided by law or these Byiaws; and· such execution or signature shall be
binding upon the corporation.
Authorization granted to any person
hereunder may be general or confined to specific instances •
. Unless otherwise specifically determined by the Board of Directors
or otherwise required by law, promissory notes, deeds of trust, mortgages
and other evidences of indebtedness of the corporation, and certificates
of shares of stock owned by the corporation,- shall be executed, signed or
endorsed by the president or any vice president, and by the secretary or
treasurer or any assistant secretary or assistant treasurer. All other
instruments and documents requiring the corporate signature may be
executed as aforesaid or in such manner as may be directed by the Board
of Directors.
Section 6.2 Loans. No. loan shall be con_tracted on behalf of the
corporation and no evidence of indebtedness shall be issued in its name
unless authorized by resolution of the Board of Directors.
Such
authorization may be general or confined to specific instances.
Section 6.3 ·Deposits and Checks. All fnnds of the corporation not
otherwise employed shall be deposited from time to time to the credit of
the corporation in such banks, trust companies or other depositories as
the Board of Directors may select. All checks and drafts drawn on banks
or other depositaries on funds to the credit of the corporation or in
special accounts of the corporation shall be signed by ·such person or
persons as the Board of Directors shall authorize to. do so.
Such
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AIA Serviees Corporation
One LewiS Clark PlaZa
PO Box538
Lewiston, Idaho 83501-0538
(208) 709-QOOO FAX (208} 746-815Q

April 22, 1996

Mr. Reed Taylor
4080 Old Lapwai Rd.
LeWiston1D 8350I
Dear Reed:
Let me respond to each of the issues raised in your April 18, I996 letter.

Down Payment Note
It was the intent of all parties that the Down Payment Note would be used as a vehicle to allow the
closing of the sale of preferred stock to Messrs. Cashman and Beck to fund the transfer of AIA
Insurance from Universe Life and to effect the reorganization of AfA Services and its subsidiaries
that was necessary for all parties in interest.
In agreeing to the Down Payment Note, the parties contemplated that the principal of the Note would
not be pa.id until the Company had sold additional Series C Preferred Stock in sufficient amount
(approximately $3.5 million) to pay off the First Interstate bank loan, to pay Donna Taylor $700,000
towards redemption of her Series A Preferred Stock pursuant to the July 18. 1995 letter agreement,
and to pay you the principal of the Down Payment Note for your common stock. To date, the
Company has been able to sell some additional preferred stock to meet obligations of the Company
and, through an arrangement with the Company's profit sharing trust. has paid off the First Interstate
bank loan by substituting an obligation to the trust. The additional sales of preferred stock have not
yet been sufficient, however, to pay the principal of the Company's redemption obligations to Donna
and to you. Our preferred stock sales efforts continue; and I would expect that AIA will be able to
pay the principal in the near future.

The January I I, 1995 letter agreement among Donna Taylor, you and the Company subordinates
all principal payments to you for redemption of your common stock to the payment of $700,000 to
Donna for the redemption of a portion of her Series A Preferred Stock. That agreement was
superseded by July 18, 1995 letter agreement among Donna, you and AIA which permits monthly
interest payment$ to you not to exceed the amount of the monthly redemption payments to Donna,
approximately $24,000 per month, and allows payment of the principal of the Down Payment Note
only if and to the e"1ent equal principal payments are made to Donna up to $700,000.

Exhibit001452
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My first priority now is to raise the necessary money to first pay Donna Taylor the required amount,
including the catch-up, and then to retire the balance of your Down Payment Note. The current
principal balance, according to my figures, is less than $900,000 (copy attached). My biggest
challenge is to completely pay off your Down Payment Note. I have been encumbered in that
process because I first must also raise $650,000 for Donna Taylor before you get full payment of
your Down Payment Note balance. I would agree to a waiver of the July 18 agreement in order to
pay you first, before Donna.
I flatly reject any contention that AIA's payments of CAP expenses were not part of either the Down
Payment Note principJe or interest thereon, or somehow unconnected with the transaction.
However, because you take such a contrary position, I will be forced to discontinue all CAP
payments to protect the Company. AIA will discontinue the CAP payroll functions immediately.
In addition, all agents who have not been producing will be or have been terminated, including CAP
agents.

Default
All of your allegations of default are without merit.
L

Attorney Fees. We paid your attorneys' fees in the amount of$25,000 on 11/9/95,
and an additional amount of $22,461 on l'U29/95 for payment in full of the
Caimcross bill. The Stock Redemption Agreement does not require payment of postclosing attorney fees; and AJA is not responsible for biUings for post-closing services
by your lawyers.

2.

FinanciaJ Statements. I have previously provided you 1995 year-end financial
statements (including resuJts of operations for the fourth quarter) for each of the
operating companies. The year-end consolidated financial statements are now being
reviewed and audited by Peat Matwick. Traditionally, the conso1idated statements
have been available on May 1, and that was contemplated by the Stock Redemption
Agreement. As you know the consolidated statements are more difficult this year
because of the discontinuance of insurance operations. I would assume that you
would have some patience with that.

3.

$6 Million Note Interest. Your assertion that AIA is in default for failure to pay
interest accruing in February and March 1996 on the $6 million note is
unsupportable. I remind you that the July 18, 1995 letter agreement is a three-party
agreement in which you agreed with Donna and the Company that monthly interest
on the $6 million note would be paid to you in an amount not exceeding the monthly
redemption payment to Donna, v..ith the balance of the interest being accrued and
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payable only after Donna received the entire $700,000. You and Donna may not

unilaterally change that agreement without the Company's approval. As a board
member, all modifications affecting you need to have full board approval. Further,
even if the April 16 letter agreement were valid, it would only be effective
prospectively. You cannot retroactively impose an obligation for payments where
such an obligation did not previously exist.
4.

Financial Covenants. The alleged financial covenant defaults are without merit.

With some difficulty and distraction, we have been able to move the Company forward from
substantial losses in 1994 and 1995. The situation is that we now have quarterly profits. The pre-tax
profits for this quarter will be about $471.000. The Company has paid off the First Interstate Bank
loan. We have downsized the corporation as necessary to restructure and streamline the
organization. We have done so without your assistance. encouragement or support. In fact, this is
illustrated by the fact that we received only a few pieces of business from your agency, which was
to provide a substantial amount of premium over this last few months during this transition.

AIA has also been generous to you in providing and paying for your expenses. Let me remind you
that, on a monthly basis, you are taking between $80,000 to $100,000 per month out of this
Company. That includes $20,000 plus benefits in salary~ $24,000 to $42,000 interest payments;
$18,000 in various CAP expenses; $10,000 to $12,000 per month in commission payments to your
agents who are providing services to CAP; and other miscellaneous expenses like the airylane's
insurance. Bob Petersen, etc.
It is apparent that we need a "Come to Jesus" meeting with more than just you and me in the room.
Each of the principals should be represented including Beck-Cashman, Donna Taylor (through
Cumer Green), you, AJA, and our respective counsel, if needed.
I have a very important proposed transaction meeting next week. April 24-26, hopefully to sell Great
Fidelity and Universe Life and to secure an investment from a major insurer. This is subject to the
Rehabilitator's approval, the sinking fund agreement and the Cashman - Beck Agreements. I would
be pleased to meet with you after that offer is made.
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On Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday, April 30 - May 2, I have meetings in Kansas City and
Minneapolis. The week after that is the Af.A Board meeting, and a GGMIT Executive CoIIlJTlittee
meeting on May 9 and 10. I would propose a meeting on either May 3, 4, 6 or 7. By then all
financials should be done. The regular Board meeting is scheduled for May 7.

trufyM
4'-__,~..n

Tayl r
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May 3, 1996

T. H. E•ll:RLI[ 11e;ia-1SJ77)

Mr. Scott T. Bell
Caimcross & Hempelmann, P.S.

70th Floor, Columbia Center
701 Fifth Ave.
Seattle, WA 98104
Re:

AJA Services Corporation - Redemption of Recd TayJor's Common Stock

Re,,ponse to Default Notice
Dear Scott:

The purpose of this letter is to respond to your April 2.i, 1996 letter.

1.
Pownpayment Nof.c. As you know. AlA Services Corporation attempted a private
placement to raise capital in the early part -of -1995. The -Kinnard -offering -contemplated
sufficient equity infusion to recapitalize The Universe Life Insurance Company and to financ.e
the $1..5 million llownpaymenL on Reed Taylor's common stock redemption and at least a partial
redemption ($700,000 minimum) of Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred Stock. In connection
with the private placement, Ree.d Taylor, Donna Taylor and AIA Services Corporation ent.ered
into a letter agreement dated January 11, 1995. In that agreement, the parties agreed that any
note payable to Reed Taylor for the $6 million balance of the redemption price for his stock
would be subordinated to full payment of the redemption price for Donna Taylor's preferred

stock.

The Kinnard Offering was unfortunately unsuccessful. Subsequent efforts to raise capital
resulted in an Investment Agreement with Messrs. Cashman and Beck to purchase $1.5 million
of Series C Preferred Stock. The Company had hoped to sell additional shares as well but, as
of mid-summer, had not been able to do so. At the time of the July 18, 1995 AIA Services
Corporation Board meeting in Lewiston, it became apparent that, in order to proceed with the
Company's restructuring and development of its marketing business, it would be necessary to ,
close the Cashman/Beck Lraosaction, contribute the $1.5 million proceeds to Universe Life and \'.
spinout AIA Insurance. All parties acknowledged the necessity to complete that part of the
transaction and to continue efforts to raise additional capital to fund Reed's downpayment and
the partial redemption of Donna Taylor's stock.
-~

l

Accordingly, Reed, Donna and AIA Services Corporation entered into a July 18, 1995
letter agreement. which superseded the earlier Jetter. That agreement restated the previous
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agreement concerning the subordination of Reed Taylor's $6 million not.e lo the complete
redemption of Donna Taylor's stock. Jn addition, Reed agreed to accept a second, interest·free
note for the $1.5 million downpayment. All parties contemplated that additional proceeds of sale
of Series C Preferred Stock would be received over the next 90 days; and Reed Taylor agreed
that the funds received from additional sales of Series C Preferred Stock following the
Cashman/Beck transaction would be aJlocated as follows=
(i)

The first $100,000 shall be (and was) paid lo Donna Taylor for

reimbursement of professional fees.
(ii)
The next $1.4 million is to be paid, as received, in equal amounts to
Donna Taylor and Reed Taylor until Donna Taylor has been paid $700,000 for
redemption of her preferred stock.
(iii) Thereafter, the next $800,000 is lo be paid to Reed Taylor until he bas
received the full $1.5 minion downpaymcnt for redemption of his common stock.

Shortly after the Board meeting, I left on vacation. Your office prepared the Addendum to the
Stock Redemption Agreement and the Downpayment Note which, because of my absence, J did
not review before it was signed. It is true that the Downpayment Note was not made expressly
subordinate to AIA's redemption obligations to Donna Taylor. However, in the July 18, 1995
letter agreement, Reed clearly agreed that the principal of the Downpayment Note would not and
could not be paid except as the Company is able to pay an equal amount to Donna Taylor up to
$700,000. Further, the parties clearly contemplated that the requisite capital might not be raised
within the 90-day target period and therefore provided for the accrual of interest if the
Downpayment Note were not paid by that date.
Accordingly, your assertion that the July 18, 1995 agreement relates only to payment of
interest under the $6 million note and not to the Downpayment Note is incorrect. The Company
has paid Re.eel the default interest on the Downpayment Note; and, as Reed agreed in the July
18, 1995 letter agreement, the Compll.Ily has paid Reed interest on the $6 million note in the
amount of the monthly payment to Donna Taylor for redemption of her Preferred Stock and has
accrued the balance of those interest payments. The accrued interest, pursuant to the July 18
letter agreement, is not due and owing until after Donna Taylor has received the full $700,000
redemption payment.
As you know, the Company has sold some additional Series C Preferred Stock and is
continuing efforts to raise capital. In these fund raising efforts, the Company has made
representations to investors and potential investors concerning the terms and amount of its
obligations to Reed and Donna under these agreements. These agreements cannot be unilaterally
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amended by Reed and Donna, as they purported to do in an Apri1 18, 1996 letter, to the
detriment of the Company and its investors.
The principal of the Downpayment Note, due in October 1995 by the terms of the note,
has not been fully paid. However, the Company has made advances on behalf of Reed particularly advance., to the CAP Program because of its negative cash flow - which Reed and \
John agreed would be offset against the principal of the Downpaymcnt Note. On the same basis,
the Company also assumed Reed's personal loan payable to West One Bank in the principal and
interest amount of $172,825.04. Absent Reed's agreement to offset those amounts against his
Downpayment Note, the Company would not have entered into those transactions. Indee.d,
loaning money to CAP would have violated the covenant in Section 5. l(h) of the Stock
Redemption Agreement; and it would have been fiscally imprudent t.o do so given the
Company's finaocial situation.
Your letter asserts that the Downpayment Note is explicit that AIA has no right of offset.
However, the pertinent clause provides that the Company "waive(s) any right to offset against
amounts due to Payee hereunder any amounts due to the [Company] pursuant to the Addendum
or the Redemption Agreement or any agreement (or exhibit thereto) Jisted herein ..•. " This
clause does not cover the CAP advances or the loan assumption. because (i} they did not involve
any amounts due from Reed to the Company and (ii) did not arise under the Addendum, the
Redemption Agreement or any other agreement listed therein - or indeed, any agreement
existing at the date of the note. Rather, the offsets arose by subsequent agreement of the parties.

The Downpayment Not.e is unsecured. While the unpaid balance of the Downpayment
Note became due in October 1995, the Company has been making timely payments of the default

interest: and Reed is e.-ttopped by the July 18 Jetter agreement among Reed, Donna and the
Company to attempt to accelerate that note.
2.
Attorney Fees. Section 2.5 of the Stock Redemption Agreement and Section 3
of the Addendum to Stock Redemption Agreement require the Company to pay, at closing,
Reed's attorney fees incurred in connection with the negotiation and drafting of the Agreement,
the Addendum and ancillary documents and the transactions contemplated thereby. These
provisions clearly contemplated payment of Reed's attorney fees incurred through the date of
closing. The provisions just as clearly do not contemplate a continuing obligation to pay
attorney fees subsequently incurred by Reed. Your firm's bill for services rendered through the
closing date has been paid in full.
3.
l!royision of Quar~rly FioancialStatements. This alleged default was previously
addressed in John Taylor's April 22, 1996 letter to your client. Reed has previously received
from the Company its year-end financial statements for the operating subsidiaries. In accordance
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with historical practice and practical necessity, the audited financial statements are not typically
completed until June.
4.
$6 Million Note. The $6 million not.e expressly provides that "this note is
subordinate to the payment of the redemption obJigations owed by the Company to Donna Taylor
pursuant to that certain letter agreement dated January 11, 1995, signed by Company, Payee,
Donna Taylor and Cumer Green. The 1anuary 11, 1995 letter agreement, as well as the July
18, 1995 letter agreement, both expressly state that "Reed Taylor will receive no principal
payments on said note until Donna Taylor's stock has completely redeemed.• As to the payment
of interest, your client expressly agreed in July 18, 1995 letter agreement that his interest
payments on the $6 miUion note "shall be reduced to the amount of monthly payment to Donna
Taylor for redemption of her Preferred Stock" and that the excess amount of such interest due
to Reed on the $6 million note shall be accrued and payable "only if and after Donna Taylor has
received the full $700,000 redemption payment." I applaud you for the creativity of your
argument that Reed's agreement "does not allow AJA to avoid a default under the Not.e, but
merely establishes the priority between Donna and Reed as to the coJJection of such payments
from AIA". However, I do not think a court would buy it. No reasonably prudent person
would enter into a debt transaction in which it would be in default and the debt subject to
acceleration immediately upon consummation of the transaction. The Company has relied to its
detriment upon Reed's July 18, 1995 agreement; and I believe he is estopped t.o assert your
argument. I would certainly be interested in reviewing any contrary Idaho authority which
supports your position.
5.
Financial Covenants. As discussed in Paragraph 3 above, Reed has received all
financial information to which he is entitled by the Stock Redemption Agreement; and that
information is certainly adequate for Reed to confirm the Company's compliance with financial

covenants. Further. in your analysis of the financial covenants, you should consider the effect
of Reed's August 15, 1995 Shareholder's Closing Certificate. As I re<:all, there was significant
reclosing discussion of the Company;s financial condition - including discussion of the effect
of the redemption of Reed's common stock on the Company's equity. I believe you and Reed
will understand that the financial covenants were problematical and that Reed waived technical
covenant defaults in his Closing Certificate.

I

The last page of your April 25 Jetter asserts certain additional defaults. As I indicated
in yesterday's telephone conversation, the Company delivered to Reed. at closing. an executed
letter instructing First Interstaf.e Bank, upon satisfaction of the Company's obligations to the
Bank, to deliver Universe Life Stock Certificate No. 1 to Reed. I am enclosing a copy of that
letter which evidences the Company•s satisfaction of its obligation in this regard.

You are correct that the Company has not established a commissi.ons collateral account
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or entered into a lock box agreement in accordance with the terms of the Security Agreement.
I apologii.e to you and Reed for failing to realize that the lock box agreement with Centennial
did not suftlce. Dan Spickler is preparing a draft agreement for your review. In the meantime,
I am enclosing a draft notice letter to First Interstate Bank to advise it of the existence of Reed's
Security interest in the commission collateral. 1f the letter is acceptable to you and Reed, I will
fax it to the Bank immediately.
Reed has been receiving weekly production reports of AIA 's sales. While these reports
do not include commissions ea.med by ATA, the Company assumed that Reed was receiving the
information he desired to monitor his collateral position. However, Reed is entitled to monthly
oommission statement.~; and the Company will cure this default within the cure period and in the
future will provide monthly statements of commissions earned by AIA's agency subsidiaries in
lieu of production reports.

Your letter asserts that the Company is in default for failing to provide a list of Account
Debtors. Reed's April 18, 1996 letter does not request that infonnation; and, to our knowledge
Reed has not previously requested that information. Reed's April 18, 1996 letter requests
detailed information about the Company's employees and agents matters which have no apparent
relationship to his security interest in Commission Collateral. Further, particularly in view of
recent duwnsizing, the Company has neither the personnel nor the financial resources to
assemble the detailed information requested in the April 18 letter. Nevertheless, the Company
will certainly provide reasonable access to the boob and records from which Reed (or a
designated representative acceptable to the Company) may obtain this information, conditioned
upon receipt of Reed's statement of a proper purpose for his need or use for such information,
his warranty that such information wiJl be used solely for purposes related to his security interest
and his agreement to maintain the confidentiality of that information.
This letter confirms that you and Reed will meet with the Company and its counsel
beginning Monday morning. May 6, 1996, to discuss these issues.

~;Richard A, Riley
RAR/11
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RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
CAivfPBELL. BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, WA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111

FEB 19 2010
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By J. RANDALL
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868
Plaintiff,
v.

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
ROBERT M. TURNBOW, an individual; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho

PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S CROSS
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDG~MENT
AGAINST DEFE~DANTS RILEY,
TURNBOW, EBERLE BERLN AND
HAWLEY TROXELL
Oral Argument Requested

corporation;
Defendants.
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, by and through his attorneys of record, Campbell, Bissell &

Kirby, PLLC, moves for cross sum.mm)' judgment against the Defendants in this action pursuant
to l.R.C.P. 56. Plaintiff's Memorandums of Law in Support of his Cross Motions for Summary
Judgment are the same Memorandums of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment.
111

DATED this 18 day of February, 20 I 0.

CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC

By:

~~----j<--+;''f-~~~~~~~

Roderic
ncl
Attorneys for laintiff Reed J. Taylor

REED TAYLOR'S CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGlv1E1".T - 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVJCE
I certify that on the date indicated below, I caused to be served tmc and correct copies of
the foregoing document to the follov.1ng parties:

Via:
Jack S. Gjording
Julianne S. Hall
Gjording & Fouser, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax: (208) 336-9177

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( )
( )
(X)
(X)

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
Elam & Burke, PA
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83 704
Fax: (208) 384-5844

( )
( )
( )
(X)
(X)

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight rvfail
Facsimile
Email (pdf anachment)

Signed this 18" day ofFcbruary, 2010, at Lewi~

Roderic~

nd
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FEB 19 2010
RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, WA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111

J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By J. RANDALL
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA.
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868
Plaintiff,
v.

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
ROBERT M. TURNBOW, an individual; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S
STATEMENT OF FACTS IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANTS RILEY, HAWLEY
TROXELL, TURNBOW AND EBERLE
BERLIN'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN SUPPORT OF CROSS
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Defendants.
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor'') submits the following Statement of Facts in
Opposition to Defendants Richard A. Riley ("Riley"), Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP's
("Hawley Troxell"), Robert M. Turnbow ("Turnbow") and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &
McKlveen, Chartered's ("Eberle Berlin") Motions for Summary Judgment and in Support of
Reed Taylor's Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, specifically, for the Court to strike the
defendants' affirmative defenses asserted in their Motions for Summary Judgment and for

REED TAYLOR'S STATEMENT OF FACTS IN OPPOSITIONTO DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN SUPPORT OF CROSS MOTIONS - 1
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judgment as a matter of law in Reed Taylor's favor on all issues presented. 1
I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Reed Taylor had little knowledge of the financial and legal affairs of AJA Services

Reed Taylor is 73-years-old, founded AIA in 1969, and has worked hard his entire life in
preparation for his retirement. (Affidavit of Reed J. Taylor dated February 2, 2010 ("2/2/10
Taylor Aff."), iJl 6.)

Reed Taylor later testified regarding his undisputed inferior knowledge of

the financial and legal affairs of AIA Services and his role at AIA Services:
I was responsible for sales and R. John Taylor ("John Taylor") was responsible for the
finances and legal aspects for AIA Services and its subsidiaries. In fact, when John
Taylor first joined AIA Insurance in 1976, he was hired to run the office for me and
handle financial and legal issues. I have little knowledge of financial issues. accounting
and legal matter[s] and have always relied upon others (specifically John Taylor) for
these areas of operation.
(Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond dated February 17, 2010 ("2/17/10 Bond Aff."), Ex. 21, iJ2
(emphasis added.)) This testimony is corroborated by Scott Bell in his sworn testimony:
I also learned that R. John Taylor, as President, held extensive knowledge of the financial
affairs of AIA Services· Corporation and its subsidiaries, while ·Reed Taylor held
relatively little knowledge in accounting, law or the financial affairs of the
company ...
(Id., Ex. 22, iJ4 (emphasis added).)

On July 18, 1995 (before the redemption agreements were

executed), Reed Taylor was elected to serve as C.E.O. and Chairman of the Board of AIA
Services, while John Taylor was elected President. (2/2/10 Taylor Aff., Ex. C, p. 2.) Notably,
under AIA Services' Restated Bylaws, the President is the "principal executive officer of the
corporation" and "shall, when present, preside at all meeting of the stockholders and Board of
Directors." (2/17/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 25, p. 13, iJ5.2(b).) Even more noteworthy is the fact that

1

These Statement of Facts are all incorporated by reference into each and every argument asserted by Reed Taylor
in his Responses in Opposition to Riley, Hawley Troxell, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's Motions for Summary
Judgment and his Cross Motions.

REED TAYLOR'S STATEMENT OF FACTS IN OPPOSITIONTO DEFENDANTS'
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Reed Taylor, as C.E.O., has no defined powers and appears to be no more than an honorary title.2
(2/17110 Bond Aff., Ex. 25, p. 13,iJ5.2.)

B. AJA Services' other shareholders and investors solicited Reed Tavlor to sell his shares
In 1995, other shareholders and investors solicited Reed Taylor to have his majority
interest of the common shares in AIA Services redeemed so that they could attempt to take the
company public. (Id., Ex. 22, iJiJ 4 and 6; 2/2/10 Taylor Aff., iJ9; 2/17/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 21, iJ3.)
Scott Bell confirmed that Reed Taylor had been solicited to sell his shares:
R. John Taylor and the other investors suggested the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares
as a means to achieve their objectives. Although Reed Taylor was initially resistant to a
redemption of his shares, he ultimately became willing to do so. At no point did he force
AIA Services ... through his majority vote or otherwise, to effectuate a preferential
redemption of his shares over other shareholders. In addition, as noted above, AIA
Services Corporation established a special committee of its board of directors to negotiate
and approve the redemption terms to prevent any potential conflicts of interest.

(2/17/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 22, iJ 6.) It is undisputed that Reed Taylor had inferior knowledge. (Id.)
C. Negotiations and shareholder meeting pertaining to the redemption agreements

On January 12, 1995, AIA Services Corporation ("AIA Services") held a special board
meeting to discuss various matters, including the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. (2/2110
Taylor Aff., Ex. C, p. 9.) Reed Taylor attended this meeting in person, while Mr. Riley and Mr.
Turnbow attended via telephone providing significant representations:
Mr. Riley also advised that prior to the sale of any securities, the law firm of Eberle
Berlin, et al. must give an opinion that all acts have been performed in accordance with
the law. Mr. Green requested confirmation that the opinion would not be given
unless it was true, and Mr. Riley confirmed that fact.
(Id (emphasis added).) On February 9, 1995, AIA Services sent a Notice of Special Meeting of

Shareholders to be held at Eberle Berlin's offices for the purpose of considering and voting on

2

The defendants disingenuously assert that Reed Taylor was the President of AIA Services, yet his position as
C.E.O., coupled with the provisions of AIA Services' Restated Bylaws, prove he had no power at all in terms of the
management of the corporation's financial and legal affairs. (Id.; see also 2111110 Bond Aff., Ex. 21-22.)
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certain transactions, including the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. (2/2/10 Taylor Aff., Ex.
C, p. 7.) No mention was made regarding obtaining shareholder approval to invade capital
surplus to redeem Reed Taylor's shares. (Id.)
On March 7, 1995, AIA Services held a special shareholder meeting and the shareholders
approved the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares by a vote of 926,698.07 shares in favor and
6,688.09 shares against. (2/2/10 Taylor Aff., Ex. C, pp. 5-6.) At this meeting the shareholders
discussed "going public" which Reed Taylor testified was the reason for redeeming his shares.
(Id.,

~9

and Ex. C, p. 6.) On July 18, 1995, AIA Services held a Board of Directors Meeting to

approve numerous transactions and the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. (Id., Ex. C, pp. 14.) Mr. Riley was at this meeting and again the issue oflegality was raised:
The legality of the Disclosure Statement to Shareholders was discussed. Dan
Spickler, General Counsel, and Mr. Riley on behalf of his law firm, both stated they
believed it met or exceeded the legal requirements.
(Id. at p. 2 (emphasis added).) Reed Taylor was present at this meeting and relied upon Mr.

Riley's representations at this and other board meetings. (Id.; 212110 Taylor Aff., ~8.)
D. The redemption agreements are signed and the Opinion Letter delivered to Reed Taylor

On July 22, 1995, Reed Taylor and AIA Services executed the Stock Redemption
Agreement. (Affidavit of Richard A. Riley dated November 24, 2009 ("11124/09 Riley Aff."),
Ex. A.)

In order to persuade Reed Taylor to sell his shares, AIA Services agreed to grant him

security iriterests in all of the receivables in AIA Services and its operating subsidiaries, as well
as all of the shares of its operating subsidiaries. (Id.; 2117110 Bond Aff., Ex. 1-2.) In addition to
other significant creditor rights, Reed Taylor was given the right to vote the shares of AIA
Services' operating subsidiaries and/or to transfer the shares to himself upon default. (2/17/10
Bond Aff., Ex. 1, p. 4, §§5-6.) AIA Services also granted him an irrevocable power-of-attorney,
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coupled with an interest, in order for him to exercise his right to self-help. (2/17 /10 Bond Aff.,
Ex. 1, p. 8, §11.2.)

As a condition of Reed Taylor's obligation to close the redemption of his

shares under the terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement, Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin
were required to deliver him an opinion in an acceptable form. (11124/09 Riley Aff., Ex. A, p. 4,
§2.4(j).) On August 16, 1995, the form of Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's opinion letter was
finally approved by Reed Taylor. (2/2/10 Taylor Aff., Ex. B.) The final opinion letter was
approved by a committee at Eberle Berlin (2/2/10 Taylor Aff.,

~6.),

was dated August 15, 1995

("Opinion Letter"), and was signed and delivered to Reed Taylor on or about August 17, 1995.
(2/2/10 Taylor Aff., Ex. A-B.) The Opinion Letter was drafted expressly for Reed Taylor to rely
upon:
[t]his opinion is furnished by us solely for your benefit for use in connection with the
Transaction Documents3 and the transactions contemplated thereby; and it may not
be furnished or quoted to, or relied upon, by any other person.

(2/2/10 Taylor Aff., Ex. A, p. 5 (emphasis added).) The Opinion Letter makes clear that Riley,
Turnbow and Eberle Berlin were all responsible and they all provided material representations:
Whenever our opinion with respect to the existence or absence of facts is indicated to be
based on our knowledge, we are referring to the actual knowledge of R.M. Turnbow
and Richard A. Riley, who are the sole attorneys at Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &
KcKlveen, Chartered who have represented the Company during the course of our
representation in this transaction.
The Company and its Subsidiaries have full corporate power and authority to enter into,
execute and deliver the Transaction Documents and to perform their respective
obligations thereunder; all corporate action on the part of Company and its
Subsidiaries, and their respective directors and shareholders, necessary for the
authorization, execution, delivery and performance by Company and its
Subsidiaries of the Transaction Documents and the consummation of the
transactions contemplated thereby has been taken; and the Transaction Documents
have been duly executed and delivered by Company and its subsidiaries.
(Id., p. 2 (emphasis added).)
3

"Transaction Documents" is defined as the Stock Redemption Agreement, $6 Million Promissory Note and
ancillary documents related to the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. (2/2/10 Taylor Aff., Ex. A, p. 1.)
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... to the best of our knowledge [Riley and Turnbow], [the redemption does not] violate
any law, rule, license, regulation, judgment. ..

No consent, authorization, approval or exemption by, or filing with. any Person or
any Governmental Authority is required in connection with the execution, delivery
and performance by Company and its Subsidiaries of the Transaction Documents,
or the taking of any action contemplated thereby, except such as have been obtained
prior to Closing ...
Upon delivery of the certificates representing the Pledged Shares of AIAI and Farmers to
Shareholder at Closing, Shareholder shall have at Closing a perfected first priority

security interest in such Pledged Sharers ...
(2/2/10 Taylor Aff., Ex. A, p. 3 (emphasis added).)
The foregoing opinions are limited to the laws ... of the State ofldaho ...

(lJn the event the Company or any of its Subsidiaries does not comply with the
material terms of the Transaction Documents. Mr. Taylor may exercise remedies
that would normally be available under Idaho law to a secured party provided Idaho
law applies and Mr. Taylor proceeds in accordance with such law.
(Id., p. 4 (emphasis added).) The Opinion Letter does not state that Reed Taylor or his interests
were not being represented by Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin, nor does the Opinion Letter
state that they have never represented Reed Taylor. (Id.) As a result of being provided the
Opinion Letter, the transaction was closed to redeem Reed Taylor's shares in August 1995.
(2/2/10 Taylor Aff., iJ6.)

E. Riley and Eberle Berlin were Reed Tar/or's long-standing personal attorneys
Reed Taylor had a long standing attorney-client relationship with Riley and Eberle
Berlin, which began in the 1980s.

(Id., iJ4.)

Riley and Eberle Berlin were Reed Taylor's

personal divorce attorneys from the 1980's through the 1990's and assisted him in restructuring
AIA Services through the contribution of significant personal assets to the company. (Id.) Riley
and Eberle Berlin also acted as counsel for Reed Taylor for another company. (Id.) Although
Reed Taylor retained separate counsel for purposes of negotiating and finalizing the terms of the
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Stock Redemption Agreement and ancillary agreements, Reed Taylor relied upon Riley,
Turnbow and Eberle Berlin to ensure the redemption was properly completed in accordance with
applicable laws. (2/2110 Taylor Aff., ~3.) Scott Bell had no involvement in the representation of
AIA Services. (Id.) To the contrary, Riley and Eberle Berlin were also Reed Taylor's personal
attorneys in 1995. (Id.) Reed Taylor, as both a shareholder and individual client to Riley and
Eberle Berlin, trusted and relied upon them to ensure compliance with corporate formalities,
obtain necessary shareholder consents and to comply with all laws. (Id., ~~3, 7 and 10.)
When I agreed to sell my shares, I relied upon ... Richard Riley and Eberle Berlin's
representations that the redemption of my shares in 1995 was a legal transaction and that
AIA Services had the power and authority to redeem my shares. I would never have sold
my shares but for the representations made by ... Richard Riley and Eberle Berlin that the
redemption was legal.
(2117110 Bond Aff., Ex. 21,

~~

3- 4 (emphasis added).) Significantly, the Stock Redemption

Agreement does not contain any provisions stating that Mr. Riley and Eberle Berlin were not
representing Reed Taylor and no waivers of any kind. (11124/09 Riley Aff., Ex. A; 2/17/10
Bond Aff., Ex. 1-2.)

F. Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow were responsible for the legality of the redemption
The terms and conditions set forth in the Stock Redemption Agreement clearly
demonstrate that Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's legal representation was to ensure that the
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares constituted legal and enforceable agreements enforceable
under the law against all parties to the agreements. (11124/09 Riley Aff., Ex. A-C.) These facts
and Reed Taylor's reliance upon Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin are further corroborated by
Reed Taylor's testimony. (2/2/10 Taylor Aff.,

~~5-7,

9-10.)

Scott Bell was the attorney hired

by Reed Taylor to negotiate the redemption terms, draft agreements and close the redemption
transaction. (2/17/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 22, ~4.) Mr. Bell was not hired to act as general counsel for
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AIA Services, rather, that job was left with Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin. (2/17/10 Bond
Aff., Ex. 22, iJ4; 2/2/10 Taylor Aff., iJiJ3- 7.) Mr. Bell later testified regarding the Opinion Letter:
During the course of my firm's representation of Reed Taylor. my firm determined that.
as a condition to the redemption. AIA Services Comoration's outside counsel should
deliver to Reed Taylor a written legal opinion regarding certain legal matters surrounding
the redemption. Reed Taylor agreed with this assessment.
(2/17/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 22, iJ8 (emphasis added).)
The requirement of obtaining an opinion letter for the redemption of Reed Taylor's
shares was adhered to by my firm and not waived by Reed Taylor. .. If the opinion letter
had not been provided to Reed Taylor, my firm would have advised Reed Taylor not
to close any transaction involving the redemption of his shares .... Reed Taylor relied
on the opinion letter as a necessary condition to closing the redemption of his shares.

(Id. at iJIO (emphasis added).) Mr. Bell, who was not licensed to practice law in Idaho, testified
as to Riley and Eberle Berlin's material representation and legal services provided for the
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares:
Eberle, Berlin was in a position to analyze whether, with respect to AIA Services
Corporation, the transactions were authorized, complied with applicable law;
triggered. complications with third parties, etc. Without access to confidential books,
· records and proceedings of AIA Services Corporation, and not being a licensed Idaho
lawyer, my firm was not in a position to make these determinations ... Richard Riley
was extremely well-versed in the legal, financial and operational affairs of AIA Services
Corporation as a result of his long-standing relationship with the company.
(Id. at iJ8 (emphasis added).)

At no time did Richard Riley ... advise me or my firm that AIA Services Corporation
had insufficient earned surplus and/or capital surplus to redeem Reed Taylor's
shares or that the transaction to redeem Reed Taylor's shares would constitute a
violation of any statute or law in Idaho, including, I.C. § 30-1-6. In fact, Eberle,
Berlin's opinion letter affirmatively rejects the notion that the redemption agreements
were illegal or violated Idaho law.
(Id. at iJ8 (emphasis in original and added.))

Had I or my firm been advised by Richard Riley or any other party that the redemption of
Reed Taylor's shares would violate any laws or statutes in Idaho, or even that the risk
existed, my firm would have advised Reed Taylor not to enter into the redemption
agreements or to close the transaction. Neither Reed Taylor nor my firm had any
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knowledge that there were any issues present that could affect the legality or
enforceability of the redemption.
I am perplexed as to why Richard Riley's new firm, Hawley Troxell, et al., would assert
arguments that contradict the terms of the opinion letter drafted when he was at Eberle
Berlin.
(2/17/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 22, iJiJl l-12 (emphasis added).)

G. The 1996 defaults of the redemption agreements and subsequent restructure
On April 18, 1996 (months after the redemption agreements were executed and the

transaction closed), Reed Taylor notified AIA Services that it was in default of various
provisions of the redemption agreements. (11124/09 Riley Aff., Ex. D.) On April 22, 1996, AIA
Services responded to Reed Taylor's default letter. (2/17/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 26.) Other than to
rebut Reed Taylor's asserted defaults, AIA Services makes no mention nor addresses the fact
that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares was illegal or violated Idaho law in any manner.
(Id.) On April 25, 1996, Scott Bell responded and asserted more defaults and expanded on the

nature of the defaults. (11124/09 Riley Aff., Ex. E.) On May 3, 1996, Richard Riley responded
to Scott Bell's letter addressing the asserted defaults and attempted to persuade him that AIA
Services was not in default. (2/17/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 27.) Richard Riley, knowing that AIA
Services was in default and having provided the Opinion Letter to Reed Taylor, makes no
mention or advises of the possibility that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares was illegal or
violated Idaho law. (/d.) As demonstrated by the foregoing letters, there was no evidence
presented or arguments asserted that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares was illegal or that
he should be placed on notice of the illegality issue. (11124/09 Riley Aff., Ex. D-E; 2117/10
Bond Aff., Ex. 26-27.) In fact, Reed Taylor's default letters and the response letter from Richard
Riley and AIA Services supports the argument that they may have concealed facts from Reed
Taylor regarding the legality of the transaction. (Id.)
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Instead, on July 1, 1996, AIA Services and Reed Taylor entered into the Stock
Redemption Restructure Agreement, Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement, and
Amended and Restated Security Agreement. (11124/09 Riley Aff., Ex. F; 2/17/10 Bond Aff., Ex.
3-5.) Although certain provisions were modified in the agreements, the Opinion Letter was not
withdrawn nor did Reed Taylor agree that the Opinion Letter was no longer in force and effect as
it was not included as one of the "Superseded Documents". (Id.) Instead, the security interests
granted to Reed Taylor in the original redemption agreements remained in full force and effect,
including, without limitation, Reed Taylor's self-help contractual right to irrevocably vote the
shares of all of AIA Services' operating subsidiaries (2/17/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 3, p. 7, §6 and p.
11, § 11.2.), to transfer the shares of AIA Services' operating subsidiaries to himself (Id., pp. 7-9
and Ex. 4.) and to seize all of the corporations' receivables. 4 (Id., Ex. 5, pp. 2-3, §§1-6.)
H. Riley joins Hawley Troxell and later confirms his relationship with Reed Taylor
On March 1, 1999, Riley joined Hawley Troxell. (11124/09 Riley Aff., if3.) However,
Riley's attorney-client relationship with Reed Taylor remained intact and was also confirmed in
the early 2000's when Riley requested and obtained a conflict waiver from Reed Taylor to draft
lending documents for the lender of his airplane. (2/2/10 Taylor Aff., if15.) Even though Riley
admits that he had an attorney-client relationship with Reed Taylor for many years, he would not
directly answer this request for admission:
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6: Admit that neither Eberle Berlin nor Richard A.
Riley has ever provided Reed Taylor with a letter terminating any attorney-client
relationship.
RESPONSE: [After asserting objections] Subject to and without waiver of these
objections, and for the reasons stated herein, Riley is not able to admit or deny this
Request as framed.

4

These are the security interests which were the basis for Reed Taylor's Complaints against Hawley Troxell and
Clements Brown on August 18, 2008. ( 11/24/09 Riley Aff., Ex. G-H.)
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(1121110 Bond Aff., Ex. B, p. 8 (emphasis in original).) It is noteworthy that Riley would not
directly answer this Request for Admission, yet he had Reed Taylor sign a conflict waiver
several years ago after he joined Hawley Troxell. (2/2/10 Taylor Aff., iJl 5.)

L Reed Taylor files suit on his $6M Note and obtains partial summary judgment
AIA Services continued to make payments to Reed Taylor on his $6M Note and
ultimately paid off his $1.5M Down Payment Note. (2/17110 Bond Aff., Ex. 6.) However, on
December 12, 2006, Reed Taylor provided notice of default to AIA Services. (12/3/09 Babbitt
Aff., Ex. E, p. 11, iJ2.27.) On August 1, 2005, the $6M Note matured and was due in full,
although AIA Services continued making payments. (Id.; 11124/09 Riley Aff., Ex. B.) On
January 29? 2007, Reed Taylor filed suit against AIA Services and others for the non-payment of
a $6 Million Promissory Note and various other contract claims and torts based upon officers and
directors unlawfully transferring millions of dollars out of the corporations for their own benefit

("Taylor v. AJA Services. et al."), however, over time the extent of the fraud upon the
corporations continued to grow. (11110/09 Bond Aff., iJiJ2-3; see also Affidavit of Gary Babbitt
dated December 3, 2009 ("12/3/09 Babbitt Aff.", Ex. E; 11/24/09 Riley Aff., Ex. G-1.)
On February 22, 2007, Reed Taylor, in accordance with I.C. §§ 30-1-704 and 30-1722( 4), exercised the irrevocable power-of-attorney granted to him in the Amended and Restated
Stock Pledge Agreement and voted the shares of AIA Insurance appointing himself as the sole
director thereby removing the directors and officers guilty of the mismanagement of the
corporation. 5 (2/17/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 3, p. 7, §6 and p. 11, § 11.2 and Ex. 7.) On May 22, 2007,
AIA Services, by and through Hawley Troxell, argued that Reed Taylor's unjust enrichment
5
The defendants attempt to portray Reed Taylor's vote of the shares to replace management and change the locks on
the doors of AIA Insurance's offices as an "illegal act," however, such a position is without merit as AIA Services
irrevocably granted him this right and he duly exercised it. Indeed, AIA Services even granted him the right to
transfer all of the shares of AIA Services' operating entities without the necessity of seeking court approval. See
e.g., Hawley Troxell and Riley's Memo, p. 5 and note 5. (2/17 /10 Bond Aff., Ex. 4-5.)
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claim should be dismissed since he had valid contract remedies:
Second, Plaintiff is precluded from bringing an unjust enrichment cause of action because
Plaintiff alleges that there is a valid contract between the parties governing the
Defendants' obligations to Plaintiff... Just like in Wilhelm, various agreements govern the
rights of the respective parties in this action, and a claim for unjust enrichment is,
therefore, precluded.
(2/17/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 8, p. 19.) As a result, the district court dismissed Reed Taylor's unjust
enrichment cause of action. (2/17/10 Bond Aff., iJ9.)
On November 15, 2007, Reed Taylor moved for partial summary judgment on AIA
Services' default of the $6M Note and the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement.
(2117/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 9.) AIA Services responded by asserting that Reed Taylor had agreed to
orally modify the terms of the $6M Note, as well as other defenses. (Id., Ex. 10.) In its
Introduction, AIA Services asserted "AIA Services Corporation is not in default of the Note
because the Note was modified by the parties in March of 2003, and AIA Services [is] in
compliance of the modification." (Id. at p. 2.) On February 8, 2008, the district court granted
Reed Taylor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (2/17 /10 Bond Aff., Ex. 11.)
On March 7, 2008, AIA Services filed its Amended Answer asserting various new
defenses, none of which pertained to the alleged illegality of the redemption agreements. 6 (Id.,
Ex. 12.) At this same time, AIA Services moved for reconsideration of the partial summary
judgment granted to Reed Taylor on the defaults of the $6M Note and Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement7, however, that motion was denied by the court and it granted AIA Services' Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal. (Id., Ex. 13, p. 22.) On May 22, 2008, AIA Services filed a Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal with the Idaho Supreme Court based upon waiver, oral modification and
other defenses to the defaults of the $6M Note, however, that motion was denied by the Idaho
6

This Answer remains AJA Services' Answer in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al.
AJA Services asserted yet additional waiver, modification and other defenses based upon John Taylor's
inconsistent testimony. (2117/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 9-11and13.)

7
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Supreme Court. (2117110 Bond Aff., Ex. 14-15.)

J. The illegality issue in raised for the first time in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al.
On April 16, 2008, after almost fifteen months after Reed Taylor filed his Complaint in
Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., Connie Taylor and James Beck first asserted that the redemption of
Reed Taylor's shares was illegal. (12103109 Babbitt Aff., Ex. F-H.) In early 2009, Hawley
Troxell successfully obtained a stay in discovery in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., thereby
thwarting any attempts to depose Riley or others about the Opinion Letter. (212110 Taylor Aff.,
iflO; 11110109 Bond Aff., if9.) On February 12, 2009, Connie Taylor and James Beck filed a
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment asserting the redemption of Reed
Taylor's shares violated LC.§ 30-1-6 (1995) and, consequently, that the redemption agreements
were illegal and unenforceable. (11110109 Bond Aff., Ex. B; 1213109 Babbitt Aff., Ex. G.) On
February 12, 2009, AIA, through Hawley Troxell and with the assistance of Riley, filed its own
Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares was illegal
and also incorporated by reference Connie Taylor and James Beck's Memorandum. (11/10109
Bond Aff., Ex. E; 212110 Taylor Aff., irill0-11; 11124 Riley Aff., if 10.) On February 23, 2009,
AIA, through Hawley Troxell and with the assistance of Riley, filed a Joinder to Connie Taylor
and James Beck's Motion for Summary Judgment. 8 (11110109 Bond Aff. Ex. C; 212110 Taylor
Aff., ififl0-11; 11124109 Riley Aff., iflO.)

Despite Riley's former legal representations to AIA

Services and Reed Taylor, he assisted in the litigation and refused to be deposed or otherwise
disclose facts relative to his Opinion Letter and prior legal representation in the parties in 1995.
(212110 Taylor Aff., ififl0-11; 11110109 Bond Aff., ifif9-l 1.)

Ill

8

AIA's Joinder indicates that it was signed on February 2, 2009, but it was not served until February 23, 2009.
(11/10/09 Bond Aff., Ex. C, pp. 2-3.)
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K. Reed Taylor files suit against Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown for unrelated claims
After obtaining partial summary judgment confirming the defaults (2/17II 0 Bond Aff.,
Ex. 9, 11 and 13.), Reed Taylor filed suit against Hawley Troxell, Clements Brown and certain
of their attorneys for conversion, breach of fiduciary duties, malpractice and the conspiracy and
aiding and abetting of the foregoing torts. 9 (11124/09 Riley Aff., Ex. G-H.) In the case of
Hawley Troxell, they had also assisted the insiders of AIA Services to have its subsidiary
guaranty loans for CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. ("CropUSA") and cover up millions of
dollars of funds and assets unlawfully transferred to CropUSA from AJA Services and its wholly
owned subsidiary AJA Insurance. (Id., Ex.Gans I; 2/2/10 Taylor Aff, Ex. E-F.)
Although Reed Taylor asserted that Hawley Troxell and Riley were making arguments
against Riley's Opinion Letter10 , Reed Taylor never asserted in his Complaint or Proposed
Amended Complaint that the redemption agreements were illegal and that Riley had
misrepresented facts surrounded the Opinion Letter, which would be required elements of any
causes of action pertaining to the illegality of the redemption agreements. ( 11 /24/09 Riley Aff.,
Ex. G and I.) For example, in his Complaint, Reed Taylor asserted:
Defendants were responsible for issuing opinion letters relating to the transaction, which
include various applicable representations and warranties. Defendants are now asserting
arguments counter to the representations made in the opinion letter drafted by Defendants
by and through Defendant Richard A. Riley.
(11124/09 Riley Aff., Ex. G, p. 22, iJ53.) Defendants now assert that this was a cause of action

on the legality issue simply based on the contents of one paragraph of a Complaint, when the
9

See e.g., Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers § 56 cmt. E (2009) ("A lawyer is liable for
conversion and trespass to chattels on the same basis as a nonlawyer."); Restatement {Third) of The Law Governing
Lawyers § 44 cmt. G (2009) {"Thus, if a third person claims that property stolen from that person has been used by
the client to pay the lawyer's fee, the lawyer's right to keep the payment depends on the law generally applicable to
transfers of stolen property.")
10
All of Reed Taylor's arguments in this action for acts and/or omissions taken by Riley and others against the
Opinion Letter occurred after Reed Taylor's first lawsuit against Hawley Troxell was dismissed on December 23,
2008. (11/24/09 Riley Aff., Ex. J.) Thus, even if identical, the present claims are new and distinct causes of action.
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Complaint contains 72 paragraphs. (11/24/09 Riley Aff., Ex. G, p. 22,

~53.)

This paragraph

simply asserts that Riley is assisting the other defendants in Taylor v. AJA Services to breach
their duties and obligations by preventing Reed Taylor from obtaining possession of his
collateral, not that the redemption was illegal and that Riley was liable for that claim. (See
Complaint.) Similarly, Reed Taylor's proposed First Amended Complaint asserted:
As a former attorney for Reed Taylor and the attorney who provided an opinion letter to
Reed Taylor, defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by and though the opinion
letter that was based upon Riley's personal knowledge (representing such facts as the
transactions being fully legal and authorized by the corporations), 11 which further invokes
personal liability to Riley. Reed Taylor had a right to rely on Riley's representations and
justifiably relied on such representations. Riley breached his duties when he asserted that ·
the transaction was illegal. Although Reed Taylor believes the transaction was legal
and supported by applicable law, Riley's actions have breached his duties to Reed
Taylor and caused Reed Taylor to incur damages from the payments of attorneys'
fees and costs and lost possession of property and funds because of AIA Insurance
being wrongfully withheld from Reed Taylor. As a result of Riley's acts and/or
omissions (which constitute fraud), Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount to be
proven at trial or on summary judgment.
(11/24/09 Riley Aff., Ex. I, pp. 33-34,

~

92 (emphasis added).) This paragraph alleges facts that

· Riley was assisting the defendants in preventing Reed Taylor from exercising his contractual
rights to possess and operate AJA Insurance and does not state or imply a cause of action based
upon the Opinion Letter or any other claim pertaining to the illegality of the redemption of Reed
Taylor's shares. (Id.; see also Complaint.) In fact, the paragraph (one paragraph out of 129
paragraphs in the Complaint) affirmatively rejects the notion that the redemption agreements
were illegal or that the cause of action had accrued. (Id.) The allegations pied in Reed Taylor's
Complaint and proposed Amended Complaints were not causes of action for fraud based upon
the Opinion Letter, as those causes of action were not pied and could not have been pied until
June 17, 2009, which was well after the district court granted Hawley Troxell's Motion to
11

The Opinion Letter expressly stated that Reed Taylor had perfected security interests in the shares of AIA
Insurance, the redemption agreements were enforceable as to their terms, and that he had rights to take legal action
as a secured creditor under Idaho law. (2/2110 Taylor Aff., Ex. A.)
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Dismiss in the first action on December 23, 2008. (11/24/09 Riley Aff., Ex. J.) Moreover, the
district court never even addressed that issue, nor did Hawley Troxell in its Motion to Dismiss.
(Id.; 2117110 Bond Aff., Ex. 16-17.) Reed Taylor did not, and could not, have asserted the

redemption agreements were illegal in his first action against Hawley Troxell as there had not
been a finding of illegality nor could have there been a finding of illegality in that action. (Id.)
On September 10, 2008, Hawley Troxell moved to dismiss Reed Taylor's action. (2/17/10 Bond
Aff., Ex. 16.) In the Introduction to its Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, as was
the theme throughout its Memorandum, Hawley Troxell asserted:

This case presents the unusual issue of whether one party may sue another party's
attorney for decisions made during the course of litigation or for alleged
malpractice ...
In vague and conclusory terms, the complaint in the present action attempts to
assert claims against HTEH for malpractice or wrongful conduct arising out of the
defense of their-clients in the Underlying Litigation or related matters. Reed Taylor
has also filed separate but substantially similar lawsuits against counsel who have
appeared in behalf of other defendants in the Underlying Litigation.
If· the present lawsuit and the companion lawsuits against ·defense counsel are not
dismissed, defense counsel may be required to withdraw from representing their
respective clients in the Underlying Litigation after nearly a year and a half of
proceedings.

(2/17/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 16, pp. 2-3 (emphasis added).) Hawley Troxell's Conclusion also
demonstrates that this action and the dismissed action have virtually nothing in common:
The complaint fails to state a cognizable claim. The plaintiffs cause of action for aiding
and abetting does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted because he fails to
allege any facts that, if true, would establish that HTEH owed any duty to him or that he
has any standing to sue HTEH directly. His claims of civil conspiracy and intentional
interference with contract also fail, because, as a matter of law, an agent, such as an
attorney, is incapable of conspiring with his principal or interfering with the principal' s
contract. His claim under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act fails as a matter of law
because he does not allege he has purchased any goods or services from HTEH. His
claim for conversion is legally deficient because he fails to allege any specific chattel of
which he was wrongfully dispossessed by HTEH. He fails to allege any facts which
would show that he is in privity with HTEH or has any standing to sue that firm or its
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attorneys for malpractice. Finally, plaintiffs complaint is deficient because the actions of
HTEH in connection with the Underlying Litigation are protected by the litigation
privilege.
(2/17/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 16, pp. 32-33.) Hawley Troxell and Riley's Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Dismiss, their Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, and their Memorandum In
Opposition to Motion to Amend Complaint unequivocally prove that this action has no
resemblance whatsoever to the action that was erroneously dismissed. (2/17110 Bond Aff., Ex.
16-18.) Hawley Troxell asserted the same arguments opposing Reed Taylor's Motion to Amend:
Plaintiffs proposed amended complaint alleging direct claims suffers from the same
legal deficiencies as the original complaint. Insofar as plaintiffs proposed amended
complaint alleges derivative claims, these also fail as a matter oflaw.
(2/17110 Bond Aff., Ex. 18, p. 2.) There are no similarities between this action and the prior
action, as confirmed by Mr. LaRue at oral argument on Hawley Troxell's Motion to Dismiss:
(Mr. LaRue): May it please the Court, I'm representing Hawley Troxell on their Motion
to Dismiss. This case presents the question of whether a plaintiff may
sue his adversary's attorneys for decisions made by those attorneys in
the course of defending their clients. 12
(2/17/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 19, p. 8, 11. 16-20 (emphasis added).)
(Mr. LaRue): As long as the malpractice cases exist against the law firms defending

Plaintiffs adversaries, the lawyers are put in that position in the
representation of their clients in the underlying case.
(Id., Ex. 19, p. 9, 11. 21-24.)
(Mr. LaRue): There are two systematic deficiencies in Plaintiffs Complaint: One is

standing, 13 and the other is litigation privileges. And they run
throughout the four or five causes of action enumerated in the
Complaint. 14
12

It is noteworthy that RPC 13(b) mandates that an attorney representing an organization proceed "in the best
interest of the organization." This requirement was clearly not met when Hawley Troxell elected to represent the
interests of the insiders accused of fraud, conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and related torts, instead of
proceeding in the manner best suited for AIA Services. (11/24/09 Riley Aff., Ex. G and I.)
13
As discussed in Reed Taylor's Memorandum of Law, a finding of lack of standing does not and cannot be the
basis for res judicata, even assuming the facts and claims in the two actions were identical.
14
Standing and litigation privilege are inapplicable to this action, to the extent that the Idaho Supreme Court adopts
the litigation privilege in the pending appeal on the first cause against Hawley Troxell.
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•
(2/17110 Bond Aff., Ex. 19, p. 11, 11. 12-15.) Then, Mr. LaRue stated the eight reasons Reed
Taylor's Complaint should be dismissed in the first action, none of which are based upon the
same facts or causes of action, as pied, presently before this court:
(Mr. LaRue ): An attorney clearly owes a duty to his client, but a plaintiff should have no
standing to object to the means and method by which that attorney defends
his adversaries.

Eight separate categories are listed. The first is as a stock pledge of
[AIAJ Insurance he claims that he may bring a direct action against
Hawley Troxell for his interest in the stock and for their apparent
failure to preserve that interest ...

The second is he claims to be entitled to become the sole shareholder
of [AIAJ Insurance.
(2117110 Bond Aff., Ex. 19, p. 11, 11. 20-25, p. 12, 11. 1-2 and 11-12 (emphasis added).)
(Mr. LaRue): The third and fourth categories are as a secured creditor and he's a
creditor. And he claims as a secured creditor that [AIA] Services has
made an unauthorized disposition of collateral and wants to sue the
attorneys for doing that ...

His fifth and Sixth position are he is the only authorized director and
officer of [AIAJ Insurance16 ...
The seventh position is he is entitled to third partv beneficiary [sic] to
have standing to sue Hawley Troxell .. .I doubt that AIA hired their
counsel to benefit the very person that sued them. They hired their
counsel to defend the claims registered in the underlying lawsuit by
Plaintiff. So third-party beneficiary status cannot be pied or proven.
And the last position is if none of the individual seven alone are
enough, cumulatively they should be.
(Id., p. 13, 11. 7-10, 15-17, and 20-22 (emphasis added).) Mr. LaRue also addressed each cause

15

AIA Insurance is a wholly owned subsidiary of AIA Services and AIA Insurance's shares were all pledged to
Reed Taylor, along with the right to vote the shares and transfer the shares to himself without court intervention.
(2/17/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 3-4.)
16
Under the Restructure Agreement, Reed Taylor was also required to be appointed to the board of AIA Services,
but the defendants refused to do so, even during Hawley Troxell's purported representation. (2/17110 Bond Aff.,
Ex. 3, p. 6, §4.10; 11/24/09 Riley Aff., Ex. G, p. 17, ~38.) Like Reed Taylor, AIA Services, by and through Hawley
Troxell, has also denied Donna Taylor her right to be on the board of directors of AIA Services. (Id.)
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of action, and, as admitted in oral argument, the prior causes of action are entirely different than
those presently before the court. (2/17/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 19, pp. 15-18.) Finally, Mr. LaRue
argued standing was the issue:
(Mr. LaRue): Because in this case, no additional facts are going to change the legal
position that Plaintiff has no standing to sue Hawley Troxell ...
(2/17/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 19, p. 19, 11. 19-21 (emphasis added).) Finally, Mr. Janus (who was the
attorney for Clements Brown) correctly pointed out that:
(Mr. Jannis):

[T]he case[s] [against Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown] are clearly
connected. In fact, the claims made in both of the cases are very similar to
each other. And if one compares the complaints in both cases, most of the
paragraphs in them are word for word identical.

(2/17/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 19, p. 21, 11. 7-11.) This argument isprimafacia proof that the causes of
action presently before the court are not identical to those previously asserted, as Clements
Brown never issued any opinion letters or personally represented Reed Taylor. (11/24/09 Riley
Aff., Ex. H.) In the court's opinion and order, it did not assert that the Motion to Dismiss was
granted with prejudice. (Id., Ex. J.) In addition, the court did not deny Reed Taylor's Motion to
Amend with prejudice. (Id.) That action is presently on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court.
(11/24/09 Riley Aff., ~18.)
Based upon the above and all of the evidence in the record, there are virtually no
similarities between this action and Reed Taylor's first action against Hawley Troxell.

(Compare Complaint; 11124/09 Riley Aff., Ex. G and I.)
L. The district court rules the 1995 redemption agreements were illegal and unenforceable
On June 17, 2009, in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., the district court ruled that the
redemption agreements and $6M Note were illegal and unenforceable contracts.

(12/3/09

Babbitt Aff., Ex. J.) The district court specifically found that the redemption was illegal:
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The Court can reach but one result - the 1995 stock redemption agreement entered
into between Reed Taylor and AIA violated l.C. § 30-1-6 as it existed in 1995 and,
therefore, the contract between the parties is illegal and unenforceable ...
(Id., p. 9 (emphasis added).)

Further, the district court noted that "[t]here is also no reason to

doubt that all parties, including the Plaintiff, sought to benefit from the business agreement." 17
(Id. at p. 13.) The district court concluded:

In 1995, the earned surplus of AIA was in the negative and there has been no evidence
presented to the Court that there was an affirmative vote of the majority of shareholders
that capital surplus could be looked to for the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares.
Therefore, the stock redemption agreement was entered into in violation of Idaho
code, making the agreement illegal and unenforceable. Following the law in Idaho,
the Court must apply the illegality doctrine, denying enforcement of the contract and
leaving the parties where the Court finds them.
(Id. at p. 14 (emphasis added).) Interestingly, the court even addressed the Opinion Letter:

Plaintiff relies heavily on an August 15, 1995 opinion letter from Richard Riley, an
attorney then with the Boise law· firm of Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow and
McKlveen, Chartered, who acted as general counsel for AIA in connection with the stock
redemption agreement between AIA and Reed Taylor. In his letter, attorney Riley
offered the opinion that the stock redemption agreement "did not conflict with or
violate .. .law, rule or regulation" without making specific reference to or discussing LC. §
30-1-6 .. .By this ruling today, the Court finds the attorney opinion incorrect.
(Id. at p. 12, n. 15 (emphasis added).)

On July 8, 2009, Reed Taylor filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the district court's
finding of illegality and unenforceability.

(2/17/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 23.) In his Motion for

Reconsideration, Reed Taylor requested that the court enforce the illegal redemption agreements
based upon the fraud of others against him, as an exception to the illegality doctrine. 18 (2/17I10
Bond Aff., Ex. 23, pp. 19-20, Ex. 24, pp. 8-9.) There was no claim asserted for fraud in Reed
Taylor's Fifth Amended Complaint based upon the illegality of the redemption agreements.
17

This further evidences the fact that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares was intended to benefit all parties and,
consequently, the legal representations provided by Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin was harmonious with Reed
Taylor and AIA Services-that everyone's goal was to ensure the redemption was legal and enforceable.
18
Had Reed Taylor not asserted the fraud exception to the illegality doctrine, the defendants would certainly be
asserting that Reed Taylor failed to mitigate his damages.
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..
(12/3/09 Babbitt Aff., Ex. E, pp. 24-25.) The fraud claims that were specifically based were
based upon corporate malfeasance and mismanagement by the officers, directors and
shareholders of the corporation. (Id.) In fact, Reed Taylor's Fifth Amended Complaint's breach
of contract causes of action were based upon the amended redemption agreements and not the
original redemption agreements.

(Id., Ex. E.)

The district court declined to enforce the

redemption agreements based upon the fraud exception to the illegality doctrine. (Id., Ex. K, p.
6.)

Although the district court declined to enforce the redemption agreements based upon the

fraud exception to the illegality doctrine, Reed Taylor's Sixth Amended Complaint contains
causes of action against other defendants based upon the fraud, and, the decision was made to
sue the defendants in this action separately. (1/21110 Bond Aff., 'if9 and Ex. I.) At the request of
Hawley Troxell and its clients, Reed Taylor's Motion to Amend to file his Sixth Amended
Complaint has not been heard and the Complaint has not been filed and that action is now stayed
·as a result of the appeal Reed Taylor is pursing in that action. (Id.)
On September 4, 2009, the court entered a judgment dismissing the majority of Reed
Taylor's causes of action, including all claims relating to the enforceability of the $6 Million
Note, and certified the judgment in accordance with Rule 54(b) in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al.:
On June 17, 2009, the Court entered an Order granting Defendants' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment after the Court found the 1995 stock redemption agreement
between Reed Taylor and AJA [Services] Corporation was unlawful and
unenforceable under the illegality doctrine where the agreement was entered into in
violation of then existing I.C. § 30--1-6 ((1995)). Based on the Court's ruling, it is
hereby the Order of the Court that the following Causes of Action found in
Plaintiff's Fifth Amended Complaint are dismissed as to all Defendants: a) First
Cause of Action - Breaches of Contract; b) Third Cause of Action Misrepresentations/Fraud; c) Fourth Cause of Action - Conversion; d) Sixth Cause of
Action - Constructive Trust; e) Eighth Cause of Action - Specific Performance; [and] f)
Tenth Cause of Action - Breach of Implied Covenants of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.
(2/2/10 Taylor Aff., Ex. D (emphasis added); see also 1213109 Babbitt Aff., Ex. E.)

In other
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words, all of Reed Taylor's contract related claims and related torts in his Fifth Amended
Complaint were dismissed on September 4, 2009, which is arguably the true accrual date for
Reed Taylor's causes of action in the present action, rather than June 17, 2009. (Id.) Reed
Taylor has appealed this action to the Idaho Supreme Court as well. (12/3/09 Babbitt Aff., ~11.)
M. Reed Tavlor files suit in this action

On October 1, 2009 (less than four months after the court ruled the redemption
agreements were illegal), Reed Taylor filed suit in this action against Riley, Turnbow, Eberle
Berlin and Hawley Troxell.

(See Complaint.)

Contrary to the Defendants' assertions, the

Complaint in this action and the facts that support the Complaint share no resemblance in terms
of the basis for the causes of actions and the fact supporting the causes of actions in Reed
Taylor's actions against Hawley Troxell, et al., and Clements Brown, et al.

(Compare

Complaint and 11/24/09 Riley Aff., Ex. G-H.)
In his Answer, Riley admitted that he acted as outside counsel for AIA Services,
participated in drafting and delivering the Opinion Letter, had knowledge concerning those AIA
Services matters referred to Eberle Berlin to which he "devoted substantial attention," attended
board meetings, and drafted some board resolutions, among other things. (Riley's
10, 12, 15.)

Answer,~~

In Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's Answers, they admit that they were involved in

drafting and delivering the Opinion Letter, involved in the representation for the redemption of
Reed Taylor's shares, were counsel for AIA Services and appear to suggest that Riley was the
key attorney involved in the redemption. (Turnbow's Answer,
Answer,

~~7-8,

10-12 and 21.)

~~7-8,

10-12; Eberle Berlin's

None of their Answers deny any former attorney-client

relationship with Reed Taylor. (Turnbow's Answer; Eberle Berlin's Answer; Riley's Answer.)
On November 24, 2009, Mr. Riley, for the first time, admitted in sworn testimony that:
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I have communicated from time to time with other Hawley Troxell attorneys
relative to the AIA litigation and filed an Affidavit in Opposition to Disqualify Hawley
Troxell. " 19
(11/24/09 Riley Aff., iJlO (emphasis added); see also 212110 Taylor Aff., iJiJl0-11; 11/10 Bond

Aff., iJiJ9-11.) Riley also admitted that he "participated in the preparation of the 1995 Opinion
Letter." (11/24/09 Riley Aff., iJ4; see also 212110 Taylor Aff., Ex. B.) Despite Riley having
provided Affidavit testimony in this action and Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., he has never
explained his opinions and representations set forth in the Opinion Letter and never agreed to be
deposed or otherwise testify on behalf of his former clients AIA Services and Reed Taylor.
(2/2/10 Taylor Aff., iJiJl0-11; 11/10/09 Bond Aff., iJiJ9-11)

In fact, Mr. Riley refused to be

deposed regarding the Opinion Letter in the AIA litigation, but instead he and other members of
his firm sought an order finding the redemption agreement illegal to apparently avoid liability for
their torts committed against the AIA corporations and Reed Taylor in regards to his security
interests and contractual rights. (Id.; 12/03/09 Babbitt Aff., Ex. J, N-0.)

N. Reed Tavlor has been damaged bv the defendants
Reed Taylor would not have sold his shares in AIA Services but for the Opinion Letter
and the representations and warranties contained in the Opinion Letter, and he relied upon Riley,
Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's representations, including, without limitation, that all consents had
been obtained and that no laws were violated by the redemption, among other representations
and warranties. (2/2/10 Taylor Aff., iJiJ6-7.) Reed Taylor also relied on Riley's representations
at AIA Services' board meetings prior to the redemption of his shares. (Jd., iJ8 and Exhibit C,
pp. 2 and 9.) Scott Bell also testified that he would not have advised Reed Taylor to redeem his
shares but for the Opinion Letter and that Reed Taylor relied upon the Opinion Letter. (2117/10

19

Although dated November 24, 2009, Mr. Riley's Affidavit was not filed until January 15, 2010 (Court File.)
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..
Bond Aff., Ex. 22, ~~8-10.) Reed Taylor had no knowledge that the redemption of his shares
was illegal or violated any laws and neither Riley nor any other attorney at Eberle Berlin ever
advised him otherw1se. (2/2/l 0 Taylor Aff., ifl 1.) Recd Taylor also rightfully presumed that
there was not any legal issues regarding the legality of the redemption of his shares as the
shareholders had overwhelmingly voted in favor of the redemption of his shares. (Id.,

~8.)

As a result of Riley, Turnbow, Eberle Berlin and Hawley Troxell's acts and/or omissions,
Reed Taylor hos been left with an unenforceable $6 Million Promissory Note that had over S2.5
Million in accmed interest-a total of over $8.5 Million. (2/2110 Taylor Aff., Ex. D and
and 16; Complaint,

~23.)

•:q 3

In addition to over $8.5 Million, Recd Taylor has lost over 75% of his

retirement income. (2/2/10 Taylor Aff.,

~16.)

As demonstrated by the district court's order in

Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin merely needed to draft and
submit a shareholder resolution approving the invasion of capital surplus to redeem Reed
Taylor's shares to have prevented the Court's Opinion and Order dated June 17, 2009, and
Judgment dated September 4, 2009. (12/4/09 Babbitt Aff., Ex. J; 2/2.110 Taylor Aff., Ex. D.)
Reed Taylor's damages in this action, unlike his first action against Hawley Troxell, is for the
loss of his $6M Note and rights to obtain payment by and tJuough the redemption agreements,
not that the value of his collateral has been diminished by way of Hawley Troxcll's conversion
and other torts as previously asserted. (Compare Complaint; I 1/24/09 Rile Aff.. Ex. G a."1d I.)
Accordingly, Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment should be denied and
summary judgment should be entered in favor of Reed Taylor on all issues raised by them.
DATED this 18 111 day of February, 2010.

& KIRBY PLLC
By: _ _-Ti::------~""1-------
Roderi k: ..... ,,~"''"'"
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868
Plaintiff,
V.

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HA VILEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA VILEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
ROBERT M. TURNBOVI, an individual; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOVI
& McKL VEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S
MEMORANDUM OF LAVI IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS RILEY
AND HA VILEY TROXELL'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND CROSS
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Defendants.
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor"), by and through his attorneys of record,
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC, submits the following Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Richard A. Riley ("Riley") and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP's ("Hawley Troxell")
Motion for Summary and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment:

I.

INTRODUCTION

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment lacks merit. Res judicata and collateral
estoppel do not apply to this action. Likewise, the statute of limitations has not run on any of
Reed Taylor's claims in this action. Reed Taylor's claims in this action accrued at the earhest on
MEMO IN OPPOSITION TO RILEY AND HA VILEY TROXELL'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN SUPPORT OF CROSS MOTION FOR SJ. - 1
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June 17, 2009. Reed Taylor was first damaged at the earliest on June 17, 2009. Their Motion
lacks substance and merit and the court should deny their Motion and enter judgment in favor of
Reed Taylor on all of the issues.
II. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENTS

Reed Taylor incorporates by reference into each and every argument asserted below Reed
Taylor's Statement Facts in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and in
Support of Cross Motions for Summary Judgment ("Facts").
A. Summary judgment standard for Riley and Eberle Berlin.

When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must liberally construe all
disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from the record will be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church
v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 307, 160 P.3d 743 (2007). Summary judgment is improper "if reasonable

persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence
presented." McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 394, 64 P.3d 317 (2003).
When a party moves for summary judgment based upon an affirmative defense, the party
asserting the defense bears "the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of fact
material to ... [the] defense." Mason v. Tucker and Associates, 125 Idaho 429, 437, 871 P.2d 846
(Ct. App. 1994). The party seeking summary judgment on the basis of an affirmative defense
must conclusively prove all elements of the defense. Franklin v. J.O. Jackson, 847 S.W.2d 306,
308 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). The defendants have failed to meet their burden.
B. Summary judgment standard for Reed Taylor.

Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
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that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c).
Once the moving party has provided sufficient evidence to support the motion, the party
against whom a motion for summary judgment is sought may not merely rest on
allegations contained in the pleadings, but must come forward and produce evidence by
way of deposition or affidavit to contradict the assertions of the moving party and
establish a genuine issue of material fact.

Post v. Idaho Farmway, Inc., 135 Idaho 475, 478, 20 P.3d 11, 14 (2001) (citing I.R.C.P. 56(e);
McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 770, 820 P.2d 360, 365 (1991)). "Such evidence must consist
of specific facts. and cannot be conclusorv or based on hearsay." Id. (emphasis added).
The moving party is entitled to judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 205, 61 P.3d 557, 562 (2002) (citing
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 254, 91L.Ed.2d265 (1986)). Reed Taylor has met
the required burden and partial summary judgment should be granted in his favor.
C. Res judicata has no application to the claims in this action and the Court Should
grant Reed Taylor partial summary judgment striking the defense.
1. Riley and Hawley Troxell have not and cannot meet the required burden.

"Res judicata is an affirmative defense and the party· asserting it must prove all of the
essential elements by a preponderance of the evidence." Ticor Title Company v. Stanion, 144
Idaho 119, 122, 157 P.3d 613, 617 (2007).
Here, Riley and Hawley Troxell have failed to meet the required burden. They have
failed to prove the elements of res judicata, their motion should be denied and judgment entered
in Reed Taylor's favor striking res judicata as a defense under any one of the following reasons:
2. Defendants have failed to prove all of the required elements of res judicata.
There are three requirements for res judicata to bar a subsequent action: ( 1) same parties;
(2) same claim; and (3) a final judgment. Ticor Title v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 124, 157 P.3d
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613, 618 (2007). The burden of proof is on the defendants to prove the elements. Id. at 122. As
set forth below, the defendants have not and are unable to prove all three elements.
a. The claims are not the same in this action.
Idaho has adopted the transactional approach to determining res judicata.

See e.g.,

Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 150, 804 P.2d 319, 323 (1990). Whether a
factual grouping constitutes a transaction is:
to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts
are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit,
and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations.
Id. at 150. Even if based upon the same transaction, resjudicata does not bar a subsequent action

when the party was diligently attempting to ascertain the facts to support additional claims.
Durant v. Quality First Marketing, Inc., 127 Idaho 558, 560, 903 P.2d 147, 149 (1995).
The true test of the identity of 'causes of action,' as that term is used in connection with
the plea of former adjudication, is the identity of the facts essential to their maintenance ...
'The authorities agree that when the same evidence supports both the present and the
former cause of action, the two causes of action are identical.'
Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 471 P.2d 254, 256 (Nev. 1970) (no res judicata because the party
relied upon events that transpired after the first action). "Although both lawsuits arose out of the
same transaction (sale of property), their subject matter differed" and the second lawsuit was
therefore not barred by resjudicata. Mellor v. Chamberlain, 673 P.2d 610, 613 (Wa. 1983).
Finally, the Ninth Circuit determines whether two claims are the same for purposes ofres
judicata based upon the following criteria:
(1) whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or
impaired by prosecution of the second action; (2) whether substantially the same
evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement
of the same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional
nucleus of facts.
Nordhorn v. Ladish Co., 9 F.3d 1402, 1404 (9th Cir. 1993). "One fundamental test applied for
MEMO IN OPPOSITION TO RILEY AND HAWLEY TROXELL'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN SUPPORT OF CROSS MOTION FOR S.J. - 4

001491

comparing causes of action, for the purpose of applying the principals of res judicata, is whether
· the primary right and duty and delict wrong are the same in each action."

47 Am.Jur.2d

Judgments § 478 (2009). In determining whether the same nucleus of facts is involved, the two
causes of action must allege the same conduct and whether the two causes of action allege
contemporaneous conduct. Durney v. Wavecrest Laboratories, LLC, 441 F.Supp.2d 1055, 1060
(N.D. Cal. 2005).
Here, the facts supporting Reed Taylor's causes of action were not present in the first
lawsuit.

(Facts, §§K-L.) The rights of the parties to the previous lawsuit would not be

destroyed., i.e., Reed Taylor is not suing Rile and Hawley Troxell again for conversion and other
torts. Different evidence will be used to support the claims in this action. (See Complaint; Facts,
§§J-M; 11/24/ 09 Riley Aff., Ex. G and 1.) The two lawsuits do not involve the infringement of
the same right as Reed Taylor is no longer a secured creditor of AJA Services and the issue of
illegality was neither pled nor could the issue have been raised by Reed Taylor in the first
lawsuit. (Facts, §§L-N.) Finally, the two lawsuits do not rise from the same nucleus of facts, as
the nucleus of facts in the first lawsuit was primarily based upon Reed Taylor enforcing his
creditor rights, while this action primarily involves Reed Taylor's claims pertaining to the
illegality of the transaction to redeem his shares back in 1995. (Complaint; Facts, §§ K-N.)
Even if the claims in this action were out of the same transaction, the subject matter of this action
is entirely different, as it is based primarily on events in 1995. (Facts, §§K-N; Complaint.)
Moreover, Reed Taylor had been diligently attempting to ascertain the truth about the
legality of the redemption of his shares and he was denied information from Riley, through
depositions and otherwise, even though Riley drafted and delivered the Opinion Letter to Reed
Taylor. (Facts, §J.) Indeed, in the first lawsuit, the defendants were asserting that Reed Taylor
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was attempting to disqualify them based upon "litigation strategy" and that his claims were
baseless. (Facts, §K; 2/17/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 16-18.) Now they are asserting that Reed Taylor
should have sued them in the first lawsuit, and, consequently it follows that Hawley Troxell
should have been disqualified in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al. (See 1213109 Babbitt Aff., Ex. BC; Facts §§I-J.)
b. The parties are not the same in this action.
In order to prove res judicata, both proceedings must involve the same parties or their
privies. Foster v. City ofSt. Anthony, 122 Idaho 883, 888, 841P.2d413, 418 (1992).
Reed Taylor, Riley and Hawley Troxell were parties to the first lawsuit. However,
Turnbow and Eberle Berlin were not parties to the first action and they are not in privity with
Riley or Hawley Troxell. Eberle Berlin and Turnbow are likely perplexed by Riley and Hawley
Troxell successfully asserting the redemption was illegal in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al. (Facts,
§§J-L.) Regardless, the parties are different in this action and, in any event, the court would
likely not have had jurisdiction over Eberle Berlin and Turnbow based upon improper venue.
c.

There is no final judgment.

"The party asserting res judicata must plead and prove that the prior judgment on which it
is relying was final. Failure to prove a final judgment generally will defeat a plea of res judicata
or collateral estoppel." 47 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 648 (2009); Con v. Cuff, 427 A.2d 195
(1981); In re Cuffey, 162 B.R. 469 (E.D. Va. 1993). A judgment is not final in state court for res
judicata purposes when an appeal is pending. In re Lumbermans Mortgage Co. v. Secured Inv.
of Maryville, Ltd., 712 F.2d 1334, 1335 (9th Cir. 1983); Rodriguez v. Department of Correction,

136 Idaho 90, 94, 29 P.3d 401, 405 (2001).
The defendants have failed to plead and prove the existence of a final judgment. Without
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pleading and proving a final judgment, there can be no res judicata. Moreover, as discussed
below, the court's order granting the defendants' Motion to Dismiss was not entered with
prejudice. (Facts, §K; 11124/09 Riley Aff., Ex. K.)

3. The claims in this action did not accrue until after the first lawsuit was
dismissed.
Res judicata does not punish a litigant for failing to prosecute a claim in an earlier suit if
that claim had not yet accrued at the time of the initial action. CoreStates Bank, NA. v. Huls
America, Inc., 176 F.3d 187, 203 (3rd Cir. 1999); Arnold Crossroads, L.L.C. v. Gander
Mountain Company, 2010 WL 148439 (E.D. Mo. 2010). Claims must be the same in order for

res judicata to bar a subsequent action. Ticor Title, 144 Idaho at 124.
Here, Reed Taylor's complaints and proposed amended complaints in his previous action
did not assert, nor could have asserted, that the redemption agreements were illegal and
unenforceable. (Facts, §K-L.) If Reed Taylor had taken the position that the agreements were
illegal in the first lawsuit, such a position would have been contrary to the basis for asserting his
claims and the defendants in this action would have asserted that the issue had not been
determined in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al. Indeed, the defendants Answers assert exhaustion as
an affmnative defense as well. (See Defendants' Answers.)

4. Claims which were not ripe are not subject to res judicata.
Matters not ripe in first lawsuit are not barred in a second lawsuit by res judicata. U.S.
Bank Nat. Ass 'n v. Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222, 226, 999 P.2d 877, 881 (2000); Duthie v. Lewiston
Gun Club, 104 Idaho 751, 663 P.2d 287 (1983); Restatement (Second) of the Law Judgments§

20(2); 47 Am.Jur.2d Judgments§ 555 (2009).
The claims presently asserted in this action were not ripe until the court ruled the
redemption agreements were illegal on June 17, 2009, at the earliest, or on September 4, 2009, at
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the latest. (Facts, §L.) Under the defendants' rationale, a party would be required to file suit
against their attorney in every action, just in case problems arise pertaining to the contracts or
transaction through which the attorney provided legal representation. The defendants' arguments
that Reed Taylor should have sued them in the first action also flies in the face of the arguments
that they asserted in the first action and they should be estopped from asserting the defense.
5. Assuming the elements of res judicata were proven, the supporting facts are
far different and occurred after the previous action was dismissed.
The application of res judicata does not apply to new facts asserted in a later filed
complaint which cure defects in a complaint previously dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). Abbott

Laboratories v. Zenith Laboratories, Inc., 934 F.Supp. 925, 928-29 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (citing SAC.
Wright, A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1357 (2nd Ed. 1990) ("Unless [a complaint
has been disposed of in accordance with Rule 56], application of res judicata seems to be a
dubious path to follow.")).
A court must be careful, when dismissing a second suit between the same parties as
duplicative, not to be swayed by rough resemblance between the two suits without
assuring itself that beyond the resemblance already noted, the claims asserted in both
suits are the same. Here, they are not entirely duplicative. Thus, dismissal in whole was
inappropriate and we must remand the case.

Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 136 (2nd Cir. 2000).
Here, the present action is not duplicative of the prior action. The Complaint in this
action is based almost entirely on different facts and claims not asserted in the first Complaint
against Riley and Hawley Troxell and the facts and causes of action accrued well after the
dismissal of the previous action. (Compare Complaint; Facts, §K.)

Under Riley and Hawley

Troxell's argument, Reed Taylor had already pied fraud and, as such, the claim is barred by res
judicata.

Reed Taylor has asserted the new significant facts that have occurred after the

dismissal of the first lawsuit, specifically, the district court's finding the redemption agreements
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were illegal and unenforceable and subsequently entering judgment on June 17, 2009, and other
events that have transpired since the dismissal of the first lawsuit. (Facts, §§J-N.)

6. Even if the causes of action were identical and all elements satisfied, it is not
clear that the court intended that the disposition was without future rights.
"To support a defense of res judicata, it must be clear that the court, by the previous
dismissal, intended that the disposition was to be without a right to further proceedings ... " 47
Am.Jur.2d Judgments§ 546 (2009); Equitable Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Bradford Builders, Inc.,
174 So.2d 44 (Fla. 1965).
Here, the court's order was implicate that Reed Taylor's voting rights and other rights
could be determined at a later day. (11/24/09 Riley Aff., Ex. K.) The court was well aware that
Reed Taylor could obtain operational control of AJA Insurance at any time, and, consequently,
he could be back asserting claims once again. (Id.)
7. The district court granted the defendants' Motion to Dismiss and denied
Reed Taylor's Motion to Amend without addressing all of his claims.
The burden of showing the meaning of a former adjudication is on the party asserting res
judicata and any reasonable doubt as to what was decided in the first action should preclude the
drastic remedy of res judicata. McNellis v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association of

Rochester, New York, 364 F.2d 251, 257 (2nd Cir. 1966). When a court fails to address the
reasons why it denies a motion to amend, the order denying the motion cannot be taken as res
judicata. Horner v. Ferron, 362 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1966).
Assuming Reed Taylor's claims in this action had accrued and he had asserted a fraud
claim on the issue of illegality, Judge Brodie failed to even address Reed Taylor's fraud claim
and other claims asserted in his Complaint and proposed Amended Complaint. (Facts, §K;
11/24/09 Riley Aff., Ex. G, I and J.) The court never even discussed them and there can be no
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res judicata.
8. Reed Taylor's claims were dismissed based on standing, and, consequently,
there can be no res judicata, even if the elements were satisfied.

A determination regarding standing is not an adjudication on the merits for purposes of
res judicata. Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1987); 47 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 542
(2009).
Here, Hawley Troxell asserted, and the court determined, that Reed Taylor lacked
standing to pursue his malpractice and related causes of action in his first lawsuit. (Facts, § K;
11/24/09 Riley Aff., Ex. J.) There can be no res judicata, even if the defendants' had proven the
requisite elements of the defense.
9. Reed Taylor's Complaint was dismissed and motion to amend was denied in
the first lawsuit without prejudice.

Res judicata has no application to dismissed actions, unless the causes of action were
dismissed with prejudice. 47 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 547 (2009) (emphasis added); Topps v.
State, 865 So.2d 1253 (Fla. 2004); Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 75 S.
Ct. 865, 99 L. Ed. 1122 (1955).
Here, Riley and Hawley Troxell's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss in the first lawsuit
was not sought "with prejudice" and the district court's opinion and order did not grant their
Motion "with prejudice." (Facts, §K, 2/17/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 16-18; 11/24/09 Riley Aff., Ex. J.)
As such, Reed Taylor was free to file claim again in the future and there can be no res judicata.
D. Collateral estoppel does not apply to this action.

The party asserting collateral estoppel has the burden of proving that all of the
requirements have been met. Pocatello Indus. Park Co. v. Steel, 101 Idaho 783, 787, 621 P.2d
399, 403 (1980). Five facts must be proven in order for collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) to
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bar the re-litigation ·of an issue determined in a prior proceeding:
(1) The party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the
prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue
sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final
judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is
asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation.
Ticor Title, 144 Idaho at 124. "If there is doubt as to the scope of the prior judgment, collateral
estoppel will not be applied." 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 1058 (2009); Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432
(9th Cir. 1994).
Other factors to consider include whether "the previous decision was 'avowedly
tentative,' whether the parties were fully heard, whether the court supported its decision with a
reasoned opinion, and whether the decision was subject to appeal." Rodriguez v. Department of
Correction, 136 Idaho 90, 94, 29 P.3d 401, 405 (2001). There is no privity of contract between
an attorney and his client for purposes of the defense. Ammon v. McCloskey, 655 A.2d 549, 554
(Pa. 1995). The issue that the party seeks to bar re-litigation must have been determined in the
first action through a valid and final judgment "to which determination was essential." Bignell v.
Wise Mechanical Contractors, 720 P.2d 490, 494 (Alaska 1986).
Here, the defendants have failed to meet their burden and summary judgment should be
entered in favor of Reed Taylor striking collateral estoppel as an affirmative defense in this
action. First, Reed Taylor asserted fraud as an exception to the illegality doctrine in an effort to
enforce the redemption agreements in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., not to pursue damages or
claims for the fraud in the Opinion Letter, thus, the issues are not identical (Facts, §L.) The
issue of Reed Taylor's fraud claims has not been addressed as those claims are pending in Reed
Taylor's Sixth Amended Complaint, only whether the court would, in its discretion, enforce the
redemption agreements based upon the fraud exception to the illegality doctrine. (Facts, §L;
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1213109 Babbitt Aff., Ex. K.)

Third, the court only decided that it would not enforce the

redemption agreements based upon the fraudulent representations contained in the Opinion
Letter, and it did not resolve any claims pertaining to the Opinion Letter or other fraudulent
representations in the redemption agreements. (1213109 Babbitt Aff., Ex. K; Facts, §L.) Fourth,
. there is no final judgment on the merits in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., rather, a Rule 54(b)
Certificate was entered and that case has been appealed. (212110 Taylor Aff., Ex. D; Facts, §L.)
Finally, the defendants in this action were not parties in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., and they
were not involved in determining the fraud exception to the illegality doctrine, and, to bar the
issue based on collateral estoppel would manifestly unfair to hold otherwise. See In re Freeman,
30 F.3d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Moreover, the evidence was restricted by and through Riley's
refusal to be deposed and a stay in general discovery.

Lastly, the court did not even address the

factual fraudulent representations asserted in the Opinion Letter that were unrelated to legal
opinions. (Facts, §D.)
Collateral estoppeldoes not apply to Reed Taylor's fraud and constructive fraud claims
and summary judgment should be granted in his favor striking the defense.

E.

Reed Taylor's malpractice claims are not barred by I.C. § 5-219{4)
A cause of action against an attorney does not accrue until some damage has occurred.

City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 659-61, 201 P.3d 629, 632-34(2006); LC. § 5-219.

"[T]here must be objective proof that would support the existence of some actual damage. Id. at
634. The circumstances of damages must be decided on a case by case basis. Id. at 635. Mere
knowledge of any attorney's negligence does not cause a legal malpractice claim to accrue,
rather, the client must sustain damage. Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 621 A.2d 459 ( 1993).

Ill
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The first time objective proof was found that Reed Taylor had incurred some damages
was when the court ruled the redemption agreements were illegal and unenforceable on June 17,
2009. (Facts, § L.)

Until this time, there has been no objective proof that Reed Taylor was

damaged as a result of the illegality of the transaction to redeem his shares. See Treasure Valley
Bank v. Killen & Pittenger, P.A., 112 Idaho 357, 732 P.2d 326 (1987) (claim accrued on the date

that the bankruptcy court approved the reorganization plan and debtor lost his right to make a
claim); Webster v. Hoopes, 126 Idaho 96, 878 P.2d 795 (1994) (attorney malpractice action
accrued on date summary judgment was entered in underlying foreclosure action); Olds v.
Donnelly, 696 A.2d 633, 640 (N.J. 1997).

In addition, breach of warranty claims similarly

accrue under this statute. Nerco Minerals Co. v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 140 Idaho 144, 90
P.3d 894 (2004).
The defendants have failed to identify any objective proof that Reed Taylor was damaged
in 1995 or 1996 as they assert. In 1995 and 1996 Reed Taylor had, or so he believed and Riley
warranted, valid and enforceable agreements. (Facts, §§A-K.) The fact that Reed Taylor sold·
his shares or placed AIA Services in default in 1996 is immaterial for purposes of ascertaining
when he had objective damages pertaining to the redemption of his shares.

Defendants

misconstrue Reed Taylor's testimony in weak attempt to show Reed Taylor was damaged when
he sold his shares. However, for purposes of all of his claims in this action, Reed Taylor was
damaged by the acts of the defendants, as is clear from the Complaint and the evidence.
With respect to the defaults in 1996 as being objective proof of Reed Taylor's damages,
AIA Services and Riley's response letter fail to mention or address any issues of illegality and
the parties restructured the redemption agreements thereby leaving Reed Taylor's extensive
security interests intact. (Facts, §G.) Reed Taylor has been paid in full for his $1.SM Down
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•
Payment Note and attorneys' fees the defendants argued were damages caused by their
malpractice. Finally, defendants assert that Reed Taylor was damaged when his $6M Note
matured. However, there is no connection between when his $6M Note matured and when he
ascertained that his redemption agreements were illegal and unenforceable. In fact, he continued
receiving hundreds of thousands of dollars in monthly payments after his $6M Note mature on
August 1, 2005. (Facts, I; 2117110 Bond Aff., Ex. 6.)
With respect to fraudulent concealment under I.C. § 5-219(4), the evidence demonstrates
that Riley and the other defendants concealed facts from Reed Taylor.

(Facts, §§A-N.)

Defendants provided Reed Taylor the Opinion Letter in 1995. (Facts, §D.) In 1996, Reed
Taylor placed AIA Services in default of its contractual obligations owed to him. (Facts, §G.)
Riley responded to Reed Taylor's default notices and did not mention or address the legality of
the redemption of his shares. (Id.) Finally, Reed Taylor testified that neither Riley nor anyone
else at Eberle Berlin has ever advised him the redemption was illegal from 1995 to the present
time. (Facts, §§A-N; 212110 Taylor Aff., 'i['i[2-16.) There is no issue of fact as to the defendants'
fraudulent concealment of facts.

Reed Taylor had a professional relationship with Riley,

Turnbow and Eberle Berlin by and through the Opinion Letter and as them acting as his personal
attorneys. The fact that Connie Taylor raised the illegality in 2008 is irrelevant. She raised the
issue as to insufficient earned surplus and did not even raise the issue of shareholder approval to
invade capital surplus. See I.C. § 30-1-6 (1995). Moreover, as the shareholders had approved
the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, he had no reason to believe that anything illegal had
transpired and this understanding was affirmatively supported by the Opinion Letter. (Facts,
§§A-D.)
Ill
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As such, their Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied and summary judgment
issued in favor of Reed Taylor striking LC. § 5-219(4) as a defense and finding that the
defendants have fraudulently concealed information from Reed Taylor.
F. Reed Taylor's Consumer Protection Act claim is not barred by I.C. § 48-619.
An action under Idaho's Consumer Protection Act must be brought within "two (2) years

after the cause of action accrues." I.C. § 48-619.
Like Reed Taylor's other claims, this cause of action did not accrue until, at the earliest,
June 17, 2009. (Facts, §L.) Defendants assert that Reed Taylor was damaged on August 1,
2005, but, again, the maturity date of Reed Taylor's $6M Note has no correlation or application
to the claims asserted in this action. As his claim accrued on June 17, 2009, the defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied and summary judgment entered in favor of
Reed Taylor striking I.C. § 48-619 as an affirmative defense.
G. Reed Taylor's fraud claim is not barred by I.C. § 5-218(4).

The statute of limitations for a fraud and constructive fraud claim does not accrue ''until
the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake." I.C. § 5218. An action against an attorney for fraud or deceit is covered by the statute of limitations for
fraud. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 820 P.2d 360 (1991).
Here, Reed Taylor, having believed the redemption of his shares was properly approved
by AIA Services shareholders, had no reason to be placed on notice of any claims relating to the
redemption.

(Facts, §§A-E.)

The defendants incorrectly argue that Reed Taylor was the

President of AIA Services, when in fact he held positions which had no powers under AIA
Services' Restated Bylaws. (Facts, §A.) In addition, Reed Taylor had little knowledge of legal
or financial affairs of the corporation and had delegated those duties to his brother, who was an
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attorney and an accountant. (Facts, §A.)

The defendants also mistakenly rely solely upon the

issue of insufficient earned surplus, instead of shareholder approval for capital surplus.
Moreover, they act as though Reed Taylor was responsible for ensuring the legality of the
redemption and ascertaining knowledge of the legality, while not addressing the fact that they
were the attorneys who represented the parties and drafted and delivered the Opinion Letter.
The first time Reed Taylor had any knowledge that AIA Services should have had
shareholders vote and approve a specific shareholder resolution approving the redemption of his
shares from capital surplus was when Judge Brudie entered his order finding the redemption
agreements illegal and unenforceable on June 17, 2009. (Facts, §L.) Moreover, Reed Taylor
attempted to discovery more facts, but his efforts to conduct discovery were thwarted by the
defendants in this action. (Facts, §J.) Thus, the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
should be denied and summary judgment entered in Reed Taylor's favor striking I.C. §5-218(4)
as a defense in this action.
H. Reed Taylor's negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duties claim are
not barred by I.C. § 5-224.
Breaches of fiduciary duties are covered by I.C. § 5-224 and action must be commenced
within four years of accrual. In addition to traditional breaches of fiduciary duties which have
accrued, Riley has breached fiduciary duties of undivided loyalty owed to Reed Taylor by and
through successfully assisting Hawley Troxell in obtaining an order finding the redemption
agreements illegal and taking such other acts set forth in the Complaint and as asserted as facts in
these motions. (Facts, §§A-N.) Moreover, Riley and Hawley Troxell have collectively assisted
other defendants by thwarting discovery in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., and by filing motions
against the Opinion Letter and Riley's former clients. All of the claims for breaches of fiduciary
duties and negligent misrepresentations accrued after the dismissal of the first lawsuit and when
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the court found the agreements to be illegal on June 17, 2009. (Facts, §L.) Thus, the court
should deny Hawley Troxell and Riley's Motion for Summary Judgment and enter judgment in
favor of Reed Taylor striking this defense.
I. The defendants are equitably estopped from asserting statute oflimitations
defenses.
The elements of equitable estoppel are:
( 1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or constructive
knowledge of the truth; (2) the party asserting estoppel did not know or could not
discover the truth; (3) the false representation or concealment was made with the intent
that it be relied upon; and (4) the person to whom the facts were concealed, relied and
acted upon the representation or concealment to his prejudice.
Anderson v. Anderson, Kaufman, Ringer! and Clark, Chartered, 116 Idaho 359, 364, 775 P.2d
1201, 1206 (1989).
Here, the court need not consider any of the defendants' statute of limitations arguments
since all elements of equitable estoppel are proven. 1 Eberle Berlin, Turnbow and Riley made
false representations of fact and law to Reed Taylor in the Opinion Letter that the redemption of
his shares was legal, the agreements enforceable, that all necessary shareholder consents had
been obtained and other material misrepresentations. (2/2/10 Taylor Aff., Ex. A; Facts, §D.)
Reed Taylor did not know the truth about what had transpired nor could he discover the truth.
(212110 Taylor Aff.,

~~2-16.)

The Opinion Letter itself states that it is being furnished for Reed

Taylor to rely upon and he, and Scott Bell, testified that he relied upon the representations in the
Opinion Letter. (Id. and Ex. A, p. 5; 2/17/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 22,

~10;

Facts, §D.) Summary

judgment should be entered for Reed Taylor barring Riley, Eberle Berlin and Turnbow from

1

To the extent the defendants come forward with any evidence disputing the equitable estoppel argument, then Reed
Taylor requests a Rule 56(f) continuance to depose Riley and Turnbow as their deposition testimony will show that
they had actual or constructive knowledge of the truth that no shareholder resolution was obtained expressly
authorizing the payments to Reed Taylor from capital surplus as provided in l.C. § 30-1-6 (1995) and that the false
representation was made with the intent that Reed Taylor would rely upon it.
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asserting any statutes of limitations as defenses in this action.
J. To the extent that the court believes any of Reed Taylor's claims are barred by the
statute of limitations, he asserted that the statutes should be equitably tolled.

"[U]nder the doctrine of equitable tolling, the statute of limitations does not begin to run
until the plaintiff either acquires actual knowledge of the facts that comprise the cause of action
or should have acquired such knowledge through the exercise of reasonable diligence after being
apprised of sufficient facts to put him or her on notice." 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions §
178 (2009). With the significant facts implying a cover-up and/or concealment of facts, this case
is ripe for equitable tolling, to the extent that the court believes any claims are barred by the
applicable statutes of limitations. (Facts, §§A-N.) Thus, the court should equitably toll any
statutes oflimitations which have run, although no actions have accrued until June 17, 2009.
K. Riley is not entitled to dismissal of Reed Taylor's negligent misrepresentation claim
and summary judgment should be granted to Reed Taylor on this claim.

Idaho, like many other states, has recognized the tort of negligent misrepresentations
. against professionals when a special relationship exists or the occurrence of unique
circumstances requires a different allocation of risk. Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho
702, 710, 99 P.3d 1092, 1100 (Ct. App. 2004); Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass 'n, 126
Idaho 1002, 1007-08, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200-01 (1995). Although negligent misrepresentation
claims were previously limited to accountants in Idaho, the tort has been implicitly clarified in
recent years to apply in circumstances where there is a "special relationship" pertaining to
services provided by professionals such as attorneys, engineers, physicians, insurance agents and
architects. Nelson, 140 Idaho at 710 (emphasis added).
States that have recognized the tort of negligent misrepresentation against professionals
(like Idaho), first recognized the tort as one that may be brought against accountants, but the law
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in these states evolved to also permit the tort to be asserted against attorneys.

See e.g.,

Prndential Insurance Company of America v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 605
N.E.2d 318, 320 (N.Y. 1992) ("there is no reason to arbitrarily limit the potential liable
defendants to [accountants]"); Crossland Savings Bank FSB v. Rockwood Insurance Company,
700 F. Supp. 1274 (N.Y. 1988); Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987). To prove
negligent misrepresentation based upon an attorney's opinion letter, a plaintiff must show:
( 1) attorney was aware that opinion was to be used for a particular purpose; (2) opinion
was relied upon in furtherance of that purpose; (3) attorney was aware of the reliance; (4)
opinion contained misrepresentation; and (5) plaintiff suffered damages as a result of its
reliance upon misrepresentation.

Finova Capital Corporation v. Berger, 18 A.D.3d 256, 379-81 (N.Y. 2005); see also Walco
Investments, Inc. v. Thenen, 881 F.Supp. 1576 (D.C. Florida 1995); Prudential Insurance
Company of America v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 605 N.E.2d 318 (N.Y.
1992); Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 128 Cal.Rptr. 901, 906 (Cal. 1976); see

also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977).
Reed Taylor has proven, as a matter of law, that the Opinion Letter contains negligently
misrepresented facts and opinions. (Facts, §§D, Land N; Complaint.) Eberle Berlin, Riley and
Turnbow were aware that their opinions and representations were to be used and relied upon by
Reed Taylor for the purpose of redeeming his shares in 1995. (Facts, §D.) These opinions and
representations include those set forth in the Opinion Letter and those made by Riley at various
meetings of AIA Services' Board of Directors. (Facts, §§C and N.) Reed Taylor relied upon the
opinions and representations and Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow were aware of his reliance,
and, in fact, expressly invited his reliance. (Id., §D.) Significantly, Eberle Berlin, Riley and
Turnbow expressly stated that "[tlhis opinion is furnished solely for your benefit. . .it may not
be ... relied upon by any other person."

(Id.; 212110 Taylor Aff., Ex. A, p. 5.)

Their
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representations and opinions contained misrepresentations as determined by the district court in

Taylor v. AJA Services, et al. (Facts, §L; 12/3/09 Babbitt Aff.. Ex. J.) Reed Taylor has suffered
damages as his $6 Million Promissory Note (plus accrued interest of over $2.5 Million) and
extensive contractual rights have been mled illegal and unenforceable. (Facts, §N; 2/2/10 Taylor

Aff., Ex. D; 12/3/09 Babbitt Aff., Ex . .J.)

The defendants' Motion for Swnrnary Judgment to dismiss Reed Taylor's negligent
misrepresentation claims should be denied und partial summary judgment should be granted iu
favor of Reed Taylor on this claim on the issue of liability.

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated above, the Court should deny Riley and Hawley Troxell's
Motion for Summary Judgment and enter judgment in favor of Recd Taylor striking their
defenses of res judicata, collateral cstoppel and statutes of limitations, and enter judgment in
favor of Reed Taylor on his negligent misrepresentation claim.
DATED this 18th day of February, 2010.
KIRBY PLLC

By: _ _ _.,___.:.=--::.~------
Roderic
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
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7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, VJA 99201
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By J. RANDALL
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868
Plaintiff,
v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAVJLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAVJLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
ROBERT M. TURNBOVJ, an individual; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOVJ
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S
MEMORANDUM OF LAVJ IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS
TURNBOVJ, RILEY AND EBERLE
BERLIN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND CROSS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Defendants.
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor"), by and through his attorneys of record,
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC, submits the following Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Robert M. Turnbow ("Turnbow"), Richard A. Riley ("Riley"), Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow
& McKlveen, Chartered's ("Eberle Berlin") Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross Motion

for Summary Judgment:

I.

INTRODUCTION

Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow have moved for summary judgment apparently
believing that they do not owe Reed Taylor any obligations for any of the legal services and
MEMO IN OPPOSITION TO TURNBOVJ, RILEY AND EBERLE BERLIN'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN SUPPORT OF CROSS MOTION FOR S.J. - 1

001509

representations they provided to him and AIA Services.

Under their flawed rationale, an

attorney can commit malpractice, make false representations, and commit other torts without
regard to the people they directly represent and impact. However, like Hawley Troxell and
Riley's Motion for Summary Judgment, Turnbow, Eberle Berlin and Riley's Motion for
Summary Judgment fails as a matter of law and summary judgment should be entered in favor of
Reed Taylor of all issues presented.
II. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENTS

Reed Taylor incorporates by reference into each and every argument asserted below all of
the facts set forth in Reed Taylor's Statement Facts in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment and in Support of Cross Motions for Summary Judgment ("Facts").

A. Summary judgment standard for Eberle Berlin and Turnbow.
When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must liberally construe all
disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from the record will be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church
v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 307, 160 P.3d 743 (2007). Summary judgment is improper "ifreasonable

persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence
presented." McPhheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 394, 64 P.3d 317 (2003).
When a party moves for summary judgment based upon an affirmative defense, the party
asserting the defense bears "the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of fact
material to ... [the] defense." Mason v. Tucker and Associates, 125 Idaho 429, 437, 871 P.2d 846
(Ct. App. 1994). The party seeking summary judgment on the basis of an affirmative defense
must conclusively prove all elements of the defense. Franklin v. J.O. Jackson, 847 S.W.2d 306,
308 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). The defendants have failed to meet their burden.
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B. Summary judgment standard for Reed Taylor.

Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." l.R.C.P. 56(c).
Once the moving party has provided sufficient evidence to support the motion, the party
against whom a motion for summary judgment is sought may not merely rest on
allegations contained in the pleadings, but must come forward and produce evidence by
way of deposition or affidavit to contradict the assertions of the moving party and
establish a genuine issue of material fact.
Post v. Idaho Farmway, Inc., 135 Idaho 475, 478, 20 P.3d 11, 14 (2001) (citing I.R.C.P. 56(e);
McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 770, 820 P.2d 360, 365 (1991)). "Such evidence must consist

of specific facts. and cannot be conclusory or based on hearsay." Id. (emphasis added).
The moving party is entitled to judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 205, 61 P.3d 557, 562 (2002) (citing
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct 254, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Reed Taylor has met

the required burden and partial summary judgment should be granted in his favor.
C. Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow owed Reed Taylor duties.

The defendants assert that they owed no duties to Reed Taylor and had no attorney-client
relationship with him in 1995, however, they do not dispute that they drafted and delivered the
Opinion Letter to Reed Taylor.
When an attorney delivers an opinion to a third party at the request of his client, privity is
established as a matter of law. Finova Capital Corporation v. Berger, 18 A.D.3d 256, 257 (N.Y.
2005); RTC Mortgage Trust 1994 N-1 v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Company, 58
F.Supp.2d 503, 521 (D. N.J. 1999). When a lawyer represents that he is acting on the third
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party's behalf, the attorney is estopped from denying the attorney-client relationship and may be
held liable for breach of fiduciary duty or negligence.

Crossland Savings Bank FSB v.

Rockwood Insurance Company, 700 F. Supp. 1274 (N.Y. 1988); Cohen v. Godfriend, 665
F.Supp. 152, 158 (E.D. N.Y. 1987).
Despite the defendants arguments addressed below, as a matter of law, Reed Taylor had
privity with Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow, and they owed him duties which were breached
when the district court found the redemption agreements to be illegal and unenforceable on June
17, 2009. N (Facts, §§D, E and L.)
1. Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow committed malpractice against their client

Reed Taylor.
In order to establish a claim for professional negligence, the plaintiff must show:

(1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the existence of a duty on the
part of the lawyer; (3) the failure to perform that duty; and (4) the failure to perform
the duty must be a proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the client.

J-U-B Engineers, Inc. v. Security Insurance Company of Hartford, 146 Idaho 311, 317, 193 P.3d
858 (2008).
Here, defendants assert that they had no attorney-client relationship with Reed Taylor,
while he asserts that he did have an attorney-client relationship. It is at least undisputed that
Riley and Eberle Berlin (and other attorneys at Eberle Berlin) were Reed Taylor's personal
attorneys from the 1980's through the early 1990's. They also don't deny or dispute Reed
Taylor's testimony that they were restructuring AIA Services on his behalf. (Facts, §E.) The
restructuring of AIA Services continued well past 1991, the year that Riley and Eberle Berlin
assert their attorney-client relationship with Reed Taylor ended. It is noteworthy that Riley does
not dispute obtaining a conflict waiver from Reed Taylor in the early 2000's. (2/2/10 Taylor
Aff., iJl 5.) Defendants also spend significant time discussing the termination of their attorneyMEMO IN OPPOSITION TO TURNBOW, RILEY AND EBERLE BERLIN'S MOTION
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client relationship with Reed Taylor, yet they have submitted no proof other than their affidavit
testimony. Thus, at the very least, the issue of Reed Taylor's relationship with Riley and Eberle
Berlin is an issue of fact which precludes granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
However, as mentioned above, privity is established as a matter of law under the facts
and circumstances in this action. (Facts, §D, E and H.) At the very least, Reed Taylor is entitled
to partial summary judgment finding that, as a matter of law, he has privity with the defendants.

2. Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow committed malpractice against Reed
Taylor, a third-party beneficiary of the redemption representation and the
majority shareholder of AIA Services.
Attorneys may also be liable for malpractice to intended third-party beneficiaries. Beaty
v. Hertzberg & Golden, P.C., 571 N.W.2d 716 (Mich. 1997); Wa/co Investments, Inc. v. Thenen,
881 F.Supp. 1576 (D.C. Florida 1995). The issuance of legal opinion intended to secure a
benefit for a client, either monetary or otherwise, must be issued with due care, and attorneys
who do not act carefully will have breached the duty owed to those they attempted or expected to
influence. Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 128 Cal.Rptr. 901, 906 (Cal. 1976).
Attorneys may also be liable for malpractice/negligence to non-clients. Davin, L.L. C. v. Daham,
746 A.2d 1034 (N.J. 2000); RTC Mortgage Trust 1994 N-1 v. Fidelity National Title Insurance
Company, 58 F.Supp.2d 503 (D.C. N.J. 1999); Lloyd v. Walters, 277 S.E.2d 888 (S. Carolina
1981). In certain factual circumstances, which are present in this action, attorneys owe duties to
nonclients and the nonclients may pursue claims against them for malpractice and negligence:
In addition to the other possible bases of civil liability described in §§ 49, 55, and 56, a
lawyer is civilly liable for professional negligence to a person to whom the lawyer owes a
duty of care within the meaning of§ 50 or§ 51, if the lawyer fails to exercise care within
the meaning of § 52 and if that failure is a legal cause of injury within the meaning of §
53, unless the lawyer has a defense within the meaning of§ 54.

Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers§ 48 (2009).
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For purposes of liability under § 48, a lawyer owes a duty to use care within the meaning
of§ 52 in each of the following circumstances:
( 1) to a prospective client, as stated in § 15;
(2) to a nonclient when and to the extent that:
(a) the lawyer or (with the lawyer's acquiescence) the lawyer's client invites the
nonclient to rely on the lawyer's opinion or provision of other legal services, and
the nonclient so relies; and
(b) the nonclient is not, under applicable torot law, too remote from the lawyer to
be entitled to protection;
(3) to a nonclient when and to the extent that:
(a) the lawyer knows that a client intends as one of the primary objectives of the
representation that the lawyer's services benefit the nonclient;
(b) such a duty would not significantly impair the lawyer's performance of
obligations to the client; and
(c) the absence of such a duty would make enforcement of those obligations to
the client unlikely.
Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers§ 51 (2009).
In 1995, the clear intent of all parties was to ensure that Reed Taylor's shares were
· redeemed legally. (Facts, §§A-F.) Eberle Berlin, Riley and Tumbow's legal representations and
services were intended to benefit all parties to ensure the redemption was legal and enforceable.
In addition, AIA Services agreed to provide Reed Taylor the Opinion Letter through an express

contract provision. (Facts, §D; 11/24/09 Riley, Aff., Ex. A, p. 4, §2.4(j).) There was but one
purpose for Eberle Berlin, Riley and Tumbow's legal representation and that was to take all steps
to ensure the redemption agreements did not violate any laws and that the transaction was
properly approved by the shareholders. (Facts, §§A-F.) These facts, coupled with the Opinion
Letter being drafted and delivered for Reed Taylor to rely upon, makes clear that Reed Taylor
has third-party beneficiary rights to pursue negligence and malpractice claims against Riley,
Turnbow and Eberle Berlin, and they are liable to him, as a matter of law, for their negligence
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and malpractice. (Id.; 12/3/09 Babbitt Aff., Ex. J; Facts, §§D, E and L.)

3. Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin have committed malpractice based upon
their obligations to Reed Taylor by and through the Stock Redemption
Agreement.
Reed Taylor incorporates by reference all of the legal authority in Sections 1 and 2 above
into this Section. Reed Taylor was provided a third-party beneficiary based upon the contract
provision in the Stock Redemption Agreement obligating the defendants to draft and deliver
Reed Taylor an Opinion Letter. (11/24/09 Riley Aff., A, p. 4, §2.5G).) It is noteworthy that the
defendants never take a shred of responsibility for their actions in any of their voluminous
filings.

On page 15 of their Memorandum, they assert, without explanation how their actions

truly benefitted the corporation in 1995. Moreover, an explanation is not provided how they
actually did proceed in the best interests of the corporation.

As an observation, one must

question who the defendants were really representing in 1995.
Regardless, Reed Taylor had an express contract provision that granted him rights to be
represented by the defendants. Now the defendants assert, for their own self-serving interests,
that the contract provision and Opinion Letter were not worth the paper they were printed on and
that they should obtain summary judgment on the claim. The court should deny their Motion for
Summary Judgment and enter summary judgment in favor of Reed Taylor.

4. Reed Taylor's derivative claims are asserted as direct claims as the majority
shareholder and the only person entitled to all the damages.
Shareholders may also pursue derivative claims for malpractice. Schulman v. Wolf &

Samson, PC, 951 A.2d 1051 (N.J. 2008). However, a shareholder may bring a derivative action
directly against parties if he can show distinct damages only applicable to him. Steelman v.

. Mallory, 110 Idaho 510, 716 P.2d 1282 (1986).
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An action brought by a shareholder is derivative if the gravamen of the complaint is the
injury to the corporation or to the whole body of its stock or property and not injury to the
plaintiffs individual interest as a shareholder.
McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228, 233, 61 P.3d 585 (2002).

A shareholder may sue directly for harm to himself or herself that is separate and
distinct from that suffered by the corporation.
Under some authority, the analysis for determining whether a stockholder's action should
be classified as direct or derivative turns on the determination of who suffered the alleged
harm, the corporation or the suing stockholder individually, and who would receive the
benefit of recovery or other remedy. Most courts hold, however, that a shareholder
may have standing to bring an action arising from an injury to the corporation if
the injury is the result of the violation of duty owed directly to the shareholder, or if
the shareholder sustains an injury that is peculiar to him or her alone, and does not
fall alike upon other stockholders, even if the corporation was similarly harmed.

When a shareholder's complaint states a cause of action that is both direct and
derivative, the shareholder may proceed with the direct action.
18 C.J.S. Corporations§ 485 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
On July 18, 1995, Reed Taylor was the majority shareholder in AIA Services. (Facts,
§§A-C.) On August 15, 1995, Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow provided Reed Taylor the
Opinion Letter. (2/2/10 Taylor Aff., Ex. A-B; Facts, § D.) However, the transaction to redeem
Reed Taylor's shares did not close until days after the Opinion Letter was provided to him.
(Facts, §D.)

When the shareholders approved the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, they

voted 926,698.07 shares in favor of the redemption and 6,688.09 shares against the redemption.
(Facts, §C.) Because the Opinion Letter was drafted and delivered to Reed Taylor before his
shares were redeemed and he relied upon it when he closed the transaction, he is the only
shareholder entitled to any damages recovered as the illegality only affected the value of his
shares and sums he was required to receive for his shares. Thus, Reed Taylor can pursue his
derivative claims directly against the defendants because the claims are distinct and personal to

him only and he is entitled to all recovered damages.
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Even though Reed Taylor is asserting the derivative claims directly against AIA Services
by way of the claims being distinct to him and only his shares, in an abundance of caution he
pled certain malpractice claims derivatively and asserted that making a demand upon the board
would be futile.

(See Complaint, iJiJ30-31.)

Contrary to the defendants' assertions, 1 Idaho

recognizes the futility exception to a derivative action. Orrock v. Appleton, 147 Idaho 613, 213
P.3d 398, 399 (2009) ("A derivative action may not be maintained unless the plaintiff can show
that demand would be futile."). Nevertheless, as stated in McCann, claims are not derivative if
the gravamen of the complaint is injury to the corporation's assets. McCann, 138 Idaho at 233.
Reed Taylor's claims are not based at all upon injury to AIA Services, but are exclusively based
upon the damages incurred by him when he was a shareholder.
Accordingly, Reed Taylor's derivative malpractice claim that he is pursuing directly
against AIA Services is appropriate and warranted under the facts and circumstances in this case.
The court should deny defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and enter judgment in favor
of Reed Taylor on this claim; as asserted in his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
D.

Reed Taylor's malpractice claims are not barred by I.C. § 5-219(4)

A cause of action against an attorney does not accrue until some damage has occurred.
City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 659-61, 201 P.3d 629, 632-34(2006); LC. § 5-219.

"[T]here must be objective proof that would support the existence of some actual damage. Id. at
634. The circumstances of damages must be decided on a case by case basis. Id. at 635. Mere
knowledge of any attorney's negligence does not cause a legal malpractice claim to accrue,
rather, the client must sustain damage. Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 621 A.2d 459 (1993).
The first time object proof was ascertained that Reed Taylor had incurred some damages
1

On page 17 of their Memorandum, the defendants incorrectly assert that Idaho does not recognize the futility
exception and completely disregard well settled Idaho law regarding a shareholder's right to pursue direct actions.
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was when the court ruled the redemption agreements were illegal and unenforceable on June 17,
2009. (Facts, § L.)

Until this time, there has been no objective proof that Reed Taylor was

damaged as a result of the illegality of the transaction to redeem his shares. See Treasure Valley
Bank v. Killen & Pittenger, P.A., 112 Idaho 357, 732 P.2d 326 (1987)(date bankruptcy court

approved the reorganization plan and debtor lost his right to make a claim); Webster v. Hoopes,
126 Idaho 96, 878 P.2d 795 (1994) (attorney malpractice action accrued on date summary
judgment was entered in underlying foreclosure action); Olds v. Donnelly, 696 A.2d 633, 640
(N.J. 1997).
The defendants have failed to put forth any objective proof that Reed Taylor was
damaged in 1995 or 1996 as they assert. In 1995 and 1996 Reed Taylor had, or so he believed
and Riley warranted, valid and enforceable agreements. (Facts, §§A-K.)

The fact that Reed

Taylor sold his shares or placed AIA Services in default in 1996 is immaterial for purposes of
ascertaining when he had objective damages pertaining to the redemption of his shares.
Defendants cite to a recent affidavit of Reed Taylor wherein he testified regarding the many
years that had been lost to him. He was merely testifying why the court should have enforced
the redemption agreements in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al. With respect to the defaults in 1996,
AIA Services and Riley's response letter fail to mention or address any illegality and the parties
restructured the redemption agreements thereby leaving Reed Taylor's extensive security
interests intact. (Facts, §G.) Finally, defendants assert that Reed Taylor was damaged when his
$6M Note matured. However, there is no connection between when his $6M Note matured and
when he ascertained that his redemption agreements were illegal and unenforceable. In fact, he
continued receiving hundreds of thousands of dollars in monthly payments after his $6M Note
mature on August 1, 2005. (Facts, I; 2/17/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 6.)
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With respect to fraudulent concealment under I.C. § 5-219(4), the evidence demonstrates
that Riley and the other defendants concealed facts from Reed Taylor.

(Facts, §§A-N.)

Defendants provided Reed Taylor the Opinion Letter in 1995. (Facts, §D.) In 1996, Reed
Taylor placed AIA Services in default of its contractual obligations owed to him. (Facts, §G.)
Riley responded to Reed Taylor's default notices and did not mention or address the legality of
the redemption of his shares. (Id.) Finally, Reed Taylor testified that neither Riley nor anyone
else at Eberle Berlin has ever advised him the redemption was illegal from 1995 to the present
time. (Facts, §§A-N; 2/2/10 Taylor Aff., iJiJ2-16.) There is no issue of fact as to the defendants'
fraudulent concealment of facts.

Reed Taylor had a professional relationship with Riley,

Turnbow and Eberle Berlin by and through the Opinion Letter and as them acting as his personal
attorneys. The fact that Connie Taylor raised the illegality in 2008 is irrelevant. She raised the
issue as to insufficient earned surplus and did not even raise the issue of shareholder approval to
invade capital surplus. See I.C. § 30-1-6 (1995). Moreover, as the shareholders had approved
the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, he had no reason to believe that anything illegal had
transpired and this understanding was affirmatively supported by the Opinion Letter. (Facts,
§§A-D.)
As such, their Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied and summary judgment
issued in favor of Reed Taylor striking I.C. § 5-219(4) as a defense and finding that the
defendants have fraudulently concealed information from Reed Taylor.
E. Reed Taylor's negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duties claim are
not barred by I.C. § 5-224.

Negligent misrepresentation claims, like traditional malpractice, accrue when there is
some damage. Mack Financial Corp. v. Smith, 111 Idaho 8, 10, 720 P.2d 191, 193 (1986).
Based upon the circumstances in this case, the negligent misrepresentations claim should be
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governed by LC.§ 5-218, LC.§ 5-216 or LC.§ 5-224. However, like Mack, it is unnecessary for
the court to make this determination since the claims for negligent misrepresentations accrued on
June 17, 2009, and the breach of fiduciary duty claims accrued well within the last four years as
well. (Facts, §L.)
In addition to traditional breaches of fiduciary duties, Riley has breached fiduciary duties
of undivided loyalty owed to Reed Taylor by and through successfully assisting Hawley Troxell
in obtaining an order finding the redemption agreements illegal and taking such other acts set
forth in the Complaint and as asserted as facts in these motions. (Facts, §§A-N.) Moreover,
Riley and Hawley Troxell have collectively assisted other defendants by thwarting discovery in
Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., and by filing motions against the Opinion Letter and Riley's
former clients. (See also Reed Taylor's Memorandum in Support of Partial Summary Judgment,
pp. 14-16.) These claims all accrued since Reed Taylor filed his Complaint in Taylor v. AJA
Services, et al., and all are within the applicable four-year statute of limitations. Thus, summary
judgment should be denied for Riley and Hawley Troxell and the court should grant Reed Taylor
summary judgment and strike LC.§ 5-224 as a defense in this action
F. Summary judgment should be granted in favor of Reed Taylor on the negligent
misrepresentation claim.

Idaho, like many other states, has recognized the tort of negligent misrepresentations
against professionals when a special relationship exists or the occurrence of unique
circumstances requires a different allocation of risk. Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho
702, 710, 99 P.3d 1092, 1100 (Ct. App. 2004); Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass 'n, 126
Idaho 1002, 1007-08, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200-01 (1995). Although negligent misrepresentation
claims were previously limited to accountants in Idaho, the tort has been implicitly clarified in
recent years to apply in circumstances where there is a "special relationship" pertaining to
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services provided by professionals such as attorneys, engineers, physicians, insurance agents and
architects. Nelson, 140 Idaho at 710 (emphasis added).
States that have recognized the tort of negligent misrepresentation against professionals
(like Idaho), first recognized the tort as one that may be brought against accountants, but the law
in these states evolved to also permit the tort to be asserted against attorneys.

See e.g.,

Prudential Insurance Company ofAmerica v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 605

N .E.2d 318, 320 (N .Y. 1992) ("there is no reason to arbitrarily limit the potential liable
defendants to [accountants]"); Crossland Savings Bank FSB v. Rockwood Insurance Company,
700 F. Supp. 1274 (N.Y. 1988); Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987). To prove
negligent misrepresentation based upon an attorney's opinion letter, a plaintiff must show:
( 1) attorney was aware that opinion was to be used for a particular purpose; (2) opinion
was relied upon in furtherance of that purpose; (3) attorney was aware of the reliance; (4)
opinion contained misrepresentation; and (5) plaintiff suffered damages as a result of its
reliance upon misrepresentation.
Finova Capital Corporation v. Berger, 18 A.D.3d 256, 379-81 (N.Y. 2005); see also Walco
Investments, Inc. v. Thenen, 881 F.Supp. 1576 (D.C. Florida 1995); Prudential Insurance
Company of America v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 605 N.E.2d 318 (N.Y.

1992); Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 128 Cal.Rptr. 901, 906 (Cal. 1976); see
also Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 552 (1977).

Reed Taylor has proven, as a matter of law, that the Opinion Letter contains negligently
misrepresented facts and opinions. (Facts, §§D, Land N; Complaint.) Eberle Berlin, Riley and
Turnbow were aware that their opinions and representations were to be used and relied upon by
Reed Taylor for the purpose ofredeeming his shares in 1995. (Facts, §D.) These opinions and
representations include those set forth in the Opinion Letter and those made by Riley at various
meetings of AJA Services' Board of Directors. (Facts, §§C and N.) Reed Taylor relied upon the
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opinions and representations and Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow were aware of his reliance,
and, in fact, expressly invited his reliance. (Facts, §D.) Significantly, Eberle Berlin, Riley and
Turnbow expressly stated that "(tlhis opinion is furnished solely for your benefit .. .it may not
be ... relied upon by any other person."

(Id.; 212110 Taylor Aff., Ex. A, p. 5.)

Their

representations and opinions contained misrepresentations as determined by the district court in
Taylor v. AJA Services, et al. (Facts, §L; 12/3/09 Babbitt Aff., Ex. J.) Reed Taylor has suffered

damages as his $6 Million Promissory Note (plus accrued interest of over $2.5 Million) and other
contractual rights have been ruled illegal and unenforceable. (Facts, §N; 2/2/10 Taylor Aff., Ex.
D; 12/3/09 Babbitt Aff., Ex. J.)
The defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment to dismiss Reed Taylor's negligent
misrepresentation claim should be denied and partial summary judgment should be granted in
favor of Reed Taylor on this claim on the issue of liability.
G. Reed Taylor has standing to assert Consumer Protection Act claims, he is elderly
during relevant time periods, and the claims are not barred by I.C. § 48-619.
1.

Reed Taylor has standing to pursue CPA claims.

First, Reed Taylor purchased services from Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow.

As

consideration for the redemption of his shares, AIA Services contracted with Reed Taylor to
have Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow to draft and deliver "[a]n opinion of Company's legal
counsel substantially in the form of Exhibit G hereto." (11124/09 Riley Aff., Ex. A, p. 4,
§2.5(j).) In other words, but for Reed Taylor's agreement to sell his shares, Eberle Berlin, Riley
and Turnbow would have never been paid to draft and deliver the Opinion Letter to him.
Contrary to the defendants' assertions, the Opinion Letter was drafted and delivered expressly
for Reed Taylor and not for AIA Services.
Regardless, as noted above, the defendants are estopped from denying an attorney-client
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relationship with Reed Taylor. When an attorney delivers an opinion to a third party at the
request of his client, privity is established as a matter of law. Finova Capital Corporation, 18
A.D.3d at 257; RTC Mortgage Trust 1994 N-1, 58 F.Supp.2d at 521. When a lawyer represents
that he is acting on the third party's behalf, the attorney is estopped from denying the attorneyclient relationship and may be held liable for breach of fiduciary duty or negligence. Crossland
Savings Bank FSB v. Rockwood Insurance Company, 700 F. Supp. 1274 (N.Y. 1988); Cohen v.
Godfriend, 665 F.Supp. 152, 158 (E.D. N.Y. 1987).

Thus, Reed Taylor was a consumer and the consideration from the sale of his shares paid
for the legal services the defendants providing drafting and delivering the Opinion Letter. He
had an express contract provision to have the Opinion Letter provided to him. Moreover, the
letter itself is a contract full of representations and warranties. (2/2/10 Taylor Aff., Ex. A; Facts,
.§D.)

In addition, the defendants were Reed Taylor's personal attorneys at that time. (Facts,

§E.) Finally, the defendants are, as a matter of law, estopped from denying an attorney-client
relationship with Reed Taylor.
2. Reed Taylor is an elderly person for purposes of his CPA claims.

Reed Taylor's CPA claim accrued on June 17, 2009. At that time, he was 72-years-old,
well over the 62-year-old minimum age to qualify for exemplary damages under the CPA. The
defendants knew the sale of his stock was his retirement and new that he was elderly, or would
be elderly, and subject to the loss of his retirement. The only relevant issue is Reed Taylor's age
when his CPA claims accrued. His age when the Opinion Letter was drafted and delivered is
irrelevant. As discussed in Reed Taylor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Riley and
Hawley Troxell's intentional and malicious actions with regard to successfully asserting the
redemption was illegal in violation of their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor explains and
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•
supports exactly why the CPA has exemplary damages and why they should be imposed upon
the defendants in this action. Based upon the defendants' unlawful acts (as asserted in Reed
Taylor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment), the court should deny the defendants Motion
for Summary Judgment and enter an order finding that Reed Taylor qualifies for exemplary
damages under the CPA.
3. Reed Taylor's CPA claims are not time barred.
An action under Idaho's Consumer Protection Act must be brought within "two (2) years
after the cause of action accrues." LC. § 48-619.
Like Reed Taylor's other claims, this cause of action did not accrue until, at the earliest,
June 17, 2009. (Facts, §L.) Until that date, Reed Taylor could not assert fraud, deceit or any
other basis for CPA claims based upon the illegality of the redemption of his shares. Defendants
assert that Reed Taylor was damaged on August I, 2005, but, again, the maturity date of Reed
Taylor's $6M Note has no relevancy to the CPA claims asserted in this action. As his CPA
claim accrued on June 17, 2009, the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be
denied and summary judgment entered in favor of Reed Taylor striking J.C. § 48-619 as an
affirmative defense.
H. Opinions can be the basis of fraud claims, and. regardless, Riley, Turnbow and
Eberle Berlin made representations of fact as well.
Generally, opinions and predictions cannot form the basis of a fraud claim, however, an
exception exists where a false prediction or opinion is given with the intent to mislead. Country

Cove Development, Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, 601, 150 P.3d 288, 294 (2006); 37 Am.Jr.2d
Fraud and Deceit § 73 (2009); 37 Am.Jur.2d Fraud and Deceit § 70 (2009) ("Stated otherwise,
the general rule that the expression of an opinion cannot constitute fraud does not apply if in
addition to expressing an opinion, material facts have been fraudulently concealed."); 26
MEMO IN OPPOSITION TO TURNBOW, RILEY AND EBERLE BERLIN'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN SUPPORT OF CROSS MOTION FOR S.J. - 16

001524

Williston on Contracts § 69:6 (4th Ed. 2009) {"There is a growing unwillingness on the part of
Courts in dealing with fraud as well as with warranty to allow statements to be made without
liability, which are calculated to induce, and do induce, action on the part of the hearer''); 37
Am.Jur.2d Fraud and Deceit § 71 (2009) ("Hence, the rule is that if the person expressing the
opinion possesses superior knowledge, and it is a justifiable conclusion that he or she intended
untruly to imply knowledge of facts such as would justify the opinion, the opinion may be
regarded in law as an assertion of fact ... "). This principal also holds true for opinions given
when the person is aware that the facts are incompatible with the opinion, and the opinion may
constitute a false statement of fact if made with the intention of deceiving or misleading. Id.
In this action, Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow made substantial and material
representations of fact and law to Reed Taylor through the Opinion Letter, including, without
limitation, that all shareholder consents had been obtained, that the redemption agreements did
not violate Idaho law, that Reed Taylor had valid and perfected security interests in the shares of
AJA Services' operating subsidiaries, that AJA Services had the power and authority to enter into
the transaction, and other material representations.

(2/2/10 Taylor Aff., Ex. A; Facts, §D.)

These representations are actionable, as a matter of law, and the court should deny the
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and grant summary judgment to Reed Taylor
striking this defense.

I. Reed Taylor's fraud claim is not barred by I.C. § 5-218(4).
The statute of limitations for a fraud and constructive fraud claim does not accrue "until
the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake." LC. § 5218. An action against an attorney for fraud or deceit is covered by the statute of limitations for
fraud. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 820 P.2d 360 (1991).
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Here, Reed Taylor believed his redemption was properly approved by AIA Services
shareholders and he had an Opinion Letter from a prestigious law firm. (2/2/10 Taylor Aff., ifif216; Facts, §§A-F.)

He had no reason to be placed on notice of anything other than the

transaction was legal and backed by a group of well respected attorneys from Boise, Idaho.
(Facts, §§A-E.) The defendants incorrectly argue that Reed Taylor was the President of AIA
Services, when in fact he merely held an honorary position of C.E.O., which had no powers
under AIA Services' Restated Bylaws, i.e., C.E.O. is not even an authorized officer under the
Restated Bylaws. (Facts, §A; 2/17/10 Bond Aff, Ex. 25.) In addition, Reed Taylor had little
knowledge of legal or financial affairs of the corporation and had delegated those duties to his
brother, who was an attorney and an accountant. (Facts, §A.) The defendants also mistakenly
rely sole upon the issue of insufficient earned surplus, instead of shareholder approval for capital
surplus. In addition, the defendants' assertions regarding Reed Taylor allegedly being in a
position where he should have discovered the fraud long ago reflects right back on the
defendants, who were the attorneys for the redemption. Moreover, they acts as though Reed
Taylor was responsible for ensuring the legality of the redemption and ascertaining knowledge of
the legality, while not addressing the fact that they were the attorneys who represented the parties
and drafted and delivered the Opinion Letter.
The first time Reed Taylor had any knowledge that AIA Services should have had
shareholders vote to approve a specific shareholder resolution approving the redemption of his
shares from capital surplus was when Judge Brudie entered his order finding the redemption
agreements illegal and unenforceable on June 17, 2009. 2 (Facts, §L.) Moreover, Reed Taylor

2

Under the terms of l.C. § 30-1-6 ( 1995), it appears that a layman such as Reed Taylor would easily believe that
there were no issues pertaining to his redemption as the board of directors could redeem shares up to the amount of
earned surplus, while they could redeem shares in excess of earned surplus upon the vote of the shareholders. Reed
Taylor would have no reason to believe that a specific shareholder resolution was required to approve the use of
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attempted to discovery more facts, but his efforts to conduct discovery were thwarted by the
defendants in this action. (Facts, §J.) Thus, the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
should be denied and summary judgment entered in Reed Taylor's favor striking LC. §5-218(4)
as a defense in this action.
J. The defendants are equitably estopped from asserting statute oflimitations
defenses.

The elements of equitable estoppel are:
( 1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or constructive
knowledge of the truth; (2) the party asserting estoppel did not know or could not
discover the truth; (3) the false representation or concealment was made with the intent
that it be relied upon; and (4) the person to whom the facts were concealed, relied and
acted upon the representation or concealment to his prejudice.
Anderson v. Anderson, Kaufman, Ringert and Clark, Chartered, 116 Idaho 359, 364, 775 P.2d

1201, 1206 (1989).
Here, the court need not consider any of the defendants' statute of limitations arguments
since all of the elements of equitable estoppel are present and easily proven in this action. 3
Eberle Berlin, Turnbow and Riley made false representations of fact and law to Reed Taylor in
the Opinion Letter that the redemption of his shares was legal, the agreements enforceable, that
all necessary shareholder consents had been obtained and other material misrepresentations.
(2/2/10 Taylor Aff., Ex. A; Facts, §D.) Reed Taylor did not know nor could he discover the
truth. (2/2/10 Taylor Aff., ifif2- l 6.) The Opinion Letter itself states that it is being furnished for
Reed Taylor to rely upon and he, and Scott Bell, testified that he relied upon the representations

capital surplus to redeem his shares. He was not an attorney and not sophisticated in legal transactions, as was
Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow.
3
To the extent the defendants come forward with any evidence disputing the equitable estoppel argument, then Reed
Taylor requests a Rule 56(t) continuance to depose Riley and Turnbow as their deposition testimony will show that
they had actual or constructive knowledge of the truth that no shareholder resolution was obtained expressly
authorizing the payments to Reed Taylor from capital surplus as provided in LC. § 30-1-6 (1995) and that the false
representation was made with the intent that Reed Taylor would rely upon it.
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in the Opinion Letter, (2/2/J 0 Taylor Aff., Ex. A, p. 5; 2/17/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 22, ~1 O; Facts,
§D.) Interestingly, the defendants have never offered an explanation of any kind for the finding
of illegality and the uncnforceability of the redemption agreements.

NeYerthclcss, summary

judgment should be entered for Reed Taylor barring Riley, Eberle Berlin and Turnbow from
asserting any statutes of limitations pursuant to equitable estoppel.

K. To the extent that the court believes any of Reed Taylor's claims arc barred bv the
statute of limitations, he asserts that the statutes should be equitably tolled.
''[U]n<ler the doctrine of equitable tolling, the statute of limitations does not begin to run
until the plaintiff either acquires actual knowledge of the facts that comprise the cause of action
or should have acquired such knowledge through the exercise of reasonable diligence after being
apprised of sufficient facts to put him or her on notice." 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions ~

178 (2009). With the significant facts implying a cover-up andfor concealment of facts, this case
is ripe for equitable tolling, to the extent that the court believes any claims are barred. (Facts,

§§A-1':.)

Thus, the court should equitably toll any statutes of limitations which have run.

although no actions have accrued tmtil June 17, 2009.

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated above, the Court should deny Eberle Berlin, Riley and

Tumbov.:'s Motion for Summary Judgment and enter judgment for Recd Taylor striking their
statutes of limitations defenses and entering judgment in Reed Taylor's favor on their issue::;.

DA TED this 18111 day of February, 2010.
KlRBY ?LLC

By: _ ___,_~=---~-----
Rodcrick C. Bo d
Attorneys for P aintiff Reed .T. Taylor
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the date indicated below, I caused to be served true and correct copies of
the foregoing document to the following parties:

Via:
Jack S. Gjording
Julianne S. Hall
Gjording & Fouser, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
F<L"C (208) 336-9177

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
Elam & Burke, PA
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83704
Fax: (208) 384-5844

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf at1achment)

Signed this l 81h day of February, 2010, at Lewiston, Idaho.
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RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, \VA 99201

By CARLY LATIMORE
DEPUTY

Tel: (509) 455-7100

Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868

Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S
v.

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual:
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
ROBERT M. TURNBOW, an individual; and
EBERLE. BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED. an Idaho

(1) REPLY IN SUPPORT OF HIS MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST DEFENDANTS; AND
(2) SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

corporation; ·

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Defendants.
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Tavlor"), by and through his attorneys of record,
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC, submits this Reply In Support of Partial Summary Judgment
against Defendants Richard A. Riley ("Rilev"), Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawlev

Troxell"), Robert M. Turnbow (''Turnbow") and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen,
Chartered ("Eberle Berlin") and Supplemental Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motions

for Summary Judgment: 1

1

In addition. Reed Taylor incorporates by reforence into this Reply all of the arguments, legal authorities,
and facts asserted in his Statement of Facts in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and in
Support of Cross Motions and Responses in Opposition to the Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and
Cross Motions for Summary Judgment against the defendants dated February 18. 2010.
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I.

LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENTS

A. Reed Taylor filed his motion for partial summary judgment first.
Defendants assert that the court should decide the defendants' motion first.

However,

Reed Taylor filed his motion for partial summary judgment first and defendants have re-noted
their Motions, which, as asserted below, fail as a matter of law anyway.

B. Reed Taylor's claims are not barred by res iudicata, collateral estoppe), or statutes
of limitations.
As already addressed by Reed Taylor, his claims in this action are not barred by res
j ud icata (even if the elements were proven by the defendants) because: (I) his claims had not
accrued; (2) his claims were not ripe; (3) his claims in this action are supported by different
facts; (4) his claims in this action were not asserted or addressed in the first lawsuit; (5) the
district court. did not dismiss the first lawsuit without further rights; (6) his claims in the first
lawsuit were dismissed for lack of standjng; (7) his claims in the first lawsuit were not dismissed
with prejudice; and (8) most importantly, the defendants have not and cannot meet the burden of
satisfying the elements required to prove res judicata, i.e., same claims, same parties and final
judgment.

2

Reed Taylor's claims in this action are not barred by collateral estoppel because: (1)
Reed Taylor did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue as he only asserted the
fraud in the Opinion Letter on reconsideration to support enforcing the redemption agreements
under an exception to the illegality doctrine, i.e., mitigate damages; (2) the issue asserted in this
action is not identical and has not been decided; (3) the issue asserted in this action was never
decided in Ta.vlor v. AJA Services, el al., and was not a formal cause of action or defense; (4)

2

See Reed Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell's
Motion for Summary Judgment. pp. 3-10 and Reed Taylor's Statement of Facts in Opposition to De fondants'
Motions for Summary Judgment, which arc incorporated by reference herein.
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there was no final judgment on the merits in the Taylor v. AJA Services. et al., rather, only a Rule
54(b) certificate on claims unrelated to the Opinion Letter; (5) the defendants in this action were
not in privily with the defendants in Taylor v. AJA Services. et al.; and (6) Reed Taylor has
appealed the Rule 54(b) Judgment in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., and, thus, even if a final
judgment, would bar collateral estoppel.3
Finally, Reed Taylor's primary claims in this action accrued after the first lawsuit was
dismissed and, with respect to the finding of illegality, at the earliest on June 17, 2009.
Accordingly, the applicable statutes of limitations do not bar any of his claims, and, even if they
did, the defendants are estopped from asserting them as a dcfense.

4

As such, the defendants' res judicata, collateral estoppel, and statutes of limitations
defenses are not applicable to this action and do not bar Reed Taylor's claims in this action.

C. Reed Taylor is entitled to partial sumrnarv judgment against the defendants.
1. The defendants do not dispute that they made misrepresentations.

None of the defendants deny making misrepresentations to Reed TaylOr. Thus, there are

no issues of fact. Accordingly, partial summary judgment is warranted for the issue of liability
on his causes of action for negligent misrepresentations. constructive fraud and fraud.

2. As a matter of law. Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow owe Reed Taylor
duties of care independent to those as his attorneys and they breached their
duties to him and made material misrepresentations of fact and law.
Under Idaho law, attorneys are liable to nonclients for assumed duties. Jones v. Ru~i.

Leroy. Coffin & Mallhews. Chartered, 125 Idaho 607, 611-12, 873 P.2d 861, 865-66 (1994).
1

See Reed Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell's Motion
for Summary Judgment, pp. 10-12 and Reed Taylor's Statement of Facts in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment, which are incorporated by reference herein.
~See Reed Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell's Motion
for Summary Judgment, pp. 12-17; Reed Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants Turnbow,
Riley and Eberle Berlin's Motion for Summary Judgment and Reed Taylor's Statement of Facts in Opposition to
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, which are incorporated by reference herein.
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The Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers sets forth an attorney's duties to a
nonclient and liability for opinions undertaken for a nonclient:

§ 95. An Evaluation Undertaken for a Third Person
(1) In furtherance of the objectives of a client in a representation, a lawyer may
provide to a nonclient the result'> of the lawyer's investigation and analysis of facts or the
lawyer's professional evaluation or opinion on the matter....

(3) In providing the information, evaluation, or opinion under Subsection (1), the
lawyer must exercise care with respect to the nonclient to the extent stated in § 51 (2) and
no to make false statements prohibited under§ 98.
Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers § 95(1) and (3) (2009) (emphasis in
original). Under§ 51 (2) and (3 ), a duty of care is owed by lawyers:
(2) to a nonclient when and to the extent that:
{a) the lawyer or (with the lawyer's acquiescence) the lawyer's client invites the
nonclient to rely on the law-yer's opinion or provision of other legal services, and
the nonclient so relies; and
(b) the nonclient is not, under applicable tort law, too remote from the lawyer to
be entitled to protection;
(3) to a nonclient when and to the extent that:
(a) the lawyer knows that a client intends as one of the primary objectives of the
representation that the la-w-yer's services benefit the nonclient;
(b) such a duty would not significantly impair the lawyer's performance of
obligations to the client; and
(c) the absence of such a duty would make enforcement of those obligations to
the client unlikely.
Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers § 51(2) and (3) (2009). Under § 98, a
lawyer may not make false statements to a nonclient:

§ 98. Statements to a Nonclient
A lawyer communicating on behalf of a client with a nonclient may not:
(1) knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to the
nonclient;
(2) make other statements prohibited by law; or
(3) fail to make a disclosure of information required by law.
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Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers § 98 (2009) (emphasis in original). "A
lawyer communicating with a nonclient on behalf of a client is not privileged to make a material
misrepresentation of fact or law to the nonclient." Id at cmt. b (emphasis added).
Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow, upon the direction of AIA Services, assumed the
duties to provide Reed Taylor an evaluation through the Opinion Letter and assumed a duties to
Reed Taylor to ensure that the redemption was legal and that the Opinion Letter was correct. In
addition, AIA Services and Reed Taylor both relied upon Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow to
ensure the redemption was legal and that the agreements were enforceable. Moreover, Eberle
Berlin, Riley and Turnbow expressly invited him to rely upon the Opinion Letter and the
evidence is undisputed that he relied upon the Opinion Letter. lbey breached their direct and
asswned duties of care to Reed Taylor when they negligently provided legal services for the
redemption, delivered the Opinion Letter to him and made material misrepresentations of fact
and law to him. 5 Thus, Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow are liable to Reed Taylor through the
tort of negligent misrepresentations and negligence

or malpractice

(whether direct or assumed

duties). There is no issue of fact to prevent the court from granting partial summary judgment.

3. Idaho, like other states, should apply the tort of negligent misrepresentations
against an attorney ..
As asserted in Reed Taylor's Memorandum, many states have adopted negligent
misrepresentations as a tort against anomeys and the defendants cite no authority why Idaho
should not formally adopt the tort. The cause of action clearly involves the required special
professional relationship, the cause of action should be adopted and applied to this action, and

5

See Reed Taylor's Memorandum in Support of Partial Summary Judgment, pp. I· I 0 and Reed Taylor's
Statement of Facts in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. which are incorporated by
reference herein.
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partial summary judgment granted to Reed Taylor. 6

4. Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's act's and/or omissions constitute
negligence per se.
LC. § 30-1-6 (1995) was adopted to protect shareholders and Reed Taylor was a
shareholder of AIA Services when his shares were redeemed and Eberle Berlin, Riley and
Turnbow provided their legal services. Their duty of care was to simply obtain the required
shareholder resolution approving the invasion of capital surplus to pay Reed Taylor and/or to
obtain a shareholder resolution that the redemption was approved in accordance with I.C. § 30-16 (1995), but they failed to do either. As determined by the district court, their actions violated
LC.§ 30-1-6 and constitute negligence per se. (See 12/3/09 Babbitt Aff., Ex. J.)

5. Reed Taylor has proven the standard of conduct and expert testimony is not
required to prove the standard of conduct.
Expert testimony is unnecessary to establish negligence and causation in a legal
malpractice action "where the attorney's alleged breach of duty of care is so obvious that it is
within the ordinary knowledge and experience of a layman." Jarman v. Hale, 112 Idaho 270,
273, 731P.2d813, 816 (Ct App. 1986).
Here, the standard of conduct. as previously asserted by Reed Taylor, was that the Eberle
Berlin, Riley and Turnbow failed to obtain the necessary shareholder consents as determined by
the district court in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al. (See 12/2/09 Babbitt Aff., Ex. J.) It is also not
necessary to provide expert testimony as the defendants themselves readily admit the standard is
a "lay person" when they asserted that Reed Taylor should have known that l.C. § 30-1·6 (1995)

6

Reed Taylor mistakenly asserted that Idaho had adopted the tort in his Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, when Idaho had adopted that a special relationship must exist for negligence. ln Idaho, the tort of
negligent misrepresentations against an accountant is based upon a special professional relationship with an
accountant and Reed Taylor asserts that the same special relationship is present in this action with an attorney
warranting the adoption of this tort in Idaho as done by many other states. See Reed Taylor's Memorandum in
Support of Partial Summary Judgment, pp. 11-13; see also Section 2 above.
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was violated as he was the CEO and Chainnan of the Board. 7 By asserting that Reed Taylor
should have known the redemption violated Idaho law, they, being attorneys licensed to practice
law in Idaho, certainly should have knovm the facts and they are estopped from asserting
otherwise.

Regardless, as noted above, Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow, as the attorneys

handling the redemption, only needed to have the corporation's shareholders execute a resolution
consenting to the redemption pursuant to l.C. § 30-1-6 (1995) or a resolution expressly
authorizing the invasion of capital surplus to pay Reed Taylor and the issue would not be before
the court. Indeed, Reed Taylor, as the majority shareholder, would have gladly voted in favor of
such a resolution had he known it was necessary and was even required to vote his shares in
favor of the redemption. (11124/09 Riley Aff., Ex. A., p. 5. §2.6(h), p. 6, §3.2.)

6. Riley admits through his 2006 email to Reed Taylor that he had an ongoing
attorney-client relationship with him.
Any doubt as to whether an attorney-client relationship existed "should readily have been
resolved against the defendant, absent proof of clear and forthright statement to his clients that he
was no longer their attorney ... " Howard v. Murray, 372 N.E.2d 568, 570 (N.Y. 1977).
In response to Reed Taylor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Riley submitted yet
another affidavit. This time, he finally admits that he at least sought to obtain a conflict waiver
from Reed Taylor. This email proves that Riley's relationship with AIA Insurance included
Reed Taylor:
Recd: This email confinns today's telephone call in which you agreed that you have no
concern with Hawley Troxell1s representation of Aviation Finance Group in connection
with review of loan documentation for the refinance of the loan on your aircraft,
notwithstanding my prior and ongoing representation of AIA in various matters and my
representation. while employed at Eberle Berlin. of you personally with respect to certain
matters ...

7

See e.g.. Eberle Berlin and Turnbow·s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 28
and Riley and Hawley Troxell 's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 19.
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(2/17110 Riley Aff., Ex. 0.) In this email, there is no reason for Riley to obtain a conflict waiver

for Reed Taylor for AIA unless Riley believed from day one that he jointly represented Reed
Taylor and AIA or that he owed obligations to Reed Taylor.

Also, Riley admits that he

represented Reed Taylor on matters, which obviously means more than one matter. This email
confirms Reed Taylor's contention that Riley and Eberle Berlin jointly represented Reed Taylor
and AIA in the redemption of his shares, other than negotiating the terms of the redemption and
the final redemption documents--which Reed Taylor has never contended Riley and Eberle
Berlin represented him on. 8 There is no other reasonable explanation for this waiver has Reed
has sold his shares long ago. Moreover, there is no evidence that the defendants advised Reed
Taylor to retain his own corporate counsel to ensure that AIA Services could enter into the
agreement in the first place or that he needed to retain separate corporate counsel to ensure Riley,
Eberle Berlin and Turnbow did their jobs correctly. Significantly, there was no conflict waiver
in the redemption agreements or even a provision stating that Reed Taylor could not rely upon
them. (1 l/24/09 Riley Aff.• Ex. A) Finally, Riley certainly never bothered to obtain a waiver
from Reed Taylor when they decided to undertake representations directly againi.1 Reed Taylor
and AIA Services as it was in 1995, let alone assert that Riley's Opinion Letter was wrong.

7. Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow's representations were not predicated
upon future events, and, even if so, are still actionable misrepresentations.
Defendants assert for the first time that the facts and opinions asserted in the Opinion
Letter are apparently based upon future events or predictions. 9

This argument fails for two

separate reasons. First, the factual and opinion representations were present facts and opinions,
including, without limitation: (1) the redemption agreements \Vere either legal or illegal; (2) the

1

See 2/2/10 Taylor Aff.
See Riley and Hawley Troxell's Brief, pp. 11-12. This argument was not asserted by the defondants in
their Motion for Summary Judgment against Reed Taylor on rhe fraud claim.
9
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redemption agreements either violated Idaho low or did not violate Idaho law; (3) necessary
shareholder consents and approvals were either obtained or not obtained-a fact; (4) defendants
either reviewed sufficient corporate records to ~ake their represe~tations or they did not review
sufficient records; (5) the redemption agreements were either enforceable or not enforceable; and
(6) Reed Taylor either had security interests or did not have security interests. 10
Second, contrary to the defendants' assertions, future predictions or opinions are
actionable fraud if given with the intent to mislead in Idaho. Country Cove Development, Inc. v.
May,

143 Idaho 595, 601, 150 P.3d 288, 294 (2006).

Thus, even if defendants'

misrepresentations were given only as to future opinions (which they clearly were not), they
intended to mislead Reed Taylor by providing the false opinions and representations to him.
However, it is undisputable that the defendants simply needed to ensure that the
shareholders were provided with a resolution specifically addressing 1.C. § 30-1-6 and/or capital
surplus and they failed . to do so, yet they still made their representations to
. Reed Taylor to induce
him to sell his shares, presumably so that they could generate further revenues preparing a public
offering or sale of the company by way of getting Reed Taylor's shares redeemed. It is also
undisputed that the district court ruled the redemption agreements were illegal when the
transaction was closed in 1995, not based upon some act that occurred in the future. (12/3/09
Babbitt Aff., Ex. J.) Defendants' arguments are without merit.

8. Opinions may constitute fraud and the defendants have ~ommitted fraud.
A lawyer is liable for misrepresentations of fact or law. See e.g., Restatement (Third) of

The Law Governing Lawyers § 98 (2009). 11

Idaho has also adopted the rule that an opinion

constitutes actionable fraud. Country Cove Development, Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, 601, 150
10

See 212110 Taylor Aff., Ex. A.
See also Reed Taylor's Memorandum in Opposition to Turnbow, Riley and Eberle Berlin's Motion for
Summary Judgment, pp. 16-17, which is incorporated by reference herein.
11
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P.3d 288, 294 (2006); Country Cove Development, Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, 601, 150 P.3d
288, 294 (2006); 37 Am.Jr.2d Fraud and Deceit§ 73 (2009); see also 37 Am.Jur.2d Fraud and
Deceit § 70 (2009) ("Stated otherv.ri.se, the general rule that the expression of an opinion cannot
constitute fraud does not apply if in addition to expressing an opinion, material facts have been
fraudulently concealed.'.); 26 Williston on Contracts § 69:6 (4111 Ed. 2009) ("There is a growing
unwillingness on the part of Courts in dealing with fraud as well as with warranty to allow
statements to be made without liability, which are calculated to induce, and do induce, action on
the part of the hearer''); 37 Am.Jur.2d Fraud and Deceit § 71 (2009) ("Hence, the rule is that if
the person expressing the opinion possesses superior knowledge, and it is a justifiable conclusion
that he or she intended untruly to imply knowledge of facts such as would justify the opinion, the
opinion may be regarded in law as an assertion of fact. .. ").
Thus, the opinions and facts asserted in the Opinion Letter are actionable under any
scenario.

Moreover. defendants have concealed facts from Reed Taylor regarding the

.redemption of his shares.

Most importantly,

the defendants do not deny their

misrepresentations. Reed Taylor has proven all elements of fraud and constructive fraud.

9. Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow owed Reed Taylor duties and he has
proven constructive fraud as a matter of law.
Under the legal authority cited by Reed Taylor herein Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow
owed Reed Taylor fiduciary duties and duties through any one or more of the following: (1)
through their representation of AIA Services and him; (2) as his personal attorneys; (3) as the
third-party beneficiary of their representations. i.e., everyone's goal was to ensure the
redemption was legal; and (4) through drafting and delivering the Opinion Letter for him to rely
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upon.

12

As such, the elements of knowledge of falsity or intent to induce reliance are removed

from the nine elements of fraud and Reed Taylor has proven constructive fraud as a matter of
law. See Country Cove Development, 143 Idaho at 601.

10. Reed Taylor has not submitted any sham affidavits or testimony.
The defendants assert that Reed Taylor's testimony is inconsistent, without provided full
and complete explanations. Contrary to the defendants' assertions, the issue before this court has
never been addressed by any prior testimony or any case. Jn the other cases, the issue of Riley,
Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's role in representing him was never addressed or discussed. Ree.d
Taylor testified that they had represented AJA Services. Not one time did Reed Taylor testify or
state ihat they did not represent his interests in ensuring the redemption was properly completed
in accordance with the law. Rather, he has readily admitted that he did retain separate counsel
for the purpose of negotiating the tenns of the redemption and the written agreements. At no
lime has Reed Taylor testified, nor could he testify, that Scott Bell was retained to represent AIA
Services to ensure that the corporation complied with all legal and shareholder formalities. This
argument is simply a last gasp effort by the defendants to avoid partial summary judgment for
lheir intentional wrongs. Riley even now finally admits to seeking Reed Taylor's conflict waiver

in 2006. (See 2/17/10 Riley Aff., Ex. 0.) ·

11. Reed TayJor's derivative claims are direct cJaims and he plead futility.
Shareholders may also pursue derivative claims for malpractice. Schulman v. Wolf &

Samson, PC, 951 A.2d 1051 (NJ. 2008). A shareholder may bring a derivative action directly
against parties if he can show distinct damages only applicable to him. S1eelman v. A.fallmy, 110
Idaho 510, 716 P.2d 1282 (1986).

A shareholder need not provide a derivative demand if

12

See e.g., Crossland Savings Bank FSB v. Rockwood Insurance Company, 700 F. Supp. 1274 (N.Y 1988);
Cohen v. Godfriend, 665 F.Supp. 152, 158 (E.D. N.Y. 1987)
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demand would be futile. Orrock v. Appleton, 147 Idaho 613, 213 P.3d 398, 399 (2009). Here,
Reed Taylor was the only shareholder with shares redeemed. He is the only person damaged and
he pled in his complaint that making a derivative demand would be futile. (See Complaint, iMl3031.) Thus, a written demand and 90-day notice is not required.

12. What transpired in Reed Taylor's first lawsuit against Hawley Troxell has no
correlation to the claims in this action.
Defendants resort to citing language from the district court's opinions in Reed Taylor's
first lawsuit against Hawley Troxell. However, the defendants are no sho\.\ing candor to the
court. They know that this action and the first lawsuit are entirely different.

The first action

involved claims against Hawley Troxell for malpractice and other torts relating to their acts in
assisting others unlawfully transfer millions of dollars in funds and assets from AIA to CropUSA
and other parties and by paying themselves hundreds of thousands of dollars, if .not over $1
Million, in attorneys' fees and costs from funds that were subject to Reed Taylor's security
interests. Despite referencing the Opinion Letter in one paragraph out of many in his Complaint,

Reed Taylor did not and could not have asserted the redemption was illegal until June 17, 2009,
which was over eight months after Reed Taylor filed his proposed amended complaint. (12/3/09
Babbitt Aff., Ex. J, N and P-Q.)
The undersigned attorney is also the attorney for Donna Taylor, who is the preferred and
priority shareholder over AlA Services' assets and owed over $400,000. To this day, Hawley
Troxell continues to assist AJA Services' management in covering up the wrongful conduct and
denying Ms. Taylor her contractual rights and rights under AIA Services' Amended Articles of
Incorporation. No annual shareholder meetings have been held for years, Donna Taylor has been
denied her board seat for years, no disinterested approval has been obtained for Hawley Troxell
to represent AIA (let alone CropUSA, the entity were millions of dollars has been unlawfully
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS
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transferred), and the officers and directors are not properly seated--all and significantly more
examples of malfeasance under the guidance and assistance of Hawley Troxell (See e.g., 12/3/09
Babbitt Aff., Ex. E. N and P; 212/10 Taylor Aff., Ex. E-F.) To be clear, they are disingenuously
asserting arguments now and continuing to represent others in actions to cover up their conduct
aud the conduct of others to protect their O\Vn interests. Despite the district court's dismissal of
Reed Taylor's first lawsuit against Hawley Troxell, the examples of malfeasance are numerous,
significant, and have nothing to do v.ith the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares in 1995 or the
Opinion Letter. (See 12/3/09 Babbitt Aff., Ex. N and P.)

13. Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin are estopped from asserting lack of privity
as a defense, even if they were not Reed Taylor's personal attorneys.
When an atto.mey delivers an opinion to a third party at the request of his client, privity is
established as a matter oflaw. Finova Capital Corporation v. Berger, 18 A.D.3d 256. 257 (N.Y.
2005); RTC Mortgage Trust 1994 N-1 v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Company, 58
F.Supp.2d 503, 521 (D. N.J. 1999). When a lawyer represents that he is acting on the third
party's behalf, the attorney is estopped from denying the attorney-client relationship and may be
held liable for breach of fiduciary duty or negligence.

Crossland Savings Bank FSB v.

Rockwood Insurance Company, 700 F. Supp. 1274 (N. Y. 1988); Cohen v. Gm/friend, 665
F.Supp. 152, 158 (E.D. N.Y. 1987).
Defendants assert, without citing any legal authority, that they are not estopped from
asserting lack of privity. To support this argument, the defendants rely upon Recd Taylor's first
lawsuit against Hawley Troxell and Reed Taylor's prior testimony which is taken out of context.
First, as demonstrated in Reed Taylor's Statement of Facts in Opposition to Defendants' Motions
for Summary Judgment, there arc no similarities to the causes of action and relief asserted in this
action and his first lawsuit against Hawley Troxell. Second, Reed Taylor's prior testimony never
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS
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addressed the identical issues in this action and he never asserted that Riley and Eberle Berlin
had never been his attorneys. Defendants simply attempt to inap-propriate twist the facts to suit
their needs, as with most of their other arguments.

14. Hawley Troxell and Eberle Berlin are vicariously liable.
Contrary to the defendants' assertions, Reed Taylor only asserts that Hawley Troxell is
only vicariously liable for Riley's acts and omissions during the time in which he has been with
Hawley Troxell, which is March l, 1999, through the present time. Eberle Berlin is vicariously
liable for all of Turnbow's acts and omissions and only vicariously liable for Riley's acts and
omissions from 1995 through February 28, 1999. However, this argument is not a waiver of
Reed Taylor's rights to expand this liability or the time frame through discovery or otherwise.

15. Reed Taylor does not urge the court to reject Harrigfeld.
As asserted by Reed Taylor in his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Idaho
Supreme Court engages in a balance-of-the-harms test when deciding whether to recognize a
duty beyond the scope previo.usly imposed. Harrlgfeld v. .ID. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134. 138, 90
P.3d 884. 888 (2004). Despite the defendants' contentions, Reed Taylor's claims and relief in
this action, to the extent not supported by Idaho case law, is supported by and satisfies all of the
elements set forth in Harrigjidd Id.

'lbe claims in this action are based upon egregious facts

and are in accord with the Harrigfeld elements, to the extent that the cause of action has not
prosecuted in Idaho. None of Reed Taylor's causes of action or requested relief is contradictory

to Harrigfeld and is actually supported by and in accord with Harrigfeld.
II. CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated above, the Court should grant partial summary judgment in
favor of Reed Taylor. The defendants do not deny their conduct and do not deny what has
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transpired. They do not deny their malpractice, but attempt to rely up unsupported defenses

based upon technicalities which are not supported by the facts and circumstances in this case.
1l1ey do not deny their misrepresentations of fact and law, but mistakenly rely upon the incorrect
presumption that representations of opinion are not actionable when they are actionable under
Idaho law. There are no issues of material fact and judgment should be entered on liability only
for Reed Taylor's causes of action.

DATED this 24th day of February, 2010.

IRBY PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the date indicated below, I caused to be served true and correct copies of
the foregoing document to the following parties:
Via:

Jack S. Gjording
Julianne S. Ha11
Gjording & Fouser, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax: (208) 336-9177

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Ma.ii
(X) Facsimile
(X) Email (pelf attachment)

Via:
James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
Elam & Burke, PA
P.O. Box I 539
Boise, ID 83704
Fax: (208) 384-5844

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid .
( )
( )
(X)
(X)

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Email (pdf atta

Signed this 24th day of February, 2010, at Clarkst ,

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS
AND SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDAi~TS' MOTIONS - 15

001544

James D. LaRue, ISB #1780
Loren C. Ipsen, ISB #1767
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
File No. 7082-0013

~,.·;/. ___~l..,JILl:,l~.12l/ C(

MAR 12 2010
J. DAVID tJAVAnRo, Clerk
By E. HOLMES
CiC:?UTY

Attorneys for Defendants, Richard A. Riley
and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-OC-0918868

v.
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES D. LaRUE
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HA WLE
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; ROBERT M.
TURNBOW, an individual; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKL VEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO )
) SS.

County of Ada

)

JAMES D. LaRUE, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says:
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1.

I am an attorney licensed in the State of Idaho and a shareholder in the firm Elam

& Burke, P.A.

2.

I am over 18 years of age, competent to testify regarding the matters set forth in

this affidavit, and am one the attorneys who represented defendants Gary D. Babbitt, D. John
Ashby, Patrick V. Collins, Richard A. Riley and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, in the case of
Taylor v. Babbitt, et al., Case No. CV 08-02765, in the District Court of the Second Judicial

District of the State of Idaho, Nez Perce County ("Hawley Troxell #1"). As such, I am familiar
with the files and records in Hawley Troxell # 1 and make this affidavit based upon my personal
knowledge.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a copy of the Motion to Dismiss filed September

10, 2008, filed on behalf of the defendants in Hawley Troxell # l. The Motion to Dismiss prayed
for dismissal of plaintiffs complaint with prejudice.
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SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this~ day of March, 2010.

Notary Public for Idaijo
Residing at B~.u
Commission expires: ID
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of March, 2010, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, Washington 99201
Jack S. Gjording
Julianne S. Hall
Gjording & Fouser, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

v

V

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(509) 455-7111
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-9177
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James D. LaRue ISB #1780
Loren C. Ipsen ISB #1767
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
E & B File No. 7082-0013

FIL.ED
lOOR SEP 10 Arl 10 18
PATTY J. WEEKS

CLERK GF THE DIST. COURT

TERESA DAr~~7MON
OEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

)

v.

Case No. CV 08-01765
MOTION TO DISMISS

GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X,
unknown individuals;
Defendants.

Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Elam & Burke, P.A., hereby move,
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss plaintiffs complaint
with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
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DATED this _9_ day of September, 2008.

ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

()

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the_!}_ day of September, 2008, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the
manner indicated below:
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 416
Spokane, VIA 99201

v

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission (509) 455-7111
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James D. LaRue, ISB #1780
Loren C. Ipsen, ISB #1767
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
E & B File No. 7082-0013

MAR 12 2010
J. DAVID NP..VARRO, Cieri
By E. HOLMES
IJC,-'UTY

Attorneys for Defendants, Richard A. Riley
and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HA WLE
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; ROBERT M.
TURNBOW, an individual; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKL VEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

Case No. CV-OC-0918868
MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS
RICHARD A. RILEY AND HAWLEY
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
AMENDED CROSS-MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.
Defendants Richard A. Riley ("Riley") and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawley
Troxell"), by and through their counsel ofrecord, Elam & Burke, P.A., hereby submit the following
Memorandum in Opposition to plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Amended Cross-Motions for Summary
Judgment.
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A.

Plaintiffs Request to Strike Defendants' Defenses Is Untimely and Lacks Merit.

In addition to requesting partial summary judgment on "all issues raised by the defendants"
and/or addressed by him in five different memoranda, affidavits and statements of facts, plaintiff
requests that the Court strike all defenses raised by the defendants "including, without limitation, the
defenses of res judicata, collateral estoppel, statutes of limitations, that fraud may not be based on
opinion, that Idaho has not adopted negligent misrepresentation as a cause of action, and failure to
comply with derivative demand) .... " (Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Amended Cross Motions for

Summary Judgment against Defendants Riley, Turnbow, Eberle Berlin and Hawley Troxell).
Rule 12(f) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading, or if no
responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within
twenty (20) days after the service of the pleading upon the party or upon the court's
own initiative at any time, the court may order stricken from any pleading any
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter.
Plaintiffs motion to strike is not timely because it was not filed within 20 days after service
of these defendants' Answer. A motion to strike has never been held appropriate where the defenses
pled raised on their face genuine issues of fact or law. Rosenberg v. Toetly, 94 Idaho 413, 489 P .2d
446 ( 1971 ). The defenses raised by these defendants not only raise genuine issues, but as will be
seen upon consideration of the defendants' pending Motion for Summary Judgment, entitle them to
judgment in their favor dismissing the complaint with prejudice.

B.

Plaintiffs Ostensible Statement of Facts Contains Many Disputed and
Nonfactual Allegations.

As a preliminary matter, it must be noted that plaintiffs Statement of Facts in Opposition to
Defendants' Riley, Hawley Troxell, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's Motions for Summary Judgment
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and in Support of Cross Motions for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Reed Taylor's Statement of

Facts") is highly argumentative and contains many unsupported allegations, suppositions and
assertions. Evidence supporting or opposing a motion for summary judgment " ... must consist of
specific facts and cannot be conclusory in nature or based on hearsay." State v. Shama Res., Ltd

Partnership, 127 Idaho 267, 271, 899 P.2d 977, 981 (1995). Plaintiffs purported statement of
"facts" is nothing more than a litany of unproven and unsustainable allegations.
For example, plaintiff asserts as "fact" his self-serving statement that he was merely a
corporate figurehead and had" ... little knowledge of financial issues, accounting and legal matter[ s]
and have always relied upon others (specifically John Taylor) for those areas of operation." 1 (Reed

Taylor's Statement ofFacts, pp. 3-4). Yet, the Court in theAIAlitigationfound that Mr. Taylor was
or should have been knowledgeable regarding the business and affairs of AIA. 2 Thus, the Court
held him chargeable with knowledge of the financial structure of AIA when AIA redeemed his stock
in 1995 and rejected his argument that he was entitled to allege fraud as an exception to the illegality
of the stock redemption agreement.

1

In support of this contention, plaintiff points out that he resigned as president of AIA and assumed the
honorary position of CEO and Chairman of the Board on July 18, 1995, only four days before the AIA board of
directors voted to redeem his shares on July 22, 1995.
2

The Court found, "Plaintiffs second contention is that, even if unlawful, the agreement should be
enforced as Reed Taylor was justifiably ignorant of the illegality of the agreement. The Court is not persuaded by
plaintiffs efforts to paint himself as an innocent and naive party. Reed Taylor was the founder of AIA and, at the
time the agreement was entered into, the majority shareholder. Reed Taylor was in a position to have intimate
knowledge of the corporation's financial status. This is not a case where the parties to the agreement were not in
pari de/icto, as asserted by Plaintiff. If Reed Taylor was uninformed as to the financial status of the corporation, that
was a voluntary choice on his part and is insufficient to make him an innocent party to the agreement." (Babbitt Aff.,
Ex. K, Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of Court's Grant of Partial
Summary Judgment; Clarification of Ruling on Motions to Strike; Alternative Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification;
Motion for Order to Protect Property and for Stay, AIA litigation).
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Mr. Taylor contends that Mr. Riley and Eberle Berlin acted as his attorneys in connection
with the redemption of his stock. However, the 1995 Opinion Letter expressly identifies AIA, not
Mr. Riley, as Eberle Berlin's client: "We have acted as general counsel for the Company [AIA
Services Corporation] in connection with the transactions contemplated by the [1995 Stock
Redemption Agreement]." (Affidavit ofRichard A. Riley in Opposition to Reed J. Taylor's Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment, p. 5). The 1995 Opinion Letter goes on to state that Mr. Turnbow
and Mr. Riley"[A]re the sole attorneys at Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered
who have represented the Company [AIA] during the course of our representation in this
transaction." (2/2/10 Taylor Aff., Ex. A).

Although Mr. Taylor admits he was represented by

separate counsel of his own choosing, Scott Bell, regarding the stock redemption (Reed Taylor's

Statement ofFacts, p. 7), he asserts without any factual support that "Riley and Eberle Berlin were
also Reed Taylor's personal attorneys in 1995." (Reed Taylor's Statement ofFacts in Opposition to

Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, etc., p. 7). Mere conclusions not supported by facts
must be disregarded when considering a motion for summary judgment. Having admitted he was
represented by Mr. Bell, plaintiff should not be heard to now change his story.
Mr. Taylor alleges as "fact" that Eberle Berlin and its attorneys were "responsible for the
legality of the redemption." (Reed Taylor's Statement of Facts, p. 7). While it is undisputed that
Eberle Berlin rendered an opinion at the request of its corporate client, it goes too far to contend that
the firm was "responsible" for the legality of the transaction. Counsel are not the guarantors or
sureties of their clients' business transactions. Plaintiffs statements in this regard are argumentative
rather than factual.
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Mr. Taylor notes that he has previously sued AIA and others for alleged fraud and then jumps
to the conclusion that, " ... over time the extent of fraud upon the corporations continued to grow."

(Reed Taylor's Statement of Facts, p. 11). However, he neglects to advise the Court that his suits
against AIA, certain officers and directors and their attorneys (Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown)
were dismissed. (Affidavit of Gary Babbitt in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment, pp. 5-9).
Mr. Taylor's accusations of fraud have been heard and rejected by the District Court for Nez Perce
County.
Plaintiffs statement of "facts" is moreover internally inconsistent. Plaintiff argues that the
allegations pled by Mr. Taylor against Hawley Troxell in the prior lawsuit in the Second Judicial
District (hereinafter "Hawley Troxell #1) " ... were not causes of action for fraud based on the
Opinion Letter. .. ," yet plaintiff quotes from his own proposed First Amended Complaint in
Hawley Troxell #1 which alleges, "As a result of Riley's acts and/or omissions (which constitute
fraud), Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment."

(Reed Taylor's Statement of Facts, p. 15).
Mr. Taylor asserts that," ... this action has no resemblance whatsoever to the action that was
erroneously dismissed [referring to Hawley Troxell# 1]. " (Reed Taylor's Statement ofFacts, p. 17).
This contention is obviously argumentative in nature, rather than factual. Defendants claim that, to
the contrary, this lawsuit has everything in common with Hawley Troxell# 1, as it involves the same
parties and arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions.
Plaintiff posits as a "fact" that " ... Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin merely needed to draft
and submit a shareholder resolution approving the invasion of capital surplus to redeem Reed
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Taylor's shares .... " in order to avoid any problem with the stock redemption. (Reed Taylor's

Statement of Facts, p. 24). This statement is an illustration of the logical fallacy post hoc ergo
propter hoc. Simply because the corporation did not adopt such a resolution and thereafter lacked
sufficient funds legally to redeem the plaintiffs stock does not mean the lack of funds was caused

by the lack of a resolution. Logically flawed statements of this nature cannot be taken as "facts."
It is unnecessary to detail all the numerous other argumentative or speculative statements
contained in plaintiffs statement of"facts." That document can be considered as nothing more than
an additional legal argument, not as a recitation of evidence or undisputed facts.

C.

Defendants Have Raised Legally and Factually Sufficient Defenses.

The affirmative defenses interposed by Hawley Troxell and Mr. Riley constitute good and
sufficient defenses to plaintiffs complaint and are supportable both as a matter oflaw and factually
based on the undisputed facts which gave rise to this litigation.

1.

Res Judicata Bars the Plaintiff's Claims in this Action.

As plaintiff is compelled to acknowledge, Idaho has adopted the "transactional approach"
to resjudicata. US. Bank Nat'/. Ass 'n. v. Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222, 226, 999 P.2d 877, 881 (2000).
"[A] valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes all claims arising out of the same
transaction or series of transactions out of which the cause of action arose." Diamond v. Farmers

Group, Inc, 119 Idaho 146, 150, 804 P .2d 319, 323 (1990). Res judicata bars not only subsequent
re-litigation of a claim previously asserted, but also re-litigation of any claims relating to the same
cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made. Wing v. Hulet, 106
Idaho 912 915-16, 684 P.2d 314, 317-18 (Ct.App. 1984) ("[T]he rule against splitting a claim applies
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even though the remedies or forms of relief demanded in one suit are different from those demanded
in another."); Farmers Nat. Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63,70, 878 P.2d 762, 769 (1994) ("It is 'well
established' in Idaho law that in an action between the same parties upon the same claim or demand,
the former adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as to every matter offered and received
to sustain or defeat the claim but also every matter which might and should have been litigated in
the first suit."); C Systems, Inc. v. McGee, 145 Idaho 559, 181 P .3d 485, 488 (2008) ("[A] valid and
final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes all claims arising out of the same transaction or
series of transactions out of which the claim arose.").
In Hawley Troxell # l, the District Court in the Second Judicial District granted Hawley
Troxell's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss with prejudice (See Affidavit of James D. LaRue) and
denied plaintiffs motion to file an Amended Complaint on the ground that amendment would be
futile because plaintiff could not state a valid cause of action against Hawley Troxell and the
individual defendants, including Mr. Riley. This constituted a final adjudication3 on the merits in
a case involving the same parties. "[D]ismissal for failure to state a claim precludes a second action
that presents the same claim through a better complaint." C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal

Practice and Procedure §4439, at 358 (1981).

3

Judge Brudie's decision in Hawley Troxell #1 was not "avowedly tentative"and did not invite Mr. Taylor
back into the trial court for further proceedings of any nature. As recognized in Rodriguez v. Dept. of Correction,
136 Idaho 90, 94, 29 P.3d 401, 405 (2001), an adjudication that has conclusive effect is considered final and on the
merits for the purpose of issue preclusion. "[F]or purposes of issue preclusion, a final judgment includes any prior
adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect. .
. . [W]hile preclusion should be refused ifthe previous decision was 'avowedly tentative,' other factors supporting
the conclusion that the decision was final for purposes of issue preclusion included whether the parties were fully
heard, whether the court supported its decision with a reasoned opinion, whether the decision was subject to appeal."
[Citations and internal quotation marks deleted]. Insofar as claim preclusion also requires a final judgment, the same
rule should be applicable.
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The basic principle of res judicata is that a party has but one opportunity to put forth all his
theories of recovery arising out of the same core facts. Under the transactional approach to res

judicata, the critical issue is "whether the two actions under consideration are based on the same
nucleus of operative facts. That the precise claim presented in the second case was not presented
in the former case does not keep the 'new' claim alive." Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Alcatel USA, Inc.,
301 F.Supp. 599, 603 (E.D.Tex. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks deleted).
In an attempt to avoid the preclusive effect of res judicata, plaintiff contends that his causes
of action in the present case are not the same as the causes of action he pied in Hawley Troxell #1. 4
It is argued on behalf of plaintiff that his theory of the case is now different because he is switching
theories to assert the 1995 Opinion Letter was incorrect. 5

However, plaintiff misconceives the

nature of res judicata. The application of res judicata is not limited to what claims were actually
asserted in Hawley Troxell #1, but also what claims could have been asserted.
The defense that the stock redemption agreement was unenforceable because it constituted
an illegal contract was raised in the AIA litigation by defendants Connie Taylor et al. on April 17,

4

Mr. Taylor attempts to distinguish the claims made in Hawley Troxell Lawsuit# 1 from those asserted in
the present case by asserting that formerly his theory was that the 1995 Opinion Letter was correct and Hawley
Troxell's illegality defense was incorrect, whereas he now is adopting the reverse theory that the 1995 Opinion
Letter was incorrect and Hawley Troxell's defense was correct. The gravamen of his claim in both actions is the
alleged conflict between the 1995 Opinion Letter and the subsequent defense of AIA. The attempt to improve his
theory does not entitle Mr. Taylor to another bite of the apple. Res Judicata bars his complaint ifhe had the
opportunity to sue the defendants based upon the same transaction or series of transactions in the prior suit. A
change in the plaintiffs theory of the case or an attempt to improve his pleadings does not avoid the application of
resjudicata. Nothing prevented the plaintiff in Hawley Troxell #1 from asserting these theories in the alternative;
plaintiff was not required and is not allowed, as he seems to assume, to make an election to pursue one theory of
recovery in Hawley Troxell #1, wait for a decision, and then pursue another in a subsequent lawsuit.
5

One can only imagine what plaintiffs next theory will be ifthe Idaho Supreme Court reverses Hawley
Troxell # 1. Will plaintiff then be entitled to proceed in different forums based on inconsistent theories?
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2008, and by AIA by Hawley Troxell on April 21, 2008. (Affidavit of Gary D. Babbitt in Support

ofMotion for Summary Judgment, pp. 4-6).

On July 21, 2008, Mr. Taylor's attorney addressed a

letter to the Board of Directors of AIA, demanding that the corporation sue Hawley Troxell, Mr.
Riley and others for, among other things:
Representing AIA Services and/or AIA insurance in making inappropriate arguments
(including alleged illegality of the debt to Reed) knowing that such arguments were
counter to AIA Services' obligations to Reed and Donna and knowing that Richard
Riley was a witness who provided a legal opinion counter to such arguments;

Affidavit of Gary D. Babbitt in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. M, ~ 26.
On August 5, 2008, Mr. Taylor's lawyer emailed Mr. Babbitt of Hawley Troxell with
additional threats to sue Hawley Troxell and Mr. Riley based upon, other things, the 1995 Opinion
Letter. Among the statements made in that email were the following:
Explain to Mr. Clark how Richard Riley issued an opinion letter to Reed and you are
now trying to disingenuously argue the $8 .5 million is not owed to him .... Explain
to Mr. Clark that even ifthe illegality argument had merit. Donna Taylor and Reed
Taylor would be suing Hawley Troxell (and Richard Riley) in such an instance
regardless of the circumstances.

Affidavit of Gary D. Babbitt in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. L (emphasis in
original).
Approximately four months after the illegality defense was raised in the AIA litigation, with
full knowledge of the fact that AIA was disputing the enforceability and legality of the stock
redemption agreement, Mr. Taylor filed his complaint in Hawley Troxell #1, alleging as follows:
53.
The Defendants were fully aware of Reed J. Taylor's rights to property
in which he held a security interest and was pledged to him as collateral. In fact,
Defendant Richard A. Riley represented AIA Services Corporation in the redemption
of Reed J. Taylor's shares and the drafting of the Amended and Restated Stock
Pledge Agreement and other applicable agreements. Defendants were responsible
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for issuing opm1on letters relating to the transaction, which include various
applicable representations and warranties. Defendants are now asserting arguments
counter to the representations made in the opinion letter drafted by Defendants by
and through Defendant Richard A. Riley. Defendants also assisted in the
commission of torts by R. John Taylor, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., and other
interested parties by representing the corporations in various inappropriate
transactions.
Plaintiff later moved in Hawley Troxell #1 to amend his Complaint to refine his theories.
He included the following separate allegations in the proposed Amended Complaint:
92.
As a former attorney for Reed Taylor and the attorney who provided
an opinion letter to Reed Taylor, defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by
and through an opinion letter that was based upon Riley's personal knowledge
(representing such facts as the transactions being fully legal and authorized by the
corporations), which further invokes personal liability to Riley. Reed Taylor had a
right to rely on Riley's representations and justifiably relied on such representations.
Riley breached his duties when he asserted that the transaction was illegal. Although
Reed Taylor believes the transaction was legal and supported by applicable law,
Riley's actions have breached his duties to Reed Taylor and caused Reed Taylor to
incur damages from the payments of attorneys' fees and costs and lost possession of
property and funds because of AIA Insurance being wrongfully withheld from Reed
Taylor. As a result of Riley's acts and/or omissions (which constitute fraud), Reed
Taylor has been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.

*

*

*

99.
Defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by and through an
opinion letter that was based upon Riley's personal knowledge, which further
invokes personal liability to Riley. Riley breached his duties when he asserted that
the transaction was illegal. Although Reed Taylor believes the transaction was legal
and supported by applicable law, Riley's actions have breached his duties to Reed
Taylor and caused Reed Taylor to incur damages for the payments of attorneys' fees
and costs and lost revenues because of AIA Insurance being wrongfully withheld
from Reed Taylor. As a result of Riley's actions and/or omissions, Reed Taylor has
been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.

*

*

*

118. Defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by and through an
opinion letter that was based upon Riley's personal knowledge, which further
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invokes personal liability to Riley. Riley breached his duties when he asserted that
the transaction was illegal. Although Reed Taylor believes the transaction was legal
and supported by applicable law, Riley's actions have breached his duties to Reed
Taylor and caused Reed Taylor to incur damages for the payments of attorneys' fees
and costs and lost revenues because of AIA Insurance being wrongfully withheld
from Reed Taylor. As a result of Riley's acts and/or omissions, Reed Taylor has
been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.
Thus, plaintiff based his Complaint in Hawley Troxell #1 upon the same transaction - the
same nucleus of operative facts - as he pleads in the present case. The underlying facts are the same,
although plaintiffs theory has changed.

The gist of plaintiffs Complaint is that Eberle Berlin

(through Mr. Riley and Mr. Turnbow) opined in 1995 that the redemption of Mr. Taylor's AIA stock
was a valid, legal and enforceable agreement, while in 2008 Hawley Troxell (by whom Mr. Riley
was then employed) and other parties raised the defense on behalf of AIA in the AIA litigation that
the corporation lacked sufficient earned surplus to redeem Mr. Taylor's shares and, therefore, the
transaction was invalid, illegal and unenforceable. Plaintiff had full opportunity to litigate the effect
of these transactions and claims in Hawley Troxell # 1.
The transactional approach to res judicata rejects the "view that a 'cause of action' is
synonymous with a particular legal theory in which a party's claim for relief must be framed."
Eastern Marine Const. Corp. v. First Southern Leasing, Ltd., 129N.H. 270, 274, 525 A.2d 709, 712

(1987).
Thus the present trend is to define cause of action collectively to refer to all
theories on which relief could be claimed on the basis of the factual transaction in
question. Under such any analysis, a subsequent suit is barred even though the
plaintiff is prepared in the second action ( 1) to present evidence or grounds or
theories of the case not presented in the first action, or (2) to seek remedies or forms
of relief not demanded in the first action. We choose to adopt this modem definition
of' cause of action' as representative of the prevailing trend. Thus, the term connotes
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facts which give rise to one or more relations of right-duty between two or more
persons. It does not describe a mere label or theory applied to those facts.

Id. at 275, 551 A.2d. 713-14 (citations and internal quotation marks deleted).
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments §24 (1982) provides in relevant part as follows:
(1) When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the
plaintiffs claims pursuant to the rules of merger or bar ... , the claim extinguished
includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to
all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the
action arose.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982). Comment c to section 24 further explains as
follows:
[A] transaction may be single despite different harms, substantive theories, measures
or kinds of relief.... That a number of different legal theories casting liability on an
action may apply to a given episode does not create multiple transactions and hence
multiple claims. This remains true although the several legal theories depend on
different shadings of the facts, or would emphasize different elements of the facts,
or would call for different measures of liability or different kinds of relief.
Plaintiff argues that res judicata should not apply because his claims against Hawley Troxell
and Mr. Riley allegedly did not become ripe until June 17, 2009, when the Court ruled in the AIA
litigation that the stock redemption agreement was unenforceable and illegal. By that time, plaintiff
contends, Hawley Troxell #1 had been dismissed, and it was too late for plaintiff to switch his theory
of recovery. Of course, this disregards the fact that plaintiff had known about the illegality issue
well before filing his Complaint in Hawley Troxell # 1, and that plaintiff could have (and in fact did)
raise the issue that Hawley Troxell, on behalf of its client AIA, was taking a position seemingly
contrary to the 1995 Opinion Letter.
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As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 342, 127 P.3d 954,
959 (2005) (citations omitted):
The ripeness doctrine concerns the timing of a suit and asks whether a case
is brought too early. The purpose of the ripeness requirement is to prevent courts
from entangling themselves in purely abstract disagreements. Under the ripeness test
in Idaho, a party must show ( 1) the case presents definite and concrete issues; (2) a
real and substantial controversy exists (as opposed to hypothetical facts); and (3)
there is a present need for adjudication. This Court has recognized that judicial
review may be had where there is no need for further factual development.
Accordingly, in Manley the Court held that a double jeopardy claim was ripe for review after
a mistrial and subsequent dismissal of a criminal complaint without prejudice, even though no new
charges had been filed. Because no new facts would be introduced and the legal issue presented
would be the same, the Court held that the case was ripe for adjudication.
Similarly, in Gibbons v. Cenarrusa, 140 Idaho 316, 92. P .3d. l 063 (2002), the Court held that
a challenge to the Idaho Legislature's repeal of the Term Limits Act, passed as an initiative, was ripe
prior to the deadline for candidates to file for re-election. Noting that, "Ripeness asks whether there
is any need for court action at the present time," Id. at 1065, 92 P .3d at 1065, the Court held that the
case was ripe because there was a need for certainty regarding who could appear on the ballot. In
Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128 Idaho 371, 913 P.2d 1141 (1996), the Court held
that the constitutionality of a county land use ordinance was ripe for adjudication, although the
county commissioners had declared their intent not to enforce the ordinance. The Court held there
was a real and substantial controversy because the ordinance threatened to disturb the status and
management of public lands in the county.
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In United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Severson, 143 Idaho 628, 151P.3d824 (2007), the Idaho
Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the Idaho slayer statue, Idaho Code § 15-2-803,
prevented a husband convicted of his wife's murder from acquiring any part of his wife's life
insurance proceeds. The husband argued the case was not ripe because his criminal conviction was
on appeal and subject to reversal. The husband argued that the pendency of the appeal made the case
premature. However, the Court held the case met the three tests for determining whether a
controversy is ripe for adjudication or would entangle the judicial system in a purely abstract
disagreement: (1) The case presented definite and concrete issues; (2) a real and substantial
controversy existed (as opposed to hypothetical facts); and (3) there was a present need for
adjudication.
Those three tests are similarly met in the case at bar. First, Mr. Taylor's allegations in
Hawley Troxell #1, and the fact that he was aware the enforceability of the 1995-96 agreements was
challenged, presented definite and concrete issues.

Second, a real and substantial controversy

existed regarding whether the firm and the opining attorney owed any duty to Mr. Taylor. Third,
there was a present need for adjudication because plaintiff contended he was damaged by all actions
of the defendants. The issues thus presented were not merely hypothetical or abstract.

Most

importantly, all parties were aware that AIA had not paid the balance allegedly owing to Mr. Taylor
under the stock redemption agreement and was contending, as were other parties, the agreement was
illegal and unenforceable. Mr. Taylor needed no additional information to assert in Hawley Troxell
#1 any claims he wished to assert regarding this transaction. The policy underlying the doctrine of
res judicata prohibits him from trying his claims piecemeal.
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Knowing the same facts as he knows today, plaintiff alleged professional malpractice, breach
of fiduciary duty, and breach of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, and moved to amend his
Complaint to allege fraud and constructive fraud, in Hawley Troxell #1 based on the same nucleus
of operative facts on which he bases his complaint in the case at bar. In the present case, Mr. Taylor
seeks recovery from the same parties with respect to same alleged acts and omissions arising out of
the same transaction, i.e., the redemption of plaintiffs AIA stock and subsequent related events. The
judgment in Hawley Troxell #1 bars any attempt by Mr. Taylor to re-litigate issues which relate to
the redemption of this AIA stock and following events, regardless of any differences in his choice
of theories.

Since res judicata applies to plaintiffs claims, his request for partial summary

judgment must be denied.

2.

Collateral Estoppel Also Bars Plaintiff's Claims of Fraud and Constructive
Fraud in this Action.

While res judicata or claim preclusion "refers to the effect of a judgment in foreclosing
litigation of a matter that never has been litigated, because of the determination that it should have
been advanced in an earlier suit," Buckeye Community Hope Foundation v. City ofCuyahoga Falls,

970 F.Supp. 1289 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (emphasis added), collateral estoppel or issue preclusion
operates to bar re-litigation of the identical issues with the same parties or their privies. Ticor Title
v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613, 617 (2007). Thus, collateral estoppel bars any and
all issues actually litigated by Mr. Taylor in a previous case against a party in privity with Hawley
Troxell and Mr. Riley.
Hawley Troxell and Mr. Riley are in privity with their client, AIA. See Weinberger v.
Tucker, 510 F.3d 486 (2007) (applying Virginia law); Jaye! Corporation v. Cochran, 366 Ark. 175,
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234 S.W.3d278 (2006);DeLisle v. Avallone, 117N.M. 602, 874P.2d1266 (1994);A.1 Credit Corp.

v. Aguilar & Sebastinelli, 113 Cal.App.4th 1072, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 813 (1988) (describing the
circumstances in which attorney and client are in privity for purposes of collateral estoppel). The
same counsel who represent Mr. Taylor in the present case represented him in the AIA litigation and
raised the same claims of fraud which Mr. Taylor now seeks to assert in the present litigation. In that
case the Court found that no fraud was committed in propounding the 1995 Opinion Letter:
Plaintiffs fourth argument for the enforceability of the agreement is a claim
of constructive fraud. Plaintiff bases his claim on the opinion letter from corporate
counsel stating that, to the best of counsel's knowledge, the stock redemption
agreement violated no laws or regulations and on the representations of John Taylor
as a corporate director that no laws or regulations were violated by the agreement.
To prove fraud, including constructive fraud, a claimant must show a false statement
of fact on which the hearer relied. Country Cove Development Inc. v. May, 143
Idaho 595, 150 P.3d 288 (2006). The statements by corporate counsel and others
that the stock redemption agreement did not violate any laws or regulations were
offered as opinion, not fact. "Opinions and predictions cannot form the basis of a
fraud claim because they do not speak to matters of fact." Id at 601. Counsel for
AIA expressed an opinion that no statute was violated by the stock redemption
agreement, an opinion currently postulated to the Court by Plaintiff. Such an opinion
was no more a statement of fact when expressed by corporate counsel in 1995 than
it is now when asserted by Plaintiff. It is, simply, an opinion based on one's
interpretation of law and cannot form the basis of a fraud claim. 6
It is irrelevant whether or not Mr. Taylor could have raised better arguments relating to

possible exceptions to the rule that voicing an opinion does not constitute fraud. Having once
litigated the issue, he is barred by collateral estoppel from re-litigating it. Since collateral estoppel

6

Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of Court's Grant of
Partial Summary Judgment; Clarification of Ruling on Motions to Strike; Alternative Motion for Rule 54(b)
Certification; Motion for Order to Protect Property and for Stay, Case No. CV 07-00208, in the District Court of
the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for Nez Perce County, p. 6. (Babbitt Affidavit, Exhibit K)
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applies to plaintiffs claims of fraud and constructive fraud, his motion for partial summary judgment
striking the defenses to these claims must be denied.

3.

Plaintifrs Complaint Is Barred by the Applicable Statutes of Limitation.

A cause of action for professional malpractice accrues and the statute of limitation begins to
run when the plaintiff sustains "some damage." Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 542, 808 P.2d
876, 879 (1991 ). 7 In the present case, there can be no doubt that plaintiff sustained some damage,
at the latest, when AIA failed to pay the balance of the promissory note to plaintiff when it matured
on August 1, 2005. 8

At that point Mr. Taylor indisputably sustained some damage and his cause

of action for professional malpractice accrued and is now barred by the two-year limitation period
ofldaho Code §5-219(4).
Plaintiffs cause of action, if any, for alleged violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act
is now barred by the two-year limitation period of Idaho Code §48-619, which provides that, "No
private cause of action may be brought under this act (the ICP A) more than two (2) years after the

7

"This Court has dealt with the question of professional malpractice in a number of recent cases. These
cases point out that while LC.§ 5-219(4) provides that 'the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued as of the
time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of ... , ' nevertheless until some damage occurs no cause of
action accrues for professional malpractice, even though the 'occurrence, act or omission complained of,' which
ultimately causes the damages has occurred earlier." Treasure Valley Bank v. Killen & Pittenger, P.A., 112 Idaho
357, 359, 732 P.2d 326, 328 (1987), citing Mack Financial Corp. v. Smith, 111 Idaho 8, 720 P.2d 191 (1986); Streib
v. Veigel, I 09 Idaho 174, 706 P.2d 63 (1985); Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 698 P.2d 315 (1985); Stephens v.
Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 (1984).
8

In point of fact, Mr. Taylor sustained some damage much earlier. He states that, "I would never have
sold my shares but for the representations made by ... Richard Riley and Eberle Berlin that the redemption was
legal." (Reed Taylor's Statement of Facts, p. 7). Elsewhere, he states that, "Almost 14 years have gone by since I
sold my shares in AJA Services in 1995. John Taylor, James Beck, and Michael Cashman have controlled AJA
services since my shares were redeemed in 1995 and there is nothing that can be done to replace the lost time. I have
been deprived of my right to request to have my shares returned because over 13 years have transpired and AJA
Services business has been substantially depleted under the management of John Taylor." Affidavit of Reed J.
Taylor~ 7, dated April 9, 2009, in AJA litigation. (Babbitt Affidavit, Exhibit A)
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cause of action accrues." The cause of action for alleged violation of the ICPA accrued as early as
1995, but in any event not later than August 1, 2005, when the plaintiff suffered "some damage."
Mr. Taylor acknowledges that he was damaged when AIA defaulted. 9

His cause of action for

alleged violation of the ICPA is barred by Idaho Code§ 48-619.
With respect to plaintiffs cause of action for fraud, the applicable statute of limitation is
three years. Idaho Code §5-218(4).

The issue is when plaintiff was, or with the exercise of

reasonable care, should have been on notice of the facts constituting the alleged fraud. An objective
test is applied to determine when a reasonable person should have discovered the facts constituting
the alleged fraud. "Discovery relates to the facts constituting fraud rather than a mere recognition
that something is wrong and the commencement of an investigation." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho
765, 773, 820 P.2 360, 368 (1991). The statute of limitations begins to run when plaintiff has
knowledge of facts sufficient to put a reasonably prudent person on notice that fraud has occurred.
"[W]here only one conclusion can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the question of
the exercise of reasonable diligence to discover fraud may be decided by the court as a matter of
law." Full Circle, Inc. v. Schelling, 108 Idaho 634, 638, 701 P.2d 254, 259 (1985).

As the

president, chairman of the board, and largest shareholder of AIA, Mr. Taylor was familiar with its
operations and finances and was represented by counsel and an accountant of his choosing.

(Affidavit of Richard A. Riley in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,

~

4). He had full

opportunity to examine the corporate records. No facts regarding the financial condition of the

9

Reed Taylor's Statement of Facts at p. 24 puts it as follows: "Reed Taylor's damages in this suit, unlike
his first action against Hawley Troxell, is for the loss of his $6M Note and rights to obtain payment by and through
the redemption agreements ...."
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corporation were hidden from him. The facts constituting any alleged fraud in connection with the
redemption of his stock were known or should have been known to him in 1995.
In regard to the redemption of Mr. Taylor's stock in AIA, the key fact was whether the
corporation possessed sufficient earned surplus in 1995 or 1996 to redeem his stock. A reasonably
prudent person in Mr. Taylor's position, with the assistance of paid professionals chosen by himself,
should have been able to ascertain for himself the corporation's capital structure. There is no
allegation that the corporate financial records were themselves misleading or incomplete.

Mr.

Taylor must be deemed to have been on notice of facts in 1995 that would have commenced the
running of the statute of limitation applicable to an action for fraud.

Judge Brudie was "not

persuaded by plaintiffs efforts to paint himself as an innocent and naive party. "10
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "actual knowledge of the fraud will be inferred
where the allegedly aggrieved party could have discovered it by the exercise of due diligence."
Nancy Lee Mines, Inc. v. Harrison, 95 Idaho 546, 547, 511 P.2d 828, 829 (1973), citing Davis v.
Harrison, 25 Wash. 2d 1, 167 P.1015, 1024 (1946):

We hold that this action was barred by the three year statute of limitations,
whether appellants had actual knowledge of the various transactions or not, for the
reason that the facts were open and appeared upon the records of the corporation,
subject to inspection by stockholders. If the stockholders failed to examine the

10

Judge Brudie found that, "Reed Taylor was the founder of AJA and, at the time the agreement was
entered into, the majority shareholder. Reed Taylor was in a position to have intimate knowledge of the
corporation's financial status. This is not a case where the parties to the agreement were not in pari de/icto, as
asserted by Plaintiff. If Reed Taylor was uninformed as to the financial status of the corporation, that was a
voluntary choice on his part and is insufficient to make him an innocent party to the agreement." (Babbitt Aff., Ex.
K, Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of Court's Grant of Partial
Summary Judgment; Clarification of Ruling on Motions to Strike; Alternative Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification;
Motion for Order to Protect Property and for Stay, AJA litigation).
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corporate records, they must have been negligent and careless of their own interests.
The means of knowledge were open to them, and means of knowledge are equivalent
to actual knowledge.
In present case, plaintiff and his advisors had full and unfettered opportunity to inspect the
corporate records. Mr. Taylor knew, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
known, the amount of AIA's earned surplus, or lack thereof. He must be deemed to have knowledge
of facts sufficient to put him on notice of any alleged fraud in 1995, which is when the statute of
limitation for fraud commenced to run. Plaintiff is time barred from bringing an action based on
alleged fraud 14 years later.
With respect to alleged breach of fiduciary duty, where a claim is not covered by any other
statute oflimitation, the 4-year limitation ofldaho Code § 5-224 will be applied. Jones v. Kootenai

County Title Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 607, 873 P.2d 861 (1994).

The Complaint alleges breach of

fiduciary duty in connection of the redemption of plaintiffs stock in AIA and the issuance of the
1995 Opinion Letter. 11 Since the occurrence, acts or omissions complained of happened in1995,
and plaintiff sustained damages at the latest on August 1, 2005, when AIA defaulted on payment of
the promissory note, Idaho Code§ 5-224 bars any claim at this time for alleged breach of fiduciary
duty.

11

Although the Complaint alleges that Mr. Riley's alleged fiduciary duties to Mr. Taylor at the time the
Opinion Letter was prepared in 1995 are imputed to Hawley Troxell, this cannot possibly be correct since Mr. Riley
did not become employed by Hawley Troxell until 1999.
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4.

Idaho Does Not Recognize the Tort of Negligent Misrepresentation Except in the
Narrow Confines of a Professional Relationship Involving an Accountant.
Plaintiff argues that the tort of negligent misrepresentation under the jurisprudence of this

State should be extended to "professionals such as attorneys, engineers, physicians, insurance agents
and architects." (PlaintiffReed J. Taylor's Memorandum ofLaw in Opposition to Defendants Riley
and Hawley Troxell 's Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, p.

18). However, the issue has been decided by the Idaho Supreme Court, which held in Duffin v.
Idaho Crop Improvement Association, 126 Idaho 1002, 1010 895 P.2d 1195, 1203 (1995), reh. den.
June 22, 1995, "[W]e expressly hold that, except in the narrow confines of a professional

relationship involving an accountant, the tort of negligent misrepresentation is not recognized in
Idaho." Duffin has not been overruled or modified, but was cited with approval in Mannas v Moss,
143 Idaho 927, 935, 155 P.3d 1166, 1174 (2007).

5.

Since Mr. Taylor Is Not a Shareholder of AIA, He May Not Assert Shareholder
Derivative Claims against Defendants.

Plaintiffs motion seeks to strike any defense of failure to comply with derivative demand.
It is not clear what plaintiff means by this request, and his supporting memorandum does not explain.

In any event, Mr. Taylor is not entitled to bring a shareholder derivative action against Hawley
Troxell or Mr. Riley because he is not, and was not at any relevant time, a shareholder of the
corporation. This issue has already been determined in Hawley Troxell #1:
Plaintiffs attempt to bring derivative claims on behalf of AIA Insurance and
AIA Services fail as a matter of law. Idaho Code §30-1-741 clearly and
unambiguously provides standing to bring derivative proceedings only to those who
are shareholders at the time of the act or omission complained of and only to those
shareholders who fairly and adequately represent the interests of the corporation. As
noted bytheABA Official Comment atthe endofl.C. §30-1-741, while some state's
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have eliminated the "contemporaneous" ownership rule, Idaho's legislature chose to
retain the requirement, as is evidenced by the language in the statute. Plaintiff
contends that, because other states have allowed creditors and stock pledges to bring
derivative claims, standing should not be limited to shareholders. The Court is not
persuaded. Idaho Code § 30-1-741 is clear and unambiguous, making it clear Idaho's
legislature has chosen to limit derivative claims to shareholders only.

Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint,
p. 15, Hawley Troxell #1, Affidavit ofGary D. Babbitt in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment,
Ex.Q.
D.

Conclusion

For the reasons articulated herein, plaintiffs motion to strike defendants affirmative defenses
and to enter summary judgment in plaintiffs favor should be denied.
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DATED this __i_1=_ day of March, 2010.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By:~dAfL_
es D:iaRUe, Of the Firm

Riley and

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ l l day of March, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, Washington 99201
Jack S. Gjording
Julianne S. Hall
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
_K' Facsimile Transmission (509) 455-7111
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
v- Facsimile Transmission (208) 336-9177
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MICHAELS. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 4 I 6
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Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
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Atlomeys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH nJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
CaseNo.: CV-OC-2009-18868
Plaintiff.
v.

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability p~rtncrship;
ROBERT M. TURNBOW, a:1 individual; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& l'vkKL VEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMOR/\NTIUM JN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONS FOR SurvUvLA.RY JUDG!VtENT
AND IN SUPPORT Of CROSS MOTIO!'-iS
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Defendants.
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor"), by and through his attorneys of record,

Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC, submits the following Supplemental Memorandum of La'.v in

Opposition to Defendants' Molions for Summary Judgment and in Support of Reed Taylor's
Cross Motions for Partial Summary Judgment:

I.

LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENTS

Reed Taylor incorporates by reference into each and every argument asserted below Reed
Taylor's Statement Facts in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and in
Support of Cross Motions for Summary Judgment ("Facts").
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A. Recd Taylor's negligent misrepresentation claim has, for all practical purposes,
already been adopted bv Idaho and summary judgment should be granted to Recd
Tavlor on this claim.
As asserted by Reed Taylor in prior briefing, the tort of negligent misrepresentations has
been adopted and prosecuted in many states.

See e.g., Prudential !11s11rance Company oj

America v. Dewey, Ballanti11e, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 605 N.E.2d 318. 320 (N.Y. 1992):

Crossland Savings Bank FSB v. Rockwood Insurance Company, 700 F. Supp. 1274 (N.Y. 1988);
Finuva Capital Corporation v. Berger, 18 A.D.3d 256, 379-81 (N. Y. 2005 ); Roberts v. Bal!,
Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baern1it=, 128 Cal.Rptr. 901 (Cal. 1976).

The defendants assert that the tort of negligent misrepresentations should not be adopted
in Idaho and that Reed Taylor's c:laims are all barred by the standard set forth in Harrigfeld

i·.

J.D. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004). However, Harrigfeld not only supports Recd

Taylor's claims in this action, when the Idaho Supreme Court adopted the same standard used in
California to expand claims against attorneys and adopted the trend of relaxing the privity
requirement. Id. at 13 7 (citing Biakcmja v. Irving, 320 P .2d 16 (Cal. 1958)). Jn Roberrs, the
California Court of Appeals addressed the tort of negligent misrepresentation using the standard
that it long followed and was same standard adopted by the Idaho Supreme Cour1 as set fortl1 in
llarrigfeld:

Jn U1e instant case, according to plaintiff's allegations, defendants undertook, on behalf of
their clients, to assist in seeming loans from various persons, including plaintiff. for the
benefit of BBC. The defendants' opinion concerning the status of the partners was
rendered for the purpose of influencing plaintiffs conduct, and hann to him was clearly
foreseeable. We have no difficulty, therefore, in determining that the issuance of a legal
opinion intended to secure benefit for the client, either monetary or othcrnise, must be
issm:d with due care, or the attomt:ys who do not act carefully \\ill have breached a duty
owed to those they attempted or expected to influence on behalf of their clients.
Rubt:rts, 128 Cal. Rptr. At 906 (emphasis added). Moreover, there is even more of a duty as

Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin were Reed Taylor's personal attorneys. While they now assert
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that that relationship ended a few years before the Opinion Letter was drafted and delivered, this
assertion is contrary to Riley seeking conflict waivers from Reed Taylor as late as 2006. At a
minimum, this dual relationship created an even more heightened duty on Riley, Turnbow and
Eberle Berlin.

1

Reed Taylor has proven, as a matter of law, that the Opinion Lener contains negligently
misrepresented facts and opinions provided to him in order to induce him to sell his shares.
(Facts, §§D, L and N; Complaint.) These opinions and representations include those set fonh in
the Opinion Letter and those made by Riley at various meetings of AJA Services' Board of
Directors. (Facts, §§C and N .) Recd Taylor relied upon the opinions and representations. (id ..
~D.)

Their representations and opinions contained misrepresentations as determined by the

district court in Taylor v. AIA Services, et al.

(Facts, §L; 12/3/09 Babbitt Aff., Ex . .J.) Reeu

Taylor has suffered damages as his $6 Million Promissory Nott: has been ruled illegal and
unenforceablt:.

(Fads, §N; 2/2/l 0 Taylor Aff., Ex. D; 1213109 Babbitt Aff., Ex. J.)

The

ddendants do not dispute any of proven elements of negligent misrepresentations, rather, they
only assert, and nothing more, that Idaho does not recognize the tort. The defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment should be denied and partial summary judgment should be granted in
favor of Reed Taylor on this claim on the issue of liability.
B. Reed Taylor is n consumer under the Consumer Protection Act and/or a third-party
beneficiary with standing to pursue such claims.
A consumer need not have paid for services to have a CPA daim and a may also qualify

as a consumer as a third party beneficiary of services. Bohl.s v. Oakes, 75 S.\\'.3d 473, 479 (Tex.
2002); see also Kansallis Finance LTD v. Fern, 40 F.3d 476 (1st Cir. 1994): Perez v. Kirk &

It is noteworthy that Mr. Riley held himself out as an expert in the field of eurncd imd capital surplu~ and
he even aurhored an article on the issue. See "Shares and Distributions'" bv the Idaho State Bar and Richard A.
Riley; '10-Apr Advocate (Idaho) 24 (April, I 997).
1
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Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. 1991). In Bohls, the defendants asserted the same arguments
presently being asserted by the defendants in this action:
Bohls contends the Oakeses were not consumers because there \Vas no legal relationship
or \vrittcn agreement between Bahls and the Oakes, there was no transfer of goods or
services founded on 'valuable consideration,' there was no evidence of a purchase or
payment for services, and wha1ever services he may have pro\'ided were gratuitous ...

Bohls, 75 S.W.3d at 479. However, the Texas Court of Appeals soundly rejected this argwncnt
by holding that the person need not have paid for the services and that a third-party beneficiary is
also a consumer:
Consumer status is c.-.tahlishcd merely be seeking to acquire sen ices, even if the
services are not actuallv acquired, and no monev need change hands to establish
consumer status. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wilson, 963 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1998, no pet.). Thus, it was not necessary for there to h:1vc been a written
agreement, an actual purchase, or an\' consideration paid for Chal'les to be a
consumer ...
1

Plaintiffs establish their standing as consumers by their relationship to the transaction, not
by a contractual relationship with the defendant. Kennedy v. Sale, 689 S.W.2d 890. 89293 (Tex. 1985). Pri"·ity between the plaintiff and defendant is not a consideration in
deciding the plaintiff's consumer status under the DTPA. Id. Thus, although the
term 'consmner' includes one who acquires goods or services by purchase or lease. the
plaintiff need not herself be the one who purchases or leases the goods or sen•iccs to
be a consumer. Id.; Lukasik, 21 S.\V.3d at 401. A third party beneficiary may qualify
as a consumer of goods or services, as long the transaction was specifically re<1uircd
by or intended to benefit the third party and the good or service bl'ncfit the party
and the good or scn·icc n·as rendered to benefit the third partv. Lukasik, 21 S.W.3d
at 401.

Bahls, 75 S. W.3d at 479. (emphasis added). Significantly, Reed Taylor actually paid for Riley,
Tumbow and Eberle Berlin's services as consideration for the

purcha~e

of his shares, as AJA

Services was obligated to provide and pay for Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's legal services
rendered to provide the Opinion Letter.

,.

- -

(11/24/09 Riley Aff., Ex. /\., p. 4. §2.S(i).) Riley,

TurnbO\\' and Eberle Berlin were well aware of their contractual obligations to provide the
Opinion Letter and they did so without objection. Finally, Reed Taylor asserts that Riley and
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Eberle Berlin were his attorneys at the time of the redemption in 1995 and there is evidence to
corroborate this.

This Court denied his partial summary judgment finding issues of fact

pertaining to the issue of Riley and Eberle Berlin's past representation of Recd Taylor. This
a~so, at a minimum, establishes

an issue of fact as to whether Reed Taylor had direct privity with

them at that time.
The main thrust of Reed Taylor's Consumer Protection Act claims is bused upon Riley
and Hawley Troxell's actions in the last 2 years, not what Riley did or did not do back in 1995.
For analogy purposes, if Riley had sold Reed a car in 1995 and advised him that he bad
marketable title to the car to close the transaction to induce Reed Taylor to purchase the care.
then Riley could not come back 10 years later after he had spent the money Reed Taylor paid for
the car and assert that he did not have marketable title. Riley had an affirmative duty to stand
behind his Opinion Letter or withdraw as attorney for AIA Services. Instead, he chose to remain
to assist Hawley Troxell in asserting the redemption was illegal in an attempt to avoid liability
for the millions of dollars in attorneys' fees accepted by his firm and assets his firm had assisted
others in pledging to others when he knew such assets were all subject to Reed Taylor's security
interests.

Moreover, Riley knew that Reed Taylor's $6M Note was for his retirement and then

he and Hawley Troxell assisted in taking that retirement away from the elderly Reed Taylor.
There can be no set of facts better suited to impose exemplary damages. As noted in

Davin, L.L.C. v. Daham, 746 A.2d 1034, 1045 (N.J. 2000), "(t]he practice of Jaw is a profossion,
not a business. An attorney is not merely a hired gun, but, rather, a professional required to act
with candor and honesty." Id. "[H]e had the right, if not the duty, to cease representing them."

id.

Accordingly, any assertions of lack of privity have no application to Reed Taylor"s

Consumer Protection Act claim in thi!' action and, even if applicable, he has third-pu.rty
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beneficiary standing to assert the claim. The court should deny the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, and enter partial summary judgment in favor of Reed Taylor on this claim
against Riley and Hawley Troxell. Riley and Hawley Troxell do not dispute or deny what they
have done, rather, they only assert that there is no privity. Their

~fotion

for Smnmary Judgment

should be denied and partial summary judgment entered in favor of Reed on this issue and claim.

C. Reed Taylor's breach of fiduciary duties claims are separate and distinct and arc
alternative claims.
"'fT]he absence of an attorney-client relationship docs not preclude defendants from
asserting a cause of action alleging breach of fiduciary." Davin, L.L.C. v. Daham. 746 A.2d
1034, 1045 (N.J. 2000) (holding that fiduciary duties were owed to non-clients). Attorneys owe
their undivided duty of loyalty to clients. RPC 1.7 n. 6. This undivided duty of loyalty also

pertains to the existence of a corporations when a particular transaction occurred. Jn re Skyi.rny

Communications Holding Corp v. Island Capital Management. LLC., 415 B.R. 859, 869 (:vLD.
Florida 2009).
Rj]ey, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin were retained and paid to ensure thal the redemption of

Reed Taylor's shares was a legal transaction and the documents were unenforceable.

The

company and its insiders wanted to effectuate a public offering or sale of the company and they
needed Reed Taylor eliminated as a shareholder as he opposed such decisions.

Thus, Riley,

Turnbow and Eberle Berlin owed /\.Ii\. Services undivided duties of loyalty as the corporation
existed prior to the closing of Reed Taylor's redemption in 1995 (which was to ensure the
transaction wa-; legal) and duties to Reed Taylor as their client and recipient of the Opinion
Letter delivered to induce him to sell his shares. Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin are barred
from attacking their legal representations and services provided in 1995 pertaining to the legality
of

1h~

redemption. Riley and his new firm Hawley Troxell are equally barred and Riley has
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admitted to assisting m the representation of AIA Services to attack the legality of the
redemption.
To clarify, Reed Taylor asserts that the breach of fiduciary duty claims asserted against
Riley and Hawley Troxell are based solely upon their involvement successfully asserting that the
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares was illegal in Taylor v. AJA Serv;ces. et al. With respect to
Turnbow and Eberle Berlin, they had nn affirmative duty to intervene in Taylor v. AJA Sen,ices.

et al., and support the Opinion Letter. Instead, the abandoned Reed Taylor and art:

nO\\'

asserting

that he is barred from recove1ing based upon rcsjudicata, collateral cstoppcl, and other defe11Sl.:S.
In the alternative, until it is established that Reed Taylor prevails on his negligence based
claims, his breach of fiduciary duty claims provide alternative causes of action to pursue his
millions of dollars in damages.

Thus, Recd Taylor's breach of fiduciary duty claims are causes

of action pertaining to events, acts and/or omissions in the past three years, and also alternative
causes of action for what transpired in 1995 and which acts and/or omissions Reed Taylor had no
knowledge of until .June 17, 2009.

Partial Summary Judgment should be denied to the

defendants and granted in favor of Reed Taylor as to liability on the claim and striking the statute
of limitations defense.

D. Defendants res judicafa defense lacks merit.
Pursuant to I.R.L 20 I (d), Reed Taylor requests that the court take judicial notice of the
fact that Riley and Hmvlcy Troxell have asserted that there is no final judgment in Taylor

i-.

Babbitt. et al., Nez Perce County District Court Case No.: CV2008-000l765 and Taylor v.
AfcNichols, et al., Nez Perce County District Court Case No.: CV2008-000l 763, specifically, (1)
Defend ants Joint Motion for Amended Judgments filed on February 16, 20 I 0: (2) the Affidavit
of Jeffrey A. Thomson in Support of Defendants Joint Motion for Amended Judgments filed on
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Carnpbe 11,

Febrnary 16, 2010; (3) Reply in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion for Amended Judgments
filed on March 2, 2010; and (4) Supplemental Affidavit of Jeffrey Thomson in Support of
Defendants' Joint Motion for Amended Judgments filed on March 2, 2010.

Recd Taylor's sole purpose for requesting judicial notice of the above-referenced
documents is to demonstrate that the defendants are asserting that there is a final judgment in this
court, while they are asserting in the court where the final judgment was allegedly derived in the

first case against Hawley Troxell and Riley that there is no final judgment. For this reason alone,
there can be no res judicata.

2

II. CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated above, the Court should deny the Defendants' l'v1otion for
Summary Judgment and enter judgment in favor of Reed Taylor striking their defenses of res
judicat.a, collateral estoppel and statutes of limitations, and enter judgment in favor of Reed

Taylor on his negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty claims as these causes of
action do not need expert witness testimony. 3
DA TED this

12th

day of March, 2010.
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC

By:

Roderic~

Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

' Although the Joint Motion \\as cleverly cloaked as one to "Amend Judgment>." the reality is tha! ~he
defendants all assert that there is no final judgment in those cases. Although Recd Taylor believes that this
acgumenl is not necessary for him to prevail on the res judieata defense, it does prove that the defendants have not
met their burden of proving a fin a1judgment.
~ To the extent that the defendants assert or argue that Reed Taylor has no submitted the requisite expe11
witness testimony to support his claims or defeat their Motions for Summary Judgment, Reed Taylor moves the
court for an extension of time to obtain expert witness testimony as provided under l.R.C.P. ~6(1). Reed Taylor "vi:I
obtain and submit expert witness testimony that the defendants breached their duties, including the s!andard of care,
nhen they provided their legal services and delivered the Opinion Letter.
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Via:

Jack S. Gjording
Julianne S. Hall
Gjording & Fouscr, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax: (208) 336-9177

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile
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Via:
James D. LaRuc
Loren C. Ipsen
Elam & Burke, PA
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83704
Fax: (208) 384-5844

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
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(X) Email (pdf attachment)
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J QA\110 NAVARRO, Clerk
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Jack S. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
Julianne S. Hall, ISB No. 6207
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208)336-9777
Facsimile: (208)336-9177

Attorneys for Defendants Robert M. Turnbow and
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
ROBERT M. TURNBOW, an individual; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0918868

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFF'S CROSS MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

COME NOW, Defendants Robert M. Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &
McKlveen, Chtd. (hereinafter "Defendants", "Turnbow" and/or "Eberle Berlin"), by and through
their counsel of record, Gjording & Fouser, PLLC, and respectfully submit this Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Cross Motion for Summary Judgment.
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I. ARGUMENT
A.

Partial Summary Judgment is not the appropriate avenue to strike Defendants'
defenses.

Plaintiff has filed a Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to strike all of the
defenses raised by Defendants. 1 However, a 12(£) motion is the proper motion for attacking an
insufficient defense. Stewart v. Arrington Constr. Co., 92 Idaho 526, 529-530 (1968) citing the
1948 Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure. See also 3A Barron and
Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 438 (1958). Moreover, Rule 12(£) of the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure provides:
Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive
pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within twenty
(20) days after the service of the pleading upon the party or upon the court's own
initiative at any time, the court may order stricken from any pleading any
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous
matter.
Plaintiff did not file a timely Motion to Strike in accordance with Rule 12(£).
Furthermore, a motion to strike has never been held appropriate where the defens es pled raised
on their face genuine issues of fact or law. Rosenberg v. Toetly, 94 Idaho 413, 489 P.2d 446
(1971 ). In this case, it is clear that Defendants' defenses raise genuine issues and the granting of
a Motion to Strike would be improper. Moreover, as more fully developed in Defendants'
Memorandum and Reply in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, as a matter of law,
these defenses provide the basis for summary judgment in Defendants' favor.
1

Plaintiff states in his Cross Motion that he is seeking to strike the defenses in Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment. Defendants' defenses were asserted in their Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint, not their Motion for
Summary Judgment. Accordingly, it is presumed that Plaintiff is trying to strike some of Defendants' defenses in
their Answer.

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, P. 2
001583

B.

The defenses in Defendants Turnbow's and Eberle Berlin's respective Answers are
strong and material defenses to Plaintiff's Complaint.
1.

Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel

To the extent that Defendant Riley was employed by Defendant Eberle Berlin and to the
extent that the defenses of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel apply to Mr. Riley for his
actions during this time period, Defendant Eberle Berlin joins in the Memorandum of Defendants
Riley and Hawley Troxell in Opposition to Plaintiff's Amended Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment on these issues.

2.

Statute of Limitations

As further developed in Defendants' Memorandum and Reply in Support of their Motion
for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations; thus,
Plaintiff's request for partial summary judgment striking this defense should be denied.
Plaintiffs cause of action for professional malpractice is barred by the two-year statute of
limitations. As outlined in detail in Defendants' Memorandum in Support of their Motion for
Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs cause of action for professional malpractice accrued and Plaintiff
suffered some damage in 1995. Plaintiffs financial losses continued to become more objectively
ascertainable in April 1996.

There is no discovery exception to Idaho Code § 5-219(4).

Plaintiffs cause of action for professional malpractice, asserted in 2009, is time barred.
Additionally, Plaintiffs cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against Defendants
Turnbow and Eberle Berlin (to the extent that Defendants Riley and Turnbow were attorneys
employed by Eberle Berlin) arises out of Defendants' performance of professional services.
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Accordingly, Plaintiffs cause of action is governed by the two-year statute of limitations set
forth in Idaho Code§ 5-219(4). Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 585 (2002).
Plaintiffs claim for negligent misrepresentation is also timed barred pursuant to Idaho
Code § 5-224. It is time barred because this action, assuming such a cause of action was valid,
must be commenced within four years after the cause of action accrued. Any representations
giving rise to such a claim were made by Defendants Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin in 1995.
Plaintiff did not file his cause of action until September 30, 2009.
Furthermore, under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, a private cause of action cannot
be brought more than two years after the cause of action accrues. I.C. § 48-618. Any cause of
action under this Act accrued in 1995. Plaintiff brought his action in 2009, 14 years later.
With regard to the statute of limitations for fraud, I.C. § 5-218(4) provides a three year
statute. Idaho Code § 5-218(4) also provides that a cause of action for relief on the ground of
fraud or mistake accrues upon discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the
fraud or mistake. See also McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 772 (1991).
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, Defendants' defense that Plaintiff's causes of action are
barred by the statute of limitations is supportable both as matter of fact and factually based on
the undisputed facts which gave rise to this litigation.
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Additionally, Plaintiff cannot rely on the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

Under the

doctrine of equitable estoppel, Plaintiff cannot establish the prima facie case to necessary to
assert equitable estoppel based on the record before this Court. 2
Moreover, equitable estoppel does not eliminate, toll, or extend the statute of limitations.

JR. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics Int'/, Inc., 126 Idaho 532, 887 P.2d 1039 (1994).

It merely

temporarily bars a party from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense. Ferro, 143 Idaho
538; 149 P.3d 813 (2006). The temporary bar lasts only for a reasonable time after the party
asserting estoppel discovers or reasonably could have discovered the truth. Knudsen v. Agee, 128
Idaho 776, 918 P.2d 1221 (1996) (estoppel did not bar defendants from relying upon the statute
of limitations where plaintiff learned of an allegedly concealed fact within adequate time to bring
a lawsuit prior to the running of the statute of limitations). Once the party claiming estoppel
discovers the truth with respect to the alleged misrepresentations upon which the estoppel is
based, that party must act with due diligence in asserting the claim. Ferro, 143 Idaho 538; 149
P.3d 813 (2006).
In this case, not only can Plaintiff not establish prima facie case of equitable estoppel, his
filing of the professional malpractice action was not completed in within a reasonable time after
he reasonably could have discovered the truth.

It is undisputed that Connie Taylor raised

2

The prima facie case of equitable estoppel requires: (1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact
with actual or constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting estoppel did not know or could not
discover the truth; (3) that the false representation or concealment was made with the intent that it be relied upon;
and (4) that the person to whom the representation was made, or from whom the facts were concealed, relied and
acted upon the representation or concealment to his prejudice. Idaho Title Company v. American Insurance
Company, 96 Idaho 465, 531P.2d227 (1975).
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illegality as a defense in the AIA litigation in April of 2008. 3 Plaintiff waited until September
30, 2009, approximately a year and half, to bring this lawsuit for professional negligence.
Hence, Plaintiff failed to act with the requisite due diligence in asserting his claim and equitable
estoppel, though Plaintiff fails to establish it, still would not preclude Defendants from asserting
the defense of statute of limitations.
3.

Fraud may not be based on opinion.

Plaintiffs argument is not specifically related to any of defenses asserted by Defendants.
Defendants asserted a defense regarding the need to allege fraud and/or constructive fraud with
particularity, which is well supported by Idaho law.

In further response, Idaho law clearly

provides that opinions and predictions cannot form the basis of a fraud claim. Country Cove
Dev., Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, 601 (2006). Moreover, in Idaho, the mere expression of an

opinion, which is understood to be only an opinion, does not render a person expressing it liable
for fraud. Fox v. Cosgriff, 66 Idaho 371, 381 (1945). Additionally, under Idaho law, an action
for fraud will not lie in statements about future events. 4 Id. Idaho law clearly requires the
plaintiff to form his own conclusions regarding the occurrence of future events. Thomas v. Med.

3

Plaintiff tries to distinguish Ms. Taylor's allegation as "irrelevant" because she asserted the contract was illegal
based on a violation of the former Idaho Code § 30-1-46, as opposed to the Idaho Code § 30-1-6. The code section
this illegality argument was based on is wholly irrelevant because Plaintiff's contention, or one of them, is that
Defendants Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin committed malpractice by offering an opinion that the transaction did
not violate any section of the Idaho Code (the opinion letter was not just limited to Idaho Code § 30-1-6 as Plaintiff
suggests).
4
For example, in Country Cove Dev., the statement of fact that the plaintiff alleged constituted fraud was a
statement suggesting an individual would commit suicide if the "deal" was not completed with certain terms.
Country Cove Dev., Inc., 143 Idaho at 601. On appeal, the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's fraud cause of
action was affirmed because the "suicide statement" was just an opinion about the occurrence of future events and
not actionable in fraud. Id.
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Ctr. Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 207, 61 P.3d 557, 564 (2002). Idaho law does not provide
a remedy for a plaintiffs reliance and change of position based on another's future prediction or
opinion about future events. Thomas, 138 Idaho at 207. Hence, Plaintiffs attempt to strike
Defendants' defense with regard to fraud based on the issue of "fraud not being based on upon
opinion" is misplaced.
4.

Negligent Misrepresentation.

While only vaguely referenced in Plaintiffs Cross Motion for Summary Judgment,
Plaintiff apparently is seeking to strike Defendants' Twelfth Affirmative Defense in Defendants'
Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's Answer as it applies to Plaintiffs alleged cause of action for
negligent misrepresentation.

Defendants' Twelfth Affirmative Defense stated that Plaintiffs

claims present no justiciable controversy (i.e. a controversy capable of being disposed of
judicially). As set forth in Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Mannas v. Moss, and
the line of case law prior to Mannas undisputedly establishes that the tort of negligent
misrepresentation is not recognized in Idaho except in the narrow confines of a professional
relationship involving an accountant. 143 Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166 (2007). Duffin v. Idaho

Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1010, 895 P.2d 1195, 1203 (1995). See also Idaho
Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp of Idaho, 115 Idaho 1082, 772 P .2d 720 ( 1989); Mannas v.
Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166 (2007). Furthermore, in Plaintiffs Reply in Support of his
Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff acknowledged and admitted that Idaho has not
recognized the tort of negligent misrepresentation for attorneys. See Plaintiff's Rely in Support
of Partial Summary Judgment, p. 6, footnote 6. Yet, nevertheless Plaintiff has moved for Cross
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Motion for Summary Judgment. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Cross Motion for Summary Judgment
on this issue, as a matter of law, should be denied and Defendants' defenses should not be
stricken.

5.

Failure to Comply with Derivative Demand

The Affirmative Defense that Plaintiff is seeking to strike with his sixth argument (i.e.,
"failure to comply with derivative demand") in not related back to any specific Affirmative
Defense. This is Plaintiffs Motion and his burden of proof. Plaintiff simply has not met his
burden of proof to strike any of Defendants' defenses by making this argument.
Moreover, pursuant to Idaho Code § 30-1-742, no shareholder derivative action can be
commenced until: (1) a written demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable
action, and (2) ninety (90) days have expired from the date of the demand. In this case, Plaintiff
admits he failed to make the required demand under Idaho Code § 30-1-742. Plaintiff, in his
Complaint, contends that his failure to comply with Idaho Code § 30-1-742 should be excused
because "the demand would have been futile." (Plaintiffs Complaint, ,-i 46.) However, Idaho no
longer permits "futility" arguments as an excusing condition for a failure to make the requisite
demand under Idaho Code§ 30-1-742. Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 934 (2007).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the alleged grounds of
the defense of "failure to comply with derivative demand" should be denied.
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II. CONCLUSION
Defendants Turnbow and Eberle Berlin respectfully request this Court deny Plaintiffs

Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and dismiss Plaintiffs causes of action for
negligence/professional malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation,
violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act and fraud/constructive fraud as set forth in
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED this

/~ day of March, 2010.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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Attorneys for Defendants, Richard A. Riley
and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH mDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,
v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HA WLE
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; ROBERT M.
TURNBOW, an individual; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKL VEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;
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Case No. CV-OC-0918868
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD A. RILEY'S
AND HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS &
HAWLEY LLP'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY ruDGMENT

Defendants.
Defendants Richard A. Riley ("Riley") and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawley
Troxell"), by and through their counsel of record, Elam & Burke, P.A., hereby submit the following
Reply Memorandum in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing the plaintiffs
Complaint with prejudice.
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TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
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.
'

INTRODUCTION
There has been substantial litigation between the same parties regarding the same
transactional issues. Having once litigated his claims, plaintiff is not entitled to re-litigate them here.
These defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor based on the res judicata effect of the rulings
of the District Court in Hawley Troxell # 1. 1 Plaintiffs claims are also time barred.

LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

A.

Summary Judgment Standard Applicable to Riley and Hawley Troxell

Even if plaintiff is given the benefit of the doubt regarding all factual questions, Hawley
Troxell and Mr. Riley are entitled to entry of summary judgment. Summary judgment shall be
"rendered forthwith ifthe pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter oflaw." First Sec. Bank of Idaho, NA. v. Murphy, 131Idaho787, 790,
964 P.2d 654, 657 (1998). Res judicata bars not only subsequent re-litigation of claims previously
asserted, but also subsequent litigation of any claims which could have been made. With respect to
issues actually litigated in the AIA litigation,2 collateral estoppel bars the plaintiff from re-litigating
the same issues. Notably, the Court in the AIA litigation expressly held that the opinions expressed
in the 1995 Opinion Letter were just that - opinions - rather than statements of present fact and
could not form the basis for fraud. Each of plaintiffs claims is also barred by the applicable statutes

1

Taylor v. Babbitt, et al., Case No. CV 08-01765, in the District Court of the Second Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, Nez Perce County (hereinafter "Hawley Troxell # l ").
2

Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al., Case No. CV 07-00208 in the District Court of the Second
Judicial District of the State ofldaho, Nez Perce County (hereinafter the "AIA litigation").
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of limitation. Plaintiff suffered some damage over 14 years ago, and in any event not later than
August 1, 2005, when AIA defaulted in the payment of his $6MM promissory note. Each of his
alleged causes of action accrued not later than that date, and each is time barred. To the extent
plaintiff seeks to avoid the strictures of the applicable statutes of limitation by alleging that Hawley
·Troxell and Mr. Riley are somehow liable to him "based solely on their involvement successfully
asserting that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares was illegal in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al. ,"3
this allegation was rejected by the Court in Hawley Troxell# 1, and plaintiff is barred by res judicata
from seeking to re-litigate it. Plaintiff cannot sue Mr. Riley4 for alleged negligent misrepresentation
because Idaho does not recognize that cause of action in the circumstances of this case.

B.

Res Judicata Bars Mr. Taylor's Attempt to Re-Litigate His Claims Against
Riley and Hawley Troxell

Idaho has adopted the "transactional approach" to res judicata. US. Bank Nat 'l. Ass 'n. v.
Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222, 226, 999 P .2d 877, 881 (2000). This means that the courts are not limited
to examining whether the subsequent case is based upon the same legal theory as the prior litigation.
Rather, "[w]hen a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiffs claim
. . . the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with
respect to all or any part of the transaction ... out of which the action arose." Nash v. Overholser,
114 Idaho 461, 464, 757 P.2d 1180, 1183 (1988), quoting with approval Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho
at 258-59, 668 P.2d 15 134-35. "The doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent

3

See, Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment and in Support of Cross Motions, p. 7.
4

Plaintiff alleges negligent misrepresentation against Mr. Riley but not Hawley Troxell.
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'

.

relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of any claims relating

to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made."
Hindmarsh at 94, 57 P .3d at 805 (emphasis added).

1.

Riley and Hawley Troxell Have Proved All the Required Elements of Res
Judicata

The three elements of res judicata are: (1) identity of parties, (2) identity of subject matter,
and (3) finality of judgment. Farmers Nat. Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 878 P.2d 762 (1994);
Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 434, 437, 849 P.2d 107,110 (1993).

a.

The Parties Are the Same in the Present Case

Plaintiff argues the parties are not the same in the present case because he has added two new
defendants, Mr. Turnbow and Eberle Berlin. This argument was rejected by the Idaho Supreme
Court in C Systems v. McGee, 145 Idaho 559, 562, 181 P.3d 485, 488 (2008):
The previous case involved C Systems and McGee. The present case also involves
C Systems and McGee. The parties are the same even though this case also involves
additional parties, rendering unpersuasive C System's argument that the identity of
parties was lacking for res judicata purposes.

b.

The Subject Matter Is the Same in the Present Case

The subject matter of the present case is the same as the subject matter of Hawley Troxell
# 1, i.e., both cases are based on the same nucleus of operative facts. The critical issue is "whether

the two actions under consideration are based on the same nucleus of operative facts. That the
precise claim presented in the second case was not presented in the former case does not keep the
'new' claim alive." Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Alcatel USA, Inc., 301F.Supp.599, 603 (E.D.Tex. 2004)
(citations and internal quotation marks deleted).
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(1)

Hawley Troxell #1 Included Factual Claims That the Transaction Was
Unenforceable

While his theory of the case has changed somewhat, plaintiff is barred by res judicata from
bringing the same claims against the same defendants in the present case as he brought or could have
brought in Hawley Troxell #1. Hawley Troxell and Mr. Riley have demonstrated by affidavit that
in Hawley Troxell #1 plaintiff sued them based upon the same transaction or series of transactions
as are alleged in the case at bar. As more fully described in the Memorandum of Defendants Riley
and Hawley Troxell in Opposition to Plaintiffs Amended Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment,
filed March 12, 2010, the original Complaint (i! 53) and the proposed Amended Complaint (i!i! 92,
99 and 118) in Hawley Troxell # 1 included allegations that these Defendants provided improper
legal representation to their clients in the AIA litigation relating to the assertions of arguments that
the 1995-1996 transactions were illegal. Having actually pled and litigated his claims alleging
malpractice, breach of fiduciary duties and breach of the ICPA in Hawley Troxell #1, plaintiff is
barred by res judicata from re-litigating those same claims in the present case.

(2)

The Claims in This Action Accrued Prior to Filing of Hawley Troxell #1

Plaintiff argues his claims in this action did not accrue until the Court in the AIA litigation
ruled that the stock redemption agreement was illegal and unenforceable. However, plaintiff was
put on notice as early as April 2008, well before Hawley Troxell # 1 was even filed, that AIA
repudiated the stock redemption contract because of illegality .5 AIA had defaulted in payment in

5

In the AIA litigation defendants Connie Taylor et al., raised the defense the stock redemption agreement
was an illegal contract on April 17, 2008, and AIA through Hawley Troxell raised the same defense on April 21,
2008. (Babbitt A.ff, pp. 4-6.)
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2005. It was not necessary for plaintiff to litigate "a case within a case" to realize the nature of his
claim, if any he had.

(3)

The Claims in This Action Were Ripe in the First Lawsuit

Ripeness asks whether a case is premature.
The purpose of the ripeness requirement is to prevent courts from entangling
themselves in purely abstract disagreements. Under the ripeness test in Idaho, a party
must show (1) the case presents definite and concrete issues; (2) a real and substantial
controversy exists (as opposed to hypothetical facts); and (3) there is a present need
for adjudication. This Court has recognized that judicial review may be had where
there is no need for further factual development.

State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 342, 127 P.3d 954, 959 (2005) (citations omitted).
Those three tests of ripeness are met in the case at bar. First, Mr. Taylor's allegations in
Hawley Troxell# 1, and the fact that he was aware the enforceability of the 1995-96 agreements was
challenged, presented definite and concrete issues. Second, a real and substantial controversy existed
regarding whether the firm and the opining attorney owed any duty to Mr. Taylor 14 years later.
Third, there was a present need for adjudication because plaintiff contended he was damaged by all
actions of the defendants. The issues thus presented were not merely hypothetical or abstract. Most
importantly, all parties were aware that AJA had not paid the balance allegedly owing to Mr. Taylor
under the stock redemption agreement and was contending, as were other parties, the agreement was
illegal and unenforceable. Mr. Taylor needed no additional information to assert in Hawley Troxell
# 1 any claims he wished to assert regarding this transaction.

(4)

The Supporting Facts Are the Same in Both Lawsuits

The facts upon which plaintiff bases his Complaint in the case at bar were all on the table
when plaintiff filed his Complaint in Hawley Troxell #1 on August 18, 2008. Prior to filing the
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Complaint in Hawley Troxell #1, the defendants in the AIA litigation had raised the defense that
the stock redemption agreement was unenforceable because it constituted an illegal contract. 6
Indeed, Hawley Troxell's raising of this defense appears to have been the precipitating event that
motivated Mr. Taylor to file his Complaint in Hawley Troxell #1.
Well before the Complaint was filed in Hawley Troxell #1, plaintiff was making threats of
'litigation against Hawley Troxell, as AIA's attorneys, based on the very same actions as he now
alleges as the basis for his Complaint in the present case. For example, on July 21, 2008, Mr.
Taylor's attorney addressed a letter to the Board of Directors of AIA, demanding that the corporation
sue Hawley Troxell, Mr. Riley and others for, among other things:
Representing AIA Services and/or AIA insurance in making inappropriate arguments
(including alleged illegality of the debt to Reed) knowing that such arguments were
counter to AIA Services' obligations to Reed and Donna and knowing that Richard
Riley was a witness who provided a legal opinion counter to such arguments;

(Babbitt Aff., Ex. M, ~ 26.)
On August 5, 2008, Mr. Taylor's lawyer emailed Mr. Babbitt of Hawley Troxell with
additional threats to sue Hawley Troxell and Mr. Riley based upon, other things, the 1995 Opinion
Letter. Among the statements made in that email were the following:
Explain to Mr. Clark how Richard Riley issued an opinion letter to Reed and you are
now tcying to disingenuously argue the $8.5 million is not owed to him.... Explain
to Mr. Clark that even ifthe illegality argument had merit. Donna Taylor and Reed
Taylor would be suing Hawley Troxell (and Richard Riley) in such an instance
regardless of the circumstances.

(Babbitt Aff., Ex. L (emphasis in original).)

6

See Fn. 5.
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The indisputable facts demonstrate that the plaintiff was put on notice of the fact that AIA
was challenging the enforceability and legality of the stock redemption agreement, notwithstanding
the 1995 Opinion letter. Contrary to Mr. Taylor's argument, none of operative facts have changed.

c.

The Judgment in Hawley Troxell #1 Is Considered Final

Lest there be any doubt about whether the judgment entered in Hawley Troxell # 1 is final, 7
the Idaho Supreme Court has directed that the District Court enter final judgment so that the appeal 8
of that case may proceed. (See, Affidavit of Loren C. Ipsen dated 3/19/10.)

2.

It Is Clear Judge Brudie Intended the Disposition of Hawley Troxell #1 to Be
Final, Conclusive and Non-Tentative

Plaintiff suggests that disposition of Hawley Troxell # 1 was merely provisional in nature.
Thus, argues the plaintiff, the decision in Hawley Troxell #1 should not be considered as final, yet
this same plaintiff appealed the decision. The defendants in Hawley Troxell # 1 moved pursuant to
IRCP 12(b)(6) for a dismissal with prejudice9 , and that motion was granted. (See, Opinion and

7

While there is no doubt an appealable judgment is final for res judicata purposes, a judgment which is
not final for appeal purposes may nonetheless constitute a final adjudication for res judicata purposes. Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 13, cmt. b (1982), states, "It has often been suggested that finality for appellate review is the
same as for finality of purposes of res judicata, but that has probably never been quite true, and it is surely not true at
present. ... [W]hen res judicata is in question a judgment will ordinarily be considered final in respect to a claim ...
if it is not tentative, provisional, or contingent and represents the completion of all steps in the adjudication of the
claim by the court .... " For examples of cases holding that a judgment, although not yet appealable, is final for res
judicata purposes, see Alexander v. Chicago Park District, 773 F.2d 850 (7 Cir. 1985); Perrin, Forster & Crosby,
Inc. v. Brown, 732 F.2d 345 (3 Cir. 1984); Role Models America, Inc. V. Penmar Dev. Corp., 394 F.Supp.2d 121
(D.C.C. 2005); Hennessy v. Cement & Concrete Workers Union Local I 8A, 963 F.Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y 1997); U.S.
v. McGann, 951 F.Supp. 372 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Augustine v. Adams, 88 F.Supp. 2d 1166 (D.Kan. 2000); Ensley v.
Pitcher, 152 Wash.App. 891, 222 P.3d 99 (2009); Hudson v. City of Chicago, 228 Ill.2d 462, 889 N.E.2d 210
(2008); Youren v. Tintic School Dist., 2004 Vt.App. 33, 86 P.3d 771(2004); Blum v. Rest/and ofDallas, 971 S.W.2d
546 (Tex.App. 1997); Azadigian v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 643, 7 Cal.App.4th 372 ( 1992).
8

Plaintiff obviously believes the Opinion and Order dismissing Hawley Troxell #1 is final, since he has
appealed it. Taylor v. Babbitt, et al., Docket No. 36130-2009, Idaho Supreme Court.
9

See, Affidavit ofJames D. LaRue filed March 12, 2010.
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Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint in Hawley
Troxell # 1.) (Babbitt Aff, Ex. R.) Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration was denied. (Babbitt Aff,
Ex. U.) Finally, Judge Brudie awarded attorney's fees against plaintiff:
"The Court finds the claims alleged by the Plaintiff in his Complaint and his
proposed Amended Complaint were frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation
in law or fact. Therefore, pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and Rule 54(e)(1) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure the Court finds Defendants are entitled to a
reasonable award of attorney fees and cost. In addition, the Court finds a reasonable
award of attorney fees is also warranted under Idaho Code § 30-1-746(2) and (3) and
Idaho Code § 48-608( 5) for the cost of defending against the two claims in Plaintiffs
proposed Amended Complaint."

Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Award ofAttorney's Fees and Costs, Case No. CV
08-1765 in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County, p. 10. (Riley Aff,
Ex. L.) It should be crystal clear that Judge Brudie was not inviting plaintiff back into court for
further proceedings. A starker example of a final, dispositive adjudication would be hard to find.

3.

All of Plaintiffs Claims Were Disposed of in Hawley Troxell #1

No claims or issues were left unadjudicated in Hawley Troxell# 1. The plaintiffs Complaint
was dismissed in its entirety, and his Motion to Amend was denied in its entirety. This is not a
situation where the decision in Hawley Troxell# 1 disposed of some, but not all, of plaintiffs claims.

4.

Plaintiffs Claims Were Dismissed on the Merits

The Court in Hawley Troxell# 1 dismissed the plaintiffs Complaint for failure to state a
cause of action and denied his Motion to Amend. "A dismissal for failure to state a claim is res
judicata as to the then existing claim which plaintiff was attempting to state ... If, upon dismissal

of the complaint, the plaintiffseeks leave to file an amended complaint and such leave is denied
with prejudice, the denial is res judicata as to any claim made by plaintiff in that amended
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complaint." (emphasis added) Carter v. Money Tree Co., 532F.2d113 (8th Cir. 1976) cert den. 426
U.S. 925, 96 S.Ct. 2636, 49 L.Ed.2d 380; see also Hubicki v. ACF Indus., Inc., 484 F2d 519, 523
(3rd Cir. 1973) ("[A] Rule 12(b)(6) motion raises matters in bar and results in a judgment on the
merits.").

C.

Collateral Estoppel Bars Certain of Plaintiff's Claims

Res judicata or claim preclusion "refers to the effect of a judgment in foreclosing litigation
of a matter that never has been litigated, because of the determination that it should have been

advanced in an earlier suit," Buckeye Community Hope Foundation v. City ofCuyahoga Falls, 970
F.Supp. 1289 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (emphasis added). On the other hand, collateral estoppel or issue
preclusion operates to bar re-litigation of the identical issues with the same parties or their privies.

Ticor Title v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613, 617 (2007). Thus, collateral estoppel bars
any and all issues actually litigated in a previous case againstthe same parties or their privies.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars plaintiff from re-litigating the same claims of fraud
and constructive fraud he advanced in the AIA litigation, where the Court held that the 1995 Opinion
Letter was an expression of opinion only and did not constitute fraud. Since Hawley Troxell and Mr.
Riley are in privity10 with their client AIA, plaintiff is barred by collateral estoppel from re-litigating
his fraud/constructive fraud claims relating to the 1995 Opinion Letter.

10

See Weinberger v. Tucker, 510 F.3d 486 (2007) (applying Virginia law);Jayel Corporation v.
Cochran, 366 Ark. 175, 234 S.W.3d 278 (2006); Delisle v. Avallone, 117 N.M. 602, 874 P.2d 1266 (1994); A.I.
Credit Corp. v. Aguilar & Sebastinelli, 113 Cal.App.4th 1072, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 813 (1988).
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D.

Plaintiff's Malpractice Claims Are Barred by I.C. § 5-219(4)

A cause of action for professional malpractice accrues and the statute oflimitation begins to
run when the plaintiff sustains "some damage." Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 542, 808 P.2d
876, 879 (1991). In the present case, some damage occurred in 1995, 11 1996, or at the latest, when
AIA was unable to pay the balance of the purchase price on August 1, 2005. At that point Mr.
Taylor indisputably sustained some damage and his cause of action for professional malpractice
accrued. His malpractice claims are barred by the two-year statute oflimitation ofl.C. § 5-219(4).
The only statutory bases for extending the statute oflimitation for professional malpractice
in Idaho are the foreign object and fraudulent concealment exceptions. 12 An action within the
fraudulent concealment exception must be commenced within the later of two years from the
occurrence, act or omission complained of or one year following the date the "injured party knows
or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been put on inquiry regarding the condition or
matter complained of. ... " LC. § 5-219(4).
The issue of the illegality of the stock redemption was raised in the AIA litigation on April
16, 2008, by Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck and on April 21, 2008, by Hawley
Troxell as counsel for AIA. By any measure, Mr. Taylor not only suffered monetary damages but

11

Plaintiff acknowledges/claims damage in 1995 when he entered into the redemption agreement - he gave
up his stock which cost him the right to vote, his majority control, and all other ownership benefits. f$ee, Complaint
~~ 44, 66; Babbitt Ajf., Ex. D.)
12

Fraudulent concealment for this purpose is defined in Idaho Code§ 5-219(4) as "[W]hen the fact of
damage has, for the purpose of escaping responsibility therefor, been fraudulently and knowingly concealed from the
injured party by an alleged wrongdoer standing at the time of the wrongful act, neglect or breach in a professional or
commercial relationship with the injured party .... " Plaintiff argues equitable estoppel and "equitable tolling" as
grounds for preventing the application ofl.C. § 5-219(4), but to the extent theories are contrary to the express
provisions of the statute, they are inapplicable
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was apprised of the illegality issue within the statutory period ofldaho Code§ 5-219(4); i.e., more
than one year before filing this action.

E.

Plaintiffs ICPA Claims Are Barred by I.C. § 48-619

The cause of action for alleged violation of the ICP A accrued as early as 1995, but in any
event not later than August 1, 2005, when the plaintiff suffered "some damage." His cause of action
for alleged violation of the ICPA is barred by Idaho Code§ 48-619.

F.

Plaintiffs Fraud Claims Are Barred by I.C. § 5-218(4)

Plaintiffs fifth cause of action, fraud and constructive fraud, is asserted against defendants
Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin, but not Hawley Troxell. The statute of limitation for fraud or
mistake is three years. I.C. § 5-218(4). But, "[t]he cause of action in such case [is] notto be deemed
to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or
mistake." I.C. § 5-218(4). An objective test is applied to determine when a reasonable person
should have discovered the facts constituting the alleged fraud.
In present case, plaintiff and his advisors had full and unfettered opportunity to inspect the
corporate records of AIA in connection with the stock redemption. Mr. Taylor knew, or through the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, the amount of AIA's earned surplus, or lack
thereof. 13 He must be deemed to have knowledge of facts sufficient to put him on notice of any

13

Judge Brudie found that, "Reed Taylor was the founder of AIA and, at the time the agreement was
entered into, the majority shareholder. Reed Taylor was in a position to have intimate knowledge of the
corporation's financial status. This is not a case where the parties to the agreement were not in pari de/icto, as
asserted by Plaintiff. If Reed Taylor was uninformed as to the financial status of the corporation, that was a
voluntary choice on his part and is insufficient to make him an innocent party to the agreement." (Babbitt Ajf., Ex.
K, Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of Court's Grant ofPartial
Summary Judgment; Clarification ofRuling on Motion to Strike; Alternative Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification;
Motion for Order to Protect Property and for Stay, AIA litigation.)
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alleged fraud in 1995, which is when the statute oflimitation for fraud commenced to run. Plaintiff
is time barred from bringing an action based on alleged fraud 14 years later.

G.

Idaho Does Not Recognize the Tort of Negligent Misrepresentation Except for
Accountants - Even if Recognized, This Claim is Time Barred

Except with respect to accountants, the tort of negligent misrepresentation is not recognized
in this state. See, Duffin v. Idaho Corp Improvement Ass'n., 126 Idaho 1002, 1010, 895 P.2d 1195,
1203 (1995), reh. den. June 22, 1995, where the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "[W]e expressly hold
that, except in the narrow confines of a professional relationship involving an accountant, the tort
ofnegligent misrepresentation is not recognized in Idaho." Accord, Feld v. Idaho Crop Improvement

Ass 'n., 126 Idaho 1014, 895 P .2d 1207 (1995), reh. den. June 22, 1995; Intermountain Construction,
Inc. v. City of Ammon, 122 Idaho 931, 933, 841 P.2d 1082, 1084 (1992). The Duffin rule was
recently reaffirmed inMannos v Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 935, 155 P.3d 1166, 1174 (2007). In the
present case, negligent misrepresentation is not a viable cause of action, and summary judgment
should be entered dismissing this claim. Even if negligent misrepresentation was a recognized cause
of action in the circumstances of this case, it is subject to dismissal under I.C. § 5-219(4).

H.

Summary Judgment Standard Applicable to Plaintiff

Plaintiffs request to strike the defendants' defenses merely reiterates the arguments of his
prior motion for partial summary judgment, which this Court denied on March 3, 2010. In an
attempt to supply at least one missing element of his case, plaintiff requests additional time to obtain
expert witness testimony, citing IRCP 56(f) in support of his plea for a delay .14 This need not detain
14

Plaintiff has not filed a motion for continuance pursuant to IRCP 56(f) but merely requests an extension
of time by footnote on p. 8 of his Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment and in Support of Cross Motions. This is insufficient. See Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979 (7th
Cir. 2000), holding that unverified statements in an attorney's memoranda of law alleging the need for a continuance
on a motion for summary judgment were insufficient as grounds for a continuance under Rule 56(f).
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the Court or the parties for a number of reasons. First, any expert testimony would be immaterial.
The defendants' pending summary judgment motion is not predicated on factual grounds but on the
legal grounds of res judicata, collateral estoppel, application of the applicable statutes of limitation
and, with respect to alleged negligent misrepresentation, failure to plead a cause of action cognizable
by Idaho law. Expert testimony would not bear on any of these issues. Second, plaintiff has failed
to make any showing by affidavit as required by Rule 56(f) regarding what additional information
he seeks to bring forward that would be of assistance to the Court. The essential requisite of a Rule
56(f) motion is an affidavit specifying, for example, what particular information is sought; how, if
uncovered, it would preclude summary judgment; and why it has not been previously obtained.

Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986). Third, plaintiff has waived his ability
to request a continuance by electing to proceed with his own Cross Motion for Summary Judgment
and in opposition to defendants' motions. See, Falcone v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 805 F.2d 115,
117 n. l (3d Cir 1986), holding that failure to file a Rule 56(f) motion may waive the right to avoid
summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

It is unnecessary to inquire into disputed facts in this case because plaintiffs claims are
barred as a matter of law. Plaintiff premises his claims on a transaction that started approximately
14 years ago and related developments in that transaction, all known before filing Hawley Troxell

#1. He has, or could have, litigated the issues arising from these transactions once with Hawley
Troxell and Mr. Riley. Regardless of any intervening court holdings in the AIA litigation, he is not
entitled to change his theories regarding the same nucleus of operative facts in order to re-litigate the
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same events. Further, his current claims are time barred. Summary judgment should be granted to
Riley and Hawley Troxell, and plaintiffs Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this _Jj_ day of March, 2010.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By:~d··-~
Je;ri.
LaRue, Of the Firm
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Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

v

v'

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(509) 455-7111
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-9177

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT RICHARD A. RILEY'S AND HAWLEY
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 15
G:\7082/0013\HTEH #2\Pleadings\Motion for Summary Judgment\Reply Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ver_05.wpd

001606

NS·--~~---M
FILED J.
P.M_, 2 I ·~

A. •

James D. LaRue, ISB #1780
Loren C. Ipsen, ISB #1767
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
File No. 7082-0013

MAR 1 9 2010
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By KATHY J. ISIEHL
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendants, Richard A. Riley
and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH illDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No. CV-OC-0918868

Plaintiff,

v.
AFFIDAVIT OF LOREN C. IPSEN
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HAWLE
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; ROBERT M.
TURNBOW, an individual; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKL VEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO )
) SS.

County of Ada

)

LORENC. IPSEN, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says:
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1.

I am an attorney licensed in the State of Idaho and a shareholder in the firm Elam

& Burke, P.A.

2.

I am over 18 years of age, competent to testify regarding the matters set forth in

this affidavit and am one the attorneys who represented defendants Gary D. Babbitt, D. John
Ashby, Patrick V. Collins, Richard A. Riley and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, in the case of
Taylor v. Babbitt, et al., Case No. CV 08-02765, in the District Court of the Second Judicial

District of the State of Idaho, Nez Perce County ("Hawley Troxell # 1"). As such, I am familiar
with the files and records and make this affidavit based upon my personal knowledge.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Idaho Supreme

Court's Order to Remand to the District Court for Entry of Final Judgment dated March 16, 2010
of that case, captioned Taylor v. McNichols, et al., Supreme Court Docket Nos. 36130-2009
(36131-2009), Nez Perce County Docket Nos. 2008-1763 (2008-1765).

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this

-

J_j_ day of March, 2010.

Za:lu.. J

i

/n.,..._..6"M
-

Notary Public r Idaho
Residing at ~B-t.;i~
Commission expires: ~ f

<

kJ 1 /::u;;1 ~
,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Jj_ day of March, 2010, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, Washington 99201

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(509) 455-7111

Jack S. Gjording
Julianne S. Hall
Gjording & Fouser, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-9177
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
MICHAEL E. MC NICHOLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS, BROWN & MC NICHOLS,
P.A., an Idaho professional corporation; JANE
DOES 1-V, unknown individuals,
Defendants-Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

~

~

ORDER TO REMAND TO THE
~
DISTRICT COURT FOR ENTRY O~
FINAL JUDGMENT
(? . ~
Supreme Court Docket Nos. 36130-20~
(36131-2009)
Nez Perce County Docket Nos. 2008-1763
(2008-1765)

On February 19, 2010, this Court received the following. four (4) documents from the
District Court Clerk:

1. Defendants' Motion for Amended Judgments, file stamped February 19, 2010;
2. Defendants' Joint Memorandum in Support of Motion for Amended Judgments, file
stamped February 19, 2010;
3. Affidavit of Jeffrey A. Thomson in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion for Amended
Judgments, file stampe4 February 19, 2010; and
4. Notice of Hearing on Defendants' Joint Motion for Amended Judgments, file stamped
February 19, 2010.
Thereafter, this Court issued an ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENTS' FIFTH JOINT
MOTION TO AUGMENT
RECORD on March 11, 2010, and the four (4) file stamped documents
,
listed above were augmented into the above entitled appeal.

After further reviewing the file

stamped documents listed above as well as this Record on Appeal and in light of this Court's 2010
Opinion No. 6 in Spokane Structures Inc. v. Equitable Investment, LLC, Supreme Court Docket No.
35349-2008, filed January 28, 2010, it appears that no final judgment was entered in the district
·court. Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the above entitled appeal be, and hereby is, REMANDED
TO THE DISTRICT COURT in order for District Judge JeffM. Brudie to enter a final judgment or
order in this case. Furthermore, the District Court Clerk shall immediately thereafter submit to this
Court a certified copy of the district court's :final judgment or order.

I

IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that ORAL ARGUMENT previously scheduled for Friday,

April 9, 2010,at 11: 10 a.m. in Lewiston, Idaho, SHALL REMAIN AS SET.

EXHIBIT A
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DATED this

_I_·~- day of March 2010.
For the Supreme Court

cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Judge JeffM. Brodie
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t

MAR 19 2010
J DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
'

By E. HOLMES
DEPUTY

Jack S. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
Julianne S. Hall, ISB No. 6207
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208)336-9777
Facsimile: (208)336-9177
Attorneys for Defendants Robert M. Turnbow and
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,
VS.

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
ROBERT M. TURNBOW, an individual; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0918868

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

COME NOW, Defendants Robert M. Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &
McKlveen, Chtd. (hereinafter "Defendants", "Turnbow" and/or "Eberle Berlin"), by and through
their counsel of record, Gjording & Fouser, PLLC, and respectfully submit this Reply
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, P. 1
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I. INTRODUCTION

Summary judgment should enter on Plaintiff's five causes of action against Defendants
TU.rnbow and Eberle Berlin: negligence/professional malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty,
negligent

misrepresentation,

violation of the

Idaho

Consumer Protection ·Act

and

fraud/constructive fraud. Plaintiff's causes of actions should be dismissed on summary judgment
because each cause of action is either not recognized, as alleged, under Idaho law, Plaintiff lacks
standing and/or the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations as discussed herein,
II. ARGUMENT
A.

PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE: NO DUTY EXISTS.

As a matter of law, Idaho only recognizes legal malpractice actions arising from a direct
attorney-client relationship. The duties flowing from the attorney-client relationship attach orily
after the client has requested the attorney to render legal services, and the attorney has agreed to
do so. See Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932, 934 (1990). Plaintiff argues that Defendants owed
him a duty in the subject corporate transaction because: 1) Defendants engaged ill prior
representation of Plaintiff in a divorce action; 2) as a third-party beneficiary or as the majority
sharehol~er

of AIA, Plaintiff had an attorney-client relationship with Defendants; and/or 3) the

contractual provisions in the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement between Plaintiff and AIA gave
rise to an attorney-client relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants.
1.

Direct Relationship.

An Idaho attorney only owes duties to his client. Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134,

137, 90 P.3d 884, 887 (2004). In a legal malpractice action, it is not sufficient merely to prove
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, P. 2
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an attorney-client relationship existed with respect to some matter; rather, it is necessary to
establish that the attorney-client relationship existed with respect to the act or omission upon
which the malpractice claim is based. Kurtenbach v. Tekippe, 260 N.W.2d 53,
. 56 (1977).
.
It is undisputed that an attorney-client relationship existed between Plaintiff and

Defendants with regard to Plaintiff's divorce. 1 However, there are no facts in the record
establishing that the alleged attorney-client relationship was that of a current client between
Defendants and Mr. Taylor in 1995 after the termination of the relationship in 1991, beyond
Plaintiff's vague allegations that "Mr. Riley and Eberle Berlin were Mr. Taylor's long-standing
personal attorneys."2 Of note, the fact that Defendants worked as counsel for AIA to restructure
the company after 1991 to accommodate Mr. Taylor's asset contributions to the company does
not give rise to a direct, current attorney-client relationship with Mr. Taylor in 1995.
Hence, to satisfy the direct attorney-client relationship prerequisite under Idaho law to
assert a malpractice action, Mr. Taylor's malpractice cause of action must be related to Mr.
1

As previously discussed, an attorney's representation is completed and relationship with a current client is
terminated when the agreed-upon assistance is concluded. Rule 1.16 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct,
Commentary 1. In this case, it is undisputed that Mr. Taylor, as an individual, was a former client of Mr. Riley and
Eberle Berlin. Plaintiff also does not dispute that 1991 was the year that Mr. Riley and Eberle Berlin completed Mr.
Taylor's divorce representation.
2

Plaintiff further suggests that because Mr. Riley obtained a conflict waiver in 2006 that this is evidence of a current
attorney-client relationship between Mr. Riley and Mr. Taylor in 1995. However, as set forth in Mr. Riley's
Affidavit, paragraphs 24 and 25 and Exhibits N and 0 thereto, the waiver in 2006 resulted from potential conflicts
arising from Mr. Taylor's individual status as a former client of Mr. Riley based on his divorce action in 1991.
Of note, in 2006 Hawley Troxell also attempted to obtain a conflict waiver from AIA Insurance, Inc. and Crop
USA Insurance Agency because Mr. Riley, at that time, represented these companies (i.e., AIA and Crop USA were
current clients). This waiver was obtained because another partner in Hawley Troxell was attempting to represent a
company, PNC Aviation Finance, in an action which was potentially adverse to the interests of the firm's current
clients, AIA and Crop USA. Of note, Mr. Taylor's only involvement in this was that he was the authorized agent, as
president of AIA, to execute the conflict waiver on behalf of the legal entity of AIA (i.e., see Exhibit N providing for
the signature of any agent of AIA, not Mr. Taylor as an individual).

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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Riley's handling of his divorce because that is the only factual circumstance in the

recor~

where

an attorney-client relationship exists between Plaintiff and Defendants. In 1995, the only duties
Defendants Riley and Eberle Berlin owed to Mr. Taylor would be those owed to a former client
whom they represented in a divorce action. 3 However, Mr. Taylor's malpractice cause of action
related to the stock redemption transaction with AIA in 1995 against Mr, Riley, Mr. Turnbow
and Eberle Berlin involves a matter wholly unrelated to the divorce action. Summary judgment
should enter in favor of Defendants because there were no duties owed to Mr. Taylor, as a
current client, in 1995, and there are no malpractice allegations in this litigation arising from Mr.
Riley's and/or Eberle Berlin's obligations to Mr. Taylor as a former client.

2.

Third-Party Beneficiary.

Plaintiffs argument that this Court should adopt a relaxed privity requirement for
malpractice claims has been recently rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court.

Harrigfeld v.

Hancock, 140 Idaho 134 at 137. The Harrigfeld Court, after examining case law from other

jurisdictions, flatly rejected the approach of a general relaxation of the privity requirement as it
relates to an attorney's duty to non-clients. Id. Hence, summary judgment should be granted to
Defendants as to Plaintiffs claimed "third-party beneficiary" malpractice causes of action as a
matter of law.

3

See Rule 1.9 .of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct (i.e., the duty of confidentiality and preclusion of
representing a person in a substantially similar matter with adverse interests to Mr. Taylor).

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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3.

Express Contract.

Defendants acknowledge that in certain instances an express contract can give rise to the
formation of an attorney-client relationship. However, it is important to note that Mr. Taylor, in
this case, is not alleging that he had an express contract with Mr. Riley, Mr. Turnbow and Eberle
Berlin in 1995 for legal services.
arguments.

Rather, in his Opposition brief, Mr. Taylor makes two

First, he alleges that he is the third-party beneficiary of the attorney-client

relationship between AIA and Defendants based on the language in the 1995 Stock Redemption
Agreement which requires AIA to deliver a letter from Defendants to Mr. Taylor to close the
transaction. As previously discussed, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed and expressly limited
the circumstances where a person will be able to recover as a third-party beneficiary of a contract
for malpractice (i.e., when he or she is a named beneficiary of a testamentary document). The
contract involved here is not a testamentary document; thus, as a matter of law, there is no duty
owed.
Secondly, Plaintiff alleges that "an express contract provision," presumably Section
2.50), "granted him rights to be represented by Defendants." Plaintiffs argument that Mr. Riley
and/or Mr. Turnbow owed him a duty as a client because he was "granted the rights to be
represented" by Mr. Riley and/or Mr. Turnbow in the express contract Mr. Taylor entered with
AIA Services is wholly illogical. The "express contract" was between Mr. Taylor and AIA
Services; the contract was not between Mr. Taylor and Mr. Riley and/or Mr. Turnbow.
Furthermore, an individual does not have a cause of action against an attorney for malpractice
because an individual thinks he was "granted the rights to be represented" by the attorney. The
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, P. 5
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formation of the attorney-client relationship is not one-sided, nor does it happen in a vacuum; the
attorney must agree to represent the person and act accordingly.
In sum, no matter how Plaintiff tries to characterize the relationship, Plaintiff does not
have a cause of action for professional malpractice under Idaho law.
4.

Shareholder Derivative Malpractice.

Plaintiffs cause of action as a shareholder for malpractice is not a direct cause of action.
The majority rule is that an action for injuries to a corporation cannot be maintained by a
shareholder on an individual basis and must be brought derivatively (i.e., on behalf of the
corporation), not directly (i.e., on behalf of the shareholder). Crocker v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,
826 F.2d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, some jurisdictions, including Idaho, have
adopted an exception to this general rule when a closely-held corporation is involved in the
litigation. Steelman v. Mallory, 110 Idaho 510, 716 P.2d 1282 (1986). The exception to the
general rule permits an individual in a closely-held corporation to pursue a direct claim, as
opposed to a derivative claim, when making only a claim for breach of fiduciary duties, under
limited circumstances. Specifically, in Steelman, a direct action was allowed by the minority
shareholder where the directors breached their fiduciary duty by usurping a corporate
opportunity that could have and would have been performed by the corporation but for a
disagreement amongst the directors. Steelman, 110 Idaho at 513-14. Of note, in Steelman, the
court permitted a direct action against the directors of the corporation because the directors owed
a fiduciary duty to the shareholders, including the minority shareholders. Id.

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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Six years after Steelman, the Idaho Supreme Court again addressed the general rule and
·the exception in a closely-held corporation. McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228 (Idaho 200~). In
McCann, the district court determined that the causes of action alleged by the plaintiff were

derivative rather than individual in nature, a holding affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court.
McCann, 138 Idaho 230. In determining that the causes of action were derivative, the Idaho

Supreme Court reasoned that the duties the directors of the corporation allegedly breached did .
not appear to be a "special duties owed to the stockholder by the wrongdoer," nor "do the duties
have their origin in circumstances independent of the plaintiffs status as a shareholder." Id., at
234. In concluding that the action was derivative, the Court further acknowledged that even if
there was some potential injury to the plaintiff, the plaintiffs alleged injuries were more
dependent than not on his status as a shareholder, and the injury was solely an injury to the
corporation, not to the plaintiff personally as an individual. Id.
This case is distinguishable from Steelman for two reasons. First, this lawsuit is not an
action by a minority shareholder seeking a remedy for the wrong-doings of the majority
shareholder. Rather, Mr. Taylor was the majority shareholder at the time of the alleged wrongdoings. Secondly, the cause of action in this case is not a cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty by the directors of the corporation; rather, it a cause of action for malpractice by attorneys
working for the corporation (i.e. damage allegedly caused by duly authorized agents of the
corporation). This issue is significant because it clarifies two significant points: 1) duty; and 2)
damage.

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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With regard to the duty issue, unlike the director owing a fiduciary duty to· the minority
shareholder in Steelman, there is no duty owed to Mr. Taylor by Defendants under Idaho law

(i.e., there is no duty owed to alleged third-party beneficiaries of an attorney's legal services
outside the testamentary exception). Rather, the duty owed by Mr. Riley, Mr. Turnbow and
Eberle Berlin is owed directly to the corporation, AIA. Accordingly, any damages resulting
from the alleged breach of the owed duty would result in damages attributed to the corporation,
not to Mr. Taylor on an individual basis.

Hence, Mr. Taylor's action should constitute a

derivative action.
Mr. Taylor's claim, like the plaintiff in McCann, should be construed as a derivative
action. Significantly, Judge Brudie previously held, in the McNichots and Babbitt litigations,
that Plaintiffs claim was a derivative action. Mr. Taylor's alleged injury was dependent on his
status of being a shareholder like in McCann. Additionally, the alleged "special duties" Mr.
Taylor claims were owed to him do not have their origins in circumstances independent of his
status as a shareholder (i.e., he is claiming he was a third-party beneficiary of the corporations'
actions). Additionally, Mr. Taylor lacks standing to·bring a direct action because he was no
longer a shareholder at the time he filed his lawsuit. See Idaho Code § 30-1-741.
In the alternative, Plaintiff pled that his claim for malpractice was also a derivative claim.
Mr. Taylor lacks standing to bring a derivative action because he was no longer a shareholder at

the time he filed his lawsuit. Idaho Code § 30-1-741. Secondly, Plaintiff admits he failed to
make the required demand under Idaho Code § 30-1-742. Idaho no longer permits "futility"
arguments as an excusing condition for a failure to make the requisite demand under Idaho Code
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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§ 30-1-742. Mannas v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 934 (2007). 4 Accordingly, summary judgment
should enter in Defendants' favor for the foregoing reasons.
B.

PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE: TIME BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS.
1.

The statute has expired because Plaintiff's damages were objectively
ascertainable in 1995/1996.

In the event that this Court determines that Defendants owed a professional duty under
Idaho law to Mr. Taylor, then Mr. Taylor's claim is still barred by the statute of limitations. As
set forth in City of McCall v. Buxton when an attorney gives legal advice which causes a client to
lose something quantifiable as damage, the statute of limitations begins to run. 146 Idaho 656,
659 (2009).

The Idaho Supreme Court further explained in Chicoine, the "objectively

ascertainable damage" standard provides an additional analytical tool to use in determining when
"s0me damage" has occurred, yet the Court cautioned that the standard does not mean that the
fact of damage must have been known to the injured party. Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 Idaho 482,
835 P.2d 1293 (1992).
This case is akin to the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Buxton with regard to the
City's Second, Fourth and Fifth Counts of its First Amended Complaint. In Buxton, the Court
held, with regard to the Second and Fourth Count, that the statute of limitations began to run
when the City's attorney negligently advised the City to release the project engineer for the

4

In his Opposition, Plaintiff relies on Orrock v. Appleton for the proposition that Idaho still permits futility
arguments; however, the court applied Delaware law to the substantive claims in that case, not Idaho. Orrock v.
Appleton, 147 Idaho 613, 618 (2009). Hence, despite Plaintiff's argument to the contrary, Mannas is sound law and
Idaho does not permit futility arguments as an excusing condition for a failure to make the requisite demand under
Idaho Code§ 30-1-742.
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City's waste water storage lagoon (i.e., the attorneys were negligent in advising the City of their
conflict of interest as to the project engineer). The Court held that the date that the attorneys
negligently advised the City was the date the statute of limitations began to run on the City's·
malpractice action against its attorneys. The Court explained that the date of the advice and
subsequent release of the project engineer was the date the City lost its opportunity to bring a
cause of action against the project engineer. Accordingly, that was the date that the City had
objectively ascertainable damage and any malpractice action brought more than two years after
that date was time barred.
Similarly, in Buxton, with regard to the Fifth Count, the Court held that the City suffered
objectively ascertainable damage in the form of a "lost opportunity" when the City rejected a
settlement offer of $500,000 from Wausau (the company issuing the contractor's performance
bond on the storage lagoon) based on the negligent advice of its attorneys. Accordingly, the twoyear statute of limitations began running from the date of the erroneous rejection advice for the
City's attorneys on the City's professional malpractice action. 5
In this case, like in Buxton, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was damaged as a result of the
allegedly negligent advice of "his attorneys," Defendants Riley and Turnbow and their then law
firm Eberle Berlin and such damages were objectively ascertainable as early as 1995. This case
5

This case is not akin to Counts One or Three in Buxton. In Buxton, plaintiff's malpractice claims in Counts One
and Three were premised on whether the attorney negligently advised the client to terminate a contract and withhold
payments. The Court held the malpractice action on Counts One and Three did not accrue until there was a trial
with a jury verdict where it was determined that the city's actions in terminating the contract and withholding
payments were erroneous. Said differently, the city was not "damaged" for purposes of the statute of limitations by
the attorney's advice until a jury concluded that the city's actions were wrong and that the City owed for breach of
contract damages and wrongful withholding of monies previously due and owing. Unlike in Counts One and Three,
in this case, the damage was immediately ascertainable when Mr. Taylor entered the Stock Redemption Agreement.
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is similar to the Court's analysis of Counts Two, Four and Five in Buxton. In this case, the
advice as to the legality of the contract given by Defendants caused Mr. Taylor to be damaged
due to the loss of possession of his majority shareholder interest/position in AIA Services iri
1995 and such damage was immediately ascertainable. Plaintiff was further damaged in 1996 by
the undisputed loss of money, again an objectively ascertainable damage. In Opposition to
Defendants' Summary Judgment, Plaintiff contends the 1995/1996 damage was "immaterial" or,
alternatively, that he did not think he was damaged in 1995 or 1996 because he believed he had a
valid and enforceable contract with AIA.

However, the Chicoine court cautioned that the

objectively ascertainable damage standard does not mean that the fact of damage must have been
known to the injured party. Hence, despite Plaintiffs assertions to the contrary, Plaintiff cannot
dispute that he sold his shares in 1995 and when he placed AIA in default in 1996 he was
damaged. 6 As Plaintiffs damages were objectively ascertainable in 1995 or 1996, at the latest,
the statute of limitations began to run, and has long since expired.
2.

Tolling of the statute of limitations under the "fraudulent concealment"
exception.

Plaintiff contends that summary judgment on the statute of limitations is precluded by the
fraudulent concealment exception in his Opposition brief. Under Idaho law, where fraudulent
concealment and ignorance of the facts are relied upon to suspend the running of the statute of
limitations, there must have been such concealment as would prevent a person exercising due

In this case, like in Counts Two, Four and Five in Buxton, there was no need to wait fourteen years to receive an
order from Judge Brudie.
6
Recall, in his Complaint, Plaintiff asserted that the following damages were proximately caused by Defendants
alleged acts of malpractice: 1) the loss of possession of his majority shareholder interest/position in AIA Services
Corporation and 2) the loss of money (i.e., the loss of"millions of dollars"). Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 44.
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. diligence from discovering the facts. Cook v. Saltman, 96 Idaho 187, 191 (Idaho 1974). This is a
question of law to be determined by the court from the complaint. Cook, 96 Idaho at 191. In this
case, however, Plaintiff's Complaint contains no allegations of fraudulent concealment. Failure
to plead fraudulent concealment, in and of itself, precludes Plaintiff from invoking this statutory
exception to Defendants' Motion on the issue of summary judgment for professional
malpractice.
In the event that this Court permits Plaintiff to assert such an exception, in this case the
statute of limitations is not tolled because Plaintiff cannot establish his burden of proof for the
exception. 7 Fraudulent concealment consists of "some positive act of fraud which is furtively·
planned and secretly executed as to keep the plaintiffs cause of action concealed, or perpetrated
in a way that conceals itself." Shelton v. Fiser, 340 Ark. 89, 8 S.W.3d at 557 (2000). Plaintiffs
burden of proof mandates he establish that the defendant was aware of the facts necessary to
establish this cause of action ... and that the defendant intentionally concealed those facts from
the plaintiff. Weiner v. Clinton 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3174 citing Bound Brook Ass'n. v.
Norwalk, 198 Conn. 660, 665, 504 A.2d 1047 (1986). The burden is on the Plaintiff to prove by

a preponderance of the evidence that the statute of limitations was in fact tolled. Meadors v.
Still, 344 Ark. 307, 40 S.W.3d 294 (2001). It is not sufficient for the plaintiff to prove merely

that it was more likely than not that the defendant has concealed the cause of action, rather the
plaintiff has to "prove fraudulent concealment by the more exacting standard of clear, precise,
and unequivocal evidence." Cutsumpas v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 16 Conn.App. 108,
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112-13, 546 A.2d 962 (1988). Thus, while fraud is a necessary, it alone is not a sufficient
condition for the suspension of the statute of limitations; in order to toll the statute of limitations,
the fraud perpetrated must be concealed.
Idaho has addressed the issue of fraudulent concealment under Idaho Code § 5-219(4).

Theriault v. A.H Robins Co., 108 Idaho 303, 306-308 (1985). In Theriault, the defendant
asserted that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and moved for summary
judgment.

Theriault, 108 Idaho at 306-308.

The plaintiff had alleged that defendants

fraudulently and knowingly concealed information.

Despite plaintiff's arguments as to

fraudulent concealment in Theriault, summary judgment was granted holding that plaintiff's
action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations of Idaho Code § 5-219. The Court
further held that the evidence of fraudulent concealment, even when viewed in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, was insufficient to establish a triable issue. Specifically, the court noted
that plaintiff failed to produce any evidence of conduct by the defendant designed to conceal
facts in an effort to hinder her in prosecuting her claim. Additionally, the court held that there
was nothing in the record to show that the defendant concealed material facts or made false
representations which lulled the plaintiff into inaction during the period in which she could have
brought this lawsuit.
Similarly, in a legal malpractice action, a court held that a plaintiff failed to prove that the
statutory period was tolled by fraudulent concealment because she did not produced evidence
consistent with fraudulent concealment beyond the inaccurate statements made by the lawyers.
7

Plaintiff asserts that the doctrine of equitable tolling precludes summary judgment on page 20 of his Opposition.
This argument is duplicative of Plaintiffs fraudulent concealment argument and to the extent such a doctrine applies
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Delanno, Inc. v. John Peace 366 Ark. 542; 237 S.W.3d 81 (2006). In Dalanno, the plaintiff

argued fraudulent concealment applied because a jury could possibly conclude that the lawyers
were aware of and attempted to conceal untrue statements. Delanno, 366 Ark. at 545. The court
rejected this argument. Id.
In this case, summary judgment should enter against Plaintiff because he has failed to
allege sufficient facts to establish a triable issue regarding "fraudulent concealment." Plaintiff
vaguely references the "facts" encompassed in "Sections A through N" (i.e., pages 2 through 24
of Plaintiffs Statement of Facts) as "evidence that Defendant Riley and other Defendants
concealed facts from Reed Taylor." However, the vague facts relied upon by Plaintiff fail to
show any intent on Defendants' part to conceal facts. Nor do the "facts" relied upon by Plaintiff
support a finding that Defendants' alleged concealment was "directed toward obtaining a delay
in the filing of this action" to take advantage of the statute of limitations, the standard to establish
fraudulent concealment. Plaintiff fails to even identify any act that was done in concealment, but
rather argues· that Defendants never advised him that the redemption was illegal so his
malpractice cause of action was "concealed" from Plaintiff. Even when viewed in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiffs "evidence" is insufficient to establish a triable issue precluding
summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the issue of the statute of limitations. 8

to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, it will be only addressed once herein.
8
Of note, when professional malpractice involves fraudulent or intentional concealment of the wrongdoing, the
statute of limitation contained in LC. § 5-219(4) is tolled until the injured party "knows or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have been put on inquiry regarding the ... matter complained of." McCoy v. Lyons, 120
Idaho 765, 772, 820 P.2d 360, 367 (1991). After the date of discovery, the statute of limitation period is one year,
after which an action for professional malpractice is barred. LC.§ 5-219(4).
In this case, it is undisputed that Connie Taylor raised illegality as a defense in the AIA litigation in April of 2008.
Plaintiff waited until September 30, 2009, approximately a year and half, to bring this lawsuit for professional
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C.

BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY.
As set forth in the briefing, there is no material issue of fact on this issue; rather, the

parties disagree on the applicable statute of limitation. Plaintiff contends that the breach of
fiduciary duty in this case is governed by Idaho Code § 5-224, whereas Defendants assert that
Plaintiff's cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty is governed by the two-year statute of
limitations set forth in Idaho Code § 5-219(4) because the claim arises out of Defendants'
performance of professional services. Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 585 (2002). Of note,
Plaintiff does not distinguish or address the clear holding of Lapham. The application of Idaho
Code§ 5-219(4) is discussed above with regard to Plaintiffs malpractice cause of action.
Even if Plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty cause of action does not arise out of
Defendants' performance of "professional" services, summary judgment is appropriate on
Plaintiff's cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty because it is still barred by the statute of
limitations pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-224. Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged any duty owed
by Defendants Riley (during his employment with Eberle Berlin), Turnbow or Eberle Berlin
whatsoever in his opposition which would give rise to a breach of fiduciary duty cause of action
beyond any duties inherent in a professional relationship. Plaintiff "suggests" that Defendants
Turnbow and Eberle Berlin had "an affirmative duty" to intervene on behalf of Mr. Taylor in
Taylor v. AJA Services. This suggestion is not a duty assumed by Defendants Turnbow and

Eberle Berlin, nor is it a duty that would be separate and apart from their performance of

negligence. Though Plaintiff fails to establish that a fraudulent concealment act occurred in this case, even
assuming concealment, Plaintiff still failed to act with the requisite time period in asserting his claim after discovery.
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professional services. 9

Accordingly, summary judgment should be entered m favor of

Defendants on this cause of action.

. D.

NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION.
Mannas v. Moss and the line of case law prior to Mannas undisputedly establis4es that

the tort of negligent misrepresentation is not recognized in Idaho except in the narrow confines
of a professional relationship involving an accountant. 10 143 Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166 (2007).
In Plaintiffs Supplemental Opposition, Plaintiff finally admitted that Idaho did not recognize
this cause of action as against attorneys. Yet, Plaintiff, in his supplemental Opposition, provides
detailed analysis why under Harringfeld this Court could conclude that Idaho may recognize
negligent misrepresentation. However, this analysis is flawed because the Idaho Supreme Court
decided Mannas after it decided Harringfeld.

The Court had the opportunity in Mannas to

extend the tort of negligent misrepresentation to other professionals besides accountants, but
expressly rejected it. Accordingly, this Court would be justified in relying on Mannas to grant
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue. 11

9

This is no affrrmative duty owed by Defendants. In fact, the duty that Defendants owed to their former client AIA,
based on the Rules of Professional Responsibility, would most likely preclude them from intervening on Mr.
Taylor's behalf (i.e., Defendants could not act in a manner adverse to a former client's interest in a substantially
similar matter).
10

Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1010, 895 P.2d 1195, 1203 (1995). See also Idaho
Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp ofIdaho, 115 Idaho 1082, 772 P.2d 720 (1989).
11

Of note, in the event this Court rejects the clear holding of Mannas v. Moss, Plaintiffs claim for negligent
misrepresentation is also timed barred pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-224 and summary judgment should still enter
against Plaintiff.
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E.

IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT.
As a matter of law, Plaintiff is precluded from asserting a cause of action under the Idaho

Consumer Protection Act (ICPA) because he lacks standing and the claim is barred by the statute
of limitations under Idaho Code § 48-618. Under the ICPA, a claim must be based upon a
contract. Haskin v. Glass, 102 Idaho 785; 640 P.2d 1186 (1982). In Plaintiffs Opposition, he
admits that he did not have a traditional contract for legal services with Defendants Riley,
Turnbow and/or Eberle Berlin. Rather, Plaintiff claims that he has standing to bring an ICPA
claim because he "purchased" legal services of Defendants Riley, Turnbow and/or Eberle Berlin
through consideration arising from his contract with AIA Services to redeem his shares.
Consideration given in a contract formed with a third-party does not constitute a "purchase"
which permits the person to bring an ICPA cause of action. Accordingly, Plaintiffs cause of
action for violation ofICPA should be dismissed on summary judgment.

F.

FRAUD.
Defendants should be granted summary judgment on Plaintiff's fraud cause of action

because Plaintiff cannot establish a false statement of fact, a mandatory element of the prima
facie case of fraud. Significantly, in this case, Judge Brodie previously held that Defendants'
statement of the future enforceability of the contract was an opinion statement and was not
actionable in fraud under Idaho law.
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The general rule under Idaho law provides that opinions and predictions cannot form the
basis of a fraud claim.

12

Country Cove Dev., Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, 601 (2006). Under

Idaho law, an action for fraud will not lie in statements about future events. Id. Idaho law
clearly requires the plaintiff to form his own conclusions regarding the occurrence of future
events. Thomas v. Med. Ctr. Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 207, 61P.3d557, 564 (2002).
Moreover, in Idaho, the mere expression of an opinion, which is understood to be only an
opinion, does not render a person expressing it liable for fraud. Fox v. Cosgriff, 66 Idaho 371,
381 (1945). Defendants' statement in their opinion letter about the power and authority of the
corporation to make such a transaction prior to the closing date is a true opinion statement and
not actionable in fraud.
In the event that this Court determines Plaintiffs fraud cause of action can withstand
summary judgment as a valid cause of action, Plaintiffs assertion of his fraud cause of action is
barred by the statute of limitations and summary judgment should enter in favor of Defendants.
Idaho Code § 5-218(4) precludes a cause of action for fraud if the individual claiming he was
harmed by the alleged fraud failed to act diligently in protecting his interests.

As the

Washington court stated in analyzing the statute of limitation "if the shareholders failed to
examine the corporate records, the shareholders must have been negligent and careless of their
own interests" and should be precluded from prosecuting their fraud claim. Davis v. Harrison,
12

As a very limited exception to the general rule in specific instances, Idaho case law has acknowledged that certain
"opinion" statements can be blended with statements of fact when such statements refer to value or quality.
However, none of the alleged factual statements in this case are blended statements of opinion and fact, nor are any
of the statements in this case about value or quantity. See Fox v. Cosgriff, 66 Idaho 371, 381 (1945). Thus, all the
statements by Defendants are pure opinion statements and cannot be actionable in fraud.
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167 P.2d 1015 (1946). In this case, it is undisputed that AIA had already defaulted on its
obligation in early 1996. Due diligence required Plaintiff to act accordingly to protect his
interests in 1996. Said differently, Plaintiffs own lack of diligence was the reason he waited
over fourteen years to seek judicial enforcement of failure to act in accordance with the Stock
Redemption Agreement.

There was nothing unique about the timing of Judge Brudie's

"discovery" that the contract was illegal; the same "discovery" could have been discovered in
1995 or 1996 by Plaintiff himself, his attorney Scott Bell, or through litigation to enforce the
Stock Redemption Agreement. Plaintiff opposes Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment by
deflecting his due diligence requirement by claiming he was only an honorary C.E.O. and that he
delegated the duty of being knowledgeable about legal and financial affairs of AIA to his
brother. However, such deflection attempts should not preclude the expiration of the statute of
limitations pursuant to Idaho Code§ 5-218(4).
Thus, in this case, the date of accrual of a cause of action for fraud is a question of law
because there is no dispute over any issue of material fact regarding the accrual. Summary
judgment should enter accordingly.

III. CONCLUSION
Defendants Turnbow and Eberle Berlin respectfully request this Court grant their Motion

for Summary Judgment and dismiss Plaintiffs causes of action for negligence/professional
malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, violation of the Idaho
Consumer Protection Act and fraud/constructive fraud.

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, P. 19
001630

.

DATED this

/C,""'--day of March, 2010.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

01
orneys for D ndants Robert M. Turnbow and
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen,
Chartered
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RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, VIA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868
Plaintiff,

v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HA VILEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA VILEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
ROBERT M. TURNBOVI, an individual; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOVI
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
IN SUPPORT OF REED TAYLOR'S CROSS
MOPTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
AND IN SUPPORT OF REED TAYLOR'S
I.R.C.P. 56(f) CONTINUANCE ON THE
ISSUES OF FRAUDULENT
CONCEALMENT AND EQUITABLE
ESTOPPEL

Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

)
) ss:
)

I, Roderick C. Bond, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
I.

I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in court, one of the

attorneys for the plaintiff in the above-entitled action, and make this Affidavit based upon my
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______________

,_,,,,,,,

.

personal knowledge. I have personal knowledge of all of the pleadings and documents attached
· to this Affidavit as they have been the subject of actions through which I have served as counsel
for Reed Taylor.
2.

At no time in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., did any of the defendants or their

attorneys assert that AIA Services did not obtain shareholder approval of the redemption by and
through a shareholder resolution expressly authorizing the payments to Reed Taylor from capital
surplus. As mentioned previously, my firm and I diligently sought to depose Richard Riley and
other parties to ascertain all facts surrounding the redemption and shareholder resolutions. In
fact, I filed numerous motions to compel the production of documents and discovery and Judge
Brudie refused to hear or decide the motions. I had discussions with Jack Gjording prior to the

.

.

decisfon finding illegality on June 17, 2009, at no time did Mr. Gjording ever advise me that his
clients had failed to properly represent AIA Services and render the Opinion Letter or that any ·
representations in the Opinion Letter were false.

In fact, the Opinion Letter affirmatively

rejected any notion that the redemption agreements were illegally executed. My firm and I
diligently pursued discovery in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., and we were still never provided
with adequate discovery to put Reed Taylor on notice whether in fact the redemption of his
shares was illegal, while no defendant in this action was forthcoming in providing any answers.
3.

Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the transcript for the hearing

held on March 4, 2010, in Taylor v. Babbitt, McNichols, et al., consolidated cases.
4.

I need additional time to fully respond to all of the defendants' Motions for

Summary Judgment regarding statutes of limitations. I have not been permitted to question the
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defendants or conduct discovery on Reed Taylor's fraudulent concealment and equitable
estoppels defemes. I need to depose Richard Riley, Robert Turnbow and the designees for
Eberle Berlin and Hawley Troxell. I will be able to obtain testimony that Riley, Turnbow,
Eberle Berlin and Hawley Troxell remained silent as to issues and information surrounding the
legality of Reed Taylor's shares and refused to cooperate in any discovery or communications
regarding the legality of the transaction. (See also

~2

above.) I will be able to prove that they

intentionally remained silent and that they have concealed facts surrounding the redemption of
Reed Taylor's shares, including, without limitation, that Riley, Turnbow, Eberle Berlin and the
committee who approved the Opinion Letter knew that inadequate shareholder approval/consent
had n,ot been obtained based upon Judge Brodie's opinion and order.

I also believe that

discovery and depositions ·may reveal that documents and facts were hidden surrounding the
legality redemption of Reed Taylor's shares in 1995. In addition; AIA Services redacted
documents that it did produce in 1996 regarding AIA Services defaults in 1996.

Those

documents may show that Riley or Eberle Berlin mentioned asserting the illegality argument in
1996 and I need to review those documents (privilege does not apply or has been waived) or at a
minimum have the court review them in camera. There are likely other documents that the
defendants assert are privileged that I believe will show the concealment of facts pertaining to
the legality of the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares in 1995. I also believe that it is possible
that discovery will reveal Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin may have intentionally not ensured
that all necessary shareholder consents were obtained knowing that this failure could be used as a
later defense to avoid paying Reed Taylor and thereby concealing these facts and the defense
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from him.
5.

With regard to my email to Gary Babbitt wherein I requested that he speak with

Merlyn Clark, I believed then, as I still believe now, that had Mr. Babbitt advised Mr. Clark of
all of the facts in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., Mr. Clark would have questioned and interested
to know what had transpired in that case, and that he could have possibly stepped in to assist in
resolving the complex issues. I did not know Mr. Clark, but my former partner Ned Cannon and
mentor Jerry Smith spoke very highly of him and, based upon their respect, I had immediate
respect for Mr. Clark and hoped that he could get involved. Without divulging any attorneyclient privilege, I assure this court that Reed Taylor would have timely pursued claims against
the defendants in this action for the claims asserted in this action had we sufficient evidence to
believe that the claims had accrued or the issue of illegality had been confirmed.
Notwithstanding the adequacy of earned surplus or the adequacy of any shareholder consent to
invade capital surplus, there was good law that we believed proved .the redemption agreements
would be enforced regardless of any violation of LC. § 30-1-6 (1995). See Maudlin v. Pacific

Decision Sciences Corporation, 137 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1017, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 724, 735 (Cal.
2006); Minnelusa Co. v. A.G. Andrikopoulos, 929 P.2d 1321, 1324-25 (Colo. 1996); LaVoy

Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 127, 369 P.2d 45 (1962). I cannot even imagine what the
defendants in this action would have said in court in the other actions had Reed Taylor filed this
lawsuit before Judge Brudie determined that the redemption agreements were illegal and we
would have been arguing against ourselves in three other lawsuits to assert the redemption
agreements were illegal, and at that time the defendants in this action would have assuredly been
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screaming that the finding of illegality was a condition precedent to bringing suit in this action.
finally, the defendants in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., also continued to assert that the
redemption agreements had been orally modified until early 2009, and there were many other
issues being litigated in that case.

DATED: This 22[lct day of March, 2010.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWOR.i'l\J to before me this 22"d day of March, 2010.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I cc:Uf~'t~Al on the 22nd day of March, 2010, I caused to be served lrne and conect copies
of lhc foregoing document to the following parties:

Yfil:
Jack S. Gjording
Julianne S. Hall
Gjording & Fouser, PLLC
509 W. Hays St.
Boise, TD 83701
Phone: (208) 336-9777
Fax: (208) 336-9177

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered

( ) Overnight Mai I
(X) Facsimile

(X) Email (pdf attachment)
Via:

James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
Elam & Burke, PA
251 East front St.
Boise, ID 83704
Phone: (208) 343-5454
Fax: (208) 384-5844

( )
( )
( )
(X)
(X)
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TI-IE COURT: We are on the record this
morning in two related Nez Perce County cases. The
first of those CV 08-1763, Reed Taylor versus
Mike McNichols and Clements, Brown and McNichols.
The second matter is CV 08-1765, Reed Taylor versus
Gary Babbitt, John Ashby and other named defendants
related to Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley.
This matter is on calendar this morning on
a motion seeking an amended judgment being entered
in these matters. First of all, in the CV 08-1763,
Mr. Bond is present on behalf of the Plaintiff
Reed Taylor. Mr. LaRue and Mr. Thomson and
Mr. Janis who are the defense counsel in both of
these matters are also present by telephone.
Mr. Janis, Mr. Thomson, Mr. LaRue, I'm not
sure which one of you would like to proceed first or
if just one of you is going to address all of these.
This is a joint motion entered - sought in both of
these matters, so who would like to address it?
MR. 1HOMSON: Your Honor, this is
Jeff Thomson and I'll take the laboring ore on the
joint motion.
THE COURT: Alright. Thank you,
Mr. Thomson. Go ahead.
MR. THOMSON: I think explaining and
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The appeals were then consolidated or they
were consolidated at some paint subsequent to that;
· now nearly a year after the appeals were filed and
less than three months before the oral arguments in
these consolidated appeals, the Idaho Supreme Court
has issued two decisions in January and February of
this year. And those two decisions have now become
final as there was no petition for re-hearing filed
in either one. And these two new opinions,
especially the Spokane Structures case, overturns
prior case law, and according to the opinions,
attempts to clarify what is required for a final
appealable instrument.
These decisions, I think, force the entire
bar and perhaps the courts to re-examine and
re-evaluate the status of pending appeals and the
process for issuing a final appealable instrument.
In that process, it was determined that
those cases affected the appeals that Mr. Taylor has
filed and the effect of those cases was to make
Mr. Taylor's appeals premature as to the granting of
the motions to dismiss and the denying of the - the
denials of the motion to amend.
The instruments appealable - or appealed
from bv Mr. Taylor are not final and appealable

tracking the procedure status and history of the
Taylor appeals in these two lawsuits, it's probably
the clearest way to support the joint motion. Back
in December of '08, this Court entered its opinions
and orders regarding the motions to dismiss and the
motion to amend complaint. And as the title of
these instruments suggest, this Court's opinions,
the legal reasoning and the analysis are combined
with the Court's orders, and the orders grant the
motions to dismiss and deny the motions to amend,
but the orders don't ultimately dismiss the
complaint which is the ultimate relief that would
follow from those denials and grants. And the
orders were not in the form of a judgment.
Mr. Taylor appealed from these orders and
opinions, then through amended notices of appeal,
also appealed from the orders and opinions on the
award of fees and costs, appealed from the money
judgments based on those -- those awards, and
appealed from the opinions and orders on the motions
to reconsider fees and costs. These appeals were
timely, and at that time there was case law
supporting the finality and the appealability of
those opinions and orders, and we have all proceeded
accordingly.
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judgments as to the substantive issues because the
opinions and orders combine the legal reasoning with
the order in violation riow of Spokane Structures
interpretation of Rule 58(a). The new decisions
require that there be no legal analysis or reasoning
in a final appealable judgment, and so the logical
extension of that is that in this case we needed two
separate documents. One with the opinion and
certainly the order can be combined with the opinion
but that order is not final and appealable. And
then you need a separate document called a judgment
that does not include the court's reasoning and does
include the final relief from which appeal is
taken.
The orders and opinions in this case,
while they grant the motions, they do not order the
dismissal of the complaints. It's a technical
distinction but one that the courts have made, the
Supreme Court has made in Spokane Structures.
So while the attorney fees and costs money
judgment, the judge will recall we have two
judgments, one judgment in each of these cases,
dealing strictly with the award of attorney fees.
And though those are final appealable judgments,
they are only final and appealable as to the awarded
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fees and costs, and they are not final and
appealable with respect to the substantive issues
underlying the motions to dismiss and amend the
complaints.
And while they grant jurisdiction over the
appeal for fees and costs, the Supreme Court would
likely not exercise its jurisdiction over the issues
relating to fees and costs without having
jurisdiction of the underlying substantive issues.
Otherwise we have got the cart way before the horse
in trying to decide who is the prevailing party
entitled to attorney fees without the court having
jurisdiction to determine who the prevailing party
was.
So the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction
as of the appeal set right now because they are
premature. It's not that they are not untimely, and
most important of all because they are not untimely
but rather premature, that can be cured, that
prematurity can be cured so that the Supreme Court
has jurisdiction over these consolidated appeals.
And the Spokane Structures case and the Idaho rules
provide for a simple ministerial cure to this lack
of jurisdiction, IRA 17(e)(2), in essence as a
al ri ns u on formal en of an

appealable judgment without the need for re-filing
the notice of appeal. And 13(b)(4) gives this court
3 jurisdiction to enter an appealable judgment in the
4 form of an amended judgment.
5
And then, of course, we cited cases that
6 gives this court inherent power to correct a
7 judgment so that it accurately reflects the actions
8 taken by the court, and this Court has inherent
9 power to act in ajd of any appeals.
10
So the simple ministerial cure to ripen
11 Mr. Taylor's own appeals is to enter amended
12 judgments that are separate documents stating the
13 ultimate relief granted and do not set forth therein
14 the legal reasoning. And the amended judgments that
15 we presented to this Court, and, Judge, we have
16 presented a new set of amended judgments that take
17 in a concern that Mr. Bond had about the wording and
18 changed that wording, and that was presented to the
19 Court by a follow-up letter, and it is slightly
20 different from the one that was attached to the
21 motion. Nevertheless, these amended judgments meet
22 these requirements as dictated by Spokane Structures
23 and ripen Taylor's appeals.
24
If the Court enters those amended
25 "ud
will then be au ented into the
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appellate record so that come April 9th, which is
the hearing, the oral argument hearing, the Supreme
Court doesn't dismiss the appeal that's premature,
remand it back - remand them back to this court
with instructions to enter a final appealable
judgment and putting us exactly in the position we
are right now, but the result of which would be a
year or two delay.
So, your Honor, our joint motion urges
this Court to enter the amended judgment as
proposed, and if possible, do so on an expedited
basis so that we have time to get it before the
Supreme Court before the hearing.
That's all I have think point.
THE COURT: Alright. Thank you,
Mr. Thomson.
Mr. Janis, did you have anything you
wanted to add to that?
MR JANIS: Nothing to add, your Honor,
I'll just join in the argument.
TIIE COURT~ Alright. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Bond, why don't you go ahead and set
forth for me what the Plaintiffs position is at
this point.
(Thereu n, there was a discussion held
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off the record.)
MR. BOND: Okay. Well, your Honor, we
believe that the orders you entered are appealable
orders. And after the Spokane Structure case, a
Goodman Oil case came out, and that's the other case
that was attached to their materials. And in that
case, the court talked about an order that disposed
of a case, that constitutes a judgment for purposes
of appeal.
And, in fact, in that case, the appellate
lost because he didn't timely appeal because he
thought that wasn't a judgment, so it's almost
actually the opposite. And the court really went
into some, you know, on page - it's page 3 of the
Westlaw cite is where it starts, but I think this
pretty much, I think, tells the story, and it says
the Court went on to say, "Application of a
three-step process leads to the conclusion that an
order that grants all the requested- all the
relief requested other than costs and attorney's
fees constitutes a judgment under 58 - Rule 58(a).
And then they go on to say that, 'The Court has held
that as a general rule, a final judgment is an order
or a judgment that ends the lawsuit, adjudicates the
sub·ect matter of the controvers and
resents a
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final determination of the rights of the parties.
Therefore, because an order that brings an end to a
lawsuit, other than the issues of costs and attorney
fees, constitutes a final judgment, and an appeal,
as a matter of right, may be taken from a final
judgment. An order that brings an end to a lawsuit,
constitutes a judgment."
The Defendants moved for a dismissal of
the full complaint, the Court granted. that. And
from a practical standpoint, we would assert,
your Honor, at this late stage, its really
prejudicial, I think, for the Court to do anything
any way because if the Supreme Court believes that
that's not an appealable order, then send it back
and let us all brief it or address the other issues.
Because as you are going to see, your Honor, I'm
going to get to some other issues - there's more
involved here than just meets the eye.
And first of all, they did correct -- the
Defendant did correct, we exchanged e-mails, I asked
many questions, some weren't answered, some were,
and that's why we couldn't come to an agreement on
any kind of a stipulation that we felt would address
everybody's needs.
They kind of talk out of both sides of
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15

14

everything into one document which - what I'm going
2 to get to is not appropriate.
3
·But there's a case that I - that is a
4 recent case, Straub V Smith, S+r-a-u-b, V Smith,
5 it's 145 Idaho 65. And in the concurring opinion by
6 Chief Justice Eismann, he says, quote, "ln the
7 instant case, there was no final judgment until the
8 action was dismissed." And without - without a
9 dismissal, he goes on to say, there can't be an
10 award of fees. In fact, his quote is, "indeed there
11 can be no prevailing party 1.Ultil the merits of the
12 lawsuit have been decided and there is a final
13 judgment."
14
So what's important and what Chief Justice
Eismann
acknowledges
is that either your order's a
15
16 final judgment for purposes of appeal or it's not.
17 If it's not, then you have to unwind all of the
18 attorney fee orders. Because if there was no final
19 judgment, there could be no prevailing party under
20 Rule 54. And that is essentially what Chief Justice
21 Eismann's saying.
....--...
Well, and I think the Defendants
acknowledged that and that's why they are trying to
24 include amended judgments for the attorney fees and
25 they want the Court to satisfy the judgment. That's
1

....

··-····-··········--··--·······-···------------------············-···········

their mouth. One side they say, well, there's no
final judgment, but yet they are submitting an
amended judgment. So how do you amend a judgment if
there's no final judgment to start with. And I
asked that question many times, finally Mr. Janis
did say, well, you know, we think that tmder the
Appellate Rule 13(b), the Court had jurisdiction to
amend a judgment. So that's how, I guess, they are
trying to dove tail their way into giving the Court
the jurisdiction to even do anything.
But it's important for the Court to
understand what's happened over the course of the
appeal to tmderstand why we are concerned and
there's several -- several issues have taken place.
And first of all, one of them as in the court
record, the Defendants, Hawley Troxell Defendants,
had demanded that Reed Taylor either post bond or
pay the judgments on the attomey fees. He couldn't
get a bond, so he paid the judgments. Shortly
thereafter, the Defendants move to moot the appeal
on that issue to say he's paid the judgment so he
doesn't get to - he doesn't get to try to get his
money back on attorney fees now. So that's very
important to know because it helps explain what's
going on and why I think they are trying to combine
.

1
2
3

4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15

16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24
25

why we have asked and we offer, we said, look, we
would agree to stipulate to some kind of an order;
but if you are - you are if you are asserting that
there's no final judgment, then we want you to pay
the money into the Court registry that Reed Taylor's
paid so that you can't have the cake and eat it too,
but they refused.
And that's issue No. 1 which in their
proposed - and this is all in our materials, it
would be improper for the Court to enter a
satisfaction of judgment any way. That's what they
are asking the Court to do. The rule does not
provide that the Court can enter that order. A
clerk can if the money's paid into the Court
registry or the party or the party's attorney can,
not the Court. And, again, I ask this question but
- and presented the materials, was never squarely
addressed.
As far as the amending the order of
attorney fees, which again they put in that same
order. Well, if that judgment is valid, that
judgment can only be amended in 14 days. So you
can't put that in there. And I asked that and
asserted that in our materials. Again, questions
not answered.
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And one of the - one of the important -and in dealing with the satisfaction of judgment
issue, so either they are right and there was no
judgment which means there's nothing after that; or
they are wrong, and if they are wrong, then
everything stands the way it is.
And I found a Florida case that talked
about -- and it's Morris North America V King, and
it's 430 S.2d 592. And in that case the Court said,
quote, "Nevertheless, the principle is the same, a
facially valid satisfaction is a complete bar to any
effort to alter or amend the final judgment." And
that goes to the basic argument either that those
judgments are good or they are not. And if -- and
they can't have the cake and eat it too. If they
are not good, then they need to pay the money back
and we can deal with it. We are happy to stipulate,
as I offered them, and as I put in the materials,
hey, we are okay with all this as long as there's
something entered that's right exactly identical,
but they can't have everything they want because it
just doesn't work legally based upon the legal
authorities.
Second of all, which is another important
issue, is that as everyone knows, these Taylor cases
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dismissed, arid Reed Taylor couldn't have sued on
that issue at that time and was never asserted on
it.
So, and, again, I asked them, the
Defendants, I said, you know, get me a proposed
order that includes some language that says these -the dismissal of the first lawsuits included the
claims accrued through when the first amended
complaint, the date that that was submitted. They
refused. So I'm in no -- and Mike and I are in no
other position to believe anything other than based
upon everything I have already gone over, that
really what they are asking is just not in
accordance with the rules and it's going way beyond
the scope of anything based upon their own
arguments.
THE COURT: Okay. Tell me what you feel
the prejudice is to Mr. Taylor at this point of
entering this proposed order?
MR. BOND: If, No. 1, I think the proposed
order, the timing of it would be crucial, granted
the sooner the Court does anything if it was going
to do something is important. I think under the
rules we would have a chance to try to augment our
briefs with new authority and new arguments. Now

are nasty cases and it's going on and there's other
cases involved, and there's a more recent case on
the opinion letter that was given to him. And the
Court can take judicial notice of Taylor V Eberle
Berlin, Riley, Hawley Troxell on the opinion letter
that was filed in Ada County. And it's very
interesting to note because they are asserting now
in that case that Reed Taylor should have sued
Hawley Troxell in the first lawsuit on the opinion
letter. And that because of that, he's barred by
res judicata from now suing them on that opinion
letter. And in that case, they are asserting
there's a final judgment.
So they are asserting there's a final
judgment in Boise right now, and now they are up
here saying there is no final judgment. And the
important issue with that is, and this is why I just
think on this issue alone, I think the Court should
let the Court of Appeals take care of it, because I
know what they are going to do. If the Court enters
an order that's a judgment that says - that's dated
today, they are going to go and waive that order and
say look, this includes all claims through this
date. When everyone knows the legality was not
found until six months after those suits were
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that may or may not be accepted by the Court at this
stage with oral argument a month away, and so that's
an issue.
You know, as far as the order the way it's
worded as asserted in our materials, it's just wrong
the way it's set forth anyway.
You know, I think, one, if the Defendants
would -- I mean the questions that I asked are
reasonable. If the Defendants can provide answers
to these and assure us that there is no other
motivation for getting these orders, then we can -as I have always stated, I don't see why we can't
work something out that would address everybody's
concerns. But I think the problem is they want -they are trying to get a lot of bang for the buck
with this order. That's what I believe and I have
seen nothing that tells me otherwise and Mike is in
the same boat.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, tell me again
then what prejudice you see to Mr. Taylor if I was
to enter this order as proposed?
MR. BOND: Okay. No. 1, and I'm sorry I
got off track. No. 1, the date of the proposed
order, the judgment. And really, under their own
theory, it could be just an order that says an order
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-- this is an order dismissing the complaint as of a
1
certain date, I suppose, you know. It doesn't mean
2
-- under the rules it doesn't even need to be a
3
judgment, and that's clear. So I think- that
4
would be prejudice No. I.
5
Prejudice No. 2, as I mentioned to
6
earlier, there should be no reference to attorney
7
fees, there should be no reference to the pleadings
8
that were considered. There should be no
9
satisfaction of judgment. If there was going to be
10
anything, it should be, hey, this is an order
11
dismissing the complaint and any claims that accrued 12
13
after the date that that amended complaint was filed
are not included in this order at this time.
14
15
And then the attorney fee judgment -- now
the problem is if you do that, that does wipe out
16
the attorney fee judgment. Now, if they are here to
17
tell -- if they will go on record and say we will
18
pay that money in the court registry right now, then
19
that solves the big problem right there because we
20
have said if they do that, we are fine with
21
stipulating to figuring out a way to keep all the
22
records the way it is without having to go and
23
re-litigate that issue or have that be an issue.
24
And, you know, but I don't think they want to give
25

23

22
And maybe if the Court could give me an
idea what you were thinking, then maybe that -maybe we could address that or -- it's a -THE COURT: Well, I'm thinking I want to
get this stream lined, and I don't think you want to
go through multiple steps to get a matter heard on
the appeal, so if there's a simple way that I can
assist in making sure you only have to do this once
at the appellate level and get everything addressed
that you want to, I want to do that . I think that's
what you want to do as well.
MR. BOND: Yeah, well, I think,
your Honor, and I think one possible -- one possible
fix to this that I think we -- we would agree to
would be I think the Court can just enter an
order -- an order, not a judgment, an order
dismissing his complaint and have that order entered
nunc pro tune for the date that you entered the
dismissal. In other words, this is effective that
date, it's filed this date, but it's effective that
date, and this does not address any matters that
would accrue after the original pleas were filed.
And to me that -- they can still keep
their attorney fee argument on appeal if they want
on the moot, it keeps everything clean, and I think

those fees up or that argument. Now that argument
is on appeal as well, so we are not conceding that
argument. But until that issue's resolved, if
there's going to be another order entered, then why
wouldn't we want to take that argument away from
them because they shouldn't be able to keep it if
there's no final judgment to start with.
So I think, you know, in our response,
your Honor, I kind of went over the rules on why the
attorney fee judgment can't be in there, why the
satisfaction of judgment can't be in there, and
they - in their reply they did cite Rule 60(b)5 and
6 which wasn't the basis of their motion which we
asserted from day one that there really was no
authority for their motion other than the Spokane
Structure case. So that's improper to even ask for
it, but I don't think it works anyway under 60(b)5
or6.
So I mean about the only thing that I can
reasonably think of, your Honor, and I mean, I
guess, my problem is in my mind, I have - I have
some ways that I think this could be resolved, but
I'm hesitant to put it forth too because I don't
want to shoot my client in the foot. I mean so I'm
kind of -- I'm in a terrible position myself.
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that's the only way that I can think of that would
-- you know, barring that, I think the only .other
· alternative is -- and I guess, your Honor, the
position we have is because, of course, the key case
on these appeals is another case on appeal, so
really our position is unfortunately usually you
want appeals quickly heard, but our position also is
unless we are assured that it's not going to
prejudice him, we'd rather let the Court decide it.
Because so what if it comes back, I mean it could be
heard after the other appeal anyway.
So I think, you know, what I suggested is
about the only way I could think of is if you put
language in that protects us to make sure there's
no -- no claims that accrued after that -- the date
of the first amended complaint which is October 12,
I believe, that those are excluded, then minus that,
I don't-- I think it's better just let the Courts
deal with it, and if it comes back, it comes back.
I mean I'll tell if you it comes back, we
are not going to want - I mean - and I don't see
why the Defendants wouldn't agree to a fix that
would keep us from having to re-hear the attorney
fees issues and all that, I mean we are not - we
are not trying to, you know, go down that road. But
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on the other hand, your Honor, we kind of did get
blind-sided when we get told either pay it or post
the bond and then they come back and try to moot our
appeal on that issue. So we are - you know, we are
in a difficult situation. Because we were trying to
keep it simple then, fine, we will just pay the
judgment, the appeals are going, everyone knowing in
their right mind knew that Reed Taylor was giving up
his right to appeal the attorney fee award, and so
that's getting rammed down our throats right now.
So that's why -- one of the many many problems
but-IBE COURT: Alright. Mr. Thomson, why do
you want reference to the attorney's fees in the
satisfaction of the amounts in the - in your
proposed amended judgment?
MR IBOMSON: Judge, our whole purpose for
the wording in the proposed amended judgment is so
that it is actually in the form of an amended
judgment. And our reason for doing that is because
this Court has specific jurisdiction to enter an
amended judgment. And, in fact, that's what we are
doing is amending the current judgment, and they are
judgment, though limited, we are amending that
judgment, and we are amending it by adding lan~age
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original judgment and you make the amendments to it.
THE COURT: So I have the opportunity here
to confuse the appeals court, I don't get that very
often.
MR. THOMSON: Well, I hate to say that the
pending cases have been a lot of confusion -THE COURT: The point I'm getting is the
confusion usually comes the other way.
MR THOMSON: I think it's revenge,
your Honor.
To be honest, if it is problematic to the
Court to have the language from the original
judgment in the amended judgment, I don't think it
matters and we can take it out. As to the
satisfaction having occurred, we can take that
language out too. I honestly think that the proper
form of this amended judgment ought to be as
proposed, and at a minimum, we can take out that
last sentence, but I do think it's important to keep
in the attorney fee language.
Having said that, we have a judgment that
deals with attorney fees and an amended judgment
that deals only with the motions to dismiss and to
amend the complaint, I think that gets us in the
sameplare,

to it in terms of the two reliefs that we are
seeking in both cases.
The only thing we add to the attorney fee
provision is that these have been satisfied because
that reflects what has happened.
TIIE COURT: I thought the whole idea was
to assist in a quick fully adjudicated appeal Why
is that necessary to get this before the Court on an
appeal next month? What does that have to do with
that?
MR IBOMSON: Well, what part of that whyIBE COURT: Why is it necessary to include
this language about the attorney's fees and that
they have been satisfied by payment in order to get
this in front of the appeals court next month? What
purpose is that serving? I don't see that.
MR THOMSON: I don't think it ultimately
changes anything other than just trying to be
technically correct, your Honor. We don't need the
language that the judgments have been satisfied.
They have been as a fact and we can argue that in
the Supreme Court, but I think it will be confusing
to have two judgments. And if you are amending the
judgment, then I think what you do is you take the
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THE COURT: Alright. Anything else,
Mr. Thomson?
MR. THOMSON: Just to address Mr. Bond's
argument about Goodman Oil and its effect, the
linchpin case here is Spokane Structures. It is the
one that clarified the law, it is in quotes, and it
is the one that over turned prior case law that
would have allowed this appeal that we are dealing
with right now to be mature. Goodman Oil is a -follows Spokane Structures and in no manner
overrules it or affects it. What Mr. Bond is trying
to do is take the words that in Goodman Oil there
was an order that was considered to be a separate
document with no legal reasoning that sets forth the
ultimate relief. Goodman Oil doesn't give us the
benefit of showing us what that order looks like,
but it has to have been there. And so what the
Court ultimately found in Goodman Oil was the order
that was entered by the judge in that case met the
requirements. Here, the opinions and orders do not
meet the newly created requirements set forth by
Spokane Structures.
And the fact that Mr. Bond never
addresses, even mentions or cites Spokane Structures
or tries to distinguish it, I think is telling.
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MR. BOND: I will, your Honor MR. THOMSON: Frankly, your Honor, I think
motives are totally irrelevant as to whether we need
an amended judgment or not. Separate from what we
perceive to be a legal infirmity that could be
prejudicial to everybody, all clients, all parties
rather, if the matter is dismissed as premature and
we simply have to come down back to the court and do
what we are doing now and lose our place in the
queue and be delayed now a year or two in getting to
the ultimate resolution of this case.
What Mr. Bond wants you to do, your Honor,
through his request to add language regarding the
effect of the judgment and regarding attorney fees,
is to - is to take the status quo which is on
appeal right now and change the position of the
parties and give Mr. Taylor a better deal than he
got from this Court in the first place.
THE COURT: I don't think Mr. Taylor got
much of a deal from this Court in the first place.
MR. TIIOMSON: Well, yet he's trying to
lessen the impact through this amended judgment
process, and more importantly he's asking this Court
to reach out beyond the boundaries of this case and
insert language for the sole p:;.-.:;::;-..,;: of benefiting

29
1

Mr. Taylor in other cases. And that is beyond the

2
3

Court's power at this point and it's beyond - it's
beyond the need for the purpose of this motion for
amended judgments to perfect the appeal.
But putting motives aside and putting the
language that Mr. Bond wants to put into the
judgment aside, I think there's no question I
believe that Mr. Bond would agree that something has
to be done to ripen his client's appeal. We are
trying to find a simplified process for doing that,
we think we have proposed one, and we would ask this
Court to enter the amended judgment as quickly as
possible so that we can get them to the Supreme
Court.
THE COURT: Alright. Well, this is an
interesting issue, and I obviously want to assist
all parties to the extent possible to get this heard
at the appellate level, and I don't want to
prejudice anybody. I will go back and review the
proposed amended judgments, I have read - I have
read Goodman Oil when it came out, I don't recall
reading Spokane Structures, so I want to go back and
review that as well. And I know you are both in a
time crunch, so I will try to do this as soon as
possible.
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And I guess I have got a number of
2 options, one would be to just do nothing and
3 · potentially have to do this later, but I will try to
4 assist to the extent possible that I can at this
5 point in time to be sure that you can both get this
6 heard as soon as possible.
7
So I'm going to take the motions -- the
8 joint motion for the amended judgment under
9 advisement at this time, and if I want to solicit
10 any other options from anybody, I'll make that
11
request after I do my review. And I know you want
12 something done quick, so I'll try to facilitate
13 that.
14
Alright. Anything else, Mr. Thomson?
15
MR. THOMSON: Nothing, your Honor.
16
THE COURT: Mr. Bond, anything else at
17 this point then?
18
MR. BOND: No, your Honor. Thank you.
19
THE COURT: Alright. Thank you, Counsel,
20 we are in recess at this point.
21
(Thereupon, the hearing was concluded at
10:25 a.m.)
1

24
25
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By A. GARal:N
DIOPUTY

Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868
Plaintiff,

v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
. ROBERT M. TURNBOW, an individual; and
EBERLE, BERLIN; KADING, TURl'\JBOW
& McKL VEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S (1)
OBJECTIONS; (2) WITHDRAW OF CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON THE ISSUES OF FRAUDULENT
CONCEALMENT AND EQUITABLE
ESTOPPEL, CLARIFICATION AND
REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND; (3)
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT;
AND (4) SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANMDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND JN
SUPPORT OF CROSS MOTIONS FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor"), by and through his attorneys of record,
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC, submits the following Objections, Withdrawal of Certain
Issues, Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and Reply
in Support of Reed Taylor's Cross-Motions for Partial Summary Judgment against all of the
defendants in this action:

REED TAYLOR'S OBJECTIONS, WITHDRAW OF CERTAIN ISSUES, REPLY IN
SUPPORT OF CROSS-MOTIONS AND SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- I
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I.

LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENTS

Reed Taylor incorporates by reference into each and every,argutrient asserted below Reed
Taylor's Statement Facts in Opposition to Defendants' Moti~ns for Summary Judgment and in
Support of Cross Motions for Summary Judgment ("Facts"), along with all Affidavits of Reed
Taylor and Roderick C. Bond submitted in this action.

A. Reed Taylor objects to hearing the defendants motions as discovery has been staved.
Reed Taylor reiterates his objection to defendants' motions as discovery has been stayed,
they have refused to answer or conduct discovery relating to their defenses and motions
(including, without limitation, refusing to attend any depositions and refusing to answer requests
for production and interrogatories relating to their defenses), and discovery should be conducted
before hearing their Motions. Cohn v. Taco Bell Corp., 147 F.R.D. 154 (N.D.Tll. 1993).

B. Reed Taylor withdraws his Cross-Motion for Partial Summarv Judgment on the
issues of fraudulent concealment and equitable estoppel, and if necessary, requests
leave to amend to clearly state these defens es to all statute of limitations defenses.
Defendants assert that Reed Taylor may not conduct discovery on the issues of fraudulent
concealment and equitable estoppel since he moved for cross-summary judgment on these issues.
Therefore, although Reed Taylor believes that he has proven the defendants have concealed facts
from him, Reed Taylor withdraws his Cross-Motions for Partial Summary Judgment against the
defendants on the issues of fraudulent concealment and equitable estoppel. Defendants also
assert that these issues have not been adequately pied. To the extent that the court may find that
Reed Taylor inadequately pied fraudulent concealment or equitable estoppel, he requests leave to
amend to sufficiently plead those defenses pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15(a)-(d). Moreover, although
the evidence shows that his claims are not barred by any of the statues of limitations, Reed
Taylor will, in an abundance of caution, move for an l.R.C.P. 56(f) continuance to prove these
REED TAYLOR'S OBJECTIONS, WITHDRAW OF CERTAIN ISSUES, REPLY IN
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defenses. Finally, Reed Taylor clarifies that his Motions for Partial Summary Judgment are to
bar the defendants from asserting certain affirmative defenses, and he is not asserting that they
should be stricken pursuantto l.R.C.P. 12(f), as asserted by the defendants.

C. The burden is on the defendants to prove their affirmative defenses, they have all
failed to meet that burden, and Reed Taylor has met his burden to prevail on them.
1. Riley and Hawley Troxell have not and cannot meet their burden to prove
res judicata.
"Res judicata is an affirmative defense and the party asserting it must prove all of the
essential elements by a preponderance of the evidence." Ticor Title Company v. Stanion, 144
Idaho 119, 122, 157 P.3d 613, 617 (2007). Res judicata is a question of law only when:
(1) the facts are undisputed, (2) the preclusion question may be answered solely by
reviewing the judgment put forward as the bar, or (3) the preclusion question may be
made solely by inspection of the record of the proceeding culminating in the judgment
put forward as the bar.

Grand Lake Marina, LTD v. Grand River Dam Authority, 177 P.3d 1104, 1108 (Okla. 2007).
As preliminary matter, whether there is a final judgment in the first lawsuit has no
bearing on why the res judicata defense fails as a matter of law. The same evidence does not
support this case and the first case against Riley and Hawley Troxell. The time, space, origin
and motivation of the facts supporting this case have virtually no commonality with the facts in
the first lawsuit. Even John Janis asserted at oral argument in the first lawsuit that the claims
against his clients (Clements Brown & McNichols) were pied virtually identical as those against
Riley and Hawley Troxell, with the key difference being that Hawley Troxell assisted in
unlawfully pledging AIA Services' assets and assisted in improper loan guarantees, among other
things. In addition, the origin of the facts in those lawsuits was acts and/or omissions occurring
in the past several years, while this action relies primarily on facts occurring in 1995. It would
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not have formed a convenient trial unit for Reed Taylor to assert claims related to his security
interests to a jury and then turn around and tell the same jury that his claims were not valid
because the agreements were illegal, ·particularly when no illegality had been found. Moreover,
the agreements subject to the first lawsuit were the amended redemption agreements executed in
1996, not the original agreements subject to this action. The facts essential to maintain this
action did not exist in 2008 and could not have existed until Judge Brudie ruled the agreements
were illegal on June 17, 2009.
Riley and Hawley Troxell cite to correspondence between Reed Taylor's counsel and
Gary Babbitt (AIA Services counsel). It is clear from the email to Gary Babbitt (12/3/09 Babbitt
Aff., Ex. L.) that Reed Taylor's counsel was advising Mr. Babbitt exactly what would unfold if
the agreements were found to be illegal, while encouraging Mr. Babbitt to discuss the cases with

Mr. Clark to prevent further claims and litigation. (3/22/10 Bond Aff.,

~5.)

Of course, Hawley

Troxell and Riley do not explain or deny any of the other significant issues raised in that email.
When the redemption agreements were ruled illegal, Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor filed new
lawsuits and the email does not prove that Reed Taylor's claims in this action had accrued. Riley
and Hawley Troxell's argument that these emails prove damages is without merit.
The evidence proving that the dismissal was not with prejudice is confirmed by the
district court's opinion and order dismissing the first Hawley Troxell lawsuit. In the opinion, the
court noted, as it had to do in order to not address the merits of Reed Taylor's conversion claim:
the Court found the corporate Defendants were in default of a $6 million promissory note
issued to Reed Taylor by the corporations. However, the Court made no determination
relative to other terms in the extensive buy-out agreement between AIA Insurance
Corporation [sic] and Reed Taylor, such as the effect on voting shares and receivables
upon default of the promissory note. Those issues were not before the Court in the
context of the motion for partial summary judgment and, therefore, have yet to be
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.

'

determined. 1
(11124/09 Riley Aff., Ex. J, p. 3-4.)

Judge Brodie's opinion clearly downplays Reed Taylor's

significant creditor rights by implying that Reed Taylor could not pursue secured creditor claims
without court approval, but he had the full legal right to file suit to protect his collateral. See
Case Corp. v. Gehrke, 91 P.3d 362, 365 (Ariz. App. 2004). Notwithstanding his decision, Judge
Brudie recently made the following interesting comment: "I don't think Mr. Taylor got much
of deal from this Court in the first place." (3-22-10 Bond Aff., Ex. A, p. 28, IL 19-20.

(Emphasis added).)
Finally, Reed Taylor has appealed the first lawsuit against Hawley Troxell and this
appeal bars res judicata. Kay v. city of Rancho Palos Verdes, 504 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2007);
Fidelity Union casualty Co. v. Hanson, 44 SW.2d 985 (Tex. 1932) (citations omitted); Noe v.
Afatlock, 208 P. 591 (Mont. 1922). Reed Taylor objects to any judgment or order used for the
purpose of attempting to prove res judicata as his first lawsuit is on appeal.
For any one or more of the reasons set forth above or in Reed Taylor's other briefing, the
defendants cannot meet their burden now or at trial on the issue of res judicata. Summary
judgment should be denied to them and granted to Reed Taylor.
2. Riley and Hawley Troxell failed to meet their burden on the collateral
estoppel defense.

Collateral estoppel may not be applied when a case is on appeal. In re Lumbermans
Morigage Co. v. Secured Inv. of Marysville, Ltd., 712 F.2d 1334, 1335 (9th Cir. 1983).
Here, nothing more needs to be said other than there is an appeal pendign. Reed Taylor
has appealed Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., and, therefore, any decisions rendered in that case
1
Contrary to the district court's opinion, Reed Taylor had moved for partial summary judgment on the
$6M Note and the default of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. The district court granted that motion.
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prevent the application of a collateral estoppel defense. Moreover, even if not appealed, the
court's decision that the attorneys' opinions were not actionable fraud would not act as a bar
since the.argument was raised solely as a defense raised in a motion to reconsider the application
of the illegality doctrine, i.e., to mitigate damages by enforcing the agreements as Reed Taylor
was the least guilty party. Moreover, the defendants' opinions were never the basis of a claim or
a defense pled in the action, and they were not parties to that case.

3. The defendants have not and cannot meet their burden on their statute of
limitations defenses.
The defendants bear the burden of establishing the applicability of statutes of limitations
and when a claim accrued for purposes of proving the statute of limitations defense.

Kimbrowugh v. Reed, 130 Idaho 512, 943 P .2d 1232 (1997); Estate of Page v. Litzenburg, 865
P.2d 128, 135 (Ariz. 1993).
[t]he time when a cause of action accrues may be a question of law or fact, depending
upon whether any disputed issues of material fact exist. Where there is no dispute over
any issue of material fact regarding when the cause of action accrues, the question is one
of law for determination by the court. On the other hand, where there is conflicting
· evidence as to when the cause of action accrued, the issue is one of fact for the trier of
fact ...

Reed, 130 Idaho at 516 (quoting Reis v. Cox, 104 Idaho 434, 438, 660 P.2d 46, 50 (1982)).
Under the "some sort of damage rule" applied to malpractice related claims, the claim accrues
when there is objective proof of "some damage" and what constitutes "some damage" is
determined by the circumstances of each case. Parsons Packing, Inc. v. Masingill, 140 Idaho
480, 482-84, 95 p .3d 631, 633-34 (2004).
The facts in this case are more analogous to Parsons Packing rather than Lampham v.

Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 51 P.3d 396 (2002). In this case, which is unlike any Idaho case, Reed
Taylor was provided with an Opinion Letter from the defendants that affirmatively rejected any
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notion of damages or malpractice until that Opinion Letter was proven wrong, which was on
June 17, 2009. The only definite date that the defendants have provided as the date the statute of
limitations began to run is August 1, 2005-the date the $6M Note became due and payable,
which such date has no relation to the claims in this action. The defendants have failed to set
forth any specific date or damages that Reed Taylor had incurred that would bar his claims in
this action. Defendants simply assert, while ignoring the factual and legal representations in the
Opinion Letter, that Reed Taylor should have kno¥.'ll he had claims against them years ago.
Defendants assert that Reed Taylor was first damaged in 1996 when he first placed AIA
Services in default. This argument is illogical. First, the fact that AIA Services defaulted has no
relevancy to the claims in this action. AIA Services' defaults in 1996 have no causal relationship
to the representations in the Opinion Letter or the defendants' legal services provided in 1995.
In fact, AIA Services later caught up and paid all sums owing through 2001. (2/17110 Bond Aff.,
Ex. 6.) However, the correspondence pertaining to the 1996 defaults prove that Riley and Eberle
Berlin concealed facts and for them to even argue otherwise lacks merit.

For example,

fraudulent concealment may also be proven by silence, which is exactly what the defendants in
this action have done in violation of their fiduciary obligations. Estate of Watkins v. Hedman,
Hileman & Lacosta, 91 P.3d 1264 (Mt. 2004); Brawn v. Oral Surgery Associates, 819 A.2d 1014

(Me. 2003); Keithley v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 698 P.2d 435 (N. Mex. 1984); 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud
and Deceit§ 200 (2010) (Westlaw).
The defendants also assert that Reed Taylor should have been filed claims in this action
when the illegality arguments were first asserted in 2008. This argument also lacks merit.
Defendant Riley, an attorney for AIA Services in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., refused to be
deposed and AIA Services refused to produce documents and information despite numerous
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motions to compel. 2 Most significantly, the defendants in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., never
asserted that the redemption agreements were illegal because th~ shareholders failed to approve a
specific shareholder resolution expressly authorizing the payments to Reed Taylor from capital
surplus, specifically, the basis Judge Brudie relied upon to find illegality. (Babbitt Aff., Ex. J, p.
9; 3/22/l 0 Bond Aff., ~2.) Even if the statute had run as asserted by the defendants, the Opinion
Letter and Reed Taylor's testimony has proven the elements required for equitable estoppel. See
e.g., Fairway Development Co. v. Petersen, Moss, Olsen, Meacham & Carr, 124 Idaho 866, 865

P.2d 957 (1993). Moreover, the illegality was not determined until June 17, 2009, and Reed
Taylor timely filed suit in this action within 30 days after the corresponding judgment was
entered. See e.g., Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 867 P.2d 960 (1994).
Even if Riley and Hawley Troxell assert that Reed Taylor's breach of fiduciary duty
claims accrued prior to the dismissal of his first lawsuit against Hawley Troxell, these claims are
continuing torts as they continue to accrue until the conduct ceases. See e.g., Curtis v. Firth, 123
Idaho 598, 603, 850 P.2d 749, 754 (1993); This legal theory also bars the application of res
judicata or collateral estoppel to these claims, as the breach of fiduciary duties tort is continuing.
The defendants have utterly and completely failed to meet their burden. Reed Taylor has
been the only party to meet this burden by asserting that the claims accrued at the earliest on
June 17, 2009, and during the AJA Services litigation for certain other claims.
All of Reed Taylor's claims are timely and not barred by any statutes of limitations.
Defendants have failed to meet the burden necessary to prove the application of I.C. §§ 5-219(4),
48-619 and 5-218(4), with their subjective and illogical analysis. These defenses should be

2

Despite all of Reed Taylor's Motions to Compel and requests for the appointment of a discovery master,
the district court never heard most all of his Motions to Compel and refused to appoint a discovery master. The
defendants, Riley included, preyed upon these facts to thwart discovery knowing they would never be compelled.
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barred, or at a minimum, submitted to the jury for a determination. 3
D. Idaho has never rejected negligent misrepresentation as a claim au:ainst attorneys
and it is a sound claim and should be confirmed by this court.
Idaho has not declined to adopt the claim of negligent misrepresentations against and the
issue has never been addressed by any Idaho court until now. See Manos v. Moss, 143 Idaho
927, 155 P.3d 1166 (2007) (no professional relationship); Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement

Association, 126 Idaho 1002, 1010, 895 P.2d 1195, 1203 (1995) (no professional relationship).
Here, unlike Manos and Duffin, we have a professional relationship between Reed Taylor
wid Riley, Turnbow wid Eberle Berlin.

They provided him the Opinion Letter through a

professional relationship, which is in accord with Idaho's present view on the tort as requiring a
professional relationship. Reed Taylor urges the court to adopt negligent misrepresentations as a
claim against attorneys, as has many other states before it. Finova Capital Corporation v.

Berger, 18 A.D.3d 256, 379-81 (N.Y. .2005); see also Walco Investments, Inc. v. Thenen, 881
F.Supp. 1576 (D.C. Florida 1995); Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Dewey,

Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 605 N.E.2d 318, 320 (N.Y. 1992) ("there is no reason to
arbitrarily limit the potential liable defendants to [accountants]"); Crossland Savings Bank FSB
v. Rockwood Insurance Company, 700 F. Supp. 1274 (N.Y. 1988); Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826
F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987); Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 128 Cal.Rptr. 901,
906 (Cal. 1976).
E. Reed Taylor has standing to bring a direct derivative action.
In order to bring a direct derivative action, a person need only have been a shareholder at
the time of the \Vrongful act or omission. LC.§ 30-1-741.
3

The defendants do not and cannot dispute that June 17, 2009, was the first date any detennination had
been made as to the illegality of the redemption agreements. This is the earliest accrual day for Reed Taylor's
claims for negligent misrepresentations, fraud/constructive fraud, certain breach of fiduciary duties, and malpractice.

REED TAYLOR'S OBJECTIONS, WITHDRAW OF CERTAIN ISSUES, REPLY IN
SUPPORT OF CROSS-MOTIONS AND SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 9

001656

Here, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin misconstrue the law and the facts.

Reed Taylor was

the majority shareholder of AIA Services when during the negotiations and board meetings (also
attended by Riley) leading up to the redemption of his shares, the majority shareholder when he
signed the redemption agreements on July 22, 1995, and the majority shareholder until the
redemption transaction closed on or about August 17, 1995. The acts and omissions he is
presently complaining of all took place in this time period and the Opinion Letter was also
provided to him before the transaction closed. Regardless of the interpretation of the futility
issue, Reed Taylor is bringing only direct claims and he has standing to do so. 4 As set forth in
Steelman v. Malory, 110 Idaho 510, 716 P.2d 1282 (1986), Reed Taylor's derivative claims are
being asserted directly against Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin because he is the only person
damaged by their acts. AIA Services has received the benefit, with the assistance of Riley and
Hawley Troxell, of the district court ruling the redemption agreements were illegal. Steelman
simply holds that a direct action may be brought by a shareholder when the claims are individual
and damages only that shareholder, which is the case presently before the court.
In this case, Reed Taylor was the only shareholder whose shares were redeemed. Reed
Taylor is the only party entitled to the damages. Independent of all other duties, Riley, Turnbow
and Eberle Berlin owed AJA Services a duty to ensure the redemption was legal and enforceable,
and as a result of their breached duties, the damages flowing from these breached duties belong
exclusively to Reed Taylor and not AIA Services.
Ill
Ill
4

Reed Taylor's counsel reiterated the fact that Reed Taylor's claims were direct claims to defendants
shortly after the lawsuit was filed. Although Reed Taylor pied futility in an abundance of caution a derivative
demand is not required for direct actions because the damages belong to the shareholder and the claims are not
pursued in the corporation's name, which is the situation presently before the court.

REED TAYLOR'S OBJECTIONS, WITHDRAW OF CERTAIN ISSUES, REPLY IN
SUPPORT OF CROSS-MOTIONS AND SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-10

001657

•
F. Reed Taylor's breach of fiduciarv duties claim is also a separate and distinct claim.
"[T]he absence of an attorney-client relationship does not preclude defendants from
asserting a cause of action alleging breach of fid~ciary duties." Davin, L.L.C. v. Daham, 746
A.2d 1034, 1045 (N.J. 2000). When a defendant knows that a plaintiff is relying upon him for
knowledge, business or judgment, a fiduciary relationship is established, even if an attorneyclient relationship is not formed. Smith v. Jenkins, 626 F.Supp.2d 155, 171 (D. Mass. 2009)
(breach of fiduciary duty claim stated); Croce v. Kurnit, 565 F.Supp. 884, 890 (S.D. N.Y. 1982).
Even when an attorney-client relationship is not present, a fiduciary relationship arises when one
reposes faith, confidence, and trust in another's judgment and advice and a betrayal of this trust
is actionable. Fassihi v. Sommers, Schwatz, Silver, Schwartz & Tyler, P. C., 309 N. W. 2d 645,
648 (Mich. 1981); see also 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys At Law § 189 (2009) (Westlaw);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874 (1979).
Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin owed Reed Taylor a duty to advise him that the
-transaction to redeem his shares was not properly completed. This duty is in addition to the
fiduciary duties that they owed Reed Taylor as a client or through the Opinion Letter. They
owed him duties as a non-client and client to advise him of the facts and issues pertaining to their
failure to simply obtain an express corporate resolution authorizing the invasion of capital
surplus. Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin betrayed Reed Taylor's trust and confidence.
Moreover, like In re Skyway Communications Holding Corp. v. Island Capital

Management, LLC., 415 B.R. 859, 869 (M.D. Florida 2009), Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow
owed their fiduciary duties, including the undivided duty of loyalty, to AIA Services as it existed
when Reed Taylor signed the redemption agreements on July 22, 1995, and when the shares
were redeemed when the transaction close on or about August 17, 1995. Riley, Turnbow and
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Eberle Berlin owe their duties of loyalty to AIA Services as it existed in 1995 and to Reed Taylor
as the recipient of the Opinion Letter. They do not owe their duties of loyalty to the insiders who
have Wllawfully transferred millions of dollars from the corporations because they are now in
control after stealing Reed Taylor's shares--they owe their duties exclusively to the AIA
Services as it existed in 1995 and also to Reed Taylor now and back in 1995.

G. Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin were Reed Tavlor's attorneys and they owed him
duties even if there was no formal attorney-client relationship.
Any doubt as to whether an attorney-client relationship existed "should readily have been
resolved against the defendant, absent proof of clear and forthright statement to his clients that he
was no longer their attorney ... " Howard v. Murray, 372 N.E.2d 568, 570 (N.Y. 1977).
Here, there is testimony from Reed and the defendants disputing any attorney-client
relationship. However, Riley's email supports Reed Taylor's testimony:
Reed: This email confirms today's telephone call in which you agreed that you have no
concern with Hawley Troxell' s representation of Aviation Finance Group in connection
with review of loan documentation for the refinance of the loan on your aircraft,
notwithstanding my prior and ongoing representation of AIA in various matters and my
representation, while employed at Eberle Berlin, of you personally with respect to certain
matters ...
(2/17/10 Riley Aff., Ex. 0.) (Emphasis added). This email proves that Riley and Eberle Berlin
represented Reed Taylor on more than one matter when Riley states "certain matters." (Id.) This
email is also proof of a past attorney-client relationship with Reed Taylor in sufficient manner to
at least make a reasonable juror believe that Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin were representing
both Reed Taylor and AIA Services with regard to ensuring the redemption was legal, which
such dual representation is further supported by the Opinion Letter. See Wick v. Eisman, 122
Idaho 698, 838 P.2d 301 (1992). Interestingly, Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow never sought
or obtained a conflict waiver from Reed Taylor when they provided the legal services for the
REED TAYLOR'S OBJECTIONS, WITHDRAW OF CERTAIN ISSUES, REPLY IN
SUPPORT OF CROSS-MOTIONS AND SUPPLEMENT AL MEMORANDUM JN
OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 12

001659

redemption of his shares and the Opinion Letter in 1995 (2/2/10 Taylor Aff., ~5.), yet Riley
sought to obtain a waiver some 11 years later for reasons that are not supported by the facts. s
There were also no provisions in any of the redemption agreements stating that the defendants
were not Reed Taylor's attorneys, as would seem prudent if they were not his attorneys. Riley's
email, coupled with Reed Taylor's testimony, shows that partial summary judgment should be
entered in favor of him on that issues, or, at a minimum, creates a material issue of fact for trial.
Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin also breached their assumed duties by and through
their Opinion Letter, the redemption agreement, and legal services they purportedly provided to
ensure the redemption agreements were legal and enforceable, and they breached these assumed
duties. See e.g., Jones v. Runft, LeRoy, Coffin & Mathews, Chartered, 125 Idaho 607, 873 P.2d
861 (1994).
, Finally, Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow are

estoppe~

from asserting lack of privity or

all applicable claims, including, without limitation malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty and
CPA claims, as privity has been established in this action as a matter of law. Finova Capital
Corporation v. Berger, 18 A.D.3d 256, 257 (N.Y. 2005); RTC Mortgage Trust 1994 N-1 v.
Fidelity National Title Insurance Company, 58 F.Supp.2d 503, 521 (D. N.J. 1999); Crossland
Savings Bank FSB v. Rockwood Insurance Company, 700 F. Supp. 1274 (N.Y. 1988).

Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin owe Reed Taylor duties as a matter of law and partial
summary judgment should be entered in favor of Reed Taylor on the issues of duty and privity.
H. Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow made representations of fact and opinion.

The defendants apparently now concede that opinion may be the basis of fraud, as is the
settled law in Idaho. See Country Cove Development, Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, 601, 150 P.3d
s In 2006, Reed Taylor had not been on the board of AIA Services for years, was not listed as a shareholder
ofCropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc., and had long since sold his majority interest in AIA Services.
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288, 294 (2006).
As the defendants are also aware, the Opinion Letter contains representations of fact and
.

.

opinions; both of which were provided for Reed Taylor to rely upon: (1) "[w]henever our
opinion with respect to the existence or absence of facts is indicated to be based upon our
knowledge, we are referring to the actual knowledge of R.M. Turnbow and Richard A. Riley ... "
(2/2/1 O Taylor Aff., Ex. A, p. 2.)

By defining "our knowledge" to include "existence or

absence" of facts in their "opinion," they admitted in the Opinion Letter that the representations
were based upon facts and opinion. This is logical as one would need to know facts to render a
Jegal opinion; (2) they also represented that redemption does not "to the best of our knowledge,
violate any law." This is a mixture of fact and opinion based upon the very tenns of the Opinion
Letter. (Id., at p. 3.); (3) "No consent, authorization, approval .. .is required ... except such as have
been obtained prior to Closing." (Id.) This representation is also a mixture of fact and Jaw, but
mostly factual. As everyone is fully aware, Judge Brudie ruled that the necessary shareholder
consent had not been obtained; (4) "We have further relied as to factual matters... " (Id. at I.)
This representation clearly demonstrates that the Opinion Letter itself is based upon factual
matters; and (5) "we have examined ... corporation records, instruments and certificates ... as
we deemed necessary for the purpose of rendering the opinions set forth herein." (Id.) This
representation clearly advises Reed Taylor that they had reviewed the necessary corporate
records to support their Opinion Letter.

As such, the Opinion Letter contains actionable

misrepresentations of fact and opinion.

II. CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated above, the Court should deny the Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment and enter judgment in favor of Reed Taylor barring the defendants from
REED TAYLOR'S OBJECTIONS, WITHDRAW OF CERTAIN ISSUES, REPLY IN
SUPPORT OF CROSS-MOTIONS AND SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-14
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;:

asserting the affirmative defenses of res judicata, collateral estoppcl and statutes of limitations,
and enter judgment in favor of Reed Taylor those defenses. Even if the defendants' bad proYen
their statute of limitations defenses, the Opinion Letter is undispulable proof to apply the

fraudulent concealment and equitable estoppel exceptions to bar the defenses.
DA TED this 22m1 clay of March, 20 I 0.
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC

-------·
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RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HA WLE
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
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STATE OF IDAHO )
) SS.

County of Ada

)

JAMES D. LaRUE, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says:
1.

I am an attorney licensed in the State of Idaho and a shareholder in the firm Elam

& Burke, P.A.

2.

I am over 18 years of age, competent to testify regarding the matters set forth in

this affidavit, and am one of the attorneys who represented defendants Gary D. Babbitt, D. John
Ashby, Patrick V. Collins, Richard A. Riley and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, in the case of
Taylor v. Babbitt, et al., Case No. CV 08-01765, in the District Court of the Second Judicial

District of the State ofldaho, Nez Perce County ("Hawley Troxell #1"). As such, I am familiar
with the files and records in Hawley Troxell #1 and make this affidavit based upon my personal
knowledge.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of an Amended Judgment

filed March 22, 2010, in Hawley Troxell #1.
DATED this ~day of March, 2010.

J~Rue
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this&'/'fftday

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES D. LaRUE- 2
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Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, Washington 99201
Jack S. Gjording
Julianne S. Hall
Gjording & Fouser, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
r"" Facsimile Transmission
(509) 455-7111

~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-9177
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE S
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND F

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CV08-01765

AMENDED JUDGMENT

)

~

)
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN)
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
)
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A
)
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL )
ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP an Idaho limited )
liability partnership; JANE DOES 1-X,
)
unknown individuals;
)
)
Defendants.
)

The Court, having entered an Order on December 23, 2008 granting Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss, IT IS HEREBY THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT that Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's
Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety.

Dated this

EXHIBIT '°:.

2.- ~

I

day of March 2010.
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---~-mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this Jl~ day of
March 2010, to:

Michael S. Bissell
Roderick C. Bond
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC
7 South Howard St, Ste 416
Spokane, 'VIA 99201

James D. LaRue
Elam & Burke PA
PO Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

Taylor vs. McNichols, et al.
Amended Judgment
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J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
8)t K, JOHNSON
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,
V.

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HA WLE
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; ROBERT M.
TURNBOW, an individual; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKL VEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

Case No. CV-OC-0918868
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS
RILEY, HAWLEY TROXELL, TURNBOW
AND EBERLE BERLIN

Defendants.
This matter having come before the Court for hearing on Wednesday, March 3, 2010, on
Plaintiffs Motions for Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendants Riley, Hawley Troxell,
Turnbow and Eberle Berlin, and the Court being fully advised after having reviewed the
Memoranda, Briefs and Affidavits filed by the parties and having heard oral argument thereon,
and good cause appearing therefor;

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST
DEFENDANTS RILEY, HAWLEY TROXELL, TURNBOW AND EBERLE BERLIN - 1
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motions for Partial Summary Judgment
Against Defendants Riley, Hawley Troxell, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin are denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this(}1D day of March, 2010.//

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY WDGMENT AGAINST
DEFENDANTS RILEY, HAWLEY TROXELL, TURNBOW AND EBERLE BERLIN - 2
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7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, Washington 99201
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
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James D. LaRue
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U.S.Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
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APR 2 1 2010
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By K. JOHNSON
DEPUTY

Jack S. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208)336-9777
Facsimile: (208)336-9177
Attorneys for Defendants Robert M. Turnbow and
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
ROBERT M. TURNBOW, an individual; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0918868

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-)

This matter having come before the Court for hearing on Wednesday, March 3, 2010 on
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and the Court being fully advised after having
reviewed the pleadings filed by the parties and having heard oral argument thereon, and good
cause appearing therefor;

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, P. 1
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED

Jl/\,., )

this~ day of~, 2010.
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?J{F day of~2010, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Roderick C. Bond
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, 'NA 99201
James D. LaRue
ELAM BURKE
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701-1539
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 'N. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701

t(
D
D
D

g

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile

D
D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile

~
D
D
D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, P. 3
001673

•

•

NQ. _ _ ____,Fi"'"L=eot--li-()t>'"'"""~Jor--

A.M _ _ _ _ _P.M.__...
_____

APR 2 1 2010
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HA WLE
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; ROBERT M.
TURNBOW, an individual; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

Case No. CV-OC-0918868
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON THE FIRST AND THIRD CAUSES OF
ACTION OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
ANDDENYINGREEDJ. TAYLOR'S
CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON THE FIRST AND THIRD
CAUSES OF ACTION OF PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT

Defendants.

This matter having come before the Court for hearing on Friday, March 26, 2010, on
Defendants Richard A. Riley, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, Robert M. Turnbow and
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered's Motions for Summary Judgment and
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, and the Court being fully
advised after having reviewed the Memoranda, Briefs, and Affidavits filed by the parties and
having heard oral argument thereon, and good cause appearing therefor;

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE FIRST AND THIRD
CAUSES OF ACTION OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND DENYING REED J. TAYLOR'S CROSSMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE FIRST AND THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION OF
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT- I
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•
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Richard A. Riley, Hawley Troxell Ennis &
Hawley LLP, Robert M. Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen,
Chartered's Motions for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's First Cause of Action
for Negligent Misrepresentation are GRANTED and Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Cross-Motions for
Summary Judgment for Negligent Misrepresentation are DENIED;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Richard A. Riley, Hawley Troxell Ennis &
Hawley LLP, Robert M. Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen,
Chartered's Motions for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Third Cause of Action
for Idaho Consumer Protection Act Violations are GRANTED as said cause of action is time
barred by Idaho Code Section 48-619 and Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Cross-Motions for Summary
Judgment for Idaho Consumer Protection Act Violations are DENIED; and
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the first cause of action for negligent misrepresentation
and the third cause of action for Idaho Consumer Protection Act Violations in Plaintiffs
Complaint are dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED

this~ day of April, 2010.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE FIRST AND THIRD
CAUSES OF ACTION OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND DENYING REED J. TAYLOR'S CROSSMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE FIRST AND THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION OF
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT - 2
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Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

James D. LaRue
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
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2
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6
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7

Case No. CV-OC-2009-18868

8

vs.

9

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS &
HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership; ROBERT M. TURNBOW,
an individual; and EBERLE, BERLIN,
KADING, TURNBOW & McKLVEEN,
CHARTERED, an Idaho corporation,

10
11

12

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

13
14

Defendants.

15
16
17
18

BACKGROUND
Except as noted otherwise, the material facts are not in dispute in so far as this motion is
concerned. The history between some of the parties is extensive, going back to 1995. The

19

following is but a brief summary for the purpose of outlining the basis of this decision.
20

Reed J. Taylor ("Taylor") sued Richard A. Riley ("Riley"); Hawley Troxell, Ennis &
21

Hawley LLP ("Hawley Troxell"); Robert M. Turnbow ("Turnbow"); and Eberle, Berlin, Kading,
22
23

Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered ("Eberle Berlin"). Taylor is the former majority stock holder

24

of AJA Services Corporation. Riley is an attorney. He is currently a partner in the Hawley

25

Troxell firm. Before joining Hawley Troxell, Riley was a member in the Eberle Berlin firm.

26

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT-PAGE 1
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Robert Turnbow is an attorney and member of Eberle Berlin. In 1995, when Riley was still a
1

2
3
4
5
6

member of Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow authored an opinion letter that gave rise to the
current litigation.
Taylor alleges that in 1995, he was solicited by other share holders of AIA to have his
stock redeemed so they could take the company public. Negotiations ensued in which AIA was
represented by Eberle Berlin and Taylor was represented by separate counsel. The parties

7

ultimately reached an agreement for retiring Taylor's stock. The transaction was reduced to
8

writing in a Stock Redemption Agreement and related documents. Under the terms of the
9

10

agreement Taylor surrendered all his stock in AIA in exchange for cash, a $6,000,000 promissory

11

note ("the Note"), debt forgiveness, and title to certain airplanes. Included in the documentation

12

was an opinion letter from Eberle Berlin, over the signatures of Riley and Turnbow, addressed to

13

Taylor. The letter opines, in essence, that the transaction was legal and the documents

14

constituted a valid, binding obligation of AIA. The transaction closed in August 1995.

15

AIA defaulted almost immediately. Taylor and AIA entered into negotiations which
16

resulted in a Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement dated July 1, 1996. By its terms the
17
18
19

restructure agreement superseded the Stock Redemption Agreement. Under the restructure
agreement the $6,000,000 note continued in force. The Note matured on August 1, 2005. When

20

the Note was not paid, Taylor filed suit in Nez Perce County in January 2007 against AIA, its

21

subsidiary AIA Insurance, and several officers, directors, and employees of AIA, together with

22

their spouses. This litigation is referred to in this opinion as the "AIA lawsuit."

23

Meanwhile, Riley left Eberle Berlin and joined Hawley Troxell in 1999. Hawley Troxell

24

defended the AIA entities in the AIA lawsuit. Michael McNichols and his firm, Clements Brown
25
26

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
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& McNichols represented the other defendants. Taylor objected strenuously to Hawley Troxell's
1

2

representation of the AIA defendants. In 2008 Taylor filed separate actions in Nez Perce County

3

against Hawley Troxell, Clements Brown and McNichols, and the attorneys with those firms that

4

participated in the AIA litigation. Riley was one of the named defendants in the suit against

5

Hawley Troxell. These suits made claims against the lawyers for actions they took in the AIA

6

lawsuit.

7

Ultimately, all three Nez Perce County suits were dismissed. Taylor appealed the
8

dismissal of his cases against AIA and Hawley Troxell. Those appeals are currently pending
9

10

11

12
13
14

before the Idaho Supreme Court. The status of the Clements Brown and McNichols suit is not
clear from the record.
The AIA suit was dismissed by Judge Brudie in the Nez Perce County case on the
grounds that the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal under Idaho law as the same
pertained to corporations in 1995. Specifically, it appeared from the record that the corporation

15

had no retained earnings constituting earned surplus from which a redemption could be made.
16

Having found the transaction illegal, Judge Brudie held that neither party was entitled to enforce
17

the agreement and the court would simply leave the parties where it found them. The issue of the
18

19
20

21
22

legality of the stock redemption was first raised by the defendants in the AIA litigation in April
2008. Judge Brudie actually ruled the agreements were illegal on June 17, 2009.
Other facts, to the extent they are undisputed and necessary for this opinion are contained
in the body of the opinion below.

23
24

25
26
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ISSUES
1

2

By their motions for summary judgment, the defendants raised a number of issues. Some

3

of the issues pertained to all defendants, other issues to only some defendants. After a somewhat

4

lengthy and rambling recitation of the facts as he sees them, Taylor's complaint sets forth five

5

legal claims labeled as "causes of action." They are: (1) negligent misrepresentation; (2)

6

malpractice; (3) violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act; (4) breach of fiduciary duties;

7

and (5) fraud/constructive fraud. This Court dismissed the negligent misrepresentation claims
8

and the Consumer Protection Act claims in a bench ruling following oral argument. The
9

10
11

remaining claims will now be discussed. Defendants have raised affirmative defenses of
collateral estoppel, statute of limitations, and, essentially, failure to state a legal claim.
DISCUSSION

12
13
14

15

1. Malpractice
a. Hawley Troxell.

The gist of Taylor's malpractice claim, albeit somewhat

over-simplified, is that Riley and Turnbow were negligent in performing legal work related to the

16

stock redemption transaction. His complaints relate specifically to the opinion letter, but also
17

include references to other legal work performed. He alleges this negligence harmed both AIA
18
19

and him. Hawley Troxell had no involvement in the 1995 and 1996 transactions. Taylor does

20

not clearly articulate his rationale for claiming Hawley Troxell committed malpractice other than

21

the broad statement early in his complaint that "Hawley Troxell is vicariously liable for certain

22

acts and/or omissions of Defendant Riley." To the extent Taylor seeks to hold Hawley Troxell

23

liable for Riley's conduct in participation in the 1995 and 1996 transactions, there is no legal

24

25
26
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basis to do so. Riley's status as a partner in Hawley Troxell does not render Hawley Troxell
1

2
3

liable for conduct occurring before he joined the firm.
b. Res Judicata

At oral argument Taylor disavowed making claims against

4

Hawley Troxell that were made in the earlier Hawley Troxell litigation. However, many

5

paragraphs in the Complaint allege facts surrounding the AIA litigation and Taylor's claim that

6

the conduct gives rise to liability. The operative facts giving rise to the claims made in the Nez

7

Perce County suit against Hawley Troxell and Riley concerned Hawley Troxell's representation
8

of AIA in the AIA litigation. There is certainly an overlap in the parties and some of the same
9

10

events figure in both suits. As best as this Court can determine, Taylor is claiming that Riley,

11

and therefore Hawley Troxell, breached a duty to him by defending AIA in the AIA lawsuit and

12

particularly in supporting the position that the redemption agreement was illegal. Riley and

13

Hawley Troxell maintain these claims are barred by res judicata.

14

The term res judicata includes two components. These are claim preclusion and issue

15

preclusion. Issue preclusion is more properly analyzed under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
16

Claim preclusion, sometimes referred to as "true" res judicata, prevents a party from litigating
17

any issue previously litigated and any issue that could have been raised in the prior litigation.
18
19
20
21

22
23

Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 57 P.3d 803 (2002). See also, Rodriguez v. Dept. of
Correction, 136 Idaho 90, 29 P.3d 401 (2001).
In his earlier complaint against Hawley Troxell, Taylor alleged in part "defendants were
responsible for issuing opinion letters relating to the transaction, which include various
applicable representations and warranties. Defendants are now asserting arguments contrary to

24

the representations made in the opinion letter drafted by defendants by and through defendant
25
26
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Richard A. Riley." (Complaint, Taylor v. Babbit, Nez Perce County Case No. CVOS-01765.) In
1

2

his motion to amend the complaint in that action Taylor alleged "Defendant Riley owes Reed

3

Taylor special duties by and through an opinion letter." Riley breached his duties when he

4

asserted that the transaction was illegal."

5

Babbit, Nez Perce County Case No. CVOS-01765.

6

(if 99, Proposed First Amended Complaint in Taylor v.

In the present case Taylor alleges, among other things,

7

8
9

10
11

12
13
14

15

Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell owed duties (including duties of loyalty) to
Reed Taylor not to argue against or contradict the terms of the Opinion Letter.
Defendant Riley's duties owed to Reed Taylor are also acknowledged by him after
the opinion letter was issued and delivered to Reed Taylor. Defendant Riley owed
a duty to Reed Taylor to either force Hawley Troxell to withdraw from
representing AIA Services or he should have left the firm of Hawley Troxell.
Defendant Riley chose neither and instead undertook the unconscionable,
malicious, wanton, vexatious and intentional conduct described in this complaint
and participated in the litigation by submitting an affidavit and by reviewing and
monitoring the litigation. In addition Defendant Riley has profited from
Defendant Hawley Troxell's purported representation in the litigation by and
through him being a partner at Hawley Troxell, and their receipt of hundreds of
thousands of dollars in attorney fees and costs litigating the validity and legality of
the redemption agreement and related documents, which such conduct is again
unconscionable, malicious, wanton, and vexatious.

16

(Complaint if 28.)
17

Judge Brodie dismissed the original complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
18
19

relief could be granted. He also declined to allow the proposed amended complaint on the same

20

grounds. That decision is now on appeal. A comparison of the Complaint in this case and the

21

claims made, or that could have been made in the earlier litigation, show remarkable similarity as

22

to the claimed breach of duty by Riley and Hawley Troxell. The present action, so far as it

23

concerns Hawley Troxell, is no more than an effort to have this Court second guess Judge

24

Brodie. The Court declines to do so. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to make a claim against
25
26
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Hawley Troxell for malpractice based on the allegations in the complaint, the same is barred by
1

2
3

res judicata.
Taylor has appealed Judge Brudie's dismissal of his earlier action against Hawley

4

Troxell. He asserts this prevents it from having preclusive effect. Although this issue has not

5

been directly decided in Idaho, the Idaho Court of Appeals in Gilbert v. State, 119 Idaho 684, 809

6

P.2d 1163 (Ct. App. 1991) stated in dicta that the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of Judgments

7

should control the issue. The RESTATEMENT at§ 13 takes the position that dependency of an
8

appeal does not deprive a judgment of res judicata affect.
9

10

This comports with common sense. Ordinarily the determination of the timing of the

11

adjudication for res judicata purposes is the time at which the judgment is rendered, not the time

12

when the case is filed. If these claims against Hawley Troxell are allowed to go forward in this

13

action and the claims are upheld on appeal. There are two possible resolutions. Allowing this

14

case to go forward after the appeal would render any decision of our appellate courts ineffective

15

between these parties or it would result in these claims being dismissed at a later time as barred
16

by res judicata based upon affirmance of the appeal. Conversely, a reversal on appeal of Judge
17

Brudie's decision would result in two cases pending at the same time over the same issues
18
19

leading to the possibility of inconsistent outcomes. None of these outcomes is preferred.

20

On the other hand, if the present claim is barred and Judge Brudie is reversed on appeal,

21

Taylor will be able to pursue these claims in that case. If Judge Brudie is affirmed, the matter is

22

concluded. The fact that Taylor has appealed Judge Brudie's dismissal of his earlier action

23

against Hawley Troxell does not prevent it from having preclusive effect.

24

25
26
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1

c. Malpractice As To Remaining Defendants.

As stated above, the gist of

2

Taylor's malpractice claim is that Riley and Turnbow were negligent in performing legal work

3

related to the stock redemption transaction. The opinion letter authored by Riley and Turnbow as

4

part of that work was addressed to Taylor, specifically provided that it was for Taylor's benefit,

5

and acknowledged he would rely on it. It is on this basis he claims an attorney client relationship

6

with Riley and Turnbow. Eberle Berlin is named as being vicariously liable for the conduct of

7

its members. Riley and Turnbow argue strenuously that there was no attorney client relationship

s

and therefore no duty was owed to Taylor. Defendants are partly right. There is no attorney

9

client relationship. That does not necessarily mean there was no duty.

10

A lawyer is generally not liable in negligence to a person who is not the lawyer's client.

11

Taylor vs. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005). There are, however, exceptions to this

12

rule. See Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004) (holding that where, as a

13

result of the attorney's negligence, and the estate is not distributed in accordance with the

14

testator's intent, the intended beneficiaries may maintain an action against the attorney). Another

15

narrow, but widely recognized, exception to this general rule is the case of opinion letters drafted

16

and delivered to a non-client with the expectation that the non-client will rely on it. See, e.g.

17

Prudential Ins. Co. ofAmerica v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer and Wood, 80 N.Y. 2d

18

377, 605 N.E. 2d 318 (1992). Although this precise issue has not been addressed by the Idaho

19

courts, the holding of cases such as Prudential, supra, are consistent with the reasoning of our

2o

Supreme Court in Harrigfeld.

21

Riley and Turnbow had a duty to Taylor, a non-client, to draft the opinion letter in a no-

22

negligent fashion. That is, to exercise the ordinary care, skill and prudence of a lawyer under the

23

circumstances. The Court is making no finding that the lawyers were in fact negligent. That is a

24

matter of fact which cannot be resolved on this record.

25
26
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d. Derivative Claims.

Taylor asserts his malpractice claims as both

1

2

personal claims and as derivative claims of the corporation he makes on his own behalf. He

3

seeks to hold the attorneys liable for not just the opinion letter, but the alleged errors they

4

committed in drafting the documents and advising the corporation in the course of the

5

redemption transaction. Plaintiff further claims that he was the only shareholder suffering

6

damages as a result of this malpractice and he should, therefore, be entitled to maintain the action

7

directly.
8

A derivative claim (or suit), is an action brought by a shareholder against a third party to
9

10

vindicate a wrong done to the corporation where the persons in control of the corporation fail or

11

refuse to have the corporation bring the action. If successful, the derivative action inures to the

12

benefit of the corporation, not the shareholder. Before filing a derivative action in Idaho, a

13

shareholder must first make demand on the corporation to take the proper action as required by

14

LC.§ 30-1-742. Failure to make demand is fatal to a derivative action. Mannas v. Moss, 143

15

Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166 (2007); McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228, 61P.3d585 (2002). It is
16

undisputed that Taylor made no written demand on the corporation more than 90 days before
17

commencing this suit.
18
19

Plaintiff attempts to distinguish his derivative claims here by asserting the claims are

20

corporate claims he may pursue on his own behalf for malpractice committed by the corporate

21

attorneys in representing the corporation. For this proposition he cites Steelman v. Mallory, 110

22

Idaho 510, 513, 716 P.2d 1282, 1285 (1986). Plaintiff misconstrues the holding in Steelman.

23

That case involved an action by a shareholder against the other shareholder/directors of a closely

24
25
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held corporation for breaching their fiduciary duties to him as a minority shareholder. It was
1

2
3
4

specifically not a derivative claim:
Since Mallory and Jensen, as directors in this small closely held corporation, had a
fiduciary duty to Steelman, as a minority shareholder, we cannot agree with
appellants' contention that this case should have been dismissed because it is a
"direct action" rather than a shareholder's derivative suit.

5
6
7

Steelman, 110 Idaho at 513, 716 P.2d at 1285.

The allegations here are not that the directors of the company breached their duties to

8

minority shareholders, but that the corporate attorneys committed malpractice in their work on

9

behalf of the corporation. Assume, for argument, that the attorneys in fact committed

10

malpractice causing injury to the corporation. The damages recoverable inure to the

11

corporation and, indirectly, to all its shareholders, not just the majority shareholder. The claims
12

made here are traditional derivative claims. The derivative claims fail for failure to make
13

14
15

proper demand 90 days before suit was filed.
e. Malpractice Statute of Limitations.

All of the defendants in this case

16

argue the statute of limitation for malpractice bars Taylor's claims. The rule of law regarding

17

commencement of the statute of limitations is well settled. For professional malpractice claims,

18

the statute is two years from the negligent act; unless fraudulent concealment is involved in

19

which case the claimant has the later of two years or one year from the discovery of the fraud.

20

LC. § 5-218 (4). Notwithstanding this statute, a cause of action does not arise until the
21

occurrence of "some damage" resulting from the negligent act. This requirement of "some
22
23

damage" is not the same as a discovery rule. Numerous cases have so held. See, e.g. Elliott v.

24

Parsons, 128 Idaho 723, 918 P.2d 592 (1996); Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 Idaho 482, 835 P.2d

25

1293 (1992); Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 808 P.2d 876 (1991).

26
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In the present controversy, application of this rule is not so clear cut. Defendants argue
1

2

strongly that the damage here occurred upon the issuance of the opinion letter in 1995.

3

Conversely, plaintiff argues no damage occurred until Judge Brudie ruled in June 2009 that the

4

contract was illegal. The Court has determined upon review of Idaho cases, that yet a different

5

date is appropriate. See, e.g. Elliott v. Parsons, supra, and Streib v. Veigel, 109 Idaho 174, 706

6

P.2d 63 (1985)

7

In Streib v. Veigel, an accountant had negligently prepared income tax returns for
8

taxpayers, claiming certain deductions that were not allowable. The taxpayers filed an action
9

10

against the accountant more than two years after the last return was prepared. The accountant

11

moved for summary judgment on the basis ofl.C. § 5-219(4). The Court held that the action for

12

professional malpractice accrued when the Internal Revenue Service assessed the taxpayers for

13

penalties and interest. The assessment by the IRS was considered by the Court to be the date

14
15

when damage to the taxpayers occurred. The taxpayers were allowed two years after that date to
file their action against the accountant.

16

In Elliott v. Parsons, supra, the Court revisited Streib. An attorney negligently structured
17

and drafted a transaction for the sale of the Elliott's business that resulted in the failure of the
18

19

transaction to qualify for installment sales treatment, which in turn, resulted in increased liability

20

and interest payment to the I.R.S. The Court distinguished Elliott's case from Streib, holding that

21

some damage occurred when the Elliotts hired new tax lawyers in 1986 after receiving a 30 day

22

letter from the I.R.S. The hiring of the lawyer to deal with the IRS constituted "some damage."

23

There are numerous other cases discussing the "same damage" rule in various contexts. Many of

24

the cases are collected in Anderson v. Glenn, 139 Idaho 799, 87 P.3d 286 (2003).
25

26
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The lesson to be learned from these cases is that "some damage" means damage for
1

2

which a suit could be filed and money awarded. It is not hypothetical damage. It is not creating

3

the circumstance from which damage may or may not occur. It means actual, measurable

4

damage. In this case, the alleged negligent acts took place in 1995. The damage occurred in

5

April 2008 when one of the Defendants in the AIA lawsuit raised the issue of the legality of the

6

redemption agreement. Taylor was required to incur attorney fees to counter the attack on his

7

right to recover under the note. At that point, he had suffered damage that could be proven in
8

court and for which a court may enter judgment. Before that date, he had no right to file suit as
9

10
11

12

he could prove no damages arising from the opinion letter. Before April 2008, any loss arising
from the alleged negligence was merely hypothetical.
It should be noted that the default on the Note in 1996 does not constitute damage

13

flowing from the opinion letter, as contended by Riley and Turnbow. Taylor was not entitled

14

sued Riley and Turnbow in 1996 for AIA's failure to pay the note. The erroneous opinion letter

15

did not cause the default. It was not until the AIA litigation was underway that any loss occurred

16

to Taylor that can be attributed to the erroneous opinion letter. Since April 2008 is less than two
17

years before the filing of this action, the claim for malpractice is not barred by the statute of
18
19

limitations.

20

2. Breach of Fiduciary Duties.

21

The allegation pertaining to breach of fiduciary duty, as best this Court can determine

22
23

from the complaint, has two components. First, the allegation is that Riley, Turnbow, and Eberle
Berlin breached their fiduciary duties in the drafting of the opinion letter and generally in the

24

drafting of corporate resolutions and other services rendered to AIA in the stock redemption
25
26
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transaction. Hawley Troxell is alleged to be liable because Riley's fiduciary duties to Reed
1

2

Taylor are imputed to his current firm. The second component directed at Riley and Hawley

3

Troxell specifically, is breach of fiduciary duty for taking a position in later litigation contrary to

4

the statements made in the opinion letter.

5
6

As to Hawley Troxell, this claim is dismissed. As discussed above, there is no authority
for the proposition that Hawley Troxell is vicariously liable for the conduct of one of its

7

members before that member joined the firm.
8

As to the remainder of the allegations to the extent they apply to Hawley Troxell, they are
9

10

11
12
13
14
15

barred by res judicata. They are barred for the same reasons set forth above regarding the
malpractice.
As to the other defendants, the breach of fiduciary claims must also be dismissed. Riley
and Turnbow did not represent Taylor in the stock redemption transaction. There was no
attorney client relationship. Nor was there any other relationship giving rise to fiduciary duties.
The only possible source of fiduciary duties owed by Riley and Turnbow to Taylor is the opinion

16

letter. The rendering of the opinion letter does not create a fiduciary relationship between the
17

author and the recipient in this circumstance. As pointed out above, the third party opinion letter
18
19

circumstance is one of the rare exceptions to the rule that bars negligence suits against on

20

attorney by anyone, other than by the client, for negligent legal work. In other words, the mere

21

fact that the law allows a negligence action to be maintained against the attorney, does not mean

22

the relationship is expanded to a fiduciary transaction in every instance. The attorney owes the

23

recipient of the letter the same duty to act without negligence that the attorney would owe to the

24
25
26
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client. The rendering of the opinion, in this context, does not create an on going relationship nor
1

2
3

implicate any duties beyond negligence.
The policy underlying the rule that only a client may sue an attorney for negligence is

4

founded on the concern that, to do otherwise would divide the loyalty of the attorney. The

5

attorney would be faced with choosing between the best interest of the attorney's client and the

6

best interest of third parties, something which the law does not allow. To require a duty of care

7

owed by Riley and Turnbow to Taylor beyond the non-negligent rendering of the opinion, would
8

place the attorneys in just such a quandary. Whether or not they properly advised AIA
9

10

concerning stock holder meetings, drafting of documents, etc. may shed some light on whether or

11

not they were negligent in drafting the opinion letter, but it does not give rise to any additional

12

liability to Taylor.

13
14

3. Fraud/Constructive Fraud.
a. Hawley Troxell.

As to Hawley Troxell, there is no evidence, nor

15

allegation, of a false statement by anyone other than Riley upon which Taylor relied. The
16

statements by Riley were made before he became a member of the Hawley Troxell firm. As
17

pointed out above, Hawley Troxell is not liable for his acts before he joined the firm. The fraud
18
19
20

21
22
23

claim, to the extent one is made, against Hawley Troxell is dismissed. Vague allegations of a
"fraudulent scheme" do not state facts with sufficient particularity to maintain the claim.
b. Other Defendants.

Taylor's complaint claiming fraud is based on

statements made by Turnbow and Riley in the opinion letter. In order to sustain an action for
fraud in Idaho, a plaintiff must prove a clear and convincing evidence the following nine

24

elements: (1) a statement of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speakers knowledge of
25
26
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its falsity; (5) the speakers intent to induce reliance; (6) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the
1

2

statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) the hearer's right to rely; and (9) consequent proximate

3

injury. Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat'! Ass 'n, 141 Idaho 362, 109 P.3d 1104 (2005). The person

4

claiming the fraud must plead the factual circumstances with particularity.

5
6

In this case, the allegations of fraud have to do with statements made in the opinion letter
offered by Turnbow and Riley. This Court concludes that certain of the statements made in the

7

opinion letter are statements of fact. For example, whether or not all necessary actions required
8

by the directors and shareholders to be taken had been taken is a representation of an existing
9

10

fact. Some of these statements in the opinion letter are mixed statements of law and fact. For

11

example, the statement that no consent by any person that was required to authorize the

12

execution, etc. of the redemption agreement was needed, except those that had been obtained

13

prior to closing, is just such a mixed statement. It requires legal analysis of whose consent is

14

required, but it is a statement of fact as to whose consents had been obtained prior to closing.

15

There is evidence in the record of all nine elements sufficient to create a disputed issue of
16

material fact. The possible exception is element No. 4, the speaker's knowledge of falsity.
17

Because this Court has stayed discovery in this action, the fraud claim will not be dismissed for
18

19
20

lack of proof on that element at this stage.
c. Collateral Estoppel and Riley.

As to the remaining defendants, the defense

21

of collateral estoppel is unique to Riley. Riley claims the benefit of collateral estoppel through

22

Judge Brudie's dismissal of the fraud claims in the main AIA litigation. Riley was not a

23

defendant in that case, but was a member of the firm defending AIA against nearly identical

24
25
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claims of fraud arising from the opinion letter. As a member of the defense firm, he claims
1

2
3

privity with the firm's client in the AIA lawsuit.
Judge Brudie, in the course of ruling on a motion for reconsideration of his finding the

4

transaction illegal, declined to accept an argument that the agreement was enforceable in spite of

5

its illegality because one of the parties had been subject to constructive fraud. In that context,

6

Taylor apparently argued that he should be entitled to enforce the agreement because the opinion

7

letter stated that the agreement was legally enforceable. He pointed to that as a statement of fact
8

upon which he relied. Consequently, AIA, through its then attorneys, had committed
9

10

constructive fraud in the making of the agreement. Therefore, so the argument went, Taylor was

11

not subject to the rule that says a court will not enforce an illegal agreement. Judge Brudie stated

12

that this conclusion contained in the opinion letter was a mere opinion of law, "albeit an incorrect

13

one." It could not form the basis of a fraud claim. Consequently Taylor was not entitled to

14

enforce the illegal agreement.

15

This statement from Judge Brudie is not a sufficient specific factual finding upon which

16

collateral estoppel can be based. The ruling was not directed specifically at the claims made
17

against Riley. Nor was it a finding of a specific fact. It was a legal ruling based upon one
18
19

statement in the opinion letter. The Court declines to dismiss the fraud claims against Riley on

20

the basis of collateral estoppel. Genuine issues of material fact otherwise exist with respect to

21

the claim.

22
23

d. Fraud Statute of Limitations.

All Defendants also raise the statute of

limitations as a complete defense to Taylor's fraud claims. The fraud alleged here, at least so far

24

as the Court is not dismissing these claims, occurred in 1995 with the issuance of the opinion
25
26
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letter by Riley and Turnbow. The statute of limitations for fraud is 3 years from the commission
1

2
3

of the fraudulent act or the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or
mistake. LC.§ 5-218.
The determination of the discovery of the fraud is a question of fact. "Our cases have

4
5
6

consistently held that where discovery of a cause of action commences the statute of limitations
the date of discovery is a fact question for the jury unless there is no evidence creating a question

7

of fact." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 773, 820 P.2d 360, 368 (1991). While we also
8

recognized in Nancy Lee Mines that "actual knowledge of the fraud" can be inferred ifthe
9

10

aggrieved party could have discovered the fraud by reasonable diligence, we have since noted in

11

our cases that the courts of this state should hesitate to infer knowledge of fraud. Id at 773, at

12

368.

13

14

This Court, at Defendants' request, stayed discovery pending the decision on the
summary judgment motions. The Court is not going to infer knowledge on the part of Mr. Taylor

15

sufficient to commence the statute of limitations running before April 2008 when the issue of
16

legality was first raised in the AIA lawsuit. There are genuine issues of material fact regarding
17

the running of the statute of limitation on the remaining fraud claims.
18
19

CONCLUSION

20
21

In conclusion:

22

1) The Court grants summary judgment on Taylor's claims against Hawley Troxell;

23

24
25
26
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2) The Court will deny summary judgment, in part, on the claim for malpractice against
1

2
3

4
5

6

Riley, Turnbow, and Eberle Berlin so far as the claims arise from the issuance of the opinion
letter. The so-called derivative claims are dismissed;
3) The Court concludes that the Statute of Limitations on the malpractice cause of action
began to run when Taylor incurred attorney fees to defend against allegation that the Stock
Repurchase agreement was illegal;

7

4) The Court denies summary judgment on the claim of fraud against Riley, Turnbow,
8

and Eberle Berlin, both on the merits and on the statute of limitations on the basis of factual
9

10
11

12

disputes;
5) The Court grants summary judgment to all defendants as dismissing claims of breach
of fiduciary duty.

13

IT IS SO ORDERED.

14

Dated this

:J__ day of May 2010.

15
16
17

District Judge
18
19

20
21
22

23
24
25
26
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copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, Washington 99201

V'

Jack S. Gjording
Julianne S. Hall
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

......-

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(509) 455-7111
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-9177
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RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, VIA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant Reed J. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

)
)
)

Nez Perce County Docket Nos.:
CV 2008-1763 and CV 2008-1765

)
)
)

MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS, an
individual; CLEMENTS, BROV/N & )
McNICHOLS,
P.A.,
an
Idaho )
professional corporation; JANE DOES )
)
I-V, unknown individuals,
)
)
Defendants-Respondents,
)
REED J. TAYLOR,
)
)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
)
v.
)
)
GARY D. BABBIIT, an individual; D. )
JOHN
ASHBY,
an
individual; )
PATRICK V. COLLINS, an individual; )
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; )
HA V/LEY, TROXELL, ENNIS & )
HA V/LEY, LLP, an Idaho limited )
liability partnership; JANE DOES 1-X, )
wiknown individuals,
)
)
Defendants-Respondents.
)

AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND
AND REQEUST FOR JUDICIAL
NOTICE PURSUANT TO I.R.E. 201 IN
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' JOINT
MOTION FOR AMENDED
JUDGMENTS
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1.

I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in court, one of the

attorneys for the plaintiff in the above-entitled action, and make this Affidavit based upon my
personal knowledge. I am also one of the attorneys for Reed Taylor in Taylor v. Riley, et al.,
Ada County District Court Case No.: CV -OC-0918868 ("Taylor v. Riley, et al.") and am familiar
with and certify that the attached Exhibits were in fact served upon me at my law firm and are
true and correct.
2.

On October 1, 2009, Reed Taylor filed suit against Richard Riley, Hawley

· Troxell, Richard Turnbow and Eberle Berlin for claims for negligent misrepresentations, breach
of fiduciary duties, and other claims based upon the opinion letter issued and delivered for him to
rely upon when he sold his shares in AIA Services, together with related claims. See e.g.,

Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 605
N.E.2d 318, 320 (N.Y. 1992); Crossland Savings Bank FSB v. Rockwood Insurance Company,
700 F. Supp. 1274 (N.Y. 1988); Finova Capital Corporation v. Berger, 18 A.D.3d 256, 379-81
(N.Y. 2005); Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 128 Cal.Rptr. 901 (Cal. 1976);

Davin, L.L.C. v. Daham, 746 A.2d 1034, 1045 (N.J. 2000).

3.

In Taylor v. Riley, et al., Riley and Hawley Troxell have moved to dismiss that

case based upon res judicata and other defenses. In other words, Riley and Hawley Troxell are
now asserting that Reed Taylor SHOULD HA VE SUED them for claims based upon the Opinion
Letter in 2008, instead of after this court found the redemption agreement to be illegal on June
17, 2009.
4.

Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Memorandum in Support

AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND AND REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
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of Defendants Richard A. Riley's and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP's Motion for
Summary Judgment dated January 15, 2010.

5.

Attached as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the Memorandum of

Defendants Richard A. Riley and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Cross.Motions for Summary Judgment dated March 12, 2010.

6.

Pursuant to I.R.E. 20l(d), Reed Taylor and I request that the court take judicial

notice of the attached Exhibits A and B for the purpose of judicially noticing the fact that
Richard A. Riley and Hawley Troxell are asserting that there are final judgments in the first
lawsuit against Riley and Hawley Troxell. Reed Taylor and I request that the court defer the
issues raised in the Joint Motion for Amended Judgments to the Idaho Supreme Court for
determination at this late hour.

If Idaho Supreme Court determines that there are no final

judgments as asserted by the defendants, 'then the court and parties could address the issues in
due course below and then fully brief and address the issues on appeal. Reed Taylor does not
believe that he would be prejudiced because he would prefer that his pending appeal in Taylor v.

AJA Services, et al., be heard and decided first in the interests of all pa ,' s.

I
DATED: This 15lhday of March, 2010 .
...._ _

_,~-..;r.£--+---------

Roderick
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 15th day of March, 2010.

~'L.,L._?~'w~~-Not
ublic · r,
Residing at: -i.-e+y:=4'£Arx.!:!;___ _ _ __
My commission expires: &JS-0U:J13.
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CERTIFJCATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15 1h day of March, 2010, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid (if applicable), to the following parties:
DELIVERY
- - HAND
U.S. MAIL
- - OVERNIGHT MAIL

-·-

)( FAX TRANSMISSION
EMAIL (. pdf attachment)

John J. Janis
Hepworth, Janis & Brody, Chtd.
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582

"X
,

HAND DELIVERY
··-_ _ U.S.MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL
-)\
- FAX
TRANSMISSION
---"-)<..._EMAIL (.pdfattachment)

James D. LaRue
Jeffrey A. Thomson
Elam & Burke, PA
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83 704

RODERICK C. BO
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c/t

NO
A.M _ _ _ _
...P.M_.;,...__--....--

James D. LaRue ISB #1780
Loren C. Ipsen ISB #1767
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844

MAY 19 2010
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By J. RANDALL
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendants Richard A. Riley

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,
v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HA WLE
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; ROBERT M.
TURNBOW, an individual; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKL VEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

Case No. CV-OC-0918868
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT RICHARD A. RILEY'S
MOTION FOR STA Y

Defendants.
Defendant Richard A. Riley requests that proceedings be stayed in the above-captioned
action pending the outcome of Reed J. Taylor's appeal in Reed Taylor v. AJA Services, et al,
Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 36916-2009.
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The present action is premised on the presumptive illegality and, therefore, lack of
enforceability of a stock redemption agreement entered into in 1995 between AIA Services
Corporation and Reed J. Taylor, and the restructure of that agreement in 1996. In Reed Taylor v.

AJA Services Corporation, et al., Case No. CV 07-00208, in the District Court of the Second
Judicial District of the State ofldaho, Nez Perce County (the "AIA Litigation"), Judge Brudie
held that the stock redemption agreement was illegal. That decision is currently on appeal to the
Idaho Supreme Court. 1
In the case at bar, plaintiff contends that defendant Riley was negligent and committed
fraud in the preparation of an opinion letter in 1995 that opined, among other things, that the
1995 stock redemption agreement was legal, valid and enforceable according to its terms. The
question of whether or not the redemption agreement was illegal is currently before the Idaho
Supreme Court. In the event the Idaho Supreme Court reverses Judge Brodie's decision, then the
entire premise of the current case will cease to exist and this case will become moot.
In the absence of a stay of proceedings in the current case, it is possible that a significant
amount of time, effort and money could be wasted in discovery and other proceedings involving
a potentially moot issue. The depositions alone in the case at bar promise to involve much effort
and expense. Since common questions of law and fact are currently on appeal in the AIA case, it
makes sense to stay proceedings in the present case until a definitive ruling is obtained whether
the 1995 redemption agreement is or is not illegal and, therefore, whether the 1995 opinion letter

1

Affidavit of Gary D. Babbitt in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed January 15, 2010, ~· 11
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which is the subject of the present case was or was not correct.

Additionally, a stay would serve

to avoid the potential for inconsistent results that might otherwise be reached if the Idaho
Supreme Court were to hold the redemption agreement legal but plaintiff in the present case were
allowed to proceed against Mr. Riley on the premise that such agreement is illegal.
Two District Judges in north Idaho, Judge Brudie and Judge Kerrick, have stayed
proceedings in cases involving issues of fact and law which are common to the present case. See,
Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; Plaintiffs Motion to
Strike; Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, entered on
January 15, 2010, in Donna J. Taylor v. R. John Taylor, et al., Case No. CV 08-1150 in the
District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Nez
Perce; and Memorandum Opinion and Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and Defendant's Motion to Stay, in Donna J. Taylor v. AJA
Services Corporation, Case No. CV 09-02470 in the District Court of the Second Judicial

District of the State ofldaho, in and for the County of Nez Perce.2 The reasons articulated in
those orders are equally applicable to the present case.
Counsel for Reed Taylor has acknowledged, albeit in a slightly different context, the
desirability of obtaining a final appellate decision regarding the legality and enforceability of the
1995 stock redemption agreement before proceeding with other aspects of related litigation. In
the matters of Reed J. Taylor v. Michael E. McNichols, et al., Nez Perce County Case No. CV

2

Supplemental Affidavit of Gary D. Babbitt in Support of Richard A. Riley's Motion for Stay, Exhibits A

and B.
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2008-1763, and Reed J Taylor v. Gary D. Babbitt, et al., Nez Perce County Case No. CV 20081765, Mr. Taylor's counsel filed an affidavit in which he stated that Mr. Taylor "would prefer
that his pending appeal in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., be heard and decided first in the interests
of all parties." 3 For reasons of judicial economy and to avoid the possibility of inconsistent
adjucations, it would be appropriate to stay the current lawsuit until a decision is reached on
appeal in the AIA Litigation. The pragmatic approach taken by Judge Kerrick and Judge Brudie
should also be adopted in the present case.
DATED this

_rt day of May, 2010.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By:~~£~#·
J~ ~,OftheFirm
Attorneys for Defendant Richard A. Riley

3

Supplemental Affidavit of James D. LaRue in Support of Defendant Richard A. Riley's Motion for Stay.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ___fl_ day of May, 2010, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, Washington 99201

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(509) 455-7111

Jack S. Gjording
Julianne S. Hall
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-9177
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A.M _ _ _ _
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MAY 2 1 2010
J. DAVID l'JAVARRO, Clerk
By J. RANDALL
DEPUTY

Jack S. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
Julianne S. Hall, ISB No. 6207
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208)336-9777
Facsimile: (208)336-9177
Attorneys for Defendants Robert M. Turnbow and
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENl'-IIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
ROBERT M. TURNBOW, an individual; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0918868

DEFENDANTS TURNBOW
AND EBERLE, BERLIN'S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO STAY

~~~~~~~~~~~-)

I.

INTRODUCTION

Defendants Robert M. Turnbow and Eberle Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen,
Chartered (hereinafter "Defendants"), respectfully request this Court stay the proceedings in
Plaintiff Reed Taylor's professional malpractice action and fraud action in the case pending
DEFENDANTS TURNBOW AND EBERLE, BERLIN'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO STAY, P. 1
001708

before this Court to permit Plaintiffs appeal in Reed Taylor v. AJA Services, et. al., to be
resolved by the Idaho Supreme Court.
As this Court is aware, Mr. Taylor asserted a lawsuit against AIA Services for breach of
contract and other actions in 2007 in Nez Perce County. In that case, Judge Brudie held that the
1995 Stock Redemption entered between Mr. Taylor and AIA in 1995 and restructured in 1996
was illegal and, accordingly, Judge Brudie refused to enforce the contract due to its illegality.
Thereafter, Mr. Taylor filed an appeal and Taylor v. AJA Services is presently pending before the
Idaho Supreme Court.
Mr. Taylor then filed the present lawsuit against Defendants Turnbow and Eberle Berlin
alleging five causes of action: negligence/professional malpractice; breach of fiduciary duty;
negligent misrepresentation; violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act; and fraud. After
the parties' summary judgment proceedings, Mr. Taylor's claims against Defendants Turnbow
and Eberle Berlin have been limited to a professional malpractice cause of action as a non-client
and a fraud cause of action.
II. ARGUMENT
A.

Claims and allegations in the pending lawsuit are dependent and directly impacted
by the outcome of Taylor v. AJA Services.
Mr. Taylor's professional malpractice claims arise from an opinion letter issued in 1995

to Mr. Taylor. In its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendants' Motion of Summary
Judgment, this Court held as a matter of law that the Defendants had a duty to Mr. Taylor as a
non-client. One of the issues presently facing the parties is endeavoring to complete discovery

DEFENDANTS TURNBOW AND EBERLE, BERLIN'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO STAY, P. 2
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with regard to the issue of breach of this duty. While Defendants acknowledge that the Court
specifically noted in its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendants' Motion of Summary
Judgment that AIA's default in 1996 and failure to pay do not constitute potential damages
flowing from the alleged breach of duty by Defendants in drafting the opinion letter, the ultimate
illegality of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and restructured 1996 Stock Redemption
Agreement are central to Plaintiffs cause of action for professional malpractice.

Said

differently, the Idaho Supreme Court's ultimate ruling on whether the 1995 Stock Redemption
Agreement and restructured 1996 Stock Redemption Agreement were illegal and/or enforceable
directly impacts whether Defendants' actions potentially breached a duty owed to Mr. Taylor.
For example, if the Idaho Supreme Court determines that the Stock Redemption Agreements are
legal, Plaintiffs allegation in this case that Defendants negligently drafted the opinion letter by
including the statement that "[n]either the execution and delivery ... nor the consummation of
the transactions completed ... violate any law, rule, license, order .. " will have effectively been
decided by the Idaho Supreme Court.
With regard to Plaintiffs fraud cause of action, this cause of action is similarly directly
impacted by the ultimate outcome in Taylor v. AJA Services.

Of note, one of the alleged

fraudulent statements made by Defendants involves whether or not all necessary actions required
by the directors and shareholders to be taken had been taken. This alleged misrepresentation by
Defendants is specifically dependent on the AIA litigation.

If the Idaho Supreme Court

concludes that Judge Brudie incorrectly interpreted Idaho Code § 30-1-6 or, alternatively,
concludes that a vote of the shareholders was not necessary prior to the redemption of Mr.
DEFENDANTS TURNBOW AND EBERLE, BERLIN'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO STAY, P. 3
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Taylor's shares for an alternative reason, then Defendants would be entitled to use and
incorporate the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in their defense (i.e., truth is a defense to a fraud
claim based on an allegedly false misrepresentation).

Moreover, depending on the ultimate

outcome in the Taylor v. AJA Services litigation, the present lawsuit could be moot.
In accordance with the principles of the doctrine of judicial economy, the judiciary,
B.
the parties and involved non-parties would all benefit from having the discovery issues in
this case streamlined and potentially narrowed and/or eliminated by the Idaho Supreme
Court.
As acknowledged by this Court in addressing the initial stay for discovery during the
pendency of the Motions for Summary Judgment, the scope of discovery in this case is
potentially immense and undoubtedly will prove to be taxing on judicial resources and judicial
time to address the scope and permissibility of discovery. As this Court may recall, Plaintiff has
indicated a desire to depose various members of counsel representing AIA Services on various
topics.

Additionally, Plaintiffs counsel has recently informed the defense counsel that he

intends to move forward immediately with the depositions of several non-parties, including John
Taylor, Dan Spickler, and JoLee Duclos.

(See,

ii 1, Affidavit of Jack S. Gjording filed

concurrently herewith.) Upon information and belief, these individuals are or were involved
with AIA Services and/or an entity affiliated with AIA Services.
For example, Ms. Duclos was named as an individual defendant in Taylor v. AJA
Services. Ms. Duclos is currently the Vice President and Secretary of CropUSA, a company

previously associated with AIA Services. Of note, in the Taylor v. AJA Services litigation, prior
to it being appealed, one of Mr. Taylor's main allegations against AIA and other named

DEFENDANTS TURNBOW AND EBERLE, BERLIN'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO STAY, P. 4
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defendants was that money was improperly being moved from AIA to other affiliated companies
owned by his brother, John Taylor.
Accordingly, Defendants respectfully request a stay of the present case until the appeal of
Taylor v. AJA Services has been resolved by the Idaho Supreme Court. This would promote the

principles of judicial economy and allow the parties to engage in a more streamlined approach to
the discovery in this case after the causes of action, if any still exist, have been defined and
clarified by the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling in Taylor v. AJA for the benefit of parties and
involved non-parties.
C.

Other litigation arising from the transaction between Mr. Taylor and AIA has
already been stayed in cases presently pending before Judge Brodie and Judge
Kerrick in Nez Perce County pending the resolution of the Taylor v. AJA Services
appeal.
As discussed in the Memorandum in Support of Defendant Richard A. Riley's Motion for

Stay, litigation in two cases similarly arising from the transaction between Mr. Taylor and AIA

has been stayed pending the resolution of the AIA appeal by the Idaho Supreme Court. In
requesting a stay in this case, Defendants Turnbow and Eberle Berlin further rely on the reasons
articulated in the Orders entered by Judge Brudie and Judge Kerrick staying the litigation in Nez
Perce County. (See, Affidavit of Jack S. Gjording, Exhibits A and B).
II.

CONCLUSION

Based on the principles of judicial economy and the sound logic set forth in Judge
Brudie's and Judge Kerrick's Orders entering stays in similar litigation in Nez Perce County,

DEFENDANTS TURNBOW AND EBERLE, BERLIN'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO STAY, P. 5
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Defendants respectfully urge this Court to stay the current litigation until a decision is issued by
the Idaho Supreme Court in the Taylor v. AJA Services appeal.
DATED this

2(

sfday of May, 2010.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

rneys for De dants Robert M. Turnbow and
berle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen,
Chartered
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day of May, 2010, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Roderick C. Bond
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, VIA 99201
James D. LaRue
ELAM BURKE
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701-1539
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D
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RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, WA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868
Plaintiff,
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND

v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
ROBERT M. TURNBOW, an individual; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;
Defendants.
STATE OF WASHINGTON
COUNTY OF SPOKANE

)
) ss:
)

I, Roderick C. Bond, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in court, one of the

attorneys for the plaintiff in the above-entitled action, and make this Affidavit based upon my

)

'
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personal knowledge. I have personal knowledge of all of the pleadings and documents attached
to this Affidavit as they have been the subject of actions through which I have served as counsel
for Reed Taylor. I am one of the attorneys for Reed and Donna Taylor in all of the actions from
which the attached documents were derived and for Reed Taylor in his first lawsuit against
Hawley Troxell, Riley and other defendants ("Tar.tor v. HawlgyTroxell, et al.")
2.

Attached as ExhibitA .are true and correct copies of pertinent pages of Riley's

Answer in Taylor v. Hawley Troxell, et al. I am one of the attorneys in this action.
3.

Attached as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of my letter to Jack Gjording

dated April 15, 2009. Despite my repeated requests for assistance from Mr. Gjording's clients
(his clients in this action), they have refused to assist Reed Taylor in any way with respect to the
Opinion Letter, have refused to intervene in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., to support his clients'
representations and warranties made in the Opinion Letter to Reed Taylor, and have refused to be
deposed or conduct discovery relevant to the Opinion Letter and the legal services relating to the
Opinion Letter. I have written numerous correspondence to Mr. Gjording and Mr. McKlevcen
requesting assistance and support for the Opinion Letter, prior to and after Judge Brudie ruled the
agreement was illegal, and Mr. Gjording and his clients have refused to provide any assistance.
4.

Attached as Exhibit C are emails exchanged between me and other attorneys

relevant to the Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., litigation and the Donna Taylor v. AJA Services
Corporation (Nez Perce County District Court Case No. CV-02470 ("Donna Taylor v. AJA
Services") action seeking to appoint a receiver for AIA Services and for injunctive re1ief ordering
that Donna Taylor's right to be on the board of AJA Services be honored, among other things.

AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK BOND - 2
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Richard Riley was carbon copied on these attached emails and others. These emails provide that
a "Chinese Wall" is not in place at Hawley Troxell with respect to Richard Riley as he would not
be receiving copies of email if a "Chinese Wall" was in fact in place. I hand wrote "Richard
Riley" on relevant portions of these emails and drew the line to, and box around, "Richard Riley"
on the emails for the convenience of the Court. In addition, I did the same for certain references
to James LaRue, who has refused to produce Richard Riley for a deposition or subpoena for any
case, including this one.
5.

Attached as Exhibit D are true and correct copies of pertinent pages of the

deposition of R. John Taylor taken in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al. We have not been pennitted
to depose R. John Taylor since the allegations of illegality were made in Taylor v. AJA Services,

et al. In his testimony, John Taylor admitted that Richard Riley had drafted the documents in the
Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., litigation to pledge the Washington Bank Properties Mortgage to
CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. This mortgage was subject to claims of conversion from Reed
Taylor as it was proceeds of property in which AIA Services had granted him security interests.

6.

Attached as Exhibit E are true and correct copies of pertinent pages of the

deposition of R. John Taylor taken in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al.
7.

I argued the appeals for Taylor v. Hawley Troxell, et al., and Taylor v. Clements

Brown, et al. At oral argument, defense counsel in both of the foregoing cases (including Mr.
Thomson for Elam Burke) argued that these appeals should not be stayed pending the outcome
of the appeal in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al. My request for judicial notice is taken out of
context and relates in no way to staying this case, which Reed Taylor and I oppose.
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8.

Campbell, Bissell & Kirby

13:52

Recd Taylor has incurred tens of thousands of attorneys' fees, expert witness foes

and costs litigating this case and Taylor v. AJA Services, et al. He has been forced to sell assets
and take other actions that have damaged him so that he can continue to live. The funds that he .
has been deprived of at AIA Services will likely no longer be obtaining even if Reed Taylor is
successful on appeal in the appeal in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al. There also is no assurances
that that appeal will be completed and a final decision rendered.
9.

I have repeatedly asked for deposition dates for Riley, Turnbow and the entity

designccs for Eberle Berlin and Hawley Troxell. I was advised by Mr. Gjording and Mr. LaRuc
that the requested dates would not be provided. I requested that the defendants complete Recd

Taylor's written discovery to them by providing full and complete responses. I requested that
Mr. LaRuc and Mr. Gjording attend a discovery conference and they both refused to do so. ivly
client has been prejudiced by the past delays and will be prejudiced by any stay in this action. He
has been forced to sell assets by way of the finding of illegality and has incurred significant ·
attorneys' fees and costs in this action and Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., which are all
a111;butablc to Riley and Eberle Berlin's acts and/or omissions in 1995 and the Opinion Letter. I
respectfully ask that the Court deny the Motions to Stay, set this case for trial and give me client
his long-awaited day in court.
DATED: This

1st

day of.Tune, 2010.

AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK BOND - 4
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JUN-Ql-2010

13:52

Campbell. Bissell & Kirby

Notary Public for ~ngtord)
Residing
d.N_:_~
My commission expires: \ O · \:J.. ...lD\3

at:-:J)e

n
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•
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on June 1, 2010, I caused to be served true and c01Tcct copies of the
foregoing document to the following parties:

Via:
Jack S. Gjording

Julianne S. Hall
Gjording & Fouser, PLLC
509 W. Hays St.
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 336-9777
Fax: (208) 336-9177

( )
( )
( )
(X)
(X)

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
Elam & Burke, PA
251 East Front St.
Boise, ID 83 704
Phone:(208)343-5454
Fax: (208) 384-5844

( )
( )
( )
(X)
(X)

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Email (pdf attachment)

Roderick

AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK BOND - 5
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James D. LaRue ISB #1780
Loren C. Ipsen ISB #1767
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
E & B File No. 7082-0013
Attorneys for Defendants

IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIIB
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIB COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 08-01765

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

v.

FOR DAMAGES
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D.
JOHN ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.

RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-~
unknown individuals;
Defendants.

COME NOW Defendants Gary D. Babbitt, D. John Ashby, Patrick V. Collins, Richard

A. Riley and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP ("Hawley Troxell,,), (collectively referred to
as "answering Defendants"), by and through their counsel of record, Elam & Burke, P.A., and

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES - 1
05183.()062.1291409.2

300

Exhibit-A
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FOURlJI AFFIBMA.TIVEDEfENSE

Plaintiff has failed to mitigate his damages sought in his Complaint
FIFTII AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff has fulled to state with particularity all averments of fraud and/or conspiracy as
required by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

SIXTI1 AFFIRMATIVE DEFENS~
Certain of Plaintiffs claims are barred by the statutes of limitation pursuant to Idaho
Code Sections 5-219(4) and 48-619.

Plaintiff's claims against Defendants are based on an unenforceable and illegal agreement
and as such he has suffered no recoverable damages.

RESERVATION
These answering Defendants reserve the right, after discovery, to amend this Answer to

add additional affirmative defenses supported by the facts, and a failure to include all such

defenses in this Answer shall not be deemed a waiver of any right to further amend this Answer.
REQlJEST FOR ATIOR@Y FEES
These answering Defendants hereby request that they be awarded their attorney fees and
costs incurred herein pursuant to Sections 12-120(3), 12-121, 12-123, and 48-608 of the Idaho
Code, and R~~"54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
WHEREFORE, having fully answered the Complaint on file herein, these answering
Defendants pray as follows:

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES - 13

312'

05183.0062.1291409.2

001720

1.

That the Complaint herein be dismissed with prejudice, and that Plaintiff take

nothing fuereby;
2.

1hat these answering Deferidants be awarded fueir attorney fees and costs

incurred herein; and
3.

For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable.

DATED this .25_ day of September, 2008.

ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

ANSWER TO COMPLAJNT FOR DAMAGES - 14
·'1
,) ~.3
j.: •

05183.0062.1291409.2
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CERTiflCATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of September, 2008, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the
manner indicated below:
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC

7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, Washington 99201

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(509) 455-7111

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES - 15
05183.0062.1291409.2
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LAW OFFICES OF

SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
AiJORNEYS ATLAW
508 EIGHTH STREET
LEWfSTON. IDAHO 8350 l

JERRYV.SMITHt
NED A.CANNON
RODERICK C. BOND •

Telephone
(208) 743-9428

Fee simile
(208) 746-8421

t 11e<;m1 IJ2·31-05)
• Licen1~d in Idaho o.nd Washington

April 15, 2009

Vlf>. 6.M.AIL AliJ2FACSIMILE 'QS.336.9177
Jack S. Gjording
Gjording & Fouser, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Re:

Reed Taylor v. AJA Services, et al.
SC&B File No.:

1048~004

Dear Jack:
Thank you for your letter dated April 14, 2009. As indicated in my email to you yesterday, Reed Taylor
is very disappointed as to your clients' refusal to act, which we believe is wholly inapropriate.
You indicated in your letter that Eberle Berlin's carrier would not become involved "under the
circumstances." Please explain what you mean by this statement.
I would appreciate knowing what assistance Eberle Berlin will offer. J need to know specifics. I need to
know what specific assistance will be offered in writing by Friday at 5 p.m.
Please also advise me whether Eberle Berlin or its carrier has entered into any agreements (including,
indemnification agreements) pertaining to the abov~referenced matter, the redemption of Reed Taylor's
shares or in any way to this litigation.

we

As a result of Eberle Berlin, its applicable attorneys, and its carrier's intentional failure to act,
will
construe such failure to act as an admission that they are all supporting Hawley Troxell's arguments that
the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares was a violation of LC. § 30-1-6 or other Idaho law and that
Eberle Berlin and its attorneys made false representations to Reed Taylor in their opinionJetter to him.
Sincerely,

· ONDPLLC

'

RCB:rb
ce:

Reed Taylor via email
Michael Bissell via eilll!il

Exhibit - B
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Roderick C. Bond
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:

Gary Babbitt [gbabbitt@hawleytrox .com)
Wednesday, January 21, 2009 2: PM
Mike Bissell; Roderi
• iohael McNichols; David Risley; David Gittins; Charles
Brown; John Ashby; ffchard Rile James Gatziolis; John Taylor; Jolee Duclos
RE: IRE 408 Settlement
r
SMSG1.FID319790]

Mike, your reference to the "record" is meaningless. Gary

**

Please note that as of 1/1/2009 my e-mail address has changed from GDB@hteh.com to GB~bbitt@lh9wlmrQX§ll.g>m
• Please make the appropriate changes to your address directory.

GARY D. BABBITT
Attorru!y

direct 208.3tl8.
fax 208.9545201
email >i8abbitt@hawleytroxell.com
web www.hawleytroaell.com

HA\VLEY TROXE
Attorneys and Counselors

This e-mail message from the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP is intended only for named recipients. It contains infonnation that may be confidential,
privileged, attorney work product, or otherwise exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you have received this message in error, are not a named recipient, or are not the
employee or agent responsible for delivering this message to a named recipient, be advised that any review, disclosure, use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this
message or its contents is strictly prohibited. Please notify us immediately at 208.344.6000 if you have received this message in error, and delete the message.

From: Mike Bissell [mailto:mbissell@cbklawyers.com]
sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 3:16 PM
To: Gary Babbitt
Cc: 'Charles Brown'; 'Charles Harper'; John Ashby; 'David Gittins'; 'David Risley'; 'James Gatziolis'; 'James LaRue'; 'John
Janis'; 'Michael McNichols'
Subject: RE: IRE 408 Settlement Offer [DMSMSG1.AD319790]

I understand - you do not want to go on the record with this.
We will get back to you.

From: Gary Babbitt [mailto:gbabbitt@hawleytroxell.com]
sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 2:10 PM
To: Mike Bissell; Roderick C. Bond
Cc: Charles Brown; Charles Harper; John Ashby; David Gittins; David Risley; James Gatziolls Jam~ t.aRue John Janis;
Michael McNlchols; John Taylor; Jolee Duclos
...._ _ _ _,.,,,
Subject: RE: IRE 408 Settlement Offer [DMSMSG1.AD319790]

Mike, Once again there is a settlement offer pending. Either respond to the settlement offer or make a counter offer. You
have asked for a settlement offer, there it is. I will not engage in hypoetheticals With you. Gary

**

Please note that as of 1/1/2009 my e~mail address has changed from GDB@hteh.com to G~Qbittahawl~ytroxell.g>m
. Please make the appropriate changes to your address directory.

GARY D. BABBITT
Attorney

1
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direct 208.388.
fax 203.954.5201
email !i§S!Qbitt@hawlevtroxell.com
web yyww.haw!qytroxel!.s:om

HAWLEY TROXELL
Attorneys and Counselors

This e-mail message from the law finn of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP is intended only for named recipients. It contains infonnation that may be confidential,
privileged. anomey work product, or otherwise exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you have received this message in error, are not a named recipient, or are not the
employee or agent responsible for delivering this message to a named recipient, be advised that any review, disclosure, use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this
message or its contents is strictly prohibited. Please notify us immediately at 208.344.6000 if you have received this message in error, and delete the message.

From: Mike Bissell [mailto:mblssell@cbklawyers.com]

Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 3:06 PM
To: Gary Babbitt
Cc: 'Charles Brown'; 'Charles Harper'; John Ashby; 'David Gittins'; 'David Risley'; 'James Gatziolis'; 'James LaRue'; 'John
Janis'; 'Michael McNicho!s'
Subject: RE: IRE 408 Settlement Offer [DMSMSG1.AD319790]
My goodness Gary, can't you answer a simple question? In the interests of your client, please tell me, yes or no, if
Services will settle with Reed independently.

From: Gary Babbitt [mailto:gbabbitt@hawleytroxell.com]

Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 1:45 PM
To: Mike Bissell
Cc: Charles Brown; Charles Harper; John Ashby; David Gittins; David Risley; James Gatziolis; James LaRue; John Janis;
Michael McNichols; John Taylor; Jolee Duclos
Subject: RE: IRE 408 Settlement Offer [DMSMSG1.AD319790]
Mike, There is a settlement offer outstanding to your client. Please respond to the settlement offer or make a
counteroffer. Thank you, Gary

**

Please note that as of 1/1/2009 my e-mail address has changed from GDB@hteh.com to GBabbitt@hawle¥troxell.com
. Please make the appropriate changes to your address directory.
· ··

GARY 0. BABBITT
Attomr-1
direct ·200. 388.
fax 208.954.5201
email !iJBabbitt@hawleytrox~ll.com
web >nyw.bawfevtroxell.com

HA \VLEY TlHJXJ(LL
Attorneys and Counselors

This e-mail message from the law finn of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP is intended only for named recipients. It contains information that may be confidential,
privileged, attorney work product, or otherwise exempt from disclosure under apj>licable law. If you have received this message in error, are not a named recipient, or are not the
employee or agent responsible for delivering this message to a named recipient, be advised that any review, disclosure, use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this
message or its contents is strictly prohibited. Please notify us immediately at 208.344.6000 if you have received this message in error, and delete the message.

From: Mike Bissell [mailto:mbissell@cbklawyers.com]

Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 1:54 PM
To: Gary Babbitt
2

001725

Cc: 'Charles Brown'; Charles Harper; John Ashby; David Gittins; David Risley; James Gatziolis; James LaRue; John Janis;
Michael McNichols
Subject: RE: IRE 408 Settlement Offer [DMSMSG1.FID319790]
Please answer the question: Is AIA Services willing to settle with Reed independent of the other defendants or not? A
simple yes or no is all I need, and we can proceed from there.

From: Gary Babbitt [mailto:gbabbitt@hawleytroxell.com]
Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 12:50 PM
To: Mike Bissell
Cc: Michael McNichols; David Risley; david@gittinslaw.com; Gatziolis, James J.; John Ashby; Richard Riley; John Taylor;
Jolee Duclos
Subject: RE: IRE 408 Settlement Offer [DMSMSG1.FI0319790]

Mike, Once again, AIA Services has made a settlement offer as outlined in my letter. Your email is not a response to the
settlement offer. I do not intend to discuss with you discovery issues in the context of this settlement offer. The
settlement offer is as stated and will expire as stated. Gary

**

Please note that as of 1/1/2009 my e-mail address has changed from GDB@hteh.com to ~Babbjtt@hawleytroxell.com
. Please make the appropriate changes to your address directory.

GARY D. BABBITT
Att'o1·ney

direct 208.38H.
fax 203.954.5201
email G6abbitt@h<1~!sytroxell.com
web www.hawleytroxell.com

HAWLE.Y TROXELL
Attorneys and Counselors

This e-mail message from the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP is intended only for named recipients. It contains infomiation that may be confidential,
privileged, attorney work product, or otherwise exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you have received this message in error, are nOt a named recipient, or are not the
employee or agent responsible for delivering this message to a named recipient, be advised that any review, disclosure. use, dissemination. distribution, or reproduction of this
message or its contents is stri1;1ly Jll'Ohibited. Please notify us immediately at 203.344.6000 if you have received this message in error, and delete the message.

From: Mike Bissell [mailto:mbissell@cbklawyers.com]

sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 1:32 PM
To: Gary Babbitt; 'Michael McNichols'; david@gittinslaw.com; 'David Risley'; 'Gatziolis, James J.'
Cc: Richard Rifey; John Ashby; James laRue; John Janis
Subject: RE: IRE 408 Settlement Offer [DMSMSG1.FID319790]

The information requested is the subject of discovery requests and is needed to fully evaluate the offer (unless it was so
sweet that it could not be refused (which isn't)) and to advise Reed. Indeed, I would think your clients would want to see
the information as well.
Is AIA Services willing to settle wrth Reed to the exclusion of the other defendants (with the exception that such a
settlement would likely include Insurance)? If so, send me an offer and let's see if we can wrap this up and stop the
bleeding for your clients Services and Insurance.

From: Gary Babbitt [rnailto:gbabbitt@hawleytroxell.com]
Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 10:47 AM
To: Mike Bissell; Roderick C. Bond; Michael McNlchols; david@gittinslaw.com; David Risley; Gatziolis, James J.
Cc: John Taylor; Jolee Duclos; Richard Riley; John Ashby
Subject: IRE 408 Settlement Offer [DMSMSG1.FID319790]
3
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Dear Mike,
Yesterday ,Rod Bond sent an email to me purportedly in response to the AIA Services settlement offer. This email
contained a number of questions. AIA Services sent a settlement offer to you defining the general terms of a settlement ,
and we anticipated a substantive response from you on behalf of the Plaintiff. AIA does not intend to respond to Rod
Bond's email. I remind you that the settlement offer expires on January 30 , 2009 at 5 pm (MST).
Thank you, Gary

**

Please note that as of 1/1/2009 my e-mail address has changed from
. Please make the appropriate changes to your address directory.

GARY

§DB@lht~h.~m

to GBabbitt@lhawleyt;roxell.com

D. BABBITT

At:tornt--v
direct ~!Oil.J88.
fax 208.954. 5201
email GBabbltt@hawleytroxell.com
web www.hawleytroxell.com

HAWLEY TROXELL
Attorneys and Counselors

This e-mail message from the law finn of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP is intended only for named recipients. It contains information that may be confidential,
privileged, attorney work product, or otherwise exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you have received this message in error, are not a named recipient, or are not the
employee or agent responsible for delivering this message to a named recipient, be advised that any review, disclosure, use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this
message or its contents is strictly prohibited. Please notify us immediately at 208.344.6000 if you have received this message in error, and delete the message.

001727

Roderick C. Bond
From:
Sent:
To:

Cc:
Subject:

Attachments:

Gary Babbitt [gbabbitt@hawleytroxell.com]
Wednesday, December 23, 200912:13 PM
Roderick C. Bond
Deanna Silvers; John Ashby; Richard Rile John Taylor; Jolee Duclos
AIA Services
DOC001.PDF

Dear Rod, Attached is a letter which is in response to your December 21, 2009 demand to honor Donna's Seat on the
BOD of AJA Services.
Have a Merry Christmas, Gary

l
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Page 1
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR,a single
person,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs

)

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
Idaho corporation; AIA
INSURANCE, INC., an Idaho
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR
and CONNIE TAYLOR,
individually and the community
property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single
person; and JOLEE DUCLOS, a
single person;

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-07-00208
VOLUME I

)

)
)

Defendants.
)
,,,,..--~---..,.~--.,,....-~.....-~~~~~~~~)
lContinued)
)

Taken at 508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho
Wednesday, August 29, 2007 - 9:03 a.m.

D E P 0 S I T I 0 N

OF

R. JOHN TAYLOR

Clearwater Reporting of
Washingto & Idaho LLC

(800) 247-2748
(208)

743-2748

email:

Exhibit_ D

83501
:::e.net
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Page 2
AIA Services CORPORATION,
an Idaho corporation; and
AIA Insurance, INC., an
Idaho corporation,
Counterclaimants,
vs
REED J. TAYLOR, a single
person,
Counterdefendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

A P P E A R A N C E S
RODERICK C. BOND, Esq., of the law firm of Smith, Cannon
and Bond, 508 Eighth Street, Lewiston, Idaho 83501,
appearing on behalf of the
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant.
MICHAELE. McNICHOLS, Esq., of the law firm of Clements
Brown and McNichols, PA, 321 Thirteenth Street, Post
Office Box 1510, Lewiston, Idaho 83501,
appearing on behalf of the
Defendant/Counterclaimant, R. John Taylor,
GARY D. BABBITT, Esq, of the law firm of Hawley Troxell
Ennis and Hawley, LLP, 877 Main Street, Suite 1000, Post
Office Box 1617, Boise, Idaho 83701-1617,
appearing on behalf of the
Defendant/Counterclaimant, AIA Services and
AIA Insurance.
RICHARD GITTINS, Esq., of the Gittins Law Office, 843
Seventh Street, Post Office Box 191, Clarkston,
Washington 99403,
appearing on behalf of the Defendant, JoLee
Duclos.
ALSO PRESENT:

Reed J. Taylor, JoLee Duclos,
Jack Little, Esq.

Clearwater Reporting of
Washingto & Idaho LLC

(800) 247-2748
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-2748 email: clrwtr@qwestoffice.net
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Page 15
/

~

1

A.

I don't recall that.

2

Q.

Have we been provided a copy of that

3

resolution?

4

A.

I don't know.

5

Q.

What if I told you that we haven't been

6

provided a copy of that resolution?

7

MR. McNICHOLS:

There's no -- that's not a

8

question, you don't have to -- if it is a question, it's

9

argumentative.

10

Q.

(BY MR. BOND)

When was the pledge agreement

11

executed pertaining to the Washington Bank Property's

12

note that was pledged to Crop USA?

13

A.

As I recall, the fall of 2007.

14

Q.

Would that be September of 2007?

15

A.

I

16

Q.

And did counsel draft that agreement?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

What, what law firm drafted that agreement?

19

A.

Hawley Troxell.

20

Q.

And who at Hawley Troxell drafted that

21

don't recall the specific month.

agreement?

22

A.

Richard Riley.

23

Q.

Again back to AIA, where does AIA Services

24

25

derive its revenues?
A.

From its subsidiaries, generally.

Clearwater Reporting of
Washingto & Idaho LLC

(800) 247-2748
(208} 743-2748

Lewiston, Idaho 83501
email: clrwtr@qwestoffice.net
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Page 188
1
2

CERTIFICATE
STATE OF IDAHO
SS.

·3

County of Nez Perce

4

S
6

I, Amy Wilkins, CSR, Freelance Court Reporter
and Notary Public for the States of Idaho, Idaho CSR No.
679, and Washington, Washington CSR No. 2187; and
Oregon, residing in Lewiston, Idaho, do hereby certify:

7

S

That I was duly authorized to and did report
the deposition of R. JOHN TAYLOR in the above-entitled
cause;

9

10

That the reading and signing of the
deposition by the witness have been expressly reserved.

11
12

13

That the foregoing pag~s of this deposition
constitute a true and accurate transcript of my
stenotype notes of the testimony of said witness.

14
15
16

I
nor counsel
employee of
action, nor

further certify that I am not an attorney
of any of the parties; nor a relative or
any attorney or counsel connected with the
financially interested in the action.

17
18

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my
hand and seal on this
day of
2008.

19
20

21
22

23
24

Amy Wilkins, CSR
Freelance Court Reporter
Notary Public, States of Idaho
and Washington
Residing in Lewiston, Idaho
My Commissions Expire: 1-11-08, 9-2-08

25
Clearwater Reporting of
Washingto & Idaho LLC

(800) 247-2748
(208)

743-2748

Lewiston, Idaho 83501
email: clrwtr@qwestoffice.net
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Page 416
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR,a single
person,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

)
}

VS

Case No. CV-07-00208
VOLUME I I I

)

)

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
Idaho corporation; AIA
INSURANCE, INC., an Idaho
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR
and CONNIE TAYLOR,
individually and the community
property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single
person; and JOLEE DUCLOS, a
single person;

)
)
)
)
)
}
}
)
)

)
)

}

Defendants.
}
~~~~~~~~~~~-'--"-~~~~)
(Continued)
)

Taken at 508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho
Wednesday, January 30, 2008 - 9:05 a.m.

D E P 0 S I T I 0 N

OF

R. JOHN TAYLOR
Clearwater Reporting of
Washingto & Idaho LLC

(800) 247-2748
(208) 743-2748

emai1Exhibit - E

83501
_ce. net
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Page 517
1

Q.

Who would know?

2

A.

I would have to look at the records of the

3

company to see when payments were made.

4

Q.

Did you use Dick Riley for AIA matters in 2002?

5

A.

I don't know.

6

Q.

Did you use Dick Riley for Crop USA matters in

A.

We may have, yes.

9

Q.

Did you use Dick Riley for AIA matters in 2001?

10

A,.

We may have.

11

Q.

Did you use Dick Riley for Crop USA matters in

13

A.

We may have.

14

Q.

Is it a fair statement that Dick Riley has

7

12

15

We may have.

2002?

2001?

provided legal services for both Crop USA and AIA?

16

A.

I

17

Q.

And you don't see a problem with that?

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

And why is that?

20

A.

Because he is an attorney that can provide

21

-- he has, yes.

services for both companies.

22

Q.

You don't see a conflict of interest with that?

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

Why not?

25

A.

I don't think there is a conflict of interest.

Clearwater Reporting of
Washingto & Idaho LLC

(800) 247-2748
(208)

743-2748

Lewiston, Idaho 83501
email: clrwtr@qwestoffice.net
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1

C E R T I F I C A T E

2

STATE OF IDAHO

3

County of Nez Perce

SS.
4

5
6

I, Arny Wilkins, CSR, Freelance Court Reporter
and Notary Public for the States of Idaho, Idaho CSR No.
679, and Washington, Washington CSR No. 2187; and
Oregon, residing in Lewiston, Idaho, do hereby certify:

7
8

That I was duly authorized to and did report
the deposition of R. JOHN TAYLOR in the above-entitled
cause;

9
10

That the reading and signing of the
deposition by the witness have been expressly reserved.

11
12
13

That the foregoing pages of this deposition
constitute a true and accurate transcript of my
stenotype notes of the testimony of said witness.

14
15
16

I
nor counsel
employee of
action, nor

further certify that I am not an attorney
of any of the parties; nor a relative or
any attorney or counsel connected with the
financially interested in the action.

17

18

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my
hand and seal on this
day of
2008.

19
20

21

22
2~

24

Arny Wilkins, CSR
Freelance Court Reporter
Notary Public, States of Idaho
and Washington
Residing in Lewiston, Idaho
My Commissions Expire: 1-11-08, 9-2-08

25

Clearwater Reporting of
Washingto & Idaho LLC

(800) 247-2748
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JUN D3 2010
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. CV-OC-0918868
JUDGMENT

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HA WLE
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; ROBERT M.
TURNBOW, an individual; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKL VEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;
Defendants.

The Court, having entered its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment on May 10, 2010, granting Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley
LLP's Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Court having previously entered its Order
Granting Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment on the First and Third Causes of Action of
Plaintiffs Complaint on April 21, 2010. Therefore, entry of Judgment concerning all claims
against Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP is now proper.
Accordingly, JUDGMENT is hereby entered under the standards of the Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 56, DISMISSING Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Complaint against Hawley Troxell
Ennis & Hawley LLP, in its entirety and WITH PREJUDICE.

JUDGMENT- I

j
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Attorney fees and costs of litigation, if any, will be assessed and ordered in a manner
consistent with Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED

thi~t

day of May, 2010.

District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

6~ay ~~'

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, Washington 99201

_X_ U.S. Mail

Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

~

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-9177

James D. LaRue
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701

":i_

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 384-5844

Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(509) 455-7111
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JUN 10 2010

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTi:ij/Wr~l~AVARRO, Clerk
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR,

By K. JOHNSON
DEPUTY

)
)

PLAINTIFF,

)
)

v.

)

)

RICHARD A. RILEY, AN
INDIVIDUAL; HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, AN IDAHO
LIMITED LIABILITY
PARTNERSHIP; ROBERT M.
TURNBOW, AN INDIVIDUAL; AND
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING,
TURNBOW & McKLVEEN,
CHARTERED, AN IDAHO
CORPORATION,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DEFENDANTS.

)

CASE NO. CV-OC-2009-18868
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON
VARIO US MOTIONS

)

The captioned case is before the court on the plaintiffs motion to amend his
complaint and on the defendants' motion to stay proceedings.
MOTION TO AMEND
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor has moved to amend his complaint to assert new
claims. In support of his motion he submitted a proposed amended complaint.
Between the time he filed his motion to amend and the hearing on the motion, the
court granted summary judgment dismissing a number of his claims, including all
claims against Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley. The summary judgment
has rendered parts of the proposed amended complaint inappropriate, as the plaintiff
conceded during argument. Before ruling on the merits of the motion, the court would
like to have an opportunity to review a proposed amended complaint that takes into

CIVIL/STAY.TAYLOR.2010

1
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account the summary judgment decision. The court, consequently, will defer ruling on
the motion until a new amendment is submitted. After the plaintiff submits a revised
amended complaint, the court will rule without further hearing.
MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
The remaining defendants have moved to stay proceedings until a decision is
entered in the appellate case of Taylor v. AL4 Services Corporation, Supreme Court
Docket No. 36916-2009. The decision whether to stay proceeding pending disposition
of an appeal in a related case is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Newell v.
Newell, 77 Idaho 355, 365, 293 P.2d 663 (1956)(denial of stay upheld).

The Newell case on appeal involves attempted redemption of Reed Taylor's
interest in AIA Services Corporation in 1995. Defendants Riley and Turnbow were
and are attorneys. Defendant Eberle Berlin is the law firm with which Mr. Riley and
Mr. Turnbow were then associated. As part of the redemption arrangement,
Defendants Riley, Turnbow, and Eberle Berlin allegedly prepared an opinion letter
that indicated in substance that AIA had taken all steps necessary to make the
agreement enforceable. Although the opinion letter was prepared for AIA, it
apparently was understood that Mr. Taylor would rely on its representations. AIA
subsequently defaulted, and Mr. Taylor brought an action against AIA to enforce the
agreement and to recover damages. The trial judge found the redemption agreement
to be illegal and dismissed the claim against AIA. In 2009 Mr. Taylor timely appealed
from the decision. The appeal is now pending under the name of Taylor v. AL4
Services Corporation, as noted above. Mr. Taylor filed his opening appellate brief in

May 2010. The respondents have not yet filed their briefs.
Shortly after filing his appeal Mr. Taylor instituted the captioned action
accusing Mr. Riley, Mr. Turnbow, Eberle Berlin, and Hawley Troxell of legal
malpractice arising out of the opinion letter, as well as other torts. The claims against
CIVIL/STAY.TAYLOR.2010

2
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Hawley Troxell have been dismissed in their entirety.
The remaining defendants argue that if Mr. Taylor is successful in his appeal,
most if not all of the claims against them will be rendered moot. Furthermore, if this
case is prosecuted while the appeal is pending, there is the possibility of inconsistent
and irreconcilable results.
Mr. Taylor is fairly elderly and would like to have his day in court in the
instant case as soon as possible. The court, however, is of the opinion that
considerations of judicial economy and the risk of inconsistent results favor imposing
a stay in the captioned case. While not necessarily persuasive, the court notes that
two other cases, which involve most of the same facts but have been brought by a
different plaintiff, have been stayed pending the appeal in Mr. Taylor's case against
AIA. Taylor v. Taylor, Nez Perce County Case No. CV 08-1150; Taylor v. AIA Services
Corporation, Nez Perce County Case no. CV 09-024 70.

ORDER
It hereby is ordered that proceedings in the captioned case are stayed pending

a decision in Taylor v, AIA Services Corporation, Supreme court Docket No. 369162009, or upon further order of this court.
Notwithstanding the stay order, the court will rule on the plaintiffs motion to
amend his complaint when it receives the revised proposed amendment.
Dated this 9th day of June, 2010.

CIVIL/STAY.TAYLOR.2010
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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I hereby certify that on the
of June, 2010, I served a true and accurate
photocopy of the foregoing document to the persons identified below by the method
indicated:

Roderick Bond
Attorney at Law
7 South Howard St, Suite 416
Spokane WA 99201

_L By United States mail

Jack Gjording
Attorney at Law
509W Hays St
Boise ID 83701

_L By United States mail

James LaRue
Attorney at Law
2510 East Front St
Boise ID 83704

_L By United States mail

_
_
_

_
_
_

_
_
_

By telefacsimile
By personal delivery
By overnight mail/Federal Express

By telefacsimile
By personal delivery
By overnight mail/Federal Express

By telefacsimile
By personal delivery
By overnight mail/Federal Express
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RECEIVED

NOV 2 8 2011

MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY, ISB No. 3558
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNE~County Clerk
2105 Coronado St.
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
Tel: (208) 557-5203
Fax: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com

FILED
-P.M.
_ _ __

NOV 2 B2011
CHRISTOPHER D RI

By JAMIE RAND CH, Clerk
DEPUTY

ALL

RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, WA 98004
Tel: (425) 591-6903
Fax: (425) 462-5638
Email: rod@roderickbond.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH illDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868
Plaintiff,
NOTICE OF ASSOCIATION OF COUNSEL
V.

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
ROBERT M. TURNBOW, an individual; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;
Defendants.
Notice is hereby provided that Michael D. Gaffney on behalf of Beard St. Clair Gaffney
PA hereby enters an appearance in the above-entitled action as co-counsel for Plaintiff Reed J.
Taylor in association with Roderick C. Bond on behalf of Roderick Bond Law Office, PLLC.
Service of all further pleadings, papers, proceedings and communications relative to the
above-referenced action, except original process, should be served upon both Michael D.

NOTICE OF ASSOCIATION OF COUNSEL - 1
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Gaffney of Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA and Roderick C. Bond of Roderick Bond Law Office,
PLLC at the addresses indicated on page 1 of this Notice.
Although Michael D. Gaffney of Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA will serve as lead counsel
and all communications from counsel for the Defendants should be directed to Mr. Gaffney,
copies of all communications should also be provided to Roderick C. Bond of Roderick Bond
Law Office, PLLC, as provided in the preceding paragraph.
DATED

this~ of November, 2011.
BEARDST.C

NOTICE OF ASSOCIATION OF COUNSEL - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on th@~y of November, 2011, I caused to be
served true and correct copies of the foregoing doc~ ;;·the following parties:
Via:

Jack S. Gjording
Julianne S. Hall
Gjording & F ouser, PLLC
509 W. Hays St.
Boise, ID 83701
Fax: (208) 336-9177
Via:

James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
Elam & Burke, PA
251 East Front St.
Boise, ID 83704
Fax: (208) 384-5844

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
ernight Mail
csimile
( ) Emaiy('pdf attachment)

I

a

/,

NOTICE OF ASSOCIATION OF COUNSEL - 3
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DEC 3 0 2011
CHF-llSTOPHER D. RICH, CIGrk
By ELYSHIA HOLMES
DEPUTY

Jack S. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
Julianne S. Hall, ISB No. 8076
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208)336-9777
Facsimile: (208)336-9177
Attorneys for Defendant Eberle, Berlin,
Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
ROBERT M. TURNBOW, an individual; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0918868

AFFIDAVIT OF JACK S.
GJORDING IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-)

STATE OF IDAHO )
)ss.
)
County of Ada

ORIGINAL
AFFIDAVIT OF JACKS. GJORDING IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT -1-

001745

Jack S. Gjording, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says that he is one of the
attorneys of record for the Defendants in this action and makes this affidavit having personal
knowledge of the facts herein contained.
1. Mr. Robert "Mickey" Turnbow was a member of Eberle Berlin in 1995.
2. Mr. Turnbow is now deceased. See "Exhibit A", attached hereto.
3. Prior to his death, Mr. Turnbow was not deposed relative to this litigation.
4. Nor did Mr. Turnbow execute any Affidavits which would address his knowledge of the
falsity of the statements of fact by Eberle Berlin in the 1995 Opinion Letter.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to befor

AFFIDAVIT OF JACKS. GJORDING IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT -2-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

~ay of December, 2011, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Roderick C. Bond
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
800 Bellvue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, WA 98004

D
D
D/

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado St.
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495

D
D

James D. LaRue
ELAM BURKE
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701-1539

D
Via U.S. Mail
D
Via Hand-Delivery
D /Via Overnight Delivery

~

~
~

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile

Via Facsimile

AFFIDAVIT OF JACKS. GJORDING IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT -3-
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More Cloverdale Funeral Home, Cemetery & Cremation Obituaries
• Mina Marie Eacker, 96. Meridian, Idaho
• Frances L. Elhvood, 96. Boise, Idaho
• Patrick J. Inglis, S l, Boise, Idaho
See More

Remember

Robert Mickey Turnbow
• September 16, 1936 - August 27, 2011
• Boise, Idaho
Set a Reminder for the Anniversaiy
of Robert's Passing
•
•
•
•

Forward to Family & Friends
Add a Photo
Print
Contact Support

•I
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'Share This Obituary

• Facebook
• Twitter
• Favorites
Resources

Arrangements made by

Cloverdale Funeral Home, Cemetery & Cremation
1200 N Cloverdale Road
Boise, ID 83713
View Map - Get Directions____,
Profile of Cloverdale Funeral Home, Cemetery & Cremation____,
Tel. (208) 375-2212
wecare@cloverdalefuneralhome.com
Receive Obitua1y Notifications by Email
Send Flowers

Flowers & Gifts
• Obituary
• Services
• View Guestbook

September 16, 1936 -August 27 , 2011
Robert "Mickey" Turnbow was born
in Kellogg, Idaho to Robert S. Turnbow and
Lillian E. Turnbow. Mickey was a 1954 graduate of Kellogg High School. After gradua~ion he
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'attended the University of Idaho where he received his Bachelor of Arts degree
in 1958. He then attended the University ofldaho, College of Law where he
received his Juris Doctorate on June 5, 1960, graduating with high honors. He
then began his law practice with the firm of Richards, Haga and Eberle, now
known as Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chtd. In 2010,
Mickey celebrated 50 years of practicing law and was honored by the Idaho
State Bar. Mickey had a distinguished career in which he was corporate
counsel to some of the largest publicly and privately held companies in the
State of Idaho. He was recognized as a creative lawyer with the ability to
develop practical and unique solutions to complex legal issues. Mickey was general counsel for Boise
Cascade Corporation during its dramatic growth years and in that capacity participated in its
acquisition and financing transactions, including industrial revenue bond financing. He specialized in
business acquisitions and sales, corporate and commercial law, antitrust and trade regulation law. He
was also a member of the Idaho Law Foundation committees which prepared and sponsored revision
and modernization of the Idaho Business Corporation Act in 1979 and the Idaho Limited Partnership
Act in 1982.
Mickey was a dedicated conservationist. He was a founding member of Idaho Steelhead and Salmon
Unlimited and provided the legal representation needed for its formation. For many years he served as
a director and the editor of its newsletter.
Mickey's hobbies included watching sports, listening to jazz music, reading, playing the trumpet and
last, but certainly not least, fishing with family and friends. Mickey was a very well-loved friend to all
whom he encountered. He was always willing to tell you a fishing story or discuss sports statistics
with you. He would always tell you where the fish were located, but never divulge the "secret spot" or
"super-secret fly." In August of 2010 Mickey took a fishing trip with his nephew Scot Cummings to
Katmai, Alaska to the Royal Wolf Fishing Lodge. Describing the trip in a letter to his sons, Mickey
wrote: "You all have heard me say that I didn't believe there could be a perfect fishing trip. I now
know I was wrong .... Everyday we caught great fish. Our best day the 2 of us caught 60 fish. All but
3 of them were over 20 inches. The largest were between 28" & 29. 25 of them jumped & the most
jumps were 4." Mickey lived a full life exactly the way he wanted to.
Mickey was preceded in death by his parents. His is survived by his sister Lynne Cummings -Kellogg,
ID; five sons, Dennis M. Turnbow -Salem, OR; Ronald M. Turnbow -Keizer, OR; Mark R. Turnbow Park City, UT; Daniel T. Turnbow -Seattle, WA; Christopher William Turnbow -San Diego, CA; five
grandchildren and seven great-grandchildren.
A reception will be held to celebrate Mickey's life on Saturday, September 17, 2011 at 2:00 p.m. at
the Cloverdale Funeral Home Reception Center, 1200 N. Cloverdale Rd., Boise, Idaho.
In lieu of flowers, please make donations to: Idaho Steelhead & Salmon Unlimited, 2600 Rose Hill,
Ste. #201, Boise, Idaho 83705 or a charity of your choice.
To share memories with the family please visit Mickey's online memorial webpage at
\V\Nw.cloverdalefuneralhome.com

Tributes.com is the online resource for curTent local and national obituary news, lasting tributes
celebrating the lives of loved ones, and an online community to provide support during times of loss
and grieving.
© 2011 Tributes, Inc. All rights reserved.
• Terms of Use I
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Robert Micket Turnbow, 74
· "·u.·J

Wednesday, September 7, 2011 9:34 am

Rober1 Mickey Turnbow, 74

Former Kellogg resident Roben Mickey Turnbow died Aug. 27, 2011 in Bo>se. He was 74.
He was born
801::.e law fir

in Kellogg and graduated from Kellogg High School in l 954. He graduaicd from the Univers1ry of Idaho in l 958 and got his law degree in 1960. Turnbow worked at
in, Kading, Turnbow and McKlveen, Chanered, and practiced law for 50 years.

He enjoyed fishing with family and fnend.s,jazz music, playing the trumpet and reading. He was an avid spons fan.
Turnbow is survived by sons Dennis M. and Meri vie Turnbow of Salem, Ore., Ronald M. Turnbow of Keizer, Ore., Mark R. Turnbow of Park City, Utah, Daniel T and Katya Turnbow of Seattle, and
Christopher W. Turnbow of San Diego; sister Lynne Turnbow Cummings and Roben of Kellogg; grandchildren Stacey L. NorTis and Mark, Connie M. Jackson and Jason, Vlad, Sophia and Samuel;
great-grandchildren Jordan. JarTod, Jerome, Jeremy, Jeff, Janessa, McKaylin and Trestin; as well as many aunts, uncles, nieces. nephew-s, friends and extended family.
He 1s preceded in death by his parents, Roben S. and Lillian E. (Dupuis) Turnbow.
Services

\.\~ll

be held at 2 p.m. Saturday, Sept. 17, at Cloverdale Funeral Home in Boise. Local services

\.\~II

be held at a later date.

In lieu of flowers: Boys Ranch, 5465 \V. Irnng St., Boise, Idaho 83706; ldaho Steelhead and Salmon Unlimited. 2600 Rose Hill Su11e #201, Boise, Idaho 83705; or a memorial of your choice

co Copyright 2011, ShoshoneNl'wSPress.rom, Kellogg. JD. PO\\·ered by Bio' Co:i:cnl ~v1 Mnl:j.t.'1llcr1 l s\ stern from TO\\"TINe\\S com.
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Loren C. Ipsen ISB #1767
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 3 00
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
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JAN 2 3 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE VIDAK
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendants, Richard A. Riley
and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-OC-0918868

v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; RAWLE
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; ROBERT M.
TURNBOW, an individual; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURl~BOW &
McKL VEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF
RICHARD A. RILEY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

STA TE OF IDAHO )
) SS.

County of Ada

~

)

RICHARD A. RILEY, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says:
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1.

I am a defendant in the above-captioned action, over 18 years of age, and

competent to testify regarding the matters set forth herein. I make this affidavit based upon my
personal knowledge.
2.

In the case of Reed J. Taylor v. AIA Services Corporation, et al., Case No. 07-

00208, in the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the
County of Nez Perce (hereinafter the "AIA Litigation"), plaintiff Reed J. Taylor on July 17,
2008, served a memorandum entitled Reed Taylor's Preliminary Response in Opposition to
Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, a copy of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
3.

On p. 7 of Exhibit A, plaintiff's attorney, Mr. Bond, pointed out, "In 1995, LC.

30-1-6 was the applicable law pertaining to stock redemptions. Connie and Becks erroneously
rely upon LC. 30-1-46."
4.

Approximately a month later on August 18, 2008, Mr. Bond filed the Complaint

for Damages on behalf of Reed Taylor initiating the case of Taylor v. Babbitt, et al., Case No.
CV 08-01765, in the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and
for the County of Nez Perce, a.ff'd sub nom. Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P.2d 642
(2010) (hereinafter "Hawley Troxell No. 1"). See, Exhibit G to the Affidavit of Richard A. Riley
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed herein.
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SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this c:JO~ay of January, 2012.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at ~ . J j)
Commission expires: ..:5 -...30 -.;zo

if
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the .::23. day of January, 2012, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, Washington 98004

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado St.
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495

Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise~ Idaho 83701-2837

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(425) 321-0343
Email: rod@roderickbond.com
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 529-9732
~ Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-9177
Email: jgjording@g-g.com
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RODERICK C. BOND (Pro Hae Vice)
NED A. CANNON, ISBA No. 2331
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, WA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

v.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AJA INSURANCE, INC., an Idaho
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE
TAYLOR, individually and the community
property comprised thereof; BRYAN
FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS,
a single person; CROP USA INSURANCE
AGENCY, INC., an Idaho Corporation; and
JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK,
individually and the community property
comprised thereof;

Case No.: CV-07-00208
REED TAYLOR'S PRELIMINARY
RESPONSE fN OPPOSITION TO
CONNIE TAYLOR, JAMES BECK
AND CORRINE BECK'S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
ruDGMENT

Defendants.
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Reed Taylor ("Reed") submits the following Preliminary Response in Opposition to
Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment:

I. INTRODUCTION
Connie and the Becks are attempting to avoid liability for themselves and others in this
action by disingenuously attempting to invalid the redemption of Reed's shares based upon old
case law and code intended to protect innocent creditors and shareholders. But Connie and the
Becks are hardly innocent shareholders. In fact, Connie and James Beck have been personally
involved in substantial corporate malfeasance at AIA Services and AIA Insurance. Moreover,
even if Connie and Becks' Motion had merit, the Motion fails on its own weight.
The Court should deny Connie and Becks' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
enter partial summary judgment in favor of Reed on the same issue.
Although this Response is only Reed's Preliminary Response, it is being filed to establish
that there is no reason to delay ordering AIA Insurance to be immediately relinquished to him.
Reed will respond in further detail in the future.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On June 27, 1995, a notice of special shareholder meeting was provided to the
shareholders of AIA Services for purposes of providing notice and approval of AIA Services'
purchase of Reed Taylor's shares for over $7.5 Million. See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May

9, 2008, Ex. B, p. 1, ~ 5.
On June 30, 1995, James Beck, Michael Caslunan, Richard Campanaro and R. John
Taylor entered into an Investment Agreement. See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008,
Ex. E.

Under the terms of the Investment Agreement, James Beck and Michael Cashman
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conditioned their purchase of Preferred C Shares in AJA Services on the requirement that all of
Reed Taylor's shares were purchased by AJA Services. Id. at p. 10,, 9(d).
On July 10, 1995, a revised notice of special shareholder meeting was provided by John
Taylor on behalf of AJA Services for purposes of approving various corporate actions, including
the purchase of Reed Taylor's shares.

Id. at Ex. C.

A copy of the Private Placement

Memorandum dated June 1, 2995 was attached to John Taylor's letter to shareholders. Id. at Ex.
C, p. 3; Ex. D.
On July 22, 1995, AIA Services and Reed Taylor entered into the Stock Redemption
Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, Security Agreement, among other agreements.

See

Hearing, Ex. Z, AA and AB. AIA Services executed the $6M Note on August 1, 1995. See
Hearing, Ex. A.
On August 16, 1995, James and Corrine Beck became shareholders in AIA Services. See
Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. G. Prior to purchasing shares, James Beck
executed a Subscription Agreement warranting that he had been given the opportunity to review
the financial statements of AJA Services for the periods

en~ing

December 31, 1994, and March

31, 1995. See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. F, p. 1,

iJ

l(a). The December

31, 1994, financial statements of AJA Services are also attached to the Affidavit ColUlie Taylor
submitted in support of Connie and Becks' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
On August 15, 1995, an opinion letter was issued to Reed Taylor verifying many
requirements had been met by AJA Services, including, without limitation, that the purchase of
Reed Taylor's shares was a legal transaction and that shareholder approval was obtained. See
Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. I. The opinion letter was based upon the
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knowledge of R.M. Turnbow and Richard Riley. Id. at p. 2. Richard Riley is presently an
attorney at Hawley Troxell. AIA Services Bylaws state that one person's vote of shares jointly
held by two people is the equivalent of the vote made by both joint owners. See Affidavit of
Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. J.
On August 16, 1995, AJA Services warranted in a separate and distinct document that all
conditions necessary to purchase Reed Taylor' shares had been satisfied and that "Reed J. Taylor
is hereby fully and forever released, discharged and indemnified by [AJA Services] from all
claims, caused of action, demands, rights, damages, costs expenses, fees, compensation,
liabilities and other obligations ... " See Hearing, Ex. AC.
II. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, admissions, and declarations show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. l.R.C.P. 56.
On summary judgment, the Court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
parting, including questions of credibility and the weight to be accorded particular evidence.
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).

Connie and the Becks' Motion fails to meet the required standard for partial summary
judgment. 1

1

On July 16, 2008, Counsel for Reed Taylor was advised by Jon Hally that he and his firm would be
withdrawing from representing Connie and the Becks as a result of violating the rules of professional conduct. This
Response is being submitted to support Reed being awarded possession of AJA Insurance and in the unlikely event
that Mr. Hally and his firm fail to vacate the hearing. In any event, Reed hereby requests additional time to respond
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 6(b)(I) and l.R.C.P. 56(f). A formal motion and notice of hearing will be submitted at a later
date if required.
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BECKS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 4

001760

A. Assuming AIA Services Was Insolvent and Connie and Becks' Motion Had
Merit, Connie and the Becks Motio.n Should Be DenJed Because They Have No
Standing to Attack the Redemption of Reed's Shares.
Stock redemption and distribution statutes are enacted to protect innocent creditors. A
virtually identical fact pattern to this case was more recently addressed through a unanimous
decision of the Colorado Supreme Court:
We agree with the majority view that the validity of a corporate stock repurchase may be
attacked only by persons who are injured or prejudiced thereby and not by the
corporation itself. Allowing corporations to void these transactions through the
application of a statute designed to protect creditors and minority shareholders would, in
effect, sanction corporate development of improper repurchasing schemes. Such a result
is a misapplication of the statute and circumvents its intended purpose.

'

A shareholder who is fully aware of, and consents to, a questionable transaction may not
thereafter attack that transaction by requesting it be declared illegal.

The Minnelusa Company, 929 P.2d 1321, 1324-25 (Col. 1996) (emphasis added).
John Taylor, Connie Taylor, and James Beck were intimately involved in the transactions
to redeem Reed's shares. Moreover, John Taylor voted in favor of the transaction at various
board meetings, and John and Connie Taylor voted their shares in favor of the transaction.
Significantly, James and Corrine Beck conditioned their purchase of Series C Preferred Shares in
AIA Services on the condition that Reed's shares were redeemed and, most importantly, did not
become shareholders until after Reed's shares were

redeem~d

(i.e., even creditors are barred

from attacking a redemption when they have notice of the redemption).

None of these

defendants are innocent creditors. None of these defendants are innocent shareholders. None of
these defendants have clean hands. All of these defendants wanted Reed's shares redeemed in a
failed effort to take AIA Services public.

PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO CONNIE AND
BECKS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 5

001761

Now, these same defendants are seeking to invalidate the redemption of Reed's shares
some 13 years after the fact by arguing a statutory scheme designed to protect innocent creditors.
Significantly, however, Connie Taylor, James Beck, and Corrine Beck are not innocent creditors
or the intended beneficiaries of stock redemption/repurchase statutes.

Indeed, their hands are

unclean as they have participated in siphoning off assets and cash from AIA Services and AIA
Insurance for their own benefit and to the detriment of Reed and the other shareholders of AIA
Services.
Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck are barred from seeking to invalidate the
redemption of Reed's shares. They have no standing to contest the redemption from which they
sought to profit from.

B. Assuming Connie and the Becks' Have Standing and Their Arguments Have
Merit, They Have Not Submitted Any Evidence of the Net Assets of AIA
Services' Assets on the Date Reed's Shares Were Redeemed.
In order to prevail on partial summary judgment, there can be no issue of material fact as
to any issue. I.R.C.P. 56.
Here, Connie and the Becks have submitted no evidence as to the assets and debts of AIA
Services as of July 22, 1995 (the date the Redemption Agreement was executed), or August 1,
1995 (the date the $6M Promissory Note was executed).
Thus, even if Connie and Becks' Motion was grounded in good faith law, their Motion
fails on its own weight. Moreover, AIA Services assets were obviously greater than portrayed as
it had net income of $8,820,000 in 1997 from the sale of assets that were obviously not properly
valued in 1995, thereby creating yet an additional issue of fact. See Hearing, AM, p. 29.
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Connie and Becks are not entitled to partial swnmary judgment as they have failed to
meet the burden required by the moving party.
C. Assuming Connie and the Becks' Have Standing and Their Arguments Have
Merit, They Cited the Wrong Code Section in Their Motion.
Although Connie and Becks' Motion ·Jacks merit under any theory, their Motion must be
denied because they relied upon the wrong Idaho Code Section in their Motion.
In 1995, 1.C. 30-1-6 was the applicable law pertaining to stock redemptions. Connie and
Becks erroneously rely upon LC. 30-1-46. Even if Connie and Becks' Motion had merit, it fails
as a matter of law.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated above, the Court should deny Connie and Becks' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and provide Reed additional time to respond.
DATED: This l ih day of July, 2008.
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC

By:~=-==
-fQ<leriCk
~

Ned A. Cannon
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct
copy of the Reed Taylor's Preliminary Response in Opposition to Connie Taylor, James Beck
and Corrine Beck on the following parties via the methods indicated below:

David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Attorney for Defendants JoLee Duclos and
Bryan Freeman

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for R. John Taylor

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for Connie Taylor, James Beck and
Corrine Beck

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( } Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
Gary D. Babbitt
D. John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
Attorneys for AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and
Crop USA Insurance Agency

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)
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James J. Gatziolis
Charles E. Harper
Quarles & Brady LLP
Citigroup Center, 500 West Madison Street
Suite 3700
Chicago, IL 60661-2511
Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance Agency

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Signed this 17th day of July, 2008, at Lewiston, Idaho.
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2

By KATHY JOHNSON

3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF Tfm

4

STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

5
6
7

)
)
)
)

REED J. TAYLOR,

vs.

Plaintiff,

) MEMORANDUM DECISION RE:

8
9
10
11

12

13
14

Case No. CV-OC-2009-18868

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
ROBERT M. TURNBOW, an individual; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& MCKLVEEN CHARTERED, an Idaho
Corporation,
Defendants.

)
) DEFENDANT RILEY'S MOTION FOR
) PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

15

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
16

Before the Court is Defendant Richard Riley's ("Riley") Motion for Partial Summary
17
18

Judgment. This case has its origins in a Stock Redemption Agreement between Reed Taylor

19

("Taylor") and AJA Services where AJA agreed to purchase all of Taylor's shares for a $1.5

20

million down payment promissory note, a $6 million promissory note and other consideration. In

21

the course of that transaction Defendants Riley and Robert Turnbow ("Turnbow"), and their firm

22

23

Eberle Berlin represented AJA. Eberle is a party because it was Riley and Turnbow's firm at the
time. There is no suggestion that Eberle is liable to Taylor for any reason apart from the acts of

24

25
26

MEMORANDUM DECISION RE DEFENDANT RILEY'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT-PAGE 1
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Riley and Turnbow. Defendants Riley and Turnbow' rendered an opinion letter in 1995 that
2

supported Taylor engaging in a stock redemption agreement. When AIA did not pay as agreed,

3

Taylor filed suit. In the course of that s lawsuit, the stock redemption agreement was found by

4

the trial court to be illegal. The ruling was upheld on appeal. Taylor v. AJA Services Corp., 151

5

Idaho 52, 261 P.3d 829 (2011).

6

Meanwhile, Taylor sued Defendant Riley and his new firm, Hawley Troxell, along with

7

others, in Nez Perce County for activities undertaken by them in representing defendants in the
8

AIA case. That case was dismissed by the trial court and upheld on appeal. Taylor v. McNichols,
9

10

149 Idaho 826, 243 P.2d 642 (2010). In this case, filed on October 2009, Taylor sued Riley,

11

Turnbow, Eberle, and Hawley Troxell. This Court issued a summary judgment in May 2010

12

which dismissed some of Taylor's claims but allowed his claims for fraud to remain.

13

Subsequently, a stay was issued in this case pending resolution of the appeal in Taylor v. AJA.

14

15

The stay was premised on the fact that the present case would be rendered moot if Taylor
prevailed in his appeal.

16

In September 2011, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its opinion in the Taylor v. AJA.
17

18

Defendant Riley moved to lift the stay and for a protective order pending his motion to move for

19

summary judgment based upon the resolution of issues in Taylor v. AJA. Thereafter Riley filed a

20

motion for partial summary judgment on the fraud claims. Defendants Turnbow and Eberle

21

Berlin also filed a motion for partial summary judgment, but based on different grounds. Taylor

22

opposed both motions and this Court heard oral argument on January 30, 2012.

23

Riley grounded his motion on res judicata based on the holding in Taylor v. AJA that the

24

1995 opinion letter could not be the basis of a fraud claim against AIA. As AIA' s agent, Riley
25
26
1

Defendant Turnbow is recently deceased.
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argued that he too could not be held liable for fraud based on the 1995 opinion letter. Defendant
2

Eberle Berlin argued on separate ground that the death of Robert Turnbow made it impossible for

3

Taylor to establish the requisite knowledge of any false statement of fact. Accordingly, they

4

argued, summary judgment must be granted on Taylor's cause of action against Turnbow and

5

Eberle. At the hearing the Court inquired whether there was any difference between the status of

6

the Defendants Riley and Turnbow and whether there was any justification to treat them

7

differently insofar as Riley's arguments based on resjudicata.
8

At the conclusion of the hearing, this Court held that the fraud claim against Riley based
9
10

on the 1995 opinion letter was barred by res judicata. Because Defendants Turnbow and Eberle

11

Berlin had not joined in Riley's motion, the Court gave the parties ten (10) days to file

12

supplemental briefings as to why those Defendants should or should not be treated differently

13

with respect to the res judicata ruling.

14

15

On January 31, 2012, Defendants Turnbow and Eberle Berlin filed a motion for joinder in
Defendant Riley's motion for partial summary judgment. On February 6, 2012, Taylor's counsel

16

submitted a letter to chambers informing the Court that Taylor did not intend to file any
17
18

supplemental briefing on this motion and that it waived any oral argument. Having received no

19

subsequent supplemental briefings, requests for hearings, or other filings regarding this issue, the

20

Court considers the matter fully submitted for determination.

21

For the following reasons, the Court now grants partial summary judgment against

22

Plaintiff Taylor's claim for fraud against the Defendants based on the 1995 opinion letter.

23
24

DISCUSSION
25

26

1. Res Judicata Bars Taylor's Claim For Fraud Based On The 1995 Opinion Letter.
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Although the Court ruled from the bench that res judicata and collateral estoppel bar
2

Taylor from re-litigating the fraud claim against Riley, the Court's reasoning will be reiterated

3

here for the purpose of a complete record. Taylor unsuccessfully litigated against Riley's former

4

client, AIA, in Taylor v. AJA. Taylor argues that this Court already denied Defendants' collateral

5

defense and that res judicata and collateral estoppel are otherwise inapplicable. Although this

6

Court previously denied preclusion based on the Nez Perce Court's treatment of the 1995 opinion

7

letter, that ruling is interlocutory and subject to being revisited. The Court is not free to ignore
8

the holding in Taylor v. AJA that the 1995 opinion letter could not be the basis for a fraud claim
9

10
11

against AIA.
The doctrine of resjudicata covers both claim preclusion (true resjudicata) and issue

12

preclusion (collateral estoppe/). Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002).

13

Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim or upon

14

claims "relating to the same cause of action ... which might have been made." Id. Issue

15

preclusion protects litigants from litigating an identical issue with the same party or its privy.
16

Rodriguez v. Dep't of Corr., 136 Idaho 90, 92, 29 P.3d 401, 403 (2001). Taylor's claim is barred
17
18

19

under either theory.
Claim preclusion entails three requirements to bar a subsequent action: (1) same parties

20

or their privies; (2) same claim; and (3) final judgment. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho

21

119, 124, 157 P.3d 613, 618 (2007). Same claim includes not only "the matters offered and

22

received to defeat the claim, but also as to "'every matter which might and should have been

23

litigated in the first suit."' Id. at 126, 157 P.3d at 620 (citing Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v.

24

Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 434, 437, 849 P.2d 107, 110 (1993) (Magic Valley III). Thus, "when a valid,
25

final judgment is rendered in a proceeding, it extinguishes all claims arising out of the same
26
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transaction or series of transactions out of which the cause of action arose." Id. (internal
2

quotations omitted). The ''transactional concept of a claim is broad and claim preclusion may

3

apply even where there is not a substantial overlap between the theories advanced in support of a

4

claim, or in the evidence relating to those theories." Id. (internal quotations omitted). "Whether

5

a factual grouping constitutes a transaction is to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to

6

such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether

7

they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties'
8

expectations or business understanding or usage." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
9
10

In Taylor v. AJA, Taylor sought to enforce the stock redemption agreement, despite its

11

illegality, by arguing that he was fraudulently induced by AIA to enter into the agreement

12

through AIA's submission to him of the 1995 opinion letter. Taylor v. AJA noted that the opinion

13

letter "was written by a law firm, acting as general counsel for AIA in connection with the

14

agreement, and was addressed to ... Taylor." 261 P.3d at 843. Taylor v. AJA affirmed the

15

district court and determined that the opinion letter expressed an opinion that no statute was
16

violated by the stock redemption agreement, that it could not form the basis for a fraud claim,
17

18
19

and that Taylor had failed to put forward any evidence to satisfy his burden that the statement of
opinion was made with intent to deceive. Id.

20

Here, Taylor claims fraudulent inducement against Riley and Turnbow based on

21

statements made by them in the opinion letter. This fraud claim is the same claim for purposes

22

of res judicata because it arises out of the same transaction: the use of the 1995 opinion letter to

23

induce Taylor to sign the stock redemption agreement. See Ticor, 144 Idaho at 126, 157 P.3d at

24

620 (holding that resjudicata barred party's claim for unjust enrichment because it arose "out of
25

the same transaction addressed by a bankruptcy court in the prior adjudication: [the party's]
26
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disbursement of sale proceeds").
2

Although Taylor seeks to impose liability under different statements within the opinion

3

letter and limit the overall scope of Taylor v. AJA 's treatment of the opinion letter as an opinion,

4

he is still barred by res judicata because the transaction is the same despite his purported use of a

5

different theory and evidence. See Magic Valley Radiology, 123 Idaho at 438, 849 P.2d at 111

6

(barring claim to pierce the corporate veil of alleged sham corporation because it "arose out of

7

the same transaction ... the liability of [the defendants] personally for the breach of the
8

contractual arrangement").
9
10

Riley and Turnbow were in privity with AIA as to the opinion letter in connection with

11

the stock redemption agreement. The opinion letter was authored for Taylor's benefit, but was

12

done in the course of the lawyers representing AIA. C.f Gubler By & Through Gubler v.

13

Brydon, 125 Idaho 107, 110, 867 P.2d 981, 984 (1994) (stating that privity is established by

14

showing that the subsequent party "derived a direct interest in the outcome of the former

15

litigation from the prior defendants"). An unsuccessful suit against the principal bars a
16

subsequent suit against the agent arising out of the same transaction. See, e.g., Thompson v.
17
18

SouthTrust Bank, 961 So. 2d 876, 883 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007); Restatement (Second) Judgments§

19

51 (1982). Because Taylor v. AJA services constituted a final judgment, res judicata is

20

appropriate to bar Taylor's claim for fraud.

21
22

23

Alternatively, collateral estoppel applies to Taylor's claim for fraud. "Five factors are
required in order for issue preclusion to bar the relitigation of an issue determined in a prior
proceeding: (1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair

24

opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior
25

litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be
26
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1

2

precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits
in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in

3

privity with a party to the litigation." Ticor, 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d at 618 (internal citation

4

omitted). Issue preclusion applies to Taylor's claim that he was fraudulently induced based on

5

the opinionfetter because (1) Taylor had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the AJA

6

litigation on the issue of whether AJA fraudulently induced him to sell his stock by means of the

7

1995 opinion letter; (2) the alleged fraud predicated on the opinion letter is the same issue as
8

presented in the case at bar; (3) the fraud issue was decided against Taylor in the AIA litigation;
9
10

(4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the AJA litigation; and (5) Riley and Turnbow

11

acted as AJA' s attorneys for the purpose of preparing the 1995 opinion letter and were in privity

12

with AJA.

13
14
15

2. Res Judicata Applies Equally To The Defendants
At the hearing this Court instructed the parties to address why the Defendants should be
treated differently under resjudicata based on the fact that both Riley and Turnbow were

16

involved in the 1995 opinion letter and acting as agents in the AJA transaction. The parties were
17

18

also given ten (10) days to address the issue through supplemental briefing. Having received no

19

supplemental briefing and discerning no basis to distinguish Riley from Turnbow in regards to

20

the purported fraud based on the 1995 opinion letter, this Court concludes that res judicata bars

21

Taylor's fraud claim based on the opinion letter against all of the Defendants. See Magic Valley

22

Ill,, 123 Idaho at 438-39, 849 P.2d at 111-12 (holding that resjudicata barred a plaintiffs claim

23

seeking to pierce the corporate veil so as to make a shareholder and the estate of another

24

shareholder liable for judgment entered against a corporation).
25

26
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CONCLUSION
2

For the foregoing reasons the Defendants are granted Partial Summary Judgment as to

3

Plaintiff Taylor's fraud claim against the Defendants based on the 1995 opinion letter. Counsel

4

for Riley is requested to submit an appropriate form of ord .

5

DATED this

lD._~y of April, 2012.

6
7

8
9

10
11
12

13
14

15
16
17
18
19

20
21

22

23
24

25
26
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
2

I hereby certify that on this~ day of April, 2012, I mailed (served) a true and correct

3

copy of the within instrument to:

4

JACK S. GJORDING
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
POBOX2837
BOISE, ID 83701-2837

5
6
7

8

RODERICK C. BOND
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
800 BELLEVUE WAY NE, SUITE 400
BELLEVUE, WA 98004

9

10
11

MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY, PA
2105 CORONADO ST
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83404-7495

12
13
14

JAMES D. LARUE
ELAM & BURKE, PA
PO BOX 1539
BOISE, ID 83701-1539

15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22

23
24
25
26
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LE.

t.

APR 3 0 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By KATHY JOHNSON
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an inditde,ae. \ \j
Plaintiff,

v.

~

€. O

\) ~ 1,\)\1.

f>.\>~ ~
,p

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; ROBERT M.
TURNBOW, an individual; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

Case No. CV-OC-0918868
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

This matter having come before the Court for hearing on January 30, 2012, on Defendant
Richard A. Riley's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and Defendants Robert M. Turnbow
and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered, having filed a Joinder in
Defendant Richard A. Riley's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on January 31, 2012, and
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor having submitted a letter to chambers informing the Court that Plaintiff

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY WDGMENT - 1
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Reed J. Taylor did not intend to file any supplemental briefing on this motion and that he waived
any oral argument, and the Court having received no subsequent supplemental briefing, requests
for hearing, or other filings regarding the joinder, and the Court being fully advised after having
reviewed the Motions, Memoranda, and Affidavits filed by the parties and having heard oral
argument thereon, and having issued it Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant Riley's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, filed April 5, 2012, and good cause appearing therefor;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Richard A. Riley's, Robert M. Turnbow's
and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow and McKlveen, Chartered's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Fifth Cause of Action for Fraud/Constructive Fraud is
GRANTED; and
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Fifth Cause of Action for
Fraud/Constructive Fraud is DISMISSED, WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDEr.
DATED thic2_

D day of April,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this M"day of April, 2012, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, WA 98004

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495

Jack S. Gj ording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

James D. LaRue
ELAM & BURiffi, P.A.
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701

_x

x
_x_

ly'

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(425) 321-0343
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 529-9732
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-9177
U.S. Mail
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e

NO.jt'~ l I
A.M.;Ct

I

FILED

~----1--~M.

ORIG\t~AL

-

________

JUL f 2 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Cle
By KAlliY JOHNsoN

Jack S. Gjording, ISB No. 1105

OE>PuTy

GJORDING FOUSER, PLLC

Plaza One Twenty One
121North9th Street, Suite 600
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177

Attorneys for Defendants Robert M Turnbow and
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
ROBERT M. TURNBOW, an individual; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0918868

ORDER SUBSTITUTING
DEFENDANT ROBERT M.
TURNBOW

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.)

THIS MATTER having come on regularly for hearing on June 18, 2012, and the Plaintiff
having appeared by and through his attorney, John M. Avondet of the firm Bard St. Clair
Gaffney, P.A., Defendant Richard Riley having appeared by and through his attorney James D.
LaRue of the firm Elam & Burke, P.A. and Defendants Robert M. Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin,
Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered appearing by and through their attorney Jack S.
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'

fk

.

'

Gjording of the firm Gjording Fouser, PLLC and the Court being fully advised in the premises, the
Court finds:
1.

Defendant Robert M. Turnbow is now deceased and the proper party to be named

in this matter shall be Sharon Cummings, Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert M.
Turnbow. All further pleadings shall reflect this change.
DATEDthis

~~

V

~1~

dayof~!20l2.
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

iA-th

,~~

I hereby certify that on the l..UJ__ day~' fj12, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Roderick C. Bond
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
800 Bellvue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, WA 98004

~

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado St.
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495

'bi

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile

James D. LaRue
ELAM BURKE
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701-1539
Jack S. Gjording

D
D
D

D
D

D

'ii
D
D
D
'~

GJORDING FOUSER, PLLC

D

Plaza One Twenty One
121 North 9th Street, Suite 600
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701

D
D

ORDER SUBSTITUTING DEFENDANT ROBERT M. TURNBOW, P. 3

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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ORIGINAL

NO.

----F1L1~M.

A.M._.

Jack S. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
Julianne S. Hall, ISB No. 8076
GJORDING FOUSER, PLLC

Plaza One Twenty One
121North9th Street, Suite 600
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177

/_J.

ill

AUG 0 l 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By JAMIE RAND.~LL
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendants Sharon Cummings,
Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert
M Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, Kading,
Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,
Plaintiff,

vs.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
SHARON CUMMINGS AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF
ROBERT M. TURNBOW and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation,

Case No. CV OC 0918868
DEFENDANT SHARON CUMMINGS,
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE ESTATE OF ROBERT M.
TURNBOW'S ANSWER AND DEMAND
FOR JURY TRIAL

Defendants.

Defendant Sharon Cummings, Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert M.
Turnbow (hereinafter "Estate"), by and through the undersigned counsel of record, Gjording
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Fouser,

PLLC,

and in answer to the Plaintiffs Complaint on file herein, answers, alleges and

states as follows.
INTRODUCTION

The following defenses are not stated separately as to each claim for relief or allegation
of the Plaintiff. Nevertheless, the following defenses are applicable, where appropriate, to any
and all of Plaintiffs claims for relief. In asserting the following defenses, Defendant does not
admit that the burden of proving the allegations or denials contained in the defenses are upon
Defendant but, to the contrary, asserts that by reason of said denials, and by reason of relevant
statutory and judicial authority, the burden of proving the facts relevant to many of the defenses
and the burden of proving the inverse of the allegations contained in many of the defenses is
upon Plaintiff. Moreover, Defendant does not admit, in asserting any defense, any responsibility
or liability on the part of him but, to the contrary, specifically denies any and all allegations of
responsibility and liability contained in Plaintiffs Complaint.
FIRST DEFENSE

Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE

This answering Defendant denies each and every allegation of Plaintiffs Complaint not
herein expressly and specifically admitted.
1.

In answer to paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate admits that Plaintiff is a

resident of Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho. In further response, Estate asserts that some of
these allegations call for legal conclusions, that the language of the Idaho Code speaks for itself

DEFENDANT SHARON CUMMINGS, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF ROBERT M.
TURNBOW'S ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL, Page 2
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and Estate lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of the
remaining factual and legal allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
2.

The allegations contained in paragraph 2 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Estate and thus no response appears required. To the extent a response is
required, Estate lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
3.

The allegations contained in paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Estate and thus no response appears required. To the extent a response is
required, Estate lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
4.

In answer to paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate admits that Eberle Berlin

is an Idaho corporation engaged in the business of practicing law in Idaho with its principal
offices located in Boise, Ada County, Idaho. Estate denies the remaining allegations contained
in paragraph 4.
5.

In answer to paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate admits that prior to his

death Mr. Turnbow was an individual residing in the state of Idaho and was an attorney in the
state of Idaho conducting business with and for Eberle Berlin in Ada County, Idaho. Estate
admits that at all relevant times, Mr. Turnbow was licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho.
In further response, Estate denies the remaining allegations contained therein.
6.

In answer to paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate admits that Mr. Turnbow

conducted business and/or resided in Ada County, Idaho prior to his death, but denies the
remaining allegations contained therein.

DEFENDANT SHARON CUMMINGS, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF ROBERT M.
TURNBOW'S ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL, Page 3
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7.

In answer to paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate admits that Mr.

Turnbow, through his then affiliation with Eberle Berlin, was involved in the drafting and
delivery of an Opinion letter addressed to Plaintiff at the direction of AIA Services. Estate
admits Mr. Turnbow acted as outside counsel for AIA Services. At all relevant times, Estate
admits Mr. Turnbow had experience in corporate law and corporate transactions. With regard to
the remaining allegations, Estate denies the same or lacks sufficient information and knowledge
to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining factual and legal allegations contained therein,
and therefore denies the same.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 7 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response
for or on behalf of the other parties.
8.

In answer to paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate admits that Mr.

Turnbow, through his then affiliation with Eberle Berlin, was involved in the drafting and
delivery of an Opinion letter addressed to Plaintiff at the direction of AIA Services. Estate
admits Mr. Turnbow acted as outside counsel for AIA Services. With regard to the remaining
allegations, Estate denies the same. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 8 of
Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response
for or on behalf of the other parties.
9.

In Answer to paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate states that the stock

redemption agreement and related documents speak for themselves.

With regard to the

remaining allegations, Estate denies the same.
10.

In answer to paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate admits that Mr.

Turnbow, through his then affiliation with Eberle Berlin, was involved in the drafting of an

DEFENDANT SHARON CUMMINGS, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF ROBERT M.
TURNBOW'S ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL, Page 4
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Opinion letter addressed to Plaintiff which was delivered at closing of the redemption transaction
at the direction of AIA Services, and that the documents referenced in paragraph 10 of Plaintiff's
Complaint speak for themselves. With regard to the remaining allegations, Estate denies the
same. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 10 of Plaintiff's Complaint are
directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on behalf of the
other parties.
11.

In answer to paragraph 11 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Estate admits that an Opinion

letter was delivered to Plaintiff in satisfaction of a condition precedent to Plaintiff's obligation to
close the transaction and admits that the documents referenced in paragraph 11 of Plaintiff's
Complaint speak for themselves. Estate denies the remaining allegations contained in paragraph
11 of Plaintiff's Complaint.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 11 of

Plaintiff's Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response
for or on behalf of the other parties.
12.

In answer to paragraph 12 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Estate admits that Mr.

Turnbow, through his then affiliation with Eberle Berlin, was involved in the drafting of an
Opinion letter addressed to Plaintiff and that the documents referenced in paragraph 12 of
Plaintiff's Complaint speak for themselves. Estate denies the remaining allegations contained
therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 12 of Plaintiff's Complaint are
directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on behalf of the
other parties.
13.

In answer to paragraph 13 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Estate denies the allegations

contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 13 of Plaintiff's

DEFENDANT SHARON CUMMINGS, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF ROBERT M.
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Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
14.

In answer to paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate denies the allegations

contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs

Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
15.

The allegations contained in paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than and thus no response appears required. To the extent a response is required,
Estate lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
16.

In answer to paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate denies the allegations

contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs

Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
17.

In answer to paragraph 17 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate states that said

documents speak for themselves and denies the remaining allegations contained therein.
18.

In answer to paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate denies the allegations

contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs

Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
19.

In answer to paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate states that the

referenced documents speaks for themselves and denies the remaining allegations contained

DEFENDANT SHARON CUMMINGS, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF ROBERT M.
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therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 19 of Plaintifrs Complaint are
directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on behalf of the
other parties.
20.

In answer to paragraph 20 of Plaintifrs Complaint, Estate states that the

referenced documents speaks for themselves and denies the allegations contained therein. To the
extent that allegations contained in paragraph 20 of Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties
other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
21.

In answer to paragraph 21 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate admits that Mr.

Turnbow continued to provide legal services to AIA Services after the transaction to redeem
Reed Taylor's shares closed. With regard to the remaining allegations, Estate denies the same.
To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 21 of Plaintifrs Complaint are directed at
parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
22.

The allegations contained in paragraph 22 of Plaintifrs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Mr. Turnbow and thus no response appears required. To the extent a
response is required, Estate lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
23.

In answer to paragraph 23 of Plaintifrs Complaint, Estate admits that on June 17,

2009, the Court in the underlying litigation initiated by Plaintiff in Nez Perce County issued an
Opinion and Order and admits that said Opinion and Order speaks for itself. Estate denies the
remaining allegations contained in paragraph 23 of Plaintifr s Complaint. To the extent that
allegations contained in paragraph 23 of Plaintifr s Complaint are directed at parties other than
Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
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24.

The allegations contained in paragraph 24 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Mr. Turnbow and thus no response appears required. To the extent a
response is required, Estate lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
25.

The allegations contained in paragraph 25 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Mr. Turnbow and thus no response appears required. To the extent a
response is required, Estate lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
26.

The allegations contained in paragraph 26 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Mr. Turnbow and thus no response appears required. To the extent a
response is required, Estate lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
27.

In answer to paragraph 27 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate admits that Reed

Taylor requested Mr. Turnbow intervene in the Litigation and that Mr. Turnbow did not
intervene in the Litigation. Estate denies the remaining allegations contained therein. To the
extent that allegations contained in paragraph 27 of Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties
other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
28.

In answer to paragraph 28 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Mr. Turnbow was not a party

in the Litigation and declined to become involved. Estate denies the remaining allegations
contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 28 of Plaintiffs

Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
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29.

In answer to paragraph 29 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate lacks sufficient

information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein,
and therefore denies the same.
30.

In answer to paragraph 30 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate denies Reed Taylor's

allegation that his malpractice claims against Mr. Turnbow include derivative claims for
malpractice. With regard to the remaining allegations, Estate lacks sufficient information and
knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore
denies the same.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 30 of Plaintiffs

Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
31.

In answer to paragraph 31 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate lacks sufficient

information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein,
and therefore denies the same.
32.

In answer to paragraph 32 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate denies the allegations

contained therein.
33.

In answer to paragraph 33 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate denies the allegations

contained therein.
34.

In answer to paragraph 34 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate restates his responses

to paragraphs 1 through 33 as if fully set forth herein.
35.

In answer to paragraph 35 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate states that the Opinion

letter speaks for itself as to its contents and all assumptions, qualifications and other limitations
stated therein. Estate denies the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 35 of Plaintiffs
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Complaint. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 35 of Plaintiffs Complaint are
directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on behalf of the
other parties.
36.

In answer to paragraph 36 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate admits that Mr.

Turnbow admits that he, through his then affiliation with Eberle Berlin, was involved in the
drafting of an Opinion letter addressed to Plaintiff which was delivered at closing of the
redemption transaction at the direction of AIA Services. Estate further states that the documents
referenced in paragraph 36 of Plaintiffs Complaint speak for themselves. With regard to the
remaining allegations, Estate denies the same.

To the extent that allegations contained in

paragraph 36 of Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate
makes no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
37.

In answer to paragraph 37 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate denies the allegations

contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 37 of Plaintiffs

Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
38.

In answer to paragraph 38 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate restates his responses

to paragraphs 1 through 37 as if fully set forth herein.
39.

In answer to paragraph 39 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate denies that Reed Taylor

had an attorney-client relationship with Mr. Turnbow by and through an express contract
provision. Estate admits that Mr. Turnbow, through his then affiliation with Eberle Berlin, was
involved in the drafting of an Opinion letter addressed to Plaintiff which was delivered at closing
of the redemption transaction at the direction of AIA Services. Estate further states that the
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Opinion letter and documents referenced in paragraph 39 speak for themselves as to the contents
and assumptions, qualifications and other limitations stated therein.
remaining allegations, Estate denies the same.

With regard to the

To the extent that allegations contained in

paragraph 39 of Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate
makes no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
40.

In answer to paragraph 40 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate admits that Mr.

Turnbow, through his then affiliation with Eberle Berlin, was involved in the drafting of an
Opinion letter addressed to Plaintiff which was delivered at closing of the redemption transaction
at the direction of AIA Services. Estate further states that the Opinion letter and documents
referenced in paragraph 40 speak for themselves as to the contents and assumptions,
qualifications and other limitations stated therein. With regard to the remaining allegations,
Estate denies the same. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 40 of Plaintiff's
Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
41.

In Answer to paragraph 41 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate admits only that Mr.

Turnbow, through his then affiliation with Eberle Berlin, was involved in the drafting of an
Opinion letter addressed to Plaintiff which was delivered at closing of the redemption transaction
at the direction of AIA Services. With regard to the remaining allegations, Estate denies the
same. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 41 of Plaintiffs Complaint are
directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on behalf of the
other parties.
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42.

In answer to paragraph 42 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate denies all the

allegations contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 42 of

Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response
for or on behalf of the other parties.
43.

In answer to paragraph 43 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate denies the allegations

contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 43 of Plaintiffs

Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
44.

In answer to paragraph 44 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate denies the allegations

contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 44 of Plaintiffs

Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
45.

In answer to paragraph 45 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate denies the allegations

contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 45 of Plaintiffs

Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
46.

In answer to paragraph 46 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate denies the allegations

contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 46 of Plaintiffs

Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
47.

In answer to paragraph 47 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate restates his responses

to paragraphs 1 through 46 as if fully set forth herein.
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48.

In answer to paragraph 48 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate asserts that some of

these allegations call for legal conclusions, that the language of Idaho Code speaks for itself and
Estate lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of the
remaining factual and legal allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same. To the
extent that allegations contained in paragraph 48 of Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at parties
other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on behalf of the other parties.
49.

The allegations contained in paragraph 49 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Mr. Turnbow and thus no response appears required. To the extent a
response is required, Estate lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
50.

The allegations contained in paragraph 50 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Mr. Turnbow and thus no response appears required. To the extent a
response is required, Estate lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
51.

The allegations contained in paragraph 51 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Mr. Turnbow and thus no response appears required. To the extent a
response is required, Estate lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
52.

The allegations contained in paragraph 52 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Mr. Turnbow and thus no response appears required. To the extent a
response is required, Estate lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
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53.

The allegations contained in paragraph 53 of Plaintiffs Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Mr. Turnbow and thus no response appears required. To the extent a
response is required, Estate lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
54.

In answer to paragraph 54 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate restates his responses

to paragraphs 1 through 53 as if fully set forth herein.
55.

In answer to paragraph 55 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate denies the allegations

contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 55 of Plaintiffs

Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
56.

In answer to paragraph 56 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate denies the allegations

contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 56 of Plaintiffs

Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
57.

In Answer to paragraph 57 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate denies the allegations

contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 57 of Plaintiffs

Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
58.

In answer to paragraph 58 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate admits that Mr.

Turnbow, through his then affiliation with Eberle Berlin, was involved in the drafting and
delivery of an Opinion letter addressed to Plaintiff at the direction of AIA Services. Estate states
that the Opinion letter speaks for itself as to its contents and all assumptions, qualifications and
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other limitations stated therein.
contained therein.

In further response, Estate denies the remaining allegations

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 58 of Plaintiff's

Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
59.

The allegations contained in paragraph 59 of Plaintiff's Complaint appear directed

at parties other than Mr. Turnbow and thus no response appears required.

To the extent a

response is required, Estate lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore denies the same.
60.

In answer to paragraph 60 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Estate denies the allegations

contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 60 of Plaintiff's

Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
61.

In answer to paragraph 61 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Estate denies the allegations

contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 61 of Plaintiff's

Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
62.

In answer to paragraph 62 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Estate restates his responses

to paragraphs 1 through 61 as if fully set forth herein.
63.

In answer to paragraph 63 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Estate admits that Mr.

Turnbow, through his then affiliation with Eberle Berlin, was involved in the drafting and
delivery of an Opinion letter addressed to Plaintiff at the direction of AIA Services. Estate states
that the Opinion letter speaks for itself as to its contents and all assumptions, qualifications and
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other limitations stated therein. In further response, Estate denies the remaining allegations
contained in therein. To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 63 of Plaintiffs
Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
64.

In answer to paragraph 64 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Estate denies the allegations

contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 64 of Plaintiffs

Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
65.

In answer to paragraph 65 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate denies the allegations

contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 65 of Plaintiffs

Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
66.

In answer to paragraph 66 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Estate denies the allegations

contained therein.

To the extent that allegations contained in paragraph 66 of Plaintiffs

Complaint are directed at parties other than Mr. Turnbow, Estate makes no response for or on
behalf of the other parties.
67.

In response to Plaintiffs Prayer for Relief, Estate denies allegations 1 through 5.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendants are entitled to a litigation privilege which bars Plaintiffs claims in their
entirety.
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SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

By his conduct and actions, Plaintiff has waived some or all of the claims and/or
allegations against Turnbow and the Estate.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

By his conduct and actions, Plaintiff is estopped from asserting some or all of the claims
and/or allegations against Turnbow and the Estate.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiff has failed to mitigate his damages sought in his Complaint.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiff has failed to state with particularity all averments of fraud or constructive fraud
as required by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Certain of Plaintiffs claims are barred by the statutes of limitation including Idaho Code
Sections 5-218(4), 5-219(4), and 48-619.
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims against Defendant are barred by the doctrine of laches.
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

That the negligence or fault of Reed J. Taylor was equal to or greater than the negligence
or fault of Mr. Turnbow, if any, and that said Plaintiffs negligence or fault was the sole, direct
and proximate cause of any damages and/or injuries claimed by Plaintiff.
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NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

If Plaintiff sustained or incurred any damages, the same were caused in whole or in part

by the acts or omissions of persons or entities other than Defendant Turnbow, over whom
Defendant Turnbow had no control or by the superseding intervention of causes outside of
Defendant Turnbow's control.
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

During all material times and specific to the transaction referenced m Plaintiffs
Complaint, Plaintiff was represented by counsel of his own choosing.
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims present no justiciable controversy.
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims are based under the doctrine of unclean hands.
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The opinion letter was restricted and limited pursuant to its own terms.
FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs cause of action is not ripe for controversy given the fact that there is pending
litigation in the State of Idaho that is directly related, which is on-going.
FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims against the Defendant are barred based on lack ofprivity.
SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

There was no casual connection between the opinion letter and Plaintiffs claimed
damages.
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.

RESERVATION OF RIGHTS

Discovery has not yet commenced, the result of which may reveal additional answers
and/or defenses to this Defendant.

Defendant reserves the right to amend this Answer if

appropriate.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES

As a result of the filing of the Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant has been required to
retain legal counsel to defend the said action and is entitled to recover his attorney fees, pursuant
to the provisions contained in Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-121 and Rules 11 and 54 of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Defendant demands ajury trial on all issues pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure.
WHEREFORE, having fully and completely answered the Plaintiffs Complaint herein,
this answering Defendant prays as follows:
1.

That Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed in its entirety and that Plaintiff takes

nothing thereby;
2.

That Defendant recover reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred herein; and

3.

That this Court grant such other and further relief as it deems just and proper.
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Z-_~_day of August, 2012.

DATED this _ _

GJORDING FOUSER, PLLC

jording, Of
n ys for Defe
nts Sharon Cummings,
nal Representative of the Estate of Robert
Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, Kading,
Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

.2.-fld.day of August,

2012, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Roderick C. Bond
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
800 Bellvue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, WA 98004

)?l

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado St.
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495

)l

James D. LaRue
ELAM BURKE
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701-1539

~

D
D
D
D
D
D

D
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Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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AUG 15 2012
Jack S. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
Julianne S. Hall, ISB No. 8076

CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Clerk
By JAMIE RANDALL
DEPllTY

GJORDING FOUSER, PLLC

Plaza One Twenty One
121 North 9th Street, Suite 600
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177

Attorneys for Defendants Sharon Cummings,
Personal Representative of the Estate ofRobert
M Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, Kading,
Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,

Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
SHARON CUMMINGS AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF
ROBERT M. TURNBOW and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation,

Case No. CV OC 0918868

DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THIRD
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND JOINDER OF
DEFENDANT RILEY'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON RES
JUDICATA

Defendants.

COMES NOW the Defendants, Sharon Cummings, Personal Representative of the Estate of
Robert M. Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered, by and through
their attorneys ofrecord, Gjording Fouser, PLLC, and move the Court, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho
DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THIRD MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND JOINDER OF DEFENDANT RILEY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON RES
JUDICATA, Page 1
001801

Rules of Civil Procedure, for a summary judgment in said Defendants' favor, on the grounds that there
is no genuine issue of material fact remaining to be litigated, and said Defendants are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
This motion is based upon the records, files and pleadings in the above-entitled action, together
with the Second Supplemental Affidavit of Richard A. Riley, Affidavit of Counsel, the Memorandum
in Support of this motion, and Defendant Richard Riley's Memorandum in Support of his Motion for
Summary Judgment.
DATED this \

5~ day of August, 2012.
GJORDING FOUSER, PLLC

By~~\\~

JUiiei.Hall, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants Sharon Cummings,
Personal Representative of the Estate ofRobert
M Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, Kading,
Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered
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I hereby certify that on the_\v'_ day of August, 2012, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Roderick C. Bond
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
800 Bellvue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, WA 98004

~

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado St.
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495

~

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile

James D. LaRue
ELAM BURKE
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701-1539
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Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendants Sharon Cummings,
Personal Representative of the Estate ofRobert
M Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, Kading,
Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,

Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
SHARON CUMMINGS AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF
ROBERT M. TURNBOW and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation,

Case No. CV OC 0918868

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THIRD
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND JOINDER OF DEFENDANT
RILEY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

COME NOW, Defendants Sharon Cummings, Personal Representative of the Estate of
Robert M. Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chtd. (hereinafter
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
THIRD MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND JOINDER OF DEFENDANT RILEY'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, P.1
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"Defendants," "Turnbow" and/or "Eberle Berlin"), by and through their counsel of record,
Gjording Fouser,

PLLC,

and respectfully submit this Memorandum in Support of Defendants'

Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, Third Motion for Summary Judgment and Joinder in
Defendant Riley's Motion for Summary Judgment on the impact of the subordination agreement
between Donna Taylor and Reed Taylor and on the doctrine of res judicata.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In this memorandum, Defendants present four distinct reasons why summary judgment in
favor of Defendants should be granted in this case. First, recent legal malpractice decisions from
the Idaho Supreme Court are applicable to the duty issue. Accordingly, in light of this, the Court
should re-evaluate whether a legal duty exists in a professional malpractice case to a person not
in an attorney-client relationship. As discussed herein, Defendants respectfully suggest that the
Idaho Supreme Court's pronouncements and continued rejection of any expansion beyond the
single limited exception to the general rule in Harrigfeld provide grounds for entry of summary
judgment in this case.
Second, as discussed in detail below, Plaintiffs malpractice action is solely based on the
1995 Opinion Letter included in the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. However, the 1995
Stock Redemption Agreement was superceded and wholly replaced by Taylor's entry into the
1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement, which did not contain an opinion letter from
Defendants. As such, Taylor cannot establish damages proximately caused by the 1995 Opinion
Letter.
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Third and fourth, as briefly discussed herein and covered in greater detail in Defendant
Riley's Memorandum in Support of his Motion for Summary Judgment, the impact of the
subordination agreement and the doctrine of res judicata also bar Taylor's lawsuit and summary
judgment is warranted on these issues as well.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

As this Court is aware, the subject lawsuit represents one lawsuit in a long string of
complex litigation commenced by Plaintiff Reed Taylor (hereinafter "Taylor" or "Reed Taylor").
As means of background, Reed Taylor founded AIA. In 1995, Reed Taylor was serving as the
president of AIA and was chairman of its Board of Directors. See Second Supplemental Affidavit

of Richard Riley,

~

3.

In 1995, John Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman and other

individuals involved with AIA Services indicated their desire to take AIA Services in "a different
direction and attempt to take it public." See Affidavit of Julianne S. Hall, Exhibit 1 (Plaintiff's

Complaint for Legal Malpractice against Attorney Scott Bell,~ 10, p. 3, Superior Court, State of
Washington, in Taylor v. Bell). Taylor "did not agree with their ideas" and decided to redeem
his stock. Id. Prior to the redemption of his shares, Taylor owned approximately 63% of AIA's
Common Stock. See Second Supplemental Affidavit of Richard Riley,~ 3. See also Affidavit of

Julianne S. Hall, Exhibit 1 (Plaintiff's Complaint for Legal Malpractice against Attorney Scott
Bell,~

9, p. 3).
Taylor retained Attorneys Scott Bell and Frank Taylor and their Seattle law firm,

Cairncross & Hempelmann, P.S. to negotiate and draft the relevant agreements necessary to
redeem Taylor's AIA stock, in early 1995. See Second Supplemental Affidavit of Richard Riley,
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if 3. See also Affida,vit ofJulianne S. Hall, Exhibit 1 (Plaintiff's Complaint for Legal Malpractice
against Attorney Scott Bell, if 11, p. 4).

After Taylor retained Bell, it was Attorney Bell's

responsibility to negotiate, draft agreements and close the redemption transaction. Id. Of note,
during the entire time of the negotiations between Taylor and AIA for the redemption of Taylor's
AIA stock, AIA was represented by its own in-house counsel.
Affidavit of Richard Riley,

See Second Supplemental

if 3. AIA also engaged Attorneys Richard Riley and Robert M.

Turnbow to assist in preparing the documentation needed for the redemption transaction. Id. In
1995, Riley and Turnbow were members of the Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen,
Chtd. law firm (hereinafter "Eberle Berlin").
redemption transaction agreements to Riley.

Id.

Attorney Bell provided drafts of the

See Affidavit of Julianne S. Hall, Exhibit 2

(Transcript of Deposition of Richard Riley, pp. 36, 37, and 42). After months of negotiations, on
or after July 22, 1995, Taylor signed a Stock Redemption Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement,
Security Agreement and other ancillary agreements (the "1995 Agreements") to redeem his
shares of AIA stock. See Second Supplemental Affidavit of Richard Riley, iii! 4-17 and Exhibits
1-16A.
Significantly, based on advice from his attorney, Scott Bell, Taylor conditioned the
redemption of his AIA stock on AIA obtaining all necessary approvals and consents from all
shareholders. See Second Supplemental Affidavit of Richard Riley, if 7 and Exhibit 6 ("1995
Stock Redemption Agreement").

In the course of advising Taylor to enter into the Stock

Redemption Agreement, Attorney Bell, on behalf of Taylor, requested and required an Opinion
Letter from Eberle Berlin regarding legal matters surrounding the 1995 redemption agreement.
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See Affidavit of Julianne S. Hall, Exhibit 2 (Transcript of Deposition of Richard Riley, pp. 36,
48, and 49). Attorney Bell had extensive experience in drafting, reviewing and interpreting
opinion letters for corporate transactions. He negotiated the contents of the Opinion Letter with
Riley. See Affidavit ofJulianne S. Hall, Exhibit 2 (Transcript of Deposition of Richard Riley, pp.
36, 37, 42 48, and 49). Attorney Bell also actively participated in the drafting of the Opinion
Letter ultimately signed by Eberle Berlin. Id. Attorney Bell approved the 1995 Opinion Letter
as to form and substance. See Affidavit of Julianne S. Hall, Exhibit 1 (Plaintiff's Complaint for
Legal Malpractice against Attorney Scott Bell, if 17, p. 6). On August 15, 1995, Eberle Berlin
provided the requested Opinion Letter to Taylor's attorney, Scott Bell, pursuant to Section 2.50)
of the July 22, 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement.

See Second Supplemental Affidavit of

Richard Riley, if 11 and Exhibit 10 ("1995 Opinion Letter").

The 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement specifically referenced the Opinion Letter in
Section 2.50). See Second Supplemental Affidavit of Richard Riley, if 7 and if 11 and Exhibit 6
("1995 Stock Redemption Agreement") and Exhibit 10 ("1995 Opinion Letter"). The August 15,
1995 Opinion Letter undisputedly addressed only the 1995 Agreements between Taylor and
AIA. Id. The Opinion Letter was also limited in time in that the representations in the letter
were confined to the documents which existed as of the date that the Opinion Letter was
finalized, August 15, 1995. Id. In the Opinion Letter, Eberle Berlin further expressly stated that
"[w]e assume no responsibility for updating this opinion to take into account any event, action,
interpretation or change of law occurring subsequent to the date hereof [August 15, 1995] that
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may affect the validity of any opinions expressed herein." See Second Supplemental Affidavit of

Richard Riley, Exhibit IO ("1995 Opinion Letter," p. 4).
After Taylor and his attorney, Scott Bell, received and reviewed Eberle Berlin's August
15, 1995 Opinion Letter, Taylor decided to move forward with the "Closing" of the 1995 Stock
Redemption Agreement. Of note, the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement expressly provided
that the Agreement could be terminated after it was signed, but before the Agreement was
"closed," if, for example, the opinion letter provided by AIA's outside counsel was deemed to be
unacceptable. See Second Supplemental Affidavit of Richard Riley,~ 7, Exhibit 6 ("1995 Stock
Redemption Agreement", Provision 8.1, p. 13).
After Taylor "closed" on the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, he became upset with
AIA's contractual performance. Hence, on April 18, 1996, Reed Taylor wrote a letter to the then
AIA Services' Chairman, R. John Taylor, and demanded payment of monies allegedly owed and
gave notice of default based on the terms in the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. See Second

Supplemental Affidavit of Richard Riley,~ 18, Exhibit 17 (Reed Taylor's April 18, 1996 Letter).
Specifically, in his April 18, 1996 letter, Reed Taylor stated that if the defaults on the 1995
Agreements he outlined in his letter were not cured within five days of his letter, "he shall have
no other recourse other than to exercise all remedies available" and would "take legal action to
enforce the corporation's obligations." Id. On behalf of AIA Services, on April 22, 1996, John
Taylor responded to Reed Taylor's letter denying his allegations of default.

See Second

Supplemental Affidavit of Richard Riley,~ 19, Exhibit 18 (John Taylor's April 22, 1996 Letter).
Thereafter, on April 25, 1996, Plaintiffs attorney, Scott Bell, wrote a second letter to AIA
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outlining the numerous defaults and addressing AIA's failure to perform on the 1995
Agreements. See Second Supplemental Affidavit of Richard Riley,, 20, Exhibit 19 (Scott Bell's
April 25, 1996 Letter).
In the late spring and early summer of 1996, a series of negotiations between Taylor and
AIA representatives transpired addressing the alleged defaults under the 1995 Agreements. See
Second Supplemental Affidavit of Richard Riley, ,, 20-27 and Exhibits 20-26. During these

negotiations, the parties, unsuccessfully, attempted to reach a "Forbearance Agreement" and
Reed Taylor even attempted to foreclose on the "Pledged Collateral" in the 1995 Stock Pledge
Agreement. See Second Supplemental Affidavit of Richard Riley,,, 22-26 and Exhibits 21-25.
Ultimately, Reed Taylor decided not to move forward with "exercising his remedies" or
"taking legal action" on alleged defaults and breaches of contract of the 1995 Agreements
despite his threats to the contrary. At this point in time, Taylor had several choices: he could
have declared the entire unpaid balance due and payable and proceed to judicially enforce the
Agreement by suing on the amount due or he could have repossessed the pledged stock and sold
the stock in a commercially reasonable manner. See Second Supplemental Affidavit of Richard
Riley,,, 22-26 and Exhibits 21-25.
Rather, on July 1, 1996, Taylor and AIA entered into a wholly new contractual

agreement, entitled the "Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement," in an effort to resolve their
disputes. See Second Supplemental Affidavit of Richard Riley, , 36 and Exhibit 35 ("1996 Stock
Redemption Restructure Agreement").

Attorney Bell continued to represent Taylor in

connection with the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement. See Affidavit ofJulianne S.
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Hall, Exhibit 1 (Plaintiff's Complaint for Legal Malpractice against Attorney Scott Bell, ii 18, p.

7).

Unambiguously, by its terms, the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement
superseded and replaced the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. See Second Supplemental
Affidavit of Richard Riley,

iiii 38-40 and Exhibit 35 ("1996 Stock Redemption Restructure

Agreement"). The 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement specifically provided
that the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, the Down Payment Note, the Security
Agreement,

the

Stock Pledge Agreement,

the Consulting Agreement and

the

Noncompetition Agreement were superseded and "[were] of no further force and effect."
Id. at

ii C and Provision 4.2. See also

Affidavit of Julianne S. Hall, Exhibit 1 (Plaintiff's

Complaint for Legal Malpractice against Attorney Scott Bell, ii 18, p. 7). Accordingly, between

1996 and 2007, the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement was the binding contractual
agreement between Taylor and AIA.
Additionally, and of great significance to this lawsuit, Attorney Bell did not, as he had
done with the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, request or require an opinion letter from
Eberle Berlin regarding any aspect of the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement. See
Second Supplemental Affidavit of Richard Riley, ii 41. Consequently, Eberle Berlin did not draft

or author an Opinion Letter regarding any aspect of the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure
Agreement. Id.
Unhappy with AIA's contractual performance in 2007, Taylor filed suit against AIA
alleging a variety of causes of action, including breach of contract (the "AIA litigation"). In the
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AIA litigation, Taylor pied breach of contract in his Fifth Amended Complaint based on the
terms of the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement and sought enforcement of the
duties and obligation owing under the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement. See
Second Supplemental Affidavit of Richard Riley, 'if'il 57-59 and Exhibit 56 (Plaintiff Taylor's Fifth

Amended Complaint, 'if'il 3.2 and 3.3).
In 2009, while Taylor's lawsuit against AIA for breach of contract arising from the 1996
Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement was on-going, he filed a lawsuit against Defendants
Richard Riley, Hawley Troxell, Robert Turnbow and Eberle Berlin for professional malpractice·
based on their respective representations in the August 15, 1995 Opinion Letter, which was
included in the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. See Affidavit of Julianne S. Hall, Exhibit 3
(Plaintiff Taylor's Complaint, 'if'il 9-12, in Case No. CV-OC-2009-18868).

In 2012, Taylor filed suit against Attorneys Scott Bell and Frank Taylor and their Seattle
law firm, Cairncross & Hempelmann, P.S. for malpractice. See Affidavit of Julianne S. Hall,
Exhibit 1 (Plaintiff's Complaint for Legal Malpractice against Attorney Scott Bell, 'if'il 25-30). In
his Washington lawsuit, Taylor specifically alleges that Attorney Bell and Attorney Taylor
breached the applicable standards of care by, among things, failing to obtain an opinion letter
from AIA's counsel in 1996 in their course of representation of Taylor when he entered into the
1996 SRRA. Id. at 'if 18. Reed Taylor's Washington lawsuit against Attorney Bell and Attorney
Taylor for their alleged failure to obtain and/or require an Opinion Letter from Eberle Berlin on
the legality and enforceability of the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement highlights
the inconsistencies in his positions. Taylor's Washington lawsuit also makes it undisputedly
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clear that Eberle Berlin had no involvement in opining on any aspect of the 1996 Stock
Redemption Restructure Agreement.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) establishes that summary judgment shall be granted
when the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). Summary judgment is appropriate where the nonmoving party bearing the burden of proof fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case. Harris v. Dep 't of Health and Welfare, 123
Idaho 295, 298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992). In other words, when a defendant moves for
summary judgment, the plaintiff cannot "rest on mere speculation because a mere scintilla of
evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of facts." Anderson v. Hollingsworth, 136 Idaho
800, 803, 41P.3d228, 231 (2001).
If the moving party challenges an element of the non-moving party's case on the basis

that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to
present evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact.

Mitchell v.

Bingham, 130 Idaho 420, 422, 942 P.2d 544, 546 (1997). Moreover, a "complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts
immaterial." Foster v. Traut, 141 Idaho 890, 893, 120 P.3d 278, 281 (2005).
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IV.

A.

ARGUMENT

As there was no attorney-client relationship between Taylor and these Defendants,
these Defendants did not owe a duty to Taylor under Idaho law.

In the Spring of 2010, Defendants moved for Summary Judgment based on the long
standing Idaho law that the existence of an attorney-client relationship is a prerequisite to
maintaining an action for negligence against an attorney. In its Memorandum Decision of May
10, 2010, this Court found that the Plaintiff did not have an attorney-client relationship with the
Defendants, but denied the summary judgment in finding that the Defendants owed the Plaintiff
a duty despite the absence of the attorney-client relationship. In reaching that conclusion, this
Court expanded the one exception, as set forth in Harrigfeld v. Hancock, to the general rule
requiring the existence of an attorney-client relationship in Idaho. Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140
Idaho 134, 137, 90 P. 3d 884, 887 (2004).

In its Memorandum Decision, this Court

acknowledged that the circumstances of this case did not fall within the Harrigfeld exception,
but followed a 1992 New York state court decision in finding that a lawyer who drafted an
opinion letter owed a duty to a non-client who relied on that opinion letter. See Prudential Ins.
Co. of America v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer and Wood, 80 N.Y. 2d 377, 605 N.E. 2d

318 (1992). In expanding the law beyond the recognized Harrigfeld exception, this Court
reasoned that the holding in the New York case was "widely recognized" and that expanding the
exception to the general rule would be "consistent with the reasoning of our Supreme Court in
Harrigfeld." The Court specifically stated "[a]lthough this precise issue has not been addressed

by the Idaho courts, the holding of cases such as Prudential, supra, are consistent with the
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reasonmg of our Supreme Court in Harrigfeld."

Memorandum Decision and Order Re:

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 8, Case No. CV-OC-2009-18868 (May I 0,
2010).
These Defendants wish to make it clear to this Court that they are not critical of the
process this Court followed in ruling on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in 2010.
That process was within the court's judicial discretion. Rather, now having the opportunity to
review decisions our Supreme Court has made since May of 2010, these Defendants respectfully
submit that it is appropriate to reconsider this legal issue.
As part of that reconsideration, it is important to review some of the points made by the
Idaho Supreme Court in Harrigfeld. It is significant that the decision was made in 2004, a date
which illustrates that Harrigfeld is well established precedent in Idaho.

In the Harrigfeld

decision, the Court acknowledged that, in 2004, the trend among its sister states was to relax the
privity requirement. Harrigfeld, 140 Idaho at 13 7. The Harrigfeld Court also acknowledged the
third-party beneficiary analysis that supported the new trend of relaxing the privity requirement,
but nevertheless stated ''the greater good [in Idaho] is served by preserving a bright-line privity
rule." Id. at 138. In Harrigfeld, our Supreme Court specifically referenced a dissent in a Texas
court decision that stated that only four states followed the doctrine of law requiring strict privity
while the "overwhelming majority of jurisdictions" rejected the rule. 1 Clearly, our Court was
aware that the trend of relaxing privity was widely recognized. Notwithstanding that trend,
Idaho's Supreme Court specifically, clearly and affirmatively rejected the logic and reasoning of
1

See dissent cited in Harrigfeld at Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575, 578-79, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 607 (Tex. 1996).
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those states adopting the new trend of relaxing the privity requirement. In its conclusion in
Harrigfeld, our Supreme Court said, "[a] direct attorney-client relationship is required to exist

between the plaintiff and the attorney-defendant in a legal malpractice action except in this very
narrow exception." Id. at 139.
In Taylor v. McNichols, decided in 2010, our Supreme Court was again asked to expand
the exception it created in Harrigfeld.

Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P.3d 642

(2010). Significantly, the McNichols decision was handed down AFTER this Court rendered its
Memorandum Decision in this case in May of 2010. The circumstances in the McNichols case
were very similar to the circumstances in the case now before this Court. Reed Taylor was/is the
Plaintiff in both cases. In both cases, Taylor urges the Court to expand the Harrigfeld exception
to create a duty to third-parties not in privity with the attorney.
In the McNichols case, quoting language from Harrigfeld and, noting that the principle
set forth in Harrigfeld was reaffirmed in Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005)
(another case where Reed Taylor was the plaintiff), our Supreme Court said, "Reed cites to law
from other jurisdictions, ignoring the well-established Idaho precedent, in arguing that thirdparty beneficiaries to an attorney-client relationship may have standing to pursue malpractice
claims against an attorney." McNichols, 149 Idaho at 845. The Court continued "Reed offers no
compelling reason why this court should expand its carefully reasoned analysis in Harrigfeld."
Id.

In 2011, in another legal malpractice case, the Idaho Supreme Court again refused to
expand an attorney's malpractice exposure in Idaho. Soignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, 256
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P.3d 730, 734 (2011). Specifically, in Soignier, the Court continued to emphasize the extremely
limited nature of the recognized duty where no attorney-client relationship exists. Soignier, 151
Idaho at 325. Of significance, even when presented with an alleged malpractice case in the
limited area of estate planning, the Idaho Supreme Court steadfastly refused to expand any
aspect of its holding in Harrigfeld, something the Court could have easily done in Soignier.
Although having been asked on several occasions in several different circumstances to do
so, our Supreme Court has consistently refused to follow the obvious trend, outside the state of
Idaho, of relaxing the privity requirement and has been unwavering in its rejection, inside the
state of Idaho, of efforts to expand exceptions, beyond the lone exception in Harrigfeld, to the
general rule requiring an attorney-client relationship for a plaintiff to prevail in a legal
malpractice case.
The pronouncements of our Supreme Court are clear and very recent.

Given these

circumstances, should this Court try to further distinguish Reed Taylor's circumstances and again
conclude that our Supreme Court would probably make an exception for him? Probably, it
should not. Given our Supreme Court's thorough and recent pronouncements in this area of
well-established Idaho law, any changes to the general rule requiring privity should be made by
the Supreme Court.
Accordingly, because Reed Taylor does not have an attorney-client relationship with
these Defendants and he does not fit into the lone exception recognized in Harrigfeld,
Defendants respectfully request that this Court reconsider its holding on duty entered prior to the
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Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in McNichols and grant Defendants' Motion for Renewed
Summary Judgment.

B.

Summary Judgment is also warranted because Taylor has no damages proximately
caused by the 1995 Opinion Letter, included in only the 1995 Stock Redemption
Agreement, as a result of the execution of the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure
Agreement.
To the extent that this Court continues to recognize Taylor's "malpractice expansion"

argument after considering McNichols, Taylor should not be permitted to present his case to a
jury. Even to the extent that Taylor could establish breach of the standard of care, which is

unlikely, he simply cannot prevail on the prima facie element of damages. Specifically, Taylor
cannot establish any damage at trial because he opted to enter into the 1996 Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be
granted for this reason as well.
1.

The 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement supersedes and wholly
replaces the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement.

To understand the context of the pending malpractice action, it is first necessary to
examine the structure of the underlying legal contracts related to the malpractice action. As
means of background, to the extent that Taylor had causes of action against AIA arising from
their contractual agreement, the governing contractual agreement, in 2007, was the 1996 Stock
Redemption Restructure Agreement, not the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement.
In the AIA litigation, Taylor pied breach of contract in his Fifth Amended Complaint
based on the terms of the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement and sought
enforcement of the duties and obligation owing under the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure
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Agreement. See Second Supplemental Affidavit of Richard Riley, iii! 57-59 and Exhibit 56
("Plaintiff Taylor's Fifth Amended Complaint", iii! 3.2 and 3.3).
Under Idaho law, whether a document, like the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure
Agreement, is ambiguous is a question of law. McKay v. Boise Project Bd. of Control, 141
Idaho 463, 469, 111 P.3d 148, 154 (2005) (citing City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127
Idaho 198, 899 P.2d 411 (1995)).

In this case, there is no dispute that the 1996 Stock

Redemption Restructure Agreement is unambiguous. The 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure
Agreement expressly provided that the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement
"superseded all other agreements," including the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, and the
1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement included a provision providing that the 1995
Stock Redemption Agreement and documents are "of no further force or effect." See Second
Supplemental Affidavit of Richard Riley, iii! 36-41 and Exhibit 35 ("1996 Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement'', ii 4.2).

Throughout the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure

Agreement, the Agreement undisputedly provided that the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure
Agreement wholly and completely replaced the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. See Second
Supplemental Affidavit of Richard Riley, iii! 36-41 and Exhibit 35 ("1996 Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement", iii! B, C and G).
Specifically, the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement, provided that the
parties wished to rely entirely upon those representations, warranties and covenants contained in
the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. See Second Supplemental Affidavit of Richard Riley, iii!
36-41 and ii 50 and Exhibit 35 ("1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement'', ii G) and
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Exhibit 46 ("Amended Stock Pledge Agreement"). The Amended Stock Pledge Agreement was
entered into in 1996. Id.
It is also clear that the plain and unambiguous contractual language of the 1996 Stock

Redemption Restructure Agreement limited Plaintiffs contractual remedies in 2007. The 1996
Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement addressed waiver and release of any claims arising
based on the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. The 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure
Agreement expressly provided for a mutual release between Taylor and AIA releasing "any and
all claims . . . such a party may have arising out of previous agreements . . . other than those
obligations set forth in the Restructured Obligations." See Second Supplemental Affidavit of
Richard Riley,~~ 36-41 and Exhibit 35 ("1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement",~ 3).

Thus, it is clear that the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement is unambiguous
and that the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement superseded and replaced the 1995
Stock Redemption Agreement. Additionally, it is clear that Plaintiffs contractual remedies for
enforcement of default and failure to pay on the $1.5 million promissory note and the $6 million
promissory against AIA were limited to the terms of the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure
Agreement.
2.

It is undisputed that Eberle Berlin did not draft an Opinion Letter in 1996.

The plain, unambiguous language of the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement
makes it clear that there was no opinion letter drafted by Eberle Berlin opining on any aspect of
the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement.

See Second Supplemental Affidavit of
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Richard Riley,

~~

36-41 and Exhibit 35 ("1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement",

~

4.6). Paragraph 1.5 of the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement provided:
The representations, warranties and covenants made by Company in the Stock
Redemption Agreement or any other Original Documents are hereby superseded and
replaced by the representations, warranties and covenants set forth in the Amended Stock
Pledge Agreement, and neither Company nor Creditor shall have any claims for any past,
existing or future breach of any representation, warranty or covenant made in any of the
Superseded Documents or any claim for any breach of the $6M Note if such breach
occurred prior the date of this Agreement.
Id.

at~

1.5.
In addition to the clear contractual language of the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure

Agreement, Taylor does not challenge the fact that the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure
Agreement did not include an opinion letter from Eberle Berlin. In fact, in filing his malpractice
claim against the attorneys representing him in the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure
Agreement, Taylor specifically alleges that Attorney Scott Bell and Attorney Frank Taylor
breached the applicable standards of care by, among other things, failing to obtain an opinion
letter from AIA's counsel in 1996 in their course of representation of Taylor when he entered
into the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement. See Affidavit of Julianne S. Hall,
Exhibit 1 (Plaintiff's Complaint for Legal Malpractice against Attorney Scott Bell, ~ 41 ).
3.

With regard to Plaintiffs alleged damages in the present malpractice lawsuit, any
damages incurred by Plaintiff in the AIA litigation seeking enforcement of the
1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement were not proximately caused by
the 1995 Opinion Letter.

Under Idaho law, to establish a claim for attorney malpractice arising out of a civil
action, the plaintiff must show, among other things, that the failure to perform a legally
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recognized duty was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho
586, 590 (2001). In this case, Taylor claims that the issuance of the 1995 Opinion Letter,
proximately caused him to "lose millions of dollars." See Affidavit ofJulianne S. Hall, Exhibit 3
(Plaintiff Taylor's Complaint,

iii! 44-45,

in Case No. CV-OC-2009-18868). However, as this

Court has already explained, AIA's default does not constitute damage flowing from the 1995
Opinion Letter. See Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, p. 12, Case No. CV-OC-2009-18868 (May 10, 2010). The Court expressly stated, the
"opinion letter did not cause the default [by AIA]." Id.
Taylor also alleges that the 1995 Opinion Letter proximately caused him to incur
approximately $1,000,000 in attorney's fees, costs and expert witness fees in filing and litigating
Taylor v. AJA. See Affidavit of Julianne S. Hall, Exhibit 4 (Taylor's Response to Interrogatory
No. 7 contained in Eberle Berlin's Second Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff). Hence, in the
context of this litigation, it necessary to consider the circumstances in which Taylor was required
to "attack" his right to recover from AIA on AIA's financial obligations to him in 2007 and how
that damage (i.e., attorney fees and costs) corresponds to the Opinion Letter issued in 1995.
As discussed above, the plain and unambiguous language of the 1996 Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement undisputedly provided Taylor with the only contractual agreement upon
which he could pursue breach of contract cause of action in 2007. It was in the context of
Taylor's breach of contract litigation against AIA, based on the terms of the 1996 Stock
Redemption Restructure Agreement, that the defendants in the AIA litigation raised the illegality
defense. However, the terms of the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement were not the
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same as the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. All agree that the 1996 Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement did not include an opinion letter authored by Eberle Berlin opining on the
legality of the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement. Specifically, in the 1996 Stock
Redemption Restructure Agreement, the parties undisputedly denounced all representations,
warranties and covenants made "in the [1995] Stock Redemption Agreement or any other
Original Documents" and the parties agreed to replace any and all previously made
"representations, warranties and covenants" with those which were set forth in the [1996]
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. See Second Supplemental Affidavit of Richard Riley, ~~ 3641 and Exhibit 35 ("1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement"). Hence, as a matter of
law, the 1995 Opinion Letter had no connection to 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure
Agreement.
Thus, to the extent that Taylor incurred attorney fees/legal costs in course and scope of
seeking to enforce the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement in the AIA litigation,
there is simply no link or legal connection to the 1995 Opinion Letter. Said differently, the 1996
Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement was a separate legal agreement and Eberle Berlin had
no role in advising Taylor of the legality or enforceability (or illegality for that matter) of that
legal contract. Rather, addressing the legality or enforceability of the 1996 Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement was left to Taylor's Washington State counsel, Attorneys Scott Bell and
Frank Taylor.
Accordingly, as a matter of law, Taylor's cause of action for professional malpractice
against these Defendants should be dismissed. Furthermore, Defendants' Motion for Summary
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Judgment should be granted because 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement
unambiguously superseded the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, making the 1995 Stock
Redemption Agreement a null and void contract. Additionally, any representations made by
Defendants Turnbow and/or Eberle Berlin in their 1995 Opinion Letter are expressly limited to
the 1995 Agreements. To the extent that Taylor alleges damages in the AIA litigation, litigation
in which he was seeking to enforce the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement,
Defendants Turnbow and Eberle Berlin cannot be held legally liable for such damages as they
did not draft an opinion letter opining on the legality or enforceability of the 1996 Stock
Redemption Restructure Agreement.
C.

Joinder in Defendant Riley's Motion for Summary Judgment on the impact of the
subordination agreement between Donna Taylor and Reed Taylor and on issue of
res judicata.

Additionally, Defendants respectfully join in, adopt and incorporate herein by reference
Defendant Riley's Motion and Memorandum for Summary Judgment, on the impact of the
subordination agreement between Donna Taylor and Reed Taylor and on the application of the
legal doctrine of res judicata. Defendants also join, adopt and incorporate any Affidavits filed in
support of these Motions, including the Second Supplemental Affidavit of Richard Riley.
Summary judgment should be granted on the impact of the subordination agreement
entered into between Donna Taylor and Reed Taylor as fully set forth in Defendant Riley's
Memorandum, which is joined, adopted and incorporated by these Defendants. When the 1995
Stock Redemption Agreement was entered into, there was no violation of Idaho Code § 30-1-6
because AIA's promise to pay Reed Taylor was subordinate to AIA's obligation to pay Donna
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
THIRD MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND JOINDER OF DEFENDANT RILEY'S MOTION FOR
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Taylor for the redemption of her preferred stock. Accordingly, when the Opinion Letter was
drafted, an agreement was in place that Donna Taylor's preferred stock would be redeemed first
"to the extent that such redemption shall not violate the Idaho Business Corporation Act
restrictions on the redemption of its own shares," and only then would the outstanding balance
due to Reed Taylor for the redemption of his stock become due. Thus, no redemption of Donna
Taylor's stock, hence no redemption of Reed Taylor's stock, could occur if such redemption
would "violate the Idaho Business Corporation Act restrictions on the corporation's redemption
of its own shares."
Thereafter, Reed Taylor subsequently visited Donna Taylor at her home and succeeded in
convincing her to sign a Subordination Agreement dated December 1, 2006, reversing the order
of payment - i.e., Donna Taylor agreed to subordinate the payment of the amount owed her by
AIA for the redemption of her stock to the amount owed to Reed Taylor for the redemption of
his stock.

Hence, the subsequent invalidation of the Stock Redemption Agreement due to

illegality resulted from the execution of Subordination Agreement between Donna Taylor and
Reed Taylor.
As discussed in Defendant Riley's Motion and Memorandum, Defendant Riley also
moved for Summary Judgment on the doctrine of res judicata, which is also joined, adopted and
incorporated by reference by these Defendants. Reed Taylor's professional negligence claim in
the present case against Defendants Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin is predicated on their
participation in preparing an opinion letter in 1995. In this case, Taylor's claim is barred because
he litigated or could have litigated the same claim in a prior case against these Defendants.
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
THIRD MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND JOINDER OF DEFENDANT RILEY'S MOTION FOR
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Furthermore, to the extent that Taylor's claim is barred against Defendant Riley, it is similarly
barred against Defendants Turnbow and Eberle Berlin and Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment should be granted.
V.

CONCLUSION

Defendants Sharon Cummings, on behalf of the Estate of Robert M. Turnbow, and Eberle
Berlin respectfully request this Court grant their Motion for Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment, their Third Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant Riley's Motion for
Summary Judgment on the doctrine of res judicata and on the impact of the subordination
agreement. Defendants further request that this Court dismiss Plaintiffs cause of action for
negligence/professional malpractice for the foregoing reasons.
DATED this \ S1'Jay of August, 2012.

GJORDING FOUSER, PLLC

q.~
fuS. Gjording, Of the Firm~

Attorneys for Defendants Sharon Cummings,
Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert
M Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, Kading,
Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered
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I hereby certify that on the .LL_ day of August, 2012, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Roderick C. Bond
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800 Bellvue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, WA 98004

~

Michael D. Gaffney
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Via Facsimile

James D. LaRue
ELAM BURKE
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1.

I am one of the attorneys of record for Defendants Sharon Cummings,

Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert M. Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, Kading,
Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered and as such have personal knowledge of the facts herein.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a certified copy of the March 28, 2012 Complaint

for Legal Malpractice, Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Violation of the Washington State
Consumer Protection Act in the case of Reed Taylor v. Scott Bell, et al., Superior Court of the
State of Washington in and for the County of King, Case No. 12-2-10803-0 SEA.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 are true and correct copies of excerpts of the March

29, 2012 Deposition of Richard Riley, Volume I.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy ofifi! 9-12 and iii! 44-45 of

the October 1, 2009 Complaint for Damages in Taylor v. Riley, Case No. CV OC 2009-18868.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs Response to

Interrogatory No. 7 contained in Plaintiffs Responses to Defendant Eberle Berlin's Second Set
of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents (With Answers and Responses
thereto) dated August 6, 2012.
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DATED this

12 day of August, 2012.
JULIANNE s. HALL
-r:i--

I day of August, 2012.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this~

0

Residing at_ _..,,......~..-'-'"""-'-+--~+--
My Commission Expires_ __.__,_.___.___,,____
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2

KING COUNTY
SUPERIOR COURT CLER
E-FILED
CASE NUMBER: 12-2-10803-0 EA

3

RECEIVE

4

AUG 0 6 2012

5

GJORDING & FOUSE
PLLC

6

7

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KING

8
9

REED TAYLOR,
11
12

14

15

CASE NO.

Plaintiff,

10

v.
SCOTT BELL and JANE DOE BELL, and their
marital community; FRANK TAYLOR and JANE
DOE TAYLOR, and their marital community;
CAIRNCROSS & HEMPELMANN, a Professional
Service Corporation,

COMPLAINT FOR LEGAL
MALPRACTICE, BREACH
OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, AND
VIOLATION OF THE
WASHINGTON STATE
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

Defendants.

16

17
18

COMES NOW the Plaintiff and for cause of action against the Defendants complains
19

1
22
23

and alleges as follows:

General Allegations
I.

Plaintiff Reed Taylor ("Reed" or "plaintiff') is an individual and resident of

the State ofldaho and has been a resident ofldaho at all relevant times. Reed is 75-years-old

24

and does not have a college degree.
25

2.

Plaintiff is informed and believes that defendant Scott Bell ("Bell"), is a

26

27

resident of the State of Washington, County of King. Bell is an attorney, licensed to practice
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..

law in the State of Washington, and a shareholder of ~efendant Cairncross & Hempelmann, a
2

Professional Service Corporation. Bell does business in Seattle, County of King, in the

3

Seattle venue. Plaintiff further alleges that any obligation incurred herein by Bell was for the

4

benefit of the marital community of Bell and Jane Doe Bell whose true name is unknown to

5

plaintiff.

6

3.

Plaintiff is informed and believes that defendant Frank Taylor ("Taylor"), is a

7
8
9

resident of the State of Washington, County of King. Taylor is an attorney, licensed to
practice law in the State of Washington, and a shareholder of defendant Cairncross &

10

Hempelmann, a Professional Service Corporation. Taylor does business in Seattle, County of

11

King, in the Seattle venue. Plaintiff further alleges that obligation incurred by Taylor herein

12

was for the benefit of the marital community of Taylor and Jane Doe Taylor whose true name

13

is unknown to plaintiff. Taylor is not related to Reed.
14

15

4.

Defendant Cairncross & Hempelmann, is a Washington professional services

16

corporation ("Cairncross"), and is a law firm doing business in Seattle, Washington. At all

17

relevant times, Bell and Taylor were employees, agents and/or shareholders of Cairncross.

18

The liability of Cairncross for the actions, inactions and negligence of Bell and Taylor arise

19

from the doctrine ofrespondeat superior and vicarious liability.

20

5.

Venue is proper in this Court since the defendants' principal place of business

21
22
23
24

25

and/or residence is in King County and the acts complained of occurred in King County,
Seattle venue.
6.

Plaintiff began selling group health insurance through farmer associations in or

about 1969. In 1974, Reed founded AIA Insurance, Inc. ("AIA") and expanded selling group

26

health insurance to members of national farmers associations in the major farming states
27
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throughout the United States. Under the business model developed by Reed, AIA
2

administered and collected dues for the associations and in exchange AIA held exclusive

3

contracts to market and sell group insurance products to association members. Under this

4

business model, AIA's business thrived and performed well.

5

7.

In 1976, Taylor's younger brother, R. John Taylor ("John"), joined AIA. John

6

had an accounting degree and was licensed to practi<X? law in the State of Idaho. Over the
7

8
9
10

11
12

next two decades, Reed primarily focused on travelling and outside sales, functions that
served to build up the original business model. Reed delegated the financial management and
legal affairs to his brother John.
8.

In 1988, Reed and John formed AIA Services Corporation ("AIA Services") as

the holding company for the various AIA entities. In exchange for contributing certain assets

13

to AIA Services, including his ownership in AIA Insurance, Reed was issued additional
14
15

16

common shares and all of the outstanding Series A Preferred Shares in AIA Services.
9.

Reed's Series A Preferred Shares were later transferred to his ex-wife, Donna

17

Taylor, as part of his divorce. Richard Riley ("Riley") and the law firm of Eberle, Berlin,

18

Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered ("Eberle Berlin"), located in Boise, Idaho,

19

represented Reed in his divorce. Eberle Berlin also acted as AIA Services and its subsidiaries

20

attorneys for the negotiation and finalization of the terms for the redemption and the
21

22
23

24
25

26

redemption related agreements. After his divorce Reed owned approximately 63.03% of AIA
Services and his brother John owned approximately 19.07%.

10.

In 1995, John and an investor group desired to purchase Reed's shares and take

AIA Services public or to effectuate a sale of the company. Reed resisted this, but ultimately
agreed to sell his shares through a stock redemption plan under the advice and direction of the

27
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Defendants. The parties contemplated a stock redemption by AIA Services whereby John and
2

his investor group would become the majority shareholders of AIA Services without directly

3

purchasing Reed's shares in the company and without being personally liable for the

4

redemption obligations.

5

11.

During the negotiations, defendants Bell, Taylor and Caimcross, in Seattle,

6

Washington represented Reed. Neither Bell nor Taylor was authorized and admitted to the
7

8
9

practice law in the State ofldaho. Neither Bell nor Taylor advised Reed that they were not
licensed to practice law in Idaho and no written consents were obtained from Reed. Bell and

10

Taylor's acts and/or omissions constitute the unlawful practice oflaw in Idaho, which is a

11

misdemeanor crime under Idaho law.

12

12.

The ultimate transaction that was engineered was via a restructuring of AIA

13

Services, and the redemption of Reed's stock by AJA Services. The transaction was intended
14
15

to pay Reed approximately $7.5 million dollars for his interest in the company, along with

16

other consideration. Neither John nor his investor group was individually liable for the debt.

17

In addition, Bell and Taylor did not require, or recommend, that John and his investors

18

personally purchase Reed's shares or otherwise be responsible for the payment for his shares.

19

The final terms of the stock redemption called for Reed to be paid $1.5 million in cash at the

20

closing, the elimination of $469,996 in debt to the company, the transfer of approximately
21

22

$1,321,000 in aircraft to Reed (which required Reed to assume $670,000 in debt securing the

23

aircraft), and a $6 million promissory note ("Note") with interest payable monthly, and

24

principal due in 10 years. Reed was granted security in all of AIA Services' assets.

25

However, Reed would never had acquired, paid for and maintained the aircraft had he been

26

advised that the redemption of his shares was illegal and that he would not be paid.

27

COMPLAINT FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE, BREACH
OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, AND VIOLATION OF THE
WASHINGTON STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT- 4

LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT B. GOULD
2110 North Pacific St., Suite 100
Seattle, WA 98103-9126
(206) 633-4442

001835

13.
2

By structuring the transaction in this fashion, it should have been clear to Bell

and Taylor that John and his investor group's intent was to create a liquidity event by taking

3

the company public or selling the company and thereby reaping the cash benefits as the new

4

"majority" shareholders. On the other hand, if John and the investor group's plan did not

5

work out, they would be simply obligated to "return" whatever was left of the company to

6

Reed in 10 years ifthe company defaulted on the notes. Neither Bell nor Taylor recognized
7

the great risk in this transaction to Reed nor did they advise Reed of the risks, and did not
8

9

recommend on his behalf that the deal be structured as a personal buyout of his stock by John

10

and his investor group. Bell and Taylor were fully aware that Reed would be relying on the

11

redemption of his shares for his ultimate retirement.

12

14.

At the time the stock redemption was in place, Idaho Code § 30-1-6 provided,

13

in part, that "No purchase of or payment for its own shares shall be made at a time when the
14
15

corporation is insolvent or when such purchase or payment would make it insolvent." That

16

code section also required that the shareholders vote for and approve the stock redemption

17

transaction be paid from the "capital surplus" ifthere was a negative earned surplus. None of

18

the defendants advised Reed that if the company did not comply with l.C. § 30-1-6, the

19

transaction would be void. Plaintiff is informed and believes that defendants Bell, Taylor and

20

Cairncross were not aware ofl.C. § 30-1-6.
21

22

15.

In connection with the redemption, AIA Services amended its articles of

23

incorporation. A draft copy of the proposed amended articles of incorporation was proved to

24

Bell and Taylor for their review and approval. Instead of requiring a provision to be inserted

25

in the amended articles of incorporation which approved the redemption of Reed's shares and

26

27
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l

waiving the restrictions under LC. § 30-1-6, Bell and Taylor approved the amended articles of
2
3
4

5

incorporation as proposed.
16.

Bell and Taylor knew that Reed was the majority shareholder in AIA Services

and that any redemption of a majority shareholder's c~mmon shares could or would be
scrutinized at a later date. Bell and Taylor included a provision in the redemption agreements

6

requiring Reed to vote his shares in favor of the transaction, when they knew or should have
7
8
9

known that Reed's shares were disqualified from voting on a transaction that favored the
majority shareholder. Had the proper shareholder resolutions or articles of incorporation been

10

presented and approved by the minority shareholders, then the transaction to redeem his

11

shares would have been legal, notwithstanding Bell and Taylor's failure to require John and

12

the investor group to purchase Reed's shares.

13

17.

As a condition of the redemption, Riley and Eberle Berlin were required to

14
15

deliver to Reed an opinion letter in a form acceptable to the defendants, in addition to any

16

other documents deemed appropriate and necessary by Bell and Taylor of Caimcross. On

17

August 15, 1995, Eberle Berlin provided an opinion letter to Reed in the form and substance

18

approved by the defendants, and Eberle Berlin represented that no laws were being violated

19

by the redemption agreement, that all necessary consents had been obtained, that AIA

20

Services had the power and authority to enter into the transaction, among other things. The
21
22
23
24

25

defendants knew or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that the
opinion letter was incorrect and violated then existing Idaho statutory law.
18.

In 1996, AIA Services defaulted on the redemption agreement and its

payments on the $1.5 million note for the down payment. At this point, AIA Services through

26

John and his investors, negotiated a restructuring of the redemption agreement with Reed.
27
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Reed continued to be represented by Bell, Taylor and Cairn.cross in the restructuring. Bell and
2

Taylor did not request a new opinion letter from AIA Services' legal counsel, nor did Bell and

3

Taylor request shareholder approval for the transaction through a formal shareholder vote or

4

by amending the articles of incorporation, both of which were authorized under LC.§ 30-1-6.

5

For Bell and Taylor's services rendered in the 1995 and 1996 transactions on behalf of Reed,

6

Cairncross was paid in excess of$93,000 in attorney's fees and costs.
7

8
9

19.

In August of2005;the $6 million note matured and AIA Services defaulted on

payment. On January 29, 2007, Reed filed suit against AIA Services, John, and others in the

10

Nez Perce County District Court in Lewiston, Idaho under cause no. CV07-00208 ("Idaho

11

action"). Reed moved for, and obtained, partial summary judgment on the default of the $6

12

million note.

13

20.

On April 16, 2008, the defendants in the Idaho action raised, for the first time,

14
15

a defense that the redemption of Reed's shares violated the Idaho Code (but not I.C. § 30-1-6),

16

and that the redemption and all supporting documents were illegal contracts. On February 12,

17

2009, the underlying defendants specifically alleged, for the first time, that the redemption

18

transaction violated I.C. § 30-1-6 (which had since been repealed).

19

21.

On June 19, 2009, the Nez Perce district court in the Idaho action granted the

20

defendants Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, finding that the redemption agreement was
21

22

illegal and unenforceable. In its decision, the district court found that AIA Services had a

23

negative earned surplus at the time of the redemption, and that there was no evidence

24

presented that there was ever an affirmative vote of the majority of the shareholders that the

25

capital surplus could be looked to for the redemption of the shares. The district court further

26

noted that "[t]here is no question that all parties, including Plaintiff, either ignored or failed to

27
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consider J.C. § 30-1-6." The Idaho Supreme Court on September 7, 2011 affirmed the district
2

court's findings, concluding that "it appears none of the parties recognized the potential

3

violation ofl.C. § 30-1-6." The Idaho Supreme Court rejected Reed's arguments to have the

·4

5

redemption enforced and noted that the transaction appeared to favor Reed over the minority
shareholders-which could have easily been prevented had Bell and Taylor exercised the

6

minimum standard of care of reasonable attorneys familiar with Idaho law in the same or
7
8
9

similar circumstances.
22.

Despite numerous requests by Reed for assistance from Bell, Taylor and

10

Cairncross in defeating the motion for partial summary judgment in the Idaho Action, none of

11

the defendants herein offered any help to Reed. Ultimately Bell agreed to provide an affidavit

12

in support of Reed's argument that he was not in pari delicto.

13

23.

At no time during the relevant periods above were Bell or Taylor admitted to

14

15
16

practice law in Idaho in violation of their duty of care to Reed and RPC 5.5.
24.

Due to ongoing litigation in Idaho that impacted potentially liability defendants

17

Bell, Taylor and Cairncross executed a one-year Tolling Agreement of the statute of

18

limitations effective April 1, 2010. That Agreement was extended for an additional year in

19

2011, and expires on March 31, 2012.

20

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(For Legal Malpractice)

21

22
23

25.

Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations

of paragraphs 1 through 24, inclusive, as though set forth at length.

24

26.

By virtue of the attorney/client relationship between the defendants, on the one

25

hand, and plaintiff, on the other hand, defendants owed to plaintiff all duties and obligations
26
27
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of reasonable attorneys in the same or similar circwnstances including, but not limited to, the
2

following:

3

A.

The duty to represent plaintiff and plaintiff's interests faithfully;

4

B.

The duty to, at all times, deal with plaintiff honestly and with the

5

utmost good faith;

6

C.

The duty to represent plaintiff in accordance with the Rules of

7

Professional Conduct of the State Bar, State of Washington and the standard of care
8

9

for lawyers in the State of Washington;

IO

D.

The duty to represent plaintiff with undivided loyalty;

11

E.

The duty to disclose significant information to plaintiff, including,

12

without limitation, the fact that defendants were not licensed to practice law in Idaho.

13

27.

Despite these fundamental duties, defendants failed to comply with the

14
15
16

17
18
19

minimwn standard of care, and breached their duties to plaintiffs by committing, among other
things, the errors and omissions set forth in paragraphs 6 through 23 above, and further:

A.

failed to comply with the required standard of conduct as set forth in

RPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, and 5.5, among others;
B.

practiced law in Idaho when not authorized to do so;

C.

rendered opinions and advice regarding legal matters which defendants

20
21
22
23

24

were not qualified to do so, including the impact of Idaho law on plaintiff;

D.

failed to recognize that the redemption agreement and transaction were

illegal and void as a matter oflaw if not in compliance with I.C. § 30-1-6;

25
26
27

COMPLAINT FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE, BREACH
OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, AND VIOLATION OF THE
WASHINGTON STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT- 9

LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT B. GOULD
2110 North Pacific St, Suite I 00
Seattle, WA 98103-9126
(206) 633-4442

001840

E.

failed to understand the implications of LC § 30-1-6 and request

2

appropriate corporate shareholder approvals of the redemption transaction through

3

appropriate resolutions or an amendment of the articles of incorporation;

4

F.

s

failed to request, require or recommend that Reed sell his shares to John

and the investor group, rather than redeem the shares with the corporate entity..

6

28.

Defendant's conduct, as set forth herein above, was neglectful, dilatory,

7
8
9

negligent, and fell below the recognized standard of care owed by attorneys to their clients,
including the standard of care in King County and the State of Washington.
29.

10

11

Had defendants fulfilled their duties to plaintiff, and acted reasonably and

within the standard of care, plaintiff would have been provided competent counsel.

12

30.

As a direct and proximate result of defendants' negligence, plaintiff has been

13

damaged in a sum within the jurisdiction of this court and in an amount according to proof.
14
IS

Plaintiff will seek leave of court to amend this Complaint to allege the exact amount of said

16

damages when said sum is fully ascertained or the amount proven at or before the time of

17

trial.

18

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Fiduciary Duty)

19

31.

Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations

21

of paragraphs 1through24, and 26 through 29, inclusive, ofthis Complaint as though set
22
23

24
25
26

forth at length herein.
32.

By virtue of the attorney/client and/or special relationship between defendants,

on the one hand, and plaintiff, on the other hand, there existed a fiduciary relationship
between plaintiff and defendants. The defendants were under a duty to act or to give advice

27

for the benefit of Reed, upon a matter within the scope of the engagement.
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33.
2

By virtue of the attorney/client and/or special or superior knowledge

relationship between plaintiff and defendants, and by virtue of the fiduciary and/or special

3

relationship between plaintiff and defendants, defend~ts owed to plaintiff all duties and

4

obligations of a trustee and fiduciary to a beneficiary including, but not limited to, the

5

following:

6

A.

The duty to represent plaintiff and plaintiff's interests faithfully;

B.

The duty to, at all times, deal with plaintiff honestly and with the

7

8
9

utmost good faith;

C.

10

II
12

The duty to represent plaintiff in accordance with the applicable Rules

of Professional Conduct, including the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State
Bar, State of Washington;

13

D.

The duty to represent plaintiff with undivided loyalty;

E.

The duty to disclose significant information to plaintiff;

F.

The duty to not engage in the unauthorized practice of law.

14
15
16
17
18
19

34.

Defendants breached these fiduciary and/or special duties owed to plaintiff by

committing, among other things, those acts as set forth in 6 through 24 above.
35.

Defendants further had a fiduciary, and ethical duty, to fully comply with

20

Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, and 5.5, and 8.4 of the Rules of Professional conduct, among others.
21

22
23

24
25

Defendants breached their fiduciary duties and the ethical responsibilities to plaintiff, by
among other things:

A.

Engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in the State of Idaho when

not authorized to do so;

26

27
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B.
2

By providing legal opinions and representation to plaintiff regarding

legal matters which defendants were not qualified to do, including the impact of Idaho

3

law on plaintiff;

4

C.

5

By failing to recognize that the redemption agreement and transaction

were illegal and void as a matter oflaw if not in compliance with LC.§ 30-1-6;

6

D.

By failing to identify and understand the implications ofl.C § 30-1-6,

7

Idaho common law and request appropriate corporate shareholder approvals of the
8
9
10

redemption transaction through formal shareholder resolutions or the amendment of
AIA Services articles of incorporation;

11
12

E.

By failing to recommend or require that Reed sell his shares directly to

John and the investor group, rather than redeem the shares with the corporate entity.

13

36.

As a direct and proximate result of defendants' breach of fiduciary and/or other

14

15

special duties, plaintiff has been damaged in a sum within the jurisdiction of this court and in

16

an amount according to proof. Plaintiff will seek leave of court to amend this Complaint to

17

allege the exact amount of said damages when said sUm. is fully ascertained or in the amount

18

to be proven at or before the time of trial.

19

37.

As a further direct and proximate result of defendants' breaches of their

20

fiduciary duty, plaintiff seeks the disgorgement and return of all fees, profits and costs
21

22
23
24

incurred by defendants as a result of their improper conduct.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Violation of the Washington State Consumer Protection
Act, RCW 19.86, et seq.)

25
26
27
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38.
2

3
4

5
6

Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations

of paragraphs 1through23, 25 through 28, and 31through34,inclusive, of this Complaint as
though set forth at length herein.
39.

Defendants are and have been engaged in the trade and profession of the

practice oflaw in King County, in the State of Washington.
40.

Defendants engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the

7

entrepreneurial aspect of the practice of law in their business dealings with plaintiff.
8
9

10

11
12

13

41.

Specifically, but not expressly limited to the following, defendants committed

the acts alleged in ~~6 through 13 and ~34 above.
42.

Plaintiff alleges that these, and other acts of the defendant, were part of a

deceptive and unfair business practice engaged by defendants in their trade and profession,
and in the entrepreneurial aspect of the practice of law. Plaintiff further alleges that these acts

14

were in violation ofRCW 19.86.020 et seq. Upon information and belief, plaintiff believes
15

16

and hence alleges that upon information and belief, that this is not the first time that

17

defendants and/or members of defendant Caimcross have represented out of state defendants

18

in out of state transactions without being licensed to practice there or associating with counsel

19
20

in that jurisdiction. .
43.

As a direct and proximate result of the defendants' unfair or deceptive trade

21

practices, plaintiff has been damaged in a sum within the jurisdiction of this court and in an
22
23
24

amount according to proof. Plaintiff will seek leave of court to amend this Complaint to
allege the exact amount of said damages when said sum is fully ascertained.

25
26
27
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44.
2

As a further direct and proximate cause of defendants' unfair and deceptive

trade practices, plaintiff has incurred and will continue to incur legal fees and costs in a sum

3

according to proof.

4

45.

5
6

Plaintiff further alleges that as a result of defendants' unfair and deceptive

trade practices, she is entitled to an award of treble damages in an amount up to $25,000.00.
46.

Plaintiff further prays for injunctive relief to prohibit defendants, and each of

7

them, from using similar fee agreements with other clients.
8
9

IO

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays as follows:

II

On the First Cause of Action

I2

1.

13
I4

For an award of damages compensating plaintiff in an amount to be proven at

or before trial;
2.

For an award of pre-judgment interest at the legal rate;

I5

On the Second Cause of Action
I6

3.

For an award of damages compensating plaintiff in an amount to be proven at

I7
IS

or before trial;

I9

4.

For an award of pre-judgment interest at the legal rate;

20

5.

For relinquishment, disgorgement and repayment of fees received by

2I

22

defendants arising from their breach of fiduciary duty;

On the Third Cause of Action

23

6.

For all damages caused plaintiff as a direct and proximate result of the

24

25

defendants' unfair and deceptive acts and trade practices;

26

7.

For plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees and costs, according to proof;

27

8.

For treble damages up to $25,000.00 per violation;
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9.
2
3
4
5

Injunctive relief to prohibit defendants, and each of them, from using similar

deceptive and illegal contracts with other clients or from deceiving other clients by practicing
law in violation ofRPC 5.5.
On the All Causes of Action
10.

For an award of damages compensating plaintiff for his costs of suit incurred

6

herein; and,
7

8
9
10

11.

For such other and further relief as Reed may request at or before trial and/or

that the court deems just and proper.
DATED this jJ_ day of March, 2012.

11
12
13

14

15

16
17

18
19
20

21

22

LAW OFFICES OF BRIAN H. KRIKORIAN

.
&

/-J-JL.r:~,~ (1Ja-.J
yl

y

(V

RIANH.KRIKORIAN
~~~
WSBA#27861
2110 N. Pacific Street, Suite 100
Seattle, Washington 98103
Telephone: (206) 547-1942
Fax: (425) 732-0115
bhkrik@bh.klaw.com
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RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICES, PLLC

flA)J

2

RI ~ J::J

By
RODERICK BOND, WSBA
800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, WA 98004

3
4

5
6

Tel: (425) 591-6903
Fax: (425) 321-0343
Email: rod@roderickbond.com

7

8
9
10

11
12

13

14

15
16

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

27
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;

)

Plaintiff,

)

vs.

)

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;

)

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP,

)

an Idaho limited liability

)

partnership; ROBERT M. TURNBOW, an

)

individual; and EBERLE BERLIN

)

KADING TURNBOW & McKLVEEN,

)

CHARTERED, an Idaho corporation;

)

Defendants.

Case No. CV-OC-2009-18868
VOLUME I

)

THE AUDIO-VISUAL DEPOSITION OF RICHARD A. RILEY
MARCH 29, 2012

REPORTED BY:

MONICA ARCHULETA, CSR NO. 471

Notary Public

~

EXHIBIT

~001848;2
F

~

[Page 2]
THE DEPOSITION OF RICHARD A. RILEY was
2

taken on behalf of the Plaintiff at the offices of

3

Elam & Burke, 251 East Front Street, Suite 300, Boise,

4

Idaho, commencing at 8:04 a.m. on March 29, 2012, before

5

Monica M. Archuleta, Certified Shorthand Reporter and

6

Notary Public within and for the State of Idaho, in the

7

above-entitled matter.

8

9
10

APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff:

11

BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY, PA

12

BY:

13

2105 Coronado Street

14

Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495

15

MR. MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY

And

16

RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC

17

BY:

18

800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400

19

Bellevue, Washington 98004

MR. RODERICK C. BOND

20
21
22

23
24

25

(208)345-9611

Continued ...
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(208)345-8800
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09:12:10
09:12:11

1

A. That is mine.

09:16:19

1

2

Q. Now, when you say, "Opinion not yet reviewed

09:16:23

2

restrictions. That research file, was that contained in

09:16:34

3

the documents that you provided to us?

09:12:14

3

09:12:17

4

09:12:22

5

09:12:29
09:12:32
09:12:39

8

by firm's conunittee," what does that mean?

deposition that you had reviewed a research file on

09:16:38

4

A. Yes.

opinions was that all opinions would be reviewed by -- I

09:16:41

5

Q. Do you know where the original of that

6

guess Stan Tharp said yesterday by the senior person

09:16:44

6

7

that practiced in that area

09:16:48

7

A. Currently it is in the hands of counsel.

09:16:51

8

Q. Your counsel?

A. The practice and procedure for issuance of

Q. When you wrote that notation on the fax cover

research file is kept?

09:12:44

9

sheet that the opinion had not been reviewed at that

09:16:52

9

09:12:49

10

point by the firm's committee, to whom are you

09:16:52

10

09:12:52

11

referring?

09:17:04

11

time that you were working on the Opinion Letter? Or is

09:12:53

12

A. Mickey Turnbow.

09:17:06

12

that research that was done later?

09:12:54

13

Q. It says, "Not yet reviewed by clients" in the

09:17:08

13

09:17:12

14

A. Yes.

Q. Was that research file prepared at the same

A. The bulk of it was research done at the time

of the opinion. In preparation for the opinion.

09:12:59

14

09:13:02

15

A. AIA Services.

09:17:15

15

09:13:11

16

Q. If this is a -- do you know at this point in

09:17:17

16

A. I did at least part of it. I thought someone

09:13:24

17

time when the draft was generated, this Exhibit No. 16,

09:17:22

17

else might have participated in some of the research.

09:13:33

18

had Mr. Turnbow looked at this Opinion Letter at all?

09:17:27

18

But I don't know that to be the case.

09:13:36

19

A. I don't recall.

09:17:29

19

09:13:40

20

Q. At this point when the draft was presented to

09:17:32

20

09:13:44

21

Scott Bell and Frank Taylor had you been the one that

09:17:33

21

09:13:49

22

had prepared this draft?

09:17:37

22

09:13:55

23

A. The Opinion -- the guts of the Opinion, the

09:17:38

23

09:14:00

24

requested Opinions, were provided by Scott Bell or his

09:17:39

24

A. Neil Mcfeeley.

09:14:04

25

firm. The statements of what was reviewed. The

09:17:41

25

Q. Is he an associate or a shareholder at Eberle

plural. Do you know what that refers to?

[Page

Q. Do you know who did that research?

Q. If someone else did participate who could that
have been?
A. Neil Mcfeeley would have been the likely

person.

Q. Say that again?

36]
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09:14:12

I

qualifications. Disclaimers. Those all came from our

09:17:47

I

09:14:17

2

firm.

09:17:48

2

09:14:21

3

09:17:51

3

09:14:28

4

Bell and Frank Taylor, I assume, by virtue of that fax

09:17:55

4

Joe -- and I don't know how to -- I can never pronounce

09:14:34

5

cover sheet; right?

09:18:01

5

it. It starts with a "U."

09:14:35

6

A. It appears to be the case; yes.

09:18:03

6

09:14:38

7

Q. To your knowledge, had they received a copy of

09:18:05

7

09:14:42

8

09:14:49

9

Q. Okay. Well, this draft is being sent to Scott

this draft before August 16 of!995?
A. I don't recall.

Berlin?
A. At this point he is a shareholder.

Q. There is a person on the letterhead named

MR. LARUE: Are you speaking of the letterhead
ofEberle?

8

MR. GAFFNEY: OfEberle.

9

MR. GJORDING: Uberuaga

09:14:52

JO

09:18:11

10

MR. GAFFNEY: Is that how you say it?

09:15:00

11

Frank Taylor for their review that suggests to me that

09:18:11

11

THE WITNESS: It's Uberuaga.

09:15:03

12

the draft document that is being provided would have

09:18:14

12

09:15:06

13

been authored by someone at Eberle Berlin.

09:18:15

13

A. Yes.

09:15:12

14

09:18:16

14

Q. I can't pronounce Basque names at all. Do you

Q. If this is being sent to Scott Bell and

Is that inaccurate?

Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Is that a Basque name?

09:15:14

15

A. As I said, the Opinion -- guts of the Opinion

09:18:20

15

know ifhe had any involvement in preparation of the

09:15:19

16

were as provided -- as requested by Scott Bell or his

09:18:24

16

Opinion Letter?

09:15:23

17

firm. And the rest was authored by Eberle Berlin.

09:18:25

17

09:15:28

18

09:18:27

18

09:15:31

19

fundamental. Who actually prepared this draft document,

09:18:31

19

of the AJA representation on Eberle Berlin's part at any

09:15:36

20

Exhibit No. 16?

09:18:41

20

time related, for example, to tax issues?

09:15:38

21

A. Ilikely did the bulk of it.

09:18:44

21

09:15:42

22

Q. Do you have any idea how many drafts of the

09:18:46

22

09:16:06

23

09:18:54

23

09:16:10

24

A. Not at this time.

09:18:57

24

A. Yes.

09:16:13

25

Q. You said that in preparation for the

09:19:00

25

Q. So he actually might be somebody at Eberle

Q. Well, maybe my question is a little more

Opinion Letter were generated?

[Page

A. I don't believe so.

Q. Do you know ifhe had any involvement in any

A. I suspect that he represented them on tax

issues. That is his forte.
Q. Is he still with Eberle Berlin?

[Page 39]
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09:19:04

I

Berlin that has at least some recollection of what was

09:22:40

I

09:19:07

2

going on back in 1995 with regard to the Stock

09:22:43

2

A. I don't recall.

09:19:13

3

Redemption Agreement?

09:22:46

3

Q. IbelievetheclosingwasAugust 16ofl995.

09:19:13

4

09:19:17

5

A. I couldn't tell you whether he -- what was in

matter of weeks? A matter of months? Do you recall?

09:22:51

4

The letter is dated August 15 of 1995. Do you have any

his mind. Whether he participated or remembers

09:22:55

5

idea how many days prior to that you would have been

anything.

09:22:59

6

working on this?

09:19:21

6

09:19:23

7

Q. Now, take a look at page five of Exhibit

09:23:03

7

09:19:43

8

No. 4, if you would, please. It is the signature page.

09:23:04

8

MR GAFFNEY: The Opinion Letter.

09:19:54

9

A. I have it.

09:23:06

9

THE WITNESS: I can't tell you specifically.

09:19:54

10

Q. ltsays, "Eberle Berlin Kading Turnbow &

09:23:08

10

I think we received draft documents from Scott Bell in

09:20:01

11

09:23:13

11

perhaps May of 1995. So somewhere between therein the
date of delivery of the Opinion on August 16.

McKlveen, Chtd." Whose handwriting is that?

MR LARUE: "This" being the Opinion Letter?

09:20:05

12

A. That's mine.

09:23:19

12

09:20:05

13

Q. Is there some particular reason that you would

09:23:22

13

09:20:07

14

sign the firm name rather than an individual lawyer?

09:23:23

14

documents from Scott Bell. Specifically draft documents

09:20:12

15

A. The firm's practice, and I think the typical

09:23:28

15

ofwhat?

09:20:17

16

practice for Opinion givers, is that it signed in the

09:23:29

16

09:20:21

17

name of the firm and not any individual lawyer.

09:23:31

17

09:23:34

18

09:23:36

19

Q. I want you to turn to page two of the Opinion

Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Now, when you say draft

A. The transaction documents as defined in this
Opinion Letter.

Q. But that -- you are not referring to a draft

09:20:28

18

09:20:33

19

09:20:34

20

MR. LARUE: I'm assuming Exhibit 4?

09:23:39

20

A. No.

09:20:37

21

MR. GAFFNEY: Exhibit4.

09:23:41

21

Q. Okay.

09:20:39

22

09:23:43

22

09:20:41

23

says, "Whenever our opinion with respect to the

09:23:50

23

09:20:44

24

existence or absence of facts is indicated to be based

09:23:54

24

09:20:46

25

on our knowledge, we are referring to the actual

09:23:59

25

Letter, please.

Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) The first full paragraph it

of the Opinion Letter itself?

A. As I said, Scott Bell provided the guts of the
opinion that he requested.

Q. Well, when you say the guts of the opinion.
Are you talking about the guts of this Exhibit No. 4?

[Page 40]
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09:20:49

1

knowledge ofR.M. Turnbow and Richard A. Riley, who are

09:24:03

1

09:20:54

2

the sole attorneys in Eberle Berlin Kading Turnbow &

09:24:12

2

A. Exhibit No. 4. The numbered paragraphs.

09:21:00

3

McKlveen, Chartered, who have represented the company

09:24:15

3

also provided to you the transaction documents defined
in the first paragraph?

Q. And in addition you are saying that Scott Bell

09:21:02

4

during the course of our representation in this

09:24:21

4

09:21:04

5

transaction."

09:24:22

5

A. The initial drafts; yes.

09:21:06

6

Is that a true statement?

09:24:24

6

Q. Do you know where those initial drafts are

09:21:12

7

A. I believe thars true; yes.

09:24:27

7

09:21:13

8

Q. When you refer to "this transaction" are you

09:24:29

8

A. No.

09:21:16

9

talking to the preparation of the -- well, back in the

09:24:35

9

Q. When you were at Eberle Berlin was there a

09:21:23

JO

first page. The phrase "transaction documents" is

09:24:38

10

separate file that you maintained related to the Stock

09:21:27

I1

defined. It talks about the agreement. Which I assume

09:24:46

I1

Redemption Agreement transaction involving Reed Taylor?

09:21:31

12

is the Stock Redemption Agreement, the Note, the Pledge

09:24:51

12

A. The entire transaction?

09:21:34

13

Agreement, the Security Agreement, the Consulting

09:24:53

13

Q. Correct.

09:21:37

14

Agreement, and the Noncompetition Agreement.

09:24:58

14

A. Separate from what?

09:21:40

15

09:21:43

16

09:21:45

17

09:21:48

18

09:21:52

19

09:21:58

20

09:22:00

21

09:22:01
09:22:25

currently located?

09:24:59

15

09:25:02

16

A. That's correct.

09:25:05

17

Q. And just so we are clear that was the Stock

09:25:06

18

Q. Where would that file have been kept?

Redemption Agreement that was entered into between AJA

09:25:09

19

A. I don't know how to answer that.

Services and Reed Taylor; right?

When you refer to "transaction" in that second
page is that the transaction being referred to?

Q. Any general work that you may have been doing

for AIA Services?

A. I would say yes.

09:25:14

20

A. Yes.

09:25:23

21

22

Q. Now, do you recall when you first were

09:25:27

22

A. I don't believe so.

23

assigned the task of doing this Opinion Letter?

09:25:33

23

Q. So you believe that there may be a separate

Q. In 1995 was Eberle Berlin using some type of

electronic filing system to retain documents?

09:22:33

24

A. Not specifically.

09:25:36

24

file related to the Taylor AJA Stock Redemption

09:22:34

25

Q. Was it a matter of days before the closing? A

09:25:43

25

Agreement transaction, but you don't currently know
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09:32:33

I

is besides this fax that you sent to Scott Bell and

09:36:19

1

09:32:37

2

Frank Taylor on August 16, which is -- this is Exhibit

09:36:20

2

A. If there were modifications.

60. And then exhibit -- was it 8?

09:36:49

3

Q. This is Exhibit No. 21.

09:36:50

4

09:36:57

5

09:32:42

3

09:32:46

4

A Four?
MR. LARUE: Sixteen.

5

Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Sixteen. I'm sorry. The

Q. All right.

(Exhibit 21 marked.)

Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Why don't you take a look

09:32:48

6

09:37:18

6

through Exhibit No. 21. And in that exhibit there are a

09:32:49

7

one with the fax cover sheet to Scott Bell. Are there

09:37:29

7

few documents. There is a 1995 Donna Taylor letter

09:32:55

8

any, to your knowledge, still existing versions of the

09:37:40

8

agreement -- letter agreements. I'm sorry. There is

09:33:04

9

Opinion Letter itself that would have been exchanged

09:37:42

9

one dated January 11. One dated March 22. One dated

09:33:07

10

between Scott Bell and Eberle Berlin?

09:37:47

10

09:33:11

11

A I have no idea at this point.

09:37:54

11

09:33:14

12

Q. You haven't seen any?

09:37:58

12

July 11. And one dated August 10.
Could you look at that and tell me who drafted
those agreements, if you know?

09:33:16

13

A No, I have not.

09:38:00

13

09:33:17

14

Q. So you would agree at least based upon what

09:38:04

14

July -- l think you said July l I. The one l have is

09:33:24

15

you have got in front of you, these two fax sheets, as

09:38:08

15

July 18.

09:33:30

16

far as today the only still existing communications

09:38:10

16

09:33:37

17

related to the Opinion Letter between Scott Bell and

09:38:17

17

09:33:44

18

Eberle Berlin are fax sheets going to Scott Bell? We

09:38:22

18

09:33:50

19

don't have any evidence of anything coming back from

09:38:33

19

09:33:52

20

Scott Bell?

09:38:34

20

09:33:53

21

09:33:56

22

A You haven't presented me with any. I have no
idea whether any exist at this point.

09:38:38

21

09:38:40

22

09:34:09

23

09:38:42

23

09:34:14

24

back to that since that appears to be the completed

09:38:51

24

09:34:17

25

Opinion Letter. Was Exhibit No. 4 prepared based upon

09:38:53

25

Q. Was Exhibit No. 4 -- I'm going to keep coming

MR. LARUE: Excuse me, Counsel. You said

MR. GAFFNEY: I'm sorry. Maybe l misspoke.
January II, March 22, July 18. You're right. Sorry.
MR. LARUE: Thank you.
MR. GAFFNEY: And then the last one is
August 10 of'95.
THE WITNESS: And your question was what?
Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) My question is, do you know

who prepared these four letters?
MR. LARUE: Address them separately, please,
if you know.

[Page 48]
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I

09:34:29

2

09:34:30
09:34:32

[Page 50]
09:38:54

1

A Yes.

09:38:56

2

letter I prepared. The other ones, other than by their

3

Q. Do you know ifthat request is in writing?

09:39:03

3

content, I couldn't tell you who drafted them.

4

A I don't believe so.

09:39:07

4

09:34:40

5

Q. Do you know ifthat was a specific requirement

09:39:09

5

09:34:46

6

within the redemption agreement itself that that opinion

09:39:14

6

09:34:48

7

be provided?

09:39:17

7

09:34:50

8

A I believe so.

09:39:17

8

09:34:51

9

Q. Now, if I understand what you testified to

09:39:19

9

09:35:21

10

earlier, the numbered paragraphs in Exhibit No. 4, it

09:39:21

10

09:35:28

11

is your testimony that those were provided to you by

09:39:23

11

MR. GAFFNEY: What's that?

09:35:34

12

Scott Bell's law firm?

09:39:24

12

MR. GJORDING: And you won't have.

09:35:37

13

A In their original form subject to discussion

09:39:26

13

MR. GAFFNEY: Is he gone?

09:35:40

14

and potential modification as we worked through the

09:39:28

14

MR. GJORDING: He's gone.

09:35:43

15

opinion.

09:39:29

15

09:35:44

16

09:39:32

16

cosigned by you. It says, "Just a note to memorialize

09:35:48

17

have originally been provided by Scott Bell's law firm,

09:39:39

17

our understanding that the amortization contemplated

09:35:54

18

but ultimately they were modified?

09:39:42

18

under the letter of January 11." Which is the letter

09:35:58

19

09:39:45

19

that appears before. "Was that recalculated payments

09:36:01

20

09:39:51

20

would begin in such an amount that the amount due to

09:36:05

21

09:39:56

21

Donna Taylor would be amortized over a period of time

09:36:09

22

modification of the numbered paragraphs in the Opinion

09:40:00

22

which would be ten years," et cetera, et cetera

09:36:15

23

Letter?

09:40:02

23

09:36:15

24

09:40:05

24

between whom -- well, first of all, why are you

09:36:18

25

09:40:11

25

cosigning this letter? Do you recall? I assume that is

the request of AJA Services?

Q. So what we see in the numbered paragraphs may

A Could have been; yes. I see that in one of
these exhibits there is some markup.
Q. And I assume that you were involved in the

A I don't specifically recall it. But it is
likely.

THE WITNESS: Yeah, I will. The August 10

Q. The March 22 letter appears to have been
prepared by -- is it Cumer?

A Cumer. Well, you can say it different ways,
but.
Q. I have heard the name before. But I never had
the privilege.

MR. GJORDING: And you won't have.

Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) This is -- this letter is

I guess what I'm trying to figure out here is

[Page 51]
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Ada Countr Clerk

J_ OAVIO NAVARRO. CJerk
By ?ATPllClA A. DWOlllCH
llEPUt'r

RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No_ 8082
MlCHAEL S. BISS ELL. ISB No . .5762
CAMPBELL. BISSELL & KIRBY. PLLC
7 South Howard Street. Suite416
Spokane. WA 9920 l
Tel: (509) 455-7l00

Fax: (509) 455-711 l
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. TaylQr

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF

fDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COL:NTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;

.·• .'·"·. 1=.I ,J.
·'
·~

I•

Plaintiff,

1

~3

f'

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENN!S & HAWLEY
LLP. ilil Idaho Jimitcd liability partnership~
ROBERT M. TURNBOW, an individual; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADJNG, TURNBOW
& .McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an 1daho
corporatton;

Jl:RY TR1AL DEMANDED
Fee Category A.
Fee: $88.00

Defendants.

-~----

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor. by and thmugh his attorneys of record, Campbell> Bissell &

Kirby, PLLC, alleges as folJows:
I.
1.

FACTUAL BACKGROL'NJ2

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor C'Rccd Taylor'') is a resident of Lewiston, Nez Perce

County, Idaho. Reed Taylor is 72-years-old and an elderly person as defined in
2.

Defendant Richard A. Riley

(''Rile~'')

r.c. § 48-608.

is an individual residing in the state of

Jdaho and is an attorney in the state of rdaho conducting business with and for Hawley TroxelJ in

CO!vfPLAINT - l

...

EXHIBIT

~
~001854
3

lo~

minority shareholders des.ired to acquire Recd Ta)-'lor•s majority interest in AL'\ Services to

obtain operational control of the corporation i11 an effort tn sen the company or effectuate a
public offering.

And, as a means for the minority shareholders to obtain their objectives,

Defendants Eberle Berlin. Riley and Twnbow represented AIA Services in negotiating the tenn.s,
conditions and agreements for AIA Services to purchase Reed Taylor's shares in a transaction

structured as a redemption of his shares by the corporation. At the time Reed Ta}·lor's shares

were redeemed, Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow had ex.tensive experience in

corporate Jaw and in corporate transactions.
8.

Defendants Eber1e Berlin, Riley and Tumbow acted as oounseJ for a committee

established for board of directors of AlA Services to negotiate and approve the terms and
conditions. of the corporation's redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. Reed Taylor was not on this
commirtee.

Dcfendanls Eber1e Ber1in., R1lcy and Turnbow acted general counsel for AIA

Services i11 the negotiation ofth.e tcnns and conditions of the redemption of Reed TayJor•s shares
and drafting of the redemprion agreement and related agreements. Defendants Eberle Berlin and
Ri1ey attended certain board meetinW> and shareholder mceti.ngs and drafted board and
shareholder reso]utions pertaining to the general corporate matters and the redemption of Reed

Taylor's shares, inc1uding. without limitation, the sharehoJder resolutions spedti.ca1ly addressing
the redemption of Recd Taylor's shares.
9.

Under the terms of the stock redemption agreement betY>'een AIA Services and

Reed TayJor (''redemption agreement''), Reed Taylor would receive, .among other things and
consideration. the payment of $6 Million, plu.s accrued interest. for his shares and receive

security interests in an of the commissions of AJA Services and all of the shares of its operating
subsidiaries.. Under the terms of the redemption agr=ment, Defendanrs Eherlc Berlin. Riley an<l

COMPLAINT - 3
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___, ______
Turnbow were required to deliver art opinion Jetter to Reed Taylor and he could tenninate the

redemption agreement prior to closing if an opinion letter acceptable to him was. not deJiycred.
10.

Reed Taylor signed the redemption agreement and related agreements (including

the security agreement and stock pledge agreement).

As

r~4uired

under the redemption

agreement, Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Tumbow drafted and delivered their opinion
letter to Reed Taylor approximately three weeks tater in which they made

wb~tantial

factual and

legal representations upon which they induced Reed Taylor to roly (''Opinion Letter..). The
Opinion Letter was specifically written to Reed Taylor, wa..... addressed to him, referenced
··comm.on Stock Redemption" in the .subject

line~

stated that it was being. delivered as required

by the redemption agreement, and expressly stated that it was being provided for his benefit and

use in connection with the redemption of his .shares. The Opinion Letter was a requin..'1Ilent prior

to closing (tho clnsing date was over three weeks after the redemption agreement was signed}.
As a result., Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow had over three weeks to ta1ce such
actions as were necessary as general counsel for AIA Services and as authors of ttic Opinion
Letter tCl ensure that the representations in the Opinion Letter were true and concct and chat all
necessary sh.areholder consents and resolutions had been

obtain~.

As a result of receiving

Defendants Eberle Berlin, Turnbow and Riley's Opinion l.ctter, the redemption transaction was
dosed apprcxtmately one day after Reed Taylor received the Opinion Letter resulting in his
~hates

being fully redeemed by AJA Services.

rn

addition to the redemption agreement, the

executed security a.greemenl, $6 Million promis..s;:ory note, stock pledge agreement and ancillary
agreements ('):elated agmemcnt:f') were all part of the

transa~tion

to redeem Reed Taylor's

shares and aH of the agre..'ments were drafted and entered into by the parties for the same
purpose.

COMPLAINT - 4
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J 1.

Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow delivered to Ret.'d Taylor the

Opinion Letter addressing factual and legal issues pertaining to the redemption of his shares.
Defendants f.bcrJe Berlin, Riley and Turnbow knew that Reed Taylor W()uld re1y upon their
Opinion Letter and that the Opinion Letter was a condition prci.:t:<lt:at before the redemption
transaction could be closed. The Opinion Letter is also a contract between Recd Taylor and
Defondants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Tumbow (which became binding when Reed Taylor agreed
tQ

sel1 his shares in re1iance upon the Opinion Letter) and there were direct dealings between

Reed Taylor's counsel and Defendant RiJcy pertaining directly to drafting. issuing and delivering
the Opinion Letter. By providing the Opinion Lener knowiog that Reed Taylor would rely upon
it to close the redemption, Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow knew that if Reed
Taylor relied upon the Opinion Letter and closed the lransaction he would waive his right to
terminate the redemption prior ro closing. thereby resu1ting in him waiving his rig.ht to tenninare
the redemption agreement
12.

The Opinion Letter specifica1ly stated that facts or absence of facts were ba8ed

upon the actual know]edge of Defendants Turnbow and Riley. The knowledge of Defendants
Turnow and Riley was extensive as they act~ as general counsel for AIA Services and

rt..-presented the corporation in the transa(:tion to which the Opinion Letter addressed legal and
facrual mattem. They also were intimately invoJved witl1 the relevant corporate guvemance
matters at AIA Services. To the extent that any corporate acts were improperly taken and/ur not
taken by the management of AIA Services, these acts andior omissions Olmld have hecn
prevented andlor cured by Deft:ndant.s Eberle Berlin, Tumbow and Riley's representation of AIA

Services.
///

COMPLAINT~

5
001857

there duty of care in providing the Opinion Letter to Reed Taylor, pro""iding false and/or wrong
representation.sand opfoions in the Opin?on Letter ro Roed Taylor, faiJing to ensure all necessary

shareholder approvals and/or consents were obtained to the extent required by ldaho law, and by
net advising Reed Tiiylor that the redemption was not 1cgal, among <.)ther breached duties set
forth or contemplated in this Complaint.
44.

There is a causal connection bclween the Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and

Turnbow's faiJure 1o perfonn their duties and/or breach of their duties of care owed to AIA
Services and Reed TayJor and the damages incurred by Recd TayJor. The court's fintling that the
redemption agreemenrs and related agreements were illegal and unenforceable has TesuJted in a
direct and causaJ connection to Reed Taylor losing milJions of dollars and for him being
defrauded of his majority interest in AIA Services.

Defendants Eberle Berlin, Riley and

Tumbow'.s breached duties were aJso lhe proximate cause of Reed Taylor's: damages,
45.

Defendants F.berle Berlin, Riley and Tumbow's acts constitute professional

negligence, ma1pracrice, negligence and/or negligent issuance of an opinion letter; and such acts,
conduct and/or omissions have directly and/or proximately damaged Reed Tay1or, in an amount

to be proven at or before trial.
46.

Reed Taylor's malpractice cJalms include derivative c:lajms and a derivative

demand is not required because it would be futile as AlA

s~rvfoes dirccrors are au conflicted,

disjnterested and not properly elected or :seated as set fon.h in Paragraphs 30-3 I above. Because
Reed Taylor is the shareholder harmed by such conduct, he is entitled to all damages recovered
and is also asserti1tg direct claims for malpractice. To the extent that he recovers any damages
for which there is a question of ownership under

hi~

derivative malpracti<.-e claims, he

will

deposit such funds \\.·ith 1he coun pending a determination of their rightful owriers.

COMPLAINT , 19
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,.

I

unenforceable by the court and it refused to give him hii; shares back, includin~, without
limitation, by and through the acts of Defendant Riley's firm, Defendant Hawley Troxell
VII.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Reed Taylor prays for the following relief:
I.

For a judgment against Defendants Eberle Berlin. Riley and Tumbow, jointly and

severally, in an amount to be proven at or before trial, plus pre and post judgment interes.t;
2.

For judgment against Defendant Hawley Troxell in an amount to be proven at or

bofore trial~ plus pre and post judgment interest;

3.

For a judgment against Defendants Riley and Hawley TroY(en. jointly and

severally, for treble damages in the amount to be proven at or before trial pursuant to J.C. § 48608{2) and for other damages. and/or relief provided under I.C. § 48-608 or l.C. § 48-601 et seq.;
4.

For an award of attorneys fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to Idaho

Law, including. withour Ilmitati.on, l.C. § 48-608, lC. § 12-120 and/or l.C. § 12-121; and
5.

For such other relief as may be sought ar or before trial by Reed Taylor that the

Court deems ju.st and equitable.

VIII. DEMAND FOR .WRY TRIAL
I.

Rt:ed Taylor demands a trial by jury of not less than twelve (12) on all claims and

damages so triable.
DATED this; 301h day of September, 2009.

BYPLLC
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James D. LaRue ISB #1780
Loren C. Ipsen ISB #1767
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844

n

CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Clerk
By ANNAMARIE MEYER
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendants, Richard A. Riley
and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

v.

-

Case No. CV-OC-0918868
RICHARD A. RILEY'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; SHARON
CUMMINGS, Personal Representative of the
Estate of Robert M. Turnbow; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;
Defendants.
Defendant Richard A. Riley, by and through his attorneys of record, Elam & Burke, P.A.,
moves this Court for an order granting summary judgment against all claims asserted by Plaintiff
against Richard A. Riley, pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, on the
grounds and for the reasons that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Richard A.
Riley is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

RICHARD A. RILEY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 1
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This motion is made and based upon the files and records in this action together with the
Memorandum in Support of Riley A. Riley's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Affidavit of
Loren C. Ipsen, the Second Supplemental Affidavit of Richard A. Riley, and the Affidavit ofD.
John Ashby, filed concurrently herewith.
DATED this

;j

day of August, 2012.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By:~d:±h
esn:LaRUe, Of the Firm

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ___l§_ day of August, 2012, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, Washington 98004

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495

Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

__L

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(425) 321-0343

./

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 529-9732

./

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-9177

~~

James~aRue
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James D. LaRue ISB #1780
Loren C. Ipsen ISB #1767
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ANNAMARIE MEYER
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendants, Richard A. Riley
and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,
v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; SHARON
CUMMINGS, Personal Representative of the
Estate of Robert M. Turnbow; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

:

Case No. CV-OC-0918868
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
RICHARD A. RILEY'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.

Defendant Richard A. Riley by and through undersigned counsel, hereby submits the
following memorandum in support of his motion for summary judgment.
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I. Introduction
The facts which give rise to this action were summarized in the Memorandum in Support of
Defendants Richard A. Riley's and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP's Motion for Summary
Judgment filed January 15, 2010. The material facts being undisputed, the only issue that remains
for decision with respect to defendant Richard Riley is whether the plaintiff has a viable cause of
action against Mr. Riley for professional negligence. For the reasons stated herein, summary
judgment dismissing the remaining claim against Mr. Riley should be granted as a matter of law.

A.

Plaintiff's claim for professional neKliKence is barred by res judicata.

Resjudicata, also known as claim preclusion, prevents a party from re-litigating issues which
he litigated, or which he could have litigated, in a previous case with the same parties or their privies
arising out of the same transaction or series of connected transactions. As stated by Judge Winmill
in Cacciaguidi v. Reinke, 2012 WL 892298 at *4 (D. Idaho 2012), applying Idaho law:
For claim preclusion to bar a subsequent action there are three requirements: (1) the
same parties or privies; (2) the same claim; and (3) a final judgment. Ticor Title Co.
V. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 157 P.3d 613 (Idaho 2007) (citing Hindmarsh v. Mock,
138 Idaho 92, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (Idaho 2002); Farmers Nat'/ Bank v. Shirey, 126
Idaho 63, 878 P.2d 762, 767 (1994)).
Idaho has adopted the "transactional" approach to claim preclusion, which
means that "[i]n an action between the same parties upon the same claim or demand,
the former adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as to every matter
offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim but also as to every matter which
might and should have been litigated in the first suit." Weldon v. Bonner County Tax
Coalition, 124 Idaho 31, 855 P.2d 868, 872 (Idaho 1993) (relying on Diamond v.
Farmers Group, 119 Idaho 146, 804 P.2d 319, 323 (1990)).
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1.

Reed Taylor previously sued Mr. Riley relatinfl to the same transaction or series
of connected transactions.

The present case arises out ofthe successful defense of a lawsuit filed by Reed Taylor against
AIA Services Corporation ("AIA") and other defendants to collect the amount allegedly due for the
redemption of his AIA stock. 1 AIA was represented in the AIA Case by the law firm of Hawley
Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP. Mr. Riley was a member of the Hawley Troxell law firm at the time
suit was brought against AIA by Mr. Taylor. Before the AIA Case was resolved, Mr. Taylor filed
suits against the defense attorneys and Mr. Riley. 2 The sequence of pertinent events was as follows:
April 16. 2008 - Certain defendants in the AIA Case filed an answer and motion for
summary judgment alleging that the Stock Redemption Agreement between Mr. Taylor and AIA was
illegal and unenforceable. (Affidavit of D. John Ashby, hereinafter "Ashby Alf.", Ex. A) 3
April 21. 2008 - AIA, through Hawley Troxell, filed a motion in the AIA Case to amend
AIA's answer to assert the illegality defense. (Ashby Alf., Ex. C)
August 18. 2008 - Reed Taylor filed his complaint against Hawley Troxell and Mr. Riley
in Hawley Troxell No. 1. (Affidavit ofRichard A. Riley, filed herein on January 15, 2010, hereinafter

"Riley Alf.," Ex. G)

1

That lawsuit, which will be referred to as the "AIA Case," was filed in 2007 as Case No. CV 07-00208 in
the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State ofldaho, Nez Perce County.
2

The suit against Hawley Troxell, Mr. Riley, et al., was denominated Taylor v. Babbitt, et al., Case No.
CV 08-01765, in the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State ofldaho, Nez Perce County
(hereinafter "Hawley Troxell No. l "). The district court's dismissal of Reed Taylor's complaint in Hawley Troxell
No. 1 was affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court sub nom Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P.2d 642 (2010).
3

In response, Reed Taylor's attorney himself pointed out that LC. § 30-1-6, in effect in 1995, was the
applicable statute governing the legality of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. (Ashby A.ff., Ex. B)
MEMORANDUM 1N SUPPORT OF RICHARD A. RILEY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY WDGMENT- 3
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October 17. 2008 - Reed Taylor moved to amend his complaint in Hawley Troxell No. 1.4
December 20. 2008 - Judge Brudie issued a decision in Hawley Troxell No. 1 dismissing
Reed Taylor's complaint and denying his motion to amend. (Riley A.ff., Ex. J)
February 12. 2009 -

Defendants in the AIA Case filed their Supplemental Memorandum

regarding the illegality issue. (Ashby A.ff., Ex. G)
June 1. 2009 - Judge Brudie held in the AIA Case that the Stock Redemption Agreement
was illegal and unenforceable. (Affidavit of Gary D. Babbitt, filed herein on January 15, 2010,
hereinafter Babbitt A.ff., Ex. J)
December 1. 2009 - Reed Taylor filed the present lawsuit ("Hawley Troxell No. 2").
September 3. 2010 - The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Hawley Troxell
No. 1. Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P.3d 642 (2010).
September 7. 2011 -

The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Judge Brodie's decision in the

AIA Case holding the Stock Redemption Agreement to be illegal and unenforceable. Taylor v. AJA
Services, Inc., 151 Idaho 552, 261 P.3d 829 (2011).
The first and third requirements of res judicata5 have been met: Reed Taylor sued Richard
Riley in both Hawley Troxell No. 1 and the present case, thus satisfying the "same parties"
requirement; and final judgment was entered in Hawley Troxell No. 1 on the merits in favor Mr.
Riley, thus satisfying the "final judgment" requirement. Since the same transaction or series of

4

Paragraph 16 of the proposed Amended Complaint in Hawley Troxell No. 1 explicitly alleged that, on
behalf of their respective clients in the AIA Case, Hawley Troxell and other defense counsel had raised the defense
that "Reed Taylor has no rights because his redemption was allegedly illegal. ... " (Riley A.ff., Ex. I)
5

Cacciaguidi v. Reinke, supra, at *4.
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connected transactions were involved in Hawley Troxell No. 1 as in the present case, the case must
be dismissed as a matter of law.

2.

Mr. Taylor's cause of action aeainst Mr. Riley for professional neelieence accrued
in April 2008, before Hawley Troxell No. 1 was filed.

In the case at bar, this Court ruled that Mr. Taylor's cause of action against Mr. Riley for
professional negligence accrued and the statute of limitation began to run in April 2008:
In this case, the alleged negligent acts took place in 1995. The damages occurred in
April 2008 when one of the Defendants in the AIA lawsuit raised the issue of the
legality of the redemption agreement. Taylor was required to incur attorney fees to
counter the attack on his right to recover under the note. At that point, he had
suffered damage that could be proven in court and for which a court may enter
judgment.
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Case No. CV-

OC-2009-18868 (May 10, 2010).
Since Mr. Taylor's cause of action against Mr. Riley for professional negligence accrued in
April 2008, it necessarily follows that when Mr. Taylor filed the complaint in Hawley Troxell No.
1 on August 18, 2008, the doctrine of res judicata obliged him to bring all claims he had against Mr.
Riley for professional negligence at that time, including his claim arising out of preparation and
delivery of the Opinion Letter.

3.

Reed Taylor was on notice and actually aware of the nucleus of operative facts
eivin& rise to his claim aeainst Mr. Riley before Hawley Troxell No. 1 was filed
and while it was oneoine.

Res judicata applies where "[T]he supportive facts for these transactionally related claims

were in existence and known (or at least readily discoverable) at the time the earlier suit was
ongoing .... " Role Models America, Inc. v. Penmar Dev. Corp., 394 F.Supp.2d 121, 135 (D.D.C.
2005). Reed Taylor was on notice of his claim, and his cause of action against Mr. Riley relating
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RICHARD A. RILEY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY WDGMENT- 5
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to alleged negligence in preparing the Opinion Letter accrued, in April 2008. In an affidavit6 filed
in the AIA Case dated August 28, 2008, Reed Taylor's attorney expressed keen awareness of the
potential claims of his client against Mr. Riley arising from the Opinion Letter:
Because of Richard Riley's opinion letter provided to Reed Taylor by his old
firm (the letter specifically references Richard Riley), Richard Riley is a witness in
this action as well. In other words, Richard Riley is a witness against his clients and
has diverging interests against his clients. On one hand, Richard Riley could provide
testimony that his opinion letter was correct. In this example, he would testifying
against his clients AIA Services and AIA Insurance because Hawley Troxell is now
arguing that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares should be ruled illegal some 13
years after the fact. This would also result in Reed Taylor having claims accruing
against Richard Riley, which creates another conflict of interest On the other hand,
Richard Riley could testify that his opinion letter was wrong. In this example, Mr.
Riley is still testifying against his client AIA Services and the corporate officers
because AIA Services executed a separate document over 1 month after Reed Taylor
sold his shares in which it agreed to indemnify him, hold him harmless and was a
release of all known and unknown claims, all causes of action, etc. (Emphasis
added)
Having specifically referenced through his lawyer the existence of a potential malpractice
claim against Mr. Riley based on the Opinion Letter,7 Mr. Taylor was required to litigate such claim
along with any other claims he had against Mr. Riley in Hawley Troxell No. 1:
That a number of different legal theories casting liability on an actor may
apply to a given episode does not create multiple transactions and hence multiple

6

Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Disqualification,~ 57. (Ashby A.ff., Ex. F) See also, Motion

to Disqualify. (Ashby A.ff., Ex. E)
7

The fact that Reed Taylor's counsel, Mr. Bond, was conscious of the nature of the potential claim for
professional negligence against Mr. Riley is illustrated by an email he transmitted to Hawley Troxell lawyers and
others on August 5, 2008, shortly before the complaint in Hawley Troxell No. 1 was filed, in which he stated,
"Explain to Mr. Clark how Richard Riley issued an opinion letter to Reed and you are now trying to disingenuously
argue the $8.5 Million is not owed to him." Mr. Bond continued to fulminate in his August 5, 2008, email: "Explain
to Mr. Clark that even if the illegality argument had merit, Donna Taylor and Reed Taylor would be suing Hawley
Troxell (and Richard Riley) in such an instance regardless of any circumstances." Email from Roderick C. Bond to
Gary Babbitt et al., dated August 5, 2008. (Babbitt A.ff., Exhibit L)
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.-------------------------------------------------

claims. This remains true although the several legal theories depend on different
shadings of the facts, or would emphasize different elements of the facts, or would
call for different measures of liability or different kinds of relief.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(2), cmt. c (1982).

4.

Plaintiff's claim aKainst Mr. Riley arises out of the same transaction or series of
connected transactions.

In Brunacini v. Cavanaugh, 117 N.M. 122, 869 P.2d 821 (1994), an employer's attorney
prepared an opinion letter that a written employment agreement was not binding. Based on the
opinion letter, the employer discharged an employee, who then sued and won a judgment against the
employer for breach of the employment contract. While an appeal of this judgment was pending,
the attorney filed a lawsuit against the employer to collect legal fees. The employer entered into a
stipulated judgment settling the lawyer's suit for fees. The employer then brought a malpractice suit
against the lawyer who prepared the erroneous opinion letter. Granting the lawyer's motion to
dismiss on res judicata grounds, the Court in Brunacini, quoted with approval the following from
2 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice §17.12 at 47 (3d ed. 1989):
The most common context of the [res judicata] defense arises out oflitigation
for legal fees. Res judicata [exists] where a client unsuccessfully [raises] the issue
of malpractice in the attorney's action for fees, even though the client [does] not or
[can]not cross-claim for affirmative relief. The failure to raise the issue of legal
malpractice by a compulsory counterclaim can also be a bar. Similarly, a client who
[allows] a default to be entered against him by his former attorneys in their action to
recover legal fees [can]not later urge malpractice as a defense to an action to collect
the judgment.
Id. at 124, 869 P.2d at 823 (emphasis in the original). 8

8

The Brunacini rule has been adopted in a number of cases from various jurisdictions. See, for example,
Breslin Realty Dev. Corp. v. Shaw, 72 A.D.3d 258, 263-64, 893 N.Y.S.2d 95, 100 (2010) ("Under New York State
law, a determination fixing a defendant's fees in a prior action brought by the defendant against the plaintiff for fees
for the same legal services which the plaintiff alleges were negligently performed, necessarily determines there was
no legal malpractice."); Grausz v. Englander, 321F.3d467, 475 (4th Cir. 2003) ("Because all of the elements ofres
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RICHARD A. RILEY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 7
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Although the client in Brunacini did not actually litigate malpractice in the prior case with
the attorney, res judicata barred his claim because he was on notice of the facts constituting the
alleged malpractice and could have alleged a counterclaim for malpractice in the prior litigation. The
same result should be reached in the present case. When Mr. Taylor filed Hawley Troxell No. 1, he
and his counsel were on notice of the same facts and circumstances on which he now bases his
professional negligence claim against Mr. Riley.
While his motion to amend his complaint in the present case was not granted, Mr. Taylor
acknowledged in his proposed amended complaint that the same transaction which gave rise to both
the present case and Hawley Troxell No. 1 commenced with the Opinion Letter. "Eberle Berlin,
Riley and Turnbow' s representation and Opinion Letter were all focused on the same end and aim
-to provide the necessary legal representation and opinions to Reed Taylor as required to induce him
to sell his shares .... " Proposed First Amended Complaint,~ 27. Mr. Taylor explicitly connected
the Opinion Letter to the actions of Mr. Riley previously litigated in Hawley Troxell No. 1.9 The
plaintiff could have raised in that case his professional negligence claim against Mr. Riley arising
from the Opinion Letter.

judicata are present, and no practical considerations prevent the fair application of the doctrine, we hold that [former
client's] legal malpractice claim is barred by the final fee order in the bankruptcy case."); CLS Associates, Ltd, v. A
_ _ B _ _ , 762 S.W.2d 221 (Tex.App. -Dallas 1988) (holding that a malpractice claim was barred by res
judicata arising from a prior suit to collect attorney's fees due for the same services); In the Matter ofInterlogic
Trace, Inc., 200 F.3d 382, 389 (5th Cir. 2000)(holding that allowance of an accounting firm's claim for fees in prior
proceedings barred a malpractice suit on res judicata grounds where the claimant " ... had sufficient general
awareness of the real potential for claims against Ernst & Young such as those here asserted.").
9

"Riley, Hawley Troxell and/or certain of its attorneys represented AIA Services and other parties
undertook representation of parties adverse to the representations in the Opinion Letter. Eberle Berlin and Turnbow
did nothing to stop such adverse representation, despite the fact that Taylor v. AJA Services involved the
substantially same, if not identical, transaction to redeem Reed Taylor's shares. Riley and Hawley Troxell had
duties to not represent parties, including AIA Services, whose interests were adverse to Reed Taylor in connection
with the redemption and Opinion Letter." Proposed First Amended Complaint,~ 32 (emphasis added).
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RICHARD A. RILEY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 8
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5.

Res judicata bars all claims which were previously liti&ated or which could have been
liti&ated.
InDiamondv. Farmers Group, Inc., 119Idaho 146, 151, 804P.2d319, 323 (1990), the Idaho

Supreme Court approved the Restatement 10 formulation that a" ... valid and final judgment rendered
in an action extinguishes all claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions out
of which the cause of action arose."

In Diamond, a former claims investigator sued an insurance

company in federal court in Oregon for breach of his employment contact, fraud and related causes
of action related to his firing, and recovered substantial damages. The claims investigator then filed
suit in Idaho against the insurance company for slander in connection with the termination of his
employment. In response to the insurance company's defense that the alleged slander suit was barred
by res judicata, the claims investigator argued the he had not litigated his slander claim in Oregon
and in fact was precluded from doing so because the Oregon statute oflimitation for slander had run.
Therefore, he contended that he should be allowed to sue in Idaho to litigate his slander claim.
Similarly, Reed Taylor apparently argues in the present case that he should be allowed to sue Mr.
Riley for professional negligence relating to the Opinion Letter because in Hawley Troxell No. 1 he
did not focus on the theory that the stock redemption was illegal and that the Opinion Letter was
incorrect due to Mr. Riley's alleged lack of care and skill. 11
10

Restatement (Second) of Judgments§ 24, cmt. a (1982).

11

In his complaint in Hawley Troxell No. 1, Reed Taylor expressly acknowledged the possibility that the
Opinion Letter was erroneous and the stock redemption was illegal and unenforceable. However, after recognizing
that a finding of illegality was one potential interpretation of the transaction, he elected to assume that the
redemption gave rise to an enforceable contractual obligation on the part of AIA and to disregard the other potential
outcome - that the transaction was illegal ab initio. See~ 92 of Reed Taylor's proposed First Amended Complaint
for Damages in Hawley Troxell No. 1 ("Although Reed Taylor believes the transaction was legal and supported by
applicable law, Riley's actions have breached his legal duties to Reed Taylor and caused Reed Taylor to incur
damages from the payments of attorney's fees and costs and lost possession of property and funds because of AIA
Insurance being wrongfully withheld from Reed Taylor.") The choice to assume legality of the transaction was a
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The Idaho Supreme Court in Diamond was unsympathetic to the plaintiffs attempt to litigate
different theories of recovery arising out of the same operative facts in different forums:
The policy considerations undergirding the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel, as discussed above, preclude the splitting of the same transactional claim
into discrete substantive theories or variant forms of relief flowing from those
theories. Having chosen the Oregon forum, Diamond was required to file all claims
stemming from the transaction in the Oregon federal court, even though the slander
portion of the claim was untimely because of failure to file within the statute of
limitations.

Id. at 151-52, 804 P.2d at 325-26.
Similarly, Reed Taylor was required to file all claims he had against Mr. Riley relating to the
redemption of his AIA Stock in Hawley Troxell No. 1. Mr. Taylor could have, and therefore should
have, asserted all claims he possessed against Mr. Riley at that time. Res judicata precludes him
from litigating one set of theories ofliability against Mr. Riley in Hawley Troxell No. 1 and another
theory in the present case.

6.

A party is required to plead all theories of recovery in one case.

The agreement to redeem Reed Taylor's stock and attendant Opinion Letter are part of the
same transaction or series of related transactions that gave rise to both Hawley Troxell No. 1 and the
present case. The collapse of Reed Taylor's stock redemption scheme is the key factor that informs
and gives content to his claims in both cases. In Hawley Troxell No. 1, the original Complaint (if
53) and the proposed Amended Complaint (ifif 92, 99 and 118) alleged that Hawley Troxell and
individual members of the firm (including Mr. Riley) provided improper legal representation
injurious to Reed Taylor in the AIA Case because they argued contrary to the Opinion Letter that the

matter of litigation strategy; nothing compelled Mr. Taylor to base his theories of liability against Mr. Riley on that
assumption, rather than the assumption that the Opinion Letter was negligently prepared and incorrect.
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1995-1996 stock redemption transactions were illegal. (Riley Ajf., Exs. G and I)

Both the trial

court and the Idaho Supreme Court disagreed. McNichols v. Taylor, supra.
Mr. Taylor now attempts to switch gears. Formerly, his theory was that in light of the 1995
Opinion Letter, which he assumed to be correct, Mr. Riley was liable because Hawley Troxell's
illegality defense was improper; whereas he now is adopting the reverse theory and asserts that Mr.
Riley is liable because the 1995 Opinion Letter was negligently prepared and incorrect. The attempt
to improve his theory does not entitle Mr. Taylor to a second bite of the apple.
The basic principle of res judicata is that a party has but one opportunity to put forth all his
theories of recovery arising out of the same core facts. Under the transactional approach to res

judicata, the critical issue is "whether the two actions under consideration are based on same nucleus
of operative facts. A party who has knowledge of the factual basis of his claim is required to plead
all theories which support his asserted entitlement to recovery one action. "The purposes of res
judicata would be thwarted if a plaintiff could search for legal malpractice arguments in perpetuity
and re-file a lawsuit every time a new argument is discovered." Capitol Hill Group v. Pillsbury

Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP, 574 F.2d 143, 150 (D.D.C. 2008). 12 See also, Weiss v. Weiss, 297
Conn. 446, 465, 998 A.2d 766, 778 (2010) (holding that resjudicata bars a second suit where "All
of the relevant facts had occurred or were known or easily discoverable to the plaintiff at the time
of [the first suit.]); In re Howe, 913 F.2d 1138, 1147 (5th Cir. 1990) (knowledge of the basic facts
underlying the claims, despite ignorance of their significance, was enough to bar subsequent claims

12

Affirming the principle that "[T]he purpose of res judicata is to prevent cases from being like onions
[where after peeling back one set of issues, another set appears]. Instead, res judicata is supposed to ensure that
cases are more like apples, and a plaintiff gets one bite - one chance to assert a claim against a defendant arising out
ofa particular core of facts." Id., at 150, n. 1.
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by virtue of resjudicata); In re Smyth, 2001 WL 1013183 at *4 (5th Cir. 2001) ("general awareness
of facts that could have supported" a claim, even if no "legal conclusions" had been drawn from
them, is sufficient to invoke res judicata); Hanson v. Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia, 2006 WL
1738243 at *6 (Minn.App. 2006) ("[W]hetherthe claim was raised in the previous case is irrelevant;
the relevant inquiry is whether the claim could have been raised."); Tingley Systems, Inc. v. CSC

Consulting Inc., 919 F.Supp. 48, 52 (D.Mass. 1996) (resjudicata requires plaintiffs "to plead all ·
factually related allegations and attendant legal theories for recovery the first time they bring suit");

Williams v. Rape, 990 S.W.2d 55, 60 (Mo.App. 1999) (res judicata applies to all points and issues
"which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time").
7.

It was not necessary to await Jud&e Brudie's decision in order brin& a claim
a&ainst Richard Riley for alle&ed ne&li&ent preparation of the Opinion Letter.

A case which is analogous to the present case is Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153
Idaho 73, 279 P.3d 943 (2012) (Taylor III), the third appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court arising out
of a dispute between the Taylors and a lawyer, Thomas Maile. In January 2004, the Taylors, as
residuary beneficiaries of a trust, filed a complaint against Mr. Maile alleging professional
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty as the result of Mr. Maile's purchase ofreal property from
the trust on terms advantageous to himself. Judge Wilper dismissed the complaint on the ground that
the trust beneficiaries lacked standing to sue and only the trustee could sue on behalf of the trust.
The Taylors appealed. While the appeal was pending, the Taylors and the trustee executed a
disclaimer in which the initial trustee resigned, the Taylors were appointed as successor trustees, and
the Taylors disclaimed all interest in trust assets other than the lawsuit against Mr. Maile. The
disclaimer was approved by the probate court havingjurisdiction over the administration of the trust.
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The Idaho Supreme Court reversed Judge Wilper' s first decision and remanded, holding that
the beneficiaries of the trust had standing to bring suit. Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d
156 (2005) (Taylor I). On remand, Judge Wilper entered summary judgment for the Taylors in May
2006. Mr. Maile appealed. During the pendency of this appeal, Mr. Maile and an entity controlled
by him, Berkshire Investments, LLC, filed suit against the Taylors and their counsel alleging that the
approval of the probate court of the disclaimer had been obtained by fraud on the court.
In January 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Judge Wilper's May 2006 summary
judgment in favor of the Taylors. Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 201P.3d1282 (2009) (Taylor II).
At the trial court level, the Taylors then moved to dismiss the complaint of Berkshire and Mr. Maile
on the basis of res judicata, arguing that Mr. Maile had previously had the opportunity to litigate his
claim in the case before Judge Wilper. Mr. Maile countered that res judicata should not apply
because his fraud claim was not ripe. The trial court rejected Mr. Maile' s argument, holding that his
complaint for fraud was barred by res judicata because that theory could have been litigated in the
prior case, and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed 13 the holding of the trial court:
Although the Mailes attempt to repackage it in terms of fraud, perjury, negligence,
and ever racketeering, the central issue underlying all their claims is the interpretation
of the Opinion Letter and its effect on the Taylors' beneficial status.

Berkshire Investments, Inc. v. Taylor, 153 P. Idaho 73, _ _, 278 P .3d 943, 952 (2012) (Taylor Ill).
Taylor Ill is similar to the present case, where Reed Taylor argues that Judge Brodie did not

13

Affirming the trial court, the Idaho Supreme Court noted in Berkshire, supra at _ _, 278 P.3d at 952,
"Indeed, at the jury trial in this case, Colleen Birch-Maile stated that the Mailes had the Disclaimer in their
possession in 2004 but were not 'looking for misrepresentation,' at that time." Similarly, when litigating Hawley
Troxell No. I, Mr. Taylor had the Opinion Letter in his possession, and was on notice that AIA contended, contrary
to the Opinion Letter, the Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal and unenforceable. Mr. Taylor, therefore, had
notice of his professional negligence claim against Mr. Riley, even ifhe was not "looking for" negligence at that
time.
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hold the Stock Redemption Agreement illegal and unenforceable until after Hawley Troxell No. 1
had been dismissed. Mr. Taylor contends that he was therefore excused from litigating Mr Riley's
alleged negligence in connection with preparing the Opinion Letter in Hawley Troxell No. 1. This
argument is specious. A party who is on notice of, or can readily discover, the relevant facts and
circumstances at the time he files suit is required to litigate all his claims arising therefrom in that
suit and may not try his theories ad seriatim. Just as it was not necessary for Mr. Maile to await the
final judgment of Judge Wilper in favor of the Taylors before having an opportunity to litigate the
issue of whether the disclaimer was obtained by them by fraud on the court, it was not necessary to
await a final adjudication by Judge Brudie in the AIA Case regarding illegality of the Stock
Redemption Agreement before Mr. Taylor could have asserted his negligence claim against Mr.
Riley regarding preparation of the Opinion Letter. At the time Hawley Troxell No. I was before the
trial court, Reed Taylor was on notice of AIA's contention that the Stock Redemption Agreement
was illegal and unenforceable and the Opinion Letter perforce incorrect. Mr. Taylor could have, and
should have, asserted his claim in Hawley Troxell No. 1 against Mr. Riley for professional
negligence in connection with preparation of the Opinion Letter.

B.

Reed Taylor waived his riKht to sue on the Opinion Letter by restructurinK the
Stock Redemption AKreement.

An alternative reason for dismissing Mr. Taylor's complaint against Mr. Riley is that the

Opinion Letter does not pertain to the agreement pursuant to which Mr. Taylor's stock was actually
redeemed. Shortly after the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement was entered into, AIA defaulted.
Reed Taylor had the choice of a number of remedies, which included accelerating the debt and suing
for the amount due, repossessing the pledged stock, and selling the stock in a commercially
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reasonable manner. (Second Supplemental Affidavit ofRichard A. Riley, hereinafter 2d Supp. Riley
Aff., ifif 18-26) He chose instead to waive the default and restructure the transaction. (2d. Supp. Riley
A.ff., if 36-41) After negotiations, the parties cancelled the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and

replaced it with a Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement dated July 1, 1996 (hereinafter the
"1996 Restructure Agreement"). No opinion letter was requested or given in connection with the
1996 Restructure Agreement. (2d Supp. Riley A.ff. if 41)
The 1996 Restructure Agreement recites that the parties intended to restructure the
transaction in several respects, including adjustment of the principal amount of the down payment
note, extension of such note's maturity date, termination of a consulting agreement between Mr.
Taylor and AIA, revision of anoncompetition agreement, termination ofAIA' s obligation to pay Mr.
Taylor a monthly salary, amendment of the security agreement and stock pledge agreement, revision
of certain representations, warranties and covenants, and modification of the default and remedies
provisions. The 1996 Restructure Agreement provided, "In exchange for this restructuring of the
Company's obligations to Creditor [Reed Taylor], Creditor is willing to agree to waive, and to
forbear from exercising any remedies he may have for, any existing defaults under the Original
Documents, including (without limitation) those defaults alleged in the Notice of Default." (2d
Supp. Riley A.ff., Ex. 35)

The 1996 Restructure Agreement defines the "Original Documents" as the 1995 "Stock
Redemption Agreement, the Down Payment Note, the $6M Note, the Security Agreement, the Stock
Pledge Agreement, and the Consulting Agreement." (2d Supp. Riley A.ff., Ex. 35) All but the $6M
Note were collectively referred to as the "Superseded Documents" and were expressly replaced by
new agreements. (Other than the payment schedule embodied in the $6M Note, the 1995 deal was
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completely expunged and a new deal was substituted therefor. The 1996 Restructure Agreement
provided that, "The Superseded Documents are of no further force or effect." (2d Supp. Riley Alf.,
Ex. 35) In return, Reed Taylor agreed to waive any remedies he may have then possessed for any
existing defaults under the Original Documents. The parties granted each other mutual releases.
"Each of the Companies and Creditor hereby releases the other from any and all claims (whether
known or unknown, anticipated or unanticipated, contingent or liquidated) such party may have
arising out of previous agreements (including, without limitation, the Original Documents) or other
business arrangement between Company and Creditor. ... " (2d Supp. Riley Alf., Ex. 35)
The 1995 Opinion Letter opined only as to the effect oflaws then in force with respect to the
1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, not the 1996 Restructure Agreement. "This opinion is rendered
only with respect to the laws and the rules, regulations and orders (excluding the principles of
conflicts of laws) of the State of Idaho that are in effect as of the date hereof. We assume no
responsibility for updating this opinion to take into account any event, action, interpretation or
change of law occurring subsequent to the date hereof that may affect the validity of any of the
opinions expressed herein." (Riley Alf., Ex. C)
Whether or not the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement is legal and enforceable and whether
or not the Opinion Letter was correct are moot issues. The documents which control are the 1996
Restructure Agreement and documents executed in connection therewith. Reed Taylor has no cause
of action against Mr. Riley relating to the Opinion Letter because the accuracy of that letter is
irrelevant; Mr. Taylor waived and released all claims he had based on the 1995 Stock Redemption
Agreement. He did not request or receive an opinion regarding the 1996 Restructure Agreement and
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may not base his suit on an opinion that relates to documents other than those which control the sale
of this stock. 14
Reed Taylor continues to recognize that the 1996 Restructure Agreement governs the sale
of his stock and that no opinion was expressed regarding the legality of that agreement. Mr. Taylor
filed suit in King County, Washington, against the attorneys who represented him in connection with
the redemption of his AIA stock. 15

Therein, he accused his own counsel, Scott Bell and Frank

Taylor, 16 of committing professional malpractice by acquiescing in the supersession of the 1995
Stock Redemption Agreement by the 1996 Restructure Agreement without obtaining a new opinion
letter:

14

Reed Taylor predicated his claim in the AIA Case on the 1996 Restructure Agreement. His Fifth
Amended Complaint in the AIA Case (which was the last amendment allowed by the trial court and, therefore, the
operative pleading) alleged that, "AIA Services, AIA Insurance and Reed agreed to modify the Stock Redemption
Agreement and executed the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement."(~ 2.15) "On or about December 12,
2006, Reed provided AIA Services with written notice of default under the various provisions of the Restructure
Agreement, ..." (~ 2.26) "Despite Reed's demands, AIA Services and AIA Insurance failed to cure the numerous
defaults under the terms of the Promissory Note, Restructure Agreement," etc. (~ 2.32) "The Defendants owed Reed
obligations and/or continuing contractual obligations to timely pay him and comply with specific terms, conditions,
covenants, warranties and the like required by the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended
Security Agreement, and Restructure Agreement."(~ 3.2) "[F]ailure to pay Reed the amounts owed and comply
with the continuing contractual obligations under the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Redemption Agreement,
Amended Security Agreement and Restructure Agreement constitute a breach.... " ( ~ 3.3) "Under the Amended
Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security Agreement, and Restructure Agreement, Reed is entitled to vote the
pledged shares of AIA Insurance ...." (~ 10.2) "Despite Reed's demands for the Defendants to comply with the
provisions in the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security Agreement and
Restructure Agreement, ... the Defendants have refused to comply." (~ 10.3) "There is an implied obligation of
good faith and fair dealing between the parties in the performance of the terms and conditions of the Promissory
Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security Agreement and Restructure Agreement." (~ 12.2)
The prayer for relief sought by Reed Taylor pursuant the Fifth Amended Complaint was that he was entitled to such
relief as he "[M]ay request before or at trial to enforce his rights under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement,
Amended Security Agreement, and/or Restructure Agreement. ..." (~ 14.16). All references are to the paragraphs of
Reed Taylor's Fifth Amended Complaint in the AIA Case. (2d Supp. Riley Ajf., Ex. 56)
15

Reed Taylor v. Scott Bell et al., Case No. 12-2-10803 SEA, in the Superior Court of the State of
Washington, in and for the County of King (hereinafter referred to as the "Bell Suit"). (Affidavit ofLoren C. Ipsen,
hereinafter Ipsen Ajf., Ex. A)
16

Reed Taylor alleges there is no relation between himself and Frank Taylor.
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18.
In 1996, AIA Services defaulted on the redemption agreement and its
payments on the $1.5 million note for the down payment. At this point, AIA
Services through John and his investors, negotiated a restructuring ofthe redemption
agreement with Reed. Reed continued to be represented by Bell, Taylor and
Caimcross in the restructuring. Bell and Taylor did not request a new opinion letter
from AIA Services' legal counsel, nor did Bell and Taylor request shareholder
approval for the transaction through a formal shareholder vote or by amending the
articles ofincorporation, both of which were authorized under LC. § 30-1-6. For Bell
and Taylor's services rendered in the 1995 and 1996 transactions on behalf of Reed,
Caimcross was paid in excess of $93,000 in attorney's fees and costs.
Reed Taylor is suing different lawyers in different states for the same damages based on
different versions of the same events. In the present suit, Mr. Taylor ignores the fact that the stock
redemption transaction was restructured. In the Washington suit, Mr. Taylor focuses on the very fact
that the transaction was restructured, and asks the Washington Court to find liability on the part of
his lawyers because they did not obtain a new opinion letter regarding the Restructure Agreement.
In Isaak v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, 119 Idaho 988, 812 P.2d 295 (1990), the holder of a
promissory note secured by a mortgage renegotiated the mortgage when the obligor defaulted. The
renegotiated agreement substituted a nonrecourse note and released the obligor from personal
liability. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the holder of the note was bound by the modification
of the agreement and had waived the right to sue the obligor for personal liability upon a subsequent
default. The same principle applies to the present case. When Reed Taylor agreed to the 1996
Restructure Agreement, the new agreement entirely replaced the prior stock redemption transaction.
Reed Taylor waived all rights to seek a remedy under the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. The
1995 Opinion Letter ceased to apply because there was nothing to which it could apply. Since Reed
Taylor ultimately sold his stock pursuant to the Restructure Agreement, his attempt to file suit based
on an Opinion Letter which does not relate to that agreement is logically flawed.
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C.

Any unenforceability of the Stock Redemption Aireement was caused by Reed
Taylor's own actions.

When the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and 1996 Restructure Agreement were entered
into, there was no violationofldaho Code§ 30-1-6, as then in effect, because AIA's promise to pay
Reed Taylor was subordinate to AIA's obligation to pay Donna Taylor for the redemption of her
preferred stock. The Articles of Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation of AIA Services
Corporation filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on December 29, 1987 (hereinafter referred to
as the "1987 AIA Amended Articles"), created two classes of stock, common and stated value
preferred stock. (Ipsen A.ff, Ex. B) The only person to whom stated value preferred stock was
issued was Donna Taylor. The purpose of the issuance of preferred stock to Donna Taylor was to
provide a vehicle for cashing her out of the corporation as part of the property division in connection
with her divorce from Reed Taylor. (2d Supp. Riley Aff., ~ 53) Article 4.3(a) and (b) of 1987 AIA
Amended Articles provided that the holder of stated value preferred stock had the right to require
AIA to redeem her stock "from legally available funds" at any time after September 14, 1993, but
''. . . only to the extent such redemption shall not violate the Idaho Business Corporation Act
restrictions on the corporation's redemption of its own shares." (Ipsen Aff., Ex. B) AIA's Articles
of Incorporation were again amended and restated by Articles of Amendment filed with the Idaho
Secretary of State on April 11, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the "1995 AIA Amended Articles").
The name of Donna Taylor's stated value preferred stock was changed to "Series A Preferred Stock,"
but the provisions related to the redemption of her stock remained unchanged, including the proviso
contained in Article 4.2.3(b) (hereinafter the "fail-safe clause") that Series A Preferred Stock could
be redeemed with "legally available funds" from the holder thereof "only to the extent such
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redemption shall not violate the Idaho Business Corporation Act restrictions on the corporation's
redemption of its own shares." (Ipsen Ajf., Ex. C)
Donna Taylor exercised her right to have AIA redeem her Series A Preferred Shares. As of
the date of the Opinion Letter, August 15, 1995, AIA's agreement to redeem Donna Taylor's
preferred stock was set forth in a series of letter agreements, which consisted of (a) a letter from her
attorney, Cumer Green, to Richard Riley dated January 11, 1995, (b) a letter from Mr. Green to Mr.
Riley dated March 22, 1995, (c) a letter agreement dated July 18, 1995, and (d) a letter from Mr.
Riley to Mr. Green dated August 10, 1995. (2dSupp. RileyAjf., iii! 53, Exs. 50-53) Reed Taylor was
a party to the January 11, 1995, and July 18, 1995, letter agreements, which expressly subordinated
AIA' s obligation to redeem Reed Taylor's common stock to its obligation to redeem Donna Taylor's
preferred stock. Specifically, both the January 11, 1995, and July 18, 1995, letter agreements signed
by Reed Taylor provided:
Further, AIA Services Corporation's note or any note payable to Reed J.
Taylor for the $6,000,000 purchase price for his common shares will be subordinated
to the redemption rights of your client [Donna Taylor] so that Reed J. Taylor will
receive no principal payments on said note until Donna Taylor's stock has been
completely redeemed. Reed J. Taylor will receive no interest payments on the note
payable to him if payments to Donna Taylor are in default.
Accordingly, when the Opinion Letter was drafted, an agreement was in place that Donna
Taylor's preferred stock would be redeemed first "to the extent that such redemption shall not violate
the Idaho Business Corporation Act restrictions on the redemption of its own shares," and only then
would the outstanding balance due to Reed Taylor for the redemption of his stock become due. This
subordination is reflected by the terms of the Promissory Note dated August 1, 1995, payable by AIA
to Reed Taylor for the balance of the purchase price arising from the redemption of his AIA stock
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(the "$6M Note"), which provided that, "This Note is subordinate to the payment of the redemption
obligations owed by the Company to Donna Taylor pursuant to that certain letter agreement dated
January 11, 1995, signed by Company, Payee [Reed Taylor], Donna Taylor and Cumer Green." (2d

Supp. Riley Aff., if5, Ex. 4) No redemption of Donna Taylor's stock, hence no redemption of Reed
Taylor's stock, could occur if such redemption would "violate the Idaho Business Corporation Act
restrictions on the corporation's redemption of its own shares." 17 Mr. Riley's contemporaneous
handwritten notes show that the subordination of Reed Taylor's redemption obligation to Donna
Taylor's and the fail-safe clause which precluded any stock from being redeemed unless such
redemption would be legal under the Idaho Business Corporation Act, were taken into account in
preparing the Opinion Letter. (2d Supp. Riley Aff., if54, Ex. 54)
A subordinated debt does not become due until the senior debt is satisfied. In Culp v. Tri-

County Tractor, Inc., 112 Idaho 894, 736 P. 2d 1348 (Ct.App. 1987), a creditor brought an action
to collect the amount allegedly due on subordinated notes. The Court, however, held that there could
be no default on the subordinated debt while the senior loan was still outstanding.
Payment in those circumstances would have violated the subordination agreements.
Failure to perform a prohibited act cannot be treated as an event of default.

Id. at 897, 736 P.2d at 1351.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Blickenstaff v. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572, 581, 97 P.3d 439, 448
(2004), adopted with approval the definition of a subordination agreement from Culp:

17

It is true that the subordination of Reed Taylor to Donna Taylor could result in a significant delay in
payment to Reed Taylor because his note would not become due until such time as she was paid in full, which could
only happen when and if the corporation had legally available funds from which it could redeem Donna Taylor's
stock without violating the restrictions of the IBCA on the redemption of stock. But this is the deal Reed Taylor
made and the predicate on which the Opinion Letter was based.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RICHARD A. RILEY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 21
G:\Client\7082\0013\HTEH#2\Memomandum in Support of Richard A Riley's Motion for Summary Judgment ver_07.wpd

001886

It is the subordination or the right to receive payment of certain indebtedness (the
"subordinated debt") to the prior payment of certain other indebtedness (the "senior
debt") of the same debtor .... [A] "complete" subordination permits no payment to
be made on the subordinated debt at any time while the senior debt remains
outstanding.
The carefully orchestrated prioritization of payments, whereby Reed Taylor was subordinated
to Donna Taylor, was preserved when the transaction was restructured in 1996. In connection with
the Restructure Agreement, the parties executed a Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement dated
July 1, 1996, in which Reed Taylor, Donna Taylor and AIA agreed that the redemption of Reed
Taylor's common stock remained subordinated to the redemption of Donna Taylor's preferred stock:
Payment of principal to Creditor [Reed Taylor] on the $6M Note (whether at maturity
or at any time in accordance with any right of prepayment) shall be subordinated to
payment in full of Company's obligation to redeem the Series A Preferred Stock.
Company shall not pay any principal on the $6M Note until the Series A Preferred
Stock is completely redeemed (provided, however, this limitation shall not preclude
Company from exercising any contractual or equitable right of offset against the
principal of the $6M Note)
The Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement dated July 1, 1996, also provided that, "No
provision of this Agreement may be amended, modified, waived, or supplemented, except in writing
signed by all the parties to this Agreement." (2d Supp. Riley A.ff, Ex. 49) Notwithstanding that
provision, Reed Taylor subsequently visited Donna Taylor at her home and succeeding in convincing
her, without advice of independent counsel, to sign a Subordination Agreement dated December 1,
2006, reversing the order of payment- i.e., Donna Taylor agreed to subordinate the payment of the
amount owed her by AIA for the redemption of her preferred stock to the amount owed to Reed
Taylor for the redemption of his common stock. (2d Supp. Riley A.ff., Ex 55) AIA did not agree to
the 2006 Subordination Agreement. Judge Brodie held that the consent of AIA was not required.

(Ashby A.ff., Ex. D)
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Reed Taylor's actions backfired. The effect of the 2006 Subordination Agreement was to
cause the amount owed Reed Taylor to become due and payable and to deprive not only AIA, but
Reed Taylor, of the protection of the fail-safe clause. The subsequent invalidation of the Stock
Redemption Agreement due to illegality was ironically the result of Reed Taylor's own actions
calculated to prefer himself to the detriment of his former spouse. Having himself changed the
predicate upon which the Opinion Letter was based, Reed Taylor has no cause of action against Mr.
Riley, whose Opinion Letter was based upon a set of totally different facts.
D.

Harrigfeld continues to be &ood law in Idaho.

As this Court has recognized, there was no attorney-client relationship between Mr. Taylor
and Mr. Riley in regard to the redemption of Mr. Taylor's stock. The Idaho Supreme Court
subsequently issued its opinion in Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P.3d 642 (2010), which
reaffirmed the continuing vitality of Harrigfeld 18 Mr. Riley was a party-defendant in Taylor v.

McNichols, supra. The holding that Reed Taylor lacked standing to sue AIA's attorneys applied to
Mr. Riley, as well as to the other defendants in that case. The Supreme Court therein declined Reed
Taylor's invitation to expand its "carefully reasoned analysis in Harrigfeld." Taylor v. McNichols,
at 845, 243 P.3d at 661.
Of course, this Court did not have the benefit of the Taylor v. McNichols decision when it
previously ruled on the issue of whether Reed Taylor could sue Mr. Riley concerning the Opinion
Letter in spite oflack of privity. If any such expansion of Harrigfeld is to be made, it is the province

18

The Idaho Supreme Court in Harrigfeldv. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 137, 90 P.3d 884, 887 (2004),
enunciated the rule that "an attorney-client relationship with the plaintiff is a prerequisite for holding the attorney
liable for negligence in the performance oflegal services." The only exception is that an attorney owes a duty to
testamentary beneficiaries to "effectuate the testator's intent as expressed in the testamentary instruments." Id., at
138, 90 P.3d at 888.
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of the Idaho Supreme Court to do so. Unless and until it is reversed or modified by the Idaho
Supreme Court, Harrigfeld continues to be the law in this State and bars Mr. Taylor's cause of action
for professional malpractice against an attorney with whom he did not have an attorney-client
relationship.

III.

Conclusion

The complaint against Mr. Riley should be dismissed for the following reasons: (1) Res

judicata bars Mr. Taylor's attempt to play another ticket in the litigation lottery. Mr. Taylor was
placed on notice of his claim against Mr. Riley relating to the Opinion Letter in April 2008, and his
cause of action accrued at that time. He litigated, or could have litigated, that claim in Hawley
Troxell No. 1, which he filed in August 2008. (2) The Opinion Letter relates to a different
transaction than the agreement whereby Mr. Taylor's stock was actually redeemed. The 1995 Stock
Redemption Agreement was completely superseded and replaced by the 1996 Restructure
Agreement. Mr. Riley expressed no opinion regarding the 1996 Restructure Agreement. (3) Reed
Taylor changed the factual predicate on which the Opinion Letter was based when he entered into
a new agreement without the consent of AIA, subordinating the redemption of Donna Taylor's stock
to his. This material change in the underlying facts vitiates the Opinion Letter, which was based on
a different set of facts. (4) Harrigfeld remains good law in Idaho and precludes a suit for
professional negligence against an attorney with whom the plaintiff is not in privity.
DATED this / j day of August, 2012.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By:~~
James D. LaRue, Of the Firm
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _f_£_ day of August, 2012, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner indicated
below:
Roderick C. Bond
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, Washington 98004

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495

Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

_y

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(425) 321-0343
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U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
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Loren C. Ipsen ISB #1767
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844

AUG 1 5 2012
CHRISTOPHER O. RICH, Clerk
By ANNAMARIE MEYER
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendants Richard A. Riley and
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No. CV-OC-0918868

Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF LOREN C. IPSEN

v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; ROBERT M.
TURNBOW, an individual; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;
Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO

)
) SS.

County of Ada

)

LORENC. IPSEN, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
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1.

I am a shareholder with the law firm of Elam & Burke, P.A., attorneys of record

for Defendants Richard A. Riley and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP.
2.

This Affidavit is made in support of Defendant Richard A. Riley's Motion for

Summary Judgment.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a certified copy of the Complaint for Legal

Malpractice, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, and Violation of the Washington State Consumer
Protection Act filed March 28, 2012, in the Superior Court of the State of Washington, in and for
the County of King, captioned Reed Taylor, Plaintiffv. Scott Bell and Jane Doe Bell, and their
marital community; Frank Taylor and Jane Doe Taylor, and their marital community; Caimcross
& Hempelmann, a Professional Service Corporation, Defendants.

4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a certified copy of the Articles of Amendment of

the Articles of Incorporation of AIA Services Corporation filed December 29, 1987, with the
Idaho Secretary of State.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a certified copy of the Articles of Amendment to

the Articles of Incorporation of AIA Services Corporation filed April 11, 1995, with the Idaho
Secretary of State.

AFFIDAVIT OF LOREN C. IPSEN - 2

001892

•''

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this or'

day of August, 2012.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11>' day of August, 2012, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(425) 321-0343

~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 529-9732

RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC

800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, Washington 98004

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA

2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495

Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

11"

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-9177
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FILED
12 MAR 28 AM 9:00
KING COUNTY
SUPERIOR COURT CLER
E-FILED
CASE NUMBER: 12-2-10803-0

2

EA

3
4

5
6

7

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KING

8
9

REED TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,

10

11
12
13
14
15

CASE NO.

v.
SCOTT BELL and JANE DOE BELL, and their
marital community; FRANK TAYLOR and .~ANE
DOE TAYLOR, and their marital community·;
CAIRNCROSS & HE:MPELMANN, a Professional
Service Corporation,

COMPLAINT FOR LEGAL
MALPRACTICE, BREACH
OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, AND
VIOLATION OF THE
WASIDNGTON STATE
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

Defendants.

16
17

18
19
20

COMES NOW the Plaintiff and for cause of action against the Defendants complains
and alleges as follows:

General Allegations

21

22
23

1.

Plaintiff Reed Taylor ("Reed" or ''plaintiff') is an individual and resident of

the State ofldaho and has been a resident ofldaho at all relevant times. Reed is 75-years-old

24

and does not have a college degree.
25
26
27

2.

Plaintiff is informed and believes that defendant Scott Bell ("Bell"), is a

resident of the State of Washington, Ci: ..nty of King. Bell is an attorney, licensed to practice
COMPLAINT FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE, BREACH
OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, AND VIOLATION OF THE
WASHINGTON STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT· 1

LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT B. GOULD
2110 North Pacific St., Suite 100
Seattle, WA 98103-9126
(206) 633-4442
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I A

law in the State of Washington, and a shareholder of ~efendant Cairncross & Hempelmann, a
2

Professional Service Corporation. Bell does business in Seattle, County of King, in the

3

Seattle venue. Plaintiff further alleges that any obligation incurred herein by Bell was for the

4

benefit of the marital community of Bell and Jane Doe Bell whose true name is unknown to

5

plaintiff.

6

3.

Plaintiff is informed and beli1wes that defendant Frank Taylor ("Taylor"), is a

7

8
9

resident of the State of Washington, County of King. Taylor is an attorney, licensed to
practice law in the State of Washington, and a shareholder of defendant Cairncross &

10

Hempelmann, a Professional Service Corporation. Taylor does business in Seattle, County of

11

King, in the Seattle venue. Plaintiff further alleges that obligation incurred by Taylor herein

12

was for the benefit of the marital (';Ommunity of Taylor and Jane Doe Taylor whose true name

13

is unknown to plaintiff. Taylor is not related to Reed.
14
15

4.

Defendant Cairncrcss & Hempelmann, is a Washington professional services

16

corporation ("Caimcross"), and is 1 law firm doing business in Seattle, Washington. At all

17

relevant times, Bell and Taylor were employees, agents and/or shareholders of Cairncross.

18

The liability of Caimcross for the actions, imctions and negligence of Bell and Taylor arise

19

from the doctrine of respondeat superior and vicarious liability.

20

5.

Venue is proper in this Court since the defendants' principal place of business

21
22
23
24

25

and/or residence is in King County fil'} fue acts complained of occurred in King County,
Seattle venue.

6.

Plaintiff began seldng group health insurance through farmer associations in or

aboutl969. In 1974, Reed founded AJA Insurance, Inc. ("AJA'') and expanded selling group

26

health insurance to members of national farmers assoc;ations in the major farming states
27
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throughout the United States. Under the business model developed by Reed, AJA
2

administered and collected dues for the associations and in exchange AJA held exclusive

3

contracts to market and sell group insurance products to association members. Under this

4

business model, AIA's business thrived and performed well.

5
6

7.

In 1976, Taylor's younger brother, R. John Taylor ("John"), joined AIA. John

had an accounting degree and was licensed to practic~ law in the State of Idaho. Over the

7

8
9

10
11

12

next two decades, Reed primarily foe· · ed on travelling and outside sales, functions that
served to build up the original business model. Reed delegated the financial management and
legal affairs to his brother John.
8.

In 1988, Reed and John formed AIA Services Corporation ("AIA Services") as

the holding company for the various AIA entities. In exchange for contributing certain assets

13

to AIA Services, including his ownership in AfA Insurance, Reed was issued additional
14
15
16
17

" common shares and all of the outstanding Sed~s A Preferred Shares in AIA Services.
9.

Reed's Series A Preferred

19

were later transferred to his ex-wife, Donna

Taylor, as part of his divorce. Richard Riley ("Riley") and the law firm of Eberle, Berlin,
•

18

S~!a;.;:s

'~

f

Kading, Turnbow & McKlve(m, Chartered ("Eberle Berlin"), located in Boise, Idaho,
represented Reed in his divon :e. Eberle Berlin also acted as AIA ~ ervices and its subsidiaries

20

attorneys for the negotiation rnd finalization of the terms for the re(f.emption and the
21

22
23

24

25

26

redemption related agreements. After his divorce Reed owned approximately 63.03% of AIA
Services and his brother John owned approximately 19.07%.
10.

In 1995, John and an investor group desired to purchas• Reed's shares and take

AIA ·Services public or to effectuate a sale of the company. Reed resisted this, but ultimately
agreed to sell his shares through a stock redemption plan under the advite and direction of the

27
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Defendants. The parties contemplated a stock redemption by AIA Services whereby John and
2

his investor group would become the majority shareholders of AIA Services without directly

3

purchasing Reed's shares in the comp~y and without being personally liable for the

4

redemption obligations.

5

11.

During the negotiations, defendants Bell, Taylor and Caimcross, in Seattle,

6

Washington represented Reed. Neither Bell nor Taylor was authorized and admitted to the
7

8
9

practice law in the State of Idaho. Neither Bell nor Taylor advised Reed that they were not
licensed to practice law in Idaho and no written consents were obtained from Reed. Bell and

IO

Taylor's acts and/or omissions constitute the unlawful practice oflaw in Idaho, which is a

11

misdemeanor crime under Idaho law.

12

12.

The ultimate transaction that was engineered was via a restructuring of AIA

13

Services, and the redemption of Reed'., stock by AIA Services. The transaction was intended
14

15

to pay Reed approximately $7 .S million dollars for his interest in the company, along with

16

other consideration. Neither John nor his investor group was individually liable for the debt.

17

In addition, Bell and Taylor did not require, or recommend, that John and his investors

18

personally purchase Reed's shares or otherwise be responsible for the payment for his shares.

19

The final terms of the stock redemption called for Reed to be paid $1.S million in cash at the

20

closing, the elimination of $469,996 in debt to the company, the transfer of approximately
21
22

$1,321,000 in aircraft to Reed (which required Reed to assume $670,000 in debt securing the

23

aircraft), and a $6 million promissol) uote (''Note") with interest payable monthly, and

24

principal due in 10 years. Reed was granted secur.ty in all of AIA Services' assets.

25

However, Reed would never had acquired, paid for and maintained the aircraft had he been

26

advised that the redemption of his shares was illegal hlld that he would not be paid.

27
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13.

------ - ----- -----

By structuring the transaction in this fashion, it should have been clear to Bell

2

and Taylor that John and his investor group's intent was to create a liquidity event by taking

3

the company public or selling the company and thereby reaping the cash penefits as the new

4

"majority" shareholders. On the other hand, if John and the investor group's plan did not

5

work out, they would be simply obligated to 'return" whatever was left of the company to

6

Reed in 10 years if the company defaulted on the notes. Neither Bell nor Taylor recognized
7
8
9

the great risk in this transaction to Reed nor did they advise Reed of the risks, and did not
recommend on his behalf that the dea:.

;,,~

structured as a personal buyout of his stock by John

10

and his investor group. Bell and Taylor were fully aware that Reed would be relying on the

11

redemption of his shares for his ultimate retirement.

12

14.

At the time the stock redemption was in place, Idaho Code§ 30-1-6 provided,

13

in part, that "No purchase of or payment for its own shares shall be made at a time when the
14

corporation is insolvent or when such purchs :e or payment would make it insolvent." That
0

15

16

code section also required that the shareholders vote for and approve the stock redemption

17

transaction be paid from the "capital surplus" if there was a negative earned surplus. None of

18

the defendants advised Reed that iftht""
r.ompany
did not comply with I.C. § 30-1-6, the
I
,.

19

transaction would be void. Plaintiff is informed and believes that defendants Bell, Taylor and

20

Caimcross were not aware ofI.C. § 30-1-6.
21

22

15.

In connection with the redemption, AIA Services amended its articles of

23

incorporation. A draft copy of the proposed amended articles of incorporation was proved to

24

Bell and Taylor for their review and approval. InsK:ad of requiring a provision to be inserted

25

in the amended articles of incorporation which app:roved the redemption of Reed's shares and

26

27
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waiving the restrictions under LC. § 30-1-6, Bell and Taylor approved the amended articles of
2
3
4

incorporation as proposed.
16.

Bell and Taylor knew that Reed was the majority shareholder in AIA Services

and that any redemption of a majority shareholder's common shares could or would be
f

5

.~.

•

scrutinized at a later date. Bell and Taylor included a provision in the redemption agreements

6

requiring Reed to vote his shares in favor of the transaction, when they knew or should have
7
8
9

known that Reed's shares were disqualified from voting on a transaction that favored the
majority shareholder. Had the proper shareholder resolutions or articles of incorporation been

10

presented and approved by the minority shareholders, then the transaction to redeem his

11

shares would have been legal, notwithstanding Bell and Taylor's failure to require John and

12

the investor group to purchase Reed's shares.

13

17.

As a condition of the redemption, Riley and Eberle Berlin were required to

14

15

·deliver to Reed an opinion letter in a fo::.tll acceptable to the defendants, in addition to any

16

other documents deemed appropriate and necessary by Bell and Taylor of Caimcross. On

17

August 15, 1995, Eberle Berlin provided an opinion letter to Reed in the form and substance

18

approved by the defendants, and Eberle Berlin represented that no laws were being violated

19

by the redemption agreement, that all necessary consents had been obtained, that AIA

20

Services had the power and authority to enter into the transaction, among other things. The
21

22
23
24
25

26

defendants knew or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that the
opinion letter was incorrect and violated then existing Idaho statutory law.
18.

In 1996, AIA Services 1.Jaulted on the redemption agreement and its

payments on the $1.5 million note for the down payment. At this point, AIA Services through
John and his investors, negotiated a restructuring of the redemption agreement with Reed.

27
COMPLAINT FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE, BREACH
OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, AND VIOLATION OF THE
WASHINGTON STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT- 6

LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT B. GOULD
2110 North Pacific St., Suite 100
Seattle, WA 98103-9126
(206) 633-4442

001900

--

----------------

,.
Reed continued to be represented by Bell, Taylor and Caimcross in the restructuring. Bell and
2

Taylor did not request a new opinion letter from AIA Services' legal counsel, nor did Bell and

3

Taylor request shareholder approval for the transaction through a formal shareholder vote or

4

by amending the articles of incorporation, both of which were authorized under J.C.§ 30-1-6.

5

For Bell and Taylor's services rendered in the 1995 and 1996 transactions on behalf of Reed,
,,

6

Caimcross was paid in excess of $93,000 in attorney's fees and costs.
7
8
9

19.

In August of 2005;the $6 million note matured and AJA Services defaulted on

payment. On January 29, 2007, Reed filed suit against AJA Services, John, and others in the

10

Nez Perce County District Court in Lewiston, Idaho under cause no. CV0?-00208 ("Idaho

II

action"). Reed moved for, and obtained, partial summary judgment on the default of the $6

12

million note.

13

20.

On April 16, 2008, the defendants in the Idaho action raised, for the first time,

14
15 '

a defense that the redemption of Reed's shares violated the Idaho Code (but not LC. § 30-1-6),

16

and that the redemption and all supporting documents were illegal contracts. On February 12,

17

2009, the underlying defendants specifically alleged, for the first time, that the redemption

18

transaction violated LC. § 30-1-6 (which had since been repealed).

19

21.

On June 19, 2009, the Nez Perce district court in the Idaho action granted the

20

defendants Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, finding that the redemption agreement was
21
22

illegal and unenforceable. In its decision, the district court found that AIA Services had a

23

negative earned surplus at the time of tht: redemption, and that there was no evidence

24

presented that there was ever an affirmative vote of the majority of the shareholders that the

25

capital surplus could be looked to for the redrmiption of the shares. The district court further

26

noted that "[t]here is no question that all parties, including Plaintiff, either ignored or failed to

27
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consider J.C. § 30-1-6." The Idaho Supreme Court on September 7, 2011 affirmed the district
2

court's findings, concluding that "it appears none of the parties recognized the potential

3

violation ofl.C. § 30-1-6." The Idaho Supreme Court rejected Reed's arguments to have the

4

redemption enforced and noted that the transaction appeared to favor Reed over the minority

5

shareholders - which could have easily been prevented had Bell and Taylor exercised the

6

minimum standard of care of reasonable attorneys familiar with Idaho law in the same or
7

similar circumstances.

8

22.

9
10

Caimcross in defeating the motion for partial summary judgment in the Idaho Action, none of

11

the defendants herein offered any help to Reed. Ultimately Bell agreed to provide an affidavit

12

..

Despite numerous requests by Reed for assistance from Bell, Taylor and

in support of Reed's argument that he was not in pari delicto.

13

23.

At no time during f1.e relevant periods above were Bell or Taylor admitted to

14

,,

.
{

15
16

practice law in Idaho in violation of fueir duty of care to Reed and RPC 5.5 .
24.

Due to ongoing litii;,ation in Idaho that impacted potentially liability defendants

17

Bell, Taylor and Caimcross executed a one-year Tolling Agreement of the statute of

18

limitations effective April 1, 2010. That Agreement was extended for an additional year in

19

2011, and expires on March 31, 2012.

20

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
'(For Legal Malpractice)

21

22
23

25.

Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations

of paragraphs 1 through 24, inclusive, as though set forth at length.

24

26.

By virtue of the attorney/client reh:..~onship between the defendants, on the one

25

haud, and plaintiff, on the other hand, defendants owed to plaintiff all duties and obligations
26
27
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of reasonable attorneys in the same or-similar circumstances including, but not limited to, the
2

following:

3

A.

The duty to represent plaintiff and plaintiff's interests faithfully;

4

B.

The duty to, at all times, deal with plaintiff honestly and with the

5

utmost good faith;

6

C.

The duty to represent 1Jlaintiff in accordance with the Rules of

7

8
9

Professional Conduct of the State Bar, State of Washington and the standard of care
for lawyers in the State of Washington;

10

D.

The duty to rep:".'PSent plaintiff with undivided loyalty;

11

E.

The duty to disclose significant information to plaintiff, including,

12

without limitation, the fact that defendants were not licensed to practice law in Idaho.

13

27.

Despite these fundamental duties, defendants failed to comply with the

14

15
16
17
18

19

minimum standard of care, anci breached their duties to plaintiffs by committing, among other
things, the errors and omissions set forth in paragraphs 6 through 23 above, and further:
A.

failed to comply with the required standard of conduct as set forth in

RPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, and 5.5, among others;
B.

practiced law in Idaho when not authorized to do so;

c.

rendered opinioas and advice regarding legal matters which defendants

20
21

22
23

24

were not qualified to do so, including the impact of Idaho law on plaintiff;

D.

failed to .recognize that the redemption agreement and transaction were

illegal and void as a matter of law if not in compliance with LC. § 30-1-6;

25
26

27
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E.

failed to understand the implications ofl.C § 30-1-6 and request

appropriate corporate shareholder approvals of the redemption transaction through

2

appropriate resolutions or an amendment of~e articles of incorporation;

3

F.

4

5

failed to request, require. or recommend that Reed sell his shares to John

and the investor group, rather than redeem the shares with the corporate entity.

6

28.

Defendant's conduct, as set forth herein above, was neglectful, dilatory,

7

negligent, and fell below the recognized standard of care owed by attorneys to their clients,
8

9

including the standard of care in King County and the State of Washington.
29.

10
11

Had defendants fulfilled their duties to plaintiff, and acted reasonably and

within the standard of care, plaintiff would have been provided competent counsel.

12

30.

As a direct and proximate result of defendants' negligence, plaintiff has been

13

damaged in a sum within the jurisdiction of this court and in an amount according to proof.
14
15 .

Plaintiff will seek leave of court to amend this Complaint to allege the exact amount of said

16

damages when said sum is fully ascerLatned or the amount proven at or before the time of

17

trial.

18

.SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Fiduciary Duty)

19
20

31.

Plaintiff repeat~~, realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations

21

of paragraphs 1 through 24, and 26 through 29, inclusive, of this Complaint as though set
22
23
24

forth at length herein.
32.

By virtue of the attorney/client and/or special relationship between defendants,

25

on the one hand, and plaintiff, on the other hand, there existed a fiduciary relationship

26

between plaintiff and defendants. The defendants WF.,.Te under a duty to act or to give advice

27

for the benefit of Reed, upon a matter within the sccpe of the engagement.
COMPLAINT FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE, BREACH
OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, AND VIOLATION OF THE
WASHINGTON STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT- 10

LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT B. GOULD
2110 North Pacific St., Suite l 00
Seattle, WA 98103-9126
(206) 633-4442

001904

33.

By virtue of the attorney/client and/or special or superior knowledge

2

relationship between plaintiff and defendants, and by virtue of the fiduciary and/or special

3

relationship between plaintiff and defendants, defend~ts owed to plaintiff all duties and

4

obligations of a trustee and fiduciary to a beneficiary including, but not limited to, the

5

following:

6

A.

The duty to represent plaintiff and plaintiff's interests faithfully;

B.

The duty to, at all timts, deal with plaintiff honestly and with the

7

8
9

utmost good faith;

c.

10
11

12

The duty to represent plaintiff in accordance with the applicable Rules

of Professional Conduct, incl;' ':ng the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State
Bar, State of Washington;

13

D.

The duty to represent plaintiff with undivided loyalty;

E.

The duty to disclose significant information to plaintiff;

F.

The duty to not engage in the unauthorized practice of law.

14
15

16
17

18
19

34.

Defendants breached these fiduciary and/or special duties owed to plaintiff by

committing, among other things, those acts as set forth in 6 through 24 above.
35.

Defendants further had a fiduci!\l'}', and ethical duty, to fully comply with

20

Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, and 5.5, and 8.4 of the Rules of Professional conduct, among others.
'

21

22
23
24
25

Defendants breached their fiduciary duties and the ethical responsibilities to plaintiff, by
among other things:

A.

Engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in the State of Idaho when

not authorized to do so;

26
27
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B.

By providing legal opinions and representation to plaintiff regarding

2

legal matters which defendants were not qualified to do, including the impact of Idaho

3

law on plaintiff;

4

c.

5

By failing to recognize that the redemption agreement and transaction

were illegal and void as a matter oflaw if not in compliance with LC. § 30-1-6;

6

D.

By failing to identify and understand the implications of I.C § 30-1-6,

7
8
9

10

Idaho common law and request appropriate corporate shareholder approvals of the
redemption transaction through formal shareholder resolutions or the amendment of
AIA Services articles of incorporation;

11
12

E.

By failing to recommend or require that Reed sell his shares directly to

John and the investor group, rather than redeem the shares with the corporate entity.

13

36.

As a direct and proximate result of defendants' breach of fiduciary and/or other

14
15

special duties, plaintiff has been damaged in a sum within the jurisdiction of this court and in

16

an amount according to proof. Plaintiff will seek leave of court to amend this Complaint to

17

allege the exact amount of said damages when said sUm. is fully ascertained or in the amount

18

to be proven at or before the time of trial.

19

37.

As a further direct and proximate result of defendants' breaches of their

20

fiduciary duty, plaintiff seeks the disgorgement and return of all fees, profits and costs
21
22

23
24

incurred by defendants as a result of their improper conduct.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Violation of the Washington State Consumer Protection
Act, RCW ~.9.86, et seq.)

25
26
27
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.

38.

Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations

2

of paragraphs 1through23, 25 througt 28, and 31through34,inclusive, of this Complaint as

3

though set forth at length herein.

4

5

39.

Defendants are and have been engaged in the trade and profession of the

practice oflaw in King County, in the State of Washington.

6

40.

Defendants engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the

7
8
9

10

11
12

entrepreneurial aspect of the practice of law in their business dealings with plaintiff.
41.

Specifically, but not expressly limited to the following, defendants committed

the acts alleged in ~~6 through 13 and ~34 aboTe.
42.

Plaintiff alleges that these, and other acts of the defendant, were part of a

deceptive and unfair business practice engaged by defendants in their trade and profession,

13

and in the entrepreneurial aspect of the practice of law. Plaintiff further alleges that these acts
14
15

were in violation ofRCW 19.86.020 et seq. Upon information and belief, plaintiff believes

16

and hence alleges that upon information and belief, that this is not the first time that

17

defendants and/or members of defendant Caimcross ~ve represented out of state defendants

18

in out of state transactions without being licensed to practice there or associating with counsel

19

in that jurisdiction. .

20

43.

As a direct and proximate result of the defendants' unfair or deceptive trade

21
22

practices, plaintiff has been damaged ll1 a sum within the jurisdiction ofthis court and in an

23

amount according to proof. Plaintiff will seek leave of court to amend this Complaint to

24

allege the exact amount of said damages when said sum is fully ascertained.

25
26
27
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44.

As a further direct and proximate cause of defendants' unfair and deceptive

2

trade practices, plaintiff has incurred and will continue to incur legal fees and costs in a sum

3

according to proof.

4

45.

5

Plaintiff further alleges that as a result of defendants' unfair and deceptive

trade practices, she is entitled to an award of treble damages in an amount up to $25,000.00.

6

46.

Plaintiff further prays for injunctive relief to prohibit defendants, and each of

7
8

them, from using similar fee agreements with other clients.

9

10

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays as follows:

11

On the First Cause of Action

12

1.

13
14

For an award of damages compensating plaintiff in an amount to be proven at

or before trial;
2.

For an award of pre-judgmtmt ir1terest at the legal rate;

15

On the Second Cause of Action
16

3.

For an award of damages compensating plaintiff in an amount to be proven at

17
18

or before trial;

19

4.

For an award of pre-judgment interest at the legal rate;

20

5.

For relinquishment, disgorgement and repayment of fees received by

I

21
22

defendants arising from their breach of fiduciary duty;

On the Third Cause of Action

23
24

25

6.

For all damages caused plaintiff as a direct and proximate result of the

defendants' unfair and deceptive acts and trade practices;

26

7.

For plaintiffs reasonable attorney's fees and costs, according to proof;

27

8.

For treble damages up to $25,000.00 per violation;
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9.
2
3

4
5

Injunctive relief to prohibit defendants, and each of them, from using similar

deceptive and illegal contracts with other clients or from deceiving other clients by practicing
law in violation of RPC 5.5.
On the All Causes of Action

10.

For an award of damages compensating plaintiff for his costs of suit incurred

6

herein; and,
7

8
9
10

11

11.

For such other and further relief as Reed may request at or before trial and/or

that the court deems just and proper.

DATED this jJ_ day of March, 2012.
LAW OFFICES OF

12
13
14

15

16

LAW OFFICES OF BRIAN H. KRIKORIAN

17

/} . /J-)L. r: k,~
tpv.:_

18
19
20
21

22

hy Is BRIAN H. KRIKORIAN

{J;ra-.J
~

WSBA#27861
2110 N. Pacific Street, Suite 100
Seattle, Washington 98103
Telephone: (206) 547-1942
Fax: (425) 732-0115
bhkrik@bhklaw.com

rY

~ ~ yt._., .~tll

23
24

25
26

27
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RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By~ BJ~ J:~J

2
3
4

i

5

6

RODERICK BOND,W8BA
800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, WA 98004
Tel: (425) 591-6903
Fax: (425) 321-0343
Email: rod@roderickbond.com

7
8
9
10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24

"

t; ..
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26
27
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State of, Idaho
Off ice of the Secretary of State
I

I, BEN YSURSA, Secretary of State of th~State of Idaho, hereby certify that I
am the custodian of the corporation 1)imited liability company, limited partnership,
limited liability partnership, and

assµ~ed business name records of this State.

I FURTHER CERTIFY That the annexed is a full, true and complete duplicate of
and filed on [)ecember
Certificate of Amendment of AIA Services 'Corporation,
" received
,
,

29, 1987, under file number C74568

Dated: July 27, 2012

~~
SECRETARY OF STATE

001912

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION
I PETE T. CENARRUSA, Secretary of State of the State of Idaho hereby. certify that
duplicate originals of Articles of Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation of

AIA SllRYICES CORPORATICU

been received in this office and are found to conform to law.
ACCORDINGLY and by virtue of the authority vested in me by law. I issue this Certificate of

of Amendment.

Dated

December 29

'19

87

SECRETARY OF STATE

7clrporation Clerk
-
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iiiICLES OF AMENDMENT
;fg~RTICLES OF INCORPORATION
OF
SECREl '4R~ Of ~°MfsERVICESCORPORATION

UEC

Z9

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 30· I·59 and 30-1-61 of the Idaho
Business Corporation Act, the undersigned corporation adopts the following
Articles of Amendment to its Articles of Incorporation, as heretofore amended.
FIRST: The name of the corporation is AIA SERVICES CORPORATION.
SECOND:

Effective on December ~3, 1987, the shareholders of the

corporation adopted and approved the following Amended and Restated Articles
of Incorporation of AIA Services Corporation, pursuant to which Article Fourth
was amended by replacing it in its entirety and new Articles Tenth and Eleventh
were added to the original Articles of Incorporation of AIA Services Corporation
as filed on December 20, 1983 and previously amended on October 14, 1986:
"AMENDED AND RESTATED ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION
OF
AIA SERVICESCORPORATION
Except for the amendment of Article Fourth by replacing it in its entirety
and the addition of new Article Tenth and new Article Eleventh as contained
herein, these Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation of AIA Services
Corporation correctly set forth without change the corresponding provisions of
the original Articles of Incorporation as heretofore filed on December 20, 1983
and amended on October 14, 1986; and these Amended and Restated Articles of
Incorporation of AIA Services Corporation, including the amendment of Article
Fourth and the addition of new Articles Tenth and Eleventh, supersede the
original Articles of Amendment and all previous amendments thereto.
FIRST
The name of the corporation is AIA SERVICES CORPORATION.
SECOND
The period of its duration is perpetual.

ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT - 1
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THIRD
The purpose for which the corporation is organized is for the transaction
of any or all lawful business for which the corporation may be incorporated
under the Idaho Business Corporation Act.

FOURTH
4.1 Authoriz.cd Capital. This corporation is authorized to issue two classes
of stock to be designated, respectively, "Stated Value Preferred Stock" and
"Common Stock".
The total number of shares which this corporation is
authorized to issue is 5,200,000 shares, of which 200,000 shares shall be Stated
Value Preferred Stock, without par value, and 5,000,000 shares shall be common
stock, $1.00 par value. The Stated Value Preferred Stock shall be issued in a
single series; and each share of Stated Value Preferred Stock shall have the
rights and preferences conferred in this Article Fourth. Holders of Stated Value
Preferred Stock shall have no rights to share in any distribution of the profits
or assets of the corporation, whether in the form of cash or stock or dividends
or otherwise, except to the extent specifically provided herein.

4.2

No Dividends.

The Stated Value Preferred Stock shall not pay or

accrue any dividends.
4.3 Demand for Redemption. (a) The holder of Stated Value Preferred
Stock shall have the right to require the corporation to redeem such stock from
any legally available funds upon breach of any covenant of the corporation set
forth in this Article Fourth, but only to the extent such redemption shall not
violate the Idaho Business Corporation Act restrictions on the corporation's
redemption of its own shares.
This right may be exercised by giving the
corporation written notice of demand for redemption specifying the default and a
redemption date not less than ninety (90) days from the date such notice
delivered to the corpora ti on; provided however that, if the corporation cures
such specified default within sixty (60) days after receipt of such notice by
corporation, the right to redeem Stated Value Preferred Stock on account of
such specified default sha11 be extinguished.
(b) The holder of Stated Value Preferred Stock shall have the right
to require the corporation to redeem such stock from any legally available funds
at any time after September 14, 1993, but only to the extent such redemption
shall not violate the Idaho Business Corporation Act restrictions on the
corporation's redemption of its own shares.
This right may be exercised by
giving the corporation written notice of demand for redemption specifying a
redemption date after September 14, 1993 and not less than ninety (90) days or
more than one hundred eighty (180) days from the date such notice is delivered
to the corporation.

4.4 Call for Redemption. The Stated Value Preferred Stock may be called
for redemption by the corporation, in whole or in part, upon payment of the
redemption price from legally available funds at any time prior to demand for
redemption by the holder of Stated Value Preferred Stock. Notice of such call
for redemption, specifying the redemption date not less than thirty (30) days
from the date such notice is mailed, shall be mailed to each record holder of
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Stated Value Preferred Stock. If fewer than all shares of Stated Value Preferred
Stock are to be redeemed, the shares shall be redeemed prorata from the holders
thereof.
4.5 Redemption Price;. If Stated Value Preferred Stock is redeemed on or
before September l4, 1990, the redemption price is $8.00 per share if paid in a
lump sum. If Stated Value Preferred Stock is redeemed any time during the
three-year period beginning September 15, 1990 and ending on September 14,
1993, the redemption price is $8.50 per share if paid in a lump sum. If not paid
in a lump sum on or before September 14, 1993, the redemption price for Stated
Value Preferred Stock is $10.00 per share, provided that the redemption price
may be paid, at the corporation's sole option, in monthly installments on a
fifteen (15) year amorti~ation schedule beginning on the day after the redemption
date and accruing interest at a rate one-and one-half (1-1/2) points under The
First Interstate Bank of Idaho, N.A., prime lending rate, adjusted quarterly.
4.6 Redemption Procedure and Effect.
(a) Lump Sum Payment. If the redemption price is to be paid in a
lump sum, the corporation shall deposit, or shall cause its nominee to deposit, on
or before the redemption date specified in the notice of redemption, the
aggregate redemption price of the shares of Stated Value Preferred Stock to be
redeemed with a bank or trust company specified in the notice, payable on the
redemption date in the amounts and to the respective orders of the holders of
the shares of Stated Value Preferred Stock to be redeemed, on endorsement to
the corporation or its nominee as may be required and upon surrender of the
certificates for such shares. U nlcss the corporation or its nominee fails to pay
the lump sum redemption price on or before the redemption date, the shares of
Stated Value Preferred Stock subject to such redemption shall be deemed to have
been redeemed, and shall be deemed no longer to be outstanding, from and after
the redemption date set forth in the notice of redemption.
On or after the
redemption date, subject only to payment of the redemption price, Stated Value
Preferred Stock so called for redemption shall cease to be entitled to any
interest or right in the corporation; and holders of such Stated Value Preferred
Stock shall thereafter cease to be shareholders and shall be entitled only to
payment of the amount of the redemption price, without interest, upon surrender
of the certificates evidencing such stock.
If the lump sum redemption price
shall be paid by a nominee of the corporation, such nominee shall upon such
payment become the owner of the shares with respect to which such payment
was made; and certificates uf stock may be issued to such nominee in evidence
of such ownership.
Installment Payment.
If the corporation elects to pay the
(b)
redemption price in installments, the number of shares of Stated Value Preferred
Stock equal to the principal portion of each installment divided by $10.00 per
share shall be deemed to have been redeemed and to be no longer outstanding
from and after the date of payment of such installment. On and after such
payment date, such number of shares of Stated Value Preferred Stock shall cease
to be entitled to any interest or right in the corporation; and holders of such
shares shall thereafter cease to be shareholders of the corporation with respect
to such shares, whether or not the certificates evidencing such shares have been
Upon request of the corporation from time to time, certificates
surrendered.
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•
evidencing shares of Stated Value Preferred Stock including redeemed shares
shall be surrendered to and reissued by the corporation in reduced amount to
reflect any and all installment redemptions of shares prior to such request.
4.7
Liquidation Preference.
In case of the voluntary liquidation or
dissolution of the corporation, the hokier of Stated Value Preferred Stock shall
have the right to be paid in full, before any amount shall be paid to the owners
of the common stock, as follows:
$8.00 per share if the liquidation price is paid on or before
September 14, 1990.
$8.50 per share if the liquidation price is paid after
September 14, 1990 and on or before September 14, 1993.
$I 0.00 per share if the liquidation price is paid after
September 14, 1993.
In case of the involuntary liquidation or dissolution of the corporation, the
holder of Stated Value Preferred Stock shall have the right to be paid $I 0.00
per share, in full, before any amount shall be paid to the owners of the common
stock. After payment to the holders of the Stated Value Preferred Stock of the
full preferential amounts hereinabove provided, the holders of the Stated Value
Preferred Stock as such shall have no right or claim to any of the remaining
assets of the corporation either upon any distribution of such assets or upon
dissolution, liquidation or winding up; and the remaining assets to be distributed,
if any, upon a distribution of such assets or upon dissolution, liquidation or
winding up, may be distributed among the holders of the common stock.
4.8 Limited Voting Rights. The Stated Value Preferred Stock shall have no
right (except as required by law or as provided by Section 4.11 of this Article
Fourth) to receive notice of or to vote at any regular or special meeting of
stockholders, except that the holders of a majority of the shares of Stated Value
Preferred Stock shall have the right, voting separately as a class, to elect one
director to the board of directors of the corporation.
4.9 Covenants. So long as any shares of Stated Value Preferred Stock arc
outstanding, and except with the consent of the holders of a majority of the
outstanding shares of Stated Value Preferred Stock:
(a)
Common Stock. The corporation shall not
stock for less than book value (determined as of the end
preceding fiscal year), except for common stock issued to pay
solely in shares of common stock or issued to employees or
incentive stock option or bonus plan.

issue any common
of the immediately
a dividend payable
agents pursuant to

(b) Preferred Stock. The corporation shaH issue no preferred stock
other than the Stated Value Preferred Stock, nor any securities convertible into
such stock.
(c) Indebtedness. The corporation will not, and will not permit any
of its Subsidiaries to, directly or indirectly, create, incur, assume, guaranty or
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otherwise become or remain directly or indirectly liable with respect to, any
Indebtedness, except:
(1) The corporation may remain liable in respect of Indebtedness
outstanding on the date of adoption of this Article Fourth by the
corporation's shareholders.
(2) The corporation and its Subsidiaries may become and remain
liable with respect to Indebtedness that is not secured by a Lien on any of
the assets of the corporation or its Subsidiaries, provided that the
aggregate principal amount of such unsecured Indebtedness shall not exceed
Consolidated Net Worth less goodwill of the corporation at any time; and

(3) The corporation and its Subsidiaries may become and remain
liable in respect of Indebtedness secured by any of the following Liens:

(i) Liens for taxes, assessments or governmental charges or
claims the payment of which is not yet delinquent or is being
contested in good faith, if such reserve or other provision, if any, as
shall be required by generally accepted accounting principles,
consistently applied, shall have been made therefor;
(ii)
Statutory Liens of landlords and Liens of carriers,
warehousemen, mechanics, materialmen and other Hens imposed by law
incurred in the ordinary course of business for sums not yet
delinquent or being contested in good faith, if such reserve or other
appropriate provision, if any, as shall be required by generally
accepted accounting principles, consistently applied, shall have been
made therefor;
(iii) Liens incurred or deposits made in the ordinary course
of business in connection with workers' compensation, unemployment
insurance and other types of social security, or to secure the
performance of tenders, statutory obligations, surety and appeal bonds,
bids, leases, government contracts, performance and return-of-money
bonds and other similar obligations (exclusive of obligations for the
payment of borrowed money);

(iv) Any attachment or judgment Lien; nrovided that if the
judgment it secures exceeds $250,000 (alone or when aggregated with
all other judgments secured by Liens permitted by this clause (iv)),
such judgment shalt, within 45 days after the entry thereof, have been
discharged or execution thereof stayed pending appeal, or shall have
been discharged within 45 days after the expiration of any such stay;
(v) Easements, rights-of-way, restrictions and other similar
charges or encumbrances not interfering with the ordinary conduct of
the business of the corporation or any of its Subsidiaries;
(vi) Any interest or title of a lessor under any lease;
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(vii) Any Lien existing on any asset of any corporation at
the time such corporation becomes a Subsidiary if such Lien was not
created in contemplation of such event;
(viii) Any Lien on any asset securing Indebtedness incurred
or assumed for the purpose of financing not more than eighty-five
percent (85%) of the cost of acquiring such asset; provided that such
Lien attaches to such asset concurrently with or within 90 days after
the acquisition thereof;
(ix) Any Lien on any asset of any corporation existing at
the time such corporation is merged into or consolidated with the
corporation or a Subsidiary, if such Lien was not created in
contemplation of such event;
(x) Any Lien existing on any asset prior to the acquisition
thereof by the corporation or a Subsidiary, if such Lien was not
created in contemplation of such acquisition;
(xi)
Any Lien arising out of the refinancing, extension,
renewal or refunding of any Indebtedness secured by any Lien
permitted by any of the foregoing clauses of this Section 4.9(c);
provided that the amount of such Indebtedness is not increased and
that such Indebtedness is not secured by any additional assets; and
(xii)
Liens not otherwise permitted by the foregoing
clauses of this Section 4.9(c) (including, without limitation, Liens on
stock of Subsidiaries, whether consolidated or unconsolidated) securing
Indebtedness in an aggregate principal amount at any time outstanding
not to exceed 10% of the difference between Consolidated Net Worth
and the amount of the goodwill of the corporation.
(d) Corporate Existence. The corporation will maintain its corporate
existence and will not liquidate, wind up or dissolve itself (or suffer any
liquidation or dissolution), or enter into any transaction of merger or
consolidation with any Person (including any Subsidiary) unless (i) this
corporation is the surviving corporation following any such merger or
consolidation, and (ii) the Consolidated Net Worth of the surviving corporation
immediately following such merger or consolidation equals or exceeds the
Consolidated Net Worth of this corporation immediately prior to such merger or
consolidation.
(e) Sale of Assets. The corporation will not, and will not permit any
of its Subsidiaries to, convey, sell, lease, transfer or otherwise dispose of all or
any material part of its business, property or assets, whether now owned or
hereafter acquired, except:
(l) The corporation and its Subsidiaries may convey, sell, lease,
transfer or otherwise dispose of investment assets in the ordinary course of
business;
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(2) The corporation and its Subsidiaries may sell or otherwise
dispose of Capital Assets or real property if the asset so disposed of is
concurrently replaced by a substantially equivalent asset having a value
equal to or greater than the asset disposed of;
(3) The corporation and its Subsidiaries may sell or otherwise
dispose of obsolete or worn out property in the ordinary course of
business;
(4) The corporation and its Subsidiaries may sell and lease back
any newly acquired asset for the purpose of financing the acquisition of
such asset and securing the repayment of Indebtedness, provided that such
Indebtedness shall not exceed eighty~fivc percent (85%) of the cost of such
asset and is otherwise permitted by the covenants contained in this Article
Fourth; and
(5) The corporation and its Subsidiaries may sell or otherwise
dispose of any of their other assets; provided that any such sale or other
disposition is made for the fair market value of such assets.
(f) Acquisitions. The corporation will not, and will not permit any of
its Subsidiaries to, acquire by purchase or otherwise all or substantially all the
business, property or fixed assets, or the stock or other evidence of beneficial
ownership, of any Person unless, immediately prior to and after giving effect to
such transaction, no violation of any of the covenants or other provisions
contained in this Article Fourth shall have occurred and be continuing or would
be caused by such acquisition.

(g) Transactions with Shareholders and Affiliates. The corporation
will not, and will not permit any of its Subsidiaries to, directly or indirectly,
enter into or permit to exist any transaction (including, without limitation, the
purchase, sale, lease, loan or exchange of any property or the rendering of any
service) with any director or officer or any holder of equity securities of the
corporation, or with any Affiliate of the corporation or of such director, officer
or holder, on terms that are less favorable to the corporation or that
Subsidiary, as the case may be, than those which might be obtained at the time
from Persons who arc not such a director, officer, holder or Affiliate; Qrovided
that the forgoing restriction shall not apply to ( 1) any transaction in effect at
the date of adoption of this Article Fourth by the corporation's shareholders; (2)
any transaction between the corporation and any of its wholly-owned Subsidiaries
or between any of its wholly-owned Su bsidiarics; (3) compensation (net of
amounts contributed or repaid to the corporation or any Subsidiary or to
Lewiston Land Company and contributed or repaid to the corporation or any
Subsidiary), by way of salary or bonus, paid to directors or officers of the
corporation in an amount, as to any one individual, not greater than the greater
of $400,000 or the total compensation paid in calendar year 1986; (4)
compensation paid to any director or officer of the corporation in amounts equal
to income tax liability of such director or officer attributable to transactions
involving the corporation, A.I.A., Inc., AIA Travel Services, Inc., AIA Travel,
Inc., Lewiston Land Company, AIA Bancard Services Corporation or Taylor
Brothers Aircraft on or before January I, 1988 or to other personal income tax
liability of such director or officer for tax years ended before January l, l 988;
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or (5) any loan to or account receivable from an officert director or shareholder
which is repaid in full at least annually on or before the last day of the fiscal
year.
(h)
Consolidated Net Worth.
The corporation will not permit
Consolidated Net Worth any date to be less than the number of shares of
Stated Value Preferred Stock outstanding at such date multiplied by $10.00 per
share.
(i)
Dividend Restriction.
The corporation will not, directly or
indirectly, declare, order, make or set apart any sum for payment of any
dividend in respect of its common stock (other than a dividend payable solely in
shares of common stock), except that the corporation may declare and pay
common stock dividends in an aggregate amount not exceeding the Dividend
Availability Amount.

(j)
Debt/Equity Ratio.
Neither the corporation nor any Subsidiary
will incur any new Indebtedness (other than Indebtedness permitted by Section
4.9(c)(xi) of this Article Fourth) if, at the time of incurring such Indebtedness,
the ratio of Consolidated Long Term Debt to Consolidated Net Worth exceeds, or
such additional Indebtedness would cause such ratio to exceedt 3.6 to 1.0.
(k)
Debt Service Coverage.
Neither the corporation nor any
Subsidiary will incur any new Indebtedness (other than Indebtedness permitted by
Section 4.9(c)(xi) of this Article Fourth) if, at the time of incurring such
Indebtedness, the ratio of (i) Consolidated Net Income plus depreciation and
amortization expenses plus compensation contributed or repaid to the corporation,
any Subsidiary, Lewiston Land Company or AIA Travel Services, Inc. during the
immediately preceding fiscal year of the corporation, divided by (ii) current
maturities of Long Term Debt is, or such additional Indebtedness would cause
such ratio to be, less than .8 to 1.0.

4.10
the following

Definitions. For the purpose of Section 4.9 of this Article Fourth,
t~rms shall have the following meanings:

,.Affiliate"', as applied to any Person, shall mean any other Person directly
or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control witht that
Person. For the purposes of this definition, "control" (including, with correlative
meanings, the terms
with"), as applied to
the power to direct
that Person, whether
or otherwise.

"controlling", "controlled by" and "under common control
any Person, means the possession, directly or indirectly, of
or cause the direction of the management and policies of
through the ownership of voting securities or by contract

"'Capital Asset"' shall mean, as at any date of determination, those assets of
a Person that would, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles,
consistently applied, be classified as plant, property or equipment on the balance
sheet of that Person.

"'Consolidated Long Term Debt• shall mean, as at any date of determination,
the total of all Long Term Debt of the corporation and its Subsidiaries on a
consolidated basis determined in accordance with generally accepted (or, in the
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case of an insurance company for which GAAP financial statements are not
prepared, statutory) accounting principles consistently applied.
"'Consolidated Net Worth"' shall mean, as at any date of determination, the
sum of (a) the capital stock and additional paid-in capital, (b) plus retained
earnings (or minus accumulated deficit) of the corporation and its Subsidiaries on
a consolidated basis, determined in conformity with generally accepted (or, in the
case of an insurance company for which GAAP financial statements are not
prepared, statutory) accounting principles consistently applied.
"Consolidated Net Income· for any period, shall mean the net income (or
loss) of the corporation and iLc; Subsidiaries on a consolidated basis determined
in conformity with generally accepted (or, in the case of an insurance company
for which GAAP financial statemenlc; are not prepared, statutory) accounting
principles consistently applied.
'''Dividend Availability Amount• shall mean, as at any date of determination,
an amount equal to 50% of Consolidated Net Income for the period (taken as
single accounting period) commencing January 31, 1987 and ending on the last
day of the fiscal quarter immediately preceding such date of determination.
*Indebtedness"' as applied to any person, means (a) all indebtedness for
borrowed money, (b) that portion of obligations with respect to finance leases
which is capitalized on a balance sheet in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles, consistently applied, (c) notes payable and drafts accepted
representing extensions of credit whether or not representing obligations for
borrowed money, (d) any obligation owed for all or any part of the deferred
purchase price of property or services which purchase price is (i) due more than
six month from the date of incurrence of the obligation in respect thereof, or
(ii) evidenced by a note or similar written instrument, and (e) all indebtedness
secured by any Lien or vendor's interest under any conditional sale or other title
retention agreement existing on any property or asset owned or held by that
Person regardless of whether the indebtedness secured thereby shall have been
assumed by that Person or is non-recourse to the credit of that Person;
provided, however, that "Indebtedness" shall not include policy claims, policy
reserves or mandatory securities valuation reserves of a regulated insurance
company; and further provided that "Indebtedness" shall not include indebtedness
of the corporation to any Subsidiary.
"Lien" shall mean any lien, mortgage, pledge, security interest, charge or
encumbrance of any kind (including any conditional sale or other title retention
agreement, any lease in the nature thereof, and any agreement to give a security
interest).
"Long Term Debt", as applied to any Person, shall mean all Indebtedness of
that Person which by its terms or by the terms of any instrument or agreement
relating thereto matures more than one year, or is directly renewable or
extendable at the option of the debtor to a date more than one year (including
an option of the debtor under a revolving credit or similar agreement obligating
the lenders to extend credit over a period of one year or more), from the date
of creation thereof, but excluding any payments due under the terms thereof
within 12 months of any date of determination.
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"Person" shall mean an individual, corporation, partnership, joint venture,
trust, unincorporated organization or any other jurisdictional entity, or a foreign
·
state or any agency or political subdivision thereof.

"'Subsidiary" shall mean any corporation of which at least a majority of the
outstanding stock having by the terms thereof ordinary voting power to elect a
majority of the board of directors of such corporation (irrespective of whether
or not at the time stock of any other class or classes of such corporation shall
have or might have voting power by reason of the happening of any
contingency) is at the time directly or indirectly owned or controlled by the
corporation or one or more of its Subsidiaries or by the corporation and one or
more of its Subsidiaries.
4.11
Conversion Right. The holders of the Stated Value Preferred Stock
shall have the following conversion right ("Conversion Right"):

(a) Right to Convert. Each share of Stated Value Preferred Stock
shall be convertible, at the option of the holder thereof, at any time prior to
the date on which notice of redemption is given under Section 4.3 or Section
4.4, at the office of the corporation or any transfer agent for the Stated Value
Preferred Stock or Common Stock, into one fully paid and nonassessabJe share
of Common Stock.
Before any holder of Stated Value
(b)
Mechanics of Conversion.
Preferred Stock shall be entitled to convert such stock into shares of Common
Stock, he shall surrender the certificate or certificates for such Preferred Stock,
duly endorsed, at the office of the corporation or of any transfer agent for the
Common Stock, and shall give written notice to the corporation at such office
that he elects to convert such Preferred Stock and shall state therein the
number of shares of Stated Value Preferred Stock being converted. Thereupon
the corporation shall promptly issue and deliver at such office to such holder of
Stated Value Preferred Stock a certificate or certificates for the number of
shares of Common Stock to which he shall be entitled.
Such conversion shall be deemed to have been made immediately prior
to the close of business on the date of such surrender of the shares of Stated
Value Preferred Stock to be converted (the "Conversion Date"); and the person
or persons entitled to receive the shares of Common Stock issuable upon such
conversion shall be treated for all purposes as the record holder or holders of
such shares of Common Stock on such date.
(c) Fractional Shares. No fractional share of Common Stock shall be
In lieu of any
issued upon conversion of Stated Value Preferred Stock.
fractional shares to which the holder would otherwise be entitled, the
corporation shall pay cash equal to the product of such fraction multiplied by
the fair market value of one share of the corporation's Common Stock on the
Conversion Date, such value to be determined in good faith by the Board of
Directors.
(d) Reservation of Stock Issuable Upon Conversion. The corporation
shall at all times reserve and keep available out of its authorized but unissued
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shares of Common Stock, solely for the purpose of effecting the conversion of
the shares of the Stated Value Preferred Stock, such number of its shares of
Common Stock as shall from time to time be sufficient to effect the conversion
of all outstanding shares of the Stated Value Preferred Stock; and if at any time
the number of authorized but unissued shares of Common Stock shall not be
sufficient to effect the conversion of all then outstanding shares of the Stated
Value Preferred Stock, the corporation will take such corporate action as may, in
the opinion of its counsel, be necessary to increase its authorized but unissued
shares of Common Stock to such number of shares as shall be sufficient for such
purpose.
Termination of Redemption Right.
Upon exercise of the
(e)
Conversion Right under this Section 4.11, all rights of a holder of Stated Value
Preferred Stock to require redemption of such stock under Section 4.3 shall
automatically terminated; and no holder of Common Stock acquired upon
conversion of Stated Value Preferred Stock shall have any right of redemption.

4.12 Modification of Rights and Preferences. The rights and preferences
hereby conferred on the Stated Value Preferred Stock shall not be changed,
altered or revoked without the consent of the holders of the majority of the
Stated Value Preferred Stock outstanding at the time.
FIFTH
Shareholders shall not have a preemptive right to acquire unissued or
treasury shares or securities convertible into such shares or carrying a right to
subscribe to or acquire shares, except as provided in the Idaho Business
Corporation Act.

SIXTH
The location of the initial registered office of the corporation is One Lewis
Clark Plaza, Lewiston, Idaho 83501; and the name of its initial registered agent
at such address is R. John Taylor.
SEVENTH
The number of directors constituting the initial Board of Directors is four,
and the names and a<ldrcsses of the persons who arc to serve until the first
annual meeting of the shareholders and until their successors are elected and
qualified are:
NAME

ADDRESS

Reed J. Taylor

P.O. Box 538
Lewiston, ID 83501

R. John Taylor

P.O. Box 538
Lewiston, ID 83501

Raymond R. Heilman

P.O. Box 538
Lewiston, ID 83501
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Mary K. Frost

P.O. Box 538
Lewiston, ID 83501

EIGHTH
The name and address of the incorporator is as follows:
Reed J. Taylor
P.O. Box 538
Lewiston, ID 8350 l

NINTH
The Board of Directors is expressly authorized to alter, amend or repeal the
Bylaws of the corporation and to adopt new Bylaws, subject to repeal or change
by a majority vote of the shareholders.

TENTH
At each meeting of shareholders, every shareholder of record of the
corporation shall be entitled to one vote for each share of common stock
registered in his name on the books of the corporation. Shareholders shall not
be entitled to vote their shares cumulatively in the election of directors of the
corporation.

ELEVENTH
A director of this corporation shall not be personally liable to this
corporation or its shareholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary
duty as a director, except for liability (a) for any breach of the director's duty
of loyalty to this corporation or its shareholders, (b) for acts or omissions not
in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of
law, (c) under Section 30-1-48, Idaho Code, or (d) for any transaction from
which the director derived an improper personal benefit. If the Idaho Business
Corporation Act is amended to authorize corporate action further eliminating or
limiting the personal liability of directors, then the liability of a director of this
corporation shall be eliminated or limited to the fullest extent permitted by the
Idaho Business Corporation Act, as so amended. Any repeal or modification of
this Article Eleventh by the shareholders of the corporation shall not adversely
affect any right or protection of a director of the corporation existing at the
time of such repeal or modification."
THIRD:

The number of shares of the corporation outstanding at the time

of such adoption was 801,000; and the number of shares entitled to vote thereon
was 801,000.
FOURTH:

The designation and number of outstanding shares of each class

entitled to vote thereon as a class were a follows:
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Number of Shares:

Class:

801,000

Common
FIFTH:

The number of shares voted for such amendment was 80 l ,000; and

the number of shares voted against such amendment was 0.

DATED this

J~day of December,

1987.

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION

R.

y

o n

VERIFICATION
STATE OF

l~fiBNA

County of ,Jr:.'£- .i.c.c::.

d3

)

:ss.

)

I,~~ JS,,~efl ,

a Notary Public, do hereby certify that on the

dayo ecemer, 1987, personally appeared before me REED J. TAYLOR,

who, being by me first duly swornt. declared that he is the President of AIA
SERVICES CORPORATION, that
signed th oregoing document as President
of the coporation, and that the state
ts contain therein are true.
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State of Idaho
I

I

I, BEN YSURSA, Secretary of State of the State of ld?ho, hereby certify that I
am the custodian of the corporation, limited liability company, limited partnership,
limited liability partnershi~ and assumed business name records of this State.

I FURTHER CERTIFY That the annexed is a full, true and complete duplicate of1
Certificate of Amendment of AIA Services Corporation, received and filed on April 11,
I

1995, under file number C74568

Dated: July 27, 2012 ·

SECRETARY OF STATE

By

.,
"'
~

zI!'

]

ID

EXHIBIT

c.

001927

State of Idaho
I

iI
CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT

OF
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION
File Number C 74568

I, PETET. CENARRUSA, Secretary of State of the State of Idaho,
hereby certify that duplicate originals of Articles of Amendment to the
Articles of Incorporation of AIA SERVICES CORPORATION duly signed
and verified pursuant to the provisions of the Idaho Business Corporation
Act, have been received in this office and are found to conform to law.
ACCORDINGLY and by virtue of the authority vested in me by
law, I issue this Certificate of Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation
and attach hereto a duplicate original of the Articles of Amendment.
Dated: April 11, 1995

~di>~
SECRETARY OF STATE
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ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT
[If·)• rt TO mE ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION
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AIA SERVICES CORPORATION
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Pursuant to the provisions of §30-1-58, §30-1-59 and §30-1-61 of the Idaho Business
Corporation Act, the undersigned corporation adopts the following Articles of Amendment to
its Articles of Incorporation, as filed on December 20, 1983 and previously amended on October
14, 1986 and December 29, 1987.
l<"'IRST: The name of the corporation is AJA SERVICES CORPORATION.
SECOND: On March 7, 1995, the shareholders of the corporation adopted and approved
the following Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation of AJA Services Corporation,
pursuant to which Article Fourth, Article Fifth and Article Tenth were amended by replacing
them in their entirety.
"AMENDED AND RESTATED ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION
OF
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION
Except for the amendment of Articles Fourth, Fifth and Tenth by replacing them in their
entirety, these Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation of AIA Services Corporation
correctly set forth without change the corresponding provisions of the original Articles of
Incorporation as hereinbefore filed on December 20, 1983 and amended on October 14, 1986
and December 29, 1987; and these Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation, including
the amended Articles Fourth, Fifth and Tenth, supersede the original Articles of Amendment and
all previous amendments thereto.

FIRST
The name of the corporation is AJA SERVICES CORPORATION.
SECOND

IDAl«J SECRETARY IF STATE
19950411 0900
~ 2
D< I: 58727
C:USTI 20168

The period of its duration is perpetual.
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mIRD
The purpose for which the corporation is organized is for the transaction of any or all
lawful business for which the corporation may be incorporated under the Idaho Business
Corporation Act.

FOURTH
4.1

Authorized Capital. The aggregate number of shares which this corporation shall

have authority to issue is 6,085,000 shares, of which 1,085,000 shares shall be Preferred Stock
and 5,000,000 shares shall be Common Stock ($1 par value). The corporation is authorized to
issue the Preferred Stock in three series designated as "Series A", consisting of 200,000 shares
of Stated Value Preferred Stock (without par value); "Series B", consisting of 735,000 shares
of 10% Preferred Stock ($1 par value); and "Series C", consisting of 150,000 shares of 10%
Preferred Stock ($1 par value). The respective preferences, limitations and relative rights of
each of the three series of Preferred Stock and the Common Stock of the corporation are set
forth in the following provisions of Article Fourth:

4.2

Series A Prefwed

SUKk·

4.2.1 General. Each share of Series A Preferred Stock shall have the rights and
preferences conferred in this Section 4.2 of Article Fourth. Holders of Series A Preferred Stock
shall have no rights to share in any distribution of the profits or assets of the corporation,
whether in the form of cash or stock or dividends or otherwise, except to the extent specifically
provided herein.
4.2.2 No Dividegds. The Series A Preferred Stock shall not pay or accrue any
dividends.

4.2.3 l)equmd for Redemption. (a) The holder of Series A Preferred Stock
shall have the right to require the corporation to redeem such stock from any legally available
funds upon breach of any covenant of the corporation set forth in this Article Fourth, but only
to the extent such redemption shall not violate the Idaho Business Corporation Act restrictions
on the corporation's redemption of its own shares. This right may be exercised by giving the
corporation written notice of demand for redemption specifying the default and a redemption
date not less than ninety (90) days from the date such notice delivered to the corporation;
provided however that, if the corporation cures such specified default withi11 sixty (60) days after
receipt of such notice by corporation, the right to redeem Series A Preferred Stock on account
of such specified default shall be extinguished.
(b)
The holder of Series A Preferred Stock shall have the right to require the
corporation to redeem such stock from any legally available funds at any time after September
14, 1993, but only to the extent such redemption shall not violate the Idaho Business Corporation
Act restrictions on the corporation's redemption of its own shares. This right may be exercised
by giving the corporation written notice of demand for redemption specifying a redemption date
after September 14, 1993 and not less than ninety (90) days or more than one hundred eighty
(180) days from the date such notice is delivered to the corporation.
ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT - Page 2
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4.2.4 Call for RedemptiQ.u. The Series A Preferred Stock may be called for
redemption by the corporation, in whole or in part, upon payment of the redemption price from
legally available funds at any time prior to the demand for redemption by the holder of Series
A Preferred Stock. Notice of such call for redemption, specifying the redemption date not less
than thirty (30) days from the date such notice is mailed, shall be mailed to each record holder
of Series A Preferred Stock. If fewer than all shares of Series A Preferred Stock are to be
redeemed, the shares shall be redeemed prorata from the holders thereof.
4.2.5 Redemption Price If Series A Preferred Stock is redeemed on or before
September 14, 1990, the redemption price is $8.00 per share if paid in a lump sum. If Series
A Preferred Stock is redeemed any time during the three-year period beginning September 15,
1990 and ending on September 14, 1993, the redemption price is $8.50 per share if paid in a
lump sum. If not paid in a lump sum on or before September 14, 1993, the redemption price
for Series A Preferred Stock is $10.00 per share, provided that the redemption price may be
paid, at the corporation's sole option, in monthly installments on a fifteen (15) year amortization
schedule beginning on the day after the redemption date and accruing interest at a rate of oneand one-half (l1h) points under the First Interstate Banlc of Idaho, N.A., prime lending rate,
adjusted quarterly.
4.2.6 Redemption Procedure and Effect;.

(a)
Lump Sum Paymem. If the redemption price is to be paid in a lump sum, the
corporation shall deposit, or shall cause its nominee to deposit, on or before the redemption date
specified in the notice of redemption, the aggregate redemption price of the shares of Series A
Preferred Stock to be redeemed with a bank or trust company specified in the notice, payable
on the redemption date in the amounts and to the respective orders of the holders of the shares
of Series A Preferred Stock to be redeemed, on endorsement to the corporation or its nominee
as may be required and upon surrender of the certificates for such shares. Unless the
corporation or its nominee fails to pay the lump sum redemption price on or before the
redemption date, the shares of Series A Preferred Stock subject to such redemption shall be
deemed to have been redeemed, and shall be deemed no longer to be outstanding, from and after
the redemption date set forth in the notice of redemption. On or after the redemption date,
subject only to payment of the redemption price, Series A Preferred Stock so called for
redemption shall cease to be entitled to any interest or right in the corporation; and holders of
such Series A Preferred Stock shall thereafter cease to be shareholders and shall be entitled only
to payment of the amount of the redemption price, without interest, upon surrender of the
certificates evidencing such stock. If the lump sum redemption price shall be paid by a nominee
of the corporation, such nominee shall upon such payment become the owner of the shares with
respect to which such payment was made; and certificates of stock may be issued to such
nominee in evidence of such ownership.
(b)
Installment Payment. If the corporation elects to pay the redemption price in
installments, the number of shares of Series A Preferred Stock equal to the principal portion of
each installment divided by $10.00 per share shall be deemed to have been redeemed and to be
no longer outstanding from and after the date of such installment. On and after such payment
date, such number of shares of Series A Preferred Stock shall cease to be entitled to any interest
or right in the corporation; and holders of such shares shall thereafter cease to be shareholders
ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT - Page 3
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of the corporation with respect to such shares, whether or not the certificates evidencing such
shares have been surrendered. Upon request of the corporation from time to time, certificates
evidencing shares of Series A Preferred Stock including redeemed shares shall be surrendered
to and reissued by the corporation in reduced amount to reflect any and all installment
redemptions of shares prior to such request.
4.2.7 UQUidation Puferem. In case of the voluntary liquidation or dissolution
of the corporation, the holder of Series A Preferred Stock shall have the right to be paid in full,
before any amount shall be paid to the owners of the Common Stock or to the owners of the
Series B or Series C Preferred Stock, as follows:
$8.00 per share if the liquidation price is paid on or before
September 14, 1990.
$8.50 per share if the liquidation price is paid after September 14,
1990 and on or before September 14, 1993.
$10.00 per share if the liquidation price is paid after September
14, 1993.

In case of the involuntary liquidation or dissolution of the corporation, the holder of Series A
Preferred Stock shall have the right to be paid $10.00 per share, in full, before any amount shall
be paid to the owners of the Common Stock or to the owners of the Series B or Series C
Preferred Stock. After payment to the holders of the Series A Preferred Stock of the full
preferential amounts hereinabove provided, the holders of the Series A Preferred Stock as such
shall have no right or claim to any of the remaining assets of the corporation either upon any
distribution of such assets or upon dissolution, liquidation or winding up; and the remaining
assets to be distributed, if any, upon a distribution of such assets or upon dissolution, liquidation
or winding up, may be distributed among the holders of the Series B Preferred Stock, the Series
C Preferred Stock and the Common Stock in accordance with the provisions of this Article
Fourth.
4.2.8 Limited votin& Riabts. The Series A Preferred Stock shall have no right
(except as required by law or as provided by Section 4.2.12 of this Article Fourth) to receive
notice of or to vote at any regular or special meeting of stockholders, except that the holders of
a majority of the shares of Series A Preferred Stock shall have the right, voting separately as
a class, to elect one director to the board of directors of the corporation.
4.2.9 Covenants· So long as any shares of Series A Preferred Stock are
outstanding, and except with the consent of the holders of a majority of the outstanding shares
of Series A Preferred Stock.
(a)
Common S~k. The corporation shall not issue any Common Stock for
less than book value (determined as of the end of the immediately preceding fiscal year), except
for Common Stock issued to pay a dividend payable solely in shares of Common Stock or issued
to employees or agents pursuant to incentive stock option or bonus plan.
ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT - Page 4
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(b)
Preferred Sl~k. The corporation shall issue no Preferred Stock or
securities convertible into such stock, other than the Series A, Series B and Series C Preferred
Stock.
Indebte<ln~ss. The corporation will not, and will not permit any of its
(c)
Subsidiaries to, directly or indirectly, create, incur, assume, guaranty or otherwise become or
remain directly or indirectly liable with respect to, any Indebtedness, except:

( 1)
The corporation may remain liable in respect of Indebtedness
outstanding on the date of adoption of this Article Fourth by the corporation's
shareholders.
(2)
The corporation and its Subsidiaries may become and remain liable
with respect to Indebtedness that is not secured by a Lien on any of the assets of the
corporation or its Subsidiaries, provided that the aggregate principal amount of such
unsecured Indebtedness shall not exceed Consolidated Net Worth less goodwill of the
corporation at any time; and
(3)
The corporation and its Subsidiaries may become and remain liable
in respect of Indebtedness secured by any of the following Liens:
(i)
Liens for taxes, assessments or governmental charges or
claims the payment of which is not yet delinquent or is being contested in good
faith, if such reserve or other provision, if any, as shall be required by generally
accepted accounting principles, consistently applied, shall have been made
therefor;

(ii)
Statutory Liens of landlords and lines of carriers,
warehousemen, mechanics, materialmen and other liens imposed by law incurred
in the ordinary courses of business for sums not yet delinquent or being contested
in good faith, if such reserve or other appropriate provision, if any, as sha11 be
required by generally accepted accounting principles, consistently applied shall
have been made therefor;
(iii)
Liens incurred or deposits made in the ordinary course of
business in connection with worker's compensation, unemployment insurance and
other types of social security, or to secure the performance of tenders, statutory
obligations, surety and appeal bonds, bids, leases, governmental contracts,
performance and return-of-money bonds and other similar obligations (exclusive
of obligations for the payment of borrowed money);

(iv)
Any attachment or judgment Lien; prqyided that if the
judgment it secures exceeds $250,000 (alone or when aggregated with all other
judgments secured by Liens permitted by this clause (vi)), such judgment shall,
within forty-five (45) days after the entry thereof, have been discharged or
execution thereof stayed pending appeal, or shall have been discharged within
forty-five (45) days after the expiration of any such stay;
ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT - Page S
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(v)
Easements, rights-of-way, restrictions and other similar
charges or encumbrances not interfering with the ordinary conduct of the business
of the corporation or any of its Subsidiaries;
(vi)

Any interest or title of a lessor under any lease;

(vii)
Any Lien existing on any asset of any corporation at the
time such corporation becomes a subsidiary if such Lien was not created in
contemplation of such event;
(viii) Any Lien on any asset securing Indebtedness incurred or
assume for the purpose of financing not more than Eighty-five percent (85 %) of
the cost of acquiring such assets; provided that such line attaches to such asset
concurrently with or within ninety (90) days after the acquisition thereof;
(ix)
Any Lien on any asset of any corporation existing at the
time such corporation is merged into or consolidated with the corporation or a
subsidiary, if such Lien was not created in contemplation of such event;
(x)
Any Lien existing on any asset prior to the acquisition
thereof by the corporation or a Subsidiary, if such Lien was not created in
contemplation of such acquisition;
Any Lien arising out of the refinancing, extension, renewal
(xi)
or refunding of any Indebtedness secured by any Lien permitted by any of the
foregoing clauses of this Section 4.2.9(c); provided that the amount of such
Indebtedness is not increased and that such Indebtedness is not secured by any
additional assets; and
(xii) Liens not otherwise permitted by the foregoing clauses of
this Section 4.2. 9(c) (including, without limitation, Liens on stock of Subsidiaries,
whether consolidated or unconsolidated) securing Indebtedness in an aggregate
principal amount of any time outstanding not to exceed ten percent ( 10 %) of the
difference between Consolidated Net Worth and the amount of the goodwill of the
corporation.

CoJwrate Existence. The corporation will maintain its corporate existence
(d)
and will not liquidate, wind up or dissolve itself (or suffer any liquidation or dissolution), or
enter into any transaction of merger or consolidation with any Person (including any Subsidiary)
unless (i) this corporation is the surviving corporation following any such merger or
consolidation, and (ii) the Consolidated Net Worth of the surviving corporation immediately
following such merger or consolidation e.quals or exceeds the Consolidated Net Worth of this
corporation immediately prior to such merger or consolidation.
(e)
Sale of Assets. The corporation will not, and will not permit any of its
Subsidiaries to, convey, sell, lease, transfer or otherwise dispose of all or any material part of
its business, property or assets, whether now owned or hereafter acquired, except:
ARTICLES OP AMENDMENT - Page 6
03113/95 10:46un/s

001934

(1)
The corporation and its Subsidiaries may convey, sell, lease,
transfer or otherwise dispose of investment assets in the ordinary course of business;

(2)
The corporation and its Subsidiaries may sell or otherwise dispose
of Capital Assets or real property if the asset so disposed of is concurrently replaced by
a substantially equivalent asset having a value equal to or greater than the assets disposed
of:
(3)
The corporation and is Subsidiaries may sell or otherwise dispose
of obsolete or worn out property in the ordinary course of business;
(4)
The corporation and its Subsidiaries may sell and lease back any
newly acquired asset for the purpose of financing the acquisition of such asset and
securing the repayment of Indebtedness, provided that such Indebtedness shall not exceed
eighty-five percent (85 %) of the cost of such asset and is otherwise permitted by the
covenants contained in this Article Fourth; and
(5)
The corporation and its Subsidiaries may sell or otherwise dispose
of any of their other assets; provided that any such sale or other disposition is made for
the fair market value of such assets.
(f)
Acquisitions. The corporation will not, and will not permit any of its
Subsidiaries to, acquire by purchase or otherwise all or substantially all the business, property
or fixed assets, or the stock or other evidence of beneficial ownership, of any Person unless,
immediately prior to and after giving effect to such transaction, no violation of any of the
covenants or other provisions contained in this Article Fourth shall have occurred and be
continuing or would be caused by such acquisition.
(g)
Transactions with Shareholders and Affiliates. The corporation will not,
and will not permit any of its Subsidiaries to, directly or indirectly, enter into or permit to exist
any transaction (including, without limitation, the purchase, sale, lease, Joan or exchange of any
property or the rendering of any service) with any director or officer or any holder of equity
securities of the corporation, or with any Affiliate of the corporation or of such director, officer
or holder, on terms that are less favorable to the corporation or that Subsidiary, as the case may
be, than those which might be obtained at the time from Persons who are not such a director,
officer, holder or Affiliate; provided that the foregoing restriction shall not apply to (i) any
transaction in effect at the date of adoption of this Article Fourth by the corporation's
shareholders; (ii) any transaction between the corporation and any of its wholly-owned
Subsidiaries or between any of its wholly-owned Subsidiaries; (iii) compensation (net of amounts
contributed or repaid to the corporation or any Subsidiary or to Lewiston Land Company and
contributed or repaid to the corporation or any Subsidiary), by way of salary or bonus, paid to
director or officers of the corporation in an amount, as to any one individual, not greater than
the greater of $400,000 or the total compensation paid in calendar year 1986; (iv) compensation
paid to any director or officer of the corporation in amounts equal to income tax liability of such
director or officer attributable to transactions involving the corporation, A. I. A., Inc., AIA
Travel Services, Inc., AIA Travel, Inc., Lewiston Land Company, AIA Bancard Services
Corporation or Taylor Brothers Aircraft on or before January I, 1988 or to other personal
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inc.ome tax liability of such director or officer fort.ax years ended before January 1, 1988; or
(v) any loan to or account receivable from an officer, director or stockholder which is repaid
in full at least annually on or before the last day of the fiscal year.
(h)
Consolidatf,d Net Worth. The corporation will not permit Consolidated
Net Worth at any date to be less than the number of shares of Series A Preferred Stock
outstanding at such date multiplied by $10.00 per share.

Dividend Restriction. The corporation will not, directly or indirectly,
declare, order, make or set apart any sum for payment of any dividend in respect of its Common
Stock (other than a dividend payable solely in shares of Common Stock), except that the
corporation may declare and pay Common Stock dividends in an aggregate amount not exceeding
the Dividend Availability Amount.
(i)

(j)
Debt/Equity Ra.tio. Neither the corporation nor any Subsidiary will incur
any new Indebtedness (other than Indebtedness permitted by Section 4.2.9(c)(xi) of this Article
Fourth) if, at the time of incurring such Indebtedness, the ratio of Consolidated Long Term Debt
to Consolidated Net Worth exceeds, or such additional Indebtedness would cause such ratio to
exceed, 3.6 to 1.0.
(k)
Debt Service Coyerqe. Neither the corporation nor any Subsidiary will
incur any new Indebtedness (other than Indebtedness permitted by Section 4.2.9(c)(xi) of this
Article Fourth) if, at the time of incurring such Indebtedness, the ratio of (i) Consolidated Net
Income plus depreciation and amortization expenses plus compensation contributed or repaid to
the corporation, any Subsidiary, Lewiston Land Company or AIA Travel Services, Inc. during
the immediately preceding fiscal year of the corporation, divided by (ii) current maturities of
Long Term Debt is, or such additional Indebtedness would cause such ratio to be, less than .8
to 1.0.

4.2.10 )kfinitious. For the purpose of Section 4.2.9 of this Article Fourth, the
following terms shall have the following meanings:

"Aff"diate", as applied to any Person, shall mean any other Person directly or
indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with, that Person. For the
purposes of this definition, "control" (including, with correlative meanings, the terms
"controlling", "controlled by" and "under common control with"), as applied to any Person,
means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the
management and policies of that Person, whether through the ownership of voting securities or
by contract or otherwise.
"Capital Asset" shall mean, as at any date of determination, those assets of a
Person that would, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, consistently
applied, be classified as plant, property or equipment on the balance sheet of that Person.

"Consolidated Long Term Debt" shall mean, as at any date of determination,
the total of all Long Term Debt of the corporation and its Subsidiaries on a consolidated basis
determined in accordance with generally accepted (or, in the case of an insurance company for
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which GAAP financial statements are not prepared, statutory) accounting principles consistently
applied.
"Consolidated Net Worth" shall mean, as at any date of determination, the sum
of (a) the capital stock and additional paid-in capital, (b) plus retained earnings (or minus
accumulated deficit) of the corporation and its Subsidiaries on a consolidated basis, determined
in conformity with generally accepted (or, in the case of an insurance company for which GAAP
financial statements are not prepared, statutory) accounting principles consistently applied.
"Consolidated Net Income" for any period, shall mean the net income (or loss)
of the corporation and its Subsidiaries on a consolidated basis determined in conformity with
generally accepted (or, in the case of an insurance company for which GAAP financial
statements are not prepared, statutory) accounting principles consistently applied.
"Dividend Availability Amount" shall mean, as at any date of determination, an
amount equal to fifty percent (50 %) of Consolidated Net Income for the period (taken as single
accounting period) commencing January 31, 1987 and ending on the last day of the fiscal quarter
immediately preceding such date of determination.
"Indebtedness" as applied to any person, means (a) all indebtedness for borrowed
money, (b) that portion of obligations with respect to finance leases which is capitaliz.ed on a
balance sheet in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, consistently applied,
(c) notes payable and drafts accepted representing extensions of credit whether or not
representing obligations for borrowed money, (d) any obligation owed for all or any part of the
deferred purchase price of property or services which purchase price is (i) due more than six (6)
months from the date of incurrence of the obligation in respect thereof, or (ii) evidenced by a
note or similar written instrument, and (e) all indebtedness secured by any Lien or vendor's
interest under any conditional sale or other title retention agreement existing on any property or
asset owned or held by that Person regardless of whether the indebtedness secured thereby shall
have been assumed by that Person or is non-recourse to the credit of that Person; provided,
however, that "Indebtedness" shall not include policy claims, policy reserves or mandatory
securities valuation reserves of a regulated insurance company; and further provided that
"Indebtedness" shall not include indebtedness of the corporation to any Subsidiary.
"Lien" shall mean any lien, mortgage, pledge, security interest, charge or
encumbrance of any kind (including any conditional sale or other title retention agreement, any
lease in the nature thereof, and any agreement to give a security interest).
"Long Term Debt", as applied to any Person, shall mean all Indebtedness of that
Person which by its terms or by the terms of any instrument or agreement relating thereto
matures more than one year, or is directly renewable or extendable at the option of the debtor
to a date more than one year (including an option of the debtor under a revolving credit or
similar agreement obligating the lenders to extend credit over a period of one year or more),
from the date of creation thereof, but excluding any payments due under the terms thereof within
twelve (12) months of any date of determination.
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"Person" shall mean an individual, corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust,
unincorporated organization or any other jurisdictional entity, or a foreign st.ate or any agency
or political subdivision thereof.
"Subsidiary" shall mean any corporation of which at least a majority of the
outstanding stock having by the terms thereof ordinary voting power to elect a majority of the
board of directors of such corporation (irrespective of whether or not at the time stock of any
other class or classes of such corporation shall have or might have voting power by reason of
the happening of any contingency) is at the time directly or indirectly owned or controlled by
the corporation or one or more of its Subsidiaries or by the corporation and one or more of its
Subsidiaries.

4.2.11 Conveaion Bi&ht· The holders of the Series A Preferred Stock shall
have the following conversion right ("Conversion Right"):
Ri&ht to Coayert. F.ach share of Series A Preferred Stock shall be
(a)
convertible, at the option of the holder thereof, at any time prior to the date on which notice of
redemption is given under Section 4.2.3 or Section 4.2.4, at the office of the corporation or any
transfer agent for the Series A Preferred Stock or Common Stock, into one fully paid and
nonassessable share of Common Stock.
(b)
Mechanics of Conyersign. Before any holder of Series A Preferred Stock
shall be entitled to convert such stock into shares of Common Stock, he shall surrender the
certificate or certificates for such Preferred Stock, duly endorsed, at the office of the corporation
or any transfer agent for the Common Stock, and shall give written notice to the corporation at
such office that he elects to convert such Preferred Stock and shall st.ate therein the number of
shares of Series A Preferred Stock being converted. Thereupon the corporation shall promptly
issue and deliver at such office to such holder of a certificate or certificates for the number of
shares of Common Stock to which he shall be entitled.

Such conversion shall be deemed to have been made immediately prior to the
close of business on the date of such surrender of the shares of Series A Stock to be converted
(the "Conversion Date"); and the person or persons entitled to receive the shares of Common
Stock issuable upon such conversion shall be treated for all purposes as the record holder or
holders of such shares of Common Stock on such date.
FractiQwU Shares. No fractional share of Common Stock shall be issued
(c)
upon conversion of Series A Stock. In lieu of any fractional shares to which the holder would
otherwise be entitled, the corporation shall pay cash equal to the product of such fraction
multiplied by the fair market value of one share of the corporation's Common Stock on the
Conversion Date, such value to be determined in good faith by the Board of Directors.
(d)
Reservation of Stock Issuable Upon Co.nversiQD. The corporation shall at
all times reserve and keep available out of its authorized but unissued shares of Common Stock,
solely for the purpose of effecting the conversion of the shares of the Series A Stock, such
number of its shares of Common Stock as shall from time to time be sufficient to effect the
conversion of all outstanding shares of the Series A Preferred Stock; and if at any time the
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number of authorized but unissued shares of Common Stock shall not be sufficient to effect the
conversion of all then outstanding shares of the Series A Preferred Stock, the corporation will
take such corporate action as may, in the opinion of its counsel, be necessary to increase its
authorized but unissued shares of Common Stock to such number of shares as shall be sufficient
for such purpose.
(e)
Tennination of Redemption Ri&ht. Upon exercise of the Conversion Right
under this Section 4.2.11, all rights of a holder of Series A Stock to require redemption of such
stock under Section 4.2.3 shall automatically be terminated; and no holder of Common Stock
acquired upon conversion of Series A Preferred Stock shall have any right of redemption.

4.2.12 Modification of Bjpts and Preferences. The rights and preferences
hereby conferred on the Series A Preferred Stock shall not be changed, altered or revoked
without the consent of the holders of the majority of the Series A Preferred Stock outstanding
at the time.
4.3

Series Band Series C Preferred Stock·

4.3. t General. Each share of Series B Preferred Stock and each share of Series
C Preferred Stock shall have the relative rights, preferences and limitations set forth in this
Section 4.3 of Article Fourth. The rights, preferences and limitations of the Series B Preferred
Stock shall be identical to the rights, preferences and limitations of the Series C Preferred Stock,
except that the holders of Series C Preferred Stock shall have certain voting and conversion
rights not shared by the holders of Series B Preferred Stock; and the Series B Preferred Stock
shall participate pro rata with the Series C Preferred Stock in any and alJ dividends declared and
paid on the Preferred Stock, in distributions upon liquidation, dissolution or winding up of
corporation's affairs, and in redemption.
4.3.2 Restricted Votin1 Ripts. The holders of the Series Band the Series C
Preferred Stock shall have no right (except as required by law) to receive notice of or to vote
on any matter (including, without limitation, the election of directors of the corporation) at any
regular or special meeting of stockholders of the corporation, except that the holders of a
majority of the shares of Series C Preferred Stock shall have the right, voting separately as a
class, to elect one director to the Board of Directors of the corporation.

4.3.3 Cumulati!e Dividend Preference
The Series B Preferred Stock and the Series C Preferred Stock shall be entitled
to receive, when and as declared by the corporation's Board of Directors, cash dividends at the
per annum rate of 10% of the Liquidation Rate (as defined in Section 4.3.4), cumulative,
payable annually at December 31 of each calendar year out of any funds legally available for
the payment of dividends, and in preference to any dividends upon the Common Stock. The
dividends on the Series B and Series C Preferred Stock shall be cumulative, whether or not
declared, so that, if for any period such dividend shall not be paid, the right to such dividend
shall accumulate as against the Common Stock; and all arrears so accumulated shall be paid
before any dividends shall be declared or paid upon the Common Stock. No dividends shall be
declared or paid on the Series B or Series C Preferred Stock if the redemption payments due to
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the holders of the Series A Preferred Stock under Section 4.2. of this Article Fourth are in
arrears. No dividend shall be declared or paid upon the Common Stock nor shall any Common
Stock be purchased or otherwise acquired by the corporation for value (other than payment of
amounts due to Reed J. Taylor for redemption of his Common Stock), unless all dividends on
the Series B and Series C Preferred Stock for all past period shall have been paid or shall have
been declared and a sum sufficient for the payment thereof set apart for payment.

4.3.4 Liguidation Preference.
In the event of any liquidation, dissolution or winding-up of the corporation,
whether voluntary or involuntary, before any other distribution or payment is made to the
holders of Common Stock or any other series of Preferred Stock (except the corporation's Series
A Preferred Stock), the holders of Series B Preferred Stock and the holders of the Series C
Preferred Stock shall be entitled to receive, out of the assets of the corporation legally available
therefor, a liquidation payment in the amount of $10.00 cash per share of Series B or Series C
Preferred Stock ("Liquidation Rate"), plus a further amount equal to the dividends accumulated
and unpaid thereon to the date of such liquidation payment. If, upon any liquidation, dissolution
or winding up of the corporation, the assets available for distribution are insufficient to pay to
the holders of all outstanding Series B and Series C Preferred Stock the full amount of the
Liquidation Rate and all accumulated but unpaid dividends, the holders of the Series B and
Series C Preferred Stock shall share pro rata in any such distribution of assets. Such rights of
the holders of the Series Band Series C Preferred Stock shall be subordinate only to the right
of the holder of the Series A Preferred Stock to be paid the redemption price of such stock in
full, together with accrued interest, in accordance with Section 4.2 of this Article Fourth. After
payment to the holders of the Series B and Series C Preferred Stock of the full preferential
amounts hereinabove provided, the holders of the Series B and Series C Preferred Stock as such
shall have no right or claim to any of the remaining assets of the corporation either upon any
distribution of such assets or upon dissolution, liquidation or winding up; and the remaining
assets to be distributed, if any, upon a distribution of such assets or upon dissolution, liquidation
or winding up, may be distributed among the holders of the Common Stock.

4.3.5 RedemptiQn.
(a) .Mandawry Redemption by CoIJ>Qiiil:ion. The Series B Preferred Stock and,
subject to the conversion rights provided in Section 4.3.6 of Article Fourth, the Series C
Preferred Stock shall be called for redemption by the corporation upon payment of the aggregate
Redemption Rate from legally available funds upon the closing of the earliest of the following
events ("Equity Offering"):

an offering of the corporation's securities conducted pursuant to the
(i)
registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act") in which gross
proceeds of at least $5,000,000 are raised;
(ii)
an offering of the corporation's securities pursuant to exemptions from
registration under the 1933 Act in which gross proceeds of at least $5,000,000 are raised;
or
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(iii)
an offering of any securities convertible into corporation's Common Stock
that are sold in an offering that conforms to the parameters of subparagraph (i) or (ii)
above.

The redemption price for each share of Series B and Series C Preferred Stock shall be the
"Redemption Rate" equal to 100 % of the Liquidation Rate if such redemption occurs within two
(2) years from the issuance of the first shares of Series B or Series C Preferred Stock. After
such two year period, an amount equal to 5 3 of the Liquidation Rate will be added to the
Redemption Rate immediately and each 180 days thereafter until all outstanding shares of the
Series B and Series C Preferred Stock are fully redeemed,

m:

Time from Original Issuance

Percentage of Liquidation Rate

Within two years

100%

After two years
but
before two years plus 181 days

1053

After two years plus 180 days but
before two years plus 361 days

110%

After two years plus 360 days
but
before two years pl us 541 days

1153

...

...

Notice of such call for redemption, specifying the anticipated date of closing of the Equity
Offering, shall be mailed to each record holder of Series B or Series C Preferred Stock as soon
as practicable before such closing date. The redemption date for mandatory redemption of the
Series Band Series C Preferred Stock shall be the actual closing date of the Equity Offering.
Mandatory redemption of the Series B and Series C Preferred Stock under this Section 4.3.5 of
Article Fourth shall automatically be cancelled upon determination by corporation's board of
directors that the Equity Offering will not be consummated for any reason.
(b) YQlun~ Redemption by Corporation. The Series B and Series C Preferred
Stock may be called for redemption by the corporation, in whole or in part, upon payment of
the Redemption Price from legally available funds at any time prior to the closing of an Equity
Offering. Notice of such call for redemption, specifying the redemption date not less than thirty
days from the date such notice is mailed and the number or percentage of outstanding shares of
Series Band Series C Preferred Stock to be redeemed, shall be mailed to each record holder of
Series B and Series C Preferred Stock. If fewer than all shares of Series B and Series C
Preferred Stock are to be redeemed, the shares shall be redeemed prorata from the holders
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thereof; and, upon request of the corporation, certificates evidencing shares of Series B and
Series C Preferred Stock including redeemed shares shall be surrendered to and reissued by the
corporation in reduced amount to reflect any and all partial redemptions of such shares prior to
such request.
(c) Redemption frocedure and Effect. The corporation shall deposit, on or
before the redemption date specified in the notice of redemption, the aggregate redemption price
of the shares of Series B and Series C Preferred Stock to be redeemed with a bank or trust
company specified in the notice, payable on the redemption date in the amounts and to the
respective orders of the holders of the shares of Series B and Series C Preferred Stock to be
redeemed, on endorsement to the corporation as may be required and upon surrender of the
certificates for such shares. Unless the corporation fails to pay the Redemption Price on or
before the redemption date, the shares of Series B and Series C Preferred Stock subject to such
redemption shall be deemed to have been redeemed, and shall be deemed no longer to be
outstanding, from and after the redemption date set forth in the notice of redemption. On or
after the redemption date, subject only to payment of the redemption price, Series Band Series
C Preferred Stock so called for redemption shall cease to be entitled to any interest or right in
the corporation; and holders of such Series B or Series C Preferred Stock shall thereafter cease
to be shareholders and shall be entitled only to payment of the amount of the redemption price,
without interest, upon surrender of the certificates evidencing such stock.
4.3.6 Conversion of Series C Prefcmd Stock. Each holder of Series C
Preferred Stock shall have the right, exercisable beginning at the earJier of the date of receipt
of notice of mandatory redemption of the Series C Preferred Stock pursuant to Section 4.3.5(a)
or two years after the first issuance of Series B or Series C Preferred Stock and ending on the
closing date of an Equity Offering, to convert Series C Preferred Stock into Common Stock at
the Conversion Rate determined as follows: Each share of Series C Preferred Stock shall be
convertible into that number of shares of Common Stock which equals 10.4 % of the Common
Stock on a fully diluted basis divided by 150,000.
This conversion right shall be exercisable by any holder of Series C Preferred
Stock as to all or any number of the shares of Series C Preferred Stock owned of record by such
holder and shall be exercised by giving the corporation written notice of the exercise of such
right, specifying the number of shares of Series C Preferred Stock to be converted and the
effective date of such conversion, provided that the effective date of the conversion shall not be
later than the closing date of an Equity Offering.
4.4
Common Stock. Holders of the Common Stock are entitled to one vote per share
on all matters to be voted on by stockholders, including the election of directors. Common
Stockholders are not entitled to vote their shares cumulatively in the election of directors.
Holders of Common Stock of the corporation shall be entitled to elect all of the directors of the
corporation other than the director appointed by the holders of the Series A Preferred Stock and
the director elected by the holders of Series C Preferred Stock. The holders of any series of
Preferred Stock of the corporation have a preference over the holders of Common Stock of the
corporation on the assets of the corporation legally available for distribution to stockholders in
the event of any liquidation, dissolution, or winding up of the affairs of the corporation. In the
event of any liquidation, dissolution or winding up of the affairs of the corporation, holders of
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the Common Stock will share ratably in any assets of the corporation legally available for
distribution to holders of Common Stock after satisfying the liquidation preferences of the Series
A, Series Band Series C Preferred Stock. Holders of Series Band Series C Preferred Stock
have a preference over the holders of Common Stock as to the payment of dividends. Holders
of Common Stock have rights, share for share, to receive dividends if and when declared by the
Board of Directors out of funds legally available therefor, after paying preferred dividends to
the holders of Series B and Series C Preferred Stock.

Holders of any class or series of corporation's stock shall not have a preemptive right
to acquire unissued or treasury shares of any class or series or securities convertible into such
shares or carrying a right to subscribe to or acquire such shares, except as provided in the Idaho
Business Corporation Act.
SIXTH
The location of the initial registered office of the corporation is One Lewis Clark Plaz.a,
Lewiston, Idaho 8350 I; and the name of its initial registered agent at such address is R. John
Taylor.

SEVENTH
The number of directors constituting the initial Board of Directors is four, and the names
and addresses of the persons who are to serve until the first annual meeting of the shareholders
and until their successors are elected and· qualified are:
Address

Reed J. Taylor

P.O. Box 538
Lewiston ID 83501

R. John Taylor

P.O. Box 538
Lewiston ID 83501

Raymond R. Heilman

P.O. Box 538
Lewiston ID 83501

Mary K. Frost

P.O. Box 538
Lewiston ID 8350 I
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EIGHm

The name and address of the incorporator is as follows:
Reed J. Taylor
P.O. Box 538
Lewiston ID 83501

The Board of Directors is expressly authorized to alter, amend or repeal the Bylaws of
the corporation and to adopt new Bylaws, subject to repeal or change by a majority vote of the
shareholders.
TENm

Shareholders entitled under Article Fourth to vote in the election of directors of the
corporation shall not be entitled to vote their shares cumulatively in the election of directors of
the corporation.

ELEVENTH
A director of this corporation shall not be personally liable to this corporation or its
shareholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, except for liability
(a) for any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to this corporation or its shareholders, (b) for
acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing
violation of law, (c) under Idaho Code §30-1-48, or (d) for any transaction from which the
director derived an improper personal benefit. If the Idaho Business Corporation Act is amended
to authorize corporate action further eliminating or limiting the personal liability of directors,
then the liability of a director of this corporation shall be eliminated or limited to the fullest
extent permitted by the Idaho Business Corporation Act, as so amended. Any repeal or
modification of this Article Eleventh by the shareholders of the corporation shall not adversely
affect any right or protection of a director of the corporation existing at the time of such repeal
or modification. "
mIRD:

The number of shares of the corporation outstanding at the time of such

adoption was 973,333.5 shares of Common Stock and 188,065 shares of Stated Value Preferred
Stock; and the number of shares entitled to vote thereon was 973,333.5 shares of Common
Stock.

FOURm: The designation and number of outstanding shares of each class entitled to
vote thereon as a class were as follows:
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.
Number of Shares
Common

FIFTH:

973,333.5

The number of shares of Common Stock voted for such amendment was

926,698; and the number of shares of Common Stock voted against such amendment was 6,688.

. '7*'

DATED this _ _ day of March 1995.

r;;;_=

)~

ft~~

Daniel L. Spickler,-Secretary

----YEROOCATIQN

STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Nez Perce

)

:ss.
I, ~nor~· ?ubeyiba Notary Public, do hereby certify that on the ~ day of
March 1995,
ly appeared before me R. JOHN TAYLOR, who, being by me first duly
sworn, declared that he is the President of AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, that he signed the
foregoing document as President of the corporation, and that the statements contained therein
are true.

per

~¥~fJ
./NOtafYbfic for Idaho
Residing at:
i .sfv n

wu

My Commission Expires:JQ/.-;;u;/9 7
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James D. LaRue ISB #1780
Loren C. Ipsen ISB #1767
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ANNAMARIE MEYER
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendants, Richard A. Riley
and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-OC-0918868

v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; SHARON
CUMMINGS, Personal Representative of the
Estate of Robert M. Turnbow; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

AFFIDAVIT OF D. JOHN ASHBY IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.
STATEOFIDAHO )
) SS.

County of Ada

)

D. JOHN ASHBY, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am over 18 years of age and competent to testify regarding the matters set forth

in this affidavit. I am an attorney with the firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP

AFFIDAVIT OF D. JOHN ASHBY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
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("Hawley Troxell") and one of the attorneys who represented AJA Services Corporation ("AIA")
and AIA Insurance, Inc., in the case of Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation et al., Case No.
CV 07-00208, in the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and
for Nez Perce County, (the "AIA Case"). As such, I am familiar with the files and records in the
AIA Case and make this affidavit based on my personal knowledge.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a copy of the Memorandum in Support of Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment dated April 16, 2008, filed by the attorneys for defendants Connie
Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck in the AIA Case. (The handwritten notation on the first
page of Exhibit A was not included on the original document filed with the Court in the AIA
Case.)
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a copy of Reed Taylor's Preliminary Response in

Opposition to Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck's Motion for partial Summary
Judgment dated July 17, 2008, filed by counsel for Reed Taylor in the AIA Case.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a copy of AIA's Motion to Amend Amended

Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim to Fifth Amended Complaint in the AJA Case.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Dis a copy of the Court's Opinion and Order on

Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration or, in the Alternative, for Certification for Interlocutory
Appeal in the AIA Case.
6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a copy of Reed Taylor's Motion to Disqualify the

Attorneys and Law Firms of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP; Clements, Brown &
McNichols, P.A.; and Quarles & Brady LLP in the AIA Case.
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7.

Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a copy of an Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in

Support of Reed Taylor's Motion to Disqualify the Attorneys and Law Firms of Hawley Troxell
Ennis & Hawley LLP, Clements Brown & McNichols, P.A., and Quarles & Brady LLP; Motion
to Relinquish Collateral; Motion to Compel; Motion to Protect Collateral; and Motion for
Continuance in the AIA Case.
8.

Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a copy of Connie Taylor's and Jim Beck's

Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment in the AIA Case.
9.

Attached hereto as Exhibit His a copy of an Affidavit of Scott T. Bell (1) in

Support of Reed Taylor's Motions for Rule 56(f) Continuance; (2) in Support of Reed Taylor's
Pending Motions to Compel Depositions and Discovery; (3) in Opposition to Connie Taylor and
Jim Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Joinders by the 401 (k) Plan and Other
Defendants; and (4) in Support of Reed Taylor's Motions for Partial Summary Judgment in the
AIACase.
10.

Attached hereto as Exhibit I is a copy of an Affidavit of Reed J. Taylor in Support

of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Motion for Reconsideration in the AIA Case .

. ;nth...

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this fJ.L_ day of August, 2012.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /$" day of August, 2012, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, Washington 98004

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado St.
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495

Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

v

v

v

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(425) 321-0343
Email: rod@roderickbond.com
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-9177
Email: jgjording@g-g.com
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l\ JONAIBAN D. HALLY
CLARK and FEENEY
Attorneys for Defendants, Connie Taylor,
3 James Beck, and Conine Beck
The Train Station, Suite 201
4 13th and Maln Streets
P. 0. Drawer28S
5
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
6 Telephone: (208)743-9516
ISB#4979
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

8
9

10
11

•
13
14
15
16

17

REED J, TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

)

Idaho~

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an Idaho)
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE)
TAYLOR, individually and the community)
property comprised thereof; BRYAN FREEMAN>)
a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS, a single)
person; CROP USA INSURANCE AGENCY,)
INC., an Idaho Corporation; and JAMES BECK)
and CORRINE BECK, individually and thC)
community property comprised thereof,
)

2 o CONNIE W. TAYLOR and JAMES BECK,

vs.

Counterclaimants,

22

24
•
26

Case No. CV-07-00208
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

)

Defendants.

19

23

)

vs.

18

21

)
)

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Counterdefcndanl

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

EXHIBIT

MEMO IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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INTRODUCTION
Defendants/CoWlterclaimants Connie Taylor and James Beck became members of the
2 Board of Directors for AIA Services in April 2007 and were subsequently named as Defendants
3 in the above-entitled lawsuit.

The lawsuit, in tum, stems from a redemption agreement entered

4

into between Reed Taylor and AIA Services.

5

Services") redeemed Reed Taylor's shares of AIA Services Common Stock. As part of the

6

In 1995, AIA Services Corporation ("AIA

redemption, the parties entered into a Stock Redemption Agreement and other related

7

agreements. The Redemption and related agreements were later modified. At the time the 1995
8
9

Agreements were entered into, AIA Services was in poor financial condition and held no capital

10 surplus. Accordingly, the 1995 Redemption Agreement was illegal and, therefore, void and
11 unenforceable since it was in violation of fonner Idaho Code Section 30-1 "46 unless the
12 purchase was from a corporation's capital surplus.

e

14

These Defendants/Counterclaimants seek partial summary judgment, requesting this
Court rule that the 1995 Redemption Agreement and related agreements as well as all

15
16

modifications thereto are illegal as a matter of law.
FACTS

17

Reed Taylor was the founder and majority shareholder of AIA Services. See Fifth

18

19 Amended Complaint, 12.10. ·As of

2 O and

21
22

1995, Reed was serving as the president of AIA Services,

was on its Board of Directors. Thus, Reed had intimate knowledge of the financial state of

the company and he had access to AIA Service's financial statements. In his capacity as
president and member of AIA's Board of Directors, Reed owed fiduciary duties to AIA Services.

23
24
25

AIA Services' consolidated financial statements establish that AIA Services was experiencing
financial difficulty in 1994 and 1995. See Sxhibit A to the Affidavit of Connie Taylor filed
MEMO IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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On July 22, 1995, in the midst of these financial difficulties, AIA Services and Recd

2

3 Taylor entered into a Stock Redemption Agreement, through which AIA Services redeemed
4

Reed's 613,494 shares of AIA Services Common Stock. Redemption Agreement has been

5 previously filed with the court. Under the terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement, Reed was
6

to receive, among other things, (a) $1,500,000 payable by cashier's check at closing (the "Down

7

Payment Note"); (b) $6,000,000 payable pursuant to the tenns of a promissory note (the
8

9
10

"$6,000,000 Note");and (c) elimination of approximately $570,000 in debt that Reed owed to

AJA Services's debt to A1A Services.
As ·of December 31, 1995, after entering into the Stock Redemption {\grec;ment,_ AJA·.

11

.3
12

14

.

.'

.

Services' total liabilities {including its liability to Reed Taylor) exceeded its total assets by over
$15 million. See id, Ex. A, pp. 3-4.
As set forth in detail below, AIA Services did not have any capital surplus to redeem

15

Reed Taylor's common stock in AIA Services. Instead, AJA Services was operating under a
16

17

deficit, and increased that deficit when it redeemed Reed Taylor's common shares. This

18

redemption of Recd Taylor's shares when AJA Services did not have any capital surplus was in

19

direct violation of an Idaho statute restricting corporations from purchasing their own stock.

2 O Thus, the entire transaction was illegal and void.
21
22

The illegality of the Stock Redemption

Agreement ~es the related $6,000,000 Note unenforceable.
STANDARD OF REVJgW

23

24
25
•

Under Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may be granted summary
judgment as a matter of law if ''the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with
MEMO JN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Yoakum v.
l

Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 129 ldaho 171, 175, 923 P.2d 416, 420 (1996). The record,

2 however, must be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party drawing all
3

4

inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Yoakum, 129 Idaho at 175, 923 P.2d at 420.
On a motion for summary judgment, the burden is upon the moving party to prove the

5 absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Once the party moving for summary judgment
6

establishes an absence of genuine issue, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to make a

7

a
9

showing of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on elements challenged by the
moving party. State v. Shama Resources Ltd. Partnership, 127 Idaho 267, 270, 899 P.2d 977,

10 980 ( 1995). The nonmoving party must respond to the summary judgment motion with specific
11 facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.

Bare assertions that an issue of fact exists, in face

12 of particular facts alleged by the movant, are not sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact.

&

Cates v. Albertson's Inc., 126 Idaho I 030, 1033, 895 P.2d 1223, 1226 (1995).

14

ARGUMENT

15
16

17

1.

The 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement Was Illegal as a Matter of Law.

The Idaho Code strictly limits the circumstances under which a corporation can

18 repurchase its own stock or make other distributions to shareholders. The statute in effect as of
19

1995 was Idaho Code § 30-1-% (superseded in 1997 by Idaho Code § 30-1-640), which.

2 0 provided in relevant part:

21
22

23

24

-6

25

The board of directors of a corporation may, from time to time, distribute to its
shareholders out of caRitAI sur.plus of the corporation a portion of its assets, in
cash or property, subject to the following provisions:
(a) NS> mch distribution 3l)1ll pg Jll!lde at 1 $ime v.:hen th§ c<u»<>ration js insolyent
Qr when 1uch dimilwtion would render th~ cm;poration iDfQlvw.
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.e

(d) No such distribution shall be made to the holders of any class of shares which
would reduce the remaining net assets of the corporation below the aggregate
preferential amount payable in event of involuntary liquidation to the holders of
shares having preferential rights to the assets of the corporation in the event of
liquidation.

1
2

3

4 Id

5
6

7

a

The courts in other states Pa.vc consistently held statutes similar to former Idaho Code
§ 30· 1-46 to prohibit a corporation from purchasing its own shares, except when such purchase

can be made from capital surplus. See, e.g., Naples Awning & Glass, Inc. v. Cirou, 358 So.2d

9 211, 214 (Fla. App. 1978) ("We conclude that under the 1973 statute a stock purchase agreement
10 which at time of execution would require payment of an amount for the stock in excess of the
11

a

12

14

corporation's 'surplus of its assets Qver its liabilities including capital' is void"); American

Heritage Inv. Corp. v. Rlinois Nat. Bank of Springfield, 386 N.E.2d 905, 908-910 (Ill. App.
1979) (concluding that a stock redemption agreement was illegal and void because the stock

15

redemption agreement was in violation of a specific statute prohibiting the purchase of shares

16

when the corporation lacks sufficient capital surplus to do so); Baird v. McDaniel Printing Co.,

17

153 S.W.2d 135 (Tenn. App. 1941) (concluding that a promissory note executed in coMection

18

with a stock redCmption agreement in violation of a statute prohibiting a stock redemption

19
20

without sufficient capital surplus was void and unenforceable, and holding that the corporation

was entitled to recover the amount already paid pursuant to the promissocy note); McGinley v.

21
22

Massey, 71 Md.App. 352, 356, 525 A.2d 1076, 1078 (Md. App. 1987) (stock redemption

23

agreement unenforceable when the corporation was insolvent because "[s]uch contracts when

24

executed by a corporation are illegal and not merely ultra vires."); In re Trimble Co., 339 F.2d

25

838, 845 (3rd Cir. 1964) (stock redemption agreement is unenforceable where made in violation
MEMO IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
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of a statute because it is "not merely ultra vires but illegal and void," and "[a]n illegal contract
l

2

may be defended against and avoided by any of the parties thereto'') (citations omitted); Stevens
v. Boyes Hot Springs Co., 298 P. 508, 509 (Cal. App. 1931) (concluding that a promissory note

3

given in connection with an illegiil stock redemption agreement is unenforceable and that the

4

corporation is entitled to the return of payments already made pursuant to the note).

5
6

Although there do not appear to be any Idaho .cas~s

app~ying

the statute in_ effect as of

1995, the common law prohibitiQn against purchasing a corporation's shares when the

7

corporation is insolvent, or when such a purchase would render the corporation insolvent, has
8
9

•

been recognized on multiple occasions by the Idaho courts. See, e.g., La Voy Supply Co. v.

10

Young, 84 Idaho 120, 127, 369 P.2d 45, 49 (1962) ("Idaho follows the rule that an insolvent

11

corporation may not repurChase its stock."); White v. Lorimer's City Dye Works, 269 P. 90, 90

12

(Idaho 1928) ("A contract by a corporation to repurchase its capital stock is not enforceable

3
14

against

~e corporation while insolvent."); Brown v. T.B. Reed & Co., 174 P. 136, 138 (Idaho

1918) ("While there is a conflict in the authorities as to the capacity of a corporation to purchase

15

16
17

its own stock, the rule appears to be universal that such a purchase is void if made while the
corporation is insolvent.").

18

Notably, the rule in Idaho regarding a corporation's ability to purchase its stock from a

19

shareholder has changed several times. The Idaho cases cited above recite the common law rule

2O

that a corporation cannot repurchase its stock while the corporation is insolvent. This rule was

21

Wf~~!i~·'.~~.!~7~},~~~!~m~Ii~~~~(~~~'§''''it'··-;;;!;t~ptougb·•,mted'iiF'the;more::iechnicat''terffij'ffiaFa

22

. corporation:®µl~ .. pi;iJy.._~purchase··••.its::shares:·~~out:•,of;:c:apital:swplus~of"tlie;;••corporation;-''\;,:1q . . •. .

23

24
25

•

6

addition to the capital surplus requirement, the repurchase could not be made "at a time when the
corporation is insolvent or when such distribution would render the corporation insolvent." Id
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2

In this case, the statute in effect as of 1995 applies. See Jn re Lake Country Investments,

3

255 B.R. 588, 600 (Blatcy. D. Idaho 2000) (applying the savings provision in I.C. § 30-1-1703

4

to detennine that former Idaho Code § 30-1-46 applies to a 1996 stock redemption agreement

5

because it was executed prior to the July 1, 1997 effective date of J.C. § 30-1-640)1 Thus, the

6

Stock Redemption Agreement is void if AJA Services did not have $7,500,000 in capital

7

surplus2 in 1995 needed to redeem' Reed's common stock.
8

9

It is indisputable that as of July 22, 1995, AIA Services did not have sufficient capital

10

surplus to redeem Reed Taylor's common stock. In fact, AJA Services did not have any capital

11

surplus and, instead, had a deficit. "Capital Surplus" is defined as ''the entire surplus of a

•

corporation other than its earned surplus." See former I.C. § 30-1-2(m).."Surplus" is defmed as

12

14

''the excess of the net assets of a corporation over its stated capital." Id. at 30-1-2(k). "Net
assets" is defined as ''the amount by which the total assets of a corporation exceed the total debts

15
16
17

of the corporation." Id. at 30-1-2(i). Thus, the "stated capital" is a component of the "net
assets!' It is clear from AIA's audited Consolidated Financial Statements that AIA did not have

l B sufficient capital surplus to redeem Reed Taylor's common shares.

19

As of December 31, 1994, AIA had total assets of $6,052,465 and total liabilities of

20

$5,001,738. See Connie Taylor Aft, Ex. A, pp. 3-4. Thus, AIA services had a capital surplus

21

of less than $1,050,727. As of December 31, 1995, after redeeming Reed's common stock, AJA

22

23

lFor the Court's convenience, copies of the applicable fonner and current statutes are attached
hereto as Exhibits I and 2.

24
25

2For the technical definition of "capital surplus," see fonner Idaho Code § 30-1-2, which is
attached hereto as Exhibit 3.
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had total assets of $3,342,152 and total liabilities of $18,655,370 (including the liability to
•

1

Reed). Id Thus, AlA had a negative capital surplus. As of December 31, 1996 (i.e., after the

2

1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement), AJA had total assets of $2,856,836 and total

3

liabilities of $16, 113, 178 (including the liability to Reed). Id at Ex. B, pp. 3-4. It is clear that at

4

no time between 1994 and 1996 did AJA services have sufficient capital surplus (if any at all)

5

with which to redeem Reed Taylor's shares as required by Idaho Code§ 30-1-46. Therefore, the

6

Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal as in violation of Idaho Code § 30-1-46.

7

A cont?act that is in violation of a statute or otherwise prohibited by law is illegal. Barry
8
9

v. Pacijlc West Const. Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 832, 103 P.3d 440, 445 (2004); Sgt q/so l1A Am.Jur.

10

2d Contracts Section 251 (1991). The law is well settled in Idaho that illegal contracts are void

11

and cannot be enforced. Barry v. Pacific West Const. Inc., 140 Idaho 827, /OJ P.3d 440 (2004);

12

Zollinger v. Ca"ol, 137 Idaho 397, 49 P.3d 402 (2002); Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 944
P.2d 698 (1997); Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 924 P.2d 607 (1996). "A party to an illegal

14

contract cannot ask the Court to have his illegal objects carried out, as the law will not aid either

15

16
17

party to an illegal agreement but leaves the parties where it finds them. Quiring, 130 Idaho at
568, 944 P.2d at 703. "In Idaho a court may not only raise the issue of whether a contract is

18

illegal sua sponte, but it has a duty to raise the issue of illegality whether pied or otherwise at

19

any stage in the litigation stream!' Hyta v. Finley, 137 Idaho 755, 758, 53 P.3d 338, 341

20

(2002)(intemal citations omitted.)

21
22

In Kunz v. Lobo Lodge, Inc., 133 Idaho 608, 611-12, 990 P.2d 1219, 1222-1223 (Ct.
App. 1999), the parties entered into a lease agreement for purposes of maintaining billboards in

23

24
25

A.
WJ

violation of a city ordinance. When one party filed suit to enforce the lease agreement, the Court
dismissed the action, refusing to enforce an illegal contract.
MEMO IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
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"(c]ontracts to do acts forbidden by law are void and cannot be enforced,. because "a contract
1

which is made for the purpose of furthering any matter or thing prohibited by statute ... is void."

2

Id at 611 (citations omitted). "This rule applies to mO! contract which is founded on a

3

transaction malum in se, or which is prohibited by statute, on the ground of public policy." Id.

4

(citations omitted).

5

regardless of the ignorance of the parties. Id ("[W]here a statute intends to prohibit an act, it

6

The court explained that illegal contract are always unenforceable,

must be held that its violation is illegal, without regard to the reason of the inhibition ... or to

7

the ignorance of the parties as to the prohibiting statute."). The Court reiterated the rule of
B
9

unenforceability of an illegal contract as follows:
No principle of law is better settled than that a party to an illegal
contract cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal
objects carried out; ... the law in short will not aid either party to
an illegal contract; it leaves the parties where it finds them. The
general rule is the same at law and in equity, and whether the
contract is executory or executed.

10
11
12

&
14

Id (quoting Hancock v. Elkington, 67 Idaho 542, 186 P.2d 494 (1947)). There is no material

15

issue of fact as to whether the Stock Redemption Agreement was in violation ofl.C. § 30-1-46.

16

Therefore, a partial summary judgment order should be entered declaring that the Stock

17

Redemption Agreement was illegal, void and unenforceable.

18

2.

20

Defendants/Counterclaimants Seek Only A Partial Summary Judgment
Determination That :J'be Stock Redemption Agreement is Illegal and
Unenforceable

21

In moving for partial summary judgment, the undersigned seek only a partial summary

22

judgment determination that the Stock Redemption Agreement is illegal and unenforceable. A

19

23

finding of illegality and unenforceability will lead to other issues to be addressed later, including
whether the entire tran·saction should or can be rescinded, requiring Reed Taylor to return all
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benefits received under the agreements and, in tum, have his stock returned, and other remedies
l

issues. Those issues should be resolved at a later time.

2

CONCLUSION

3

4

AJA Services did not have any capital swplus available to purchase Reed's common

5

stock. Thus, as a matter of law, the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement was an illegal contract

6

that is void and unenforceable. A summary judgment order should be entered finding that the

7

1995 Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal and that the related $6,000,000 Note is void and

8

unenforceable.
9
10

DATED THIS

g__

day of April, 2008.

11

•
12

CLARK AND FEENEY

14

BY

. 15

JON

D.HALLY,A11'0RNEYSFOR

ONNIE W. TAYLOR.i JAMBS BECK AND
. CORRINE BECK

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

e
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1

2
3
4

s
6
7
9
9

10
11

14
15
16

17
18

19
20
21
22

23

1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _Lb. day of April, 2008, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
· Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith and Cannon
508 Elgh1h Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneys for Reed Taylor

)J(
0

0
0

Ill

James J. Gatzlolis
Charles E. Harper
QUARLES & BRADY LI,.P
SOO West Madison Street, Suite 3700
Chicago, Illinois 60661-25 I I
Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance

Ji1

Michael McNichols
Clements, Brown & McNichols
321 13111 Street
PO Box 1510
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneys for R. John Taylor
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MEMO IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDOMENT

II
LAW OFFICES OF'

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON. ID"'HO a:1so1
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RODERICK C. BOND (Pro Hae Vice)
NED A. CANNON, ISBA No. 2331
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 8350 l
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, VIA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111

Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF TIIE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

v.
AJA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an Idaho
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE
TAYLOR, individually and the community
property comprised thereof; BRYAN
FREEMAN, a single person'; JOLEE DUCLOS,
a single person; CROP USA INSURANCE
AGENCY, INC., an Idaho Corporation; and
JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK,
individually and the community property
comprised thereof;

Case No.: CV-07-00208
REED TAYLOR'S PRELIMINARY
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
CONNIE TAYLOR, JAMES BECK
AND CORRINE BECK'S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO CONNIE AND
BECKS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT- I

EXHIBIT
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Reed Taylor ("Reed") submits the following Preliminary Response in Opposition to
Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment:
I. INTRODUCTION

Connie and the Becks are attempting to avoid liability for themselves and others in this
action by disingenuously attempting to invalid the redemption of Reed's shares based upon old
case law and code intended to protect innocent creditors and shareholders. But Connie and the
Becks are hardly innocent shareholders. In fact, Connie and James Beck have been personally
involved in substantial corporate malfeasance at AIA Services and AIA Insurance. Moreover,
even if Connie and Becks' Motion had merit, the Motion fails on its own weight.
The Court should deny Connie and Becks' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
enter partial swnmary judgment in favor of Reed on the same issue.
Although this Response is only Reed's Preliminary Response, it is being filed to establish
that there is no reason to delay ordering AIA Insurance to be immediately relinquished to him.

Reed will respond in further detail in the future.

ll.FACTUALBACKGROUND
On June 27, 1995, a notice of special shareholder meeting was provided to the

shareholders of AIA Services for purposes of providing notice and approval of AJA Services'
purchase of Reed Taylor's shares for over $7.S Million. See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May
9, 2008, Ex. B, p. 1, 'Y 5.

On June 30, 1995, James Beck, Michael Cashman, Richard Campanaro and R. John
Taylor entered into an Investment Agreement. See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May· 9, 2008,
Ex. E. Under the terms of the Investment Agreement, James Beck and Michael Cashman
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conditioned their purchase of Preferred C Shares in AIA Services on the requirement that all of
Reed Taylor's shares were purchased by AIA Services. Id. at p. I 0, 'ii 9(d).
On July 10, 1995, a revised notice of special shareholder meeting was provided by John
Taylor on behalf of AIA Services for purposes of approving various corporate actions, including
the purchase of Reed Taylor's shares.

Id. at Ex. C.

A copy of the Private Placement

Memorandum dated June 1, 2995 was attached to John Taylor's letter to shareholders. Id at Ex.
C, p. 3; Ex. D.
On July 22, 1995, AIA Services and Reed Taylor entered into the Stock Redemption
Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, Security Agreement, among other agreements.

See

Hearing, Ex. Z, AA and AB. AIA Services executed the $6M Note on August l, 1995. See
Hearing, Ex. A.
On August 16, 1995, James and Corrine Beck became shareholders in AIA Services. See

Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. G. Prior to purchasing shares, James Beck
executed a Subscription Agreement warranting that he had been given the opportunity to review
the financial statements of AJA Services for the periods en?ing December 31, 1994, and March
31, 1995. See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. F, p. 1, 'i l(a). The December
31, 1994, financial statements of AIA Services are also attached to the Affidavit Connie Taylor
submitted in support of Connie and Becks' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
On August 15, 1995, an opinion letter was issued to Reed Taylor verifying many
requirements had been met by AJA Services, including, without limitation, that the purchase of
Reed Taylo'r's shares was a legal transaction and that shareholder approval was obtained. See
Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. I. The opinion letter was based upon the
PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO CONNIE AND
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knowledge of R.M. Turnbow and Richard Riley. Id. at p. 2. Richard Riley is presently an
attorney at Hawley Troxell. AJA Services Bylaws state that one person's vote of shares jointly
held by two people is the equivalent of the vote made by both joint owners. See Affidavit of
Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. J.
On August 16, 1995, AIA Services warranted in a separate and distinct document that all
conditions necessary to purchase Reed Taylor' shares had been satisfied and that "Reed J. Taylor
is hereby fully and forever released, discharged and indemnified by [AJA Services] from all
claims, caused of action, demands, rights, damages, costs expenses, fees, compensation,
liabilities and other obligations ... " See Hearing, Ex. AC.
II. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

Swnmary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, admissions, and declarations show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56.
On summary judgment, the Court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving

parting, including questions of credibility and the weight to be accorded particular evidence.

Masson v. N,ew Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 471 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
Connie and the Becks, Motion fails to meet the required standard for partial summary
judgment. 1

1

On July 16, 2008, Counsel fur Reed Taylor was advised by Jon Hally that he and his firm would be
withdrawing from representing Connie and the Beck& as a rosult of violating the rules of professional conduct. This
Response is being submitted to support Reed being awarded possession of AJA Insurance and in the unlikely event
that Mr. Hally and his flrm fail to vacate the hearing. In any event, Reed hereby requests additional time to respond
pursuant to J.R.C.P. 6(b)(l) and J.R.C.P• .56(f). A formal motion and notice of hearing will be submitted at a later
date if required.
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A. Assuming AIA Services Was Insolvent and Connie and Becks, Motion Had
Mer.it, Connle., a11d· th~ Becks· Motion Sb.~uld Be 'DenJed . Bet:aus.e, Tb ex H-avc No
Standing to Attack the Redemption of Reed's Shares.
·
·
Stock redemption and distribution statutes arc. enacted to protect innocent creditors. A

virtually identical fact pattern to this case was more recently addressed through a unanimous
decision of the Colorado Supreme Court:

We agree with the majority view that the validity of a corporate stock repurchase may be
attacked only by persons who are injured or prejudiced thereby and not by the
corporation itself. Allowing corporations to void these transactions through the
application of a statute designed to protect creditors and minority shareholders would, in
effect, sanction corporate development of improper repurchasing schemes. Such a result
is a misapplication of the statute and circumvents its intended purpose.
A shareholder whp is full:v·.aware of. an~ C2Il§ents to, a questionable trans@ction may not
thereafter attack that transaction by reguesting it be declared illegal.
The Minne/usa Company. 929 P.2d 1321, 1324-25 (Col. 1996) (emphasis added).

John Taylor, Connie Taylor, and James Beck were intimately involved in the transactions
to redeem Reed's shares. Moreover, Jolm Taylor voted in favor of the transaction at various
board meetings, and Jolm and Connie Taylor voted their shares in favor of the transaction.
Significantly, James and Corrine Beck conditioned their purchase of Series C Preferred Shares in

AIA Services on the condition that Reed's shares were redeemed and, most importantly, did not
become shareholders until after Reed's shares were

redeem~d

(i.e., even creditors are barred

from attacking a redemption when they have notice of the redemption).

None of these

defendants are innocent creditors. None of these defendants are innocent shareholders. None of
these defendants have clean hands. All of these defendants wanted Reed's shares redeemed in a
failed effort to take AIA Services public.
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Now, these same defendants are seeking to invalidate the redemption of Reed's shares
some 13 years after the fact by arguing a statutory scheme designed to protect innocent creditors.
Significantly, however, Connie Taylor, James Beck, and Corrine Beck are not innocent creditors
or the intended beneficiarii;s of stock redemption/repurchase statutes.

Indeed, their hands are

..

unclean as they have participated in siphoning off assets and cash from AIA Services and AIA
Insurance for their own benefit and to the detriment of Reed and the other shareholders of ATA
Services.
Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck are barred from seeking to invalidate the

redemption of Reed's shares. They have no standing to contest the redemption from which they
sought to profit from.
B. Assuming Connie and the Becks' Rnve Standing and Their At·guments Have
Merit, They Have Not Submitted Any Evidence of the Net Assets of AlA
Services' Assets on the Date Reed's Shares Were Redeemed.
In order to prevail on partial summary judgment, there can be no issue of material fact as
to aoy issue. I.R.C.P. 56.
Here, Connie and the Becks have submitted no evidence as to the assets and debts of ATA
Services as of July 22; 1995 (the date the Redemption Agreement was executed), or August 1,
1995 (the date the $6M Promissory Note was executed).
Thus, even if Connie and Becks' Motion was grounded in good faith law, their Motion
fails on its own weight. Moreover, AIA Services assets were obviously greater than portrayed as

it had net income of $8,820,000 in 1997 from the sale of assets that were obviously not properly
valued jn 1995, thereby creating yet an additional issue of fact. See Hearing, AM, p. 29.
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Connie and Becks are not entitled to partial summary judgment as they have failed to
meet the burden required by the moving party.
C. Assuming Connie and the Becks' Have Sbnading and Their Arguments Have
Merit. They Cited the Wrong Code Section in Their Motion.

Although Connie and Becks' Motion·Iacks merit under any theory, their Motion must be
denied because they relied upon the wrong Idaho Code Section in their Motion.
In 1995, l.C. 30-1-6 was the applicable law pertaining to stock redemptions. Connie and
Becks erroneously rely upon I.C. 30-1-46. Even if Connie and Becks' Motion had merit, it fails
as a matter of law.
IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons articulated above, the Court should deny Connie and Becks' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and provide Reed additional time to respond.
DATED: This

tih day of July, 2008.
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
..

By:~
-RoaeriCk
~

Ned A. Cannon
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
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CERTIFICATE OF' SERVICE

I, Roderick C. Bond, decllll'e that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct

copy of the Reed Taylor's Preliminary Response in Opposition to Connie Taylor, James Beck
and Corrine Beck on the following parties via the methods indicated below:

David A. rnuins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Attorney for Defendants JoLee Duclos and
Bryan Freeman

Via:

(
(
(
(

)
)
)
)

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)
Via:

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for R. John Taylor

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box285
Lewiston. ID 83501
Attorney for Connie Taylor, James Beck and
Corrine Beck

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ):·Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)
Via:

Gary D. Babbitt
D. John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite I 000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
Attorneys for AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and
Crop USA Insurance Agency

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)
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James J. Gatziolis
Charles E. Harper
Quarles & Brady LLP
Citigroup Center, 500 West Madison Street
Suite 3700

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) bvemight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Chicago, IL 60661-2511
Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance Agency

Signed this 17th day of July, 2008, at Lewiston, Idaho.
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Gary D. Babbitt ISB No. 1486
D. John Ashby ISB No. 7228
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-i617
Telephone: (208) 344-6000
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829

Email: gdb@hteh.com
jash@hteh.com
Attorneys for ATA Services Co1poration,
AJA Insurance, Jnc., and CropUSA
JN IHE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, JN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff~

vs.

)
)
)
)
)

AJA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho )
co1poration; AJA INSURANCE, Il'IC ., an
)
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and )

CONNJB TAYLOR, individually and the
community propeity comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA
INSURANCE AGENCY, JNC., an Idaho
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and
CORRINE BECK. individually and the
community property comprised thereof,
Defendants.

Case No. CV-07-00208
MOTION TO AMEND AMENDED
ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
AND COUNTERCLAIM TO FIFTH
AMENDED COMPLAINT

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho )
corporation; and AIA INSURANCE, INC., an )
)

EXHIBIT

MOTION TO AMEND AMENDED ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND
COUNTERCLAIM TO FJFTH AMENDED CO:MPLAINT - 1
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~··

Idaho co:rporation,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Counterdefendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COME NOW the Defendants AJA Services Corporation and AJA InsUiance Inc., by and
through their counsel of1ecord Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, and hereby respectfully
move this Court for an 01der amending the Defendants' Answer and Counterclaims to Plaintiff's
Fifth Amended Complaint, and file. a Second Amended Answer, Affumative Defenses,. and
Counterclaims pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a-c) in the following particulars:
Defendants move the Court to enter its Ordex allowing the amendment of the Defendants'
Amended Answex· to the Plaintiffs Fifth Amended Complaint by adding a Nineteenth Defense
and a Seventh Counterclaim which states:
NINETEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs claims against these Defendants are baned because the
1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, the 1996 Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement and the other related agreements are void
as in violation of former Idaho1'.G~,,:§;RQ::.l~§;(~µperseded in
1997 by l9.@l:J.0Code 1§'30""1;;;640J?TIIdailio·cc;ae§ 30:1.46 provided
that a coipoiation could redeem its shares (01 make other
distributions) only out of the co.:rporation's capital swplus. The
statute fiuthex prohibited sbareholdex· distn'butions ''when the
co1po1ation is insolvent or when such clistdbution would render the
corporation insolvent."

.·. At th~Jime the. parties entered into . the .1995.Stock }l~demption
· Agreement, AIA Services did not have any capital smpltis with
which to redeem Plaintiff's common stock, AJA had an
accumulated deficit, and/or said tiansaction rendered AJA Sezvices
insolvent. The 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, the 1996
MOTION TO AMEND AMENDED ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND
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Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement and the related
agreements are, thezefore, illegal an~ void.
The Cowt should decline to enforce the illegal and void
agreements, including the $6 Million Note. In the alternative, the
agreements should be rescinded.

S~VENTH COUNTERCLAIM
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

L

Reed J. Taylor was the founder and majority shareholdez of AJA Services, Inc.

(Sei:vices).
2.

In 19~4 and 1995 until July Reed J Taylor was the chief executive officer of

Sei:vices.

e

3.

Reed J. Taylor was also a member of the Bomd of Directors of Sei:vices in 1994

through 1996.

4.

Jn 1995 Reed J. Taylor executed a Stock Redemption Agreement and related

Agreements (1995 Agreements) for the pmchase of all of'Reed J. Taylor's stock for ovex
$7,000,000 in cash, elimination of debt, and airplanes. The 1995 Agreement was restructured in
1996 with the execution of a 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement and related
agreements (hereafter 1996 A.8J'.eement). The 1995 Agreement and 1996 Agreement are
collectively referred to as the 4'Redemption Agreements."
5.

In 1995 anci 1996 Sexvices did not have any capital sutplus and was operating at a

6.

Idaho Code 30-1-46 (in effect in 1995 and 1996) provided:

deficit

The board of directors of a corporation may, :from time to time,
distribute to its shareholders out of capital sutplU§ of the
cozporation a portion ofits assets, in cash or property, subject to
the following provisions:
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(a)
No §Uch distribution span be made at a time when the
comomtion is insolvent or when mch disttjbupon would render the

comoration msolvept.
(d)
No such distribution shall be made to the holders of any
class of shares which would reduce the remaining net assets of the
co1po1ation below the aggregate preferential amount payable in
event ofinvoluntmy liquid11tion to the holders of shares having
preferential rights to the assets of the corporation in the event of
liquidation.
7.

The Redemption Agreements violate and contraven~ Idaho Code 30-146 then in

effect in 1995 and 1996.
8.

Defendants. seek a declaratory judgment pursuant to lC. 10-1201 et seq. declaring

the Redemption Agreements void and unenforceable and/01 the Redemption Agreements

e

rescinded
A true and correct copy of AJ!i. Setvices Corporation's and AJA Insursnce's Second.
Amended Answer to Plaintiff's Fifth Amended Complaint, Counterclaim and Demand for .Twy
Trial is attached as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Gacy D. Babbitt filed herewith. The grounds for
this motion are that justice requires that Defendants be permitted to plead their defenses in
response to the Plaintiff's Fifth Amended Complaint. Furthermore, the amendment will conform
to the proof that is contained in the exhibits which are of record before the Court at the present
time Furthennore, the Defendants move the Court to enter an order that the amended pleading

relate back to the time of filing the Complaint.
This motion is based upon the pleadings, the entire file of the CoUit and the affidavit filed
in suppoxt hereof: A Notice of Hearing on this motion is being filed concummtly herewith.
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DATED TH1S

-2.j_ day of April, 2008.
HAWLEY.TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

C::I

?!;

•

rs~

Gary D. Babbitt ISBNo. 1486
Attorneys for AlA Services Corporation,
AJA Insurance, Inc., and CropUSA
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COUNTERCLAIM TO FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT - 5
001974

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERIJFY that on this~ day of Aptil, 2008, I caused to be seived a true
copy of the foregoing MOTION TO~ AMENDED ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES AND COUNTERCLAIM TO FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAlNT by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

_U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_Hand Delivered
_
Overnight Mail
_Telecopy
-1L:_Email

Dean Wullenwaber
WULLENWABER LAW FIRM
P.O. Box452
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

_U.S. Mail, Postage Piepaid
_Hand Delivered
_Overnight Mail

David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
[Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman]

_U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

~mail

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
32113th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys fo1 Defendant R.)ohn Taylor]

Jonathan D Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O.Box285
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attomeys for Defendants Connie Taylor, James Beck
and Conine Beck]
James J. Gatziolis
Charles Ji Harper
QUARLES & BRADY LLP
500 West Madison Street, Suite 3700
Chicago, Illinois 60661-2511
[Attorneys fot Crop USA

!Jmmmcec· J

_Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
--lL"Bmail
_U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_Hand Delivered
_Overnight Mail
_
Telecopy
Email
__ U.S. Maii Postage Prepaid
_ _ Hand Delive1ed
_ _ Overnight Mail
__,/f elecopy
_L.Email
_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_Hand Delivered
_Overnight Mail
---::r'Ielecopy
_z_E-mail

IJ
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

llEED J. TAYLOR., a single person,

)
).

Plaintiff,

•

)
)

v.

)

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof,
BRIAN FREEMAN. a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person; CROP
USA INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an
Idaho corporation; and JAMES BECK and
CORRINE BECK. individually and in the
communJty property comprised thereof;
Defendants.

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV07·00208
OPINION AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OR,
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR.
CERTIFICATION FOR
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

)
)
)
)
)
)

"This matter is before the Court on Defendants' AIA Services and AIA Insurance Motion
for Reconsideration and Clarification and, in the Alternative, Request for Certification for
Interlocutory Appeal, A hearing on the motion was held March 13, 2008. Plaintiff Reed Taylor

fay/or v A/A

Opinion & Order on Motion for Rcconsldc:rnlion of PSJ
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'
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1
was represented by attorney Roderick C. Bond. Defendants AJA Services Corporation and AIA
Insurance, Inc. were represented by attorneys Gary D. Babbitt and D. John Ashby. The Court,
having read the motion, briefs, and affidavits submitted by the parties, having considered the
record in the matter, having heard oral arsuments of counsel and being fully advised in the

mattert hereby renders its decision.

BACKGROUND
The facts forming the background for the above-entitled litigation have been articulated
in a number of prior opinions entered by the Court and will not be repeated here. Instead, only

those facts relevant to the motion for reconsideration or the aJtema.tive motion for pcnnissiOn to
file nn interlocutory appeal, tiled by Defendants AIA Services and A1A Insurance (hereinafter
''Defendant AJA"), will be addressed.

•

In its brief in support of the motion for reconsideration, Defendant AJA argues for the
first time the effect of the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement on the payment terms of
the $6 million Note. The Series A Preferred Shareholder ~grcemcnt was made part of the record

only when attached to the Affidavit of John Taylor in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and
Clarification and, in the Alternative, Request for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal filed
February 25, 2008. 1 The Court was, therefore, upon hearing the motion for summary judgment.
unable to consider what it did not have before it.

Defendants also contend on motion for reconsideration that the Court's analysis was
incomplete in that the Court failed to address the issue of waiver raised by the Defendants in

1

The originol l 996 Stock Rodomprion Restructure Agreement had a number of nttnchments, including tho Series A
Preferred Shareholder Agreement designntcd as Exhibit 0. However, while the 1996 Stock Redemption Reslructure
Agreement wu attached as :Exhibit B to the Affidavit of John Tnylor tiled February 26, 2007 Md wus admitted into
the record M Plaintiff's Exhibit a during the March 1, 2007 heoring, nt no timo did tho document include the
exhibits noted in tho body of the document nor was tho Series A Profcl'red Shareholder Agreement made part of tho
recol'd as a sepnrute document until it wus attached to the Affidavit of John Taylor filed f'obruary 2S, 2008,
Taylor v AJA
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their opposition to Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. The Court will consider the
Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement and the waiver issue now.

STANDARDSOFREVIE.W:
The decision to grant or deny a motion to reconsider rests within the sound discretion of
the trial court.

•

When considering a motion to reconsider under I.R.C.P. 1l(a.)(2), the district
court "should take into accoWlt any new facts presented by the moving party that
bear on the correctness of the interlocutory order." Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v.
First Nat'/ Banko/N. ldaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800P.2d1026, 1037 (1990). A
decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration generally rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court. Jordan, 135 Idaho at 592, 21 P.3d at 914. Abuse of
discretion is determined by a three part test which asks whether the district court
11
(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
bowidaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to
the specific chojccs available to it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of
reason." Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho
761. 16S, 86 P.3d 47S. 479 (2004) (citations omitted) .
Spur Products Corporation v. Stoel RJve.r LLP, 1.43 Idaho 812, 817, 1s~· P.3d l J58 (2007).

Idaho Appellate Rule 12 provides that a motion for pcnnisslon to appeal an interlocutory
order may be granted by a district court if it finds there exists "a controlling question oflaw as to
which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an immediate appeal
from the order or decree may materially advance tho orderly resolution of the litigation.'' r.A.R.
12.

AJS:ALYSIS
{A) CONSlDERAIIQ.li AND CER,:rm REOUIREMENIS
Defendant AIA contends the Court erred when it found the alleged oral modification
lacked consideration. It is AlA's position that the additional interest that would be paid by the
extension of time for payment of the Note is sufficient consideration to make the agreement
Taylo,.vAIA
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enforceable. In support of its argument, Defendant AlA cites to Rule Sales and Service, Inc. v.

U.S. Bank National Association, 133 Idaho 669, 991 P.2d 857 (1999) for the definition of
consideration. However, the Rule Court upheld the lower court's finding that the oral

modification extending the date for payment on a loan lacked consideration as the bank received
no benefit.

[W) note our agreemeat with the district court's conclusion that the alleged oral
agreement was not supported by consideration. Consideration for a promise may
take the form of an act by the promisee that is bargained for and given in
exchange for the promise. Dtl)I v. Mortgage Ins. Corp., 91Idaho605, 607, 428
P.2d 524, 526 (1967). Consideration may also consist of a detriment to the
promisee or a benefit to the promisor. Surety Life Ins. Co. v.·Rose Chapel
Mortuary, Inc., 95 ldaho 599, 603, 514 P.2d 594, 598 (1973).

Rule Sales and Service, Inc. v. U.S. Bank National Association, 133 ldaho at 674.
The Rule Court did not discuss tho fact that the balance due on the loan would continue to
accrue interest during the time extension, though clearly it would. The :presumption that must be

drawn is that the Rule Court di.d not find additional interest to be sufficient consideration to
support an oral modiflcation. This is consistent with the generally accepted understanding of
sufficient consideration. "The payment of interest due or past due at the time it js paid is no
consideration for a promise by the creditor to extend the time for payment of the debt.'' l 7A

Am.Jur.2d Contracts§ 523. Therefore. the Court rejects Defendant's argument.
Defendant AlA :fiu:ther asserts Reed Taylor received a benefit by waiving the time for
payment in tho following manner. The extension of time would allow AIA and CropUSA to
work together to create a joint agency force, allowing both corporations to improve their
financial positions. AIA would then have sufficient assets to pay Reed Taylor's Note in full.
The Court is not persuaded. Foregoing the payment of a debt so that money can be spent making
a corporation more profitable is a benefit to the corporation, not the unpaid creditor. There can

Taylor vA/A
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bo no bene:tlt to Reed Taylor from foregoing payment of over $6,000,000.00 so that CropUSA, a

corporation not liable on tho Noto, can improve its financial health. Nor does th~ benefit to AIA
meet tho consideration requirement. "A debtor's promise to pay a debt for Which ho or she ls
already obliga.ted is not sufficient consideration to sustain an agreement to extend the time for
payment. 0 17A A.m.Iur.2d Contracts § S22.
Next, Defendant AJA asserts the Court erred in it.s earlier opinion by finding that the
certainty or definiteness requJrcmcnt of a modification is higher than tho agreed upon certainty in
tho original contract. Oef'cndant AIA appears to have misread or misintc.tpreted the Coutt's
opinion. Contrary to the arguments of' Defendant AlA, the Court did mt raise tho certainty bar
for oral modification above the bar of c:crtahlty established in the original agreement.
Quoting Wrenn v. Lawrence Cotton Mills, Inc, 1SO S•.E. 676, 678, 198 N.C. 89 (N.C.
1929), this Court recognized the general rule that the time for payment may be extended by oral

•

agreement as long as the time for payment is gs definite as in the original contract. '' 'Granting
that the time of payment may be extended by a de.finite and bi.nding oral agreement (Oliver v,

U.S. Fidelity Co., 176 N.C. 598, 97 S.E. 490), we are confronted by the general rule that such an
agreement mus: fix a definite time when payment is to be made. The time thus agreed on should

be as definite as that which is required when the noto is originally executed; the elements of the
agreement being certainty, mutuality, and consideration/" Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion/or Injunction entered February 8, 2008, nt
page 11.
This Court's analysis did not end there, however. This Court went on to state, "While
some courts have stated that the rule docs not require a precise date to be fixed for the agreement

to be valid, those courts have, nonetheless, held that the time must be readily. ascertainable by an

Ta>'lor v AJA
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event that is certain to occur and not one that is contingent. West Texas Loan Co. v.

Montgomery. 200 P. 681, 27N.M. 296 (N.M.!921)." Opinion and Order on Plalnllf/'.t Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment and Motio11/or lnjunction entered February 8, 2008, at pago 11.
The Court then took into consideration a less stringent certainty requirement but found •'there ls
no certainty to the term for payment of the Note, since lt was payable upon an entirely contingent
event rather than an event that was certain to occur." Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for Injunction entered February 8, 2008, at page 12.
DefendantAIA fails to distinguish oral modification of an existing contract containing a
date certain for payment from a new contract where terms are being agreed upon for the first
time. In footnote at pages 24-25 of Defendant's brief in support, Defendant AIA postulates,
Again. the question is whether these terms would be enforceable if they were the
terms of an original promissory note. Jf the original Note provided for payment
upon reaching $60 million in new business placements. AJA could not be heard to
argue that the original Note was unenforceable. Instead~ it would be enforceable
and payable within a reasonable time.
The Court agrees in theory. If reaching $60 million in new business placements had been

the agreed upon trigger :for payment in the original Note, then that would have been the
'definiteness' bar the parties would have to meet upon a modification extending the time for
payment. However, Defendant's statement is little more than conjecture as that was not the
original payment term in the Note. The original payment term in the Note was a specific date,
contingerit on nothing but the passage of time.
Certainty as to the alleged 2003 modified due date of the Note appears to have been

elusive even to John Taylor. In an October 2005 email to Reed Taylor's accountant, John Taylor
expressed his hope that an agreement could be reached that would reverse the ten~year old
transaction, would prevent Reed from declaring the Note in default, would allow AIA and

Taylor 11 AJA
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CropUSA to be put bock togeJther and would allow all tho parties to be on the same page.2 At no
point in the email did he indicate an agreeme.nt had been reached in 2003 that extended the due
date of the Note. Later, in December 2006, John Taylor expressed a new understanding as to the

due date of the Note in his response to the nodce of default from Recd Taylort s attorney.
Writing to attorney Patrick Moran on December 21, 2006, John Taylor contended an agreement
had been reached between John Taylor, Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor that extended the due
date of the Note until after Donna Taylor's stock was fully redeemed, an event estimated to

occur in 2012.3

Reed Taylor eventually filed the above-entitled action for breach of the Note along with a
number of other claims. On February 28, 2007, John Taylor tiled an affidavit in which he stated
Reed had agreed in 2003 to extend the due date of the Note to when AIA and CropUSA achieved
$60 million in new business placements. 4 On March 1, 2007, John Taylor testified before the
Court and stated the Note was to be redeemed when AIA and CropUSA 11hit sixty milliori dollars
in premium."5 Yet, in his deposition taken on August 29, 2007, he was asked several times

about the Notes due date under the terms of the alleged 2003 modification. John Taylor 1 s
answers included, "untiJ we're financially able to pay him ... our goal wa.s to rebuild the agency

force of AJA and CropUSA ... We've always intended and indicated to Reed that we would be
able to pay his interest and principal once the compan.ies were economically viable again, ..

When the companies were economically viable ... and able to borrow the amount of money to

2
Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Emio Oanrini in Support of Motion for Purtial Sumrnftl)' Judgment on the Promissory
Notc filed November IS. 2007.
' Plnintiff's Exhibit AE admitted March I, 2007.
4
Affidavit of John Toylor filed FebruW')' 28, 2007, at, 16
'Tr. of March I, 2007 hearing pp ?7·78, attnchcd 115 Exhibit B to the Aft'. of Paul R. Cressman tiled Nov. IS, 2007.

Taylor v A/A
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pay Reed off ... When they [AIA and CropUSA] had sufficient assets or borrowing power to do

Finally, the Court notes that the cases and secondary sources cired by Defendant AlA in
support of its theory on the issue of certainty are distinguisha.blet as the citations do not address
modification of an already existing agreement or contract. Defendant's reliance on MacK.ay v.

Four Rivers Packing Co, 2008 WL 427789 (Idaho 2008) is particularly misplaced as the issue in
MacKay was whether the oral contract fell within the statute of frauds, not whether it was
sufficiently certain to be enforceable.

Upon reconsideration, the Court continues to be of the opinion that the oral modltication
is unenforceable for lack of consideration and certainty.

au

SERIES A SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT

In 1996. as part of the restructuring of the buyout agreement betWeen AlA, Reed Taylor
and Donna Taylor', a document entitled Series A Prefeued Shareholder Agreement was
executed. 8 The document superseded and replaced various letters of agreement exchanged
between attorneys for AlA and Donna Taylor and was incorporated into the Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement 9 The Series A Preferred Shareholder Agteemcnt, which is nine pages in

'Ocp. of John Taylor, pp 83·86 and 93, Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Paul R. Cressman filed Nov. IS, 2007.
7 Recd Taylor 1111d Donna Taylor hod divorced or were in the process ofo divorce ot the time the various agreements
were entered. Donna Taylor' a ownership of all of the Series A Shares of AJA represented her community property
intereat In AIA.
I Seo Exhibit a to the Affidavit of John Taylol' filed February 25. 2008 llnd submitted in support
Motion ror
Reconsideration and Clarification 1111d, in the Alternativo, Request for Certification for 1nterlocutol')' Appeal. The
document also opponrs in Exhibit A of John Taylor'• Affidavit filed February 2S, 2008 as an exhibit to tho document
appearing Exhibit A.
P 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agrciamcnt, pngc 2, Rccirnt f' ond pngo 4, Agreomont 1.8,

or
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length, details certain obligations owed by AIA to Donna Taylor' 0, the sole holder of AlA Series
A Preferred Shares, and discusses how those obligations are integrated with the obligations AIA
owes to Reed Taylor, who is referred to in tho document as 'Creditor'.
As was noted by Defendant AIA in its motion for reconsideration, the Series A Preferred

Shareholder Agreement includes a subordination clause that reads:
Payment of principal to Creditor on tho $6M Note (whether at maturity or at any
earlier time in accordance with any right of prepayment) shall be subordinated to
payment in full of Company's oblisation to redeem the Serles A Preferred Stock.
Company shall not pay any principal on tho $6M Note until the Series A Preferred
Stock is completely redeemed (provided, however, that this limitation shall not
preclude Company from exercising any contractual or equitable right of offset
against the principal of the $6M Note).
Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement, page 4, Agreement 3.
Ten years later, on December J, 2006, Donna Taylor and Recd Taylor executed a three

•

page document entitled Subordination Agreement 11 • The document states that Donna Taylor
agrees to "unconditionally and irrevocably subordinate all amounts and obligations owed to her
[by AIA] under the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement•• 12 to those obl.igations, rights and

remedies owed to Reed Taylor by AIA. The document further states,
Donna [Taylor] expressly subordinates all amounts, rights, obligations and
remedies owed to her in favor of (and junior to) Reed I. Taylor under the
following agreements (including all claims, remedies, rights under such
agreements): (a) $6 Million Promissory Note between Reed [Taylor) and AJA
Services Corporation ("AIA Services") dated August 1, 1995; (b) Stock
Redemption Restructure Agreement between Reed, Donna and AIA Services
dated JuJy J., 1996; (c) Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement between
AJA Services and Reed dated July 1, 1996; (d) Amended and Restated Security
Agreement between AIA Services, AIA Insurance, Inc., and Reed dated July l,
10

Under tho t1groomant, redemption of Donna T11)'lor's Series A Shares was subject to a ten-year amortimtion
schodulc from tho dato redemption commenced, which appoara to havo been in I99S or earlier. Accordingly, full
redemption ofOonnn ToyJor's Series A shares should hnvc occurred no Inter than 2005. Sec Series A Shareholder
Agreement, page 3, § l(a).
11
Sec Exhibit 0 to the Affidavit of John Taylor tiled February 25, 2008 and Plaintitrs Sxhibit 0 11s 11dmincd during
tho March I, 2007 hearing in tho above-entitled mttttor.
11
Exhibit 0 to the Affidnvit of John Tnylor tiled Fcbrunry 25, 2008 • Subordination Agreement, pnge I,, 1.
Taylorv AIA
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1996: (and (e) Letter between Reed, R. John Taylor. and Donna dated February
27, 200 l; (f) Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement between AJA Services,
Donna and Reed dated July l, 1996; and (g) any other agreement, contract or
promise of an)' kind or nature.
Subordination Agreement dated December 1, 2006, page l, ' 2.
Defendant AJA contends the 2006 Subordination Agreement, giving the $6 million Note
payment priority over the debt owed to Donna Taylor, is void and unenforceable as it was
entered into without the consent of AIA 13 • Defendants further contend that the only enforceable
subordination agreement is the 1996 agreement and, under it, AIA cannot be held in default on
the $6 Million Note as AJA ls prohibited from paying the principaJ of the Note until DoMa
Taylor has been paid in full for her Series A shares, a debt that remains outstanding••.
The Serles A Preferred Shareholder Agreement is a multifaceted document that
establishes certain contractual obligations between AIA and Donna Taylor and between AIA and

•

Reed Taylor. In addition, it includes a subordination agreement between AIA's creditors, Reed
Taylor and Donna Taylor, an agreement AJA needed the creditors to reach in order for AlA to be
in compliance with its articles of incorporation provisfon that protects Series A shareholders.
Defendant.s further contend that AIA was a party to the subordination agreement and tha~
without its consent, Reed and Donna Taylor could not enter into a new subordination agreement.
Defendant AlA argues the 1996 agreement created a 'complete' subordination. The
Court agrees.
A subordination agreement may be "inchoate" or "complete." An inchoate
subordination is triggered by a future event specified in the agreement, such as
insolvency or bankruptcy of the debtor. When subordination is "inchoate,''
payment of the subordinated debt is not restricted unless and until the triggering

13

AIA contends it was a noccssary party to tho subordination agreement and, thcroforo, a.ny subsequent
subordination agreement ia void If AJA is not o party to tho agreement
14
Under the original terms of the Series A buyout agreement with OoMn Taylor, the debt to DoMa would have
beon paid prior to August 1, 2005, tho due date on the Promissory Note.
TaylorvAIA
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event occurs. In contrast, a "complete" subordination permits no payment to be
made on the subordinated debt at any time while the senior debt remains
outstanding. In other words, a "complete" subordination is effective i~ediateJy.
Id. at 35.

Culp v. Tri-County Tractor, Inc., 112 Idaho 894, 897, 736 P.2d 1348 (Ct.App.1987).
In the instant case, the 1996 subordination agreement .Permits no payment of the

Promissory Note's principaJ until Donna Taylor has received full payment for her Series A
Shares. However, the question of whether the subordination agreement was complete or
inchoate is irrelevant to the question of whether Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor could enter into
a now subordination agreement without the consent of AlA. A subordination agreement requires
agreement between creditors, as the right affected is the creditor's right to be paid by the debtor.

•

We begin by noting the general th.rust of a subordination agreement: 11 It is the
subordination of the right to receive payment of certain indebtedness (the
'subordinated debr) to the prior payment of certain other indebtedness (the 'senior
debt') of the same debtor." CaJiigar, Purposes and Uses o/Subordinatton
Agreements, 23 BUS.LAW. 33, 33 (1967).

•

.

Culpv. Tri-County Tractor, Inc., 112 Idaho 894, 897, 736 P.2d 1348 (Ct.A:pp.1987).
Defendants rely on Culp for the premise that creditors cannot change a. subordination
agreement without the consent of the debtor. The Court finds Defendants• position unsupported
by the language in Culp. The question before the Culp Court was whether subordinated

promissory notes could be deemed in default, and accelerated, while a senior creditor's
obligation was outstanding. Id. at 896. The holding in Culp is applicable to the instant case on/J!

if the 2006 subordination between Donna Taylor and Reed Taylor Is found to be invalid.

Tn Culp. Culp and Newton each Jowied Tri-County Tractor, Inc. $20,000.00. the loans
being evidence by interest bearing promissory notes. Several weeks later. Tri-County Tractor
borrowed additional money from Idaho First National Bank and, as part of the loan b'ansaction,
Culp and Newton signed agreements compJeteJy subordinating their notes to the bank loan.
ray/Ot' II AJA
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Three years later, when Tri-County Tractor failed to make certain payments on the notes, Culp
and Newton notified the bank they were terminating the subordination agreement and each
brought suit against Tri-County asserting the notes were in default and the debts accelerated.
The trial court agreed and entered judgments in favor of Culp and Newton. Tri-County
appealed.

On appeal, the Court found the subordination agreements were 'complete', thereby

prohibiting Tri-County from making payments on the notes •'unless the bank gave consent". 15
Culp at 897. The Court held that all oftbc creditors who were party to tho subordination
agreement had to agree to any change. However, the Court at no time found the debtor had to
consent to a change in the subordination agreement. Only a creditor in superior position must
consent. and no superior creditor is present in the instant case.
ln the instant matter, the subordination agreement was intended to protect Donna Taylor

•

as a creditor, not AIA as the debtor. AIA 's obligations to Donna Taylor and to Reed Taylor were
not changed or altered because creditors Donna and Reed agreed to enter into a subordination
agreement. Creditors are parties to subordination agreements, not debtors. Therefore, the right
to change or tenninate a subordination agreement rests with the creditors who are party to the
agreement. A senior creditor may consent to a junior creditor having payment priority at any
time and any such agreement supersedes a prior subordination agreement and/or language in

u Tho Court repe11tcd the words "consent ol'thc bank" or "consent of the senior crciditor'' four more times in its
opinion,
Taylor 11 AJA
Opinion & Order on Morion for Rcconsicler11tlctn or PSJ

IZ

001987

•

MAY-09-2008 09: 32 From: CLEME" ·-- BROWN & MCN 208 746 9295

P.18"28

·Hawlet:t Tro><e 11

articles of lncorporation 16, Bliclcenstaffv. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572, 97 P.3d 439 (2004).
Under the theory asserted by the Defendant, AIA could prevent Reed Taylor from ever

having a legal remedy for non-payment of the $6 million Note by leaving as little as one cent
unpaid on the debt owed to Donna TayJor 17• Such an interpretation would result in a legal
absurdity. The only parties whose rights are affected by the subordination agreement a.re Donna
Taylor and Reed Taylor and as suc:h. it was within their legal right to enter into a new
subordination agreement and to do so without the consent, approval or participation of AIA. 18

tC) WAIVER

'Defendant AIA contends the question of waiver is always an issue of fact to be decided
by a jury. Case law does not support such a contention.

Waiver is a mixed question of law and fact. Jones v. Maestas, I 08 Idaho 69. 696
P.2d 920 (Ct.App. l 985). A court first must determine whether the facts alleged to
constitute waiver are true. Id. The court then must decide whether these facts, as
a matter of Jaw, suffice to show waiver. Id. Waiver will not be inferred except

•

:from a clear and unequivocal act manifesting an intent to waive, Id.

So/oaga v. Bannock County, 119 Idaho 678, 682, 809 P.2d 1157 Ct.App.1990).

Defendants assert Recd Taylor's cbnduct evidences both an express waiver and an
implied waiver.· Under either theory, the party asserting waiver has the burden of cstablishlng a
clear intent to waJve.
16

AJA dirocts the Court to Section 4.9 of its Articles of Incorporation and asserts it wu a party to the I99S
subordination agroement because of its duty to limit its nssumption of debt so long u chore arc outstanding Serles A
shares. AIA then extends tho argument to assert there could be no ch'1llge in tho subordinotion agreement without its
consent. The Court ls not persuaded. Section 4.9 ot'tho Articles of lncorporation protecu Stated Value Preferred
Shareholders, i.e. Oonna Taylor IU the sole Series A shareholder, by requiring AlA to obtain OoMa Tnylor's
conacmt before it incura certain debt. AlA mot ita obligation by obtaining Donna Taylor's consent to Incur its· debt to
Rood Taylor, as evidoncod by her signature on tho agreement documents, Nothing within the language of AJA' s
Articles of Incorporation malcea It a party to agreements reached botwoon croditors regarding a subordination of their
rights u creditors. A dcbror does not become 11 party to o subordination agroomont merely because subordination is
a condition placed on the lncurrcncc of tho debt.
17
The consequence to A1A would be the potential for a domult claim by OoMa Taylor.
u The 2006 agreement between tho crodltors regarding subordination of their rights did not, nnd could not, result In
noneomplianec with Ille Artie lea of Incorporation.
tayfor v AJA
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. "A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is a voluntary act
and implies election by a party to dispense with something of value or to forego
some right or advantage which be might at his option have demanded and insisted
upon". Crouch v. Bischoff, 78 Idaho 364, 304 P.2d 646, 649 ....
In addition to express waiver, this court has recognized a doctrine of implied
waiver, under which are consistently applied principles of estoppel. City ofCoeur
d'Alene v. Spokant1, etc., R.R. Co., 31Idaho160, 169 P. 930; Hawkins v. Smith,
35 Idaho 349, 205 P. 188.
"The dividing line between waivers implied from conduct and estoppels is
often shadowy as the two terms have come to be quite commonly used
inter-changeably; • • • when the term waiver is so used the elements of
estoppol almost invariably appear, and it is employed to designate not a
pure or express waiver. but one which has come into the existence o{
effectiveness through the application of the principles Wlderlying
estoppels." Independent Gas & Oil Co., v. T. B. Smith Co., SI Idaho 710,
10 P.2d 317. 320.
This doctrine has also been applied where tho court has refused to find an implied
waiver. Neitzel v. Lawrence, 40 Idaho 26, 231 P. 423; Smith v. Farls·K.e.sl Const.
Co., Ltd., 27 ldaho 407. 150 P. 25, 32, where this court said: "What constitutes a
waiveris essentially a question of intention. • • • In order to establish a waiver
the intention to waive must clearly appear, and a waiver • • • will not be
presumed or implied, contrary to the intention of the party whose rights would be
injuriously affected thereby unless, by his conduct, the opposite party was misled,
to his prejudice, into the honest belief that such waiver was intended or consented
to. 0

Grover v, Jdaho Public Utilities Commission, 83 Idaho 351, 351-358, 364 P.2d 167 (1961).
"The par.y asserting the waiver must show that he acted in reasonable reliance upon it
and that he thereby has altered his position to his detriment. To establish a waiver, the intention
to waive must clearly appear." [cites omitted). Margaret H. Wayne Trost v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho

253 1 256, 840 P.2d 904 (J 993). "F.inally, to impose the equitable doctrine ofwniver, there must
be 'direct, unequivocal conduct indicating a purpose to abandon or waive the legal right or acts
amounting to an estoppel by the party whose conduct is to be construed as a waiver' .11 Idaho

Migrant Council v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 110 Tdaho 804, 806, 718 P.2d 1242
(Ct.App. 1986), quoting Miln v, Anderson. 576 P.2d 109, 112 (Alaska 1978). "Waiver wi II not be

Tay/on A!A
Opinion&. Order on Motion for Reconsider111ion of PSJ

14

001989

' MAY-09-2008 09:33

From:CLEMENT~

BROWN & MCN 208 746 9295

Hawle!:I Tro>ie 11

inferred except from a clear and unequivocal act manifesting an intent to waive. or from conduct
amounting to estoppel." Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky. 123 Idaho 253, 256, 846 P.2d 904
(1993).

The waiver issue in the instant matter has two components: (I) did Reed Taylor waive,

expressly or impliedly. the tenn in the Promissory Note requiring AIA to pay Reed monthly
interest payments of approximately $41.500.00 and, (2) did Reed Taylor waive, expressly or
impliedly, his right to declare the Promissory Note in default until A.IA and CropUSA reached
$60 miJUon in new business placements rather than the date certain for payment of August 1,
2005. The burden of showing waiver by direct, unequivocal conduct rests with AJA as the
asserting party.

There is substantial evidence in the record to support Defendants' contention that Recd
Taylor, either expressly or impliedly, waived monthly interest payments on the Note from

•

approximately $41,500.00 per month ($498.000.00 per year) to $25.000.00 per month 19

($300,000.00 per year). Account records for interest payments on the Note were submitted to the
Court by Plaintiff Reed Taylor. 20 The records show that from 2002 through 2006. AfA paid
Reed Taylor less than the $41,SOO.OO per month (or $498,000.00 per year) due under the terms of
the Note. According to the records, in 2002 Reed received $ J00,000.00 in Note interest; in 2003
he received $135,000.00; in 2004 he received $205,000.00; in 2005 he received $172,500.00;
and in 2006 Reed received $274,729.00 in Note interest
No evidence was presented by the Plaintiff or Defendants showing Reed Taylor at any
time contested the significantly reduced monthly interest payments. Recd Taylor's conduct, by

111

Evidence presented cnrlicr indlcatod the $25,000.00 per month payment wos to be distributed as$ I S,000.00 to
Read Taylor and $10,000,00 per month to Reed's pilot o.nd rnnch hond,
20
Plaintiff's Exhibit AJ 11.dmittcd Mnrch l, 2007, Tho Exhibit contains account records for the years 2002 through
2006, showing the 1tmount of Note interest p1dd to Recd Taylor each month by AJA.
Taylor II AIA
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way of omission if not by agreement, supports Defendants' contention of waiver on the part of
Reed Taylor. However, a waiver by Reed Taylor of the term requiring monthly payments of the
Note's interest is not evidence of waiver on the term for payment of the Note's pri11cipal, as the
two are separate and independent terms cf the Note. Therefore, the question of whether Reed
Taylor waived tho time for payment of the Note's principal must be analyzed separately.
Defendant AlA contends Reed Taylor agreed to waive his right to receive payment of the
principal of the Note until AJA and CropUSA reached certain financial goals and that his waiver

is evident from his conduct. Defendant AIA first argues that Reed Taylor's conduct in waiting
until Oecemb=r 2006 before putting AlA on notice that it was in default is evidence of his
waiver. The Court is not persuaded. The Court found no authority establishing a standard that
requires a creditor give notice of default within a set period of time or risk having patience
interpreted as waiver. Nor has Defendant AIA provided any legal support for such an assertion .

•

Defendant AlA directs the Court to 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 636 for the statement, 0 An

unexplained delay in enforcing a contract may constitute evidence of waiver and acquiesce11ce in
the manner of the other party's performance. 11 However, in the same paragraph it also states 1

However, since the waiver of a contractual right is largely a matter of intent, a
waiver will not be infeaed from involuntary or co~pulsory acts. Nor wiJJ mere
silence amount to a waiver of performance, where one is not bound to speak.
Where a contract provides that the waiver of any breach must be in writing to be
effective, an alleged oral waiver of overdue payments is ineffective.
17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 63 6.
When Defendant AJA entered into the Promissory Nore in 1995 and the amended

agreements in 1996. it waived its right to assert delay as evidence of waiver on the part of Reed
Taylor. The Note at issue provides, "[T]he undersigned [AIA] and a.11 endorsers and all persons
liable or to become liable on this Note hereby (a) waive diligence, presentment, demond, protest.

Taylor v A/A
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and notice of any kind ...." Promissory Note dated August 1, l 995, § 7. 21 The provision in the
.

Promissory Note was not altered in any way by the amended 1996 agreements. Rather, the
ame11ded agreements include provisions that coincide and/or enhance the provision in the Note.
The Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement provides that any waiver on the part of any party
to the agreement must be made in writing and that any waiver of a breach of any provision of the
agreement nshall not operate to be construed as a waiver of any subsequent breach". The
Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement is more detailed, stating.

•

All rights and remedies of Secured Party shall be cumulative and may be
exercised at such times and in such order as Secured Party [Reed Taylor]
determines. The failure of Secured Party to insist upon or enforce strict
performance of any provisions of the Restructured Obligations, or to exercise its
rights or privileges hereunder or thereunder or any of its rights as provided by
statute or law or in equity or otherwise, shall not impair, prejudice or constitute a
waiver of any such right, power, remedy or privilege or be construed as a waiver
of any Default or as an acquiescence therein or preclude the exercise or
enforcement thereof at a later time. Nor shall any single or partial exercise of any
such right, power, remedy or privilege preclude any other or further exercise
thereof or the exercise of any other right, power, remedy or privilege.
Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agrcement22, page 11.
The parties to the agreements understood in 1995, and again in 1996, that this was more
than just a business agreement - it was also an agreement between brothers. Anticipating that
there might be a reluctance to assert certain rights under the agreements, the written documents
included provisions to prevent any such reluctance from being interpreted as a waiver of rights to
the detriment of Reed Taylor. Defendant AIA. through its agent John Taylor, was at all times
during negotiations and finalization of the agreements a sophisticated party represented by
counsel who voluntarily signed the agreements with full understanding of the tenns and

21

Plaintiff's Exhibit A admitted Morch J, 2007.
n Plainti~s Exhibit C admitted March I, 2007. The very same language is found in the Amended ond Restated
Security Agreement d11ted July I, 1996. Plaintifrs Exhibit D admitted M11rch I, 2007.
TaylorvAIA
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conditions contained therein. Defendant AJA is, therefore, bound by its agreement not to infer a
waiver of rights on the part of Reed Taylor based on a delay in asserting those rights.

Defendant AlA further asserts as evidence of an express or implied waiver of payment of
tile Note's principal Reed Taylor's failure and/or delay in giving notice of default. However, as
stated in 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts§ 636, mere silence does not amount to a waiver of
performance where one is not bound to speak. The Note, while including a notice requirement
relative to acceleration of the Note, specifically states that AIA waives diligence, presentment,
demand, protest, and notice of any kind es to a genera) default. Pursuant to the clear language in
the Note, any failure or delay by Reed Taylor to be diligent, present, demand, protest and/or
provide notice of any kind that the Note is due, was waived by AJA. As a result, Reed Taylor's
mere silence cannot be used against him to assert conduct consistent with waiver to extend the

•

time for payment of the Note .

Finally, there ls the testimony of John Taylor that Reed Taylor expressly or impliedly
waived his right to declare the Note in default until AIA and Crop USA reached certain financial
goals. The Court finds John Taylor's testimony insufficient to create a genuine issue of material
fact when his statements are examined in light of the documentary evidence. "Creating only a
slight doubt as to the facts wilJ not defeat a summary judgment motion; a summary judgment
will be granted whenever on the basis of the evidence before the court a directed verdict would

be warranted or whenever reasonable minds could not disagree as to the facts." Snake River

Equipment Co. v. Christensen, 107 Idaho S41, S49, 691 P.2d 787 (Ct.App.1984).
fn December 2006, AJA and John Taylor received a Notice of Default letter from

attorney Patrick Moran who was representing Reed Taylor. 23 The letter gave notice regarding
numerous alleged defaults. including default on the $6,000,000.00 Note. John Taylor, as the
23

Plaintiff's Exhibit F ndmittcd March I, 2007.
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president of AIA, responded by letter24 dated December 21, 2006. In his letter. John Taylor
asserted the due date on the Note had been extended by agreement between John Taylor, Oonna
Taylor and Reed Taylor until Donna Taylor•s stock was fully redeemed, which John Taylor
estimated would occur in 2012. Never in his response Jetter did John Taylor claim payment of
the Note had been extended by agreement until AIA and CropUSA reached certain financial
goals. This is especially telling where John Taylor states in the letter that he is providing
attorney Moran with all the pertinent facts as to why there was no default of any term within the
agreements and that he had reviewed the same information with Reed Taylor just days prior to
writing the letter.
John Taylor had an earlier opportunity to claim the due date on the Note had been
extended \Ultil AIA and CropUSA reached certain financial goals, yet he did not. In Bii October
2005 cm.ail 2.s to Reed Taylor's accountant, Ernie Dantini, John Taylor acknowledges the Note

•

could be put in default26 and invites Reed and his accountant to offer proposals to modify the
debt. Once again, the documentary evidence belies John Taylor's post-lawsuit claim that Reed
Taylor agreed to extend the time for payment of the Note. The letter and email written by John
Taylor evidence his understanding that the Note was due and are indicative of his efforts to reach
an agreement with Reed that would prevent Reed from exercising bis right to declare the Note in
default. Only after Recd Taylor filed the above·entitled lawsuit did John Taylor assert he and

Reed had orally modified the due date of the Note, a process forbidden by the terms of the
agreements, to a time when AIA and CropUSA reached certain financial goals. When the record

l• Plaintiff's Exhibit AB admitted March 1, 2007.
" Exhibit A to the Affid11vit of Ernlo 011ntini in Support of Motion for Portis) Summary Judgment on the Promissory
Note tiled November IS, 2007.
26
"Threo of tho rout invostor of crop know Recd personally .... lfrhc note Is put in default, twill not be able to
keep any [of) them on bolll'd to do any type buyout, merger or di;al with Recd,"
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is considered as a whole, the Court is unable to find evidence of an intent by Reed Taylor to
waive the time for payment of the Note.

The second eJement of waiver is reliance. "Even though consideration is not necessary to
establish a waiver, it must appear that the adversary party has acted in reliance upon such a
waiver and altered his position... Brand S Corp. v. King, l 02 Idaho 731. 734. 63 9 P.2d 429
(l 981 ). Defendant AJA has failed to show it altered its position to its detriment in reliance of an

extension of time to pay the Noto. Defendant AIA has attempted to show reliance by the
following acts: (a) AIA abandoned a new health insurance product that would have provided it

with a revenue source to pay off the Note; (b) AJA ceased its efforts to obtain financing to pay
off the Note and Instead put its efforts into building up a joint agency force with CropUSA~ (c)
AJA guaranteed over$ JSt000,000.00 in loans to CropUSA; (d) AIA altered its payments to
Donna Taylor; (e) AIA a1Jowed Reed Taylor to continue on as sales manager even though it

•

would have preferred to terminate him.
AIA is a corporation with a board of directors and corporate officers. Decisions made by
the directors n.nd officers are to be made with an eye toward increasing profits and maintaining
corporate viability for the benefit of the shareholders and others. Given the structure of the
corporation and the alleged reason for the waiver, it is disingenuous for A.IA to contend it
abandoned a revenue producing product, guaranteed a $2t000,000.00 loan and a $15,000,000.00

line of credit for CropUSA, modified its payments to Donna Taylor, and allowed Reed TayJor to
stay on as sales manager because of reliance on Reed Taylor waiving his right to declare the
Note in default.

Defendant AIA contends Reed Taylor waived his right to declare the Note in default in
order to allow AIA and CropUSA to reach certain financial goals that would put the corporations

Tu)l/OI' v A/A
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in a better financial position to honor AIA's debt obligation to Reed. Defendant AIA then says it
altered its position and, in reliance of the waiver, abandoned a revenue producing product and
guaranteed millions of dollars of debt incWTed by CropUSA, all in reliance on Reed Taylor's
waiver. The conduct AIA attributes to reliance on the waiver runs counter to the very reason
AIA puts forward as the reason Reed Taylor allegedly agreed tO a modification. A corporation

wanting to improve Its :financial health does not abandon revenue producing products and/or
significantly increase its debt obligations when it is unable to meet its current debts. While

AIA's business decision may have been detrimental to the corporation, they are not decisions
that can logically be argued as being done in reliance of an extension of time to pay a long
standing debt.
AlA next contends it modified the payment schedule on its debt obligation to Donna

•

Taylor and begrudgingly retained Reed Taylor as sales manager, all in reliance on Reed Taylor's
waiver of payment on the Note. AJA, however, provides no logical explanation as to how these
two decisions were an altering of ATA's position based on reliance of Reed's waiver. The

impact of an extension of time to pay the Note should have been to free up funds to pay the debt
owed Donna Taylor, not reduce the availability of funds to pay any creditor. And, by contending

it felt coerced by Reed Taylor to abandon a revenue producing product and to retain Reed as
sales manager. Defendant AlA implies it knew Reed could declare the Note in default and was
attempting to keep Reed happy so he would forgo that right.
The Court is unable to find AJA altered its position in reliance of the alleged waiver.

Defendant AIA contends it sought a modification because it was financially unable to meet its
obligation on the Note. However, AlA has failed to reasonably coMect its busi11ess decisions,
decisions that run count~r to the goal of improving AJA• s financial health, to reliance on a

•
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waiver of Reed Taylor's right to declare the Note in default until AJA and a corporation with no
obligation on the Note reached certain new business goals. Therefore, the Court finds Defendant
AJA has failed to make a prima-facie showing of waiver, as AIA has not shown an intent on the

part of Reed Taylor to waive his right to payment of the principal of the Note and has failed to
show AfA altered its position, to its detriment, in reliance of the alleged waiver.

In tho alternative, Defendant AIA moves for permission to appeal the Court's Opinion
and Order entered February 8, 2008. Idaho Appellate Rule 12 allows a triaJ court to grant a
motion for permission to appeal an interlocutory order or decree if the court finds there is a

controlling question of law for which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and
that an immediate appeal may materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation. The

•

Court finds the issues ruled on by the Court in the instant matter meet the grounds set out in
Appellate Rule 12. Therefore, the Court grants Defendant AIA. pennission to seek interlocutory

appeal with the Supreme Court.
ORDER
Defendant AJA's Motion to Reconsider is hereby DENIED. Defendant AIA's alternative
Motion for permission to file an interlocutory appeal is hereby GR.ANTED.

8

Dated this
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I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPfNION AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR
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7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
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Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND WDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-07-00208

v.
AJA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an Idaho
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE
TAYLOR, individually and the community
property comprised thereof; BRYAN
FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS,
a single person; CROPUSA INSURANCE
AGENCY, INC., an Idaho Corporation; and
JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK,
individually and the community property
comprised thereof;

PLAINTIFF REED TAYLOR'S
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE
ATTORNEYS AND LA VI FIRMS OF
HA VILEY TROXELL ENNIS &
HA VILEY LLP; CLEMENTS,
BROV/N & MCNICHOLS, P.A.; AND
QUARLES & BRADY LLP

' ;:;

Defendants.
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I. INTRODUCTION

This Motion to Disqualify involves monumental irreconcilable and nonconsentable
conflicts of interest which should be eliminated by disqualifying the responsible Attorneys
before further proceedings in this action. Moreover, disqualification is warranted and necessary
to ensure fairness to Reed in prosecuting his claims, uphold the integrity of the legal system,
prevent the appearance of impropriety, and prevent appeals by Reed or any of the defendants
based upon the unwaivable conflicts of interest. Consequently, the Court should resolve the
conflicts now by disqualifying the Attorneys and order the affected defendants to retain new,
separate and independent counsel in this action.
II. RELIEF REQUESTED

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed") moves the Court to disqualify the attorneys and law
firms of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawley Troxell"), Clements, Brown &
McNichols, P.A. ("Clements, Brown & McNichols"), and Quarles & Brady LLP ("Quarles &
Brady"). All of the foregoing attorneys and firms are referred to collectively as "Attorneys".
III. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON

Reed's Motion to Disqualify is based upon the Court's record, Reed's Motion to
Disqualify, the Affidavit of Peter Jarvis, the Affidavit of W.H. Knight, Jr., the Affidavit of Steve
Calandrillo, the Affidavit of Reed J. Taylor; the Affidavit of Donna J. Taylor; the Affidavit of
Roderick C. Bond; and the Supplemental Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond.

IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On July 22, 1995, Reed reluctantly agreed to sell his shares back to AIA Services for
consideration that included a $6,000,000 promissory note ("$6M Note"). See Bond Aff., Ex. I;
p. 3 if, 6-7; Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008. Ex. A. John Taylor personally urged
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY - 2
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the shareholders of AIA Services to approve the redemption of Reed's shares. See Affidavit of
Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. C. In connection with the redemption of Reed's shares,
John Taylor became CEO and entered into an Executive Officer's Agreement, which contained
non-compete and non-solicitation provisions (e.g., it was a breach of John Taylor's employment
agreement to form and operate CropUSA as a separate entity and to transfer AIA Insurance's
long-term employees to CropUSA, among other breaches). See Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 45.
The law firm of Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen provided Reed an opinion
letter regarding various opinions and warranties, including that the transaction to redeem Reed's
shares was legal and had received the appropriate approvals from shareholders. See e.g., Bond
Aff., Ex. 2, p. 2,, 3; p. 3,

iJ 3.

The opinion letter expressly stated that it is based in part on the

knowledge of Richard A. Riley, who is now an attorney with Hawley Troxell. See Bond Aff.,
Ex. 2, p. 2, iJ 2.
In 1996, AIA Services defaulted on its obligations to Reed and the agreements were
restructured. See Bond Aff., Ex. 3-5. However, Reed still maintained a security interest in all of
the commissions and related receivables of AIA Services and AIA Insurance and the stock of
AIA Insurance was pledged to him, along with the right to vote the shares. See Bond Aff., Ex. 45. Reed has maintained a perfected security interest in the commissions and related receivables
of AIA Services and AIA Insurance. See Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Plaintiffs
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order dated March 28, 2007, Ex. 2.
In August 2004, AIA Insurance allegedly "repurchased" Preferred C Shares in AJA
Services (its parent corporation) from CropUSA for

$1,510~693.

See Bond Aff., Ex. 36.

CropUSA recognized a gain of $1,489,000 on the alleged sale, which indicates that CropUSA
was carrying the shares on its financial statement at a value of $21,693 (likely the true value of
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY - 3
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the shares-essentially worthless). See Bond Aff., Ex. 36. According to the testimony of JoLee
Duclos (an officer and board member at the time), she relied only the audited financial
statements of AIA Insurance as sufficient advice to approve the alleged $1.5 Million stock
"repurchase," yet the purported audited financial. statement that she relied upon was not issued
until over 6 months after the time of the alleged "repurchase" in August 2004. See Supp. Bond
Aff., Ex. 44, p. 122-126; see also Affidavit of Donna Taylor, p. 2,

ir 2.

Reed's $6M Note Matur·es; Hawley Troxell And Quarles & Brady Issue Unlawful Opinions
Reed's $6M Note matured on August 1, 2005, and was not timely paid. See Bond Aff.,
Ex. 1 and 6. On October 27, 2006, Hawley Troxell and Quarles & Brady issued opinion letters
to Lancelot Investors Fund, L.P. representing that AIA Insurance had the authority to guarantee
CropUSA's $15 Million line-of-credit.

See Bond Aff., Ex. 18 and 35.

However, AIA

Insurance's guarantee was expressly prohibited by the Articles of Amendment to the Articles of
Incorporation of AIA Services. See Bond Aff., Ex. 19. AIA Insurance's guarantee was also in
violation of the Bylaws of AIA Services and AIA Insurance because, among other things, the
directors were all interested parties through their ownership of shares in CropUSA. See Bond
Aff., Ex. 9 and 20-22.
Reed Provides A Notice Of Default And Settlement Discussions Take Place
On December 12, 2006, Reed provided AIA Services with a notice of default of its
obligations to timely pay the $6M Note, among other obligations (the notice was also provided to
Richard Riley as required by the agreements). See Bond Aff., Ex. 6.

During January 2007,

Reed and John Taylor (on behalf of all three corporations) entered into settlement negotiations
with the corporations and they were al being represented by James Gatziolis and Quarles &
Brady. See Bond Aff., Ex. 17.
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When settlement negotiations failed, Reed filed suit against John Taylor, AIA Services
and AJA Insurance on January 29, 2007. See Bond Aff., p. 6, 1 15. On February 1, 2007, AIA
Services sent a letter to Reed (which was drafted by Quarles & Brady and signed by JoLee
Duclos) advising him that AIA Services would not honor its contractual obligations. See Bond
Aff., Ex. 22, p. 6; Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 44, pp. 203-04. On February 2, 2007, Reed provided the
board of AIA Insurance written demand to recover all services and expenses from CropUSA.

See Bond Aff., Ex. 11.
On February 5, 2007, Reed filed his First.Amended Complaint, which named additional
defendants and asserted claims against John Taylor and other defendants for fraud, fraudulent
conveyance, breaches of fiduciary duties, conversion, and alter-ego, among other claims. See
Bond Aff., Ex. 8.

Reed Votes The Shares Of AIA Insurance Pursuant To His Rights And I.C. § 30-1-722
All of AIA Insurance's shares were pledged to Reed Taylor so a shareholder meeting was
not necessary to vote the shares since Reed Taylor was

~ranted

an irrevocable power of attorney

coupled with an interest to vote the shares as required by LC.§ 30-1-722. See Bond Aff., Ex. 4,
p. 7, § 6; p. 11, § 1 l.2(a). On February 22, 2007, Reed exercised his contractual rights (which
included an irrevocable power of attorney coupled with an interest) and voted the shares of AIA
Insurance thereby removing John Taylor, JoLee Duclos, and Bryan Freeman as directors and
appointing himself as the sole director of AIA Insurance. See Bond Aff., Ex. 4 and 7. After
appointing himself as the sole director of AJA Insurance, Reed removed all of the officers of
AIA Insurance (including John Taylor) and elected himself as the sole officer. See Bond Aff.,
Ex. 7.

Ill
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Recd Moves To Disqualify Mike McNichols And Clements, Brown & McNichols
On February 26, 2007, Reed filed and served his Emergency Motion, wherein he also
moved for the disqualification of Michael McNichols and· Clements, Brown & McNichols. See
Bond Aff., Ex. 24.

On February 28, 2007, Reed filed and served additional case law and

argwnents to support his request for the disqualification of Mr. McNichols and Clements, Brown
& McNichols. See Bond AtI., Ex. 25. At the hearing, the Court concluded that conflicts of

interest were issues for the Idaho State Bar to resolve. See Bond Aff., p. 26, , 66. Consequently,
Reed did not move for the disqualification of any other Attorneys. See Bond Aff., p. 26, ,, 6667.

John Taylor Sends A Letter To Shareholders Seeking Approval Of The Pavmcnt Of Fees
On March 16, 2007, John Taylor sent a letter to the shareholders of AIA Services in an
apparent attempt to obtain shareholder approval for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs for
individual directors. See Bond Aff., Ex. 12. Johll Taylor did not disclose the facts and claims
alleged in Reed's Complaint (i.e., make full disclosure), did not attached a copy of Reed's most
recent Complaint, did not seek approval of any joint retainer or joint defense agreements, and did
not obtain votes only from disinterested shareholders (asswning full disclosure was made). See
Bond Aff., Ex. 12. No other correspondence has been sent to AIA Services shareholders since
the letter purportedly seeking the authorization to pay attorney fees dated March 16; 2007. See
Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 44, pp. 28-29. In addition, the defendants did not obtain consent from
Reed or Donna Taylor (the person holding the shares with the highest priority).
Recd Obtains Partial Summary Judgment On AIA Services' Defaults; Confirms His Vote
On November 15, 2007, Reed moved for partial summary judgment on AIA Services'
default of the $6M Note and Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. See Bond Aff., Ex. 13. On
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February 8, 2008, the Court granted Reed's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. See Bond
Aff., Ex. 14. AIA Services' Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Permissive Appeal were
both denied by the Court and Idaho Supreme Court, respectively. See Bond Aff., p. 8,

~

20;

Court File. The finding of the defaults confirmed that Reed's February 22, 2007, vote of the
shares of AJA Insurance was appropriate and warranted. See Bond Aff., Ex. 4 and 7.
Conflicts Of Interest, Inappropriate Board Meetings, And Warnings To Attorneys
In March 2008, the purported boards of AIA Services and AIA Insurance held a joint
board meeting wherein lawyers from all of the Attorneys' firms were present. See Supp. Bond
Aff., Ex. 44, pp. 40-46. One of the purposes of the purported meeting was to direct Jonathan
Hally and Clark and Feeney to file a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Reed. See
Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 44, pp. 40-46. No resolution has been drafted for this meeting. See Supp.
Bond Aff., Ex. 44, p. 43, II. 1-10. The purported board unanimously voted to have Jonathan
Hally and Clark and Feeney file a motion for partial summary judgment against Reed. See Supp.
Bond Aff., Ex. 44, p. 44, 11. 1-20.
Jonathan Hally filed Connie Taylor and James Beck's purported Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment against Reed on April 16, 2008. See Bond Aff., p. 17,

~

48. The Motion

was not supported by modem case law or applicable to the facts in this case, and even if filed in
good faith, implicates Richard Riley and Hawley Troxell as witnesses. See Affidavit of Reed
Taylor dated May 9, 2008; Bond Aff., pp. 17-18, ~~ 48-49.
When Jonathan Hally and Clark and Feeney filed the motion for partial summary
judgment against their own client Reed, Reed's counsel, Roderick C. Bond, contacted the Idaho
State Bar and provided a factual background of the case, without providing any names. See
Bond Aff., p. 26,

~

67.

The Idaho State Bar advised Reed's counsel that the issue of
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disqualification was an issue for the Court. See Bond Aff., p. 26,

~

67. As a result of the

guidance from the Idaho State Bar, Reed elected to pursue the disqualification of the attorneys.

See Bond Aff., p. 26, if 67. However, Reed's counsel maintained the objections to the legal
representation of the defendants throughout the action. See e.g, Bond Aff., Ex. 27 and 29.
On August 3, 2008, Reed's counsel sent one of many emails regarding conflicts of
interest and the associated ramification to the Attorneys:
We have difficult jobs as attorneys. I know how easy it is to overlook things or make
mistakes. However, I have repeatedly advised all of you in writing, through telephone
conferences and/or in person of the various conflicts. Even after all my warnings. you
have all continued on with the conflicts to the detriment of AJA Services and AJA
Insurance. I apologize for this email, but again. I am simply proceeding as my client has
directed. He will not continue to allow you all to assist in the decimation of the
companies and their remaining assets.
We have been directed to commence drafting Motions to disgualify your respective
firms. I wanted to give each of you an opportunity to withdraw before I file the Motions.
Not only will the motions be embarrassing, but Reed will view the time and resources
expended and any related damages as damages he may seek from your respective firms.
My hope is that you all will simply acknowledge mistakes were made and do the right
thing and withdraw form this case. If you still have doubts, I direct you to review RPC
l.7 and l.13, among others, not to mention the case law and RPCs on assisting in
fraudulent acts ... £ have. advised you time and time again that AIA Insurance should have
separate counsel. ..

See Bond Aff., Ex. 22, p. 4-5 (pages are not numbered) (emphasis added). There has been no
intentional delay in moving for disqualification. See Bond Aff., pp. 26-27, if, 66-70.
On August 7, 2008, the purported boards of AJA Services held a joint board meeting
wherein they accepted John Taylor's resignation from the 401(k) Plan (presumably to make the
appearance that he is not involved in the intervention), have interested directors authorize the
payment of John Taylor's attorneys' fees and costs in his lawsuit with Donna Taylor, and stated
that the Court had approved the corporations' use of a pending $800,000 settlement to pay
attorneys' fees, among other issues. See Bond Aff., Ex. 41.
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On August 14, 2007, CropUSA was also named as a defendant in this action. See Bond
Aff., p. 8, , 23; Court File. Reed's Fifth Amended Complaint alleges the same and additional
claims, in addition to asserting the claims against Connie Taylor and James Beck. See Bond
Aff., Ex. 15.
AIA's Present Condition And John Taylor's As The Person Making AU Of The Decisions
AIA Insurance's business prospects are bleak as most of the commissions it receives are
likely to only last for another 2 years. See Affidavit of Reed Taylor, pp. 2-3,

ii 4; Bond Aff., p.

11, , 30. This was confirmed by James Gatziolis. See Affidavit of Reed Taylor, pp. 2-3,

~

4.

Virtually all of AIA Insurance's office employees have been transferred to CropUSA, while the
Attorneys have represented otherwise. See Affidavit of Reed Taylor, p. 2, , 2.
Although both Reed and Donna Taylor have contractual obligations to be on the board of
AJA Services until their indebtedness is paid, the Attorneys and defendants have failed to honor
the obligations, let alone notify either of them of any board meetings. See Affidavit of Reed
Taylor, p. 2, , 3; Affidavit of Donna Taylor, p. 2,

AIA Services has ceased all payments to

Reed and Donna Taylor. See Affidavit of Reed Taylor, p. 2-3,, 4; Affidavit of Donna Taylor, p.

2,, 3.
In his deposition taken on January 28-30, 2008, John Taylor testified when asked who
made the decisions for the litigation: "I make those decisions in consultation with the attorneys."

See Bond Aff., Ex. 42, p. 88, 11. 14-25. The fact that John Taylor inappropriately directs the
litigation in this matter was also confirmed by Jolee Duclos, the Secretary of AIA Services and
AIA Insurance and author of virtually all the board meeting minutes, when she testified that John
makes all of the decisions for the corporations with the attorneys. See Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 44,
p. 23, II. 6-17. When questioned about the appropriateness of certain transactions, John Taylor
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testified that he makes the decision whether a transaction is "appropriate" and the he "ultimately
make[s] the decisions for these companies." See Bond Aff., Ex. 42, p. 4 70, IL 1-21.
According to JoLee Duclos, the Secretary of AIA Services and AIA Insurance, it has
been "several years" since AIA Services has had a shareholder meeting, other than the purported
meeting to allegedly approve the payment of attorney fees for present and past directors. See
Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 44, p. 34, 11. 2-7; Bond Aff., Ex. 12. JoLee Duclos also acknowledged that
AIA Services didn't even send financial information or notices of shareholder meetings to
shareholders. See Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 44, p. 36, 11. 4-9.

General Background On Crop USA
CropUSA was formed and operated using AIA Insurance's funds, employees, and assets.

See Bond Aff., p. 10, 128. Although AIA Insurance funded CropUSA, JoLee Duclos, the longtime Corporate Secretary of AIA, acknowledged that shareholder approval was not obtained to
make CropUSA a separate entity. See Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 44, p. 79, 11. 1-14. Although John
Taylor had represented that CropUSA was being developed by AIA Insurance, John Taylor,
Connie Taylor, James Beck and Michael Cashman become the majority holders of the
I

outstanding shares of CropUSA, while AIA and Reed owned nothing in the entity. See Bond
Aff., p. 10, 1 28.
Although shareholder approval was never obtained to operate CropUSA as a separate
entity, letters exist referring to CropUSA as the "exit strategy" for certain shareholders of AIA
Services. See Bond Aff., pp. 10-11,, 28; Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 44, p. 79, 11. 1-14. John Taylor
acknowledged that expenses are not properly allocated between AIA and CropUSA, including
such expenses as electricity, which is not even allocated at all. See Bond Aff., Ex. 42, p. 294 and
296.

AIA Services and AIA Insurance should be pursuing claims against CropUSA, John
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Taylor, James Beck and Michael Cashman. See Bond Aff., p. 1 t,

~

30.

General Background On The Involvement Of Clements, Brown & McNichols
After Reed file suit, Michael McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNichols formally
appeared in this action on behalf of John Taylor, AIA Services and AIA Insurance. See Bond
Aff., p. 15, ~ 40. On February 25, 2007, Reed objected to Mr. McNichols' joint representation,
advised Mr. McNichols that he was not authorized to represent AIA Insurance, and demanded
the return of funds in which Reed held a security interest. See Bond Aff., Ex. 23.
On March 27, 2007, Reed's counsel advised Mr. McNichols that his actions were "a
continuation of the ongoing conflicts of interest and associated legal ramifications pertaining to
[Mr. McNichols'] representation of AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and John Taylor."

See

Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
dated March 28, 2007, Ex. 1.
On March 28, 2007, Mike McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNichols moved to
withdraw from representing AIA Services and AIA Insurance and continue representing John
Taylor. See Bond Aff., Ex. 26. In Mr. McNichols' Motion to Withdraw, he attempted to brush
the obvious conflicts aside by arguing:
... while there is no current or reasonably anticipated conflict of interest between the
corporations and John Taylor, there is a possible future conflict between them and they
have agreed that Michael E. McNichols should continue to represent John Taylor but no
longer represent the corporations."

See Bond Aff., Ex. 26, pp. 1-2. Mr. McNichols did not indicate whether he obtained the required
written informed consent, let alone whether he obtained the required consent from the
appropriate authorized and disinterested representatives of the corporations. See Bond Aff., Ex.
26 pp. 1-2.
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On September 20, 2007, Mike McNichols submitted a response in opposition to Reed'
motion to amend his complaint to add additional parties and claims, even though Mr. McNichols
was purportedly only representing John Taylor. See Bond Aff., Ex. 31.
On July 21, 2008, Reed's counsel, Michael S. Bissell, sent a letter to the purported boards
of AIA Services and AIA Insurance demanding that the boards take action against the attorneys
and law firm of Clements, Brown & McNichols for various ethical violations, claims and torts.

See Bond Aff., Ex. 16.
General Background On The Involvement Of Quarles & Brady

During settlement negotiations prior to the date Reed filed his Complaint in this action in
January 2007, James Gatziolis and Quarles & Brady represented AIA Services and AJA
Insurance. See Bond Aff., 17.

On January 18, 2007, James Gatziolis of Quarles & Brady

emailed a settlement proposal to Reed's counsel wherein he stated "please find a revised
proposed term sheet representing AIA's latest offer to resolve the controversies between AJA
and Reed Taylor." See Bond Aff., Ex. 17.
On January 26, 2007, James Gatziolis responded via email to a counter offer made by
Reed's coW1sel wherein Mr. Gatziolis confirmed that an alleged advisory board of CropUSA
(comprised of the major shareholders of both AIA Services and CropUSA) will "deliberate in
person to adequately consider all of the elements of your proposal. .. the board has unofficially
directed the activities of AJA [Insurance], Inc. as well so it is most appropriate for them to
consider your proposal." See Bond Aff., Ex. 22, p. 10 (the pages are not numbered).
After settlement discussions failed, on February l, 2007, JoLee Duclos executed a letter
on behalf of AIA Insurance denying Reed the right to exercise his contractual rights, which such
letter was drafted by Quarles & Brady and contained a Quarles & Brady document stamp at the
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bottom of the letter. See Bond Aff., Ex. 22, p. 6. The February 1, 2007, letter was sent to Reed's
counsel via email from James Gatziolis on the same day. See Bond Aff., Ex. 22, p. 7 (pages are
not numbered). In the same email, James Gatziolis advised Reed's counsel that ''[t]here will be
no meeting of the stockholders of AIA on Monday, February 5, 2007 ... " See Bond Aff., Ex. 22,
p. 7 (pages are not numbered).
On February l, 2007, James Gatziolis emailed Reed's counsel and proposed that Mike
McNichols accept service on behalf of all the defendants. See Bond Aff., Ex. 22, p. 8 (pages are
not numbered). In a response email, James Gatziolis expressly stated that [Mr. McNichols] and
[Mr. Gatziolis] would both continue to counsel the company (meaning AJA). See Bond Aff., Ex.
22, p. 8 (pages are not numbered).
After CropUSA was named as a defendant, James Gatziolis, Charles Harper and Quarles
& Brady formally appeared in this action on behalf of CropUSA. See Bond Aff., p. 14, ~f 37.

Quarles & Brady also represented AIA Insurance and issued an opinion letter for CropUSA's
$15 Million line-of-credit warranting that AJA Insurance had the authority to guarantee
CropUSA's loan. See Bond Aff., Ex. 28.
On June 13, 2008, James Gatziolis sent Reed's counsel a settlement proposal. See Bond
Aff., Ex. 37. Although the terms of the proposal are inadmissible to establish liability, they are
significant to establish conflicts of interest as the Attorneys requested "unconditional releases for
each and every defendant, and each of defendant's counsel. .. " in the first sentence of the offer.

See Bond Aff., Ex. 37, p. 2 (pages are not numbered) (emphasis added). Under Section 3 of the
offer, the Attorneys requested that "AJA Insurance would deliver releases to all defendants and
defendants' counsel." See Bond Aff., Ex. 37, p. 2 (pages are not numbered) (emphasis added).
Reed's counsel was instructed to deal exclusively with James Gatziolis. See Bond Aff., p. 30,

~

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY -13

002011

76 (wherein the Attorneys are implicitly acknowledging their legal exposure and setting forth a
new conflict of interest for all of the Attorneys because their interests are no longer 100% behind
their clients and Reed could have accepted the offer other than the release of the Attorneys).
On July 21, 2008, Reed's counsel, Michael S. Bissell, sent a letter to the purported boards
of AJA Services and AJA Insurance demanding that the boards take action against the

~ttorneys

and law firm of Quarles & Brady for various ethical violations, claims and torts. See Bond Aff.,
Ex. 16.
On August 4, 2008, Reed's counsel received an email from Charles Harper of Quarles &
Brady stating: " ... Quarles & Brady and its attorneys have filed an appearance only on behalf of
CropUSA. We do not represent AJA Services or AIA Insurance in this litigation." See Bond
Aff., Ex. 22, p. 4 (pages are not numbered). However, after an exchange of a few emails with
Reed's counsel, it appears that the issue was cleared up when Reed's counsel advised Mr. Harper
of his firm's "direct representation of AJA in this action" and provided documentation
demonstrating the same. See Bond Aff., Ex. 22.

General Background On The Involvement Of Hawley Troxell
On April 30, 2007, John Taylor, Connie Taylor and James Beck purportedly held a Joint
Meeting of the Boards of AIA Services and AIA Insurance. See Bond Aff., Ex. 10. At the
purported joint meeting, the boards approved a joint defense agreement, joint retainer agreement,
and the payment of $5,000 to each director for every quarter of service on the board. See Bond
Aff., Ex. IO.
On May 2, 2007, Hawley Troxell was retained to represent AIA Services and AIA
Insurance in place of Mr. McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNichols (although Mr. Babbitt
acknowledged that contact had been made prior to May 2). See Bond Aff, Ex. 29, p. 4 (pages
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.

are not numbered). Gary Babbitt, D. John Ashby, and Hawley Troxell formally appeared in this
action on behalf of AIA Services and AJA Insurance. See Bond Aff., pp. 18-19, ~ 51.
After CropUSA was named as a defendant in this action, Gary Babbitt, D. John Ashby,
and Hawley Troxell also formally appeared in this action on behalf of CropUSA. See Bond Aff.,
p. 19,

~

52. Later, James Gatziolis, Charles Harper and Quarles & Brady formally appeared on

behalf of CropUSA through Hawley Troxell Pro Hae Vice. See Bond Aff., p. 19, ~[ 52. There is
no indication that the purported boards or shareholders of AIA Services or AIA Insurance
consented to the joint representation of CropUSA. See Bond Aff., Ex. 10. On May 11, 2007,
Reed's counsel sent a letter to Gary Babbitt stating in part:
This letter confirms that you advised me that AIA Insurance and AIA Services do not
have claims against John Taylor. I am surprised at your position in this regard as you are
exposing your firm to claims from shareholders and other parties, including Reed Taylor.
As the counsel for the corporations, you have a duty to bring clai.tns for the benefit of the
corporations. their shareholders and their creditors in light of insolvency. Furthermore, .ll
is inappropriate for John Taylor to direct the litigation on behalf of the corporation in
light of the substantial claims already alleged against him. I am further surprised that you
would not require direction and consent from a disinterested board of directors prior to
your representation of both corporations ... A carefol review of the pleadings, briefs, oral
testimony and hearing exhibits clearly demonstrates that the corporations have been
operated for years for the benefit of John Taylor and others to the detriment of Reed
Taylor and other creditors.
In addition, all of the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance are pledged to Reed Taylor. If
and when Reed is permitted to exercise his rights under the various agreements and/or
Idaho law, AIA Insurance will be bringing claims against John Taylor, Bryan Freeman,
and JoLee Duclos. Your firm will also be exposed to claims from Reed Taylor at that
time. We will not permit this issue to go unaddressed .

.

See Bond Aft:, Ex. 29, p. 2 (emphasis in original and added).

On September 20, 2007, Gary Babbitt and D. John Ashby submitted a response in
opposition to Reed' motion to amend his complaint to add additional parties and claims, even
though they were purportedly representing the interests of the corporations. See Bond Aff., Ex.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY - 15

002013

30. Hawley Troxell's arguments persuaded the Court to deny naming Mike Cashman and deny
other claims, when Hawley Troxell should have been joining Reed's motion. See Bond Aff., pp.
19-20,

~

53; Ex. 30. Mr. Cashman is shareholder of AIA Services and a large shareholder of

CropUSA. See e.g., Bond Aff., Ex. 9. Hawley Troxell (and Clements, Brown & McNichols)
were successful in persuading the Court (without entering an appearance) to deny Reed's Motion
to Amend and add Michael Cashman and other claims, which they should have joined Reed in
pursuing.
Throughout this action, Hawley Troxell has not represented the interests of AIA
Insurance and AIA Services. See Bond Aff., pp. 19-20, ii 53; pp. 22-23, ii 60. Richard Riley and
Patrick Collins are two lawyers at Hawley Troxell known to represent AIA Insurance and
CropUSA in various transactions, including AIA Insurance's guarantee of CropUSA's $15
Million loan. See Bond Aff., Ex. 35.
Without knowledge of this inappropriate pledge, Reed's counsel moved the Court to
enter a preliminary injunction to protect a $1.2 Million Mortgage recently obtained by AIA
Services in a settlement. See Bond Aff., p. 23, , 61; Ex. 32. The $1.2 Mortgage was titled in
AIA Services' name only, even though AIA Insurance paid "part or all" of the attorneys' fees
and costs for the litigation. See Bond Aff., Ex. 42, p. 32, IL 1-24; p. 34, 11. 1-18.
Gary Babbitt, D. John Ashby and Hawley Troxell failed to disclose to the Court the fact
that $1.2 Million Mortgage had been pledged to CropUSA. See Bond Aff., p. 23,

~

61. Neither

Reed nor his counsel was provided copies of the pledge of the $1.2 Million Mortgage until April
17, 2008, despite discovery requests seeking such documents. See Bond Aff., Ex. 32; p. 24, ,
62. Patrick Collins of Hawley Troxell is listed as the person to return the recorded document.

See Bond Aff., Ex. 32.
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In September 2007, Patrick Collins of Hawley Troxell drafted or assisted in the drafting
of documents to pledge AIA Services' $1.2 Million Mortgage to CropUSA for the payment of
attorney fees and costs. See Bond Aff., Ex. 32. The purported loan carried an interest rate of
15% and was secured by the $1.2 Million Mortgage. See Bond Aff., Ex. 32.
On December 18, 2007, Reed's counsel requested proof that AIA Insurance's guarantee
of the $15 Million loan was terminated. See Bond

J\ff.,

Ex. 33. Gary Babbitt responded by

stating that if Reed took action to rescind the guarantee, then Reed would be sued for tortious
interference. See Bond Aff., Ex. 33.
On July 21, 2008, Reed's counsel, Michael S. Bissell, sent a letter to the purported boards
of AIA Services and AIA Insurance demanding that the boards take action against the attorneys
and law firm of Hawley Troxell for various ethical violations, claims and torts. See Bond Aff.,
Ex. 16. In response, Hawley Troxell retained counsel, who, on July 31, 2008, inquired about the
allegations made Mr. Bissell's demand letter. See Bond Aff., Ex. 34.
Gary Babbitt, D. John Ashby and Hawley Troxell have been asserting arguments against
Reed with full knowledge that such arguments are counter to an opinion letter issued on behalf of
AIA Services to Reed, which was based upon knowledge held by Richard Riley who is also an
attorney with Hawley Troxell. See Bond Aff., Ex. 2, p. 2, ~. 2.
Lawsuits Against Certain Attorneys And Pending Lawsuits Against Others
On August 18, 2008, Reed, through his counsel Michael S. Bissell, filed non-derivative
lawsuits against Hawley Troxell and Clement, Brown & McNichols, which such lawsuits include
claims for aiding and abetting, tortious interference, and conversion, among other claims. See
Bond Aff., Ex. 38-39. Reed has also retained Michael S. Bissell to file non-derivative lawsuits
against Clark and Feeney and Quarles & Brady for related claims. See Bond Aff., pp. 31-32,

~
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80. These lawsuits are not based upon litigation strategy. See Bond Aff., p. 27,, 68; p. 32,, 81.
As indicated by the expert testimony of Peter R. Jarvis, Reed's nonfrivolous claims
against the Attorneys also require them to withdraw or be disqualified. See Jarvis Aff., pp. 5-6,

1 4;

p. 7, , 5(d). As a result, the Attorneys have a vested interest in remaining as counsel to

"skew" the litigation to protect their interests. See Jarvis Aff., pp. 5-6,, 4; p. 7, 1 5(d).

It Is Impossible For The Attorneys To Obtain Tbe Required Waivers
The litigation in this matter is, and has been, directed by John Taylor, who is an
interested party by way of the individual claims asserted against him by Reed, the owner of
Crop USA shares, the recipient of inappropriate transfers, and a party breaching the terms of his
employment contract, among other issues and claims. See Bond Aff., Ex. 9, 15 and 42; Supp.
Bond Aff., Ex. 44, p. 23; Ex. 45. Likewise, the remaining purported board members of AIA
Services and AIA Insurance, Connie Taylor and James Beck, are interested parties by way of
their ownership of Crop USA shares and the individual claims asserted against them, among other
reasons. See Bond Aff., Ex. 9 and 15.
On April 29, 2008, JoLee Duclos, the Secretary of AIA Services and AIA Insurance,
testified that she cannot even recall when the corporations last had an annual shareholder
meeting. See Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. 44, p. 29-31.
AJA Services owes Reed over $8,500,000 and is insolvent. See Bond Aff., Ex. 15. Reed
is the pledgee of all of the outstanding shares of AJA Insurance, the sole person with authority to
vote the shares of AJA Insurance, the only legitimate person with authority to make any
decisions at AIA Insurance by way of AJA Services' defaults, and he has not, and will not,
consent to any joint representation of AIA Insurance or AIA Services (as the major creditor of an
insolvent corporation) with any other defendant, nor will he consent to any joint defense or joint
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retainer agreements. See Affidavit of Reed Taylor, p. 4, 1~P-10; Bond Aff, Ex. 7.
Donna Taylor, the holder of all the Series A Preferred Shares in AIA Services, has
priority over all common shareholders to the remaining assets of AIA Services. See Affidavit of
Donna Taylor, p. 2,, 2. Donna Taylor has not, and will not, consent to the joint representation
of AIA Services, CropUSA, John Taylor and other defendants in this action, nor will she consent
to any joint defense or joint retainer agreements. Affidavit of Donna Taylor, p.3, ,, 4-9.
The Attorneys Should Be Disqualified

According to the expert testimony of Peter R. Jarvis, an ethics expert and author of the
ethics treatise The Law of Lawyering and Washington and Oregon Ethics Deskbooks, all of the
Attorneys should be disqualified. See Jarvis Aff., pp. 5-11, ,, 4-5. Mr. Jarvis also opined,
among other things, that "the Law Firms are likely to want to skew the litigation away from their
own conduct, or any potential advice of counsel defense, to shift liability from themselves to one
or more of the defendants." See Jarvis Aff., p. 7,, S(d). Mr Jarvis also opined that the "defenses
mounted by AIA Services and AIA Insurance in this case would thus appear to have little or
nothing to do with the protection of the interests of AIA Services and AIA Insurance and much if
not everything to do with the defense of John Taylor and other individual defendants ... " See
Jarvis Aff., p. 9,

1 S(i).

Mr. Jarvis further opined that RPC 3.7 would likely be implicated

because any one of more of the Attorneys could be forced to testify against their client and
"confidentiality and conflict of interest considerations under Idaho RPC 1.6 through 1.10 and
RPC 1.13" are implicated even if none of the Attorneys are ever forced to testify against their
client. See Jarvis Aff., p. 6,

ii 4(b).

Finally, Mr. Jarvis also makes other substantiated opinions

regarding the need to disqualify the Attorneys, without even addressing all of the conflicts and
issues set forth in Reed's Motion to Disqualify. See Jarvis Aff., pp. 4-11.
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Mr. Jarvis' opinion that the Attorneys should be disqualified is also supported by the
expert testimony of Steve Calandrillo (a contracts and secured transactions professor of law) and
W.H. Knight, Jr. (former in house counsel to a $1.3 Billion Bank, former Dean of University of
Washington School of Law, and contracts and commercial law professor), both of whom also
opine that Reed has the contractual right to take posse·ssion of AIA Insurance, the contractual
right to sell the shares of AIA Insurance, and that Reed is entitled to possession of the
commissions and related receivables of AIA Services and AIA Insurance. See Affidavit of Steve
Calandrillo; Affidavit of W.H. Knight, Jr.
Donna Taylor (the Series A Preferred Shareholder of AIA Services who has priority over
all other preferred and common shareholders of AIA Services and who is entitled to, and not
receiving, a seat on AIA Services' board) and Reed Taylor (the pledge of AIA Insurance's stock
and the most significant creditor of AIA Services, who is also entitled to, and not receiving, a
seat on AIA Services board) have also specifically requested that the Attorneys be disqualified.

See Affidavit of Donna Taylor, p. 2, ~ 2; p. 3, ~ 9; Affidavit of Reed Taylor, p. 4, ~ 10.
V. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

A.

Standard For Disqualification.

When an ethical conflict sufficiently impacts the just and lawful determination of claims
in a lawsuit, the court has a "plain duty to act." FMC Technologies, Inc. v. Edwards, 420
F.Supp.2d 1153, 1157 (W.D. WA. 2006).
"The decision to grant or to deny a motion to disqualify counsel is within the discretion
of the trial court." Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho 692, 696, 819 P.2d 110 (Ct. App. 1991)).
When a motion to disqualify comes from an opposing party, the motion should be viewed with
caution. Weaver 120 Idaho at 697. Even if a plaintiff does not hold any special contractual
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rights or is owed special duties, a plaintiff has standing to disqualify opposing counsel. Crown v.

Hawkins Co., Ltd., 128 Idaho 114, 122-23, 910 P.2d 786 (Ct. App. 1996) (denying motion to
disqualify, but acknowledging standing to disqualify opposing counsel); Eugster v. City of

Spokane, 110 Wn.App. 212, 39 P.3d 380, 388 (2002).
Once representation has commenced, a lawyer shall withdraw from the representation of
a client if "the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or the
. law." RPC 1.16(a)(a).
Any delay in filing a motion to disqualify does not result in a waiver when a party fails to
demonstrate a clear intention to relinquish the right to challenge a representation. Nevada Yellow

Cab Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County ofClark, 152 P.3d 737 (Nev. 2007).
In Weaver, the Idaho Court of Appeals explained the guiding principles regarding
disqualification:
The moving party has the burden of establishing grounds for disqualification. The goal
of the court should be to shape a remedy which will assure fairness to the parties and the
integrity of the judicial process. Whenever possible, courts should endeavor to reach a
solution that is least burdensome to the client.
Weaver, 120 Idaho at 697 (internal citations omitted).
Here, the grounds necessary to support Reed's Motion to Disqualify are set forth below,
each of which on its own are sufficient to require the disqualification of the applicable Attorneys.
Reed has not delayed in bringing this motion and has repeatedly advised the Attorneys that
action would be taken because of the various conflicts.

Ill
Ill
Ill
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B.

All Of The Attorneys Should Be Disqualified.
1. The Disqualifications Of All Attorneys Are Warranted To Prevent
Appeals By The Defendants And The Plaintiff.

Final judgments may be set aside or new trial ordered simply on the grounds that the
attorney undertook the improper representation of more than one defendant. See e.g., Navaro v.

Jomar Real Estate Corp., 646 N.Y.S.2d 805 (N.Y. App. 1996).
Thus, it is in the interests of all the parties to this case to ensure conflict-free
representation and fairness by disqualifying the attorneys of Hawley Troxell, Quarles & Brady,
and Clements, Brown & McNichols.

The attorneys of the foregoing law firms should be

disqualified to ensure that the trial in this action is fair to all parties and does not result in a
reversal from an any appeals made by Reed or any of the defendants based upon the
irreconcilable conflicts of interest and other ethical dilemmas set forth below.

2. The Attorneys Of Hawley Troxell And Quarles & Brady Must Be
Disqualified Because They Have Violated RPC 1.7.
Idaho's Rules of Professional Conduct provide as follows, with respect to conflicts
between current clients:
RULE 1. 7 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: CURRENT CLIENTS
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of
interest exists if:
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former
client or a third person or by the personal interests of the lawyer, including
family an<l <lumt:sti1; rt:latiunships.
RPC 1.7. If the representation of one client will be adverse to the other or if an attorney's
representation of a client may be limited by the attorney's responsibility to another client, a
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concurrent conflict of interest exists. RPC 1.7(a). "Ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to
withdraw from representing all of the clients if the common representation fails." RPC 1.7,
Comment 29. "Moreover, because the lawyer is required to be impartial between commonly
represented clients, representation of multiple clients is improper when it is unlikely that
impartiality can be maintained." RPC 1.7, Comment 29.
Here, there can be no waiver or no joint representation because each of the defendant's
interests are irreconcilably divergent and in direct conflict.

The common representation of

preventing Reed from exercising his contractual rights only benefits the interested defendants in
this action and other unnamed interested parties. There can be no benefit to AIA Services, who
should be pursuing claims against John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman,
JoLee Duclos, and CropUSA. There can be no benefit to AIA Insurance because it too should be
pursing claims against the foregoing parties and others, let alone the fact that Reed voted the
shares of AIA Insurance and has the express contractual right to control it now. There can be no
benefit from all of the defendants participating in an alleged joint defense agreement when they
all have irreconcilable conflicts of interest.

3. Because Of The Hot .Potato Doctrine, All Of The Attorneys Must
Withdraw From Representing CropUSA, AJA Services And AIA
Insurance.
An attorney may not represent interests adverse to former clients. RPC 1.9.

With

respect to RPC 1.9, courts have adopted the "Hot Potato Doctrine" which states:
Generally, a lawyer may not drop one client so that he may continue to represent a more
favored one. The weight of authority holds, ... that once the lawyers find themselves
representing clients wit_J;i adverse interests, they generally may not drop one client in
order to represent the other, preferred client. In other words, a lawyer may not drop a
current client like a "hot potato" in order to tum the client into a former client as a means
of curing the simultaneous representation of adverse interests. As one commentator
explained, courts have agreed that, where a lawyer has terminated representation of a
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client for the purpose of keeping a more important client happy. counsel will be treated as
if he is still the client's present attorney for purposes of determining whether
disqualification is warranted.

Flying J. Inc. v. TA Operating Corp., WL 648545 *4 (D. Utah 2008) (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis added); see also GTX!Airlog Co. v Evergreen Inter'/ Airlines, Inc., 8 F.Supp.2d 1182
(N.D. Cal. 1998); El Camino Resources, Ltd. v. Huntington Nat. Bank, WL 2710807 (W.D.
Mich. 2007).
Here, the Attorneys must all withdraw because they cannot drop the representation of any
one or more of the defendants to remain counsel for another defendant.

Moreover, it is

impossible for the Attorneys to ever obtain the required written informed consent for the reasons
set forth herein.

4. Michael McNichols And Clements, Brown & McNichols Dropped AIA
Services And AIA Insurance As Clients Must Be Disqualified Because
They Violated The Hot Potato Doctrine By Dropping AIA Services And
AJA Insurance As Clients To Keep John Taylor As A Client.
Under the same legal authority cited in Section 3 above, Michael McNichols and
Clements, Brown & McNichols is precluded from representing John Taylor in this action.
Here, Mr. McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNichols inappropriately dropped AJA
Services and AJA Insurance like hot potatoes and could not have received the required waivers,
and they must withdraw from representing all parties or they should be disqualified. See Jarvis
Affidavit.

S. John Taylor's Interests Are Materially Adverse To The Interests Of
Michael McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNichols' Former Clients
AJA Services and AIA Insurance.
A lawyer may not represent another client in the same or a substantially related matter in
which that client's interests are materially adverse to the interest of the former client. RPC 1.9.
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"When an attorney engages in a conflict of interest on the same matter, her or she is in a
position to act on the confidential information learned from the relationship with the first client,
whether or not that information is actually disclosed or acted upon in advising the new client."

Damron v. Herzog, 67 F.3d 211, 215 (9th Cir. 1995).
Here, Mr. McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNichols are representing John Taylor
in direct conflict with the interests of AIA Services and AIA Insurance, both of whom are former
clients. Moreover, Mr. McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNichols are also representing
John Taylor in a separate lawsuit based upon the same fraudulent acts.

In doing so, Mr.

McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNichols are prejudicing AIA Services and AIA Insurance
and their representation will likely have ramifications against claims the corporations will bring
against John Taylor and others at such time as disinterested and authorized persons become
involved.

6. The Attorneys Of Hawley Troxell And Quarles & Brady Must Be
Disqualified Because They Have Failed To Adhere To The Highest
Degree Of Undivided Loyalty Owed To Each Corporation.
An attorneys' duty of undivided loyalty to a client is set forth under RPC 1.7. "[W]here
a lawyer represents parties whose interests conflict as to the particular subject matter, the
likelihood of prejudice to one party may be so great that misconduct will be found despite
disclosure and consent." Kelly v. Greason, 23 N.Y.2d, 244 N.E.2d 456, 462 (N.Y. 1968). "The
primary value at stake in cases of simultaneous or dual representation is the attorney's duty-and
the client's legitimate expectation-of-loyalty, rather than confidentiality. Representation adverse
to a present client must be measured no so much against the similarities in litigation, as against
the duty of undivided loyalty." Forrest v. Baeza, 58 Cal.App.4 1h 65, 74, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 857 (Cal.
1997). "If a conflict arises after the representation has been undertaken, the lawyer ordinarily
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must withdraw from the representation ... " RPC 1.7, Comment 4.
Disqualification is warranted because it is impossible for Hawley Troxell and Quarles &
Brady to simultaneously represent the interests of CropUSA, AIA Services and AIA Insurance,
while at the same time giving each corporation their undivided loyalty. Undivided loyalty is
particularly important in this case since all of the shares of AIA Insurance are pledged to Reed
(and he should be in control of AIA Insurance), AIA Services is insolvent and owes its duties to
its creditors, and both AIA Services and AIA Insurance should be pursuing claims against
CropUSA, John Taylor, James Beck, Connie Taylor, Michael Cashman and others.
7. The Attorneys Of Hawley Troxell And Quarles & Brady Must Be
Disqualified Because The Confidential Information Obtained From All
Three Corporations Cannot Be Protected.
"A particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness of common
representation is the effect on client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege."
RPC 1.7, Comment 30.
AIA Insurance should be under the possession and control of Reed. AIA Services has
confidential information that should be protected from CropUSA. All three corporations have
diverging interests and these diverging interests will inevitably be at issue, whether in other
lawsuits, a bankruptcy filing, a petition for receiver, the relinquishment of AJA Insurance to
Reed, or such other possible pending events. Thus, it is impossible for the Attorneys to properly
keep and protect each client's confidential information when such extreme diverging interests
exist.

Ill
Ill
Ill
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8. The Attorneys Of Hawley Troxell And Quarles & Brady Should Be
Disqualified Because The Conflicts Between CropUSA, AIA Services And
AIA Insurance Are Nonconsentable.
"[S]ome conflicts arc nonconsentable, meaning that the lawyer involved cannot properly
ask for such an agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent. When
representing more than one client, the question of consentability must be resolved as to each
client." RPC 1.7, Comment 14.
Here, the conflicts between CropUSA, AIA Services and AIA Insurance are so
irreconcilable that such conflicts are nonconsentable under RPC 1.7.

For example, AIA

Insurance should be suing CropUSA to recover the $1.5 Million that fraudulently/inappropriately
conveyed in 2004. AIA Insurance should be pursuing claims against CropUSA for the millions
of dollars of unallocated, under-allocated, and uncollected funds and assets that were wrongfully
transferred to CropUSA.

AIA Services should be pursing the same claims as the parent

corporation of AJA Insurance.

Both corporations should be pursuing claims against the

Attorneys. These conflicts, and others, are nonconsentable.
9. The Attorneys Of Hawley Troxell, Clements, Brown & McNichols And
Quarles & Brady Must Be Disqualified Because They Are Witnesses.
"A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a
necessary witness ... " RPC 3.7.
Here, the Attorneys are witnesses to (including, but not limited to) the following: (1)
inappropriate and improper board meetings (including participation of meetings that violate the
Articles of Formation and Bylaws of AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance); (2) improper and
insufficient disclosure to shareholders as required by law and the bylaws; (3) inappropriate
opinion letters to lenders and auditors that have facilitated and/or covered up acts of fraud,
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breaches of fiduciary duties, conspiracy to defraud creditors and other unlawful acts; (4)
inappropriate defense agreements and join retainers; (5) transfers of funds, assets, and resources
from AIA Insurance and/or AIA Services to CropUSA and others; (6) the opinion letter issued to
Reed (e.g., Richard Riley would be forced to testify against his client AIA Services and implicate
damages for himself and his firm for providing the opinion to Reed); (7) improper actions taken
by the boards of AIA Services and AIA Insurance when they were purportedly representing the
organizations; (8) aiding and abetting of John Taylor and others of acts of fraud and breaches of
fiduciary duties owed to Reed (among other claims); (9) the conspiracy to prevent valid claims
from being pursued against certain defendants and interested parties (e.g., arguing against
naming Mike Cashman as a defendant and not pursuing valid claims against him); (10) the titling
and pledging of AIA Services' $1.2 Million Mortgage (John Taylor acknowledged that AJA
Insurance's funds (which Reed had a security interest) ·were utilized to pay for the legal costs that
resulted in obtaining the Mortgage); (11) acceptance of the payment of attorneys fees and costs
in violation· of the rules of professional conduct (no proper shareholder approval, no shareholder
approval at all for James Beck and Connie Taylor, boards not properly seated, etc.); (11)
improperly restraining Reed, when they knew he had the contractual rights and that the
corporations were not being operated properly; and (12) acts to intentionally refuse to represent
the best interests of AIA Insurance and AIA Services (regardless of whether Reed was owed any
funds or not).
As Peter Jarvis succinctly opined that the likelihood of the Attorneys being witnesses was
real, but that at the minimum "confidentiality and conflict of interest considerations under Idaho
RPC 1.6 through 1.10 and RPC 1.13" are implicated even if the Attorneys were never forced to
testify against their client. See Jarvis Aff., p. 6, , 4(b).
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10. The Attorneys Of Hawley Troxell And Quarles & Brady Must Be
Disqualified Because They Were Never Retained Or Employed By Duly
Authorized Representatives of AIA Services and AIA Insurance.
"A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting
through its duly authorized constituents." RPC l. l 3(a).
None of the attorney in this action has been duly retained by AIA Services or AIA
Insurance. Reed and Donna Taylor have not been m.embers of the board of AIA Services as
Required. Reed voted the shares of AIA Insurance and Reed is its only authorized officer and
director. John Taylor, Connie Taylor and James Beck have not been duly appointed, have not
been re-elected through a shareholder meeting, and they all have a vested interest in protecting
John Taylor and thwarting Reed from exercising his contractual rights. Moreover, John Taylor
and Connie Taylor are both licensed attorneys who have full knowledge of the obligations to
properly operate a corporation.

11. The Attorneys Of Hawley Troxell And Quarles & Brady Should Be
Disqualified Because They Have Failed To Proceed In The Best Interests
Of AIA Services And AIA Insurance.
RPC 1.13(b) expressly states that a lawyer is required to proceed in the bests interests of
the corporation:

If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated
with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter
related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or
a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and this is likely
to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is
reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization ...
I

•

RPC l. l 3(b) (emphasis added).
Here, the Attorneys have not proceeded in the best interests of AJA Services and AIA
Insurance as required by RPC l .13(b). They have full knowledge of improper transfers of assets,

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY - 29

002027

full knowledge of inappropriate loan guarantees, full knowledge that the board of AJA Services
is breaching their fiduciary duties, and full knowledge that John Taylor is directing the litigation
to his interests and other interested party's interests only. The Attorneys have utterly failed in
their duties to AIA Services and AIA Insurance.

Instead, the Attorneys are inappropriately

representing the interests of John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Mike Cashman, CropUSA
and others.

12. All Of The Attorneys Should Be Disqualified Because None Of Them
Received The Required Informed Consent From The Appropriate
Representative Of AIA Services and AIA Insurance.
A consent to dual representation required by RPC 1. 7 mandates that "the consent shall be
given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is to be
represented, or by the shareholders." RPC 1.13(g).
The Attorneys have entered into a joint defense agreement representing the interests of all
three corporations and John Taylor, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, Connie Taylor, James Beck
(and likely other unnamed individuals who have been responsible or taken part in the corporate
malfeasance and general conspiracy).

Under RCP 1.13(g), authorization for such a

representation is required by the shareholders or other disinterested parties. However, all of the
Attorneys failed to obtain shareholder or disinterested party approval of the joint representation,
joint defense and joint retainer as required by the Rules of Professional Conduct.

13. It Is Impossible For Any Of The Attorneys From Hawley Troxell,
Quarles & Brady Or Clements, Brown & .McNichols To Obtain The
Required Informed Consent.
"[I]n some circumstances multiple representation may be permissible if both clients are
fully informed of potential conflict and the parties consent to the representation. This consent
rationale seems IJeculiarly inapplicable to a derivative action, because the corporation must
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consent through the directors, who. as in the present case, are the individual defendants."
.Forrest v. Baeza, 58 Cal.App.4th 65, 76, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 857 (Cal. 1997) citing Opinion 842,

Association of the City ofNew York Committee on Professional Ethics (Jan. 4, 1960) (emphasis
added).
Here, this action involves a creditor of an insolvent corporation and stock pledgee, Reed,
pursuing claims against the directors of AIA Services and purported directors of AIA Insurance
for fraud, breaches of fiduciary duties, conversion, conspiracy and other claims involving
corporate malfeasance. Moreover, Reed's claims are significant in nature, i.e., not business
judgment rule claims.

The individual defendants are interested by way of their common

ownership in CropUSA, their common goals of preventing Reed and innocent shareholders from
discovering the significant fraud and corporate malfeasance at AIA Services and AIA Insurance,
and the common goal of preventing Reed and others from exercising their contractual rights.
Hawley Troxell and Quarles & Brady and individual defendants have a vested interest in keeping
the truth from Reed and the Court, and accomplishing these acts without authority from AIA
Services or AIA Insurance.
Similarly, appropriate informed consent could not have been obtained for Clements,
Brown & McNichols to withdraw from representing AIA Service and AIA Insurance because the
presumed waivers would have been given by interested parties who were defendants and should
have been on the target of claims by the corporations.
14. None Of The Attorneys Could Obtain The Required Conflict Waiver
Because AIA Services Is Insolvent.
The fiduciary duty owed to creditors of a bankmpt (or in this case insolvent) client
constrains a lawyer's ability to waive conflicts of interest. In re Running Horse, L.L.C., 371 D.R.
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446, 453 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
Here, AIA Services is and has been insolvent. Although this matter is not in Bankruptcy
Court, the same principals apply because of AIA Services' insolvency and the requirement to
protect the interests of the creditors. Therefore, Reed's consent would have been required to
waive any conflicts of interest associated with multiple representations. However, the Attorneys
failed to obtain the required waivers from Reed.

15. The Questions Of Obtaining The Appropriate Waivers For Hawley
Troxell And Quarles & Brady Are Not Even Reached Because The
Diverging Interests Between AIA Insurance, AIA Services And CropUSA
Are Irreconcilable.
"If a lawyer reasonably believes representation of a client will be adversely affected by
the concurrent representation of another client, the question of waiver is not reached." State v.
Rooks, 130 Wn.App. 787, 125 P.3d 192, 198 (2005); see also RPC 1.8.
Here, the interests of all three corporations are irreconcilably divergent and there is no
possible way that Hawley Troxell or Quarles & Brady could have reasonably believed that the
interests of the corporations would not be adversely affected by joint representation. Moreover,
Reed had voted the shares of AIA Insurance and the individual defendants who consented to any
joint representation were all interested parties. Thus, any purported waivers are invalid because
they should never have been executed as the representation was not appropriate or properly
authorized.

16. No Proper Informed Consent Was Obtained By Any Of The Attorneys
From Donna Taylor, Reed, Or Disinterested Officers, Directors Or
Shareholders.
Any conflict of interest in representing a majority shareholder and corporation in
litigation brought by a minority shareholder was not waived, where only the majority shareholder
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approved the conflict waiver. Williams v. Stanford, 977 So.2d 722, 730 (Fla. 2008).
Michael McNichols and Clements, Brown &, McNichols represented AIA Services, AIA
Insurance and John Taylor without obtaining consent from the minority shareholders of AIA
Services, the Preferred A Shareholder Donna Taylor, or Reed, the only person authorized to vote
the shares of AIA Insurance. Mr. McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNichols knew that
Donna Taylor had not been paid (and that her shares had priority over any other shareholder) and
knew that Reed had not been paid and had voted his shares. When Mr. McNichols withdrew to
only represent John Taylor, he was again required to have consent from the foregoing parties.
However, Mr. McNichols failed to obtain the required consent and is inappropriately
representing John Taylor.
Similarly, Gary Babbitt, D. John Ashby and Hawley Troxell are and have been
inappropriately representing the interests of John Taylor and AIA Services, AIA Insurance and
CropUSA-all of which have irreconcilable diverging conflicts of interest.

Any joint

representation required the consent of Reed and Donna Taylor, which Hawley Troxell failed to
obtain.
Finally, Quarles & Brady represented AIA Insurance in providing the improper opinion
letter to CropUSA's lender, represented AIA attempting to settle the case, and has acted as the
"lead" counsel in subsequent settlement discussions. Moreover, Quarles & Brady is admitted to
this case through Hawley Troxell, which creates a new set of conflicts by way of Hawley
Troxell's conflicts.
Ill
Ill
Ill
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17. The Attorneys Cannot Inappropr~ately Rely Upon The Improper
Instructions From John Taylor To Perpetrate A Fraud Against Reed,
AIA Insurance, AIA Services, And It's Innocent Shareholders.

"[A]n attorney may not hide behind a client's instructions in order to perpetrate a fraud
against a third party." The Florida Bar v. Feige, 596 So.2d 433, 435 (Fla. 1992).
Here, the Attorneys have full knowledge that John Taylor is directly or indirectly
controlling the litigation in this action. The Attorneys have full knowledge that John Taylor has
not been operating AIA Services or AIA Insurance for the benefit of its shareholders or creditors
in light of insolvency, yet the Attorneys have taken instructions from R. John Taylor in violation
of the Rules of Professional Conduct and failed to notify disinterested parties or shareholders of
the improper acts of R. John Taylor. The Attorneys have full knowledge that their clients' acts
(and R. John Taylor) are defrauding Reed and the innocent shareholders of AIA Services (to the
extent that they have any claims after the moneys owed to Reed are paid in full).
18. The Joint Defense Agreement And Joint Retainer Agreement Entered
Into By The Defendants Violate Ethical Rules For The Conflicting
Attorneys Violate Public Policy And Are Unenforceable.

Contracts that violate ethical rules violate public policy and are unenforceable. Evans &
Luptak, PLC v. Lizza, 251 Mich.App. 187, 650 N.W.2d 364, 370 (Mich. 2002).

Here, AIA Insurance and AIA Services entered into a Joint Defense Agreement and Joint
Retainer Agreement purportedly drafted by Hawley Troxell.

See Bond Aff., Ex. I 0 (joint

meeting minutes of the purported boards of AIA Services and AIA Insurance approval a Joint
Defense and Retainer). Presumably, CropUSA was also made a party to the Joint Defense and
Joint Retainer Agreement, however, this information has riot been provided. However, these
"Joint" agreements violate ethical rules and are unenforceable, as are the purported waivers that
the Attorneys will presumably argue are obtained in such agreements.
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19. The Attorneys May Not Jointly Defend The Corporations And The
Individual Defendants.
Courts and commentators have consistently stated that an attorney cannot represent an
officer or director and the corporation when allegations of fraud are made against the officer or
director. Law of Corp. Officers & Dir.: Indemn. & Ins. § 4:5 (2006) ("An attorney may not
represent both the board of directors and the corporation where the directors are alleged to have
committed fraud."); Forrest v. Baeza, 58 Cal. App. 4th 65, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 857 (1st Dist. 1997)

(An attorney may not represent both corporation and directors in a shareholder suit where the
directors are alleged to have committed fraud.); Musheno v. Gensemer, 897 F. Supp. 833 (M.D.
Pa. 1995) (An attorney representing a corporation and its board of directors in a shareholder suit
would be disqualified from representing a corporation, where the complaint alleged fraud and
self-dealing by directors, revealing a clear divergence of interests between a corporation and its
directors).
Thus, the Attorneys may not directly, or indirectly through any joint defense agreement,
represent the interests of John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, AIA Services, AIA Insurance,
CropUSA and any other interested party or individual defendant with claims of corporate
malfeasance against him or her. By analogy, the Attorneys may also not represent the interests
of Crop USA, AJA Services and AIA Insurance because Reed's Fifth Amended Complaint (and
all the evidence) demonstrates that AIA Services and AIA Insurance should be pursuing claims
against CropUSA and the responsible parties.

Ill
Ill
Ill
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20. As The Pledgee Of AIA Insurance And The Only Person Authorized To
Vote Its Shares, Reed Has Not And Will Not Consent To The Joint
Representation Of AIA Insurance And Any Other Defend ant.
Informed written consent is required for any joint representation.

RPC 1. 7.

Disqualification of any attorney from subsequent representation is for the benefit of the former
client and protects the client's feeling ofloyalty owed by the attorney, and can only be waived by
the client. Prospective Investment and Trading Co., Ltd. V. GBK Corp., 60 P.3d 520, 525 (Okla.
2002).

Here, Reed is the only person with the authority to waive any conflicts or consent to the
waiver of any conflicts pertaining to the joint representation of AIA Insurance. Reed has not
consented and will not consent to AIA Insurance being represented jointly with any other
defendant in this action by Clements, Brown & McNichols, Hawley Troxell or Quarles & Brady.
See also Affidavit of Donna Taylor (who also does not consent as the priority shareholder of

AIA Services).
21. The Attorneys' Representation Results In The Violation Of The Rules Of

Professional Conduct
Disqualification.

And

Requires

Their

Withdrawal

Or

Once representation has commenced, a lawyer shall withdraw from the representation of
a client if "the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or the
law." RPC 1.16(a)(a).
Here, the attorneys are representing defendants: (1) knowing that financial statements are
being misrepresented in violation of the law, (2) knowing that fiduciary duties are being
breached, knowing that fraud has taken place and continues to take place, (3) knowing that a
fraud is being perpetrated against Recd, even if Reed was not a creditor, (4) perpetrated against
the corporations and their shareholders (which include Reed), and (5) knowing that numerous
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rules of professional conduct are being broken.

Significantly, the Attorneys are aiding and

abetting John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, .CropUSA and other interested parties in
violation ofRPC 1.16, Thus, the Attorneys should withdraw or be disqualified.
Thus, for any one or more of the reasons set forth above, the Attorneys should be
disqualified.

22. Disqualification
Impropriety.

Is

Required

Because

Of The

Appearance

Of

The Idaho Court of Appeals explained a four-part test to determine whether an
appearance of impropriety alone will give a party standing to interfere with an adverse party's
choice of counsel:
(1) Whether the motion is being made for the purposes of harassing the defendant, (2)

Whether the party bringing the motion will be damaged in some way if the motion is not
granted, (3) Whether there are anY alternative solutions, or is the proposed solution the
least damaging under the circumstances, and (4) Whether the possibility of public
suspicion will outweigh any benefits that might a~crue to continued representation.
Weaver, 120 Idaho at 698 (emphasis added). "The existence of an appearance of impropriety

should be determined from the perspective of a reasonable layperson." Clinard v. Blackwod, 46
S.W.3d 177, 187 (Tenn. 2001).
Here, the disqualification of the Attorneys is warranted because Reed is not is not
bringing the motion for harassment purposes, he will be damaged further if the motion is not
granted, there are no alternative solutions as the conflicts are irreconcilable, and the public would
be highly suspicious of any continued representation (particularly when the conflicts involve
corporations with shares held by the public). See Affidavit of Reed Taylor, p. 3,

~

5. Based

upon the perspective of a lay person (or any other person for that matter), the fairness to Reed
and the integrity of the judicial system require the law firms to be disqualified for any one or
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more of the reasons articulated below.
Moreover, the Attorneys are defendants in other lawsuits that involve claims of aiding
and abetting, conversion and other claims supported by the same documents and subject matter
of this lawsuit. Significantly, the disqualification of the Attorneys is also warranted because they
are also witnesses (see Section 12 above).

VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated above, the Court should disqualify the attorneys and law firms
of Hawley Troxell, Quarles & Brady and Clements, Brown & McNichols to resolve the
substantial irreconcilable conflicts of interest among the defendants, ensure the fairness to all
parties in this action, maintain the integrity of the legal system, resolve appearances of
impropriety, and prevent later appeals based upon the irreconcilable and nonconsentable
conflicts of interest involving all of the Attorneys.
In addition, the Court should enter an order requiring each corporation to retain separate
counsel and not participate in the defense or 'joint defense" of John Taylor or other interested
parties.
DATED: This 4th day of September, 2008.
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
CAMPBELL, B SELL & IRBY PLLC

oderick . Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Michael S. Bissell
Attomt:ys for Plainliff Rt:t:u J. Taylor
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RODERICK C. BOND (Pro Hae Vice)
NED A. CANNON, !SBA #2331
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Fax: (208) 746-8421

...

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Case No.: CV-07-00208
Plaintiff,

v.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and
CORRINE BECK, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;

AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND IN
SUPPORT OF REED TAYLOR'S MOTION
TO DISQUALIFY THE ATTORNEYS AND
LAW FIRMS OF HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, CLEMENTS
BROWN & MCNICHOLS, P.A., AND
QUARLES & BRADY LLP.; MOTION TO
RELINQUISH COLLATERAL; MOTION TO
COMPEL; MOTION TO PROTECT
COLLATERAL; AND MOTION FOR
CONTINUANCE

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss:
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE )
I, Roderick C. Bond, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in court, one of

the attorneys for the plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") in this action, and make
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND
IN SUPPORT OF DISQUALIFICATION - 1

EXHIBIT
002037

this Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge.
2.

I am licensed to practice law in the state of Washington, a resident of the

state of Washington, and was admitted as an attorney on this case Pro Hae Vice.
3.

This Affidavit is being submitted for purposes of disqualifying the lawyers

and law firms Michael McNichols and Clements Brown & McNichols, P.A.; Gary
Babbitt, D. John Ashby, and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP; and James Gatziolis,
Charles Harper, Jr., and Quarles & Brady LLP. As a result of the facts described in this
Affidavit and the resulting conflicts of interest, this Affidavit is also being submitted for
purposes of continuing the trial date and requiring AIA Insurance, Inc. ("AJA

Insurance") to be turned over to Reed Taylor.
4.

Although I have no special training in legal ethics, I believe that the

following Rules of Professional Conduct ("RPC") are implicated by the various conflicts
of interest in this action: (1) RPC 1.7; (2) RPC 1.8; (3) RPC 1.13; (4) RPC 1.17; (5) RPC
3.7, among others. There have also been various times that I believe other RPCs may
have been implicated.
5.

Reed Taylor was the founder and majority shareholder of AIA Services

Corporation ("AIA Services") prior to selling all of his shares back to AIA Services
through a stock redemption in 1995. Reed Taylor and the defendant R. John Taylor are
brothers.

R. John Taylor and other named and unnamed defendants entered into

negations with Reed Taylor to have AIA Services redeem Reed Taylor's shares so that
they could obtain operational control of AIA Services.
6.

As a result of John Taylor and the other key parties' request to buy Reed

Taylor out of AJA Services, Reed Taylor finally agreed to permit his shares to be
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redeemed. Many of pre-redemption and post-redemption documents show that R. John
Taylor and the others desired to have Reed Taylor's shares redeemed in an effort to take
AIA Services public.

The purchase of Reed Taylor's shares was structured as a

redemption for the purpose that R. John Taylor, Michael Cashman, James Beck and
others would not be personally contractually obligated to pay the approximately $10
Million purchase price.
7.

On July 22, 1995, the parties agreed upon the redemption terms. Attached

as Exhibit l is a copy of the $6,000,000 Promissory Note ("$6M Note") evidencing the
indebtedness incurred by AIA Services for the redemption of Reed Taylor's common
shares, which was executed on August 1, 1995. The parties had previously entered into a
Stock Pledge Agreement, Security Agreement, and related agreements in connection with
the transaction on July 22, 1995 (which were required tp execute the $6M Note).
8.

Attached as Exhibit 2 is a copy of the opinion letter given by Richard

Riley's prior firm, which such opinion letter provided certain representations and
warranties that are now being adversely challenged by Hawley Troxell and the other
defense attorneys. Richard Riley is now an attorney at Hawley Troxell and is therefore a
witness with respect to the opinion letter issued by his former law firm.
9.

In 1996, the agreements were amended by the parties when AIA Services

defaulted in its obligations to Reed Taylor, however, the terms of the $6M Note remain
unchanged. Attached as Exhibit 3 are pertinent pages of the Redemption Restructure
Agreement ("Restructure Agreement") entered into between Reed Taylor and AIA
Services. Under the terms of the Restructure Agreement, AIA Services was obligated to
ensure that Reed Taylor was a member of the board of directors of AIA Services until
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Reed Taylor's debt was paid in full. AIA Services has not honored this obligation since
my involvement in this action.

10.

Attached as Exhibit 4 is a copy of the Amended and Restated Stock

Pledge Agreement ("Amended Stock Pledge Agreement") entered into between Reed
Taylor and AIA Services. Of all the subsidiaries pledged to Reed Taylor in the Amended
Stock Pledge Agreement, AIA Insurance is the only subsidiary that remains, and it is
wholly owned by AIA Services. All of the shares of AJA Insurance were pledged to
Reed Taylor to secure the payment of the $6M Note and other obligations. AJA Services
also granted Reed Taylor an irrevocable power of attorney, coupled with an interest, to
vote the shares upon any default until his debt was paid in full as authorized under LC. §

30-1-722.
11.

Attached as Exhibit 5 is the Amended and Restated Security Agreement

("Amended Security Agreement") wherein AIA Services granted Reed Taylor a
security interest in all of AJA Services and AIA Insurance's commissions and related
receivables. This document is significant because Reed Taylor's security interest in the
commissions results in the claim of conversion for the use of the commissions. This is
true for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs with such funds as Reed Taylor made
clear that he does not authorize the use of the fund for such purposes. Reed Taylor has
perfected his security interest by filing the necessary statements with the Idaho Secretary
of State.
12.

Attached as Exhibit 6 is a copy of the notice of default letter that Reed

Taylor's counsel sent to AJA Services on December 12, 2006. Under the tenns of the
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, AJA Services' right to vote the shares of AJA
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Insurance ceased and became vested exclusively in Reed Taylor (including a right to vote
the shares and an irrevocable power-of-attorney to do so) when AIA Services failed to
pay the balance of Reed Taylor's $6M Note within 5 days as required. The Amended
Stock Pledge Agreement also granted Reed Taylor the right to transfer or sell the shares
of AIA Insurance. AIA Services failed to cure the defaults and over $8.5 Million is owed
to Reed Taylor as of the date of this Affidavit.
13.

As a result of the defendants' failure to comply with Reed Taylor's request

for a shareholders' meeting, Reed Taylor elected, pursuant to his contractual rights, to
vote all of the shares of AIA Insurance by executing a consent in lieu of a shareholder
meeting and a consent in lieu of board meeting, copies of which are attached as Exhibit
7. This was possible because all of the shares of AIA Insurance were pledged to Reed
Taylor so a shareholder meeting was not necessary to vote the shares and Reed Taylor
was granted an irrevocable power of attorney coupled with an interest to vote the shares
as required by LC. § 30-1-722.

Notwithstan'ding the various conflicts of interest

discussed below, the defendants should have appointed separate and independent counsel
to represent AIA Insurance, if for no other reason, because of the fact that Reed Taylor
voted the shares of AIA Insurance pursuant to his contractual rights.
14.

Under the

Redemption

Agreement and

Amended

Stock Pledge

Agreement, AIA Services was obligated to ensure Reed Taylor was a member of the
board of directors of AIA Services until his debt was paid in full (the failure to maintain
Reed Taylor on the board is another basis for a default). In addition, upon any default,
Reed Taylor was the only authorized party entitled to vote the shares of AJA Insurance
by way of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement. Because Reed Taylor
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has not been appointed to the board of AJA Services as required under the terms of the
redemption of his shares and his vote of the shares of AIA Insurance has already
occurred, it is impossible for any of the attorneys presently representing the corporations
(or attorneys who fonnerly represented the corporations) to obtain informed consent of
any dual or multiple legal representations in this action, let alone through any joint
defense agreement.

I have reiterated this fact to opposing counsel on numerous

occasions. I have also reiterated to opposing counsel on numerous occasions that AIA
Services, AIA Insurance and Crop USA Instirance Agency, Inc. ("Crop USA") should all
have separate and independent counsel and their defense be directed by uninterested
parties. Despite my complaints, the litigation on behalf of the foregoing corporations has
been directed by John Taylor and other interested parties.
15.

On January 29, 2007, Reed Taylor filed suit in this action against R. John

Taylor, AJA Services, and AIA Insurance. On February 5, 2007, Reed Taylor filed his
First Amended Complaint adding additional director defendants and claims for fraud,
fraudulent conveyance, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, alter-ego and other claims, a
copy of which is attached as Exhibit 8. The facts and claims contained in the First
Amended Complaint required separate and independent counsel for AIA Services and
AJA Insurance. However, other defendants were named later as indicated in the present
Fifth Amended Complaint (See Exhibit 15 below). As indicated in the attached Exhibit

9, the same individuals who control AJA Services also control Crop USA, even though
the assets, funds and employees of AIA Services and AIA Insurance were inappropriately
utilized to found and assist in operating the company.
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16.

When Reed Taylor attempted to repossess AIA Insurance in February

2007, the defendants obtained a preliminary injunction against him, even though there
was no evidence indicating that the defendants would prevail in this action. The bond
was only set at $200,000 when Reed Taylor was owed over $8.5 Million. Nevertheless,
since that time, Reed Taylor has abided by the terms of the preliminary injunction against
him, all the while the assets of AIA Services and AJA Insurance were not being
protected. The Defendants and their counsel persuaded the Court to enjoin Reed Taylor
and continued to permit the Court to enjoin Reed Taylor when they knew that the
corporations were not being represented or operated for the benefit and protection of the
corporations.

17.

Shortly after this litigation commenced, the defendants JoLee Duclos and

Bryan Freeman resigned from the boards of AIA Services and AIA Insurance. Connie
Taylor and James Beck were appointed in their place by John Taylor.

Attached as

Exhibit 10 is a copy of the board meeting minutes of AIA Services and AIA Insurance.
The meeting minutes detail the defendants' Joint Defense Agreement and Joint Retainer
Agreement, and show how Connie Taylor and James Beck were appointed to the boards
of the companies, when both of them were interested parties through their ownership of
Crop USA shares. The transcripts attached as Exhibit l 0 clearly demonstrate that R. John
Taylor, an interested party who is facing claims of fraud and other malfeasance, is being
inappropriately permitted to control the litigation in this matter.
18.

Prior to this time, Reed Taylor had made demand on AIA Insurance's

board of directors to take action and to recover all sums owed by Crop USA. A copy of
Reed Taylor's letter dated February 2, 2007, is attached as Exhibit 11. This letter serves
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as one of many reminders that the defendants' attorney should not be undertaking joint
representation.
19.

On March 16, 2007, R. John Taylor sent a letter to shareholders of AIA

Services requesting shareholder approval for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs.
Attached as Exhibit 12 is a copy of the letter that Reed Taylor obtained from a
shareholder of AIA Services. It should be noted that the letter does not enclose a copy of
Reed Taylor's Complaint nor does the letter specify the significant fraud and related
claims involving this litigation. This letter illustrates the lack of disclosure and fairness
in the defendants' transactions, and that consent cannot be given when full disclosure is
not made.
20.

In November 2007, Reed Taylor moved for partial summary judgment

against AIA Services requesting a finding that AIA Services was in default of the $6M
Note and Amended Stock Pledge Agreement (and other relief), which is attached as
Exhibit 13. On February 8, 2008, the Court granted Reed Taylor's motion and denied

AIA Services' Motion for Reconsideration (i.e., it now follows that Reed Taylor's
Consents attached as Exhibit 7 were valid). A copy of the Court's Opinion and Order is
attached as Exhibit 14. AIA Services and AIA Insurance moved for reconsideration and
the motion was denied.

AIA Services' Motion for Permissive Appeal of the Order

Granting Partial Summary Judgment was denied by the Idaho Supreme Court.
21.

The significance of the above paragraphs and attached documents cannot

be underemphasized. Because the $6M Note was due in full on August 1, 2005 and had
not been paid, the voting rights to the shares of AIA Insurance were vested in Reed
Taylor, particularly when AIA Services failed to cure Reed Taylor's notice of default in
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2006 (Reed Taylor didn't even need to send a notice of default after the $6M Note
matured in 2005). This issue alone warranted separate counsel for AIA Insurance.
22.

From the time Reed Taylor filed suit, I advised counsel of the various

conflicts that I perceived in this action. O:ver the course of this litigation, I identified
other perceived conflicts of interest as well. I also advised counsel of these conflicts.
23.

Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. was not added as a defendant in this

action until August 14, 2007. For purposes of providing additional information for the
various significant conflicts and divergent interests among the defendants, attached as
Exhibit 15 is a copy of the Fifth Amended Complaint in this action, which is the current

Complaint in this action.
24.

As discussed above, Reed Taylor is owed over $8.5 Million dollars by

AIA Services and the Court has entered partial summary judgment against AIA Services
finding that it was in default of the $6M Note and Amended Stock Pledge Agreement.
Even so, the defendants and their attorneys continue to operate AJA Insurance and AIA
Services to the detriment of the corporations, and Reed Taylor in light of AIA Services'
insolvency and AIA Insurance being pledged to him as collateral.
25.

On July 21, 2008, Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor sent a demand letter to

the boards of AJA Services and AJA Insurance demanding that action be taken against
certain attorneys and law firms, a copy of the letter is attached as Exhibit 16. It should
be noted that AJA Insurance's business prospects are bleak and presently its income
comes from policies issued many years ago. AIA Insurance's policy payments are not
expected to continue. Thus, every dollar is important to preserve. Like Reed Taylor,
Donna Taylor has not been paid and her Preferred A Shares in AIA Services were
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required to be redeemed years ago. Donna Taylor's Preferred A Shares have priority
over the common shareholders of AIA Services.
The Short Story (based upon my review of substantial documents in this action)

26.

Reed Taylor sold his shares and all of AJA Services' subsidiaries were

pledged as collateral. AIA Services and its subsidiaries marketed, sold and underwrote
health insurance for farmers, which was sold through associations such as the Wheat
Growers Association. In 2001, AIA Services could not meet the required payment terms.
R. John Taylor, James Beck, Mike Cashman and others· wanted to buy Reed Taylor out to
take AIA Services public.
27.

At the present time, AIA Insurance is the only remaining subsidiary and

almost all of its commissions and revenues are obtained from health policies that were
sold before Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed. Revenues have dropped significantly
virtually every year. Reed Taylor expects the remaining policies to only produce income
for no more than two years.
28.

Crop USA was formed in 1999 and was originally called AIA Crop

Insurance, Inc. Crop USA was formed and operated using funds, employees and assets
from AJA Insurance (the same company pledged to Reed Taylor). R. John Taylor and
others represented that Crop USA was being developed by AJA Insurance. However, at
some point in time Crop USA became a separate entity that was owned primarily by R.
John Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, and others. Even though Crop USA was

formed and operating under the AIA umbrella of companies and from AIA Insurance's
funds, resources and employees, neither AIA Services, AJA Insurance, Reed Taylor, nor
any of AIA Services' minority shareholders own any interest in Crop USA. Letters exist
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that refer to Crop USA as being an "exit strategy" for named and unnamed defendants.
29.

The development of Crop USA occurred during times that AIA Services

was insolvent and the fiduciary duties were owed to the major creditor Reed Taylor.
Millions of dollars were transferred and/or utilized by Crop USA, which such funds Reed
Taylor also had a security interest.
30.

Thus, AIA Services and AIA Insurance should be pursing claims against

R. John Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman and others to recover the shares of stock
and funds diverted to Crop USA.

Some of the transactions are alleged to be fraud,

conversion and/or fraudulent conveyances by Reed Taylor, yet Hawley Troxell represents
AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and Crop USA. Because AIA Insurance is pledged to
Reed Taylor and he has voted the shares, all three corporations have diverging interests.
As detailed in the attached Fifth Amended Complaint (See Ex. 15), Reed Taylor's claims
and damages are substantial, all the while the defendants have persuaded the Court from
awarding Reed Taylor AJA Insurance when they have failed to advise the Court of many
facts, including the fact that A.IA Insurance's business revenues could end any year if
Trustmark elects to not renew its contract with AIA Insurance.
31.

Since Reed Taylor has been enjoined by the Court from voting the shares,

all of AIA Insurance's key employees have become employees of Crop USA, AIA
Insurance's funds are improperly utilized for the benefit of R. John Taylor, Crop USA
and others, a $1.2 Million Mortgage was pledged to Crop USA, no action has been taken
by the corporations' attorneys to recover damages for the inappropriate actions and such
other acts as set forth in the attached Fifth Amended Complaint (See Ex. 15).
Ill
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James Gatziolis, Charles Harper, Jr., and Quarles & Brady
32.

Prior to the time Reed Taylor filed suit against the defendants in this

action in January 2007, the parties attempted to settle their claims. In those settlement
discussions, AIA Services and AJA Insurance were represented by James Gatziolis and
Quarles & Brady. Attached as Exhibit 17 are copies of an email and settlement offer
sent to me by James Gatziolis (who claims to have never represented AIA in this matter).
James Gatziolis also provided me with a term sheet regarding settlement of Reed
Taylor's claims and the email from which the offer was attached states " ... please find a
revised proposed terms sheet representing AIA's latest offer to resolve the controversies
between AIA and Reed Taylor ... " At no point in time did James Gatziolis state that AIA
Services or AIA Insurance would need to retain other counsel in the settlement
negotiations or the consummation of a settlement. Although the terms of the settlement
offer are immaterial and inadmissible at trial for damages, the settlement offer and email
are evidence that demonstrate that James Gatziolis and Quarles and Brady were
representing AIA Services and AIA Insurance.
33.

Prior to the settlement discussions, AIA Services voluntarily provided

Reed Taylor with a number of documents, including, without limitation Quarles &
Brady's opinion letter to the lender of Crop USA. Attached as Exhibit 18 is a copy of
the opinion letter dated October 27, 2006, provided by Quarles & Brady to Crop USA's
lender in connection with Crop USA's $15 Million line-of-credit, which AIA Insurance
improperly guaranteed.

Contrary to this letter, AIA Insurance was not permitted to

guarantee any loans of any entity unless it was a wholly owned subsidiary of AIA
Services. Attached as Exhibit 19 are pertinent pages of AJA Services' Amended Articles
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of Formation. Attached as Exhibit 20 are pertinent pages of AIA Insurance's Bylaws
(AIA Insurance was formerly known as "AIA, Inc.".

Attached as Exhibit 21 are

pertinent pages of AIA Services' New Restated Bylaws, which have provisions for loans
and director conflicts of interest. As discussed above, Crop USA is not a wholly owned
subsidiary of AIA Services or AIA Insurance. In fact, neither AIA Services nor AIA
Insurance owns a single share of stock or other ownership interest in Crop USA. As
discussed below, Hawley Troxell also inappropriately issued a substantially similar
opinion letter for this loan (see below).
34.

When Reed Taylor filed suit, James Gatziolis advised me that he and his

firm would remain involved and that Michael McNichols would be the counsel as well
and wherein James Gatziolis represented that he was representing AJA Services and/or
AIA Insurance. Attached as Exhibit 22 are emails exchanged between James Gatziolis
and me regarding the representation, along with more recent emails exchanged between
me and Charles Harper.
35.

When the defendants denied Reed Taylor's last demand for a shareholder

meeting of AIA Insurance, the letter denying his request was signed by JoLee Duclos (the
letter had a Quarles & Brady document management stamp at the bottom and was clearly
copied onto AIA Insurance letterhead) and delivered to me via email by James Gatziolis.
Mr. Gatziolis also advised me in that email Michael McNichols and Clements Brown &
McNichols was appearing on behalf of all of the defendants.

Mr. Gatziolis further

advised me that he would remain involved in the case. Attached within Exhibit 22 are
copies of the foregoing letter signed by JoLee Duclos denying Recd Taylor the right to
exercise his contractual rights and emails between James Gatziolis and me.

It is
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important to understand that James Gatziolis and Quarles & Brady's position will be that
they only appeared formally on behalf of Crop USA, however, Crop USA would not even
become a defendant in the lawsuit for several more months.
36.

Even though Charles Harper of Quarles & Brady has recently asserted that

Quarles & Brady has not represented AIA Services or AIA Insurance, the emails and
letters in Exhibit 22 show otherwise. Also, although not attached, Mr. Gatziolis has sent
numerous emails to R. John Taylor regarding his representation, both individually and
with regarding to AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance.
37.

Notwithstanding the above emails and letters, James Gatziolis and Quarles

& Brady did not formally appear in this action until Crop USA was named as a

defendant. Shortly after Crop USA was named as a defendant, James Gatziolis, Charles
Harper, Jr., and Quarles & Brady were admitted Pro Hae Vice in this action for Crop
USA through Gary Babbitt and Hawley Troxell. It seems to me that if Hawley Troxell is
conflicted out of this action, Quarles & Brady is also conflicted out because of their
association with Hawley Troxell. It also poses the question as to whether Quarles &
Brady were parties to the Joint Defense Agreement.
38.

Finally, as discussed below, James Gatziolis was the point person for the

defendants most recent settlement offer. If Mr. Gatziolis had discussions with other
counsel regarding confidential or attorney-client privilege information obtained through
Hawley Troxell, this issue poses additional possible conflicts.
39.

Based upon documents and my experience in this case, I believe Quarles

& Brady also represent the interests of individual shareholders of Crop USA who are also

shareholders of AIA Services, who are subject to claiins by AIA Services and/or AJA
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Insurance that have not been made.
Michael McNichols and Clements Brown & McNichols
40.

After Reed Taylor filed suit in January 2007, Michael McNichols and

Clements Brown & McNichols appeared on behalf of R. John Taylor, AJA Services and
AIA Insurance.

I immediately advised Michael McNichols that it was a conflict of

interest for him to represent all of the foregoing parties.
41.

When the defendants failed to turn over AJA Insurance to Reed Taylor, he

wrote a letter to Michael McNichols demanding that he not represent AIA Insurance, a
copy of the letter is attached as Exhibit 23. In the foregoing letter, Reed Taylor also
demanded the return of any funds paid to Mr. McNichols' firm. No funds were returned.
42.

In March 2007, Reed Taylor moved to disqualify Michael McNichols and

Clements Brown & McNichols because they were representing AIA Services, AIA
Insurance and R. John Taylor. Attached as Exhibit 24 are pertinent portions of Reed
Taylor's Emergency Motion addressing conflicts, which was filed on February 26, 2007.
On February 28, 2007, Reed Taylor also filed additional legal authority and arguments
for removal of Mr. McNichols' firm, pertinent portions of which are attached as Exhibit
25. In Reed Taylor's Memorandum of Law, he asserted that AIA Services and AIA
Insurance must each have separate counsel because there interests are divergent. Reed
Taylor asserted that R. John Taylor should be represented by separate counsel because of
the significant fraud claims, corporate malfeasance, and improper acts alleged in Reed
Taylor's Complaint. At the hearing, the Court indicated that conflicts of interest were
issues for the Idaho Bar to resolve and not the Court. Based upon the Court's position,
Reed Taylor did not move for any further disqualifications.
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43.

On March 28, 2007, Michael McNichols and Clements Brown &

McNichols moved to withdraw from representing AIA Services and AIA Insurance,
although Mr. McNichols indicated in his Motion that no conflicts presently existed. A
copy of Michael McNichols' Motion to Withdraw is attached as Exhibit 26. Under my
understanding of RPC I. 7 case law as applied to the Rules of Professional Conduct, Mr.
McNichols and his firm's withdrawal from representing AIA Services and AIA Insurance
so that they could remain as counsel for R. John Taylor was a violation of the "hot potato
doctrine," as they should have withdrawn in full from the representation of any
defendants in this case (including R. John Taylor). When Mr. McNichols withdrew from
representing AIA Services and AIA Insurance, Reed Taylor requested that the Court
order all of the files held inviolate. The Court denied Reed Taylor's request.
44.

In addition, Mr. McNichols and his firm represented AJA Insurance

without authorization from Reed Taylor (Reed Taylor voted the shares and terminated
Mr. McNichols and his firm). In any event, if and when Reed Taylor takes control of
AIA Insurance, Reed Taylor will have full and Unfettered access to all attorney-client
privilege, documents and Mr. McNichols' knowledge of everything that transpired during
his representation of AIA Insurance, if and when Reed Taylor takes control of AIA
Insurance (which should be eminent based upon the Court granting his motion for partial
summary judgment).

This issue alone makes it impossible for him to continue

representing John Taylor, when such representation is adverse to AIA Services and AIA
Insurance and Reed Taylor. This same conflict applies to Hawley Troxell through their
representation of Crop USA, AIA Services and AIA Insurance. I advised all of the above
attorneys of this fact on numerous occasions.
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Jonathan Halley and Clark and Feeney
45.

Jonathan Halley and Clark and Feeney first formally appeared in this

action on behalf of Connie Taylor (John Taylor's ex-wife) and later also appeared on
behalf of James and Corrine Beck. Connie Taylor is also an attorney and partner at Clark
and Feeney.
46.

Prior to Jonathan Halley and Clark and Feeney's formal appearance in this

action, I had various telephone and email discussions with Connie Taylor regarding Clark
and Feeney's conflicts of interest. At the time Clark and Feeney appeared in this action,
it also represented my client, Reed Taylor, in another action known as Taylor v. Maile.
Attached as Exhibit 27 are copies of emails exchanged between me and Connie Taylor. I
forwarded these emails to Jonathan Halley, with a particular emphasis ofRPC 1.7.
47.

I repeatedly advised Jonathan Halley that he was breaching his duty of

loyalty to Clark and Feeney's current client Reed Taylor. Despite advising Clark and
Feeney and Jonathan Halley of the conflict of interest and that Reed Taylor would not
waive the conflict of interest, Jonathan Halley and Clark and Feeney proceeded to
represent parties in this action against Reed Taylor's interests. This only further
illustrates complete disregard for the Rules of Professional Conduct.
48.

Even though Reed Taylor was Clark and Feeney's client, on April 16,

2008, Jonathan Halley and Clark and Feeney filed a motion for partial summary
judgment against their client Reed Taylor alleging that AIA Services did not owe Reed
Taylor $8.5 Million because he sold out when AIA Services was allegedly insolvent.
This was the first time any party had raised this issue and the motion is not grounded in
good faith fact and law.

In the deposition of JoLec Duclos that was taken shortly
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thereafter, I learned that AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and Crop USA and their counsel
Gary Babbitt directed Jonathan Halley and Clark and Feeney to file the motion for partial
summary judgment.

This Motion was against the interests of Reed Taylor and has

caused Reed Taylor to incur unnecessary additional attorneys' fees, costs and damages.
49.

However, modern law does not support Jonathan Halley and Clark and

Feeney's arguments. Even if Clark and Feeney's argument had merit and the argument
prevailed, the various conflicts would not be resolved as Reed Taylor would still have
claims against the individuals and AJA Services for quantum meruit, fraud and related
claims, not to mention the fact that he would arguably be entitled to receive his shares of
stock back in AIA Services. Moreover, this would also result in Reed Taylor being
damaged by Richard Riley's opinion letter and having a right to take action against
Richard Riley and his former firm for any damages (see Ex. 2 above).
50.

Finally, Jonathan Halley and Clark.and Feeney moved to withdraw from

this action after my repeated demands that they do so. Although prior to withdrawing,
Jonathan Halley finally admitted to me that he was wrong, he advised the Court that he
was withdrawing purportedly because of my threats to take legal action and that my client
would report him to the Idaho Bar. Nevertheless, on July 18, 2008, Jonathan Halley and
Clark and Feeney finally withdrew from this action through a motion attached as Exhibit
28. To this day, Clark and Feeney still represent Reed Taylor and two of his brothers on

an appeal.

Gary Babbitt, D. John Ashby, Richard Riley and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley
51.

Gary Babbitt, D. John Ashby and Hawley Troxell first formally

appeared in this action after Michael McNichols and Clements Brown & McNichols
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withdrew from representing AIA Services and AIA Insurance. Attached as Exhibit 29 is
a letter that I sent to Gary Babbitt regarding he and Hawley Troxell's representation
(among other things) on May 11, 2007, and Gary Babbitt's response email dated May 11,
2007. All counsel, including D. John Ashby, were provided a copy of the foregoing letter
via email. Interestingly, Gary Babbitt notes in his email that he wanted to ensure that a
full board of directors was seated to approve his firm's representation, yet there is no
mention that the entire board is interested and that the entire board should be precluded
from making decisions as to this litigation. In fact, the entire board referenced in Gary
Babbitt's email should have claims against them from the corporations, yet none have
been forthcoming.
52.

When Crop USA was named as defendant in this action, Gary Babbitt, D.

John Ashby and Hawley Troxell also formally appeared for Crop USA. As discussed
above, James Gatziolis, Charles Harper, Jr., and Quarles & Brady all appeared through
Gary Babbitt and Hawley Troxell Pro Hae Vice.
53.

As counsel for AIA Services and AIA Insurance, Gary Babbitt, John

Ashby and Hawley Troxell had obligations to pursue viable claims that were in the best
interests of the corporations, including recovering the millions of dollars of funds
wrongfully transferred to Crop USA, by taking action against Crop USA, R. John Taylor
and other people such as James Beck, Connie Taylor and Michael Cashman. Instead, the
attorneys of Hawley Troxell defended the responsible parties. On one occasion, Reed
Taylor moved to amend his complaint by adding Michael Cashman as a defendant. Even
though Hawley Troxell was required to represent the interests of the corporations,
Hawley Troxell successfully and inappropriately argued to the Court that Mr. Cashman
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should not be named when in fact they knew it was in the best interests of the
corporations to name him. Attached as Exhibit 30 is the Response drafted and filed by
Hawley Troxell in which several inappropriate arguments were asserted that were not in
the best interests of the corporations. It is significant that Reed Taylor's proposed Fifth
Amended Complaint (See Ex. 15) had allegations of fraud, conspiracy, fraudulent
conveyance and other claims against Mr. Cashman. As former counsel for AIA Services
and AIA Insurance (who owed a duty ofloyalty to the corporations), Michael McNichols
and Clements, Brown & McNichols joined in Hawley Troxell's Opposition and to
naming Michael Cashman as a defendant, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 31.
Neither Hawley Troxell nor Clements, Brown & McNichols appeared in the action on
behalf of Mr. Cashman.
54.

It is significant to note that Richard Riley is also a partner of Hawley

Troxell and Richard Riley negotiated the terms of the redemption of Reed Taylor's
shares. In fact, Richard Riley, through his old firm, represented AIA Services and AJA
Insurance in connection with the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. Richard Riley
attended board meetings for AIA Services after the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares
(including board meeting specifically discussing defaults of AJA Services' obligations to
Reed Taylor). Richard Riley is the person to whom notices are required to me sent
pursuant to the terms of the various agreements associated with the redemption of Reed
Taylor's shares in AIA Services (see Ex. 4 above).
55.

Also, Richard Riley provided an opinion letter to Reed Taylor through his

former law firm (which such opinion letter specifically referenced Richard Riley's name
as the person with knowledge) (see Ex. 2 above). Richard Riley was fully aware of the
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Amended Articles of Incorporation for AIA Services under which AIA Services and its
subsidiaries were prohibited from guaranteeing loans for other entities, other than nonwholly owned subsidiaries, as these protections were all enacted during the transactions
in connection with the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares and for the protection of
Donna Taylor.
56.

Richard Riley was fully aware that Reed Taylor had a security interest in

the commissions and related proceeds of AIA Services and AIA Insurance and that the
shares of AIA Insurance were pledged to Reed Taylor. Mr. Riley assisted Crop USA,
without obtaining a written document indicating that Reed Taylor and/or Donna Taylor
approved such transactions and/or representation. Finally, Richard Riley continued to
represent AIA Services, AIA Insurance and Crop USA prior to, and after, Reed Taylor
commenced suit in this action with full knowledge that no written documents existed
through which Reed Taylor authorized any actions taken by his firm or the corporations.
57.

Because of Richard Riley's opinion letter provided to Reed Taylor by his

old firm (the letter specifically references Richard Riley), Richard Riley is a witness in
this action as well. In other words, Richard Riley is a witness against his clients and has
diverging interests against his clients.

On one hand, Richard Riley could provide

testimony that his opinion letter was correct. In this example, he would be testifying
against his clients AJA Services and AIA Insurance because Hawley Troxell is now
arguing that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares should be ruled illegal some 13 years
after the fact. This would also result in Reed Taylor having claims accruing against
Richard Riley, which creates another conflict of interest. On the other hand, Richard
Riley could testify that his opinion letter was wrong. In this example, Mr. Riley is still
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testifying against his client AIA Services and the corporate officers because AIA Services
executed a separate document over 1 month after Reed Taylor sold his shares in which it
agreed to indemnify him, hold him harmless and was a release of all known and unknown
claims, all causes of action, etc. See Hearing, Ex. AC.
58.

Richard Riley and Hawley Troxell have represented Crop USA, AIA

Services, and/or AIA Insurance in various transactions. Several of Reed Taylor's claims
are based upon assets and funds being diverted from AIA Services and AIA Insurance to
Crop USA. Richard Riley and Hawley Troxell have intimate details of such transactions.
59.

An example is the Lewis-Clark Plaza Mortgage that AIA Services

obtained in 2007 from a settlement that has a value of approximately $1.2 Million and is
literally AIA Services' only significant asset other than AIA Insurance. Hawley Troxell
was aware of AJA Services and AIA Insurance's involvement in the litigation with the
state of Idaho, a copy of the settlement and various related documents are attached as

Exhibit 32. This litigation was funded with commissions and receivables in which Reed
Taylor had a perfected security interest and AIA Insurance's promise to repay funds
advanced by others.

Instead of having the mortgage transferred to AIA Insurance,

Hawley Troxell assisted in having the mortgage only transferred to AIA Services. The
effect of this transaction was to keep the Lewis-Clark Mortgage out of AIA Insurance so
that if Reed Taylor took control, the $1.2 Million Mortgage would not be an asset of AIA
Insurance. Reed Taylor first learned of the $1.2 Million Mortgage at John Taylor's first
deposition in late August, 2007.
60.

Shortly after receiving the $1.2 Million Mortgage (again that should have

been an asset of AJA Insurance or at least partly owned by AIA Insurance), Hawley
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Troxell assisted in pledging the $1.2 Million Mortgage to Crop USA for an alleged
$500,000 loan to pay attorneys' fees.

Presumably, this transaction accomplished 3

important things: (1) it ensured that Hawley Troxell would be paid for its services in this
action; (2) it made the $1.2 Million unavailable for Reed Taylor to obtain or seize; and
(3) the alleged loan assisted in Crop USA's defense because AIA Services and AIA
Insurance were paying all of the attorneys fees and costs in this action. Of course, the
loan also enabled Crop USA to be able to demand payment anytime and seize the $1.2
Million Mortgage for less than its real value. The loan called for interest to accrue at
15% interest. At his later deposition, John Taylor testified that Richard Riley assisted in
drafting the loan documents pledging the $1.2 Million Mortgage and that AIA Services
did not retain independent counsel. Again, the purported loan documents are attached as
Exhibit 32 and one document indicates that it should be returned to Patrick Collins of
Hawley Troxell.
61.

Neither Reed Taylor nor I had knowledge that AIA Services had pledged

the $1.2 Million Mortgage to Crop USA to allegedly pay attorneys' fees.

Since

ascertaining that AIA Services had obtained the $1.2 Million Mortgage, I was concerned
that the asset would be improperly pledged (as what happened) or that the asset might be
liquidated for pennies on the dollar. Finally, I was able to find some case law authority
that authorized a preliminary injunction for the court to seize and/or protect assets in light
of insolvency. As AIA Services' value had dropped steadily over the years and millions
of dollars utilized for the founding and development of Crop USA, AIA Services was
clearly insolvent based upon Reed Taylor's $8.S Million debt. On November 29, 2007,
we filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction with the Court requesting that the $1.2
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Million Mortgage be protected and that AIA Insurance's commission be held by the
Court. At the hearing, Hawley Troxell and its attomey(s) argued that the motion should
be denied. At the same hearing none of the attorneys for any of the defendants advised
the Court that the $1.2 Million Mortgage had already been pledged to Crop USA. I
believed that the omission of this fact demonstrated a lack of candor to the Court. The
Court denied Reed Taylor's motion.
62.

It is significant to note that the documents pertaining to the $1.2 Million

Mortgage and AIA Services' pledge of the asset to Crop USA with the assistance of
Hawley Troxell were not provided to Reed Taylor until April 17, 2008, despite Reed
Taylor's discovery requests pertaining to all loans.
63.

I had many conversations with opposing counsel regarding AJA

Insurance's inappropriate guarantee of Crop USA's $15 Million line-of-credit. This loan
significantly impaired the value of AIA Insurance as there was no possible way the loan
could be repaid by AJA Insurance upon a default. It should be noted that I have reviewed
the lending documents and I believe that Crop USA is in technical default of various
provisions, although we have not been provided information on whether such defaults
have been declared by the lender. On December 18, 2007, I sent Gary Babbitt and other
counsel a letter stating that AJA Insurance's loan guarantee was not rescinded, Reed
Taylor would take action. It should be noted that this is not the first time that this issue
was addressed and no action was taken. A copy of my letter and Gary Babbitt's email
response is attached as Exhibit 33. In his response email dated December 18, 2007, to
my letter, Gary Babbitt stated that if Reed Taylor took action to rescind the loan
guarantee, he would be sued for tortious interference. Although I could not believe Mr.
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Babbitt's position, I was not surprised because Hawley Troxell had provided an
inappropriate opinion letter for the loan. Nevertheless, we did not take action because of
Gary Babbitt's email threat. Since Gary Babbitt's email, the balance due on the loan
increased by over $5.2 Million since December 14, 2007. As of May 31, 2008, the
balance owed on the line-of-credit was over $10.5 Million. Obviously, Hawley Troxell
also has a conflict of interest because they have a risk of being sued by Crop USA's
lender based upon their opinion letter. As of the date of this Affidavit, Hawley Troxell
provided documents indicating that Crop USA may be selling most of its assets to
eliminate the debt guaranteed by AIA Insurance, Inc.
64.

In response to Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor's demand letter on the

boards of AIA Services and AIA Insurance, Hawley Troxell retained counsel. Attached
as Exhibit 34 is a copy of the response letter from Hawley Troxell' s attorney dated July
31, 2008. This creates a new diverging interest between Hawley Troxell and its clients,
as Hawley Troxell and their attorneys have no~ retained counsel to defend themselves.
Hawley Troxell has also moved the Court for a stay of the proceedings for 90 days for the
corporations to conduct an independent investigation into the claims asserted in Mr.
Bissell's letter (Exhibit 16 above). This action is yet another example of Hawley Troxell
not proceeding in the best interests of the corporations.
65.

As discussed in this Affidavit, Hawley Troxell also issued an opinion

letter stating that AIA Insurance was authorized to guarantee the $15 Million line-ofcredit for Crop USA. As discussed above, this opinion letter alone creates conflicts of
interest sufficient to warrant their withdrawal, not to mention creating diverging interests
because of possible claims from Reed Taylor, AJA Insurance and/or Crop USA's lender.
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A copy of Hawley Troxell's opinion letter is attached as Exhibit 35. I have seen several
emails that have been produced that indicate Patrick Collins of Hawley Troxell was
involved in the opinion letter to Crop USA's lenders.
There Has Been No Intentional Delay In Seeking Disqualification of the Attorneys
66.

Reed Taylor has not delayed taking action to disqualify attorneys in this

action. As discussed above, we immediately moved to disqualify Michael McNichols
and Clements Brown & McNichols. The Court denied our request and stated that the
issue was simply a complaint for the Idaho Bar. As a result, Reed did not move for
further disqualifications based upon the Court's ruling.
67.

It was not until Jonathan Halley and Clark and Feeney filed the most

recent motion for summary judgment against their client Reed Taylor that I decided to
contact the Idaho Bar. Although I did not provide names, I provided some essential facts
in this action. The representative I spoke with at the Idaho Bar confirmed to me that
disqualification was an issue for the Court to rule on and that the Idaho Bar would handle
any corresponding bar complaints. My call to the Idaho Bar was based upon two primary
concerns. First, I saw that my client was being prejudiced by the conduct of opposing
counsel. Second, I was concerned that I could be violating Rules of Professional Conduct
by not filing bar complaints against the responsible attorneys.

The Idaho Bar

representative advised me that no attorney had ever been reprimanded in Idaho for not
filing a complaint against another attorney and that is was not mandatory for me to do so.
As a result of my recent conversations with the Idaho Bar, Reed Taylor elected to pursue
disqualifying certain attorneys in this action.

Ill
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68.

At the recent hearing on Jonathan Halley and Clark and Feeney's Motion

to Withdraw, Gary Babbitt and Hawley Troxell argued that Reed Taylor's request for
counsel to withdraw and demand letter to the boards of AIA Services and AIA Insurance
were based upon litigation strategy. This is false. Recd Taylor is taking action to stop
the inappropriate activities and save what little money and assets are left. I have advised
most opposing counsel on many occasions about various conflicts of interest that I do not
even recall the number of times. Even though I constantly advised the attorneys in this
action of the conflicts and possible legal ramifications, the corporations were operated
and defended for the benefit of interested defendants, rather than for the benefit of the
corporations.
69.

Since my conversation with the Idaho Bar, I again reiterated the conflicts

of interest and requested that the conflicting attorneys withdraw from this action. My
goal was to represent my client by getting conflicted attorneys to amicably withdraw
from this action to prevent Reed Taylor from incurring unnecessary attorneys' fees,
expert witness fees and costs to ensure fair litigation by eliminating obvious conflicts of
interest. Although I am of the mindset that attorneys have difficult jobs and that I would
never personally want to sue another attorney because of the difficultness of our jobs, I
cannot disagree with Reed Taylor's belief of what has transpired nor can I disagree with
the claims that he has asserted against the attorneys in his complaints.
70.

In connection with Reed Taylor's request for disqualification of the

attorneys, he is also requesting a continuance in the trial date to allow me and opposing
counsel additional time to prepare for this case. I believe that truly independent counsel
would also likely produce certain documents that I believe have been withheld.
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Some Perceived Ramifications of the Conflicts of Interest

71.

AIA Insurance should have been represented by independent counsel and

such counsel should not have taken directions or instructions from any interested
defendants. AIA Insurance is pledged to Reed Taylor. AIA Insurance's attorney-client
privilege remains with the corporation. Because AIA Services failed to pay Reed Taylor
in full on August 1, 2005, it follows that he is the only person to authorize any
representation of AIA Insurance. When Reed Taylor obtains operational control of AIA
Insurance, he will be in control of all attorney-client privilege and corresponding files.
He would be able to talk with Michael McNichols, Gary Babbitt, John Ashby, Richard
Riley, James Gatziolis and others on what information they know and what transpired
during their representation of AIA Insurance. This issue alone warrants separate counsel
representing AIA Insurance, and most importantly, the desires of the only person
authorized to vote the shares.
72.

By representing AIA Insurance, AIA Services, Crop USA, and/or

interested directors, it is impossible for Clements Brown & McNichols and Hawley
Troxell to keep attorney-client privilege separate and
party or entity.

di~tinct

as it may apply to each

Thus, when Recd Taylor obtains operational control of AJA Insurance,

he will be entitled to know everything each of the attorneys has learned through the joint
representation.
73.

During relevant times, Crop USA was founded and operated using AIA

Services and AIA Insurance's funds, assets; office space, employees, trade secrets and the
like. AIA Services and AIA Insurance should be asserting claims against Crop USA to
recover the $1.5 Million improper transfer from AIA Insurance and to recover all sums
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owed by Crop USA. Attached as Exhibit 36 are notes to financial statements of AIA
Insurance and Crop USA describing the inappropriate transfer of $1.5 Million to Crop
USA (the transfer was cloaked as AJA Insurance's re-purchase of stock in AIA Services,
its parent). AIA Services and AIA Insurance should also be asserting claims against the
individual defendants to recover funds, damages and their shares in Crop USA. Instead,
the defendants have inappropriately entered into a Joint Defense Agreement.
74.

From my knowledge of this case, no conflicts purportedly waived should

be valid involving the dual/multiple representation because informed consent could only
have been given by disinterested parties represented by independent counsel based upon
the significant claims in this action.

Similarly, the Joint Defense Agreement would

require the same disinterested approval and independent counsel approval.

I have

repeatedly advised opposing counsel of these issues.
75.

Discovery in this case has proceeded in the worst manner of any case that

I have ever been involved. Significant documents have not been produced by Hawley
Troxell that were obtained from other sources. Significant documents are believed to
exist, but have not been produced.

With the various conflicts associated with the

attorneys Reed Taylor is seeking to disqualify, it is imperative that truly independent
counsel be retained by each corporation to ensure all responsive documents are produced.
The perception of fair play was eliminated early in the action when it became apparent
that the attorneys and law firms had diverging interests with their own clients.
76.

Another conflict involves a recent settlement offer in this litigation

conveyed by James Gatziolis and Quarles & Brady on behalf of all of the defendants.
Although the specific terms of the settlement offer are inadmissible and irrelevant, the
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first sentence of the settlement offer attached as Exhibit 37 included the specific
language " ... Reed Taylor and AIA Insurance would sign general unconditional releases
for each and every defendant, and each of defendant's counsel and in consideration
therefore would be provided the following ... " Exhibit 37 was provided to me by email
from James Gatziolis and Quarles & Brady via email on June 13, 2008. Not only did the
proposed settlement offer contain release language for attorneys in the first sentence, but
the offer also contained the substantially same language in Paragraph 3 of the offer:
" ... and AIA Insurance would deliver releases to all defendants and defendants' counsel."
Other opposing counsel instructed me to only deal with James Gatziolis on the offer. Just
the fact that the above quoted sentence was in the settlement offer is evidence of a
diverging conflict of interest between the defendants and their attorneys. An interesting
aspect to consider is what would have transpired if Reed Taylor had accepted all of the
settlement terms except for the unconditional release of the defendants' counsel.
77.

All of the defense attorneys have a vested interest in assisting AIA

Services and AIA Insurance to avoid complying with their contractual obligations to
Reed Taylor and associated indebtedness as a means eliminating liability for their
respective law firms. The conflicts also pose a problem for the appearance of fairness
because the law firms have control over the documents produced by the corporation (i.e.,
Hawley Troxell has a vested interest in not producing other opinion letters because such
letters could result in further claims and/or damages being asserted against it).
78.

When I refer to AIA Insurance as being represented by an attorney or law

firm, I am only doing so for purposes of this Affidavit. I believe that Reed Taylor never
authorized Clements Brown & McNichols, Hawley Troxell or Quarles & Brady to
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represent AIA Insurance for the opinion letters to Crop USA' s lender or to represent AIA
Insurance in this action. Since all attorneys involved knew the Reed Taylor's $6 M Note
was due in full on August 1, 2005, and that the $6 M Note had not been paid, they should
have sought written authorization from Reed Taylor to represent AIA Insurance or at the
very least ensured that separate and independent legal counsel was representing AIA
Insurance.
79.

I have also seen a portion of an opinion letter issued by Hawley Troxell to

AIA Insurance's auditors, which indicates that the auditors were seeking legal opinions
on various issues.

I believe that there are other opinion letters that have not been

produced that may further implicate conflicts of interest for Hawley Troxell, particularly
in regards to the $1.5 Million inappropriate transfer made from AJA Insurance to Crop
USA that was cloaked as a stock purchase. So long as Hawley Troxell is counsel for the
defendants, I do not believe that we will ever see any further opinion letters produced
from them.
Lawsuits Against Attorneys and Law Firms

80.

Reed Taylor retained Michael S. Bissell to file suit against the attorneys

and law finns that he believes has damaged him as there are insufficient assets to pay the
over $9,000,000 now owed to him (including interest and attorneys' fees and costs). On
August 18, 2008, Reed Taylor filed suit against the attorneys and law firm of Hawley
Troxell, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 38. On August 18, 2008, Recd Taylor
filed a lawsuit against the attorneys and law firm of Clements, Brown & McNichols, a
copy of which is attached as Exhibit 39. Reed Taylor has also retained Mr. Bissell's firm
to file suits against Clark and Feeney and Quarles & Brady. I understand that those
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lawsuits are forthcoming; however, I have removed myself from any representation in
those suits because of my position as a witness.
81.

Prior to Reed Taylor filing of the above-referenced lawsuits against the

attorneys, I advised opposing counsel on many occasions that the lawsuits would be
forthcoming if decisive and proper action was not taken or the disputes resolved prior to
litigation. No attorneys contacted me or otherwise made any effort to resolve the issues
to prevent the lawsuits from being filed. Reed Taylor filed the suits to pursue and protect
his interests and recover damages.
82.

Based upon the above and the present state of this case (including the

significant discovery still to be had in this case), Reed requests a continuance to the trial
date. Without additional time, it is impossible for me and Reed's other attorneys to fully
and fairly prepare in time for the presently scheduled trial dates. For example, despite the
Court's order for the defendants to produce electronic files, the only electronic files that
have been produced were through the emails that were previously produced. Based upon
Jo Lee Duclos' deposition testimony and the documents already in Reed's possession, it is
important for all electronic files to be produced, including Word files, Excel files, pdf
files and all other electronic files. As I stated, no electronic files have been produced
other than files attached to emails.
83.

I conducted a discovery conference with Mike McNichols regarding R.

John Taylor's tax returns and financial statements. Mike McNichols advised me that the
documents would not be produced. This information is·crucial for Reed and his attorneys
to trace the assets and funds that we believe have been misappropriated to Reed's
detriment.
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84.

Attached as Exhibit 40 is a copy of the bank statement where AIA

Services has been paying the funds it stopped paying to Reed.
85.

Attached as Exhibit 41 is a copy of the Joint Meeting of the boards of

AIA Services and AIA Insurance ..
86.

Attached as Exhibit 42 are pertinent pages of the transcript of the

deposition of R. John Taylor. These transcripts show that R. John Taylor has been
directing the litigation in this action.
87.

Attached as Exhibit 43 are pertinent pages of Reed's Third Discovery

Requests to R. John Taylor, which were served on October 19, 2007.
DATED: This 281h day of August, 2008.

Roderick
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28t11 day o August, 2008.

l\•L• • ·~( ,, ;'.JfjdC
STAft l)F iUAHO

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at: Lat 1izdo~ ~
My commission expires:
~

</
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David R. Risley, ISB No. 1789
RANDALL, BLAKE & COX, PLLC
P.O. Box446
1106 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1234
(208) 743-1266 (Fax)
Attorneys for Connie Taylor, James Beck and
Corrine Beck

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

vs.

)

~

)
)

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
-, corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and
CORRINE BECK, individually and the
community property comprised thereof,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-07-00208
CONNIE TAYLOR'S AND JIM BECK'S
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SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY nJDGMENT
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AJA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho )
corporation; and AIA INSURANCE, INC., an )
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)
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)

l
)
)
)
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Connie Taylor and Jim Beck submit this supplementaJ memorandum in support of their
motion for partial swnmary judgment. This memorandum supersedes and replaces the
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment filed by Connie Taylor's and Jim Beck's prior
counsel. The facts have been supplemented but not changed in any material way; and the legal
analysis has been sharpened over the course of the intervening months.

I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor was the founder and, in 1995, the Chairman of the Board of
Directors, the Chief Executive Officer and the majority shareholder of AIA Services
Corporation, holding approximately 63% of AIA Services' common stock. With the failure of
the Company's insurance underwriting business conduc~ through its subsidiary, The Universe
•

Life Insurance Company ("ULIC"), AlA Services had incurred substantial operating losses
during 1994 and continued to suffer substantial losses in 1995. The company's profitable
insurance agency, AIA Insurance, Inc., was trapped as a subsidiary ofULIC and could be lost to
the company in insurance insolvency proceedings, in which ULIC's assets would be liquidated
and distributed to the insurance policyholders. Draft audited consolidated financial statements
for the 1994 year end reported that AIA Services had experienced a huge net loss of
($4,867,962), swallowing up all prior year retained earnings and leaving the corporation with
negative retained earnings (deficit) of ($919,700) and stockholders deficit exceeding ($852,000).
As such, Reed Taylor must have understood the business and financial condition of AJA
Services in mid-1995 and that the AJA companies were in deep fmancial trouble:
1995 would not turn out any better. By the end of 1995, the retained earnings (deficit)
reported in the audited :financial statements had ballooned to more than ($18,000,000), primarily
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because the company lost over $10,000,000 in 1995. It was readily apparent in mid-1995 that
AJA Services desperately needed additional capital and a new business model in order tp
survive.

Reed Taylor, however, saw an opportunity to bail out. As the controlling shareholder of

AJA Services Corporation, he possessed and exercised the raw voting power to protect himself to
the expens~ of the minority shareholders. He used that power to award himself a golden
parachute, i.e., a stock redemption agreement with the corporation he controlled, providing for
the redemption of his AJA Services common stock for $7.S million plus other consideration
(including debt forgiveness, transfer of title to airplanes and other payments to or on behalf of

e

Reed), aggregating over $9 million. In connection with the Stock Redemption Agreement, Reed
Taylor walked away in 1995 with over $1.7 million of airplanes, debt forgiveness and other
payment. See Affidavit of Aimee Gordon, filed concurrently herewith ("Gordon Aff."), Exh W.
Reed thus appropriated nearly $2,000,000 in 1995 just for signing over the stock of a corporation
that was sliding into deep financial problems. Further, he had the prospect of receiving an
additional $7.5 million plus interest. At this point, the Court is urged to look at Exhibit W to the
affidavit of Aimee Gordon, supra filed concurrently herewith. This exhibit graphically shows the
leeching of the corporation's life blood by Reed, especially in the years 1995 to 2000.
But the agreement gave Reed Taylor far more than just money: The practical effect Qf
this agreement was to jump Reed Taylor ahead of all of the similarly situated common
shareholders of AJA Services Corporation, giving him a purported preference to the company's
earnings and to its assets ~pon liquidation. If AJA Services survived and prospered, Reed Taylor
would receive his $7.5 million, the other consideration, and interest. If (as is the case) AIA
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Services continued its financial difficulties. Reed Taylor would have escaped with cash in hand
and would be the first in line to appropriate whatever value remained in the corporation before
any other shareholder got a dime. He would also be able to drain off corporate funds for as long

as the corporation could pay him anything.
Reed put himself in a great spot, purporting to change his position from a common
shareholder with the sam~ rights as all other common shareholders to a secured creditor with
priority rights to assets of AIA Services Corporation and its subsidiaries.
The other practical effect of the agreement to redeem Reed Taylor's stock was that AIA
Services, an already cash-strapped company with negative shareholder equity, was even deeper

e

UI;lder water: AIA Services was then faced with the burden of an additional $7.5 million
obligation which the corporation could not then pay, and never has been able to pay. Not
surprisingly given the known financial condition of the company, within a few short months
Reed declared that AIA Services was in default. The parties restructured the obligation in 1996;
and shortly thereafter, Reed again declared AIA Services to be in default.
Fast-forwarding to the present, it turns out that Reed Taylor did extremely well for
himself. While AJA .Services has struggled to survive, the company has paid Reed Taylor more
than $9 million in cash and other property. Reed Taylor, however, is still not satisfied. Through
this legal action, he is attempting to enforce his purported right to foreclose on the AIA
Insurance, Inc. stock pledged as collateral for the redemption obligation, leaving the other
common shareholders with nothing for their investment in AIA Services.
Statutory restrictions on redemption of corporate stock extant in 1995 and 1996 were
intende'd to protect not only creditors but also minority shareholders from the fate now befalling
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the AIA Services minority shareholders. Idaho Code§ 30-1-6 of the Idaho Business Corporation
Act strictly prohibited stock redemption in the absence of sufficient earned surplus to pay for the
redemption. The statutory restrictions were intended to protect minority shareholders from being
left with nothing while a controlling majority shareholder appropriates the equity of the
corporation.
Reed Taylor made a sweet deal for himself, but it was very damaging to the corporation
and the minority shareholders. This is precisely what Idaho Code§ 30-1-6, as in effect in 1995,
was intended to prevent. That code section ·bars payments to shareholders unless the corporation
is fiscally sound. This rule protects minority shareholders and creditors from the unlimited
exercise of power by the majority shareholder. The intended beneficiaries of such restrictions are
creditors and minority shareholders, who cannot protect themselves from majority shareholders
like Reed.
In the face of audited financial statements prepared on his watch, while he was the Board
Chairman, CEO and controlling shareholder, Reed Taylor cannot possibly argue that AIA
Services Corporation had any earned surplus to legally buy his shares. He implicitly recognizes
the illegality of the redemption agreement by attempting to deflect attention from the issue with
his argument that my clients lack "standing" to raise it.
However, my clients are in this case as defendants, so "standingtl is hardly the right
terminology. Further, as directors with fiduciary duties to the corporation's shareholders, my
clients must be able to contest perfonnance of an illegal contract that violates Idaho _law; and by
statute they could incur personal liability for payments made pursuant to this illegal contract with
Reed.
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Under the authorities cited below, the Court can even raise the issue of illegality sua

sponte in order to protect the integrity of the laws passed by the legislature. Simply put, all
parties, and even the Court, have the right to raise this defense.
The agreement to redeem Reed Taylor's stock was illegal because AIA Services did not
have any earned surplus with which to redeem Reed Taylor's stock. Under Idaho law, a party
cannot enforce an illegal contract. Instead, the illegal contract is void and unenforceable. The
Court should enter a summary judgment ruling that the agreement to redeem Reed Taylor's
common stock was illegal, void and unenforceable.
IL FACTUALBACKGROUND

•

A.

Reed Taylor Was The Founder And Controlling Shareholder Of AIA Services

AIA Insurance, Inc. ("AIA Insurance") is an insurance agency based out of Lewiston,
Idaho. AIA Insurance sells health, life and other insurance products to farmers and members of
various agricultural growers associations. In 1995, AIA Insurance was a wholly-owned
subsidiary ofULIC. Since 1995, AJA Insurance has been and currently is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of AJA Services Corporation ("AIA Services").
Reed Taylor was the founder of AIA Services. While there were many shareholders approximately 27 as of 1995 -Reed Taylor was, by far, the majority shareholder. See Affidavit
of JoLee Duclos, filed concurrently herewith ("Duclos Aft''),,, 3-4. Until mid-1995, he held
613 ,494 of approximately 973 ,000 issued and outstanding shares -:- 63% of the common stock of
AIA Services. Id. at ~1 3-4; Exh. A.
As the owner of over half of the voting stock of AIA Services, Reed Taylor controlled the

company. Not only was Reed Taylor the majority shareholder, but he was the Chairman of the
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Board of Directors and the Chief Executive Officer of AIA Services Corporation. Id Thus,
Reed Taylor called the shots at AIA Services. By virtue of his majority control- not to mention
his position as CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors - Reed Taylor had the power to
accept or reject any proposal submitted for shareholder vote.
B.

Decline of AIA

In 1994, insurance regulators, including the Idaho and Texas departments of insurance,
raised issues concerning the adequacy ofULIC's capital and surplus and the propriety of the
reserving methods used for ULIC's principal insurance product, a group health insurance policy
sold through AJA Insurance, Inc. to members of sponsoring agricultural growers associations.
Regulatory constraints impaired ULIC's ability to dividend the earnings of ULIC's subsidiary,
•

AIA Insurance, Inc., to AJA Services to enable the parent company to service its indebtedness to
First Interstate Bank, to redeem Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred Stock and to pay operating
expenses. See Duclos Aff., Exh. C at AIA0025263. To resolve regulatory concerns, ULIC had
previously transferred a substantial part of its group universal health insurance policy liabilities
and related reserve assets to the Centennial Life Insurance Company in October 1994, with the
balance of the book of business and related assets to be transferred to Centennial in 1995. Id. at
Exh. I (June 1, 1995 Confidential Private Placement Memorandum at AIA0028042). Also, the
existence of the Series A Preferred Stock was impairing AIA Services' ability to arrange its debt
financing. Id at Exh. A at AIA0025226.
Draft audited consolidated financial statements for the 1994 year end reported that AIA
Services had experienced a huge net loss of ($4,867,962), swallowing up all prior year retained
earnings and leaving the corporation with negative retained earnings (deficit) of ($919,700) and
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stockholders deficit exceeding ($852,000). Duclos Aff., Ex J at AIA0028169. It was readily
apparent that the AIA companies were in financial trouble and faced daunting business
challenges. AIA Services desperately needed additional capital and a new business model in
· order to survive. If Reed stayed in, he would have to deal with these problems. If he could bail
out, golden parachute in place, he could save himself.
C.

AJA Shareholders Approved Redemption of Some of Reed Taylor,s Shares, But
That Transaction Did Not Ever Occur

In January 1995, the AIA Services Board of Directors approved a corporate resolution

authorizing a private placement (the "Kinnard Private Placement") of Series B Preferred Stock
and Series C Preferred Stock and Warrants. A January 12, 1995 Board Resolution stated the

•

purposes of the Kinnard Private Placement: to raise the capital necessary to restructure AIA
Services and to redeem part or all of the approximately $1.9 million of Stated Value Series A
Preferred Stock held by Donna Taylor at the time (that stock having been issued to her in
connection with her divorce from Reed Taylor in 1988). As the Chairman of the Board of AIA
Services, Reed Taylor actively participated in the consideration and approval of this Board
resolution and the other resolutions discussed below. Duclos Aff., Exh. A (AIA0025224-228).
In February 1995, AIA Services noticed a special meeting of shareholders to be held on
March 7, 1995 to consider (1) amendment of the AIA Services Articles oflncorporation to
authorize 735,000 shares of Series B 10% Preferred Stock and 150,000 shares of Series C 10%
Preferred Stock; (2) the merger'ofR J Holding Corp. with and into AIA Services; (3) issuance of
the newly aut..1iorized Series B and Series C Preferred Stock and related Series B and Series C
Warrants pursuant to the Kinnard Private Placement; (4) exercise of an option to purchase

•

500,000 of Reed Taylor's 613,494 shares of AIA ·services Common Stock for $7.5 million (a
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$1.5 million down payment would be paid with the proceeds of the sale of the Series C Preferred
Stock and Warrants, and Reed Taylor would be issued a $6 million promissory note); (5)
application of a portion of the proceeds of the sale of the Series B Preferred Stock to the partial
or complete redemption of Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred Stock; and (6) contribution of at
least $4.2 million of the proceeds of the Series B Preferred Stock and Warrants to ULIC, to
provid~

ULIC sufficient capital and surplus to enable it to distribute to AIA Services the stock of

ULIC's wholly-owned subsidiary, AIA Insurance, Inc .. Duclos Aff., Exh. B (AIA0025254-255)
The Disclosure Statement accompanying the notice of shareholder meeting included draft
1991, 1992 and 1993 audited financial statements and September 30, 1993 and 1994 unaudited
fmancial statements of AIA Services Corporation. See Duclos Aff., Exh. C (AIA0025259•

25349). The audited 1993 financial statements disclosed retained earnings of$3,948,262. Id at
AIA0025308. The most recent financial information provided to the shareholders was contained
in the unaudited September 30, 1994 financial statements, which reported that AIA Services had
$3,156,044 in retained earnings at the time.I Id at AIA0025345.
The AIA Services shareh~lders approved the above-described transactions at the March
7, 1995 special meeting of shareholders, thus approving the redemption of 500,000 of Reed
Taylor's shares. Duclos Aff., Exh. D (AIA0025252-53). This result, however, was a foregone

1 This figure substantially overstated the company's retained earnings as compared to the
subsequently issued audited year-end financial statements. Gordon AfI., Exh. D. The 1994
audited consolidated financial statements, which were not available until after the
shareholder meeting in March 1995, reported a retained earnings (deficit) in the amount of
($919,700) at December 31, 1994. Id The shareholders' approval of the redemption
transaction with Reed, in the form proposed in the proxy statement, was tainted since it was
based on overstated retained earnings figures.
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conclusion given that Reed Taylor voted his shares in favor of the transaction. As .the holder of
well over half of the voting shares, the decision to redeem Reed Taylor's shares was wholly
within Reed Taylor's control. Ifhe voted for the transaction, it would be approved. If he voted
against the transaction, it would not. Not all shareholders voted for the transaction.
Shareholders holding 6,688.09 shares·voted against the transaction and others abstained. Duclos
Aff., Exhs. E-F. Upon shareholder approval, the Board of Directors (including Reed Taylor)
approved resolutions implementing the actions approved by the shareholders earlier that day,
including the redemption ofa portion of Reed Taylor's shares of AJA Services common stock.
Duclos Aff., Exh. G (AIA0025230-25247).

e

The successful completion of the Kinnard Private Placement was integral to the approved
plan to redeem Reed Taylor's stock. For example, the minutes to the March 7, 1995 Board of
Directors meeting state: "Cumer Green [Donna Taylor's representative on the AJA Services
Board] questioned whether it was prudent to obligate the company for a $6 million note to Mr.
Taylor without the B share financing. He was advised by Mr. Spickler [inside general counsel
for A1A Services] that Form A approval would be required and should be a safeguard." Id at
AIA0025232. Thus, the Board (including Reed Taylor) understood that AJA Services would not
be able to pay for the'redemption of Reed Taylor's shares without a funding source.
D.

The AJA Services Board Later Approved The Redemption Of All Of Reed Taylor's
Shares Without A Shareholder Vote ·

The plan to redeem 500,000 of

R~d

Taylor's shares, although approved by the

shareholders, did not materialize because the Kinnard Private Placement did not raise any funds.
AfA Services noticed a special meeting of shareholders to be held on July 18, 1995 and, on July

10, 1995, sent a letter to its shareholders announcing that the company could not proceed with
CONNIE TAYLOR'S AND Jify.t: BECK'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 10
Taylor 001303
002079

the previously approved reorganization plan because the Kinnard Private Placement was not
successfully completed. Duclos Aff.• Exh. H (AIA0025490-92). The letter annoWlced a new
plan of reorganization, which included the redemption of all of Reed Taylor's Common Stock
for $7.5 million and certain other consideration. The letter sought shareholder approval of an
amendment to AIA Services• Articles oflncorporation to change the par value of the company's
stock from $1.QO to $.01 per share, to cancel all the previously authorized Series B Preferred
Stock and to increase the number of authorized shares of Series C Preferred Stock from 150,000
to 500,000 shares. The letter announced that AIA Services would continue to market the Series
C shares and related Warrants even after the closing of the sale of 150,000 shares of Series C
stock and that the proceeds from the sale of additional Series C shares would be used to retire
•

Donna Taylor,s Series A Preferred Stock, to retire bank debt and/or to fund the balance of the
redemption price due to Reed Taylor.
The July 10, 1995 letter was accompanied by a Confidential Private Placement
Memorandum dated June I, 1995 (''PPM") offering up to 500,000 shares of Series C Preferred
Stock for $10 per share. Duclos Aff., Exh. I (AIA0028015-072). The express purpose of the
PPM was to raise funds for a new plan of reorganizatioD.t whicli included the redemption of all of
Reed's common stock, not just the 500,000 share transaction previously approved by the
sharehol~ers.

Among the risk factors discussed in the PPM is the risk of needing additional

financing: ''Assuming that the Company sells the maximum number of Shares offered hereby,
the net proceeds from this private placement are expected to be sufficient to pemiit the Company
to meet regulatory capital requirements ... and redeem its Series A Preferred Stock.... If the
Company sells only the minimum number of shares [i.e., 150,000 shares], additional financing

CONNIE TAYLOR'S AND JIM BECK'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,. 11
Taylor.001304
002080

-------

-----

--·--------------------------

will be required to complete the proposed reorganization." Id. at AIA0028029. Further, "[n]o
assurance can be given that the Company will be able to obtain additional financing from any
source, on tenns favorable to the Company.,, Id In other words, in the absence of sale of the
maximwn number of offered shares or other financing, AJA Services would be unable to fund
the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares.
On July 12, 1995, AJA Services issued an Amended Notice of Special Meeting of AJA
Services Shareholders to occur on July 1Bt 1995, accompanied by a Disclosure Statement.
Duclos Aff., Exhs. M-N (AIA0025493-94; AIA0025497-504). The Amended Notice states that
changed circwnstances necessitated changes in the plan of reorganization and recapitalization
previously approved at the special meeting of shareholders in March 1995, and that certain
transactions now contemplated require shareholder approval. The Amended Notice does not
mention the redemption of Reed's common stock, much less request shareholder approval for
it.2 The Disclosure Statement similarly lacks any discussion of the redemption of Reed's
common stock. Finally, the proxy fonn delivered with the Amended Notice and Disclosure
Statement does not reference the redemption transaction with Reed.Taylor. See, e.g., Duclos
Aff., Exh. 0 (AIA0025484-85)! Accordingly, the AJA Services shareholders were not asked to

2 The June 27, 1995 Notice of Special Meeting of AIA Services Shareholders had given

•

previous notice of the July 18, 1995 shareholder vote, and that earlier notice did include a
request for a vote on the proposed redemption of all of Reed's common stock. See Duclos
Aff., Exh. L (AIA0025495-496). That notice, however, was superseded by the July 12, 1995
Amended Notice that did not seek a shareholder vote with regard to ~ny·redemption of Reed
Taylor's stock.
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approve, an~ did not approve, the tenns of the redemption of Reed Taylor's common stock at the
July 18th meeting.

On the same date as the July 18, 1995 shareholder vote, AIA Services held a Board of
Directors meeting. Duclos Aff.• Exh. P (AIA0025505-522). Among the resolutions approved by
the Board at this meeting was Resolution No. 2, which authorized the redemption ofReetPs
common stock for $7.5 million and other consideration. The resolution noted that certain terms
of the redemption were still being negotiated. Moreover, the resolution specifically recognized
that "the amount of the down payment for Mr. Taylor's Common Stock which [AIA Services]
may be able to afford will depend on the amount of proceeds from commercial loans and from
the sale of additional Series C Preferred Stock and attendant warrants. Id at AIA0025516. Reed

41

Taylor attended this Board meeting and in fact was re-appointed as Chairman of the Board and
CEO of AIA Services at the meeting. Id. at AIA0025506. As such, Reed Taylor was on notice
that AJA Services was unable to pay even the down payment for his stock in the absence of
additional equity and/or debt financing.
E.

The Stock Redemption Agreement
AIA Services and Reed Taylor entered into a Stock Redemption Agreement for the

redemption of all of Reed Taylor's common stock, effective July 22, 1995. See Duclos Aff.,
Exh. V. Under the Stock Redemption Agreement, AJA Services was obligated to pay $1.5

million to Reed Taylor at the time of closing. Id. at '2.1.2. Even before closing, however, it
became apparent that AJA could not pay the cash down payment required by the Stock
Redemption Agreement Accordingly, prior to closing, the parties entered into an Addendwn
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provirung for the issuance of the $1.5M down payment note payable 90 days after closing. See
Duclos Aff., Exh. W (RJT0000806-807).
The Stock Redemption Agreement also provided additional consideration to Reed in the
fonn of debt forgive11ess, transfer of title to airplanes and other payments to or on behalf of
Reed, aggregating over $2 million. See Affidavit of Aimee Gordon, Exh W.
The balance of the $7 .5 million redemption price was to be paid pursuant to a promissory
note dated August 1, 1995 and payable by AIA Services to Reed Taylor in the principal amount
of $6 million ("$6M Note"). Duclos Aff., Exb. V at RJT0000644-645. The Note provides for
monthly payment of interest only, with the principal and all accrued interest due August 1, 2005.

e

The golden parachute was in place. The fact that AIA Services could not afford such a
rich bail out plan did not deter Reed Taylor. If the offering of Serles C preferred stock
succeeded, he would be paid the balance of the bail out money. If it failed, he could take the
remaining assets of the corporation ahead of unsecured creditors and all common and preferred
shareholders.
F.

AJA Services Defaulted Almost Immediately

Internal unaudited consolidated financials reflect the continuing decline

of AIA Services

Corporation during 1995:

Quarter ending

March 31, 1995
June 30, 1995

1995 year-to-date net
income (loss)

Retained earnings
(deficit) at quarter
end

($758,274)

($1,677,974)

($2,365, 177)

($3,284,877)
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September 30, 1995

($13,630,317)

.($21,740,295)

See Report attached to Affidavit of Kenneth E. Hooper ("Hooper Report''); Gordon Aff., Exhs.
E,M.
AIA Services was unable to pay the $1.5 million down payment note to Reed Taylor
when it became due October 20, I 995. See Gordon Aff., Exh. D at AIA0027755-756 (Note 21 to
the 1994 audited financial statements). As early as November 1995, Reed Taylor began
asserting that AlA Services was in default. Duclos Aff., Exhs. Q-R (minutes of meetings of the
AJA Services Corporation Board of Directors on November 17, 1995 and December 14, 1995 at
AIA002553 l-25534, AIA0025536-37). By letters dated April 18, 1996, April 25, 1996 and June
4, 1996, Reed Taylor notified AJA Services that it was in default for, among other things, failing
to pay the $1.5 million down payment note when due on October 21,.1995 and failing to make
interest payments on the $6M Note. See Duclos Aff., Exhs. S-U (RJT0000590-591;
AIA0027786-789; AI0027779-780).

G.

The 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement
AIA Services' inability to satisfy even its initial $1.5 million down payment note

obligation under the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement resulted in negotiation and execution of
the July 1, 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement. See Duclos Aff., Exh. X. The 1996
Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement called for the $1.5 million down payment note to be
paid in full on October 31, 1996; and the $6M Note was payable interest only for ten years,
payable in full on July 1, 2005.
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H.

AIA Services Defaulted Again

At the time of the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement, AIA Services Corporation's
retained earnings (deficit) stood at ($17 ,03 7,673) even if it is assumed that the en.tire $1,722,454
of net income earned during 1996 was earned prior to the July 1,1996 date of the agreement.
Hooper Report Opinion 2

n 11 and 12.

·Once again, AIA Services was unable to pay the down payment note on October 31, 1996
as required by the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement. Al.A Services sporadically
made interest payments on the $6M Note, quickly falling behind on its obligations to Reed
Taylot, and was never able to make payments in confonnance with the 1996 Stock Redemption

e

Restructure Agreement. See Gordon A:tf., Exh. W. The $1.5 million obligation was not paid off
until June 2001 - six years after it was initially due. Gordon Aff., ~ 26.
I.

Total Payments to Reed Taylor

Notwithstanding the company's inability to pay cash to Reed Taylor on the notes,
following redemption of Reed's stock in 1995, AIA Services transferred property (airplanes),
forgave indebtedness to the company and made other payments in the aggregate amount of
$1,701,721. Gordon Aff., Exh. W. In connection with the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure
Agreement, Reed Taylor received additional compensation in the amount of $1,049,584. Id To
date, since entering into the Stock Redemption Agreement in 1995, Reed Taylor has received
payments of cash and other property from AJA Services totaling $9. 709 ,3 67, consisting of
$6,592,648 cash and $3,116,718 of airplanes, debt forgiveness and other payments made to or on
Reed Taylor's behalf. Id
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ill. ILLEGALITY STAND ARD

"Whether a contract is illegal is a question of law for the court to determine from all the ..
facts and circumstances of each case." Farrell v. Whiteman, 2009 WL 198516 (Idaho, January
22, 2009). "The illegality of a contract can be raised at any stage in litigation.,, Id. "In fact, the .

court bas the duty to raise the issue qf illegality sua sponte." Id. In fact, the legality of a contract

must be analyzed by a Court even if the issue is raised for the first time on appeal. Trees v.
Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6, 56 P.3d 765, 768 (2002).
IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Under Common Law, A Corporation Could Not Redeem Its Shares While Insolvent

Idaho Courts have long recogniied a common law rule prohibiting a corporation from

•

redeeming its shares when the corporation is insolvent, or when such a redemption would render
the corporation insolvent. See, e.g., La Voy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 127, 369 P.2d
45, 49 (1962) ("Idaho follows the rule that an insolvent corporation may not repurchase its

stock."). Moreover, Idaho Courts have long held that a contract to redeem a corporation's shares
that violates this common-law rule is void and wienforceable. See id.,· see also White v.
Lorimer's City Dye Works, 269 P. 90, 90 (Idaho 1928) ("A contract by a corporation to

repurchase its capital stock is not enforceable against the corporation while insolvent.''); Brown
v. T.B. Reed & Co., 174 P. 13 6, 13 8 (Idaho 1918) ("While there is a conflict in the authorities as

to the capacity of a corporation to purchase its own stock, the rule appears to be universal that
such a purchase is void if made while the corporation is insolvent./').
While recognizing the common-law rule that a corporation cannot redeem its stock under
circumstances that would render it insolvent, none of the early Idaho cases addressed statutory
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restrictions on stock redemption. That is because statutory restrictions on stock redemption were
not enacted until 1979 by Idaho Code § 30-1-6 and 30"'.1-46. Those statutes, while including a
solvency requirement similar to the common-law rule cited above, also restricted stock
redemption in the more technical terms of"eamed surplus" (Idaho Code§ 30-1-6) and "capital
surplus" (Idaho Code § 30-1-46). In the case of AIA Services Corporation, the restrictions under
Idaho Code§ 30-1-6 are pertinent.3
B.

The Statutes In Effect In 1995 And 1996 Imposed Restrictions On The Redemption
Of Stock

Fonner Idaho Code § 30-1-6 provided in relevant part4:

•

A corporation shall have the right to purchase ... or otherwise
acquire ... its own shares, but purchases of its own shares,
whether direct or indirect, shall be made only to the extent 9f
unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus available therefor ....
. • . . No purchase of Qr pannent for its own shares shall be made at
a time when the comoration is insolvent or when such 12urchase or
payment would make it insolvent.

3 The previously filed briefing focused on fonner Idaho Code § 30-1-46 rather than § 30-1-6.
While § 30-1-46 is applicable to shareholder distributions (including redemption of stock)
from capital surplus, all parties have since recognized that § 30-1-6 is the statute more
directly applicable to a stock redemption agreement. For the Court's convenience, a copy of
the relevant sections of the Idaho Code as of 1995 and 1996 is attached to this Memorandum
as Exhibit A.
4 In 1997, Idaho Code§§ 30-1-6 was superseded by Idaho Code§ 30-1-640, which did away
with the earned surplus restriction and adopted a solvency test. However, the statutes in
effect at the time of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and the 1996 Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement should be applied to this case. See In re Lake Country Investments,
255 B.R 588, 600 (Bkrtcy. D. Idaho 2000) (applying the savings provision in J.C.§ 30-11703 to determine that fonner Idaho Code § 30-1-6 applies to a 1996 stock redemption
agreement because it was executed prior to the July l, 1997 effective date ofI.C. § 30-1640).
.
.
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Id (emphasis added).

Thus, the Idaho statute at the time set forth two separate restrictions on AIA Services'
redemption of its common stock from Reed Taylor: (1) The statute prohibited redemption of
AIA's common stock from Reed Taylor except "to the extent of unreserved and unrestricted
earned surplus available therefor"; and (2) the statute also prohibited purchase or payment for
AIA's common stock "at a time when the corporation is insolvent5 or when such purchase or

payment would make it insolvent.'' Moreover, the statute specifically provided that the solvency
test restricts both the "purchase of or payment for" a corporation's own shares. (Emphasis
added.) Thus, a corporation was prohibited from entering into the transaction at a time in which
it either lacked sufficient "earned surplus" or was insolvent (or would be rendered insolvent by
•

the transaction) at the time of the transaction; and, in addition, the statute prohibited future
payment for the corporation's own shares "at a time when the corporation is insolvent or when
such ... payment would make it insolvent." Id.
"Earned surplus,. is defined as "the portion of the surplus of a corporation equal to the
balance of its net profits, income, gains and losses from the date of incorporation, or from the
latest date when a deficit was eliminated by an application ofits capital surplus or stated capital
or otherwise, after deducting subsequent distributions to shareholders and transfers to stated
capital and capital surplus to the extent such distributions and transfers are made out of earned

5 Section 30-1-102(n) defined "insolvent" as "inability of a corporation to pay its debts as they
become due in the usual course of its business."
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surplus." See I.C. § 30-1-2(1).6 In essence, earned surplus represents. the accumulated profits
and losses from inception of the corporation. From his reyiew of the financial statements of AIA
Services Corporation. CPA Kenneth Hooper has detennined that there have occurred no transfers
between the earned surplus account and either stated capital or capital surplus and that,
accordingly, the corporation's earned surplus (deficit) equals its retained earnings (deficit) as
reported in the corporation's financial statements. See Hooper Report, Opinion 1.
The definition of "earned surplus" was based on one fonnulated by the American

Institute of Accountants Committee on Terminology. See Seward, "Earned Surplus - Its
Meaning and Use in the Model Business Corporation Act", 38 Va. L. Rev. 435, 436 (1952)
(hereinafter "Seward"), citing Acc. Research Bull. No. 9, p.75 (Comm. Acc. Proc., Amer. Inst

8

Acc. 1941 ). The Idaho Business Corporation Act is based on the Model Business Corporation
Act ("MBCA"). Seward explains:
As used in the Model Act surplus has two components, capital
surplus and earned surplus. Capital surplus is the name for the
portion of capital which is in excess of what is defined as "stated
capitar'.
"Earned surplus,, is a concept entirely different from capital
surplus. It is the net cumulative balance of profits and losses. It
could be called "undivided profits" or "retained income,, or
accumulated earnings", or even·"accumulated losses."
Although capital surplus and earned surplus are both surplus in that
each is a portion of the excess value of the assets over the
aggregate of all debts and stated capital, yet, as is apparent from
the definitions, the two are entirely different in origin. Moreover,

6 "Stated capital" essentially means the capital received by the corporation upon issuance of
capital stock. Fonner Idaho Code§ 30-1M2(j). "Capital surplus" is defined as "the entire
surplus of a corporation other than its earned surplus." See former Idaho Code§ 30-1~2(m).

CONNIE TAYLOR'S AND JIM BECK'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 20
Taylor 001313
002089

the Model Act differentiates them still further as to their
availability for use in corporate affairs.
In keeping with this dis~nction, Idaho Code Section 30-1-6 provided that a corporation's stock

may be redeemed only out of unrestricted and unreserved earned surplus (i.e., the corporation's
accumulated net earnings), thereby preserving the corporation's capital surplus and stated
capital.
"Earned surplus", as defined in the Idaho Business Corporation Act and as used in Idaho
Code§ 30-1-6, is equivalent to "retained earnings" as determined under generally accepted
accounting principles. See Hooper Report Opinion 1, citing Accounting Terminology,
Accounting Terminology Bulletin No. 1 (1953), as published in 2 AICPA. APB Accounting
Principles 9503 (1973). In short, this bulletin links the older 0 earned surplus" concept embodied
in the MBCA scheme adopted by Idaho in 1979 and the modern "retained earnings 11 terminology
in connection with the balance sheet presentation of stockholders' equity.
Further, the Hooper Report Opinion I concludes that, in the case of AIA Services
Corporation: "Earned surplus of AIA Services Corporation as defined by Idaho Code was
equivalent to GAAP retained earnings of AIA Services Corporation at the time of the stock
redemption transactions." Accordingly, the existence of retained earnings (deficits) in AIA
Services Corporation's GAAP financial statements in 1994, 1995 and 1996 means that the
corporation lacked any earned surplus from which to redeem its stock from Reed Taylor in either
1995 or 1996. Further, the redemption of Reed's stock at any time when a retained earnings
(deficit) exists violates the statutory prohibition of redemptio11 except to the extent of
unrestricted and unreserved earned surplus.
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C.

The 1995 and 1996 Stock Redemption Agreements Were Illegal Because They
Violated Express Statutory Prohibitions

It is indisputable that the stock redemption agreements violated both the "earned surplus"
restriction and the insolvency provision of the Idaho Business Corporation Act as in effect in
1995 and 1996. However, as of the dates of the Stock Redemption.Agreement and the Stock

Redemption Restructure Agreement, AJA Services did not have any earned surplus with which
to redeem Reed Taylor's stock. Instead, AIA Services had enormous accumulated deficits in
both years, far in excess of the redemption price agreed to be paid to Reed. Further, when AIA
Services incurred the redemption obligation to Reed Taylor, the company was already insolvent
or was rendered insolvent by the obligation.

1. Violation of Earned Surplus Restriction

Idaho Code§ 30-1-6 would have allowed the redemption of Reed's common stock only
"to the extent of unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus available therefor." In order to be
lawful under the applicable statute, AlA Services was required to have had at least $7.5M (the
total redemption price) in earned surplus to lawfully redeem Reed Taylor's shares.
It is clear from AlA Services' audited consolidated financial statements for 1994, 1995

and 1996 that AIA Services did not have the more than $7.5 million earned surplus that would
have been required to legally redeem those shares. The December 31, 1994 audited
consolidated fin~cial statements of AIA Services Corporation report net income (loss) of
($4,867 ,962) during 1994 and negative retained earnings (deficit) of ($919, 700) at year end. See
Gordon Aff., Exh. Cat 28663. The unaudited 3/31/95 consolidated financials report negative net
income (loss) of ($758,274) during the first quarter of 1995 and negative retained earnings
(deficit) of ($1,677,975). Id at Exh. E (AIA0028203-209). The corporation continued to
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sustain additional losses and to increase its retained earnings (deficit) during the second and third
quarters of 1995. The year-to-date losses at June 30, 1995 and September 30, 1995 were
($2,365,177) and ($13,630,317), respectively; and the corresponding retained earnings (deficits)
were ($3 ,284,877) and ($21,740,295). See Hooper Report Opinion 2 ~if 4-8; Gordon Aff., Exhs.
E, M. Prorating the year-to-date loss at June 30 and September 30, 1995, the retained earnings
(deficit) at the date of the Stock Redemption Agreement (July 22, 1995) would have been
between ($3,572,301) and ($11,055,084). Hooper Report Opinion 2 ~ 6.
The 1995 year end consolidated financial statements of AJA Services Corporation report
net income (loss) for the year of ($10,650,150) and negative retained earnings (deficit) of
($18,827,250). See Gordon Aff., Exh. C (1994-1995 Audited Financial Statements). The $1.5
million of new capital raised from the sale of Series C stock shows up as capital in the
stockholders equity (deficit) section of the 1995 year end balance sheet and does not affect
retained earnings (deficit). Thus, the new capital did not increase "earned surplus", which was
affected primarily by the net loss incurred during the year. Given that the 1995 year started with
negative retained earnings (deficit) and that the company incurred a substantial net loss of over
· ($10 million) during the year, there is no possible way that there could have been positive
retained earnings or "earned surplus" for purposes ofld~o Code section 30-1-6 at the time of
the Stock Redemption Agreement in mid-1995. See Hooper Report Opinion 2, 6.
Nor did the company's financial condition materially improve in 1996. Notwithstanding
net income of $1,722,454 during 1996, AJA Services' retained earnings (deficit) (which is called
"accumulated deficit" in the 1996 audited financial statements) stood at ($14,792,476) at

·e

December 31, 1996 (i.e., after the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement). Gordon
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Aff., Exh. B at AIA0025039 (1996/1995 Audited Consolidated Financial Statements). Thus,

AIA Services had an enormous retained earnings (deficit) at the time of the Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement in July 1996. See Hooper Report Opinion 2. It is clear that, during 1995
and 1996, AIA Servi~es did not at any time have any earned surplus whatsoever with which to
redeem Reed's shares as required by Idaho Code§ 30-1-6.
2. Violation of Insolvency Test
It is equally clear that the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and 1996 Stock

Redemption Restructure Agreement violated the solvency requirement of Idaho Code § 30-1-6 in
that AJA was either unable to pay its obligations as they became due prior to the redemption
transaction or was rendered unable to pay its obligations as they became due as a result of the

9

redemption transaction. "Insolvent" is defined in former Idaho Code § 30-1-2(n) as the

"inability of a corporation to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of its
business.,,
AIA Services' insolvency was readily apparent immediately at the time the parties

entered into the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. As that agreement was initially drafted,
AJA Services undertook to pay $1.5 million cash to Reed Taylor at the time of closing. See

Stock Redemption Agreement, , 2.1.2. However, AIA Services was not even able to satisfy this
initial obligation under the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. Because of AIA Service's
immediate .inability to make this payment, the parties entered into an Addendum, pursuant to
which the $1.5 million down payment obligation was turned into a promissory note that was to
be paid on October 22, 1995. See Duclos Ail'., Exh. W. Not-withstanding this payment deferral,

•

AIA was unable to pay even the initial $1.5 million 'when it came due. Duclos Aff., Exhs. Q-R
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(minutes of AJA Services Corporation Board meetings on November 17 and December 14,
1995). Reed Taylor notified AIA Services that it was in default by letters dated April 18, 1996,
April 25, 1996 and June 4, 1996. Id. at Exhs. S-U.
AlA's inability to satisfy even its initial obligations under the 1995 Stock Redemption
Agreement resulted in the July I, 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement. See Duclos
Aff., Bxh. X. The 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement called for the $1.5 million
down payment obligation to be paid in full on October 31, 2006. AIA Services, again, was not
able to make the payment. AIA Services sporadically made interest payments, but was never
able to make payments in conformance with the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement.

•

See Gordon Aff., Exh. W. The $1.5 million note was not paid off until June 2001. Id. at 126.
In addition, AIA Services did not have the financial resources to redeem Donna Taylor's

Series A Preferred Stock which, pursuant to the subordination proVisions in the 1995 Stock
Redemption Agreement and related July 18, 1995 letter agreement, as well as the Series A
Preferred Shareholder Agreement executed in connection with the 1996 Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement, was required to be redeemed in full prior to any payment of principal on
the $6M Note payable to Reed Taylor. See Duclos Aff., Exh. X.
Finally, in addition to the indisputable fact that AIA Services was insolvent prior to or
rendered insolvent by the 1995 and 1996 stock redemption agreements, Plaintiff has
affirmatively asserted in this litigation that AIA Services is now insolvent and has been insolvent
since at least 2001, six years prior to Reed Taylor filing his Complaint. See Fifth Amended
Complaint,~

•

2.23. Regardless of the date on which AIA Services initially became insolvent, the

clear language of the applicable statutes (both the former and current versions) prohibits Al.A
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Services .from making any payments for redemption of Reed Taylor's shares now that AIA
Services is insolvent. See fonner J.C. § 30-1-6 ("No purchase of or payment for its own shares
shall be made at a time when the corporation is insolvent or when such purchase or payment
would make it insolvent.") (emphasis added); see also current Idaho Code§ 30-1 ..640 (''No
distribution may be made if, after giving it effect ... [t]he corporation would not be able to pay
its debts as they become due in the usual course of business.'~. Thus, any payment made or due
to Reed Taylor for redemption of his AIA Services stock at any time since at least 2001 for
redemption of his shares is unlawful.

D.

•

The Stock Redemption Agreement, And All Obligations Arising Out Of It, Are
Illegal, Void and Unenforceable
Given the fact that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares was and remains unlawful, the

agreement to redeem Reed Taylor's shares, and the obligations arising out of that agreement, are
void and unenforceable. See, e.g., Naples Awning & Glass, Inc. v. Cirou, 358 So.2d 211, 214
(Fla. App. 1978) C'We conclude that under the 1973 statute a stock purchase agreement which at
time of execution would require payment of an amount for the stock in excess of the
corporation's 'surplus of its assets over its liabilities including capital' is void"); American

Heritage Inv. Corp. v. Illinois Nat. Bank ofSpringfield, 386 N.E.2d 905, 908-910 (Ill. App.
1979) (concluding that a stock redemption agreement was illegal and void because the stock
redemption agreement was in violation of a specific statute prohibiting the purchase of shares
when the corporation lacks sufficient .capital surplus to do so); Baird v. McDaniel Printing Co.t
153 S.W.2d 135 (Tenn. App. 1941) (concluding that a promissory note executed in connection
with a stock redemption agreement in violation of a statute prohibiting a stock redemption
without sufficient capital surplus was void and unenforceable, and holding that the corporation
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was entitled to recover the amount already paid pursuant to the promissory note); McGinley v.

Massey, 71Md.App.352, 356, 525 A.2d 1076, 1078 (Md. App. 1987) (stock redemption
agreement ilnenforceable when the corporation was insolvent because u[s]uch contracts when
executed by a corporation are illegal and not merely ultra vires."); In re Trimble Co., 339 F.2d
838, 845 (3rd Cir. 1964) (stock redemption agreement is unenforceable where made in violation
of a statute because it is "not merely ultra vires but illegal and void," and "[a]n illegal contract

may be defended agairlst and avoided by any of the parties thereto") (citations omitted); Stevens

v. Boyes Hot Springs Co., 298 P. 508, 509 (Cal. App. 1931) (concluding that a promissory note
given in connection with an illegal stock redemption agreement is unenforceable and that the
corporation is entitled to the return of payments already made pursuant to the note).

•

Idaho courts have not yet addressed a stock redemption agreement that is in violation of a
statute. However, Idaho courts have squarely held that a stock redemption agreement that
violates the common law rule against stock redemption that would render a corporation insolvent
is void and unenforceable. See White v. Lorimer's City Dye Works, 269 P. 90, 90 (Idaho 1928)

C'A contract by a corporation to repurchase its capital stock is not enforceable against the
corporation while insolvent."); Brown v. T.B. Reed & Co., 174 P. 136, 138 (Idaho 1918) ("While
there is a conflict in the authorities as to the capacity of a corporation to purchase its own stock,
the rule appears to be universal that such a purchase is void if made while the corporation is
insolvent.").
The Idaho Supreme Court has broadly held that all illegal contracts are void and
\

unenforceable:

•

The law is well settled, however, that illegal contracts are void and
cannot be enfQIYed. Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 351, 924 P.2d
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607, 613 (1996). A party to an illegal £Ont:ract cannot ask the Court
to have his illegal objects carried out as the law will not aid either
party to an illegal agreement.

Zollinger v. Carrol, 137 Idaho 397, 400, 49 P.3d 402, 405 (2002) (emphasis added). Moreover,
the Idaho Supreme Court in Farrell v. Whiteman, 2009 WL 198516, just recently reaffirmed that
illegal contracts are void and unenforceable; and the Court shed further light on what makes 8:
contract illegal. The Court explained that "[a]n illegal contract is one that rests on illegal
consideration consisting of any act or forbearance which is contrary to law or public policy." Id.
"Generally, when the consideration for a contract explicitly violates a statute, the contract is
illegal and unenforceable." Id
Here the Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal because the "consideration,. for the

•

redemption of Reed Taylor's shares "explicitly violates a statute." Id Idaho Code§ 30-1-6
limited the consideration that could be paid for the redemption of stock and specifically
prohibited the payment of consideration out of any source other than unreserved and unrestricted
earned surplus. -Because the Stock Redemption Agreement with Reed Taylor violated Idaho
Code Section 30-1-6, it is void and unenforceable.
The Idaho Supreme Court also reaffinned the longstanding principal that, when faced
with an illegal contract. the Court will generally leave the parties as it finds them:
Idaho has long disallowed judicial aid to either party to an illegal
contract. McShane v. Quillin, 47 Idaho 542, 547, 277 P. 554, 559
(1929) ("No principle in law ... is better settled than that which,
with certain exceptions, refus~ redress to either party to an illegal
contract.'').... In most cases, the court will leave the parties to an
illegal contract as it finds them. Id.

•

Farrell :v. Whiteman, 2009 WL 198516.
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E.

Reed Taylor's Standing Argument Lacks Merit
Reed Taylor has asserted at various times in this litigation that none of the parties has

standing to assert the illegality of the stock redemption agreements. He is wrong.
1. Under Idaho Law, Illegal Contracts Are Void a.nd Unenforceable

Reed Taylor relies on The Minnelusa Company v. A.G. Andrikopoulos, 929 P.2d 1321
(Colo. 1997), which recognizes a split in authorities as to how courts treat illegal contracts.
Cases from other jurisdictions pointing to a split in authorities, however, are irrelevant because
Idaho courts have repeatedly held that contracts in violation of a statute are void, not merely
voidable at the option of certain parties. For example, in Kunz v. Lobo Lodge, Inc., 133 Idaho
608, 611-12, 990 P.2d 1219, 1222-1223 (Ct. App. 1999), the Court refused to .enforce a lease
•

agreement that violated a city billboard ordinance. The Court held that "[c]ontracts to do acts
forbidden by law are void and cannot be enforced" because "a contract which is made for the

purpose of furthering any matter or thing prohibited by statute ... is void/' Id at 611 (citations
omitted; eD?-phasis added). Notably, the Court did not say that this rule of a contract being void
applies only to certain contracts or that only those persons the applicable statute is intended to
protect can assert the illegality of a contract. Instead the Court explained that the bright-line rule
that illegal contracts are void "applies to every contract which is founded on· a transaction malum
in se, or which is prohibited by statute, on the ground of public policy." Id. (citations omitted).
This rule has long been recognized in Idaho:

No principle of law is better settled than that a party to an illegal
contract cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal
objects carried out; ... the law in short will not aid either party to
an illegal contract; it leaves the parties where it finds them. The
general rule is the same at law and in equity, and whether the
contract is executory or executed.
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Id (quoting Hancock v. Elkington, 67 Idaho 542, 186 P.2d 494 (1947)). See also Wheaton v.

Ramsey, 92 Idaho 33, 35, 436 P.2d 248, 250 (1968) (finding that a contract in violation of areal
estate broker licensing statute was illegal and void: "A void contract cannot be enforced, no
matter what hardship it may work, or how strong the equities may appear.").
Contrary to Reed Taylor's assertion that the illegality of a contract can only be asserted
by certain parties at certain times, the Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that the illegality of a
contract can be raised at any time and should even be raised sua sponte by the Court. See Hyta v.

Finley, 137 Idaho 755, 758, 53 P.3d 338, 341 (2002) (''[l]n Idaho a oourt may not only raise the
issue of whether a contract is illegal sua sponte ... but it has a duty to raise the issue of illegality,

•

whether pled or otherwise, at any stage in the litigation.").

2.

The Stock Redemption Transaction Is llJegal And Unenforceable

Reed Taylor is asking the Court to follow Minnelusa. In that case, the court adopted the
view that a stock redemption agreement in violation of a statute should only be voided if voiding
the stock redemption agreement would protect the individuals the stock redemption statute was
intended to protect. As an initial matter, Minnelusa is contrary to the Idaho authorities cited
above, which hold that all illegal contracts are void and unenforceable. Moreover, Minnelusa is
contrary to a published Idaho Supreme Court decision that expressly rejects the argument that
only a party whom a statute is intended to protect can assert the illegality of a contract. See

Wheaton v. Ramsey, 92 Idaho 33, 35, 436 P.2d 248, 250 (1968) (rejecting the argument that only
the individuals whom a statute was intended to benefit could assert its illegality). Nevertheless,
even if the Court were to follow the line of authority adopted in Minnelusa, the Court should
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invalidate the illegal stock redemption agreement to protect the minority shareholders that Idaho
Code§ 30-1-6 was intended to protect.
In Minnelusa, the court began its analysis by explaining that "[s]tock repurchase statutes
are designed to protect creditors and minority shareholders." Id. at 1323 (emphasis added).
With regard to minority shareholders, the court explained that "minority stockholders can suffer
harm because stock repurchase agreements deplete the capital of the corporation." Id The court
recognized that a stock redemption agreement should be voided if voiding the agreement would
protect the individuals or entities that the statute was intended to protect, i.e., creditors and
minority shareholders. The court then went on to explain that a stock redemption agreement
would not be voided to protect a shareholder "who is fully aware o~ and consents to', the stock

•

redemption agreement. The cases cited for this proposition are cases mostly involving closely
held corporations where all shareholders consented to the stock redemption agreement, i.e.,

.

where there was not a single shareholder that did not consent. For example, the Minnelusa
. Court
quoted Hayes v. Belleair Development Co., 120 Fla. 326, 162 So. 698, 700 (1935) as follo,ws:
[W]e are of the opinion that the statute relative thereto is primarily
to protect creditors and other stockholders from fraud and damages
resulting therefrom. There is no evidence of fraud, nor of damage
to creditors and there are no other filockholders to complain, so we
conclude that this contention under the facts in this cause is
without merit.
(Emphasis added).
The court also relied on Swaffordv. Berry, 152 Colo. 493, 498-500, 382 P.2d 999, 1002
(Colo. 1963), which refused to invalidate a stock redemption agreement where all shareholders
in the closely held corporation had consented to the stock redemption agreement. The court
further relied on American Family Care, Inc. v. Irwin, 571 So.2d 1053, 1060 (Ala. 1990), which
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refused to invalidate a stock redemption agreement because there was "no evidence that thirdparty creditors or minority stockholders who had not participated in the improper schemes would
be harmed ...." Thus, Minnelusa and the cases it cites stand for no more than the proposition
that a stock redemption agreement should not be invalidated if doing so would not protect any
individuals or entities that the stock redemption statute is intended to protect, i.e., where all
shareholders consent to the stock redemption agreement.
Such is not the case here. Even ifthe Court were persuaded to follow the Minnelusa line
of cases, the present case is not a case where there are no individuals or entities that the stock
redemption statutes are intended to protect This is not a case where all shareholders voted in
favor of the Stock Redemption Agreement. In fact, neither the 1995 Stock Redemption

•

Agreement nor the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement was voted on by the
shareholders. The shareholders approved a substantially different transaction in the March 1995
vote (i.e., the shareholders approved the purchases of 500,000 shares of Reed's stock in
connection with additional capital to be raised in the Kinnard Private Placement and the merger
of R. J Holding Corp. with and into AJA Services). However, that transaction did not ever occur
because of the failure of:the Kinard Private Placement. Moreover, the September 30, 1994
unaudited balance sheet provided to the shareholders at the time of the March 1995 vote reported
$3,156,044 in retained earnings, a serious overstatement in light of the retained earnings (deficit)
of ($9.19,700) at December 31, 1994 as reported in the 1994 year-end audited censolidated
financial statements. See Gordon Aff., Exh. D at AIA0027728. Moreover, some shareholders
voted against this transaction and others abstained.
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The shareholders did not ever vote to approve the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement,
i.e., to approve the purchase of all of Reed Taylor's shares. While the shareholders did approve
of certain transactions in a July 1995 vote, the redemption of Reed Taylors stock was not put to
a shareholder vote. The redemption of Reed Taylor's stock was not even mentioned in the June
12, 1995 Amended Notice of Special Meeting of AJA Services Shareholders; nor was it
mentioned in the June 12, 1995 Disclosure Statement. Similarly, the proxy fotm delivered with
the Amended Notice and Disclosure Statement does not reference the redemption transaction
with Reed Taylor. Accordingly, the AIA Services shareholders were not asked to approve, and
did not approve, the terms of the redemption of Reed's common stock at the July 1995

shareholder meeting. Nor did the shareholders vote on the 1996 Stock Redemption Agreement.
3.

The Stock Redemption Agreements Must Be Voided To Protect The
Min':>rity Shareholders

Not only does Reed Taylor mistakenly assert that the illegality of a contract can only be
asserted by those whom the statutes are iritended to protect, but he mistakenly asserts that the
only purpose ofidaho Code§ 30-1-6 is to protect irmocent creditors. Reed Taylor, of course, is
far from inn9cent. He was the Chairman of the Board of Directors, Chief Executive Officer, and
majority and controlling shareholder of AIA Services at the time the corporation entered into the
Stock Redemption Agreement. He knew as well as anyone involved the corporation's financial
condition, the regulatory and other problems it faced at the time, and the corporation's inability
to pay the redemption price. In fact, in Article IV of the Stock Redemption Agreement, Reed
affirmed that AIA Services' financial representations and warranties were true and correct in all

•

material respects .
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Allowing Reed Taylor to enforce the stock redemption agreements would eviscerate the
purpose of the statute, part of which is to protect minority shareholders. Unlike in Minnelusa
and the cases cited therein, this case involves many minority shareholders whose investments in
AJA Services would be wholly wiped out ifReed Taylor is permitted to enforce the illegal stock
redemption agreements. In fact, as recognized even in Minnelusa, one of the central purposes of
stock redemption statutes is to prevent an insider majority shareholder like Reed Taylor from
stepping in front of the minority shareholders through a stock redemption agreement.

Minnelusa, 929 P.2d at 1323 (explaining that "[s]tock repurchase statutes are designed to protect
... minority stockholders" and that "niinority stockholders can suffer harm because stock

•

repurchase agreements deplete the capital of the corporation.'') .
More specifically, the statutory restrictions on stock redemption were designed to as~e
that all equally situated shareholders will share equally in the corporation•s assets and to
preclude distribution of the corporation's assets that favors an insider. Brudney, "Equal
Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and Reorganizations", 71 Cal. L. Rev.
1072, 1106 (1983), observes:
Like a dividend distribution, a corporate purchase of its own stock
is a distribution of a part of the corporation's assets to its
stockholders. But it is a distribution which differentiates among
stockholders. The sellers get cash and the surviving stockholders
receive larger proportionate claims to the remaining assets.
Of course, this premise applies only if the corporation has sufficient surplus. If its liabilities
exceed its assets either before or as a result of the repurchase of shares from a selling
shareholder, then the seller receives greater value per share than the remaining shareholders left

•
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behind to split the dregs of the assets. Idaho's ·statutory restrictions on distn'butions are intended
to prevent an insider from obtaining an unequal distribution of corporate assets. Thus:
State statutes permit a corporation to repurchase its stock at the
discretion of the directors if the corporation has a source in surplus
for the funds used in the repurchase. .. . Fiduciary notions in the
cases impose both restrictions on directors' discretion and
disclosure obligations in order to preclude a use of corporate assets
which favors insiders.

Id. at 1107-8.
Through the Stoek Redemption Agreement here, Reed Taylor sought to extract $7.5
million plus other property and debt forgiveness worth nearly $2 million from a corporation that
had no earned surplus whatsoever at the time of the redemption, thereby obtaining a preference
over the other common shareholders. Prior to entering into the agreement for the redemption of
his shares, Reed Taylor stood on equal footing with all other common shareholders. In the event
of dissolution of the corporation, Reed Taylor would have received the same pro-rata return on
his investment as all other common shareholders.
Through the stock redemption agreement, however, Reed Taylor attempted to jump in
front of all other common shareholders. According to Reed Taylor, he is entitled to all assets of
the corporation, and all other shareholders are entitled to nothing. See Plaintifrs Reply in
Support of Motion To Oissolve And Relinquish Collateral, filed September 9, 2008 ("Moreover,
as everyone is fully aware, there are insufficient assets to pay Reed and Donna Taylqr and the
Plan shares are subordinate to the moneys owed to Reed and Donna Taylor."). Thus, if Reed
Taylor prevails on this motion, he will have succeeded -in stepping in front of all other

•

shareholders-taking the entire value of the corporation for himself and leaving all other
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similarly situated common shareholders empty handed. This is precisely what Idaho Code § 301-6 was intended to prevent.

Connie Taylor and J~m Beck, as directors of AIA Services and fiduciaries for the
corporation's shareholders, have a fiduciary obligation to protect the shareholders by raising the
illegality defense to Reed Taylor's note collection suit, especially given Reed Taylor's admission
that the corporation has insufficient assets to satisfy his note and therefore that there are no assets
whatsoever left for the shareholders if bis note is enforced.
4.

Connie Taylor And Jim Beck Have Standing To Assert The Illegality Of The
Stock Redemption Agreement

Under Idaho law, as explained above, an illegal contract is void and unenforceable.
Thus, Reed Taylor c~ot enforce the illegal Stock Redemption Agreements; and there is no
limitation on which parties can asset the defense. Nevertheless, even if standing were restricted
· to individuals harmed by the illegal contract, Connie Taylor and Jim Beck easily meet that
standard, See, e.g., Minne/usa, 929 P.2d at 1324 (adopting the view- contrary to Idaho law~
that "a corporate stock repurchase may be attacked only by persons who are injured or
prejudiced thereby"). Connie Taylor and Jim Beck were riot directors at.the time of the
redemption of Reed's stock in 1995. Jim Beck was a director in 1996; but there was no vote by
the Board of Directors concerning the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement. Thus,
neither Connie Taylor nor Jim Beck voted to approve the redemption of Reed's stock. However,
for the reasons.detailed below, Connie Taylor and Jim Beck would now face exposure to
enonnous personal liability if they were to allow any payments to be made to Reed Taylor for

•

the redemption of his stock pursuant to an illegal contract and while the corporation is insolvent
(according to Reed's own admission).
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Fonner Idaho Code § 30-1-6 does not just prohibit the act of entering into a stock
redemption agreement if at the time the corporation lacks earned surplus or if the transaction
would render the corporation insolvent. Instead, the statute also prohibits any future "paymenf'
at a later time when the corporation is insolvent or when such payment would render the
corporation insolvent: "No purchase of or payment for its own shares shall be made at a time

when the corpom!ion iS in8olvent or when sUch purchase or payment would mak:e it insolvent."
Thus, the statutory prohibitions are ongoing and continue to prohibit the current board of
directors from making payments in connection with the redemption of Reed Taylor's stock.
Under both the former and current provisions of the Idaho Business Corporation Act, any
director who votes for or assents to a distribution to shareholders in violation of the prohibitions
•

on stock redemption or shareholder distributions is personally liable for any amount unlawfully
paid to the shareholder:
(a) A director who votes for or assents to the ... distribution of the
assets of a corporation to its shareholders contrary to the provisions
of this act or contrary to any restrictions contained in the articles of
incorporation, shall be liable to the corporation, jointly and
severally with all other directors so voting or assenting, for the
amount of such ... distnoution which could have been paid or
distributed without a violation of the provisions of this act or the
restrictions in the articles of incorporation.
(b) A director who votes for or assents to the purchase of the
corporation, s own shares contrary to the provisions of this act shall
be liable to the corporation, jointly and severally with all other
directors so voting or assenting, for the amount of consideration
paid for such shares which is in excess of the minimum amount
which could have been paid therefore without a violation of the
provisions of this act.

See fonner I.C. § 30-1-48; see also current l.C. § 30-1-833 ("A director who votes for or assents
•

to a distribution in excess of what may be authorized and made plirsuant to section 30-1-640(1)
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. . . is personally liable to the corporation for the amount of the distribution that exceeds what
could have been distributed without violating section 30-1-640(1) .... ").
Connie Taylor and Jim Beck are stuck between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand,
Reed Taylor has sued Connie Taylor and Jim Beck, personally, for refusing to direct the
corporation to immediately pay Reed Taylor all amounts owed him pursuant to the Stock
Redemption Agreement. On the other hand, if Connie Taylor or Jim Beck were to authorize
payment to Reed Taylor in violation of the statutory prohibitions, they would face the very real
possibility of enormous personal liability under Idaho Code § 30~ 1-833. In light of this risk of
personal liability, Connie Taylor and Jim Beck have standing to assert the illegality of the stock

•

redemption agreements .

F.

The Voiding Of The Stock Redemption Agreement Is Fair And Equitable

In light of the illegality of the Stock Redemption Agreement, that agreement is void and

cannot be enforced by Reed Taylor. Reed Taylor cannot seek aid from this Court in enforcing
the illegal contract. As explained in Farrell v. Whiteman, 2009 WL 198516, the court will
generally "leave the parties to an illegal contact as it finds them." Id While Farrell v.

Whiteman recognizes that some cases m~y call for a different remedy based on equitable
circumstances, the most fair and equitable resolution of this case may be to leave the parties
where the court finds them.
Reed Taylor is not the victim in this case, nor is he being left without compensation for
his shares in AIA Services. To date, ReedTaylor has received more that $9 million in
distributions of cash and other property by AIA Services pursuant to the Stock Redemption
Agreement, which is more than the redemption price. See Gordon Aff., Exb. W. Especially in
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light of the fact that the decision to redeem his sh~ was entirely up to Reed Taylor -the Board
Chairman, CEO and controlling shareholder who must have understood the financial condition
of the corporation and the one individual with enough shares to single-handedly decide whether
the transaction would go forward - leaving the parties where the Court find them is fair and
equitable.
Nevertheless, this Motion for Summary Judgment seeks only resolution of the dispositive
illegality issue. The issue of whether some remedy other than leaving the parties where the
Court finds them is best left for another day.

V. CONCLUSION
The agreement to redeem Reed Taylor's shares was and is illegal, void and unenforceable
•

because AIA Services did not and does not have sufficient (or any) earned surplus with which to
redeem Reed Taylor's shares.
DATED THIS Q't4-day of February, 2009.
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Idaho Code§ 30·1·2 (1995)

As .used In this act, unless the context otherwise niqUil'CS, the teuri:
(a) "Co1po1ation" or "domestic cmporatlon1' means a co1po1atlon subject to tho provisions of this act, except a
foreign 001poration
·
(b) "Foreign corponltion" means a corp01•tlon organized under laws othot than the laws of this state

(c) "Articles ofincozporation" moan tho original 01 restated articles of incorporation 01 articles of consolidation
and all amendments thereto, including mticles ofmmger.

(d) "Shares" mean the units into which the proprietary interests in a cotporatlon arc divided
(e) "SubsctibeJJ1 means one who subsctfbes fen share3 in a CO!J>Onttion. whetbet befme or~ incmporation
(f) "Shareholcfert' means one who is aholdei ofrecord of s~s in a cotporatfon and ls synonymous with the tetTb
"stock:holdet "lftbe atticles ofincotporation or tho bylaws so pt'Ovide, the board ofdiroctors may adopt by resolution a
proccdwe whereby a sbareholdei of the rorpora.tian ma:y cettify in Wiiting to the corpouu:ion that all 01 a portion of tbo
shares registered In tho name of such shareholder lll'C held for 1he 8CC0111lt Of a specified person 01 per.sons. The resolu·
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tion shall set forth (1) the classification of shareholder who may certify, (2) tho pwposa or pwposes for which the cCitification may be made, (3) the form of certification and inf01mation to be contained therein, (4) the numbcn of days before or a.ftlll any record date or date of closing of the stock u an.sfet books, by which time the c~tificatlon must be received by the coJpOtation to be effective for the record date or date of closing of the stock tra.nsfer books, and (5) such
other provisions Wjt)l mpect to the procedm'C as aJ'C deemed neccSS8t)' or desh able Upon rc~ipt by the corporation of
a cedification complyillg with the procedUTB, the persons specified in the cottification shall be deemed, for the puipose
orpmposes set forth in the ccttification, to be the holdci-s of record of the nwnber of shares spcclfied"in place ot the
shareholder maldb.g the ce1ti.fication.
·
(g) "Autbodzed shares" mean tl1e shares of all classes wblch the COiporatiou is authm ized to issue

(h) "Ircasuiy shares" mean shares ofa cotpOJatfon which have been issued, haw ber.m subsequently acquired by
and belong to the cruporation, an.d have not, either by reason of the acquisition 01 theteafter, been cancelled or restored
to the status ofauthorized butuni.ssaed sh11res Ireasuxy .shares shall be deemed to be "issued" shares, but not "outstanding" shares.

tlon

(i) "Net asset!'' mean the amount by which the total assets ofa coiporation exceed the total debts of the coipora·

0) "Stated capital" means, at any paJtlcular time, U1e swn of(I) the aggregate piu value of all shares of the corpo1atlo.n h!'lvlng a pat value that have been issued, (2) the amount of tho consideration received by the co1poration for all
shares of the coiporation without pat value that have been issued, except such part of the con&id~ation thetefo1 as may
have: bc~n allocated to capital 11U1plus in a m11nncr pc1mitted by law, and (3) such amounts not included in clauses {1)
end (2J~ftbis paragraph as have been tnmsferred to stated capital oftbe co1poration, whethet upon the issuance of
shares as a. sltare dividend 01 othe.i wise, minus all redu!ltions fi:i:im such sum as have been effected in a manner petmitted by law
(k) "Surplus" mew the excess of the net assets ofn corpo1at!on ove1 its stated capilaJ.

(/)"Earned swplus" means the portion of the SUtplus of a cot poration equal to the balance ofits net pro.fits, income. gains and losse8 fiom the date of incotporatlon, ar from the latest date when a deficit was eliminated by an application of ifs capit.al swplus 01 stated capital or ofh01wiac, aftet deducting subsequent distributions to shareholders end
trall.sfer.s to stated capital 1111d capital SUJpius to the extent S\lth clisuibutio.ns and transfe1s are made out of eained sut·
plus.~ stuplus shall include also any portion of surplus allt:>catod to earned sw-plus in mer gm, consolidations, or
acquisitions of all or substantially all of the outstanding shares or 9fthc property and assets of another corporation, domestic or foreign.
{m) "Capital surplus" means tho entire smplus of a corporation other than it! eamed sutplus.

(n) "Insolvent" means inability of a corporation to pay its debts as they become due in the usual cowse of its

business.
(o) "Employee" includes officers but not directo1a A director may accept duties which make him also ,anew·
ployee.
(p) "NonpI'oductive mining COip0nttion11 means a corporation whose specific purposes or objects are limited to
mining. although its genet ally stated powois may extend beyond _mining. Io be classified es nonproductive In any one
(l) fiscal year, the corpo1 a.tlon must neither be actuaJlY engaged in any business other than mining nor own any produc·
ing mines at any time dming the entire tlscal year

HISTORY: IC,§ 30-1-2, as 11dded by 1979, ch lOS, § 2, p 251; am. 1980, ch 197, § 1, p 433.
NO I ES;
CO'MPILER'S NOYES. For words "this act'' see compiler's notes,§ 30·1·1
Se'1tion 2 ofS t.. 1980, ch. 197 is compiled u § 30·1·14
SEC. IO SEC. Rm. Ibis section is referred to in§§ 30·M9A and 30-1-29.
DECISIONS UNDBRPRIOR lAW
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8X\JeDSes may bo entitled under any bylaw, agreement, vote of shareholders OJ disinterested d.iact.ors 01 01h111wise, both
as to action 1n his official capacity and as to action In lltlothet capacity while holding such office.
(g) A DOtporation shall have power to purchase and maintain lnsw anco on behalf of any person who ia or was a director, officer, employee 01 agent oftbe corporation, or is 01 was serving at the request of th.cs e01pontion as a director,
officer; Clllployee or agent ofanothet corporatiOll,,partnership,jolnt ventUnt, tiust or olher enteiprise against 8Jl)' Jiapility assea:ted agai.Dst him and incwrcd by him in any such capacity or adsing out of bis status as such, whether or not the
corpo1ation would have the powrn to indeUIDify him against such liability under the provisions of this section: provided
t.bat banks, savings and loan associations and credit11nions cfwteredundet the laws of the stare ofldaho may provide
indemnification only by illstu1Ul<lc.
(h) Pw the pwposes ofthia section, the tmn •corpo1ation" includes, in addition to the resulting corporation, all
constituent COtl'Oratio.ns and theh predecesso1s absotbed in a CODSOlidation or merger, which, ifsepa111te existence had
continued, would have had powe.t and authority to Indemnify ita directors. officers, employees, or agents
(i) Ihe indemnification and ad~cement of expenses provided by, or granted pmsuant to, this section shall, unless
otheswlse provided whon authorized 011atified, continiie as to a person who hanoased to be a d~t01, officer, em·
ployee or agent and shall inure lo the benefit of the heils, and personal representatives of such a peison

HIS'.f.ORY: IC,§ 30·1-5, as added by 1979, ch.105, § 2, p. 251; atn. 1987, ch. 221, § l, p. 471
NOTitS:
CO~Il.ER'S NOTES.
Se~tion2ofSL.

!he words ln parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted
1987,ch 221 iscomp0edas§30-l·54
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§ 30-1-6 Right ofco1poration to acquire and clispose oiits own shares
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Idaho Code§ 30-1-6
To tho extont that earned smplus or capital surplus is uied as the measUJ-e of the cotpo1ation's rlght to purc:hase its own
sl11u"OS. such surplus shall be 11:stl'lcted so long as such shmes are held as treaswy shares, and upon the disposition 01
canceUalfon of any such shares the 1tstiiction shall be removed pro tanto.
Notwithstanding the foregoing limitation, a co1po1ation may purchase or otherwise acquire iU owit shares fm the pur·
pose oe
(a) Eliminating fractional shares.
(b) Collecting 01 oompromising Jndobtedness to the corporation

(c) Paying dissenting shareholders entlt1ed to payment for thcll- shares under tbe provisions oithis act.

(d) Effecting, subjoct to the other provls.ions of I.his act, the l'eti.rem.ent ofits red~emable snares by redemption or
by purclwo at not to exceed the redemption price.
·

No purchase of 01 payment for ft.'l own shares shall be made at a time when tho corporation is insolvent or when such
purchase 01 payment would make it insolvent.
e:rsro~Y:

r.c., 30-1-6, as added by 1979, ch 105, § 2, p 251.

NOTES:
COMPILER'S NOTES Fo1 words "this act'' see compilet's notos1 § 30-1-1
DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW
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ANALYSIS
Insolvent Cotpo1ation Purcha.-;ing Own Stock
Reduction of Capital Stock.

TNSOLVBNI CORPORATION PURCHASING OWN STOCK
PDtchase of its own stock by an insolvent corporation is void Brown v. T.B. Reed & Co, 31 Tdaho 529, 174 P 136
(1918)

REDUCTION OF CAPITAL STOCK.
Purchase by co1po1ation of its own stock amounted to a reduction ofthe capital stock of'company in violation offot·
mer statute Dietrich v Copeland t.umbe1Co.,28 Idaho 312, 154 P. 626 (1916)
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AJA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
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Idaho corporation; R JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC .• an Idaho
, Corporation; and JAMES BECK and
CORRINE BECK, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;

AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT T. BELL (1) IN
SUPPORT OF REED TAYLOR'S MOTIONS
FOR RULE 56(f) CONTINUANCE; (2) IN
SUPPORT OF REED TAYLOR'S PENDING
MOTIONS TO COMPEL DEPOSITIONS
AND DISCOVERY; (3) IN OPPOSITION TO
CONNIE TAYLOR AND JAMES BECK'S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND JOINDERS BY nm
401(k) PLAN AND OTHER DEFENDANTS;
AND (4) IN SUPPORT OF REED
TAYLOR'S MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.
STATE OF VIASHINGTON
COUNTY OF KING

)
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AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT T. BELL - 1
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I, Scott T. Bell, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in court, and

make this Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge.
2.

In 1978, I obtained my undergraduate degree from University of Texas. I

attended law school at Harvard Law School and New York University School of Law and
obtained my J.D. in 1981. In 1981, I was admitted to practice law in Washington and
have continuously practiced law since that time.
3.

For over 25 years, I have emphasized my practice on corporate finance

..

and business transactions. My experience includes public and private offerings, business
mergers, share exchanges, recapitalizations, consolidations, and stock and asset
acquisitions.

The size of corporate transactions in which I have provided legal

representation range from several thousand dollars to over $100 million.
4.

In or about early 1995, Reed Taylor retained my firm, Caimcross &

Hempelmann, P.S. (''my firm"), to negotiate, draft agreements, and close the redemption
of his shares in AIA Services Corporation (''transaction").

From early in the

negotiations, I learned that R John Taylor and others were attempting to redeem Reed
Taylor's interest in AIA Services Corporation to take the company a different direction
and perhaps move toward a public offering or sale of the company. I also learned that R
John Taylor, as President, held extensive knowledge of the financial affairs of AJA
Services Corporation and its subsidiaries, while Reed Taylor held relatively little
knowledge in accounting, law or the financial aflhlrs of the company. While I certainly
respected Reed Taylor for bis apparent sales ability and knowledge in that realm, it
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seemed that Reed Taylor held inferior knowledge to R. John Taylor regarding the
financial affairs of AIA Service Corporation and its subsidiaries.
5.

Because of Reed Taylor's membership on the board of directors of AIA

Services Corporation, he and my firm supported the establishment of an independent
committee of the board of directors to negotiate and approve the terms of the redemption
of Reed Taylor's shares., Reed Taylor was not a member of this committee. Richard
Riley of Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered ("Eberle, Berlin")
8erved as counsel to this committee and AIA Services Corporation in connection with the
redemption.
6.

R. John Taylor and the other investors suggested the redemption of Reed

Taylor's shares as ' a means to achieve their objectives.

Although Reed Taylor was

initially resistant to a redemption of his shares, he ultimately became willing to do so. At
no point did he force AIA Services Corporation, through his majority vote or otherwise,
to effectuate a preferential redemption of his shares over other shareholders. In addition,
as noted above, AIA Services Corporation established a special committee of its board of
directors to negotiate and approve the redemption tenns to prevent any potential conflicts
of interest.
7.

The negotiation of the terms of the redemption and the redemption

agreements primarily involved Richard Riley and my firm.

I believe that the other

investors had a Minnesota law firm involved in the transaction.

AIA Services

Corporation's general counsel, Daniel Spickler, was also involved in the transaction and
my firm corresponded directly with him on certain matters.
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8.

During the course of my firm's representation of Reed Taylor, my fum
,•

detennined that, as a condition to the redemption, AIA Services Corporation's outside
counsel should deliver to Reed Taylor a written legal opinion regarding certain legal
matters surrounding the redemption. Reed Taylor agreed with this assessment. Eberle,
Berlin was in a position to analyze whether, with respect to AJA Services Corporation,
the transactions were authorized, complied with applicable

I~

laws, triggered

complications with third parties, etc. Without access to the confidential books, records
and proceedings of AIA Services Corporation, and not being a licensed Idaho lawyer, my
finn was not in a position to make these determinations. Moreover, in my experience, it
is customary for the party seeking to redeem shares and its counsel to carry out the "due
diligence" associated with detennining the legal viability of the redemption. Richard
Riley was extremely well-versed in the legal, financial and operational affairs of AJA
Services Corporation as a result of his long-standing relationship with the company.
With the advice from my finn, Reed Taylor determined that he,should receive a legal
opinion from Eberle, Berlin, who had superior knowledge of AIA Services Corporation's
legal affairs, to confinn AIA Services Corporation's legal ability to honor its obligations
under the redemption. In my experience, a written legal opinion in these circumstances is
appropriate and normal. Mr. Riley and Eberle, Berlin agreed to provide the opinion. Mr.
Riley and I negotiated the content of the opinion.
9.

As discussed above, upon the advice of my firm, Reed Taylor sought to

obtain and did obtain an opinion letter from Eberle, Berlin for the purpose of confnming
the legality of the transaction, that the corporation had the legal power and authority to
enter into the transaction (among other things), that the redemption agreements were
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enforceable pursuant to their terms (among other opinions referenced in the opinion
letter), and that all of the opinions were provided by an attorney licensed in the state of
Idaho.
10.

The requirement of obtaining an opinion letter for the redemption of Reed

Taylor's shares was adhered to by my finn and not waived by Reed Taylor. Attached as
Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the opinion letter dated August 16, 1995, provided
to Reed Taylor by Eberle Berlin for the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares ("opinion
letter"). To my knowledge, Eberle Berlin's opinion letter was drafted by Richard Riley.

If the opinion letter had not been provided to Reed Taylor, my firm would have advised
Reed Taylor nQ1 to close any transaction involving the redemption of his shares. Eberle,
Berlin's opinion letter was issued on August 15, 1995 in connection with the required
documents and officer certification necessary to close the transaction. Reed Taylor relied
on the opinion letter as a necessary condition to closing the redemption of his shares.
11.

At no time did Richard Riley or any other party (including Daniel

Spickler, AIA Services Corporation's general counsel) advise me or my finn that AJA
Services Corporation had insufficient earned surplus and/or capital surplus to redeem
Reed Taylor's shares or that the transaction to redeem Reed Taylor's shares would
constitute a violation of any statute or law in Idaho, including, J.C. § 30-1-6. In fact,
Eberle, Berlin's opinion letter affirmatively rejects the notion that the redemption
agreements were illegal or violated Idaho law. Had I or my firm been advised by Richard
Riley or any other party that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares would violate any
laws or statutes in Idaho, or even that the risk existed, my firm would have advised Reed
Taylor not to enter into the redemption agreements or to close the transaction. Neither
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Reed Taylor nor my firm had any knowledge that there were any issues present that could
affect the legality or enforceability of the redemption.
12.

Based upon my extensive experience in drafting, reviewing, interpreting,

and relying upon opinion letters for corporate transactions, the opinion letter issued to

Reed Taylor supported the legality of the transaction, that AJA Services Corporation had
the power and authority to enter into the transaction, and that the redemption agreements
were enforceable against AIA Services Corporation. I am perplexed as to why Richard

Riley's new firm, Hawley, Troxell, et al., would assert argwnents that contradict the
tenns of the opinion letter he drafted when he was at Eberle, Berlin.
13.

If AIA Services Corporation had not agreed to (at signing) and warranted

(at closing) the terms, conditions and representations in the redemption agreements (as
executed), then my firm would have advised Reed Taylor DQt to sign the redemption
agreements and rug to sell his shares in AJA Services Corporation. If AJA Services
Corporation had not provided the closing certificate, a true and correct copy of which is
attached as Exhibit B to this Affidavit, my finn and I would have advised Reed Taylor

nm to close the transaction for the redemption of his shares.
14.

I have been advised that AJA Services Corporation and other parties are

now asserting that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares in AIA Services Corporation
violated Idaho law in that AIA Services Corporation did not have sufficient earned
surplus to redeem Reed Taylor's shares. The avoidance of this kind of argument is
precisely why opinion letters are obtained in this kind of transaction.
15.

Based upon my interaction with Richard Riley in the negotiation and

drafting of the redemption agreements and related issues pertaining to the redemption of
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Reed Taylor's shares, I have no reason to believe that Richard Riley involved himself in
an illegal transaction or a transaction that violated an Idaho statute, particularly when his
own firm's opinion letter expressly stated that no laws were violated as a result of the
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. I have no reason to believe that Mr. Riley did not
consider all necessary facts and laws prior to authoring and issuing the opinion letter.

Mr. Riley impressed me as a very competent and honorable attorney.

;fh '

DATED:

This~dayof~,2009.&_.

.

~~
•

•

. ·..· ··..•.....

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this Jl..~ of May, 2009.

CA~~4l.r£aJc:

Notary Public for W~n
Residing at: 6 e:rJtfe.
My commission expires: 7-23-1(
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Roderick Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and
correct copy of the Affidavit of Scott T. Bell (w/ exhibits) on the following parties via the
method(s) indicated below:

David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Attorney for Defendants JoLee Duclos and
Bryan Freeman

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for R. John Taylor

David R. Risley
Randall, Blake & Cox
1106 Idaho St.
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for Connie Taylor, James Beck and
Corrine Beck

Gary D. Babbitt
D. John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
Attorneys for AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and
Crop USA Insurance Agency

James J. Gatziolis
Charles E. Harper
Quarles & Brady LLP
300 No1th LaSalle Street
Suite 4000
Chicago, IL 60654
Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance Agency

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)
Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

•
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Via:

Charles A. Brown
Attorney at Law
324 Main Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneys for AIA Services 401(k) Plan

(
(
(
(

)
)
)
)

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered- Via Messenger
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Signed this lzth day of May, 2009, at Lewiston, Idaho.

Roderick
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August 1S, 1995

Of'

CoUNBEL

T. H, Ellil:ftl.11: llNll-1M7)

Reed J. Taylor
P.O. BoxS38
I,.ewiston ID 83501
Re:

Common Stock Redemption

Dear Mr. ' Taylor:

This opinion is being deliveml to you pursuant to Section 2.S(j) of the Stock Redemption
Agreement dated July 22, 1995 ( •Agreement") by and between AJA Services Coxporation. an
Idaho coiporation ("Company") and Reed J. Taylor. All capitaliled terms not defined he.min
shall have the respective meanings ascribed to them in the Agreement. The phrase "Transaction
Documents" refers collectively to the Agreement, together with the Note, the Pledge Agreement,
the Security Agreement, the Con.suiting Agreement and the Noncompetition Agreement, as such
documents are defined in the Agreement.
w~,hltVe'actd;f'as~':CQunsd:;fQr·~, c;om~ariy.in coQnection•. Witli: thetransa.ctk>ns'
con~mpbrted ·QJ t,be.~~t,~::J\s·Bµch:~cQ\UlSClJ:W~ba~ as$fStCd~~ the µ~fic>nt
and'Javc:~ihi~fJ'i.executeicf(()uiitelpaits;(CJiphot0staticcopies.of'~te4 qo~)of'the

.. . Cllt.;and; oth.~ T;ransaction~Doobme.itS~>

~.;;;;>.•'••>·;•;.'..··...

m

•

m

•

••

•

•

•

•

• •

•

••

••

•

···

In addition, we have examined originals, executed oountmparts or copies of such
agreements, corporate records, instruments and certific::ates., certificates of public authorities and ·
such matteni of law as we have deemed necessary for the purpose of rendering the opinions set
forth herein. To the extent we dee.med neceswy for the pmposes of this opinion, we have
relied upon. {i) the statements and repiesentations of the Company as to factual matters, (ii) the
corporate records provided to us by the Company, and (iii) certificates and other documents
obtained from public officials. We have further relied as to factual matters on the representations
and warranties contained in the Agreement and the other Transaction Documents (including,
without lhnitation, Mr. Taylor's representations in Article N of the Agreement) and on the
Company's representations in Schedule m (attached) to the Agreement; and we have assumed
the completeness and accuracy of all such representations and wa.mmties as to facrual matters.
We have assumed the genuineness of all signatures (other than those of the Company), the legal
capacity of Mr. Taylor to execute the Agreement and all other documents we have reviewed,
the authenticity of all documents BUbmitted to us as originals, and the conformity to orlgioaJ
documents of all documents submitted to us as certified, photostatict reproduced or conformed
copies. We have further assumed tha~ the Agreement and the other Transaction Documents bave
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Reed I. Taylor
August 15, 1995
Page2

been duly authorized~ executed and delivered by Mr. Taylor and are enforceable apinst him in
accordance with their respective terms. and t.hat the execution, delivery and performance of the
Agreement and the other Transaction Documents by Mr. Taylor does not and will not result in

a breach of, or constitute a default under, any agreement, instrument or other document to which
Mr. Taylor is a party, or any order, judgment, writ or decree applicable to such party to which
l,fr. Taylor's property is subject.

··Whenevei o\l.t' Opinion with iesl'ect tO the existence or absence of facts is indicated to bee
based. on . our ~wledge; weiu'e.· referring to th~,~ kJ1oWledse of ;a~. ·M·· 1)lrnbow:and'
Richard A~ Riley t who are the~sole att~11· m<Bbme, Berliri, Kading, ·TUrnbow & McKlveen,
Cbarteted who have represented die Company during the 'course<of our representlmon in this,
uansactiori~ Except u expressly set forth ~ennn, we have not undertaken any independent legal
or factual investigation to determine the existence or absence of such facts, and no inference as
to our .knowledge of the existence or absence of such facts should be drawn from such
representation.
Based upon and subject to our examination and assumptiona as aforesaid and subject to
the qualifications hereina.ftm' set forth, we are of the opinion that, except as set forth in the
attached Schedule m and/or the Schedules attached to the Agreement:

1.
The Company is a corporation duly organjzed and validly existing under
the laws of the State of Idaho. Based solely on the attached Certificates of Coiporate Status
issued by the Idaho Sccret:ary of State, the Company, Tbe Universe Life Insurance Company
(•universe"), AJA Insurance, Inc. (•AIAI") and Farmers Health Alliance Administnltors, Inc.
("Farmers") are corporations incorporated under the cmporation laws of the State of Idaho and
in good standing on the n:cords of the Idaho Secretary of State.
2.
The Company and its Subsidiarles have full corporate power and authority
to enter into, execute and deliver the Transactions .Documenm and to perform their respective.
obligations thereunder; all corporate action on· the part. of Company and· its Subsidiaries, and
their respective directors and shareholders, neces.wy for the authorization, execution, delivery
arut· perfomiance by ·company and its Subsidiaries of the Transaction Documents and the
cQnsummation of the trinsactions· contempJated thereby bas been taken; and the Transaction
Documents have been duly executed and delivered by Company and its Subsidiaries. The
Transaction Documents comtitute the valid and bind.ins obligation of Company and its
Subsidiaries enforceable against them in accordance with their respective tenns, except that
enforceability may be limited by (a) applicable banlcruptcy, insolvency, moratorium,
reorganization, fraudulent transfer, receivership, conservator.ship or similar Jaws affecting
creditor's rights generally, (b) the eJ<ercise of judicial discretion in accordance with general
prlnciples of equity (whether applied by a court of law or equity) and (c) considerations of public
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Reed J. Taylor
August is. 1995
Page3

policy.

3.
Neither the execution and delivery c,f tho .Transaction Documents by
Company and fts Subsidiaries, nor the consummation of the. transactions contemplated thereby,
will (a;); eontlict With or violate· any provision of their respective Articles of Incorporation or
Bylaws, as amended; or (b) constitute a violation or default undet any indebtedness, indenture,
mortgage, deed of trust, note, bond, license, lease agreement, or other material agreement or
instrument to which Company or any of its Subsidiaries is a party or to which any of its assets
or the ~ of its Subsidiaries may be subject; or (c) ,to the best of,our .knowledge,; violaie any
law, rule, license, regulation~c judgment, order, .ruling,~or deqee, including anyJ11~ laws
or regulations of MY jurisdiction to which Company. or anY of its Subsidiaries are mbJect,
governing or affccli.ng the operation of Company or its Subsidiaries in any material respect.
Neither the execution and delivery of the Transaction Documonts by Company and its
Subsidiaries, nor the cooswnmation of the transactions contemplated thereby, will constitute an
event permitting termination of any material agreement or the acceleration of any indebtedness
of the Company or other liability, with or without notice or lapse of time, or result in the
creation or imposition of any lien upon the Collateral.

4.
No consent, authorization, approval or exemption by, or filing with, any
Person or any Governmental Authority is .required in connection with the execution, delivery and
performance by Company and its Subsidiaries of the Transaction Documents, or the taking of
any action contemplate.d thereby, except such as have been obtained prior to Closing.
S.
All of the currently outstanding Pledged Shares are owned beneficially and
of record by Company and, to the best of our knowledge, there are no warrants, options, or
other rights to purchase such Pledged Shares.

6.
Except for the lien of First Interstate Lien upon the First Interstate Shares,
and any interest in the Commission collateral created or granted in favor of The Centennial Life
Insurance Company pursuant to that certain Reimbursement Agreement dated August 11, 1995
among The Centennial Life Insurance Company, AJ.A Services Co.rporation, A.IA Insurance,
Inc., The Universe Life 1.nsurance Company and AJA MidAmcrica, Inc., the Collat.eml is f:rce
and clear of all pledges, liens, encumbrances, security interests, equities, claims, or options.
Upon delivery of certificates representine the Pledged Shares of AIAI and Fanners t.o
Shareholder at Closing, Shareholder shall have at Closing a perfected first priority security
interest in such Pledged Shares.

7.
To our knowledge, there are no claims, actions, suits, proceedings or
investigations pending or threatened against or relating to Company or any of its Subsidiaries,
at law or in equity before at by any Governmental Authority, nor has any such action, suit,
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Reed J. Taylor

August 15, 1995
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proceeding or investigation been pending during the three-year period pm:ediog the date hereof.
Neither Company nor any of its Subsidiaries is in default with respect to any adjudicatory Older,
writ, illjunction or decree of any Governmental authorityt and neither Company nor any of its
Subsidiaries is a party t.o any cease and desist order, supervisory agreement or arrangement,
consensual or otherwise, with any Governmental Authority.

The foregoing opinions are limited to the laws and regulations of the State of Idaho
(excluding the principles of conflicts of laws); and we have not considered and expre.ed no
opinion OJ;l the laws or .regulations of any other jurisdiction. This opinion is rendered only with
respect to the laws and the rules. regulations and orders (CJ:cludlng the principles of conflicts
of laws) of the State of Idaho that are in effect as of the date hereof. We assume no
responsibility for updating this opinion to take into account any event, action, interpretation or
change Of law occurring subsequent to the date hefeof tbat may affect the validity af any of the
opinions expressed herein.

ne

enforceability opinion expressed in opinion
following additional qualifications:

12

of this letter is subject to the

The terms of any commission agreement, lockbox a~ent or other
account agreement which may affect the Commission Collateral, the rights of the parties
(other than Company or any of its Subsidiaries) to any such agreement. and any claim
(i)

or defense of such parties against the Company or any of its Subsidiaries rising under or
outside any such agreement.
(ii)
The qualification that certain rights, remedies and waivers contained in the
Transaction Documents may be rendered ineffective, or be limib:d, by applicable Idaho
Jaws or judicial decisions governing such rights, remedies and waivers; but the inclusion
of such rights, remedies and waivers doet n9t affect the validity or enfon:eability of other ./
provisions of ·the Transaction Documents and, in tho event the Company or ·any of its
Subsidiaries does not comply with the material terms of the Transaction Documents, Mr.
Taylor may exercise remedies that wowd nonnally be available under Idaho law· t.o a
secured party provided Idaho law applies and Mr. Taylor proceeds.in accordance with
such law.
(iii)
We express no opinion with respect to the perfection or the relative
priority of the security interests granted to Mr. Taylor in the Commission Collat.cral.
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Reed J. Taylor
August 15, 1995
Pages

Tliis ()pinion is furnishe.d by us solely for your benefit for use in connection with the
Transaction Documents and the transactions contemplated therebyi and it may not be furnished
or quoted: to, Of nmed upon, by any Other pel'llOD.

Very truly yours,

sl
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I, R. JOHN TAYLOR, hereby certify that I am the duly elected,
qualified, and acting President of AIA Services Corporation, a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of
Idaho.
The Company certifies that as of August
following is true, correct and complete:
(a)

(b)

(c)

15,

1995,

the

The Debit.Balance of Reed J. Taylor has been eliminated
and no further obligations are owed by him to the
company;
.r~ .
,
)'<:. '??-·
<-.. /{):::1·1· 9
p
The CAP Service Center Balance as o:li K•l'• ai., · :}t99._ has been
eliminated and no further obligations are owed by Reed J.
Taylor with respect to the CAP Program except for amounts
due for equipment, services or payroll incurred after May
1, 1995 but not yet reimbursed by the CAP Program to AIA
Insurance, Inc.;
All conditions to Closing as set forth in Section 7.1 of
the Stock Redemption Agreement have been satisfied,
except as set forth on the attached Schedule I I I and/or
on the various other Schedules referenced in Article I I I
of the Stock Redemption Agreement;
:r;epresentatJons. and> warranties .of:the:Company set····
..• fgr;th. in::, tl'J.~s· StQC~ R~d.~ption Agreement< are~ true.. · and, '
correct, except as' •set' f"orth•.on· the•.attacbed:·~chedule ·III·
and/or,. on .~the". :various:othe~< Schedu·leii"''referenced in
Article I I I of the Stock Redemption Agreement;

(d):;'":;:.Al'1;

(e)

Except as set forth in the attached Schedule III {!
I. c.), the conditions set forth in Section 3. 2 of the
Stock Redemption Agreement have been satisfied;

(f)

The Company agrees that for purposes of Section 5 .1 (c) of
the Stock Redemption Agreement, the retained earnings of
the Company as of the Closing shall be deemed to be equal
to the retained earnings of the Company as of June 30,
1995;

(g)

The Company's working capital is equal to at least
$500,000;

(h)

The Company's current ratio is equal to at least 1.1 to
1;

(i)

The Company's ratio of Consolidated Long-Term Debt-toConsolidated Net Worth, as described in Section 5.1 (f) of
the Stock Redemption Agreement is equal to at least 3.6
to l; and

(j)

Reed J. Ta.ylor is hereby fully and forever released,
discharged and indemnified by the _comn.an'\t....Lrom all
- l

-
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claims, causes of action, demands, rights, damages,
costs, expenses, fees, compensation, liabilities and
other obligations to the company or any of its
subsidiaries of whatever kind or nature now possessed by
or which may hereafter accrue to Company or any of its
Subsidiaries, on account of or arising out of any
agreement with or any act or omission by Mr. Taylor at
any time prior to the date hereof, whether the
consequences thereof are now existing or may hereafter
arise, or whether they are known or unknown, anticipated
or unanticipated (except those such obligations that
arise under the Agreement, the AIA Insurance, Inc.
General Agency Agreement and Addendum thereto dated
August 1, 1995 and any and all undisclosed obligations of
which Reed J. Taylor had actual knowledge, which were
incurred by Reed J. Taylor on behalf of the Company or
any of its Subsidiaries and which are not reflected on
Company's books and records or its financial statements) .
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
the corporate seal of AIA Services Corporation
on this l.i'th day of
1
.
·
August 1995.
Jl,.tb..
1

l

f

,~l!O!!IJI- .. -..-~tM
Wt• M11MW1t
..
..
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AG~EEMENT

This Schedule sets forth the exceptions to representations and
warranties made by the Company to the Shareholder in Article I I I ~f
the Stock Redemption Aqreement dated July 22, 1995 ("Agreement")
between AIA Services Corporation ("Company") and Reed J. Taylor
("Shareholder")·
EXCEPTIONS APPLYING TO TBE

I.

COMP~

GENERALLY.

A.
Sections 3.2. The Company's representations concerning
its authority to execute, deliver and perform the Agreement and to
consummate the transactions contemplated thereby are qualified as
follows: At a meetinq on July 18, 1995, the Board of Directors
ratified and confirmed its March 7, 1995 resolutions authorizing
the company, through its officers, to execute, deliver and perform
the Stock Redemption Agreement and the transactions contemplated
thereby, subject to satisfaction of the conditions precedent to
Shareholder's obligations as set forth in the Agreement and receipt
of all necessary consents of governmental authorities or third
parties. .. ~.ee Para9rallh I. C. below ( exceptio11s 'tC> Sf1c;:=t~??ls J •.2 and
3 • 3 ) • . .. The,, t,::~niP2'.-i}1'1.~ f;i~1 ~~.f;lf?,i',~C?i~.~~!1~. ,'!'~~i:fiedX :the~:;: sf.oci>· Redemption '"
.~9'~~'~eJ)1:. ~~d.;~.(!lat;.ed tran!!lact1ionsi·a't· . . a:. sp,c;la]. m,e,t!nq· on •.Jµl;v• .1s ,;
'1'?95·~J Consent of the Series A Preferred Stockholder was obtained by
letter agreement dat-ed August 10, 1995.
B.
Sections 3.3 and 3.11. The Company's representation that
the execution, delivery and performance of the Agreement and the
consummation of the transactions contemplated thereby will not
result in a violation or default under any material agreement or
other instrument by which the Company or any subsidiary is bound
and the Company's representation that it is not in violation of any
such aqreement or instrument are qualified as follows:
1.
The Company is currently in technical default of
certain financial covenants contained in the First Interstate Loan
agreement. Those covenant defaults are described in the attached
letter to First Interstate Bank from Rick L Johnson, the Company
Vice President, Finance.
Absent the Bank's. ~itten consent,
completion of transactions contemplated in the Agreement may cause
additional technical defaults of negative financial covenants
contained in the Bank loan agreement.

The Company has thoroughly disclosed to the Bank all
details regarding the proposed transactions.
In view of the
current defaults, the Company has not asked for nor has the Bank.
volunteered written consent.
As the Company is current in all payments due to Bank,
the Company does not anticipate adverse action by the Bank prior to
the scheduled loan payoff date of July 20, 1996.
2.

Absent the prior written consent of Cessna Finance
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Corporation, transfer of AIA Insurance, Inc.'s Cessna aircraft (FAA
Reg. No. N27227) to Reed J. Taylor pursuant to the terms of the
Aqreement would constitute a default under the Note and security
Agreement dated September 7, 1992, and would entitle Cessna Finance
Corporation to accelerate the remaining principal balance due from
AIA Insurance, Inc. in the amount of $672,339.85 as of August 15,
1995. The Company will not transfer title to the Cessna aircraft
to Mr. Taylor until Mr. Taylor has refinanced the Cessna Finance
corporation loan or has assumed that loan and obtained the complete
release of AIA Insurance, Inc. from any further liability thereon,
in accordance with Sections 2.1.2 and 2.6(f) of the Agreement.

c.
Sections 3. 2 and 3. 3.
The Company 1 s representations
concerning consents in Sections 3. 2 and 3. 3 are qualified as
follows:
1.
To the extent any party providing financing to the
company acquires ten percent (10%) or more of the voting securities
of AIA Services Corporation (or the right to acquire such voting
securities), Form A approval by the Idaho and Indiana Insurance
Departments would be required before the Company could consummate
the related transactions contemplated by the Agreement.
2.
The Company has been made aware that the Texas
Department of Insurance has taken the position that the
distribution of AIA Insurance, Inc. requires prior departmental
approval due to the status the Company's Subsidiary, The Universe
Life Insurance Company ("ULIC"), as "commercially domiciled" in
Texas. The Company, while disputing the necessity of such approval,
has none the less filed the necessary forms to obtain such
approval.
The Company intends to close the transactions
contemplated by the Agreement upon receipt of Idaho Insurance
Department approval.
The California Department of Insurance requires the
submission of a prior approval form for the Centennial reinsurance
treaty.
Since the transaction does not affect any Cal.if ornia
insureds, and ULIC is not being dissolved or merged, approval is
expected in due course.
The Company intends to close the
transactions contemplated by the Agreement upon receipt of Idaho
approval.
3.
As described above in connection.with Section 3.3.,
certain transactions contemplated by the Agreement would violate
provisions of the First Interstate Bank Loan Agreement and related
documents, as well as AIA Insurance, Inc •.' s obligation to Cessna
Finance Corporation.
D.
Section 3. §.
The Company's financial representations
contained in Section 3. 6 are supplemented by the fallowing attached
financial statements related to the quarter ended June 30, 1995:
AIA Services Consolidated Balance Sheets at June 30,
1995.

AIA Services Consolidated Statement of Income For Six Months
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Ending June 30, 1995.
The Universe Life Preliminary Results of Operations (Statutory
Basis) For Three and Six Months Ending June 30, 1995.
Great Fidelity Preliminary Results of Operations
(Statutory Basis) For Three and Six Months Ending June
30, 1995.
AIA Services consolidated Preliminary Results of Operations
For Six Months Ending June 30, 1995.
II.

EXCEPTIONS APPLYING SOLELY TO OJJIVERSE LIPE.

sections J . 1 , 3 • 9 and 3 • 11.
The Company's representations
concerning Uni verse Life's good standing and qualification to
transact business in various states and its compliance with state
insurance laws are qualified by the following description of
regulatory proceedings in the various states in which the insurance
company transacts business.
Texas. On March 22, 1994, the State of Texas issued Cease and
Desist Order No. 94-0282 against Universe Life and its subsidiary,
AIA Insurance, Inc. The Order was based on preliminary examination
findings reported to the Texas Department of Insurance ("TDI") by
the examiners.
The Order alleged that Universe Life and its
affiliate engaged in unfair methods of competition and deceptive
practice of insurance and that Universe Life was in hazardous
financial condition. Following discussions with the company and
receipt of additional documentation, TOI issued a Consent order
dated May 17, 1994 which superseded the Cease and Desist Order in
its entirety. The consent Order abandoned allegations of unfair
competition and deceptive practices and focused on TDI's concerns
with the proper reserving for the Supplemental Benefit Accumulation
("SBA") feature of Universe Life's GUH product and the valuation of
Universe Life's investment in its subsidiary, AIA Insurance, Inc.
To address its concern with conflicting actuarial opinions on
the proper reserves for the SBA, the May 17, 1994 Consent Order
directed Universe Life to select an independent actuary to review
Universe Life's SBA reserving methods and factors. Universe Life
and the Department agreed that this actuarial review would be
performed by Donna R. Claire, F.S.A., of Claire Thinking, an
independent consulting actuary.
Ms. Claire performed an asset
adequacy analysis of Universe Life's reported December 31, 1993 SBA
reserves, including a thorough review of GUH product features,
actuarial assumptions, actual experience and historical trends.
Ms. Claire's analysis is contained in her Asset Adequacy Report
dated June 12, 1994.

..

In her Report, Ms. Claire observed that Universe Life's GUH
product, with its SBA feature, is an innovative product and that ,
" [a] s such, there is no current reserve standard for the SBA in
state law that specifically fits this benefit".
Ms. Claire
concluded that (i) Universe Life's independent consulting
actuaries, Milliman and Robertson, had developed "a methodology
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which follows the basic standards of establishing reserves that
reflect the underlying risks of the product"; (ii) "[t)he reserve
methodology used by [Universe Life's actuaries] does appear to be
reasonable"; and (iii) "given the experience that was developed
through 1993, the reserves reported in the (1993] Annual Statement
were adequate". Based on sensitivity tests which showed that the
reported reserves may be inadequate if adverse trends occur,
however, Ms. Claire recommended that the reserves be increased on
the basis of "somewhat stronger" reserve assumptions. Applying the
same gross premium valuation methodology used by Universe Life to
develop its reported reserves, Ms. Claire developed new reserving
factors reflecting her more conservative assumptions.
Universe
Life agreed with TDI that the SBA reserves for the Texas
certif icateholders
under GUH policy would be
determined
prospectively in accordance with the factors developed by Donna
Claire, with any increase in reserves being applied ratably
beginning July 1, 1995 and with the final entry being made December
31, 1996.

With respect to the valuation of AIA Insurance, Inc., TOI
acknowledged that Universe Life's accounting for the value of AIA
Insurance was permissible under Texas law; but, in light of a Texas
statute allowing the Commissioner to ascribe any other valuation he
believes more appropriate (after hearing) and the impending
statutory change in the Idaho Insurance Code effective July 1, 1995
(see below), the May 17, 1994 Consent Order directed that Universe
Life's investment in AIA Insurance, Inc. be reduced, ratably over
a three-year period beginning December 31, 1994, to the lesser of
net worth as determined in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles or the valuation amount reflected in the
final report of this examination.
During the period of discussions between Universe Life and
TDI, the Texas Insurance Commissioner approved Univers~ Life's new
GUH III product and the transfer of Universe Life's group health
and life insurance business in Texas by reinsuring, on an
assumption basis, all of such business with The Centennial Life
Insurance Company. see "Market Conduct Activities -- Policy Form
Filings and Approvals" and "Subsequent Events-Sale of Group
Universal Health Business" above.

'

.

On October 13, 1994, TOI issued a further Qonsent Order which
superseded the May 17, 1994 Consent Order in its entirety. The
October Order recited Universe Life's agreement concerning the
implementation of the Claire factors for reserving for the SBA and
ordered that Uni verse Life reduce the reported value of its
subsidiary, AIA Insurance, Inc., to the lesser or net worth (as
determined in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles) or the valuation amount reflected in the final report
of this examination, provided that the adjustment in the AIA
Insurance carrying value would be made ratably over a three-year
period beginning December 31, 1994.
Idaho.
Based on the financial concerns raised by the
preliminary examination results and the issuance of the Texas Cease
and Desist order, the Idaho Department of Insurance ("Department")
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initiated an inquiry resulting in a Voluntary Agreement Concerning
Supervisor, dated April 26, 1994 between Universe Life and the
Department.
Under the Agreement, Universe Life has provided
financial and other information to the Department on a regular
basis to enable the Department to informally monitor Universe
Life's financial condition and operations to assure that
policyholders' interests were protected during the period required
to resolve the financial and other examination issues. During the
period of discussions, the Department has approved Universe Life's
new GUH III product, the transfer of Universe Life's individual
health insurance business to States General Life Insurance Company
and the transfer of its group health and life insurance business to
The Centennial Life Insurance Company.

By agreement dated December 23, 1994, the Idaho Department
approved Donna Claire's gross premium valuation method and Ms.
Claire's reserving factors for calculating SBA reserves in
accordance with her Asset Adequacy Report dated June 12, 1994. The
Department agreed that Universe Life would not be required to
restate its 1992 or 1993 Annual statements and that implementation
of the Donna Claire reserve adjustment will be made prospectively,
in accordance with TDI's October 13, 1994 Consent Order, on a
quarterly basis beginning with the third quarter of 1995 and ending
December 31, 1996. The following table shows the effect of the
Donna Claire adjustments to Universe Lffe 1 s reported aggregate
reserve for accident and health policies and to its capital and
surplus at December 31, 1992, 1993 and 1994:
Capital & surplus reported by Universe Life:
4,182,781
Aggregate reserve for A & H policies
As reported
As calculated by Claire factor
Claire £actor adjustment
385,731)

$ 5,418,748 $ 5,140,830$

10,376,371

Capital & surplus after Claire factor adjustment:

14,040,419
9,193,850
7,843,186 14, 801, 6619,57:1,!ill.
2.533.184(
761. 242) (
$ 7 951. 932
I

4.379.5883,797.g~g

In the December 23, 1994 agreement, th!3 ;cdaho Insurance
Department acknowledged that, until July 1, 1995, the Idaho
Insurance Code permits Universe Life to continue to report its
investment in AIA Insurance, Inc. at historical cost (subject to a
15% of assets limitation) on its 1992, 1993, and 1994 Annual
statements. Al though permitted by Idaho statute, this valuation of
AIA Insurance, Inc. deviates from the NAIC standards for investment
in subsidiaries as set forth in the NAIC Accounting Practices and
Procedures Manual for Life and Accident and Health Insurance
Companies. See "Valuation of AIA Insurance, Inc." above under the
caption "Comments on 1992 Financial statements: common Stock". on
July 1, 1995, Universe Life will be required to reduce the value of
its investment in AIA Insurance, Inc., for statutory accounting
purpos.es, to the net book value of AIA Insurance, Inc (which was
$2,424,097 at December 31, 1992).
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Other states. The following regulatory proceedings in other
jurisdictions were precipitated by the issuance of the Texas Cease
and Desist order and/or the preliminary examination findings
contained therein:
A Notice of Hearing and Order to Show cause with Suspension
Instanter was issued by the Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner on
April 6, 1994 based on the Texas cease and Desist order. On May
26, 1994, by letter agreement based on the May 17, 1994 TDI Consent
Order and Universe Life's April 26, 1994 Voluntary Agreement with
the Idaho Insurance Department, the Oklahoma Department agreed to
suspend and terminate the prior Notice and Order to Show cause and
to allow Universe Life to continue to solicit business from its
existing policyholder associations.
An Order of Suspension based on the Texas Cease and Desist
Order was issued by the Illinois Department of Insurance on April
26, 1994.
The Suspension Order was lifted by stipulation and
consent Order dated July 27, 1994, pursuant to which Universe Life
agreed to notify the Illinois Department before transacting new
business in the state during the next three years.
A notice to show cause regarding suspension from doing
business in the state of Mississippi was issued by the Mississippi
Insurance Department on May 6, 1994, based on the Texas Cease and
Desist Order.
Suspension of Uni verse Life's certificate of
authority was initially stayed by the Department; however, on
September 8, 1994, a suspension Order was entered based upon the
appearance that Universe Life was then in an unsound condition.
The Alaska Insurance Department issued an Order suspending
Universe Life's certificate of authority on May 19, 1994, based on
the Texas cease and Desist Order. Universe Life entered into an
Agreement to Suspend New Sales on July 27, 1994; and the Alaska
Insurance Department withdrew the suspension order. universe Life
had not been writing new business in Alaska, so the Agreement to
suspend New Sales has had no financial effect on Universe Life's
operations.
The Missouri Insurance Department issued a Notice of
Institution of Case and Statement of Charges dated June 2, 1994,
based upon the Texas cease and Desist Order •. A. hearing in the
matter has been continued indefinitely, to be re-set upon further
notice to Universe Life.

. .

In June 1994, the California Insurance Department initiated an
informal inquiry based on the Texas Cease and Desist Order.
Universe Life entered into a confidential voluntary agreement to
cease writing new business in California. Universe Life had not
been writing new business in California; so the confidential
agreement has had no financial effect on Universe Life's
operations •
On June 6, 1994, a Suspension Order was issued by the Wyoming
Department of Insurance without prior notice or hearing, based on
the Illinois Suspension Order. Based upon subsequent withdrawal of
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the Illinois and Texas orders, Wyoming lifted the Order of
suspension and entered a Stipulation and Consent Order dated July
2a, 1994, pursuant to which Universe Life was permitted to continue
soliciting its existing policyholder association but agreed not to
solicit other business in Wyoming without the Department's consent.
universe Life voluntarily agreed to suspend new business in
Oregon pending resolution of the Oregon Insurance Department's
concerns under a unique Oregon statute regarding valuation of
Universe Life's investment in AIA Insurance, Inc. A consent Order
was issued June 30, 1994. A suspension Order was issued August 23,
upon expiration of the Consent Order. Universe Life requested a
hearing; and an Amended Suspension Order prohibiting new sales was
entered November 2, 1994.
A Notice of summary suspension was issued by the Iowa Division
of Insurance on August 15, 1994, based on failure of Universe Life
to file its annual audited financial report by June 1, 1994. (The
auditor's report on Universe Life's 1993 financial statements was
delayed pending Idaho's determination of financial issues raised by
the examination. A draft of the audited financial statements had
previously been provided to Iowa Division of Insurance. ) The Order
of suspension was rescinded and the administrative proceeding
dismissed on September 6, 1994. on January 6, 1995, the Division
issued a Notice of Hearing to determine whether Universe Life's
surplus met statutory minimums. Outside counsel informed Universe
Life on April 10, 1995 that Iowa is dropping the action.
Universe Life entered into an Agreement with the Washington
Insurance Department dated August 18, 1994, in which Universe Life
voluntarily agreed not to write any new business in the State
without prior approval of the Commissioner, pending submission of
information establishing that Universe Life's financial condition
is not detrimental to Washington policyholders.
on September 9, 1994, the Utah Insurance Department issued a
Notice of Informal Adjudicative Proceeding summarily suspending
Universe Life's Certificate of Authority for failure to maintain
minimum capital and surplus as calculated under unique Utah
statutes. Universe Life's hearing request was withdrawn after the
Department's Chief Examiner advised that the suspension order could
be lifted upon informal presentation by Univers~ Life's management
after year-end demonstrating compliance with minimum capital and
surplus requirements.
The Nebraska Department contacted Uni verse Life on October 14,
1994, concerning Universe Life's financial condition.
Universe
Life signed a Consent Order to suspend new sales on October 28,
1994.
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RODERICK C. BOND. !SB No. 8082
MICHAELS. BISSELL, ISB No. 5162
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, WA 9920 l

Tel: (509)455-7100
Pax: (509) 455-71 l l

Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TA YI.OR, a single person,
Plaintiff,
v.
AIA SERVICES CORPORA'flON, an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FR.BEMAN, a single person; JOLEB
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and
CORRINE BECK, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;

Case No.: CV-07-00208

AFFIDAVIT OF RBEDJ. TAYLOR IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF REED J.
TAYLOR'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

)

)ss:
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE )

r, Reed J. Taylor, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

J am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in court, the

plaintiff in the above-entitled action, and make this Affidavit based upon my personal
AF'FIDA VIT OF REED J. TAYLOR - I
~:n
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knowledge.
2.

I am 73 years-old. I have no college degree and always worked very hard

as an insurance salesman over the years. R. John Taylor is my brother. I first hired R.
John Taylor after he had been an accountant, had passed the CPA exam, and had obtained
his law degree and bar admission to Idaho. Connie Taylor was my sister·in·law during

the negotiations for my shares to be redeemed through the time she was divorced from R.
John Taylor in or about December 2005. Connie Taylor was also my attorney in Taylor
v. Maile, et al., when she asserted the illegality argument and has remained my attorney

on that case.
3.

John Taylor has served as President for AIA Services since its formation

and has been in charge of all of the legal and financial affairs of AIA Services and its

subsidiaries since that time. I believed that as my brother, as an accountant, and as an

attonley, R. John Taylor would properly care for the legal and financial affairs of AIA
Services. The board of directors agreed and these duties were delegated and handled by
R. John Taylor. I had very little understanding of legal issues as R. John Taylor had
always handled the office, financial and legal affairs of the AIA corporations, while I was
out in the :field selling. My position as C.E.O. was more of an honorary title than a
functional one as R. John Taylor, the President of AIA Services, was in charge of all dayto-day operations and decisions of AIA Services and its subsidiaries. In fact, there were
many times that I would be out of town fur many days and/or weeks selling and
marketing insurance products and recruiting new associations and agents in other states
and would never even be in AIA 's office or even see any of AIA's office employees. R.
John Taylor's decision making control is further evidenced by the many inappropriate
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financial transaction referenced in my Statement of Facts in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment.
4.

r presently

have no steady and reliable source of income, other than

interest accrued on a limited amount of funds In my IRA, which are insufficient to
support me. I was relying upon the payments and eventual payment in full of my $6

Million Note for my retirement fimds.

r would have never agreed to sell my shares had I

been told that my $6 Million Note would never be honored. When I sold my shares, R.
John Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman and others wanted to talce AIA Services a
different direction and attempt to take it public. 1 did not agree with their ideas, which
help persuade me to sell.

S.

The total amount of dollars paid to me over the years as reflected in the

attached Exhibit 1 to Connie Taylor and James Beck's Response is incorrect. First, I had
to assume the loan for over $650,000 owed on the Cessna Conquest that was transferred
to me as a part of the consideration of the redemption of my shares. Other items on
Exhibit 1 are also incorrect. Over the years. I have incurred hundreds of thousands of
dollars in expenses, insurance and maintenance for the Cessna Conquest transferred to
me, while AIA and John Taylor used the plane and at certain times and on certain

occasions paid for the use of the plane (which such payments are included in the
payments referenced on Exhibit l and were not payments for my redemption).
6.

I would have never kept the Ces.<>.na Conquest or agreed to accept it as

partial consideration for the redemption of my shares had AIA Services, John Taylor and
the other defendants in this action represented to me that they were going to transfer

millions of dollars out of AIA Services and its subsidiaries and then later argue that my
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$6 Million Note, plus accrued interest, would never be paid. As it stands, I am owed over

$9 Million for the note, plus accrued interest.
7.

Also depicted on F..xhibit J are purported payments to Donna Taylor, my

ex-wife. She, like me, has never been paid as promised. The Serles A Preferred Shares
owned by her were issued to her as part of our divorce because we contributed virtually
all of the shares of AJA Insurance to AlA Services, along with shares of other entities. I
had founded AIA Insurance long before I hired R. Jolm Taylor. AJA Insurance generated
over $50,000,000 in commissions and other revenue after I sold my shares in AIA
Services and these funds were in part unlawfully used to fonn, operate, fund, transfer
millions of doUars to, and provide employee time and eiforts for CropUSA insurance
Agency, Inc.. for the benefit of R. John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, JoLee
Duclos, and others. I have also learned that R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor have
transferred property through the AIA corporations to themselves, provided hundreds and
hundreds of thousands of dollars in funding and inappropriate loans to Pacific Empire
Radio Corporation and other entities relating to the radio business, which such funds
were all derived from the AIA corporations, along witb receiving approximately over
$2,000,000 in salary, compensation, and other benefits from AJA Services from the time
I sold my shares to the present time.
8.

From January 1995, through the end of 1995 (the entire time of the

negotiations for the redemption of my shares), AfA Services had in·house-eounsel
representing it named Daniel Spickler. Mr. Spickler was also AIA Services' secretary
and a vice president dul'ing the l 99S calendar year and he is now the Nez Perce County
Prosecuting Attorney. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the attorney

AFFIDAVIT OF REED J. TAYLOR- 4

RILEY 000640

002142

infonnation on Daniel Spickler which I obtained from the Idaho State Bar website, which
shows Mr. Spickler has been licensed to practice luw in Idaho since 1982. At no time did
Mr. Spickler or anyone else advise me thl:lt the redemption of my shares violated any laws
or statutes. Despite my requests and motions to compel, we have never been provided

the opportunity to depose Mr. Spickler to ascertain any facts surrounding the redemption
of my shares, shareholder meetings and board meetings. Attached as Exhibit B is a true
and correct copy of the attorney information on Mickey Turnbow which I obtained from
the Idaho State Bar website. Mr. Turnbow was one of the attorneys that represented AJA
Services in the redemption of my shares and issued the opinion letter to me. Richard
RHey was the primary attorney for the negotiation and finalizing of the redemption
agreements for the redemption of my shares. Attached as Exhibit C is a true and correct
copy of Richard Riley's print out that I obtained from the Idaho State Bar website. As
indicated in the attached Exhibit

c.

Mr. Riley is now practicing law with Hawley,

Troxell, et al., one of the firms asserting the illegality argument.
9.

The negotiations for the redemption of my shares commenced months

before the signing of the Stock Redemption Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement,
Security Agreement and ancillary agreements were executed on and after July 22, 1995
("agreements"). Upon advise of my counsel Scott Bell, I conditioned the sale of my
shares on AIA Services obtaining all necessary approvals and consents from all
shareholders, that the agreements did not violate any laws, and that AIA Services' outside
counsel, Richard Riley and Mickey Turnbow of Eberle, Berlin, et al., would provide me
with legal opinions and representations thal the agreements were enforceable, approved
by shareholders and did not violate any laws. Richard Riley and other attorneys at
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Eberle, Berlin, et al., had represented AIA Services and its subsidiaries for years prior to
the redemption of my shares and were intimately familiar wi1h their operations and their
legal affairs.
10.

Through 1he Stock Redemption Agreement (signed by R. John Taylor),

agreeme11ts (signed by R. John Tayl01), the certificate signed by R. John Taylor on

August 16, 1995 (which was a document required prior to closing the redemption of my
shares, the contents of which were provided to us prior to closing), and Richard Riley,
Mickey Turnbow, and Eberle, Berlin, et al!s representations contained in their Opinion
Letter dated August 15, 1995 1 (which was a document required prior to closing the
redemption of my shares the contents of which were provided to my attorney prior to
<"losing), {l) AJA Services, its attorneys, and R. John Taylor represented to me

(including, without limitation) that AIA Services had the power and authority to enter
into the Redemption Agreements and agreements, that all necessary shareholder
approvals and consents were obtained, that the agreements were enforceable, and that the
agreements would not violate any laws; (l) these representations were false as set forth in
the Court's Opinion and Order dated June 17, 2009; (3) these representations were
material and were used to induce me to sell my shares in AIA Services through the Stock
Redemption Agreements and agreements, but for these representations I would have

never pem1itted my shares to be redeemed in AIA Services;_ (4) l was ignorant as to the
falsity of these representations and had no reason to doubt in the slightest that the
Redemption Agreements and agreements violated Idaho law or I.C. § 301-6, particularly

when R. John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Daniel Spickler, Richard Riley and Mickey
1
Tho opinion letter as it applies to this case only relates to Richard Riley, Mickey Turnbow and Eberle,
Berlin, ct al. 's representations a.s agents for AIA Services, and not their 11ct.s andlor omissions pertaining 10
my claims against lhem.
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Turnbow all had superior knowledge to me because they were all attorneys licensed to
practice law in Idaho and R. John Taylor, Richard Riley, Mickey Turnbow and Daniel
Spickler had superior knowledge of legal issues and the financial affairs of AIA Services
and its subsidiaries; (5) I relied upon these representations when I agreed to have all of

my shares redeemed by AIA Services, but for these representations I would have never
agreed to sell my shares in AJA Services-these representations were all made to induce
me to have my shares redeemed by AIA Services; (6) I justifiably relied upon these

representations and again had no reason to not justifiably rely upon the representations.
For example, R. John Taylor (my brother), Connie Taylor (my sister-in-law), Daniel
Spickler (AIA Services' in-house-counsel), Richard Riley (AIA Services' outside
counsel), and Mickey Turnbow (AJA Services' outside counsel) and Eberle, Berlin, et al.
(AfA Services' outside law firm) were all attorneys licensed to practice law in the state of
Idaho or a law firm comprised of attorneys licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho, I
justifiably relied on the fact that not a single one of them objected to the redemption of
my shares and all consented to the redemption of my shares; and (7) I have now been
damaged by way of the Court's Opinion and Order dated June 17, 2009, in which the
Court found the redemption of my shares was iUega1 and it v.11s refusing to enforce the
agreements, through which such agreements, and specifically the $6 Million Promissory
Note, AfA Services owes my over $9 Million, plus the payment of my attorneys' fees
incurred to date in the amount exceeding hundreds of thousands of dollars. In addition,
R. John Taylor owed me fiduciary duties as my brother and as a shareholder of AIA
Services to ensure all laws were complied with, as did Connie Taylor my sister·in·law
and a co-shareholder of ArA Services.
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11.

I would never have agreed to sell my shares had anyone advised me that it

would was illegal or the agreements would be illegal contracts. As I have testified
before. I had to be persuaded to sell my shares in AIA Services. The defendants argue
now that I "pillaged the village" yet they are the ones who have unlawfully transferred
millions of dollars from AIA Services and its subsidiaries to themselves, CropUSA and
other corporations, and have made the illegality argument to avoid liability for their acts
and not pay me the money that I am owed.

12.

I had no knowledge of share redemption laws or statutes in Idaho and I

had no knowledge of the existence or meaning of r.c. § 30· 1-6 until the issue was raised
in this action. Until this action, no one has ever explained or mentioned to me that I.C. §
30-1-6 existed or needed to be complied with in any way, let alone how to comply with
it. I would have never agreed to have my shares redeemed in AJA Services hut for the

overwhelming majority of the other shareholders voting and desiring to have my shares
redeemed. For the defendants to make the inference that I somehow pulled the wool over
the eyes of five attorneys licensed to practice law in Idaho and shareholders who voted

and approved of the redemption of my shares is a not only incorrect, but also not
supported by any evidence. I never forced anyone to redeem my shares through a
majority vote of my shares or otherwise.

DATED: Thls 21 51 day of July, 2009.
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 21st day of July, 2009.
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Phone: (208) 799-3073 Ext.
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Rlcllard Alan Riley

Address: PO Bo!( 1617
Boise. l D 83 70 I
Fim1: Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley. !..LP
Phone; (208) 344-6000 Ext.
FAX: {208) 954-5255

f!-Mail Add1-ess: rrilcy@hawlcytroxelf.com
Website Addre!ll: www.hteh.com
ISB Membel'$hip Number: 2114
Admitta11cc Date: Sepl?-311977
Status: Active

Robert Handley Riley
Address:
Firm:
Phooc: Ext.
l'AX:

E-Mail Address:
Website Address:
ISB Membership Number: 4394
Admittance Date: Apr/2~/1993
Status: Deceased
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James D. LaRue ISB #1780
Loren C. Ipsen ISB #1767
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844

AUG 15 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ANNAMARIE MEYER
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendants, Richard A. Riley
and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-OC-0918868

v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; SHARON
CUMMINGS, Personal Representative of the
Estate of Robert M. Turnbow; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
OF RICHARD A. RILEY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.
STATEOFIDAHO )
) SS.

County of Ada

)

RICHARD A. RILEY, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says:
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1.

I am a defendant in the above-captioned action, over 18 years of age, and competent

to testify regarding the matters set forth herein. I make this affidavit based upon my personal
knowledge.
2.

I have previously filed an Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment in

this case (hereinafter referred to as the "Riley Aff. "), which was filed with the Court on January 15,
2010, and hereby supplement said Affidavit as set forth herein.
3.

Prior to March 1, 1999, I was an attorney employed by the firm of Eberle, Berlin,

Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered ("Eberle Berlin"). During my employment by that firm,
Eberle Berlin was engaged by AIA Services Corporation ("AIA") in connection with the 1995
redemption by AIA of the common stock owned by Reed Taylor. Reed Taylor was the controlling
shareholder of AIA, who owned approximately 63% of its common stock prior to the redemption,
and was the Chairman of the Board of Directors and the Chief Executive Officer of AIA Services.
He had complete access to all financial, accounting and other records of AIA. Eberle Berlin
represented only AIA in regard to the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. Reed Taylor was
represented by separate counsel of his selection, Scott T. Bell and Frank Taylor of the firm of
Caimcross & Hempelmann in Seattle, Washington.
4.

In order to illustrate the manner in which the 1995 stock redemption transaction was

later superseded and restructured in 1996, I am attaching to this Affidavit a more complete set of
documents that were executed by the parties. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a copy of the Stock
Redemption Agreement dated July 22, 1995, between AIA and Reed Taylor (the "1995 Stock
Redemption Agreement"). Paragraph 2.1.2 of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement originally
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provided that a down payment of $1,500,000 would be made by AIA to Reed Taylor by cashier's
check at closing. Additionally, AIA agreed to deliver a $6,000,000 promissory note payable to Mr.
Taylor, to transfer certain airplanes to him, to release certain debts owed by him, and to cause
specified tangible personal property to be transferred to him. However, even before closing it
became apparent that AIA could not make the $1,500,000 down payment to Reed Taylor, and the
parties entered into an Addendum to Stock Redemption Agreement dated July 22, 1995, a copy of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit 2, whereby it was agreed that a $1,500,000 promissory note (the
"Down Payment Note") would be substituted for the cash down payment and certain additional
consideration would be granted to Reed Taylor. The Down Payment Note matured 90 days after the
closing of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a copy of the $1. 5
Million Down Payment Note dated July 22, 1995.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a copy of the Promissory Note dated August 1, 1995,

in the principal amount of$6,000,000 dated August 1, 1995, evidencing the deferred balance of the
purchase price with respect to the redemption of Reed Taylor's stock (the "$6M Note"). The $6M
Note called for monthly payments of interest only, and did not mature until August 1, 2005.
6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 5 is a copy of the Stock Pledge Agreement dated July 22,

1995 (the "1995 Stock Pledge Agreement"), which was executed by the parties in connection with
the redemption by AIA of Reed Taylor's common stock.
7.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 6 is a copy of the Security Agreement dated July 22, 1995

(the "1995 Security Agreement"), granting to Reed Taylor a security interest in certain commissions
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from the sale of insurance or related services as collateral for the payment of the balance owing with
respect to the redemption by AIA of his common stock.
8.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 7 is a copy of the Consulting Agreement dated July 22,

1995 (the "1995 Consulting Agreement"), entered into by Reed Taylor and AIA in connection with
the redemption by AIA of Reed Taylor's common stock.
9.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 8 is a copy of the Noncompetition Agreement dated July

22, 1995 (the "1995 Noncompetition Agreement"), entered into by Reed Taylor and AIA in
connection with the redemption by AIA of Reed Taylor's common stock.
10.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 9 is what I believe to be a copy of the Bill of Sale dated

August 16, 1995 (the "1995 Bill of Sale"), evidencing the transfer of certain tangible personal
property from AIA to Reed Taylor in connection with the redemption by AIA of his common stock.
11.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 10 is copy of the written opinion dated August 15, 1995

issued by the law firm of Eberle Berlin addressed to Reed Taylor in connection with the redemption
by AIA of his common stock ("1995 Opinion Letter"), together with an attachment to the opinion
letter consisting of Schedule III to the Stock Redemption Agreement.

I participated in the

preparation of the 1995 Opinion Letter.
12.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 11 is a copy of Schedule 1 to the 1995 Stock Redemption

Agreement without the referenced Exhibit 1-A.
13.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 12 is a copy of Schedule 2.1.2 to the 1995 Stock

Redemption Agreement.
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14.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 13 is a copy of Schedule 3.4 to the 1995 Stock

Redemption Agreement.
15.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 14 is a copy of Schedule 3.6 to the 1995 Stock

Redemption Agreement.
16.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 15 is a copy of Schedule 3.7 to the 1995 Stock

Redemption Agreement.
17.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 16 is a copy of Schedule 3.11 to the 1995 Stock

Redemption Agreement.
Attached hereto as Exhibit 16A is a certificate of John Taylor dated August 16, 1995
delivered in connection with closing the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement.
18.

AIA defaulted almost immediately under the terms of the 1995 Stock Redemption

Agreement by failing to pay the $1.5 Million Down Payment Note to Reed Taylor when it became
due on its maturity date in October 1995. There followed a lengthy series of notices of default sent
by or on behalf of Reed Taylor, responses on behalf of AIA, discussions regarding potential remedies
and negotiations regarding restructuring the agreement. By letter dated April 18, 1996, a copy of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit 17, Reed Taylor provided notice of default under the Stock
Redemption Agreement and demanded payment in full of principal and interest falling due pursuant
to the $1.5 Million Down Payment Note. Additionally, Reed Taylor claimed that the following
defaults had occurred under the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement:
"l.

Failure to pay my [Reed Taylor's] attorney fees, as required under the
Agreement.
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"2.

Failure to provide me [Reed Taylor] with quarterly financial statements,
prepared in accordance with GAAP, within 45 days of the end of each fiscal
quarter.

"3.

Failure to pay the balance of interest accruing in February and March of 1996
on the $6,000,000 Promissory Note under the terms of the Agreement in the
amount of $32,976, which became due an[d] payable as a result of Donna
Taylor's letter ofrecession [sic], dated April 16, 1996, of the July 18, 1995,
letter of agreement limiting such interest payments to me [Reed Taylor].

"4.

Alleged failure to comply with financial covenants as outlined in Sections
5.1, (c), (d), (e), and (t) of the Agreement."

19.

By letter dated April 22, 1996, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 18,

John Taylor responded by contesting Reed Taylor's contentions regarding the down payment note
and by rejecting Reed Taylor's allegations regarding the other alleged defaults. John Taylor
contended that Reed Taylor was taking $80,000 to $100,000 out of the company on a monthly basis,
and suggested that the interested parties have a "Come to Jesus" meeting.
20.

By letter dated April 25, 1996, acopyofwhichis attached hereto as Exhibit 19, Reed

Taylor's attorney, Scott Bell, of the Seattle firm of Cairncross & Hempelmann, responded to John
Taylor's letter of April 22, 1996, and gave formal written notice of additional claimed defaults under
the Stock Redemption Agreement and related documents. While agreeing that the parties should
meet to discuss the issues, Mr. Bell stated that, "Reed has no choice but to pursue vigorously those
remedies which he is afforded under the Stock Redemption Agreement and ancillary documents."
21.

By letter dated May 3, 1996, to Scott Bell, a copy of which is attached hereto as

Exhibit 20, I responded to his letter of April 25, 1996.
22.

Frank Taylor, another attorney with the Cairncross & Hempelmann firm representing

Reed Taylor, sent me a letter dated May 15, 1996, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 21,
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enclosing a proposed Forbearance Agreement for the purpose of amending certain terms and
provisions of the Stock Redemption Agreement.
23.

Frank Taylor sent another letter dated May 28, 1996, a copy of which is attached

hereto as Exhibit 22, describing certain contacts made with a bank to confirm the existence of a
commission collateral ("Lock Box") account established by AIA and stating that, "Reed has not
taken any action with respect to the commissions collateral to date, nor does he intend to take any
action while the parties are negotiating in good faith toward a resolution of the redemption
arrangement."
24.

By letter also dated May 28, 1996, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 23,

Frank Taylor wrote to summarize the status of negotiations relative to restructuring the stock
redemption arrangement between AIA and Reed Taylor. The handwritten notations in the margin
of Exhibit 23 are not mine and appear to have been added, after I fax-forwarded the letter to AIA,
by an individual reviewing the letter. As indicated by the handwritten notations, which included
"No," "B.S.," "No Way," "Total BS," "not agreed to yet," and "too high," the parties had not yet
reached a meeting of the minds regarding the terms of the proposed restructuring.
25

By way of letter dated May 31, 1996, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit

24, I responded in writing to Frank Taylor concerning the terms of the proposed restructuring of the
stock redemption and enclosing a redraft of the Forbearance Agreement. In that letter I expressed
the expectation that, "[A]ll of the original documents will be superseded in their entirety and the
parties' respective rights and obligations shall be governed solely by the amended documentation
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once the restructuring transaction is closed. Consequently, we will need to redraft each of the
underlying transaction documents to address covenants, representations and warranties, etc.'
26.

Frank Taylor responded by letter dated June 4, 1996, a copy of which is attached

hereto as Exhibit 25, rejecting the terms and conditions contained in my letter of May 31, 1996, and
stating, "[W]e hereby give notice of Reed's proposal to retain all of the Pledged Collateral (as such
term is defined in the Stock Pledge Agreement between Reed and the Company) in full satisfaction
of the Company's promissory note obligation to Reed in the principal amount of $6,000,000.
Pursuant to Idaho Code section 28-9-505, the Company has thirty (30) days to inform Reed of any
objection it may have to his retention of such collateral in satisfaction of the obligation. If the
Company does object, this letter constitutes Reed's notice to the Company of his intention to sell
such collateral, immediately and without further notice, in accordance with applicable statutory
requirements." The collateral included all of the stock of AIA's wholly-owned subsidiary, AIA
Insurance, Inc.
27.

Discussions continued regarding proposals for restructuring the stock redemption

transaction. By letter dated June 6, 1996, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 26, I wrote
to Frank Taylor to summarize the significant terms of a proposed restructure arrangement. While
expressing the need to discuss some of these matters in greater detail, I indicated that it would be
appropriate to incorporate the newly agreed terms in written documentation, using the draft
Forebearance Agreement as the starting place.
28.

Reed Taylor's attorneys, Cairncross & Hempelmann, then originated the Stock

Redemption Restructure Agreements. By letter of transmittal dated June 12, 1996, a copy of which

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD A. RILEY - 8

002159

is attached hereto as Exhibit 27, Frank Taylor forwarded to me the initial drafts of a proposed Stock
Redemption Restructure Agreement, Amended and Restated Down Payment Note, Amended and
Restated Security Agreement, Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended and
Restated Noncompetition Agreement, and Amended and Restated Promissory Note. The purpose
of these draft documents was to completely amend, restate and supersede the 1995 Stock
Redemption Agreement and ancillary documents. At this point in time, the parties still had not
reached final agreement regarding the terms of the restructure, as Frank Taylor cautioned in this
letter of transmittal that, "Reed has not yet reviewed these documents, and therefore they are subject
to change."
29.

On June 13, 1996, I responded to Frank Taylor pursuant to a letter of that date, a copy

of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 28, outlining certain changes in a Lease and a Lock Box
Agreement that were intended to be included in the documentation of the restructured transaction.
30.

By letter dated June 17, 1996, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 29, Frank

Taylor wrote me regarding several aspects of the proposed restructuring transaction, including the
suggestion that the stock pledge be replaced by zero coupon bonds, proposed changes in the terms
of the commission Lock Box Agreement, preparation of a letter agreement with Donna Taylor, and
other items under discussion.
31.

By letter dated June 21, 1996, to Frank Taylor, a copy of which is attached hereto as

Exhibit 30, I communicated certain suggested changes in the terms of the restructure documents.
Among these were the deletion of default provisions from all documents other than the Stock Pledge
Agreement and moving all representations, warranties and covenants to the Stock Pledge Agreement.
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I stated that I had also attempted to simplify the default and remedy provisions in accordance with
the parties' agreement in principle. I enclosed marked up copies of Caimcross' draft documents
intended to incorporate comments of certain parties regarding the documentation. Two key financial
covenants were proposed for the intended purpose of protecting Reed Taylor's security interest in
the pledged shares of stock. I stated, "At this stage, both of these covenants are presented for
conceptual and discussion purposes only, as they need to be further reviewed and refined even if
conceptually acceptable." Finally, I mentioned the anticipated necessity for further discussions to
refine the terms of a covenant regarding the valuation of stock of subsidiaries pledged to Reed
Taylor.
32.

By letter dated June 27, 1996, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 31, I

wrote to Reed Taylor enclosing, at his lawyer's request, a revised draft of a proposed Series A
Preferred Shareholder Agreement, which was intended to continue the subordination of principal of
Reed's $6M Note to the complete redemption of Donna's Series A Preferred Stock and to constitute
part of the restructure of the redemption transaction.
33.

By letter dated July 1, 1996, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 32, I

responded to Reed Taylor's threat (in Frank Taylor's June 4, 1996 letter- Exhibit 25) to retain or sell
the pledged stock securing the stock redemption obligation allegedly owing to him.
34.

Frank Taylor faxed me on July 3, 1996, regarding the amount of fees that his firm

requested to be paid to it in connection with the restructure, and advising of the perceived need to
relax the terms of a Noncompetition Agreement as part of the restructure. A copy of his fax is
attached hereto as Exhibit 33.
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35.

By letter dated July 5, 1996, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 34, I wrote

to Frank Taylor enclosing revised drafts of the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement, the
Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement and the Amended and Restated Security
Agreement, which incorporated my understanding of changes agreed to by the parties during a
telephone conference on July 3, 1996, and discussing other details of the proposed restructure.
36.

Instead of exercising any of the remedies available to him upon default of the 1995

Stock Redemption Agreement (including without limitation, foreclosure on the pledged stock ofAIA
Insurance, Inc. as threatened in Frank Taylor's June 4, 1996 letter [Exhibit 25]), Reed Taylor
ultimately chose to restructure the AIA stock redemption transaction. Attached hereto as Exhibit 35
is a copy of the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement dated July 1, 1996 (the "1996 Restructure
Agreement"), entered into by AIA, Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor.

The 1996 Restructure

Agreement recited at paragraph E that:
"The parties now wish to restructure the stock redemption transaction by (i) adjusting
the principal amount of the Down Payment Note, extending its maturity date,
providing for interest to accrue on the principal balance of the Down Payment Note,
requiring monthly payments of principal and interest under the Down Payment Note,
and providing security for the payment of the Down Payment Note; (ii) terminating
the Consulting Agreement, revising the N oncompetition Agreement, and terminating
the Company's obligation to pay Creditor [Reed Taylor] a monthly salary; (iii)
amending the terms of the Security Agreement and the Stock Pledge Agreement; and
(iv) revising certain representations, warranties and covenants contained in the Stock
Redemption Agreement; and (v) simplifying and consolidating the various default
provisions and remedies therefor. In exchange for this restructuring of the
Company's obligations to Creditor [Reed Taylor], Creditor is willing to agree to
waive, and to forbear from exercising any remedies he may have for, any existing
defaults under the Original Documents, including (without limitation) those defaults
alleged in the Notice of Default."
37.

The 1996 Restructure Agreement further recited at paragraph G that:
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"It is the intention of the parties that this Agreement will supersede and replace the
Stock Redemption Agreement with respect to any and all representations, warranties
and covenants which were made in the Original Documents and which survived the
closing of the stock redemption transaction, and that neither Creditor [Reed Taylor]
nor Company [AIA] will have any right to claim a default under any of the Original
Documents (as they may be amended by this Agreement) merely because any such
representation. warranty or covenant was or in the future becomes false or
unperformed. The parties wish to rely entirely upon those representations. warranties
and covenants contained in the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement (as defined
below). All such representations, warranties and covenants shall be deemed to have
been made on the date of this Agreement." (Emphasis added.)

38.

The 1996 Restructure Agreement defined the "Original Documents" as the 1995

"Stock Redemption Agreement, the Down Payment Note, the $6M Note, the Security Agreement,
the Stock Pledge Agreement, and the Consulting Agreement." All but the $6M Note were
collectively referred to as the "Superseded Documents" and were expressly replaced by new
agreements. The Security Agreement and the Stock Pledge Agreement were amended and restated,
and the Consulting Agreement was entirely terminated. The 1996 Restructure Agreement provided
at paragraph 1.5 that:
"The representations, warranties and covenants made by the Company in the Stock
Redemption Agreement or any other Original Document are hereby superseded and
replaced by the representations, warranties and covenants set forth in the Amended
Stock Pledge Agreement; and neither Company nor Creditor shall have any claim for
any past, existing or future breach of any representation, warranty or covenant made
in any of the Superseded Documents or any claim for any breach of the $6M Note if
such breach occurred prior to the date of this Agreement."
39.

The 1996 Restructure Agreement provided at paragraph 3 that:

"Each of the Companies and Creditor hereby releases the other from any and all
claims (whether known or unknown, anticipated or unanticipated, contingent or
liquidated) such party may have arising out of previous agreements (including,
without limitation, the Original Documents) or other business arrangement between
Company and Creditor or arising out of the Creditor's ownership of or employment
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by Company prior to the date of this Agreement, other than those obligations set forth
in the Restructured Obligations."
40.

The 1996 Restructure Agreement provided at paragraph 4. 6 that:

"This Agreement, including the exhibits hereto, and the ancillary documents
expressly referred to herein, constitute the entire agreement of the parties concerning
the matters referred to herein and supersede all prior agreements and understandings,
oral or written, all of which are hereby superseded and canceled."
41.

The 1996 Restructure Agreement did not call for the delivery of any opinion by AIA' s

counsel. Neither Eberle Berlin nor Richard Riley nor any other Eberle Berlin attorney expressed any
opinion regarding the validity, legality or enforceability of the 1996 Restructure Agreement, the
authorization of the 1996 Restructure Agreement by the directors or shareholders of AIA, or any
other matter relating to the 1996 Restructure Agreement.
42.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 36 is a copy of Schedule 1.6 to the 1996 Restructure

Agreement.
43.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 37 is a copy of a Letter Agreement dated July 1, 1996, in

connection with the 1996 Restructure Agreement.
44.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 38 is a copy of Schedule 2.4 to the 1996 Restructure

Agreement.
45.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 39 is a copy of Schedule 2.5 to the 1996 Restructure

Agreement.
46.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 40 is copy of the Amended and Restated Promissory Note

dated July 1, 1996, in the principal amount of $1,500,000 (the "Amended and Restated $1.5 Million
Down Payment Note") made by AIA in connection with the 1996 Restructure Agreement.
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4 7.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 41 is copy of the Amended and Restated Security

Agreement dated July 1, 1996 (the "Amended and Restated Security Agreement"), made by AIA in
connection with the 1996 Restructure Agreement.
48.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 42 is copy of the Escrow Agreement dated July 23, 1996

(the "Escrow Agreement"), made by AIA in connection with the 1996 Restructure Agreement.
49.

Attached hereto as Exhibits 43, 44 and 45 are copies of Assignments Separate from

Certificate executed by AIA in connection with the 1996 Amended and Restated Stock Pledge
Agreement - Exhibit 46.
50.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 46 is a copy of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge

Agreement dated July 1, 1996 (the "1996 Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement"), made
by AIA in connection with the 1996 Restructure Agreement.
51.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 7 is copy of the Amended and Restated N oncompetition

Agreement dated July 1, 1996 (the "Amended and Restated Noncompetition Agreement"), made by
AIA in connection with the 1996 Restructure Agreement.
52.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 48 is copy of the Lease Agreement (the "Lease

Agreement") made by AIA in connection with the 1996 Restructure Agreement.
53.

Series A Preferred Stock had been authorized and issued by AIA to Donna Taylor,

the former spouse of Reed Taylor, in order to effectuate the division of their community property in
conjunction with their divorce in 1987. Pursuant to Articles of Amendments to the Articles of
Incorporation of AIA Services Corporation filed in 1987 and Amended and Restated Articles of
Incorporation filed April 11, 1995, AIA was obligated to redeem Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred
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Stock; and AIA was subject to various financial and other covenants. Donna Taylor's consent to the
terms of redemption of Reed's common stock in 1995 and waiver of alleged defaults of AIA
obligations to the Series A Preferred Stockholders was therefore required and that consent was set
forth in a series of letter agreements, consisting of (a) a letter from her attorney, Cumer Green, to
me dated January 11, 1995, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 50; (b) a letter from Mr.
Green to me dated March 22, 1995, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 51; (c) a letter
agreement dated July 18, 1995, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 52; and (d) a letter from
me to Mr. Green dated August 10, 1995, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 53. Reed
Taylor was a party to the January 11, 1995, and July 18, 1995, letter agreements, which expressly
subordinated AIA's obligation to pay the redemption price for Reed Taylor's common stock to its
obligation to redeem Donna Taylor's preferred stock. Specifically, both the January 11, 1995, and
July 18, 1995, letter agreements signed by Reed Taylor provided:
"Further, AIA Services Corporation's note or any note payable to Reed J.
Taylor for the $6,000,000 purchase price for his common shares will be subordinated
to the redemption rights of your client [Donna Taylor] so that Reed J. Taylor will
receive no principal payments on said note until Donna Taylor's stock has been
completely redeemed. Reed J. Taylor will receive no interest payments on the note
payable to him if payments to Donna Taylor are in default."
54.

The subordination of AIA's obligation to pay for Reed Taylor's common stock to its

obligation to redeem Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred stock was expressly noted in the $6M Note,
which provided that, "This Note is subordinate to the payment of the redemption obligations owed
by the Company to Donna Taylor pursuant to that certain letter agreement dated January 11, 1995,
signed by Company, Payee [Reed Taylor], Donna Taylor and Cumer Green." My handwritten notes,
made contemporaneously with the research and preparation of the 1995 Opinion Letter, show that
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the subordination of Reed Taylor's redemption obligation to Donna Taylor's was taken into account
in preparing the Opinion Letter. A copy of those notes, and a transcription thereof, are attached
hereto as Exhibit 54. The reference to 4.2.3(b) in my handwritten notes refers to section 4.2.3(b) of
AIA's Articles of Amendment of the Articles of Incorporation of AIA Services Corporation, filed
with the Idaho Secretary of State on April 11, 1995, which provided that AIA could redeem its Series
A Preferred shares " ... only to the extent such redemption shall not violate the Idaho Business
Corporation Act restrictions on the corporation's redemption of its own shares." (See Affidavit of
Loren C. Ipsen.)
55.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 49 is a copy of the Series A Preferred Shareholder

Agreement dated July 1, 1996, that was attached as an exhibit and executed in connection with the
1996 Restructure Agreement. Under the terms of the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement,
Donna Taylor consented to the 1996 Restructure Agreement, and it was expressly agreed in
paragraph 3 that AIA's obligation to pay the principal of the $6M Note to Reed Taylor would be
subordinate to AIA's obligation to redeem Donna Taylor's Preferred Stock:
"3.
Subordination of Certain Principal Payments to Creditor. Payment of
principal to Creditor [Reed Taylor] on the $6M Note (whether at maturity or at any
earlier time in accordance with any right of prepayment) shall be subordinated to
payment in full of Company's obligation to redeem the Series A Preferred Stock.
Company shall not pay any principal on the $6M Note until Series A Preferred Stock
is completely redeemed (provided, however, that this limitation shall not preclude
Company from exercising any contractual or equitable right of offset against the
principal of the $6M Note)."
56.

After Reed Taylor filed the AIA Case, I learned that Reed had convinced Donna

Taylor to execute a Subordination Agreement dated December 1, 2006, a copy of which is attached
hereto as Exhibit 55, whereby she agreed to subordinate all amounts owed to her under the Series
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A Preferred Shareholder Agreement dated July 1, 1996 (Exhibit 49 hereto). The Subordination
Agreement changed a key factual predicate upon which the 1995 Opinion Letter was based: namely,
that AIA's obligation to redeem the common stock of Reed Taylor was junior and subordinate to its
obligation to redeem the Series A Preferred Shares of Donna Taylor, which could occur under
Article 4.3(a) and (b) of the April 11, 1995, AIA Amended Articles" ... only to the extent such
redemption shall not violate the Idaho Business Corporation Act restrictions on the corporation's
redemption of its own shares." The Subordination Agreement refers only to the 1996 Agreements,
Reed's implicit acknowledgment that the 1995 Agreements were superseded in their entirety.
57.

On January 29, 2007, Reed Taylor filed suit against AIA, its wholly-owned

subsidiary, AIA Insurance, Inc., and several individuals, including John Taylor, the brother of Reed
Taylor. This case was captioned Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al., Case No. CV 07-00208,
in the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for the County of
Nez Perce (the "AIA Case"). (See Affidavit of Gary D. Babbitt filed January 15, 2010.) In the AIA
Case, Reed Taylor sought to foreclose on the pledged AIA Insurance, Inc. stock, a remedy for alleged
breach of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement that he expressly waived as part of the 1996
Restructure Agreement. See Exhibit 35 and paragraphs 36-40 above.
58.

Altogether, Reed Taylor amended his complaint in the AIA Case five times. Attached

hereto as Exhibit 56 is a copy of Reed Taylor's Fifth Amended Complaint in the AIA Case. As can
be seen, Reed Taylor based his Fifth Amended Complaint not on the 1995 Stock Redemption
Agreement, but the 1996 Restructure Agreement and ancillary documents. See, for example,
paragraph 2.15 of the Fifth Amended Complaint, which alleges:
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"2.15 When AJA Services was unable to comply with the Stock Redemption
Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement, John, on behalf of
AJA Services and AJA Insurance, entered into negotiations with Reed regarding
restructuring the obligations. In 1996, AJA Services AIA Insurance and Reed agreed
to modify the Stock Redemption Agreement and executed the Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement ("Restructure Agreement"). Contemporaneously with the
execution of the Restructure Agreement, the parties executed the Amended and
Restated Stock Pledge Agreement ("Amended Stock Pledge Agreement") and
Amended and Restated Security Agreement ("Amended Security Agreement")."
59.

Paragraph 2.26 of Reed Taylor's Fifth Amended Complaint alleges that Reed Taylor

gave written notice of default of the 1996 Restructure Agreement and ancillary documents (the
Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement and the Amended Security Agreement), not the
1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. Paragraph 2.32 of Reed Taylor's Fifth Amended Complaint
alleges that AIA failed to cure the defaults under the 1996 Restructure Agreement and ancillary
documents, not the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. Paragraph 3.2 alleges that AIA was liable
to Reed Taylor for breach of the 1996 Restructure Agreement and ancillary documents, not the 1995
Stock Redemption Agreement. Paragraph 10.2 seeks specific performance of the 1996 Restructure
Agreement and ancillary documents, not the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. In short, Reed
Taylor sued AIA on the 1996 Restructure Agreement, not the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement.
60.

In July 2012, Reed Taylor filed suit in King County, Washington, against Scott Bell

and Frank Taylor, the attorneys who represented him in connection with the redemption of his AIA
stock. Reed Taylor v. Scott Bell eta!., Case No. 12-2-10803 SEA, in the Superior Court of the State
of Washington, in and for the County of King (hereinafter referred to as the "Bell Suit"). (See
Affidavit of Loren C. Ipsen.) Therein, he accused his own counsel of committing professional
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malpractice by acquiescing in the supersession of the l 995 Stock Redemption Agreement by the
l 996 Restructure Agreement without obtaining a

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this ~y of August, 2012.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /S' day of August, 2012, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner indicated
below:
Roderick C. Bond
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, Washington 98004

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado St.
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495

Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

v

v

v

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(425) 321-0343
Email: rod@roderickbond.com
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 529-9732
Email: gaffnev@beardstclair.com
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-9177
Email: jgjording@g-g.com

Jam~~
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reasonably require to cffectuatt or cv.f~ca tne ~ cantmnplatcd hcicby.
2.(i
Dclfmji;s !lJ' SJiijtQl>oldc;r at Clo$z. At Closblg. Sbarehold~ sbaii du)y r::m:ute
and deliver to Compsny the tbllowing doaarneo:ts:

(a)
A ccrti:fi~tc or cert:Uicatcs ~the Shara, endorsed !Or~
qr accompanied by llil asslgmncot sr:para:tc fi:oin ~caldj
(b)

ThcJ>lcdgcA~

(c)

Die Securlty Agreement;

(d)

The Ccmso1dng~

(c)

The Nancompetition Agrctme::JII;

.I

(t)
A:A assumption agreement. satix:5mtory Di fon:n and subsbu>ca 1l'> Company,
relilliDg to the oblipticms seemed by the liens on tho A.bplam:s dtsedbed ill Schedule 2.l~;

(g}
A c:crtificatc signed by Sha:rcholdet, ~sf.adtcry .In fonn and su!}s!:ant:e tp
Compa:uy, ocriifying toe acCllrU:y on thl'.I Closiog De.to of Shareholder's ~tations and
wa:mnties coniained ~ Artlc:Io V below; and

(b)

Sid olht:r docum.c:tliS md ~cuts u Campany or its counsel mar

tcasonabl)r require to ~ or evidence tho tr.mnt:tions comrmplb:d hci'Cby.
A.rdclt 111-RepruenJ.atlons cuul. Warrcmtia hgfltdbtf Ctmtp@y

To induce Sbarcholdl!r to enter fnto and pcrf.ozm this Agn:cment, CompaIIy represents
and warrants to SlmDboldcr as follom:

f.

J.l .(lmnimiOJI itul Good. StJmdiU• Each of Company, AIAI and P'armen is a
eotpoxatiou duly orgaaizcd. validly c:xf.sting imd .In go~ standing "QD.dm' tho laws of tho state of
Idaho BDd has all rCqpisifc power llI!d aDthoqty to own. lease 'or opc;ratc ib properties and 1o ~
ou its busin(:ss as it.is nqw bcibg cond:actcd. l:Tnivczsc iS a dom• blsmanco eom.P.Bl:l)' duly
ozgmized, validly existiDg am1 f.u good sb:odillg 1md.crtho ltv(I ofthd state ofidahO md has all
requisita power and wtbm:itJ 1o OWD, lease or opciilc its F,OPCrties mid to r:tarJ on.its business as lt
is now bcf:r.ig cmJduptcd. Great Fiddity b a sl:oQk lifd' insmaticc company duly ~ validly
cxistl:ug at¥f In good~ llD.lfcr tbc laws of tb.a state ofJndiana and bu alJ.~ta poWct and
attthl)rity to owii, Jcasc or operate its pwpc:tdcs and to e:ir.zy on ifs l:iosinuJ as tt is now being
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3J Co=tx!:s: Npo~PIJ· ASS\lliling sds:faotion of tho c:cnditi!Jll$ scUbrthin
Scctio113.2, th~ ~on md dclive:zy ofthis ABr=:uent IUld the pc::dbaD.aDco oftbo
1:f3,nsactl.ons \:Ootcm;platcd ~ will JJOt ~t ID a violation of w- oftbO t=DJs arpro'l'isiom
ofthe amclcs of.incozpor.dian orbyJam QfCompanyorauy offls Subsidiaries onny
amcndme.nb
oi constftuto IJ. viola!fon or ddiwlt uufu '1111)' iDdelrtcdn~ jndtntme,
tnortpge. deed of trust, potr:J, btmd; litcr)Sc, lease lgrcc:u;lc:nt or otbcl' nmtcdal agm:mcat or
instrum=t ro Whlch dompauy or at of its Sll'bsidici~ is a party or by ~ti or my ofitJ
assets ltlll)' o1hcnvisc be bomid, or of my Jaw, tale, lit:cn.St, rcgub:tioA, judgD:lt:ni, on:lc:r. ruling or
dcci= govcrcing o: atfccting th~ opc:ratibll 0£ Ccmp2Ul)' orimy of itl Su~ bl !Ill)' matedal
respect; DDtwilJ tho spmc constftutc im. ~t pmnittiug ti;imina!fun of my materlal ~ebt
or the accclmon Of any i:ndc1:1tedncss or o1her liabflif1 Of Coznpmy or my ofits SUSsidilirits,
wftb o:r without·notias or 111pSc of W:oc_ or result Jn tha artation .Dr .ii:Dpps:mon of a.ay lh:u UpOJl the
Coilideial. No consent,'#fUtborizatioll. approval or exe:mptian. by1 o:r filing with. any Pe:rson or my
Govetlml=ital Authority is requited in cpJlllcction wi:ih the txccutiqu, dcliv=::f and p~cc
by company oftbb A.g:recumut or the takhlg of my action co~ted ~crdiy, m.:cept w.b=
sctforlh in Section 3.l{lif) aad such ba.vc been or Jball have been obtained prior to Closing..
~g sm~011 oftbe condi!iom set ibrthin $cction 3.2, the redempti~ofthe Sbatcs an~
the other bansai:tio~ contempls.ted uacfer tb.b Ape.c.meat ue DQt prohibfud by and do not
vioi. llI1Y insu;tmc= lawa or JCgulations ,of B'llY judsdJction to whiclt Col'lipal:lY or any of m
~sidhrics arc subject.

th-.

(

•

'
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3.4, :rffi11.to ~rtiQS: F.ru!umhramm. CQmpanyowns lx:neficialfy qµd of record. a:
?<ill at tho 1imc.ofC1osing omi. beneficially Biid Qfrcciiid, all nftho Pledged Share's,~ and
• cle11r ofall plcdR. !fem, cneumbrinces, scaudty intr:r.estJ, eqllitfcs. c.tidms. options, or·
limlbtfiops on Gompa:rrta ahility to vq1D such sh.ates or to 1nms1i:r surh.~ 1o S,b.arcbold~
axoept 1br die licm in &var of Sharebold~ t:a.'Ca!l:d in CO!ltlCttion with the 1ta,nsactiom · '
colltrmplatcd by tbi.s ~ ipd tb: Ji~ inJilvor DfF~ lafcbtato lg?OD. the Fmt Id:ci:ste.tc
Shares. Company his fnll tight, ~c at.td interest in and to 1br:s Pldd&Fd $hres, md 1bll. mrtb,orlty

I

to pledge t!io Pledged ShJ!tes to Sli.attboldcr at Closmg as ~for the pc::cfhmw:icc of

,.

CbmpHI1J'11 Qbligmom to Sbarcho)dcl msmaun~ tho.Note and tills Agftiemc:nt. All ~ftbo
Pledged~ fine b=i duly autbamcd and 'Yalidly issuc.d. mi~ fully paid and
.ooJJaSS~ At Closing. ·Sharclmldcr Will ha-le a first prlodty, perfected 5l:<Curlty latcrest fn
the Pledged ~ othaf than the Pi?St .{tdrntitc Sb.trt:s. ~me no aptiom. wmants, ~
subsct:iptiohs,. rlgh2J., atrccmcats. ~ or 'Olldc:rstand{nts pt~ l1ll.ttn tba1 pall fqr the
isw.mcc. salc;pledgc or other tllij)osition. af 811)' :Pledged ~ ~ wbiCh eu.tittb BU) peusvn to
acquirD such~~ otlicr than those ~ghts ~ UDdcrthis Ast=m=t Thcs ~.bu
good lmd. J:Ml'~lc 'ffttc to, free end clear of my licp or~~ oftlcrtf:um tboso
disclosed on Sdledule :U.l or Schedule 3.4 atta!:hed h=l=lo, md .tb1l power and mtl:ierltY to
tramfcr, (l) 1h11 Airplanes, (2) the CA.PJ:>rognun Tangible Propc:tty, and (3) this ~rais:sior.u.

3.S Ca,pitalfmjQD. Thllt'C arc 1,000,900 sbatcs of c:apifat stock o{Univ~
outstanding; 999,99~ ofwbieh arc owned bcm=fiuially and gf ~by f:o~y, and the
mx:udning fivp o!wmch arc Di.rectms'·Qualibing Slul:rts. 'llic;c am 4,940,490 shai'cs ofcapita!
stool of~ It'lddity ~g. all of which pre owned benmciaU;t and of rccaxd by
Universe,
3.6 J!humcial Csmdifign. T.hc oontolida:ted finaDtitJ """=c:nt3 ofCompaay ~its
Subsidlaties :!Or the~ ended Dccembcr31.1994, 1.993 im4 l992 lpld f'orth.e quarter~
Mircb. 31, 1995 a1tBcbed hcrclo ;is Schedllla3.6 {tbC ~ ~ prcscat 1idzf1 tflc
:fbia.ncial condition and IeSUlts of Operltfom and changes miimncfalposition qf ~ md
its Subsidiaries as ofsncb ~tivc dates and for the rcsp9Cfivc pt:do~. then Cddcd in
confomiity with QAAp. apph"bti on a~ ba.tis. m:idsi11ceManoh31, 1995 no mmial
adv=so chang~ haw occ\im;d a:flectiDa tha consolidated,&am:W condition of Complllly md its
Subsidiaries,
3.7 Lit[ptfQlJ. Thet9 mi: nl) claims, aci:io~, suits. ptOGCCdix:igs ot ~tigatf.ons
pen.ding or, to th.e best ofCompany 1s knowledge, tb:reab:nc'd aga.lnst or rda~g to Company or
any of its Sllbsic:Uarics. at law or in equity bctbrG or by any Govcmmmrlal Authorit;, .11or ha! ~
such mion, suit. pioc:eedi:dg or m'l'esdgifion becu, to the best o!Compay's l:DowlcrdgDi pe:Sdmg
since the commcnccmeut ofth!! pedod cove:n:d by the Ymancial Stateqicn~ except as s~t forth.
on. Stb.tdule 3.1 hereto. N=tthcr Cpmpw:y IiPt RD1 ofitS Subsidla(ies £t m. dc5mltwith :rcspecUo
my aqjudicttapr ortkr, writ, lnjnoctjon or d~ of any Go'Vr:am>:;Dtal Amllotity. Ntdthet
Comp~ nor my of' its SubSidimie.t is 11. party to my cceso IU)d dbSlst on!cr, n;pcmsoi:y
l!gl'CC:me.Qt or ~=t,, COXlSCnsual or Qtberwise,; with any Ga't'emmcnf}ll Authority, ~t u
set forth on Schedule 3:7,
I

I
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3.8 ~ q,mpllll)' ~!ts Substdiaiids hav~ filr;c;! all state, tou:aty, local BJld~
tax and otht:rfCh1ms anCl *POtl3 that they arc rcquhe<l to file hJ ~ of all IBXCS. ass~
levies, Hcepse and registration~ chargc.s or wtthholding.. ¢'my p.aturo whalsocvcr shclvm 'by
such re~ to be, or that arc othetwis~ dac and parable. mcluding. \vl1f:tout lirtlltltioti, lnt:omi;
basizsesS and ~OD, ~)'mcnt, social aecmity, witb,bO!din& excisa and Wcu:Jct:a'
coxqpctcia1ion taxes and uscssmcd! ('1axeil. ~to tho ~ 1ts lfabilftic:s tor Taxes as of
Clbsing ~not been fully discJmtged, fi;t11 and camplr:fD ~es have bei;n eStablishcd on 1bc
Mm:'flh31, 1995 balance sheet inchldtd bi the F"mancial ~ Neither Company nor my of
its s'ubsiaiaries ls .in defilult in the payment o:f arry T-axe;i ~ or payable or of any m~smCD!s
recclvcd in respect tbcreaf.

w"'

' 3,C) C<>t\IPUMpo
ldl'M't ijach of Coµipmy lltld its W!iiar.id js i.o. co~
in all material tcSpCOt'I with all iedctal. ~tc end }Qcal law:i, statuh:s. roles, ri:gmadons and orders
of all Oo~cmmcntal Aathmitles 1,1Uilcdal to ib·bnsiocss; ~ aJJ~~ aM o~ ·
:fi.lings by Gl' on Dehal!of Company and each o:fits Subsidiaries with.all <krvcmmcotal
Authodtics arc maf;erially tntc and COJI!pletD and I.IC CQln:Jll and validly f0l1lt; all pc:anlU and
licenses~ in col'l!lcction With 1bc opcra!ion of$i: Companr'.s ~ ot'lbcs busiJl= of
its Subsidim::I~ bavo be=. oblaincd md arc ~ .rm.d "'1'.idly in fot"CC-; and ncftb.t:r the Company
nor my ofits Subsfdiadei have ~v~ imy :iiotk:= that it is in "Viola.ti.on o:f m:j laws, .rcgulatiOD.'J
· ormders.

m

3,l o »m'kt:r&·Einm~ .All ncgotiation.s rcl.atl.ng 1o this A.grcm.e.bt and the.
transactions ContrmP'•tz:d hereby have becll carded Oll without~ iJJtt::rvcDfioJJ of'1fl'SY pCrsda
acting on bcllaif'oftba Com.PllDY in such rp.Edmtt '=' 10 give tisc 1o my 'Yillld ol~ against lhc ·
Ccimpaxy Or Shucboldet for my brokerage orfi.Ddc(s fee. conm:dssioxi.
or sfmilar
.
compcusation.
'

3,11 pgfanlts. Nc:ithcrComp@Dl' nor my of~ S¢sidiatics is hniotation of any of
tha terms or ptovJ.sibns ofits articles ofilJCOlp(lri11ion dr byam or mi;,: amendu;cJJ!S ~. or in
violdbn ot dCliult 'aDd=' my iidebti:d.u~ indclltii%e. marlpgr,. deed of trust. note, bond,·
licc:ose, lease~= or other m~ ~mt or iustfum~ tO which ~;pl)' or any of
its Subsidim:W I.s aparty orbywhfcl!it orrmyof~ amtsmayo1bc:rwiscbo bo\llld, or o!acy
l&W, n:ile. licCcsc. ~gnlaiioo, judgment, o~cr, taliDg or~ govcming or aff'ceting tha
opemtion of eom.p.iy or 1IrJ1 of it3 Subsidiadcs mmy :aiattdal n::spc:cf. except as disclosed on
Schedulit ~.ll 111tachcd hereto; and except as disclosed OJl SFltedula 3.11, ab drcumstancc' exists ·
'Which constitutes an m:pt pcnnjttjni tca:Dination of fr!lY matcriaC agi:cc:meut or the aeqclc:ntfon
of any lndcbb!dness or other liability of CoJnPaD.l' or my of.fts Subsldfm:ics,,wit)i Ill' withdut
notice or Jllps11 of time, or 'Which could •tin the i=a!ion or impositian of aey lim upon the
eo lbl'tcnJ, Neither Company nor arsy of its Subsid.i4ri~ b ~ 'VfolatiOD ¢ ~ hipunsnclt lAvn or
regulations ofiby judsdier:fon to whicn Compay w my orits SUbsidi,nea are subject.

-

Article IV-RtrJ1ruuda:tiaJU and WCLt"ran'tiu o/Slur.rr.holder
To lndnco Company to q:iter .into lilld. pc:rfo:tm th1!i Agt:t:cmcut, Sba:re.boldllt rqireseqq
and \wm.nts to Compmy Ill follows: Sba:rehotdi:i owm tha Shares 1rce and cleir of all pledges.

•

:
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licm, ~ scc:ucity .intmsts, cquittC.S, claims. optiQm (otbct than tho option qrlginally
grJUited tn Ceutcmda1 Li:fo Insnranca Pein~. Jatct asslgnod to'Compan1 mid~
pllrl!,IJ2llt to this Agn:cmlcnt), or llmiratious !'11 Shattbol~i allilit;y ~ vntc the ~ or to
trtmsfct tJici Shares mCompaay. ~Jdcr has filil dgb't, iitlc a!ld intt:rcst in and to the Shares.
To the bost of Sharcholder's.actn&J lawwlcdai; Widlqut izms~n or inquiry, thes . • . · .
reprcSeutdiaas md wammli=s Qf C6mpmy ml!dc in Secdons 3;~1 3.7 and 3.8 lii:rcof'llnl uue and
corrcet ill all~ rcspcc:ts.

~.

t!rli.ck

v.. Cuvm41tts

.

S.l

~ ofC'o!UJJllDY..: eompmyb~c0VC!lllIWJ1o Sbateholdathatuntil the
earlier of (i) 1hc Su'bstitudon ofl36nds ha:viug a p:imb:t'Valuc equal to tbc .¢.neipal amount oftbc
Note aJ;ld a wclghtcd Jll!tarity date oftbo :note, for tho other CaDatcra1 hi accordmcr; with the
requfrcmcotr of Section lO(i) o:f:tlm Pledge .Agn:emcat, or (d) tbc pa}'lllcnt in .full ()fthc Note, it
wiU perfocn ind obse.tvo thb following cove:pan13:

(a)
Comp11n7 wj)lpro-vidc ~With qllartcd)' fixumcial statome.ots,
pp:parcd in accordance with GA.AP; wit1iin 45 rlayJ of the =i4 of each 1iscal qwutct';
(b)

e.

J

i·

Compa117 willprovid.e monal audited firla.QCild statements, pr~cd in

aGcordllllCO with GA.AP, within. !SO days oftho cod qfeachfi.si:al year;

•

.
· (o)
As off.ho last-dq of each calcndsrmcmlh. CoXDJ>any s&!l1 mafn1ain
n-;t.afutd camilig1, caJculm:d in aceonlaoco with GA.AP ~y ttpplitd. equal to or greater
th.an the acoouats ut closing.
.
(d)
Ju of ths last dq of tac::P calt:ttda.r mOUfJ;l. ComJ>lUIY shill mzdlltain
working c:'apital {cum:nt assets less ~liabiJitics), ealcn!ated' h1 aecordanco with OAAP
• consistently applied. cqll21 to at least

rsoo,000;

(c)
Al of the laSt day of each calendar month. Companf shall maintahl a ratio
·of cu:aent asRb to ei:ment Jiablli.ti~ calculated hi aocordBnco wilh GMP c~y applied,
cque..l ~ at least l.J-10-1;: .
:.
(f)
As of the last dn.)' of each calendar moat&. ComplllI,)!· Wll maintam a ratio
of Consol.idmd LC?Ug TCIIll Dcbt~to-ConsoliifatccJ Net Worth (u such te:r;ms IU'C defined in
Section 4.2.1 Ooftbc Compmy'1 .Articles ofllloorpozatioo. u aln.mldcd as oftbes da1o h~of {the
' 1Al'liett:.s"}) equal to It lwt 3.6-CD-l m:lud.ing NOm payable tQ Shan:.boldea;
(g)
Thes tmancial ~on of Company will at all times meet my rcgnlatary
requirements 1,pplicablc to Compllllj';
(h)
Company will not loan tund.s 10 tJJ1 a1tiliato otbc:r than wholly-ownod
Subsidiarie11 or as 1.utho~ b1 ~g .Articles ofln<:mporation. or to pay loan reimbmcmc:at

•
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to lalm Taylor for incorpc Wt liabilliies attiibtttablo to th: l~BB rcorgani'zatian of the Company
hlcident to &han:holdcr's dil'orce;
·

(i)
CoJli.parZY will not martgap, plcdse, suWcet to lien or o~ ~
sell, assign ot ttamfcr Oolliitml Dt' (,ii') IJJ'/ qthet ~ assets at Company or RU}' of its
Sn'bsld,iarl~ hav.iDa ,fidrr:i.ltkc:t "*1c tlf rb,orc tb8Il St00,000 wifiues;peol to a:oypar!icnle.r
~on. or rm aggn;pto ~ ~tnluc of'moro tbm $200,000 with~ t.o ~
tmn.samio.ns within aJf1 twclTc (12) numth.Pcrloda cx:ccpt thoac tnmsadiom mtbc ordh:uJ'y
Cl1lltSO Of bus:incss, without im: e>btaining ~ldq's 'Wtltl:llEl ~Cnf. wbitlfl consent shall not
b11 upr~rmbly.~d; nor shall Cloaipmy fsil tu tab aU reasonable ste}ls neoessaxy tq
maintain its J:US!nmcr and cl!cnt base 1$lld all OtbCf in~ola Ust:ts:

ro

© Co~ will use its best cfli>rts to Qllll5C Shmcb.oldCr, or a dcsiPi;c of
Sberehr;ildcr rr;asonahly accc.Ptablo to Com.pa:ay, to ba ~to Company's Board of Dhectmr,

.

.

•
(k)
CoQ1.pany will pconit, 11I1d cmsc cacli Df~ Subsidim::i!=S to pcanit,
Sba.teholdcr, or a dcsigncc Of Sban:holdc:i: reasonably acccptab,la tll Company~ to have fUll acec:ss
to its prl:misCs and to all propcttie$, 'boob, tonlBCls, com:milmellts apd :cconb ~ n:spect to
eac:.h suoh company's business, property aodpmonuel u ~Jdcr or its 1eprescn1ati'vcs,may
fro~ tixmr to tiiat: =quest;
(I)
Con:q>my sbal1 ~that no additional 5!wcs of capital stock arc Wucd
by lhilvcm; fazmc::tS, AIAI ar Oreat Fiddit.f;

(m) Company sb2ll cell • ~e¢ng of its COJlllJ10J1 sbarchcldm fot 'l:bc ptxrpQSe.S
of~ this Agrcez:Q.cnt and the trmsacijop.S cmrtcmplatcd bcrcby;
(~
Company sh.all~~ all steps~ to~ tms1 It bas the fimds
ncoessar.Y tp.Pl1 thi: Down Payment qt Clo;in&;

(o)
Company shall usoitsbcst c:ffbrtsto obtain.ancl ddiver, as SOOD a:ftt:r the
ClQsibg as possibl11, but In µo tn'CDt J.atcr1bim. the ~OD of a pul?lio offering by the
CQtnpany, Bi:m<Js mectmg thorcq~!Ocub set:fi:>rlh in the Plccfsc A&r=meni, and. to the extcot
pc:onissiblc wdcr applicable ~ hlws and xegulafioo.s. will use any net procecdJ trom the
sale of Great Fldi:lity ar its ass~ lfl1tt llO' net proceeds from !Jl1 publi~ aifc:dng of Compau?

stock. toward the pm:cbasc ofthts Bondi• and

S.i.J Publiclly. :&!ell party hereto agrees Uiat it will not, cxczpt as o'f:herwisc
reqnlrcd by applicable law orn;gulaUo\11, issiio 81t'/ press release or~ an)' public stail:lnclll or
disclose nny fnfomiatioo xqllrding tbi9 Agrcc:mellt and the trauw:tions GCm11:mplat,c:d hc:rd7y, or
pconit my af its oftiom, ditcctora or cmplo:ycn to ~i> co, utl,lcp thrs fbno an~ content at any
stleh pcess 10fi:asc. s~l or disclcSsme Bild the tiw ofthi; :release thf;Rofhas oc~ approved
in advahci: by tbs Qther party her9to.
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s.1.2 Cooperation. T;ach party will 1\1111' c;oopcmto with. thq other party Bild
suGh ¢.her party•s ~ ii:i iiom:iecdon with llb,y &ti:Rs tCqllitcd to bo taken ~~of mi
obligatiom her=ndcr, and wil.J USO ifs ~ ctforts 1o ~ all condfdom to CJlo,!ling to be
satisfied l1s pro~ as possi"blc and to o~ all ~ts md approvals~ for s1lCh
patty's dUc a:nd ~ pcd'OfllllUlCC bfthe~ and :fhtfhc sat4fiu:tion Qffho cond:itiozu
h~f' oq its part 1o bo sa:tisfidt\ m:l will. cxcoufll and deliver, or cans.o to be ~ JSDd
d"elivi:rcd, such additioml icalDJli!hlc ~cuts and blstro:riicnt! eod do. or ~ to be dOQc; all
l'casoiiahld lhi9gs ncbeSsmy, pl'OJICI" or fl;d;visablc uoder 11ppJicahlc lB.w 'to ~ md msb
cffectivc the trunsactioli.t cdntdnpiatt:d hereby.

•

A.'rttf/e VI-ln~n
6.1
Indausmion ofSbmboJdw llnd ~ 'Bach FlY ~to ("lodc:nmifyllig
Padt') lic::tcby ~todi;fcm~ iodd:Dµiff andbold hmmlcss,1h~ otber,partYhcrcto and titch of·
~ other,Pait.ts affiliab:S;. ~ Wlgar, oflictm, dhccbm, ~ldm and c:i:nployecs
C'Indeipni1ic:G~attie3j frOm and e.gainst and hrn:spect. of any !Vld all CO$bl., tcmes, cl.ahmi,
liablliti1:9, fines~ pcnalli~ damages awl-expenses [\Del~ vnthout llrrlitmion. cotµt costs md
rc:asbnablc fees mu:l d.i.sbum:mc¢3 of counsel.and aceounf!mfs) ~by an:In~cmnificdParty
in. i!llY ~ction commc:nced by a third parl,y hi cotm~ with or arlsing oUt of mrJ breach or
aij.cigcd }Jrcach of.my rc:prc:sClltatjQ~ warilmty or covcnam ixiadc by tbc Ind~ Party in
this A~

I

••

•

6.2
lndrmllijficJt{ipt Eros¢um. l'romptly afttr ~ by an Indemnified Party of
liotir;e of the COIJPnczicemmt of mt ac1ion by ll lh;d party co"1'Cet4 bt tbfs Article ~ sach
In4~ed PaJV ~~tit; tfio lnd~g :Party~ 'm:itfng of the CQJDmCJl=nCD( thci:eof;
provfdedt lliJWcVer, tbat miy delay by lflilJndc:mnificdhrty mso DOtiijing tbo ~
:Party sliallnotrt:licnio 1hD IDdCmu1i1in8 l'llrty df l1J.'1 Uability to this Ind.mtmfficd Paey hercitnder,
cxecptto the extent th; lJideumlfying Party ls mmiallf and advmsely prejudiced by such delay.
'fhc f.nc1enmlfying Party, by dcl.MQr of"Wrltl:t:n notice to tbq Jmfmmiiicd Pa:rty 'witMn 30 dayf of
ieccipt.O(noticc 9fcJfiin to mdC!llllif;y i'om. the Jpd~nificd Pri.ty, mq elect to c:omest sucih
claimp aolt9,u. or pmc=dDlg at tho ~g ?art:Y'F ~ IXld by cdunscl oftu own
choosi.Dg. Ifthe TudcmnifyiDg Party does not~ to~ m:h claho.; ac;don or procc:cding,
tholi1dcmnfficd hrft shall ba!Vls tfiorlghHo ~ dcfmd. Cdmprouii.sc, ~a or pay any
claf?. at the r.naeamffYtng Paw-'s ~· If the Indcamitlcd Pm:ty s:eqilem tu writlng that $urJi'
claim, aedon Qt proceeding pqt be ~ed. tbco it shaU not be ~ ~ut sbaU not be
covci'cji by the .indcmniticil provided bcxein. The Indcnmifying Party may .scttlci an md~able
matfer that ithu duly elected to coutz:sl with tha CCll1Stllt ofthe J:ndcm:uificd Party, after
dclivCtibs a w.dttc11 dcstdption df the ~posed seU!cmr:nt to, Jnd teceMng co~c:nt ftom, the
IndernmBed,Pq, Jn the event that~ iiu:Jctnni1icd. Pq dculines io consent td a bona fide
settlement at:cepbs!ile to the olaJil:md. the Indc~lliitd P*ti $hall have qo tight to
indeztmffic4ti011 bo.J'ond tbc ~ af the .PZO,PO$cd sW1t.meni The Inpcrrnni:fied Pany shall
fioO}J!)ralC with iqe !ndemnif.Yb:is Party Jn CoDnaq:ion with anylllltte( or cl~ tot
mdeinomcation.
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7.1
Conditigns to Sbm:qboldcr's Obliptiw. The obligations ofSliareholdcrundtr
fl:iis Agreemi;otlltC .mijcct to tho i\llfillmcut. Jdat lo or contemporaneotl wit1i Closing. of ea.ch
of the following copdid'ons, say or·all ofvl'hiQlun.sy ho Waived.bl. tvdting by Shatehofderinhb
SQlct discretion:
•

7.1.1 R¢nlch{nl !>fOWnershtp ofAW. All of1bc outstatuling1:11pitsJ stock of
·
~ shatl ilavc.Occn distneutm! tp Comp11I11 by Univi:isc as a dividend; mul ontsbmdhlg
stOt:k of AW. and FannctS aball be O'Wlled d!rcetly by Compmy.

an

7.1.l Consmts. Authbtb!iticns or bo~ of any Pc:csQli or Govcrmnc::a,t.al
Auihorltyn:g:ai?cd in~ W1th 1hc CCJJl.SUIJ)D)aton ofttic trw.actiOllS·coutcmp~
hereby.. inolwli:ng"Wjdic>l!t limitatloo i;ODSl:llts of the ldal:io DtparlinCllt ofTusurmcc and Fxrst
Intcrstttc shall }law been obtained. and copies of su~ ambodntjoll.S or co~cnts shall bxve been
delivered to Sbarcbnldcr.
7.1.J Accurr:u;y.ofRepn.rm(ationr 01¥1 'fYcurqntiu• .All of the ~prcsc:x;itations
and ~cs of Gompany contalllcd horc:in sball bo true oo mi as of the Closing Date with the
same force and ~as though m!dc on Wlli a3 oftbc Closing Oat:.

,.

• 1.1.4 No Defaults. NrJ mi all defaults iisttd 011S~edwc3.ll pcrcto shall
have been curtd or waiYed as of tbc GJosf:ng Date.
7.1.J Clo.ring J)ocumerrlS. Down Payment a;nd Paymenl ofFeu. Cotopany .shall
have complied Vfi1h tho ~Qllti of accdon 2..5 alxWe.
7.2 J':Dn1Utions'ts> QmnnW'1 Oh1fptjgp~ The oblipb'Qns of Co~any bcrCmldc:r
ucsubjec\to tho fol:fillme:att Id orpdO:tto Clloring, ofc!.$ of the following condiiimu, my orall
ofwliich xnis:y bo waived fn w.riting by Qampimy, in its solo disct?:ction:

1.1.I J,Cl;llfacy o/Jl.prucnl(lti<iltu and Wam:ttlliu. Thcteprc.t~o:ns au{!
warralltics of Slwcholdcr contained herein .sl1al1 ~ tn).c Dl1 nnd as of the Closing Oatc 'With th1:1
samo :fol'CC and llffcct as tlwugh made on and as of the Closing Date.
7.2.2 Ol(1!ing Documents. Sbamholdls shall brvc coul.plicd with the
TCqllircmcnts Of Scc:tiou 2.6 abovo.
7.2.3 Cotuml of~ehol41!rs. ~t to the ~archol.d.ea meeting dc:scn'bl:d
mSac1:ion5;l(m)i haldcitll of a~jorlty o!tliosharc! of Company'• amstanqb>g commons;tock
sbaU h9,V1:1 voted to mtify tbis Agn:e:mcrit ud tl:ic tra:nsaction! coat;lmplatcd hotoby•

'

..
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Artick v.111 - Tum!nafiqn a:nJ/ DeftllJlt
s.• l

IcrwJuatiou pftbJs Am:ementPriart!11hG Clp~J!i' Date. This A:grtcmcntmay be
·
·

tenni.Da:ted lit isrt 1imc prior ID 'llio Closmg Datt:

(l)

by znutu¥ ~of tho pa.J.tie,, h~to;

(b)
at the elccdon of either party to this .A.g:rcc:tncnt upon wrltk:n notice to th::
other party l.(tt ~ ~c r~ly, objcctiv~y ct'llaixl 1bat any cozidition rt;qtdtt:d to be
sa:tfsfic~ p~~ Ai:title vn hcn=cf. oth1;11;:thm a condition tbzt is reasonably within the
elccf:j.Dg pirty's cmrl:rol, willn~ be saqs:ticd on or ¢orto Closing Datbi
·

(~)
by S!wcholdt:r iftlic:rc );las been~ mptt;cial 'Vio~tiDll or brcat.h by
Company ofatty agreement,, ~011 or~ COIIbsi:Dcdm this A~ tbat bas
MO.di::rcc! tbc sattsmctfon of ffllY condition to the obligatlon ofSfiatchold.cr b:npo.ssiblc end such
violatio11 or brcach.Jps ndt been WliVcd by Sbmoho.liicr:; or

e.

J

(if.)
by Compimy if~ has been & midt:rlal '1olation or pmd1 by
Sharr;hoJdcr of any Dgt'CCDlcnt. JCpteSl:'Dtiltion or wap:a.nty COlltahicd itt thLs Agrcamcnt tba:l ~
rendered the s$facljan of my ccn:iditiOll to the ob~tlS of Company h:npossibla and such
violation or brcacll bas not been WD,ived by Compa:py.
8.2 • D;fimlia Uniier tbo-,Am:mmi::m. "Evtr!t of Dda.ult." whc:rcvc:r used hcrciD, i:acam
my one of the following ~mts:

(a)
Company shall :f'l1il ID pay my irm:rest or my other emollJlt payablr: to
Sharcholdc:r or his successoz(s)' or aSsign(s) ~to tho Note, when an<( as the S2Pl1C beci?m~
dl10 ll:lld in accordance with its tmns. and such titilmt cbl1tUraC$ fur five (5) days followiJ:ig the
dnc dqtc; .

-

{11) CQmpany shaU:tiil to cibSi;rvc or pc:lilzm any tcan, covmaol or agrecm~
of CompaDJ' in this .Ajrcemcnt, and snch 12ilin sba11 not liavc been cured witldn thirty (lO) dan
following mittt:n .qotice thr:rcof licm Shareholders
(c)
Ally rr:,prttscatation or~ l:llldc l1y (!Qmpany.haein or in conncctioa
yJith this Agrecmeot tbat shell provo ID have been mcimtcl when made or deemed {Dllde, and.
curo .shall not have becJl ma.de witb,ia tbfrty (.30) days of wrifb::d notic:e t.hcrcof' 1rom Shatcholder;

.

(d)
ComP.WJY shall. dcfanlt br.idctr the Note, 1bQ Pl~c A~ent, the Securlty
Agreement. the CoDSlllting .A&rcrmP!lt. OT the Noncompctitloli .Agreement a.tm tho cxphution of
any applicable cqre :pcxiod;

,.

.
(~)
Company J?r my of its ml!lotial Sublidll!l.ies shall m.ak.c a gc:o=ral
asatl§Ditlcni for the bc;ic.it creditor.s Ol' sba,11 bcc;omo i.asolvcnt;

or
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(f)
Company Cir any of its~ Sub.tidJatics sbiill be tho subject ct; or tbc
d,c~ bi. my banhuptcya reo.igauizktir.in, rcceiveab.\p. caznprosntse, ~=- in.solvtney,
rcad.f \lSbntztt of deb~ dissolution or liqulda:don case ar ~under uiy lavti whether now
or h~ m ~of a.y judsdldion; ar
(g)
F'~~te, the holdca of1he COl:llpw's ~ stoc:k. or any otha
matc::rii1l obligl?C of Omxpitiy shall 'llavc lUcp. aJJY remedial aati~ against CoJDRaDl follo~ a
d.efa.un in the fulfillment of Company's obligidion.s toward any~ o'bligcc and such de.fi:ult
shall COJlf:iillJe witbout being ClltT:d within my tpplicablc ~period or waived by the ~blfgcc
inw.dtiog.

8:3 Rcmedic:i for Qefim!t. Upon the: oc:cuacncc of AD, B'Ven.t o.f Dcfalllt or at my
1im.c tlicrcaftcr, if any Evi=nt of pc1lmlt ~then continu:in~ Shsrcbolder:rnay1 witbout no1fcc (or
without ib{ibct notice, if initial notice: was rcquh:cd ~to Scctlon 8.,2 above), ir.l his
discrcdoxi:

entire

(11)
dcclap: the
Ullplid bt.laa~ ofpriwfpal aact ~ undti' the Neta
immediatdy due and pa.yahlc by Company, without prcsc:nfmc.nt, cfc:mand, ~test or arr.y not:id=

of my kmd. all ofwllicll arc hereby CXJ?rcsslY waived by Company,

I

(b)
.subject to tbo n::qu:ircme.cls of applieabl11 law then ht e.ffe1;t, proceed to
cnforco this .A,g:rocmCil1 ar my dccumc::Dt contemplated hmy by ~I sodh rr.niedics a:s arc
available thacandcr or in respect tbt:reaf under appUcabla law. wbeth.ct tbr damagr:s, :lpccifia
pedoimancc of aux covtltWli or other Jl&'l'CCZl1c:nt. or in tho exctcisc of my power granted hctciii
or in the documr::n.1! contemp~hcteby;

f

I
I

.

(c)
inaddi!ion 1Dthc cxciclsc: ofanrtighti now orb~cxisting tmdcr
applicable !Aw, ex~o all r.igbts of a secured c:icditor ut.idtr ~ u.i,J!oi:m Cammc:rc.tal Codo in
all rclCYaXlt jurlsdictiom, and proceci{ to RfOtcc:t and ~ its tights hcrcuudcr or mb on 1J1iy
Of all~ granted purWant 4crcto pr Ulldtttho Plcdga Agrcemcmt. the Security Agreement or
tho Nott: in mry mamie:r at ordc;r he dell.'IIlll e.xpc:dien~ withont rcgani lo my oquftable1 prlnciples af
~haling or oth~ amJ./or

(d}
give 'Vt'df:tcn DGticc to Compllll1 ofh.il de.she to become "agent ofrcconi"
far all fium association b:"Cls13 imdfor policit:S ibr 'Which Cou:ipany or atty of i~ Subsidlarles, at tba
dmc of giving of such Jllltice, serves as agent of:rcc;brd. Upcm rCccipt otS\lcb DDtice, Companr

..•

, shall promptly dctivr:r written notl~ la fGnn ltlld subs~ satimctory to Shareholder, to all
such tJusts.pollcy holdra 11Dd othetappi:opdatc parties 9fthc appo.ixitmc:riJ ofs:bixeholdcr u
,agt:llt oftcto1'd.

••

9.1
~urvfDJ 9fR~ons and Wm:pmti';:t Thert;picScntations, wmmties,
coveoams anJl p.greem~ ofthe parties set fort!J in diis A~ hll:luding !hi' tldu"bits l\lld
schedules hereto, llJld in. any Writb:tJ rcpresc:ntatf0J.1 and W ancilliry docm:oc:nt conh:mpla:md
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bcroby, and tho pro\lisirms of Arti"1.c VI rcgllfC!ina .indemJ:ri6cation and Iel~c of claims, sball
sunivo Ol!)!ing until the l&W of (i) tbr~ years follow!Jlg Closbig pr [d) :final paym=it by
Comp&b:,Y ill full sa&motioa. eif tha l;rote.

9..2 "mendmcnts end Wt!btm. Thi:i ;Provisions of th.is .A.gn:eincm mrry be amr:ndtd
only by tbc ;written ~ Qf tha parties hereto. ~ept as otf.1.ertdsc ]'.ltovided hmhr. my
waiver, perinit, c.oc.scnt or appraval of1111y kind or cbamctcr Of! tlic part of ci:tbat patty ofany
provision ~.r ccmdftion of ~c:nt mmt bo iµac.tc j.b 'Mi~ IQld shall be cffcctivo only to
the e:xtt:nt S}>C9i.fictlly sctfortli m•writing. No ~bJ:t tak:~ pur:su.mt to t.bbi~
i.ri~ my investigafidn by or o,n behalf af cifbi;:t- party, ahld1 bc.i!ec:med.io ·~ a waiver
by tho pQI1y taking 5noh action of complimco witli my rcprescmttfon, wmamy, covcmmt or
a~cnt COil1ainc:d .hcmn. The waiyci: by anj party hr:reto of a brca.ch of any provbir;m of this
Agret:mct!t sfmll: not opcra1c or be consl:lU,Cd a.s a waiver of~ subSeqw:rrt breach.

t¥s

· 9.3 Emfas la Intm-qst. Thfs ~t4hall inuro to t?lo benefit of the parties h:rdo
and shall 'ba binding upon tha parties hereto' iml iflCi:t ~ hein, pcrsoml reprcscutativcs,
~DIS and assigns, Exce:gt to the. cxtl:Dt c:xpcessly stated fn this .Aga:emcnt, nothing bi thl.s
A.gtt,emt:Dl µIntended tD
my Eights or~ on 'lglf .Pc:rsoa other tball the~
hctelo, nor Ls aeytb.i:Dg in this Agrci=ment ~to Idicvc or disc;barga tho obligatiOil or
liability cf any thhdparty, nor shall anyprovi.rio11 giva rm.y third Pllttr llJY dgbt ofl\lhro~on
or action apin.&t my party tc tbh Agreement.

conmr

9.4 · ~ All notices, .rcq1lCSt!, ~ds and otb:t commuubtiollS that are
required to be orn:ui;y bo gtv~ unclc:rthis ~shall bo hi wxiting llXld $all be deemed to
have bCc:t:l duly given when d.cJ,ivcn:d in.person ortz:aDSmitted by tcle:x, ;&csimilo, cable or .
tclcgtam. or by certilied or xegistrm:I Mt class mail, postage ptl:paid, retam rccelpt rcquesttd, to
the t?!SpC!t:tivc parties as f6llow_s:
I;Cta Compmy. 'lo:

AJA Servi~ Cotparation
One Lewis Clm::fc Plaza
Lewiston. Idaho B3SP1
Attention: 1olm Taylor
With a, copy 10:

,

•••

:Eberle, BorliD, K.ading, Turnbow & McKlvct?I, Chartered
300.NortJJ Sheth Stre~t
P.O. Box 136!
Boise, IdabP 83701-1368
.(1tprdion: Richard RiJoy
'•

.'

..
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Ifto Sharcboldl!:. to:
~I.Taylor

P.O. Box 116:S
Lewiston.Iiiah~

g3so1

With & copy to:

Ca!ntmoss ~ H~ch.lwm
70th.Flocnt ColumbiaCcm.cr

701 Ffflh Avilnoo
SeattJCj WA98104-7016
Att=tion: Scott Bell

or to such other acl.dxc$$ as 811.1 party mrf hiv6 ibmlsbed to 1bq otllm f.n wri:f:fng In ~
hctowith; except tbal notices of change of addi~ shall be cfll::clivc OQly 'llpCln xec~t.

9.S &mi~iqCvmuJ!lfiyc. All rights and r=editll ofShlv:eholder shall be
cwntilati:vc an~ may bC cu:r;cised at sach times md in such otder as Sbiacbo1der deti:mdne:s. Tho
fa:iluro of Sharc!mldcrto insist upon Of cnforco mictperfor:m.aIICC rnw pt"Qvisfan of this or my
reliaed. agreement. of to exctclsc the rights or prhilogcs hcmzndct er~ or any pf its
:eights as pta)rid~ by s~c or l~ or ia. equ1tt· or oth~ shall not impair, ~udicc or
c:onStit:um a waiver of' any suchli8b1, power, i=edyorptivileac or be CQDStrUctcd as a waiver of
mq dmwt heicamlct of tbt:tcmXlcr: or as an accNiefcc:tlCC the'rt:iti. orprecladc IM c:xctt:ise or ·
cufon:c:mc:at thereof at a 1a:tc:r ti.mA Nor sball art! single or pezti2l ex~ af my sucb. right.
power, {CDlcdy or privileges preclude any olJlcr or fWther c~ ofany otbct right. pow=,
mJiC'ify or prlvilcgD.
9.6
~eySawilit.1. '!be ia:vaUdity of all or my p8:rt of BhI section ofthis Agrcemcm
&ball notrc!lldcr hryalld the remafnde:roftbis AgrecmtDt or the rcmaimkrofs:ac:h section. Jfany
provision of1his .Agr;=mcnt is so broacl as 'to be wr::oforccablo. such provision shall ba
iutctprcl'ed to bO o.oly s~ broad as IS cafotccable.
9.1
f1m$1;cdon. Singular and plu:cal fonns, as the caso may be, of the tetmS dtfincd
i.n.Arlicle I abovll, Qr 1>ftbo capiialb;cd 1oam 4afinl!d clsow~ in this Agtcc:m~ bvc
com:latiVc m.eattings. AfJy ddincd tcm1 ths:txelates ta a de!ilmlcnt lnclt;dcs withiJl di:finition.
any amendments, modifications, rcn~ rc:statcmerrtJ, extcnsioos, supplcmc::ats or suhmtuticms
that may herCtofom have been orthllt ma1 hm:dcr be accutcd accordance with the tcnns
tbcteof mg 8$ mrJ be pemi,itb:d by tbil .Agxw:nenL
.

m

m

.

9.8
Headi:ap. lhc sc:cticm and other headings conblincd in this Agrcem=t arc ibr
n:!ereao:: pu.tp0scs only ~ slla)l .uot be deemed to ho a part o!'lhfs AgrcemcDI: or fc a.ff'cct the
m~ning or lnti::qxctatiDn of.this~
.

••

l
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Ool'Cfllini' lJ!Wi ~m?Qo Difrnrm

m

1h' validity, meaning and dect of this

~shall bo ~med ~l:c with tpc laws of 1bc StQJ:c of Idaho. Tlic:: parties
hetcqy agree tbll.t delivery or~ of my~ or other papcrs ip. tf:io manner provided in

Section 9.4 a.bovo, or il1 such otbc:rm.iinner as may ber permitted by h\w, sliall be vilid and
6Ufficlmit service 1h=eof

9.10 T.3ntim Agrmn~t. lhis Agri:erocnt, including'lhc mcb:fbils and schedules and
antjlla.ry doCU11lCllb ~ly ~ to hcrai.n that fofm. a pert bcmof; ~ tl>c entire
agreemtht ofthe parties conce:ming the maltcts xefctred 1'> h.crcin mi sup~ aJ1 prior
agret.ments lllid undq:s:ta:ndlngs, oral orwz:iticn, all ofw.b3ch an: hereby :nxpericded and canceJcd.

.

I
'

)

E:cb.ibit A
Bxln'bi:tB
ExbibitC
Bm.l>itD

ExhibitB
ExhibltF
Bxln"bitG
Schednlcl
Scbcdulc:2.l.2
Sdlcdulc 2.1.3

St:hcdulc 3.4
Scbcdula 3.6

Scbedalc:: 3.7
Stbc:daic 3.11
Scliednlc 5.1

NOt.c
Pledp Agrcr;:mc.ut

sccrarit:y A.gr;tc:mco.t
Consulting .Agtecmc:nt
Noncompetilion Agreement
B.ill of Salo
Fom ofCompm/s Couuscl's Opinion
Dcfi.ttitioDS
Ahp1anes
Allocation efR.tdemption Pdce

I:.iCDS md E.net1t11brmccs
F:inanclal Sta:tdncllts
Litiption
Dcf.anlts
Financ£al Compllen~ Levels llDd Ratios: Bxccpliom to
Covc:oaaf;t .

9.12 F.xecntion·in QruntqpW. This /t.~t:ntm.ay be tXt:CUted .in my ntlDlbec of
counterparts. i:ach of whtch wlJon so cxccut.cd and dcllvcrcd shall be deemed Bil origfns.1, mid
suth cotlJltc::rpart togr:tber shall consl:iiuttJ one itl.stnttllent.

..

DATED tbc first day entered above.
COM'.PANY1
Br.~~~J.:.J~~~i.....;..'---~

iu:·-~-..c:;J..------
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ADDENDUM TO STOCK RBDBMPTION AGRP.BMENT
Thia Addc.ndUD.l to Stotik Rcdomption Agtccmcnt (this 11Addcndum't) is mcdo wd ebte ·
ittto by and bot:wcon Al.A Services Corporatioll, and Ida.ho corporation ("Company'', and Reed J

Taylor ("Shareholder").

.

?-

Recitala
A.
Company and Shareholder have entered into 1hat certain Stock Redemption
Agreement (the uAgrecmCI!t") of oven date hortiw.lth.

B.
Jn counection with the stock redemption, 1lw parties have agreed to cntec
Consultins Agreemem (tbe ~·co~g Agtefltllent').

mto a
~

C.
By this Addmdum. Company and Shareholder wish to &et forth certain Gbrmges
mid adcli1ion:J to the A.greo~ent and the CQ:osulting Agreement.
A.gremimt

For good and valuable consideration, the receipt and snfticiency of which are horcby
aclmowlcdgcd, 1ho pa.rti~1 ~ u follows:

1.
Sedton 2.1.2 of'the .Agreement ls hereby emended to provide that 1ho "Down
Payment" in the amount of' One Million Five Hundred Thnu.qnd Tlollffri; (.,1 ,500,000) shall be
paid in the form of a. promissory nofb {thfJ "Down Payment Note'1 to be delivered to $1iarahold
UJIO.U. ll10 cmaw!lu.u ur IW.rs A~ndum. Tht: Duwzi ?u.ylJllml. Notit II.ball bo DD. umaQWCd, !zm:rcst..
~ ngto due: and payable in .full on the date whfch is 90 days iom 1ho date of execution of this
addendum.. Tb Noto ~l boar default ~st at the rate ofiburtean (14) p=ont. Section 2.4
of thci Agreement is 11.ereby chansed to state that the Cloling Date shall be such dates u tho
pm:f:ies may establish bY, aamme.o.t. but such date shall in 110 ovemt bci lltm' than August 15, 1995 ·
2.
Ill cousklation of Sbateholder's wilffn&noo to accopt the Do~ Paym.ent Notci :
in lieu o.f a caah payment, the Compmiy hereby agrees to coadttuo to cmplay Shareholder ai1d to
pay hbn ~monthly salary equal to Twl!Qlty Thouaard I>ollara ($20,000) p¢.l' month UDtil the
Down Payment Note and any dt:dhult interest which may 8t¢rUC tha:ouponJs pald Jn fbll.
Notwithstanding anytblng contained in the Consulting Agreement, the Consulting Agreement
shall not commence until Shareholder's employment by Comp1U31111 tcrminat.ed upon tha
repayxnem in full of the Down Payment Note. In the ovellt such commi:mocmcnt date is later .:
tho do.to of C>Xecut:icm. of th1;1 Coruadting Agrc=.c.nt. tho tam of the Co.lllult.IJl& A~t:wt:nL IWtll,
nevertheless mdmid for a full three (3) year peiriod :from such .revised commencement dato.

!~

r1~

3.
Also- in oomidmtion ofthfs Addendum, Cnmp~11y hcnby agrees to pay in fW.1,
upon execution of this Addendl.Uklt all of Shareholder's attorneys recs and costs incum:d in

•I

'

..
~
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connection with tho ncigotiadon oftbe Asreemont, this Addendum and all anolllary docmmenu, .
the production. of suiili d~tmlents, and the transactiOllB contemplated by such documents.

J)AiEotMs!~.!f1r tm.
COMP.ANY:

.

A1A SBR.VICES CORPORATION .
By: --..,~~-=....,..;oL~--+
Its: --Ji~==~---!.

SHARE:H:OLDHR.!

MED-J. TAYLOR

33$1DS.M56

-~

'·.

.t
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d
.

07121/95

tf206 587 2308

~004

CAIRNCltOSS

l'R.OMISSOR:YNOTE

I~
l

$1,500,000
/·

;

16:30

:.

;

'(

FOR VAT.TJR RRCRTVRD, AJA Serv.ira C'.orpo:ration, an Idaho corpo.tation ('1AIA."), hetby, .
promises to payito the order of Reed J. Tllylor (the "Payee") the principal SU%n t>f One Mllllon Five
HuuW:i=cl Thuu111wd Dolliml ($1,SOO,OOO).

J

'·

This Note is the Down Payment Notp~ to in the Addendum. to stock Redemption
Agreement (the "Addendumj dated as of

'l.1.-

1995 b~ AIA llD.d PayH.

afP.,..,. wbiE'· arc1obo
...,_,.tho-.ofdui
Slock
1995
"Redemption
or
othei' ·

This Note shall be duo and pa}'&l>Jc in .full on The date Wbich is ninety (90) days :from the date. ,

hereofattbc ackhna

Redemption Agreement dated as of

ss tho holder hereof t>hall do&ignotll' in

(the
Agreemont''), at SllCh
· • • This Not<i ohllll bear no .ii:m;ri;at ualcu and imtil it i8

default, at whic;h time it shall bear default interest at the rate of fourteen (14) pc:cccnt or the highest
permitted. by law, whichover is Jess.

This Note may be prepaid without penalty.
: Except as- otherwise expressly provided hmein. the undersigned and all endorsers and allpe.rs · :a&
liable to become liable on thi$ Note hcrby (a) waive dillgcucc, presentment, demand, protest, and · .. . . t,>f
any kind. (b) consent to any and 111l 1'1'lnelWals RDrl cxte:mions~ tJM, time ofpaymeut hereof. (c) waive ·:y
right to offset against amounf$ due to Payee hereunder any amounts due to the 1.Dldersigned pursuant the
Addendum or D11:1 RIXlt?.WpliunA~etlI!lCnt or auy agreement (or ~bit lhcrcto) listed herein, and {d)
agree that at any 1ime the terms ofpayment hereofmay be modiffod without a:ffectina th: liability of .
party to this Note or of any person liable or to become liable with respect to any indebtedness ev1d

'herby.

ln the event this Note is placed .in ~c bands of ail attorney tor collection, or suit is bt'Ought on
balikru.Ptcy or other judicW proceediqs, them the unders.lsmid ·
agrees and promises to pay reasonabie attomcy mes and collection costs Ju.curred in connection ' · . :- tbj.
including all out-o£-pookot expwso:; inow:rcd by tho hoJl!q hcrrio~ with orwltboUL 111uiL, on Hppelll or· ··
bankruptcy or other insolvency proceedings.
samci, or the same is collected tbtough

AIA acknowledges receipt of1hc followhle ncrticCR:
ORAL AGREEMENl'S OR ORAL COMMIT.MENi'5 l'O LOAN MONEY, EXTEND

CREDIT, OR TO l'ORBJMRFROM ENFORCING REPAYMENT OF A DEBT .ARE NOT
.E.NJl'URC.EABLE UNDER ID.AHO LAW.
AJA SERV!CF.S CORPORATION
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~bftA.

PR.OMlSSO:RYNOTE

.Y \

$ "6,000,000

.11>9s

r.w_;,,

FOB. VALUBJ.t6c&vED, AlA Scivl~ Oitpm!ib11; ~:{daho corporation
hettby pro~ top~ In the order ofRecd 1. Taylar (th~ "Plyco') the prll\c:ii?tJ sum of S~
Million Dollan ($6,000,000) to~ with aedtttd .in1.m:st on~ bnpaid pd'nclpal lialancii iiorn
tb~ da.t.cbtreaf1hpctannilin Tata~ to cl~timd Qllcquant:rp~t (814Y.).
·

=

This Nola b tbc ~Noh! tcfimd tt> In, ~ b cimtJcd to tllc bcncfi.ts ut; the ·
Stoqk Redcmptlan Agrce(bent(thc ~lion /.~cnf') da1ed a.s of
2.,_ , .
J295 ~twtcn.A,t\ mll'.ll}'CI=. TctDIS used buUiot dcfim:dbercln ha'Va tho~ ghreu lri
cad} s'llcll tc:on .In lhll.~on Agn:cincnt. 'Ibis Not.cu seemed by1lse Stock PICdp
Agreemcntb)' md b;twCcnAlA. 811dl1!-.YCi; ~d bytbl:~ A~ by apd \>etwechAIA
lllld Payee, each r1f mu dldc ~ ~ "St~Plcdgo Agrctmrmt" ~ ~c ''Secmitr
AFc:mCD~" zespectivclY). to wblbb rcfc:tellCC is ma® fur a ~on af th!) collawal suljr:et

tbem1o.

\

Paymcab othttctest only sfJa1l bo.madcmoulhlyfnkwiblmooey oftlus Unftcd S~cs in
Jmmcdiatdy milalJle :fildds commenc:ing one month 6U1 !he 4llo hereof at the: address oll'11cc
w wbidi notites am to.ht: ~ pum:iaat so 1hl:l letn!.S of1hc Rcdcm¢1f'll A.gr-c;mm~ or ai such
otbcrplat;l: u tbcholdcrlRmlf shall designate hi writhig. !he caffre ba.limco ofall principal mi
mrr acct0ed but \Ul)laid Urtm:st shall be d11c and pasrablc on lhD fl:nth annivt:rmy oflbc dam of
this Not&.

1

nw N.ota 1l1ll1 ~ot be prepaid t:n Whole or fn part witltoltt the: pcior wr,ittr;Q. comcm of
l'aycr:.

.

lt I) expressly puvidcd t.hal if~ a 4cf!lult is mad11'in tho pa.actua1 pa,mem ofmoothly .
int~ hi:rcu:u4er mutconduucs for mOill than 6\.-o (5) buJhic:ss daY• after Ibo rccei.pt ofwdttea
&>tioe of $1lch ~ Of (n') a adault ocm.ut 131l&rthc'Slock Plcd~ A~Qlt or Si:cmitJ
~opt, qrtb4 ~1~ Agi-ccmcnl orNonco.rJqa ~ ~twecp A.IA ad
Patt;!:. a:a.d· ~ch detlw!t contmat:s a&:r 1hi:s ~mt o!!/lftf apjitlcahle etin period, ar an Bvi=ut
of~ult UtJdct the ltcddnptfqn Agm::me11~ occw:s 6n,!i AJA fails to c.ute·tba. ~t. ~ thirty
dayla&rthp ~ofwritb:n.nolicc of sucli ddfil~ lh~.lhc entho rcmzinin'g mipaiii balaot:c
o!~dpal en,d .U IJ:d=sl alltJ11Cd ~ trJR, a! th~ oPtlmi o(thb bolder ticrcet b~ di;clared
tp lie !mmcdra1cly d~ .rd ~le with.out nodcc {!be "Acctlcration") 11Dd t!:ic lied gfvcn lo
s~ its pa:ytncnt 11J6Y be fom;l0$Cd.

:

r····.
,.

I

~:r.

!
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~as o~ ~1 picvidcd hc:rdn. ~ ll¢alli.&nc4 and all~ and all
pcm)n! Ha}>lc or to 'bec:omo liab1o Oil thb Nolt bttebJ {a) wt.Wo dilfgcucc. pres~ dam.and,
pt0test. lllll notice of'lf!.1 klBd. (b) ~to 1/1'1 md alJ n:newah l!lld eictrii:uio.ns 1n the time of
paymt:llt.h=o( (G) waive '111 rlght to ofillct ag~ amo\ltlts ~to :PD}'CQ ~ any
amotmb due fD ~b 'Dl'l~p:'d purs;imnt to th~ ~p6on Agrccm~ or lfllY ag;ctmi::ot (or
alu"bttthctdo) trsted th~ and~) agn;c.that Jll aD:ytimv. the lztms pfpq'll.lcnthcre.ofm.ay be
modified or~ iel.cu:d, without atrcodnk 'fbc li~ ofar:r:y p.arty ta this'Nofr: or of
~n liable or to l>ccmrlo lla.Qhi with =peel. to mt! indef>tcdnds cmde:occd hc:rqby.

t·
t,.

my

In the ~i:dl 1bis Note ls p(aoeil fn tho hm:l.s of 1111 attomcy fur r.ollcodon; er smt is
brought on the bole. or 1hb SIQJlt h co.llc«cd through banl;mpt.cy 0r olhcc.JuwcillJ ~gs.
ttu:n thq tmdf:sip:d agrcc,ud promisc:s to pa.yrwoaabJ.1: ~fed ;ir,id ciollectiancqsl3
incum:d fa countcdou th=with. lnclµd\ng all but-of.po~ c:xpc:nsd in~ 'by tht: holder
lu:rco~ with or without suit, on ippeal or baxi1o:upl.t:y Of D~ fnsoJv~ procced!ngs.

-..

m

..

AJA acknowledges r=:i,pt of the: following DCrticc: •

e

ORAL AGR.EEMmffS OR ORAL CO~TO LoAN MOtiEY,
mctENll ~IT1 pit rO i()xp~lf.R.OM EMFORCING REPA'YMENT OP A:
D:EBT ARE NOT ENFORCKABLE UNDERIDARO LAW.
0

.,/.(

AJA SF.R.VICSS COR.POBA110N

~
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ExliibitB
STOCKPLEDGBAGREEMENf

.

IL\.

..,: This STOCK PLEDGE AGREEMENT is entered 4ito as of
k1 L. ~' 1~9?, by and
between AIA Services Corporation, an Idaho C9rporati.on ("Pledgor"),
Reed J, Taylor .
(''Secured Party"). Capitalized terms used in this. Agreement and nototbernjse defined shall
~ave the meanings given to them~ th~ Redemption Agreement (as defined bl?low):

and

RECITALS
Pledgor and Secured Party ~e parties to that certain St~ck Redemption
J' ~
2.. i.,...1995 (the "Redemptio!l Agreemi:;n~'), purs~t to which
Pledgqr will redeem 613',494 s ares ofits Qo~on Stock held by Secured ~arty in. exchange for,
in part, a Promissory Note of even date herewith in the principal amo.unt of$6,000,000 (the
"Note''). Pledgor and.Secured Party are also pafl:ies to~ certa.i:ii Security .Agreement (the
"Security A~r:itenf'), that certain ConsUlting Agreement (the "Consulting Agree111ent"} and
that certain Noncompetition Agreement (~e "Noncompetition Agreement"), all of even date
herewith.
·

A.

~greement, dated- l:lS of

kt

B,
The Umvetse Life Insurance Company, an Idabp domestic insurance co.ll1pany
("Uriiverse''), F~ers H~th Alliance Adminili!J"ators, Inc., an.Idaho corpc;>r!ltion ("Farmers'';),
and AIA Insµrance, Inc., an Ich/.h~ cmporation ("AJAF'), are wholly owned subsidiaries of ·
Pledgor,
C;
As a condition of Secured Piµty' s entry into the Redemption Agreement, Secured
Party has required that Pledgor pl.edge all of the shares of capiW. stock of each of Universe,
Farmers and AIAl; and any other shares of capital.stock acquired by Pledgqr after the date
hereof, including shares distributecJ to Pledgor by Universe, Farmers, o.r AIAI (collectively, the
"Share8"), as security for the Note and qther obligations of Pledgor to Secured Party arising
und~r the Redell'.J.ption Agreement.
Sec~~ Party desires, and Pfodgo:r agrees to grant to Secured Party, as security
D,
for the Secured Obligations (?S defined below) and on the teQIJ.S and "._Orid~tiODl! hereinafter se~
forth, a security interest in all right; title and interest of Pledgor in the Pi edged Collateral (as
further defined below), including, bl):t not limited t9, the· S~ares.

E.
Capitalized terms used but not c;!efined herein shall have the meanings ascribed ta
them in the Redemption ~eement.

:!!

10

~

~
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:mEREFon;

NOW,
for apd in:consid.cralfDll of thr:: forego.mg p~ and fat athe:
good and valuabl1= cansldcratl~ flit rccclpt and safiicicncy of which ara hJ:lrCby aoknowlcdget;'!.
the patties agree as 1bllows: •

l...

S~UI?4 Obliptiom

Thi.t ~is m¢c to s~ the punctual payment andp~ by Piedgor of
any and all obli8'tfons, Hibilltlcs and amounts now or hetCai\er owhlg. dot: 0:r not due,. dhect or
~ liqiiidaicd.orcdmingcmt, tqSeeurcdlartyp'llliwintto llIJOl' all ofthcb:lemp~
Agtcc:ateut,, th~ Note>, ind tJic ~ccudty Agn:emctU, ~ludhlg; Wi'thout lhnimtiori, a..oy and all
amouurs payalile tn S'cctttcd Party~ ilf therennder, and prompt obscryani::e and
pedoaomipo by Pledgar Dfits covC'Jll1ll13, agr=u=s and obligatiotis hcrcundcr and thc:rcuo.dcr
(coll~lhr~•. the "S~ Obliga:tions"),

2.

Pledge

As collate;zal se:Curi1;y fdr the pa:y.mcut and pcr.:fbtmAucc in :full Qfthc Secured QbHgatioM,
Pl~r hereby pl~ ~. 1nl1Sfca. dclivm ~ grants to ~Party a sccur!ty
in all rlgbt, 1itl9 1114 Interest of Plerlgor that~ mcists or !hath~~ Ilise fn. to and

mti:tcst

J·

uodi;r (i) tha ~and all~ and pti"vilcgcs of P.lcdgor with .n:spc:ct~, Qi) all caSb
dMdalcb., f1ollcash dJ:v.idcu.ds; stock dividcod.1. iatc.n:st. ~ instmme:d{s md othi:r projler:ty
froXJl tfiQc 10 time fCCC:lyed. recdvdblo or ~ dlsln1>lttcd in n:speot af or In e:x'cha:Dgo fur
aay at all of the Shm:s, (iii) aU subsc:ri,ptiw, ~ options aod lllJ)' other rights issued upp11
or ill COD.!lccliou. with tho~ (iv) my addiljonal lhar=s Df capital stock h~ acqlDrcd by
·lllcdgor, .includt;ng ll.ddi1:ialW sbates oftho i~= of the Slims, (v) lll1Y and all certlilc:atcs nr
ot.he:r ~c:;qt or~ xeprcsenting tlfl.Y of1bo 1brcgofn& ll1ld (ti) all cash md nDJl-ca!b.
proceedS oftbe tlmgofng (all BUCh,prop=tr, ~ollcdivcly, the "Plcidgcd Collatml").

3.

R.cptesi:nflll:ioo.s rnd Watrtllti.c:s
Pledgor~ and wamnfs to, and agree=~

Sccuxed Party as~tbllows:

3.l 'ITdt. The Slmes include al{ aftba &uca and outtaDdiag capital .st9ck '!>f~ of
l,Jnivem: (except fQ.r Dbctora' Qt.lalifying ~ PSIDll:l3, and A1.AI. Iba S~ ati!: legally mi{!
~oficially owned by .Pleif&or .on the date h~:t; ice md clear ofall lic:m,, eucumbm:ices, daims
or dcnwid:r ariM8 tbmup P • w.bamoc\'cr (othcxthah tbc ~ty, .interest 1%¢.cdb,etr:bJ ml
t.hc ~ lic:n -of:Fmt !J:itm¥c Bank: ofidaho. N.A. C'FiISt I.a=tatt'? UJI01l the capifal sf\>ck of
U:dvctse (the ''Fir.st T.ntcrStab: Lic::n'')). All oftbc Sbms 'W~ duly anthtdtcd and validly issued.
Md arc fully paid and DOnl.SSC$$8ble.
•
•
3,+

Power and:Juthprlty. Plcdgor has alll1:qUi.sitc po-we;- and a.uthorJ.ty and tbJ1 legal

right to execute, dell\'cr BJJd ~ all of.Pltd"gor'' o'bligations .under this Agreement IUld 1o

pledge BDd gntnl a secdrlfy in!qest in the.Pledged Collm:ral in thcs maimer md for.tile plll'j>Ollb

••
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cwt~phitd by this Agrcomc:o.t, and hq tbc .right t.o gnmt Seeurcd P.azty 11. secndty intez'e$t in
Sllc:.h fledged Collatcr:al, subj~ to th.& tiSJrls ofFllst Intcrstitn in the stock ofUlltvCt'SC.

(·

3.3
~cuti(Jli,• Bbu:ifng Contract. TJiic Agi:ec:ml:!lltbas been duly ctee11led and
dclivci-cd by ~lcdgor llXld constftnU:s the !cpl. valid iuid. bindins obllgalion ofPl~
cnibrceablc against flcdgot it. accordance with its bmps, ~c:ept Isa enfu~ may ~ limit.cd
by~' insolVcncy, re-0rtaniz;ttion or ot1\er s:Uni1M JIM a:ffe~ 1h11 ~en.t o-f
credltors' rigbtll g.enenlly or tbd a.vaiiabillty of c:quilnblo re.rncdic:5 subject to the discretion of tho

comt. . .

.

.

.

3.4 No YfolatioTJ. The pledsc of and ~o gtal:rt oh. sccutlty interest in tbe {llcdgcd
Colle:tcra:l by Pledger in the manpcr 1111d for tha purpose ~Jated Ly thf.s Agn::emtnt does
Dot md'Will not (i) vio'latt: any law, tulc, tcgulation, ordcr.ludament. scttitincnt agre.cm.co.t or
tJecrcc (.inclu4ing, witi\out llmimfio.Q, rmy Df tbc forcaoipg ~~'of any retuJatGry 'a¢vity
of my~ iegd!atory agency or govemmcat.al aflfhorl~ of my st:ism) appllcablc to Plcdgor
or (iiJ?CSlllt in or lCquire tlio crcatiOll or imp0$itio11 of (except~ ~led to Sccuzed .P~ by this
Agreement) any lien, ses:urlfy inJctCSt, cncambrancc or tight of othea of any na11ln'l upon, or with
respect to. any bfthe Pledged Co~

e,

J

3:5 Profectlort ofSewrfi! lnterrst, To Plc:dgw's l::obwledgc.; the Pledged Ooll.atenl i~
lltlt subject to.any optipn, agreement, ass~~ charge 'or othet< c:onua~ rcsmtiion ~my
na1urp thatndgbt ~'bit, 'bnpair, debrY or otherwise a1tecf. the pledg~ of'!ho P1cdged Collateral
hmµndcr o.r fhrj sale or dispo~d oftile Pledged Collafral pu1:sWmt hereto b)' Secan:d hdy.
Sccured. l'llrty ae.bowlcdps that~ ~ans xoay?CqU!rc :Ponn A ~val prlor to .
sttictibrtclomc t!pCll1 or Sale ofin$uraa:lcc company stock Pledgor will not suff'cr arpcmrlt lplY
lien otCDyumlmm= of my~ otbtz'tban those granted ta S~Psrtr ant\ the F'm(
l$:sbstc Lien. to iq!ch to 1hc Plddgcd Coll-1. !P.lodgar will .tblly and p\mclusJly ~ml'/
dut, ~ o£it in connection. with the Plcdp;f CoDafctal miwilJ not~ 811)' dotl flip-WW
lmpair, damtp or dtStroy S~ Piqty's tights with t=pcct 1D the Plcdg'CCl Collaftral. :Pltdgoi

will .l:cmabi tbc solo Sbamboldcr of all Of the outstmding cepitzl stock ofUmvcr.Sc. Fam:iel'.3 and
AIAJ. ind Pltdgor will not peaxdt Ulivmt:. Pmn~ qr Al>J.1n issue my ~difimi.i c8pilal

stqclr., and "llSY at,tz:mpt tQ i,;s;\lc additiDnal sbart.'f Of sld capfb4l stx>d: Wll ~_., Unralid.

4.

f'

.·

Dell~ ofPledged Colla.tcral

.

Pledger agrees to deliver tp ~Party on 1llll date oftbis Agrcdhc:ot all lo.strunicaa
and W>ck. certificat= pctfirluing to & J>lclJged ca~ now oVID.¢. ~t:fbr those Shar~s of
Universe in.1hc possession of Phst Jm~stm aqd subject ix> lhc Fust Intmtatc Ucn (the ''F"•
lntema'te Shari:t')1 and to doliv.cr to Secori:d Party promptly upOD. ICl;Cfpt all instiumcnts aad
sto~ t:crtfficdAr ~ to 1hc Pl=fgtd Colhitcral acquiied In1ho future, WithQm limiting the
f~ifPlcdgot shal1 puiv;hllSO or otT:icrwis.o ~com.o c:nt:itled to rc~c or llbaJl rccci~ in
Qlt1.hcctkn\ 'With q .of !ks Pledged COllatcnJ, my: (j) stock ocrtiflcak, ~without
~o ~~~ting 11 stack div:1dcad or in coDJJection wit:h uy inctmc or
nd:11c:tion rJ" cepital, ri:qlassifieatiOP, me:ger. cozisolldaUon, salq of assct:J, combimtion of lharcs,
stoCk~lit, sp.fn!o£t: split-oft split-up or liquidauon; (U) optillll, wm:h!nt. oriigh!. whethtr as e.t1
• 3.
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CDntt:mporaticously with ~o signing Qf this .A.greemc!n~ Pledger !ball deliver 1o Scmirr:d

Yerty

Assigmnco.ts Separate, frOr;t Certificate (''Assignments"). i:q \])c fPllll attached is

E:i:hihtbl A..t, A.~2 BDd A·3 t6 tb.is~crncnt, coVcting all the~ SuchAssignmr;nts shall
'be endo&ca in blW: by PJt:d;gor Qeforo llc;livcly to Scoured Part)'. Secured Party may .not use:
such AsSlgmnonts to traDsft:r tbi: Pledged Collmal ex.cop! in rcaUziliOll on~ SCClttitY int~
ill tho Pledged CollatcraJ aftathc ocmmence, and during the commuancc, oh Default (as
defined in Sci;tion 8 bcrco.f}. lttld a lcgCml ta .roch cffi:ct Q1aY be added to t:bc certificates
cvidcncint tqo Pledged Collafr.ral.
6.

Pledger's Voting Right!

So long as no Dbfault UDdcr'tbis A~ Jias occum:d aad is ooutiuuing. Plcdgor sbzll
bo cotitlcd to exc:ttisc Ill)' YDdq xijhf:s inctdc:at to the Pledged COllmaJ, subjcc:i to my
rc:str:ictioq. on su\Oh vptiDg tights contained hc:rdn or in thci lledcmptiua Agrcc!inent. Upou the
occmi:cnec and coJ]2inuadol1 ofa Dcfaalt. Plcdgor's tight to llJC~ su.ch 'Vdtiog tights shall
imm~ilfnlt ecasc: md tcm1ioatc aild all votipg rights with respect to tho PJcdgi:Xl ColWrnl sball
.rest soli;ty and =lusivClf ill 8ric:ttted Patty. Tho .fottgohtg scmcacd shall constftutc and gr.uit lo
~Cu:recl Party an hrcvo~c pro~ coupled 'With 1111 Jmcrcst to 'VOl:D tbc Pledged Collatcial upon
the occtin:mco andc0ntmaatlo11 ofJUcb a Dt6-n!t:, m~ my ofticcrofUnivmoa Fatmex:s, or
AlAI, u tho ease ;ID&)' be, may~ on wrltt= not.ic.o:: nom Sccutcd Jiarty u 1o the c:xisttuco ofa
Dofimlt BDd Secured Pmt1'1 ngbt to vom such Pledged Cdllattial.
7.

le
·:

•

Apptifntmeut of Sc:cmed Party

Pltdgor bmby dcsip.tes 11,11d appplnts Sewrtd Party lU tnio imd lawful attomc)' with
powa im:ivocablo, far it and ill its name, placo md stead, at av;y time afb' 1bc occur.rence ofa
dcftult tin this A~r:ment shall havl: oocuxrcct, 1tJ uk, dbmand, tcct:ive, receipt ~d give
acqui~ce tbr any aiu1 all amounts that may be at 'became due or payable to Pledgor with
ttsp~t to the PJcdgcd C~ md in Secunid Pnrtyta sale disctetion ta .file any claim or laki::
ahy alrtion o.r proceci:fing ih.tu o'Wnns:cm1 9r ln this name ofPlr:dgor, that B~ Party deems
DCOCSSatY or.desirable in onicrto c4tty out the ~\'i.sians oftllis Agreement BD4 to accomplish
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11.us pUipOscs .hl:tcof. Nothing in tiµs Apmcat shall obligate S:curcd :eiufy to perfonn 8lff
duty, cov~ or obligiltion n:qofrcd to be p'cl:f'opned by Plcdgor in coanbOtion With tho Pl....1..-i

F"

~llittmt

8.

.

""Ci-

l)cfanlt

Any ODC of the f~llowius emits shall canstitutc a' datWl.t bY P~dgor urukr tills

J\:grceau~ot (p. "D~fiwlt,1'~

·

~)
Failure ofPltdgor promPtfy to piu witlllnfivc (S.} days of the dmo·duc, ot
declared diia. any~ .t1X1dcrthc Note; pz:Pvid.ed lha,t. sucti f,ailurc.shall not constitute Dallrult
bcreuode:r mless such failure cai:mat be cured by haiu(Cr oftimds from t'hc. Co~ Account ip.
acc6.ri.W:\c: 'With S~tion 6.2.l of tbc Sccm:ity A~c:ut bcaalsc imufficictlt fiinds ~ ~ sUbh
accoUDt or far otl!cr rcasofl! outsidti of Sebured ~ 's solo COJit:nil; or

a

(b)
Failmc to pay within fivb (S) days otth'odatoduc, or dec;:lm:cd ~ BllY
prlncipal undcrthcNotc; or

.
(c)
Bl'CaCh of8JJ1 ~po. waJrlll1y, tc1m or condition,~~ In this
Ag:rccmmt wliich breach matcrlBUy IUl4i advci;scly im'paib 1hr:i YalJ:ic of'tbd Plcdpf Collateral or
the ability of Sccated Party. to caf'o= tho No.m or r~ upon the Pl=lgcd CoDan:ral, and which
default coulinucs aftct 1101,icc and a 1hirty (30) daj opporlutUly to c:urc\ or

.I

(d)
Failuie ofPlc:<f&or 1Ully im4 tim~ to i>mfbmt and observe miy of 1hi: ·
tcnns, conditions a1ld provisions cmrtahicd bl the Rcdcmptlm .Ag=m~ Note, Seouz:ity
AgretmOQf. qt J111 other ins(:ri:mumt ar ~=~ J>J.cdgor 11.\ld Sccua!d PmV n=lati:ig to
· the sale, redemption. tnmsrer or atba dUpbatiQll of Scc::m:cd Party's $tack iu Plc:dgor. as such
tams arc dt:finCd ln 1hoR.cdcmpliOn~eut, which~ .ma~1 and advcmly impairs
the vahlc of the Plc:dgcd Collatml or thb al:rility of Scctlltd l1arty 1o dlfo:co thi: Noto or xcali~
upon the Pledgi!d Collati::ra!, after any aipplicablc oppottniiity to curc (1f any) wi.t;bin the
applicablo agreemcmt; or ..

(o)
Any levy, attachment or cxci:utio11 ODt orsei:zutc of. any ofthr< Pledged
Collateral or the appointmcirt ofa.~'VCl' to take JX!~OD o:f iray of the Pledged CGl.latcnl; or,
(f)
DissolutiOD, ~on of cxiPtclll:e, iusolvmq or bankruptcy ofPledger
• Qr my of mat,i:dal Sbbsidiil:rieo!; pl"Ovidcd' thaf the diasolution. Qt te.cu:Un~on of~ of a
SubSidiuy On the absr:nca offnsolvCtlcy or bank:cup~y) sbalhiot constitlltc a Dmwt if ill of the
net p~ arc sppli~ to the purc:base of Bonds Jl)ccting tho ~en.ts ofSettiou 10.

m

9.

·r

Rcmi:dies

~.1
Genl:l'QL In the JM'Jlt of& Dctault by P!Cdgor under this .Agretnlcnf, StcUl.l;d
Party may. att its Clcctioa !tild iii its solo dls~an, wi11;oui fbrtbcr notice of S'llclJ election and
witbtnrt dcinmd upon Plcdgot, do ~Y OXll!: or mo~ oftbp fol,IO'Whlg:

-5·
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D~arc tho~ ObpP.fion.s lmmcdiafely duo~ payable.

(b)
Subject to tho rcCc.ipt of all noc~ rcgnlarqry approVaJ.it; sell till or my
part of1hc-Pltdged Cdll'a~ al pubijc auc:t:ion or pdvatD ale In acporpanbl) with tho 1aws af the
Uni1rJd States O\' qtbe:r applit:abJe Jaw, for c:ub ~ Cledit aS thzs ~On of StcUrtd :Pmty, Plcdgor

to bo ~ wi1h 'the amollllts of rmy sucluilo only When thO ~ pmc~ ~actually

rmfvl)(f by Secarcd P;o:ty, Undc:.no ~= shAU Secured Party be ~10 ~tc
ot d=I!)' sale of all or my part of the Pledged Coll~ dbc to p;cvaili:ng or cxpcctcd conmtions
mtlie JDll1lit 1br Illich p~ Co.YBt.craL Bach p1UCbascr Ill '1411 mcli Sslr: .shaJl holr! the .
pro.Pert}' ~o](\ absoluti:ly freq no.111 my cJafm or rlght on thp part of'PJcsigO.r, a.nd li'Jedgo:r hcr~b'y

,..

waives (to the C'U:nt pcm,Utted by applicable: lAw) all rights ofredemption. stay Eindlot appraisal
w~ it nowiw ct may~ 'iJ/.Y tbn~ mthe filturc liavo lµld~ my lllle bfla?i or ~xiow
emting oi:he:ea&rcr:uwtcd: ScimrCdPartY. sBall.nbtbc obligated to ma.Janey ~alcofP!a!ged
Collateral rogatdlcss of notiE;? of s:at.o having been gi'vCn. Scpurcd Party my alijo'tml my public
or prlvatc sale ~ 'lime wth:oo by amio~ Kttbc D md Place fixed therefor, and S11ch
sale may, withoutrunhcuotice, bcmo4c a1 tho time mu:lplilcctc which it wa.s so iuijouxbed.
(c)
Exttcise all of the tights and ItDlcWtS 8"1ilaPlc 12lldcrtho Uni1bm.
Comqn:rcia.I Code as cnact:d in 1hc applicable jndsdiclio11 or ltw:!.cr other applitahlc ~.
9:J.

4gQZL For thb JlUlPOSC3 act fortb below, PledSot dDbs hereby itrcvocably lllakc,

~ dcsignatr:i ab4 appoint.~ Party (and l1t'f agent whiah may ljl' desfgn$d by
B~ :Party~ as Pl~sb:nc IWQ la.w.ful attamcy--i.o.-fact ~ llgCllt.
'JM event
Dc&alt by Pledger UDdcr 1hla :Agrccmtnt. sucll agent sbal1 haw~ pcrwet ml a.utborit;y fq; and
in 1hc nmnc of PlcdgQl' tQ
.tbr1ho traosf'or of tho Plcctgcd CollareraJ on tho bOok:s of

rn

of any .

a.aaiJgc

~ Fm:mc:rs, AT.AJ.. 9r 'PY olh=: Issuer oftbc Shares, to the lllUXl.O of Se~ Pad)', or 11JY

pu:rc:haser from or noQWicc ef Sccun:d Party.

9.3 - Sals ofPledged Conai1rpl. Plcdgor TtQOgqhes that, subject to tho regcipt of all
requited :egulatoty appro~J Stetttcd Plltty may sell at! or msy part of'lho Pledged Coll.ati:tpl
)>UrSUaDt to Sctifion 9.1 abavo. as and when. appliQJblc by means of one or mere private sales to a
rCsttictcd gro11p o.fipurobasii.ts who will be obli~ to ape, among othcrih!ngs, to acquire ••
such s~ for their own a~uat, for iuvcsbiltllt md~ot with a ~cw to distn"bulion ot resale.
P!cdgw aoJcnawlcdgcs duit any such prlvafc we Ol' sales may tic at p.laccs- and on team Jess
favorable to the scllc:r than it sold atpobllc Mies and aar= that sUah private sale:s shall be
deeined to haw been m~11 in a couimttcl,ally rCBSl)nablo mannor, and tbAt Sccti:n::d Paxty bas oo
o'&Ugation to delay thcsalo of p:ny SJich aocurity for the pc:;iod cif1i:nic ncocnlll}' to peunit
Un.Wersc, Fs:mitr.51 AlfJ. or any other iss:IJCl' of1hc ~1o ~such sewritics :fotpublio
$Jale und~ .any appUcab~ sc~tics laW$ '!f rc:gular:ions. In1bo IM:llt any llotioo is .required to bis
pen to P~~r with ICSpettto lllJ)' such Qlb or dhpositloo of any of tb.6 P1cdgcd Collatual. ten
(10) t:alcndar da)"I JlO~ of iioy sucq action .sba:Jl be dcamed to 'be a sufiich:nt and· commercial I¥

.

(

xeasonabl.c notitc.

·Ii -
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51.4 Uablltt;t ofP,eCUl'dP~. NeltherSct:Urcd PartyDOr ID"/ employee, prtomey
a.coolllltaat. ~ or othr:r agcnt of8c:cux¢ P~ 5balJ be .ljablo for any acijon:takcn ~
omitted tb bi; taken in CODDcetion "With this~ r:xcept/91 iti orthc!!i 0m1 rdl~ or
wWth1 misconduct. S~wed.Pllrt)' sb.p not bo liable for miy otn.bp,. dr:mlul.IU1 l~ or dninngcs

,,,.. .

.madc,tlaimedtJC~.byl.'led.gor,c:x~,,ny~p>tybo,~.bfSCCUtedParty 1.
~or~ miscoJxl1Jct. Pledgor S1Wl Xl!hrlbmsc Secured J'mty, Oil drimsnd, !or all
costS and c:xpct1$e$ ina.u:rcd lrY Secured Party ln cotlDCClion with the administraliDll and

1

.,

eofem:;cmcmo!thh Agreement and for all C9stl und ~ of'fho ~w oftbis
Agreemcn~ and agrees to indemnify and bbld haEJDl~ Seauzed Party md tho otli=- ~

nmncd' abova from and against my anti all liabillf:t illeu:rnd in cormCCtioo. with thU A~
l.ml.css such li!lbility is due fo their gross ncgli~IC3 or willful mUco~dnm.
f1,
10.

SubstitutimundllcJcajcofSamty
•

•

.

~..
..sllfll.~~(. ffvV~·
,,,.;.
/fl

,,r.

In.the.event
rJJ able to obtain!Qrtbe bf:nc5.tofSccurcdl"arty (i) ono orDlDl:C
bollds the
· of which arc equal to S~ M.llllmi Dollal:s ($6,000,000) IUJd whichmlltUte
DO the maturity data of the Note; or (J.J) ODl/l or mote zCrO";COtip011 bonds wbipb )law a fixture
Vfllue, as of thri mid.urlty da1D oftb!= Note; cqtlA! to Six Milll0l1 Dollars ($6,000,POO), then
Scw.r:cd Pm;ty will allow Pl~or 1o sii.bstitutc suc-.b bonds for the Pledged Coll~ llJ'oli~ed
·:that the folloWing cooditlo.DS an: satisfied:
(a)
(

1P.c bonds m:i: ~a.t\:ats.blc: md ate issued by the v.s. Oovc:Dlmc:ni ot ~

ob).i,gor appt'OYcd by. sccu.tcd Party;
(b)

the 9onds arc made txJ .scCun: tbs:: ~ecuted ObligatlOIISi

(o)
Secu:ccd P~ .rcctivc:s a first pr.iodty sccutity 1n.tc:tCst In .such bonds '$icb
is pc:r:fcctcd pdar to onimultmcous with tha mwc oftllis Pledged Oollitctal;
•.
. (d)
Unless s1.wucquhl:mCl?-1 ls waived by StWRdl'arty.J:>lcdgorpro"t'ides an ·
opjnion Of l~gal counsel that Scoured Party will have a fir&t-pdbdt)' pcr&c:.tcd security in1creSt in
the bondsi and;
·

(e)
such airangcme:nbl arrs evidenced by ~d documcms. lncluding a
Bti>nd Pledge AgrcctnCJJt. in fbil)1 and substlmc:~ abceptabl11 to Sccutcd Party and Secured Party's
counsel.
Ifsuch co:ndition:s Kl'C mtl;, Scqrlrc:d Party will rel.case tbo~ged Collal;tal and rttuni
~"/ and aU certificates and .tnsf;nuilcnts rcpmcnting or vddenci:og the l>Jcdgcd Co~ to
Pledger.

•.,

I

••
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11.

,

Miscellaneous

1L l Survival All n::pn::sz:ntatiom. 'Wlmllll1W and a~ mado in 1his Agr=meot
or in any n$ted doCul:rl,cl:rts shall survive the e:xccat:ion fl,Dd delivery of this Agrcemect e,ud l!lY
rach related doc:omc;$.
•

11.2 Furtht:r-4turancu. Plcdgor will d8n RJCh additional documcnb ~gt> ~
Pledgrp Collirtt:al as 'S~ Party may .xcasonably ~ fn ordtf to provldd .Sccarcd Pat1y
with the full i>cnefit oftfds Agreement. NC(fgor ~y grants to Scebred Paxfy a. povicr of
attoi;ncy to execute my such docmnt:nf3 u Pkdgor's attmnC)"ln.fact. SQ(lh power of attoamy u
coapied wiih un ~ md shall be bcvo~lc IJ11.lil t!ic Sccnrcd Oblipd.om. h&ve bCc:n ft1U1
and finally paid.

.

'

11.3 Jmentfmeit. This~ tlic R::dcmption Agrccincat. and the do•u.
instrommrts, plcdJ.c ~- and ether agr=ncnts (lltld all~ thcrcwl ~into in
cowu:ction with, ~ listed within, the !Wailplioti Agrccinep~ c6n1a,in the .:ample~ aild fiDal
expression of the lilJtiro ag:rcc:mcnt etfthc partiC:L No provision aftb\s ~ mq be·
amended, modified, waived; O{ 5upplcmctltcd, t::X~t by a wmmg sigocd by tbc paitic:s, to tbf.s
/1.-grr::mnent. No Waiver by Sc:cbtcd ~ of 11.U)' dc.fisu1t s1lall ba a ~vcr of any othc: dc:fanlt.

••

JI

f.

11.4 Retiitdl41 Cumulslh'; Wafyus. All :cighU md ~edics of Secured Party shall Qi::
cmm1Jatfvc ll:lld may bq ~ a1 such tim.c.3 and msuch onfcr as Secum! Party detmni.,,...s.
:rhc ~ bf~~ .to insi'st U,i10D QJ:' mfbrc:e mi.ct pttfoi:m.mco of BDJ pivvtdons pf1bis
A~~ the lledempli:op.Apemcnt. th~No1e, orb CcmsulfJns~ or Ix>~
i& tiglm or pdvilcgcs .hcrqmu:Jcr ortlleroundct c1.r 111;v ofits ri&h1a as providl:d by stm.ut& or Jaw Ol'
in equity or otbc:rwi.sc, sb1J1 not mipair. prgudicc D1' ~a waivct of"1lf suqh xight, power,
remedy qr privilcgo ot be oonstnlcd as a waiver afmy DeAult or a.a au acquiesccapc therein pr
p~l.lludo the ~c Ill' cof'oiemll~ tbcrcof ltt 11 Ldet ~ Nor &hall any sipglc or~
· cxerclic of&DY sochrlght, power. nmc<br orprivilcgcpn:c::Jadc qy other orfbrthcr ex.c:rclsc
thereof or tbc cxcrci.so oi'any othct dght, power,, r=n.cdy or privilege.
11.S FJfe.~ui~s. 'ltUS Agrecme.otaha.U nmambl1b.i.lforcc and effectunlil '$c
cam er of ti) tho sabsdttltion ofbonds fotthc Pl=dkcd ColJaterlll bl ac~co with Scttiou 1-0
h~f, or ('rl) the indefeasible~ or paymcot in 1bll m
• o fthe S~nccd Obligatiogs,
or (iii) the tcmdnalion ofthis Agreement ln wdting by SCCUl1:d Party.. •
11.6 Sevuabllity. lf my of1,blt provisions pf thia Agreement shall be or become illegal
or unenforceable, the otbcr provisioJIS shall rl:Jn.abl in iUll fDrcc wl ctfech

11.7 Noticu. Any notfcc undcr.tbi!I Agrecmc:.nt shall be in wrldng and stuil1 be givc:u
as provided in 1be R.r::dcmption AgrCC!ll1!11ll

.

.

11.B (iavr:rnbtg Law. ThiS ~gri:cm~t shall be govc:racd by, apd coustrocd in
acco¢.anec with, the laws tr.f:tbc State ofldllho. wilhoitt giving cifcct to its provi'Jrions or
prioclpli:s rcgardiog ~llfli~ nf llSl'(S.

•
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11.9 Headingz. BcadiDss used ht'lbi.n atdor coµvanici:u:o only and sbaJl not bi my
way a:ffeet the- constmCtion. of'; at be taken into consldmtion in hittxpleting. this Agn:ement.
II.JD .hsipmmt TJilil Agrecmr:at it riot assigr:ui1>lc by Pledgor. s~ Party may
assign its rlghis h~ 11? any boldt:r of1hc Noki, All th~ 1Cl;llls and provlsians of tQi.i
Agteenu::nt shall bl:: bhidins upon ~cj shall iiimc to lb= bc:ocfit of tud be enforceable by the
parties bcrcto 1md 'their Jl:SP~ SU~ and pcmlfttcd assigns.
IN WfI1ilESS W'BBREOF the parties have dul)r CXCCllted lllld deI.tm-cd thiJ Agreement as
of the. datll.fitst written aboVD.

M'\,SBRVICES CQRPO.RATION

..,•

SECURED PAB.TY:

STATE OF IDAHO

)

COUNTY OFX.OOTENAI

)

) SS.

..
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E:s:hfblt A-1

to

Stock Pledge .l\greemcht

ASSIGNMENT SEPARAT.& FR.GM CER.TlFISA'ra
[CJNimBB]

FOR VALUB RECEIVEDa thp un'dcodgncd hereby es,slgm end tmu.sftts to R~ J,
Taylor
~of the common stock standing in the DmJ6 ofthe undcddgocd on tho
borlb o .. ~Li.th InSunmco ~any and-n:pccscotcd by.~~)~· L_hC{l:With,
mi:ll-hercby ir:mvocabJy"COnstitutcs ~d 'appolllls Sn.J/.LlJ..tc.... as IWOmcy to trimst'et that &tock
on the books or~~ coipora!ioq witb.tull powci of stitllfio1t in the ~· Th.it
asslgnmcm ill 'inadc pmm.IJ11D the ~tock PJl!dgc Ago:cmCQ.t dated a.s of the date hcrcOf and fn
CClmlcCdonWith thoStockRcdcnip~on~cntdatcd ;:r...,,\~ z )::::.1995,bcmveen l!le
undcr:sigm;d and Rt:td J. Taylor, 8.1\d may be used to tramfct !he avc'-dcscn'bcd shares of stock

Jlf. 2u::

,,

••

a:flCf a.DefiwJt as SQdh is defined under said StockPledgcAgrcemcat.

DATED thl:d:.!:day cf..

·

J'....(1

_, 199S.

.

AfA SBRJIICES CO.RPOR/&:TION

.: l ..

.
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Exhibit .A-2
To

r,:

StnckPiedg11.AP'(ll:.1l1cnt

ABSIGNMENT SEP.ARA.TB F.B.OM CER.'I'JllICATB
[FaxmC'l8 Health AlliSllCC Administrat.ars b:io.]

FOR V.ALW~CEIVBD, tbc updcrsigucd hcroby ~and-- to Recd 1.
:taylor ~o ~
s.bittes. pf t,bo common sto~ sWxlini in tho name ofttw und.yiPghcd QD fbc
boob of mm.ors.Health~ Admhllsb:atats, !nc. md mprc:scclcd 'Pf cedifica:te(ll) DO: ..,L..
hi:nm'itb, !!pd ~J' h:mvocAbJy co~ amt appoina ~~" as ustoµi.ey to~~·
tltat stock on th~ boob o! mch corpm,tio;i with.t\lll JJOWQ" of~.On in1bc ~11.es. This
~ciutls made~ to the Stockl'lcdgc:.Agrccm~dated as of the dafa .bc{:cof.snd in
colUlccticn vnth the Stoak bSctaption.AarcCmcnt ~ :;r
1-a z.... •• 19g5, bctwc:n tho
~ and Rt:ed ], Taylor. ind1JJ53 be used to tl:auder lb
vc-dcsaibcd aha.res of stocl.:
aft~ a De1fmlt u mch is defined under said Stock; Plc'Wf Asrccmeot.

"°'li;;

D/i:TBD this.µ. t- day of JIA.c(..\' ,

•1995.

Al}.. SERVICES COR.POMTION

. ·'

' ..

••

•

r
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EnllbitA-l
To
Stock.Plcdga ~ent
•

I

ASSIGNMENT SEPAttATBPRO~ CER.IIFICATE
[AW]

FOR VALUB R:BC&VED, the undtaigm:d harcb}> assigns and transit:%$ to R'ccd J.
Taylor ~ tff'•
~ of the comm.on m.ck ~ding ~ 1hc .name of ttlc "Dµde:rsigned 0)1 tbc
bboks of 'IJJ.. lilsurence, Jhc. 1r9-dtcpteseotcd by cerjl:fir;at(!(s) no.~ htrcWitb~ l!nd bcit:by

~Jy COllSfibUes ifnd~fuls$!+ ~ &lkC... as ~mcy to~ tfud slock on the
books of sach corp~Lliioa wf$1i:zll ~of subslitufion 111 tbt? pmn.!scs,. 'Ibis ~cm iJ
maClc pm:snazlt to tho Stock Pl~ Agrccmc:ut dated as offhd' di® hcrcaf a.ad hi i:onnootiou with
the Sfock:Rtdemp1imi Agrccincnt dated._
z..-z,,. , , 19~51 ~c=. tb1umde::slgncd
Qld R.eed J~ Taylor, and may be used tb txans.ftir the abovc.-descnDed ~ of ttoC:k e:fic:r a
Dcfimlt as scch js dc:fincd Ufli!cr said St.o{lk Pledge Agreement.

J¥,

DATBI,> this

6 ..,,µ'day of :f<.J.,.,

' .1'9S.

A1. SERVICES CORPORATION

135681B.M44

(

'
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SBCURITYA6-'REEMENT

'Ihi~ SBOURlTY AGREEMEN:f is cnt.cn:d ~as of'J'1.4 I~ 'l.. l- , l99S by BJSii
11JDQD8 ~ I: Taylor.(the "SccmcS PartT'). AJA Sc,rviccs Corppraii~ a;ti Id,tlso cdipomtioQ
(''Company"h and Univr:rsc UR Wor;m~ CtmiplUl'J', anldaM domestic ~ company,
Fmncr.i Beatlh Alliwlcc A.dmhllsfl:afor Inc... mIdllho tdrpODdiQt\ )J:A I:nsurancc. lnc.. aJ>.
Idaho cmp.~oa. and Great Fidelity Li:fo hsuran~ Company, a Stock life ~cc cfon:xpaay
~miCUed ln lJldUma (Uigcthc:r With cmnpB.01; tho 'lGompamllS"j.
RECITALS

A..
~ lmd. s~ Parly a:rc partios lo thatccrtahi Stoolckcdcmptioo
.(i.gl'CCII1C1lt da{Fd as 'Jf.l.b ,i..~ 1995 (the "Redemption Ap=mtnf'j, pummnt 'to which
Compmywill redeem 613)94 ~of its Common Stockhdd by Secured Party iu m:bangc
!at, in part, a~ Note' of~ date. hc:rc:wf.th in tf>c pi:fnc.ipal omount bU6,obo.OOO (tlu:
"Notc''). Compmy apd Secured Party arc also partic.'l·to that certaln Stock Pledge Agrpeincnt
(the "Stl)t* :Plc«i;lge .AgxecmQ.1(')1 thllt ~ Coasuldng .Agrr=lµ:ut(thc ..Ccosulling
Agreemi::nt'? and that ccr1$ Noneomp¢tioa Agrecm~t (1bc ''Noncompetiij.oo .Agr~entj, all •
of even datC h~
B. · As. a co:adttlon ofS~ Party':, c:ut:y into tbo.RedemptionAgtecmcot, Sccuicd
Party bas requhed that Onnpaxµes gmlt it a ,ecur:ity int.ert:st in All r.amnrission tevccucs xccci:vtd

PY of on bcbalfof<;ompanies md/ort.bci:r direct or hldirec:t Subildiraics.

.

~.

Sewrcd Party dc:sircot, and COmpaJ;lics iLgrec to gmit to Secured Party; as sr..writy
!or the Sc:cim:d Obligatio.o.s (as dc&cd below) and on the 1mns lllld cooditiom h~ set
forth, a. seobl:itY interest iii all righfa l:itlc: and irm::n:st of Compaaics in the Commission Col.la.tm1
(a.s defined below).

'·

AGRREMENTS
NOW, 'IlmREFOR.E,, fpi: 1U1d in comid,c:ralio.n oft;bc 1bi-ego!ttg ~ and :fur other
good and valilablc co!lSidi::ration th:; sufficiency and rcoelRt ofwhfdi arc bercby aclalowlcdged.
~ccun:cl Party and '!he Companic:s agree BS fbllows:
1.

Definitions

Ju llScd ia this A~cnt

·~

"4cco'lllJI Debtor" JlleaJI$ 81J'/ p~~n or ~f:ity ~Ying any deb~ liability or obligatian .to
any ofthe Comp~cs wi1h respect td Comxnfssion Collatcm•

••
• • 'i-·

..

~

EXHIBIT
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, .

"Co1111111mon Collateral" mClmS all cemmissions from 1bo $!lo of bism;meo or rcimd

sctvi~ received by or otfbchal,f p; or payable to. arty of tho Compa:ni~ or ap.y of their

Subsidiaries, and a:ay illtm:st thcieon.

.

·

.

"Collateral J.ccollnt" has the meaning givcfJ.
Sl1ch tcan ill Sec:tian 4 of this Agreement, ·
,.
"Defatdt" z:icm any evcit referred to in.Sdop 5 ofthjj AgfCClllcnt.

.

.

.
''Secuttd Ob/fgatfoM"·lllcms ~~al payment an!l ~ ~Y. Companies of
1$Y md all obliglrl:ions, liabilities a.nd iu:bourm now ari:icfc:a.ftcr owing. due or nbt dq~ dfrcct or
mdhect. liquidated bt confinsi:nt, to Beci.vcd Party pursuant to any or all ofthe Redemption
~cmcnt. the Ncitc~ cmd. the"~ PJedgc ~ includipg, 'Without limi\a!ion, any and all
amcnmts payablo to Sccun:dParly h~dcr ortbcn:lmdu1 and pmmpt o~cc and
pcrfb:miancc by Companlesofthcfr covenants, egn::c:tllcal:s md obligatl~m hr:rcandcr and
thctCUlldcr.
•

,.

Capitali=f teans used in this Agreement and not otherwise ddlncd shall have the
memings given ta them in the Redexoptibn Ag:rccinmL
2.

Sccnrlly Intcn:st

As collaic:ral s~ for the prompt and UDCODClitional }'a,Ymt.llt ;md pcd'oa:Dilllcc of lbc
S~ of:iligatiQll.\ Companies hereby~ to Seemed Party 1. sqrlty ~in all Of their
~t. title imd interest in md to the Commission Colla1tml.
·

3.

Coven1mu1 Re:prcsentltions and Warn:llt1cs

Compa.n!cs ~!lilt ad 'W3Itllilt to Seeurcd Party u fidlowr.

3.J. A.b.rmc4 o/Lltnl ond ln!t:l't:m. Coni.pamc:s llfC the sale DWXICl3 of tbc
Commission Collatcra.I, :free ofmy liens. s=mty Jn~, clabm or otbttcncux:nbril:nce.s of my
kind, except fbr the liens md sccurll.y interests gnurted 1o S~ Plrty in tbb Agt?;cincnt.
J.2, Power and Juthorlt)'. Each oft\le Companies has all rcqubitc power 11nd
authmity lllld fb11 Jegal D,ght to execute; deliver and pedom:i all itll obUgadom mdc:r this
Agreemcat and to grant a security mtctcst in the ConunW!on CoUakJ:al in the .DlJumc:r for tho
pu:rpqsc contcmpJl!l:td J>r this Agn:cmcn~ and hU the right to grant Seemed Party a seem.it)'
interest in such Commission Colla.Jmtl.
J'.J
ExecuJion; Binding Co121ract. This Agn,:cmcot ~ been duly cxCcutcd 11nd
delivered by Companies and constitutes the lcga1, valid an!{ 1*>dib& obllgdiou of CoDlpaoiCIJ,
enforC.cabJc against Compmfc:s en.ch of thcm iii acc:onfmcc with ilJ terms.

,.

•

3.4
Np Jliofation. 'I1ul grant efa seourity hrte::rcst In the Com,n;dssibn Colls1c:tl by
CDmp81lie3 in the maimer and for1hc purpose t:OliJrmp1alr\d bf 1his AgrcQllc.u( ~ n~ and will
·2·
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not (i) violate any law, n:dc. regulation, order, j\Xigmc:nt., .se.ttlCDlco.t agrcemc::al or d=.rec
inoludin,s. ~limitation, my of the fotego'blg arising out of 11ny rcguJsiaiy l\Ctivffy qr an.y
insmlv>.c«; rcgulatoiy agtbcy or govcmmeniJ.l BllthCJrity of uy stl;tc, applicable to any of the
Compa:nies. or (n) ~tin or require th~ creation 'Of ~cm ot (except as granted tO Secured
Party by~ AgtccmcmJ any llr:u. sccaritr 1nt=cst cpcuu:ibra.nc= or~ of o1hc:ta of anr mmc
UFOlli or with n:sJiect !01 atty' of tho Commission Collmz:al

J.J. Com,panies ~ at tba!t own~ keep the ~OQ. Collatctal .free of all
li~ llll4 C!leUmbraDC= c;:xcept the securlty inten::st of Sci;u;red P,art;y. Companies sha1i not make
9r llgtce ta make my discollDf., credit, ~ set-off or other mction hi the original amount
o~g with respect to Commission eoUafx:nt other than in accortlancc. with iis pres::ot policies
and in this o$ary come of business. Companies shall collccl md cnfbtcc aU co.tiunission

recembllls.
f

··

· ·

3.6. ~al! or DtrpOsttlon. Wi~out tho llrior v.:rlUcn conscut ofthe Sccutcd Partj,
Com}:lanics will not sell, use or t.nCll:!DbCr any port{bn of the CommDsiOD Collm.ml. in violation
of.this A~ent
3. 7. Guvemme.nt RBcetvablu. If llD)' Commission Go.l1mral ~ out of con1racts
With the UDib;d States or any dc~ent; agi:ncy, or hlstrumcntality tlu::r1Xlf;. Calxi,panits Will
lmmedfatelynotify Secured :Party in wtiling md i:xccutc any iDslmmCll~ and 1:ala: ai>.y. steps
rcq,ui:rcd of.Secured Plltf in order \hal .U amourits d~ and tti become dUll sb.ail be aSsigDcd to
ScdtD:cd'Party and notlc.C lhCrc:tifgiltm to fbc Unit.i:d Sbl.1tS in CQ!ll~ with the Fc:dt;t:al
Assignment of Claims Al::f of 1940, as BJ2lcndcd.
•
~
3.8 A.ccus 'Cl11d Rmcw. C'ompanics will kcqi ~ rccord.s IJl!.i 1xxiks of accoiJatf
In which complete cnb:ics-wS.11 be made in ai;con!ahce with <JAAf! tlOl:ISfsfJmdy applied, ;rc:flectfng
al}. Commmion eoil.atcral and rclKtcd tnnuactfons. AJ soon as pom"bh; and in my C'mlt within
l S da73 ai\ct' the Clld of each Cfll~month. Cofupar:rit:s will fbm&h to Sc~ Pllfj
oommissi<ins si:at=IJ[nts showing aii commissimu camcd in suth maatb.. COmpanles will pcanit
SeCurtd Pllrly m~n:asonal1lc Ac:ccu upOD.msonablc noli= apd durlng regular \rasinC$.S
~bud, to ifs ptcrJilii:s and to all books and rccdri!s. and to fUmish Sceurcd Party d:!ld' itS
reprcienratives such fiz:umtial and opctatfDg data and othci' infoqnifion with n:spcct to e.cli such
cOmpany's btl!incss as ~~:Party or fU n:prcscrrtatlv11S may iara ~o to timt: request.

· 3.9 Infonnatlon kgarding.Account Dtbtors. COmpmics $Jllll :frolJl ti'i:oe to lime,
upon regut:St by SCcmcd Party, provide Sccurc:d Puty with a list or all Acco\!Ut Ocbk;>rs, together
~ their currqn.t addrtsScs, telephone numbers. cdntlict pcrsO!ll mid balllDCCS o~ to
Companies, togtthcr with oopics of ell doc;umCllls relating tbeitlo~ Compm11cs hereby autllorize
Secured Part)' to contact Account Debton to verify iu:eptmt information.
4.
I

..

Collaterill Acanmt

•

All Cammbsion Collateral shall be: ~ivcd and held· by Companies in txustfor Secured
Party. and shall be qcdiatcly, 13pOII rcccJ:pt. dq)Qsltcd in a spcc!.a1 bQ.nk ai:coU:Dt (t!ic
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5.

e
I

Defaults

.

Each ofthe following sba1l be a de.fault ("Dc!mllt") under this Agreement

..•iii (

F~ of Company to pay 'Within five: (S) clays of the date due B1f1 priDclpa1 or
inteiest und.cribc Note~ or

(a)

(b)
Brc:acll Di mf repre.sco.tatlon. ~. tcon or topditjori c;Oatainc:d W. thb
A,gm:mimtwhich breach matetiallyandadvQEScly qupm thc'VBluooftba Commismon
Collateial or'Scctticd. Party'.911,bilif:y to cnfOICC his rlghl3 with resp:ct thcu:\o, and which breach
cOJJtinues after nodcc and a thirty (30) d'ay cpportwpl)' to OlltC; or

M Fail~ of Company to fully and.timely to fi.1lly pcr.fbmi epd observe an}' tcons,
conditions and provisloos contalile:d in the. Rtdemptiod Agreement, Note, Sbx:k Pl~gc
Agreement. or Jnf other inStrumcmt or agrccmcot between Company or any of tho CQmpanics
and S9curcd l'arty .rcl,atiDg to the sale, redemjJtio.a, kYmsfcr or other ~position of S,COllll:d
Party's stoek in CompallY, ds 'suCh tcnn.s are ddined in the RedcmpliQll A:grccmcnt. following
any BP,Plicablc ~ta cure (H any) within the applic:ablb agrei:mtnt; Of
(d)

Any lc:vy, attachment or execution on, or scizarc of; BJly of the <;oPlJDission

COJlatti:al;

· (<i)
Dissolution artennmation ofcxist~cc ofCompiny er any of its tuati:rial
Subsidiarlts; providod that tho dis$olutioa er tcrminllion of dX:i:stcncc of a~ubsidiary (in the
absdncl: of lnsolvCZJCY e>r bankr\tpief) sm;t! not co0$tftutc !l De.faul( if all of tht npt procc!tds m
,,;ppli~ tb tllc ~ of '.Boi;tds mcetmg the rcqt.tircmCl)ts of Stl:tiou 10 of the Stock Pledge
1
Agreqmc0t; or

r

RJTOOOOG08

:; ..··.~. ~~>;-. .
' ;.

Taylor 000849

002210

e

•

,-

(f)
!nsolv~cy or ba.akluptcy of my ofthe ComPaclcs or the appointment of a
receiver to take passc$Sion of my ofthe Cqmm,ission Co!hm:ial. '
6.

Rights and ~cs of Stca.rcd '.Party

. ~1. Chmial. In addition to the rlghts a:adrctdt=di~ grmt.ed 1o S~ Piirty in~
Agrc=cut. ~Party may~ its .rights aDd remedies in tq~ Rc:d.emption Agn:cmi:nl,
the Stoel:: Pledge~ the Co~A~or1bcNotc, ~~al lll1 ~~vc
the rlgh1s and remedies of a s~cd party und.tf thc U:niilmn Coo1Illcidal Code as ccacted il1 tho
State ofldabo end·UJldcr all otliar applic;ablc law:i. Compamcs hereby ap~Q'Wledgc and a.gr~
tba1 St:Cl.ttCd }la:rty u not ~ to cxcl'cisc all rlgliU and remedies ~le to it cqua.l1y With
respect to all th~ COlla=al and that S~ Piirty IJJIJY .s-;ltct. lcss ~all th!' CoUate:ral with
respect to which 1bc ngbts and n;nedics llS d~~ b:y tho Sccmcd Part.r h1 its sole disa~Oll
may. be c:xcrcitl:d.

'?

6.2.1 RGJPr;dics.fQf Defanlt h~ }>aymentJ21Intertsi. ln. the ~art ofa Demult
solely itl the payment of in~ unda the Notci, SCa.nd Party's .solo r-••p:u:df 'Wi1h rcspctt to the
Comxnhslon Collatr:ral shall be to transfc:r, ~ ~of Companies, tbc sum. equal to the past·
due int«esi fram the CoUutctal Accomrt t.o tho spocW account coutroll'cfl by S~ Party;
pro:vjdcd 1hit if thi:m a.re insufiic;ic;at funds in tl;c Q:illatctal Accouut to cure such. d~t.
Sceun:d Party shall h,avc: aJ,1 of the lights and r!mlcdics d.cs~Dcd in. Section 6.2.2 hcniof. . ·

.
6.2.2 RweWes tbr Other D~ Mb::r the occmtt:Dcc; and durixig the
~ti.nuance, of" Default, SCQUl'Cd Party ~y Id its ck.efSoi;i mit3 sole dl.'i~ticm, without :further
nQtice pf such Dkctiol\ and V{iftlout dctnand UP\)D Compaides. take ahy one or morel ofthe
following actfons:
(a)

P'eclarc all OJ' F11J1 p~ of thr: ~c:GUJ:l)d Obllgatioll.S due and payabf(!.

..

(b)
Tras:isfcr CommisdDll Collaicial frQm the CQllatcral Accomit to an account
controlled solely by Sc:ourod Party1 any BJ1ll?Ullt to which the Sr;cmcd Paty b cutitlcd .to 1=.s tbe
mar.b:t va.tu.c otthcBcind 11\md.
• ~

(o)
F.ndom any nqtc. dra:ft, chcclc or other instl'Umi:nt or documc.ot with
respect to the ColX1Dll'ssfon Collate.raJ. as tlii: irttomoy-io-ia.ct for; ~mpaaies, with tull power of
subs'li tution.
(d)

Take possession o.t; OJl= and dispose of all mil lllidh:sscd. to the

I

Cou;qfanies.
r •

•

(e)
Accept ll:qd [C(leive pay.meot o.t; r=Jpl for ct de.fend, settle, ~
or adjust Bil)' c.l,a\ul, suit, action or proc:etcling with respect to the Com.mis:iioli Collairnl. In

.
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dqing so, ltJJY dctmmina'tio.11 ~by Secured Party as fg the risks of liti.gatidn. aod aillcctibility
shall ~deemed to be commctclalJJ rcast>~lc unless made in bad fai1h.

!he lUldemi~i;d holds an assign.m.9Jrt ofall the ·comm.i!sion.s ~Jc of [N°BlllC
9fCopipany]. You arq liacby ~otiD.ed tha~ all amounts :ro.u owe to sucbpa:rtics

arch~ to be paid to tho nodc~ed 111. tho following addtcss:

[6ecntcd

Pmy•s Address].
AJrj payments ma:dc other than as directed in this lc:Ul:t will not be rctogn.izcd and
will not be cri;ditcd to your accounl

Please do not hesitate to colliact the tmdc:nigned ifyou bavc my qucStians.

7.

:Power of Attorn~y

Each ofthe Companies bCRby appoi:ott Sccm'cd P}llty, or my persou. or ~lity w~
S~ Pi!.EVmar from time to time dcsig;ta~ u suCh Compm:if'~ llitqmc:y-in-fAci, with poViw,
at any time after the ocouncncc of e. Ddanlt 10: (a) nofify the post office autborlucs to change
tbc ad!kcss 1br 4cliveiy of such Company's mafi 1o au address dc.sigmdcd by Secured Party,
(b) receive, OJ>CQ rmcl sort all mall ~d 10 .such Codlpe:ay; (c) lend r~csts for vcdficati011
of commission acc6unts rc~c to AccoUJJtDebJors; (d) qua.WY sucb Cbpipm)> to do 'business
many state orot\'lcrj~on ._. ncccsmy or~ to cofqn:c::uu:atof SCCPrcd Party's
iatere$tla the Commimo~ Collateral; l!lld (c) do all othct lbings1hat SCcurcd Party Ls permitted
to do u:adu tliis Agrcc:mtilt or that a:re :atccssar.Y 1n c~ out this Asmmc:nt or othi::t agreements
bctwc:cu Company or ahy of tlic Companie.s md Secured ParlJ'. Secured Party sball JlO'\ ~ liable
mran)' acts of com,mlsslon orcnn[sslon or for anycn:orinjudgriicut or mistake offiu:tor Jaw,·
uruess the same tliall have n:suJti:d from his gross .negligencb, n!cldcsmcss or will.fol
misconduct. This power, being coupled. with an iote:rCst, is im:voCzblc so. long as this ~ent
tcmains in e.tlbet.
B.

.
r :

.

'

Rrmal of Security Iis.terejt

To the Q;Wit Company miikcs itp~cot to S~ l>atty1 which payment is tatt.r
in-Yalidatcd, declared. to l>i; a .fi:audulcµt txapsfer or ~i set aside pr rCquircd to bo n;paid
under my batlkruptcy law, otbctr Jl'l'I or eqUitabJe principle, Sccmcd Party·~ interest in the
Commissiol1 C6Uatcral shall be revived BJ.id cotitiDucf as if ~c paymi::.nt or proceeds had .DCVCc
bc::n received by tho Secured Party,

.
I

•

i

.
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9,
9.J. .Ji'1lr.inc1iig Stat,nunu, Elc. Coinpanic:i will .sfp eny &umchig stat.ementS a.nd
other iil.blgs wi1A govcami=1al Di6l:cs ar agt:.1lQi0$, ml other doctimqntll .(c.Wi,qg to the
Comnrl ssfan Collat=al 1hat s~ »arty mil1 rcqu.est. Sccuzcd. P..a:rt111 DcverlhCtcss et.borl?cd
to file BUCh ll~ without C'o111pm,i~' si&1la1tlrca lllld Coritp\m.lcs '.bc-zcli)< grant 1o s~ ·
Party a powet cSf attotl)C)' ~tc -.y sooh doaamcm;s as Campzaie,' lrflorncy~m7:fuct ~
powet Qf attoalcy is ci>up]Cd with an l:ntercst 111d sllatl be b:rcvobbleimtil SCCll{Cd Obligatipns
ha.vc '.Qe1:n ftiny apd ~paid. Cqmpanie;s will (l:imbm::sc ScebIN Party npoa or=mand for lU
e:xpeuses incurred for tbepi::dection and CODti.nUillion otpc.r.fed:ipn of SectJrcd Pmty's security
interest in tlic CntlUJlfssion CoUatti:a,I.
.

!?

9.2. A.ment!Wnt. Thi& ~emmrt Ind thr:t other w.riUl:a doem:Qe:n\:s, instruments ind
agrcemcnts entered into in c:t1m:11:ction with the Sccn:rcd Obligations contain.'(bc comple'(t: ind
final ~r:ssion ~the Cl1lhc agn:cll1cnt of the parties. No prolisfon of~ Agn:em~may be
amended. n:ux1ificd. waived or supplc:mcnttd. acept by a vvriW:la signed by the party sough'l 1o
be chargCd vtitl\ t1m !llllc¢mdnt. modi~catfan, wai'Vct or su.eplc:m~oa. No wai'vct l:ly'
Secured Party a! BtJy Pc&ult Pll be a waiver bf any other Ocfs:ttlt.

f

'

e

9.3.

I .'

R~ Cwmdatfvt..

All rights and r:=cdies of Sc:cmed Party .cbalI be

cumulative IU.ld may be c;x~ ~ ~times and in such otdcc as SCc:oun:d Party detMpinei
T¥ Wlurc otSecurcdPa;I:)' to ~ 1lp<lll or ea.furcc,stdc:t ~ofany pro'vi,.giQDS aitbis
Agnrmcqt. th~~ Agn:ta>.en.\. the StorJ:PJed'go .A.p!:cmcnft the Collsultmg A¢cmdlt
QJ; the Pmmmmy Nott,
1o cxcrci.s~ itsrl&hts or pxtvilcges h~ or1hc:reundcr or my of
its rights as provided l1y staQJto or .law or in equity or otherwise, shall bot ltnpAir, prcju.dJcc or
coiutitntc a waiver of my suc:h Ii~~ rei:qcdy orpdyilcgc or \le con.stroc4 as a waivct of
llby Default or u 1ID acqUl$CDco thcmin or ptcclud& the cxcrcf.sc ot crdbrcc:mmrttb~of 111 a
later tin:u:. Nor sl)all my singl6 or patlial ~c ofany such right. power, iaoc&y or pr:ivi)cge
preclude any ot1:u::r orfm:tbtt cxeldse thereof or the c:xcJ(lisc ofany od:tcr tight. p0Wcl', remedy ar
privilege.

or

9.4, Eff~ This~ shall tcmain infbll :fbrcc rmd cffi!Gtuntil the .
earliC'I' of (i) lbt wbsfitutiOil ofBonds for tbt: other: Co~ iD accordance with S~ctfon 10~ C1f
tbc Stoyle Pledge Asrc=iim!, or {ii) the inddeaSiblc performance or psymQ!t in :full in cash of all
ofthc Spetlrcd Obltgatfo~ or Qil)tbctcaninatieu Qfthis.Asreemcntin writing by Secured

Party.
9.J,

NoticrtS.

/ujy notice utuler tlii.s Agrccment shall be in wtlting md shall

be given

a.s pro"(idcd in the Rcdetlip1ion Agreemcut.

(

.

9.6. Govmiing Ltrw. This Scapity A~!:Jllellt sball be govcmod by, 11nd construed in
accordance with the la.wa of \116 S1Uc Qfldaho.
9. 7,
CoW1lqpqrU. 11\is Airecmcpt may ~c executed in any number of counterparts
1md by each parlf on' s~ ~=.tCl:parl, t:ai:,b of Wbiah when 50 CJteeutcd a.ad deiive.rcd shall
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,,.

be dt1:racd 8,11 original and all of which ~~together shall constitute bal ona 1!1ld th11 sall)c

insllunicnt.
IN WITNESS ~O~ the parties bavi: ~ cxcauttd and delive{Cd this Agrcemcn~
as. of the datci ~ wtitW,n above.

GOMPANY:

UNlVERSBLIFBlNSURANCB COMPANY

Br.I~ ~t~~
FARMERS BEALTIIALUANCE
ADMINISTI\ATOR.S, INC.
Br.

tJ.LqJi(

lts:.~~~~~~~~~~-

. .

GREAT FIDEI.ITY I..lf.B INSURANCE
COMPANY

By.~

'?J!J!

.,.
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l!!xhJbUD
Consulting .Agreement

.

Ibis Conm!ting AgrccmCDt (''Agreement'' is entered lnto as of the k ,_day of
1995, by and between AJA Services Cmpora:tion, an Idaho coqx>mfion (''Company'1,

J. Tu.ylac ("CoDSU!taxit'1),

A.
Company and Consultant arc parties to that~ Stock R,cdc:mption Agreement
(the "Redemption Agxcemcatj daled as of
1. ' I - • 199S..
.. • _

1{

B.

i

Con.su1tmt has bcc:p active: fu the opcratioru of Company ~ the: past.

.

C.
Company desires to ma.l.o. Consultant's services in an advisory and consuJting
capacity and to ptCVCllt my other compctitivo business from. sc:cuting his services and utlli.zing
.bis ~encc, background and know-how.

e

-

,,Q} •

AgreeD1$alt

For hnd ln consideration of1bc fol:egui.o« pa:mises • ror odw good ~valuable
con.sidaatioo, the tcecipt and·sufllclcncy ot'wbich m betcby acbiowlcdgcd, Company lUld
Consultant hc:mby agree as :fullows:
l.
R~p.D- ~o~~·.~ Rlain Coomllant u ati a4visot and consnltant fur a.
.. peaod ot~@).~·~~~-of'.tbis·~

2.
~. During tho .P¢tiod of this Agre=uent. CoJ!SU)bmt shall provide UJ> to three
(3) days per month of consulting services.

3.
Loca,1iOQ. Consultation services shall be provided at the prl.ncipal place of
business of Company, Consultant shall have the use ofhls e:xistiag office or its equivalent
during hours of con.sultation.
4,
R~e.tionship nffartjca. Consultant shall during his advisory period be deemed 1o
be an independent conttactor. H~ ahall be penuittcd to engage. in any business and pe.rfoan
scmcc.,, for his own account provided thatsuch business and services shall not bo in co.mpotitioa
with. or be for a com.pllll)' that it Is in compctitfoo. with. Company or ltt afBliatr:s or .sabsidiarlcs.
Comultaot ab.all enter Jn.to a Noucompedtion Agrcei:ocat with the Cpmpeny concurrent with 1hc
cxocutioa of lbis Agn:emcat.
·

I

~·

I'
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6. . Dm\Ui: rr Co~ dles d.urlng the: tean bet~ compensation paymc:ats shall
oontlnue. Snch pa)'DlO!lts shall be mado to CollStlltant's c:stm:. Paymcuts shall not be othc.rwiso
assi,gnable wilhou:t tbc prlor written. pcm:iission. of ~any.

7.
~· During lbc tcDn haeo( Company ;ball rehnbun;c Consultant for
tea.sanablo expenses lacidcnt 1o tho rcndcdng of advisozy md consulta.nt savices so long as
Compa'ny 11.pprovcs such cx.pco.scs In. pdvancc.
8,
~. Mr notice tcqalrcd or pco:nitted to be given~ this As=lnl'illt shall
bo in wrltiog end shall be deemed lo ha.vc beca duly given or d~vcrcd if delivered pe;a;onaD.y or
malled by !l:g:ist.c:n:d or ccztified mall, xc!m:u %cccipt requested. with tmt cl.ass postage prcp.ald, to
his residence in tbc case of Consultant, and t'O its prl,ncipal office Jn the case of Company.

•

J

9.
Constmvtioa Captions and othr::r lndings contai11cd in this .Ag:tt;cmcat arc for
refe:r:cncc end idt:ati.fication purposes ocly and in no W&:'f alter, modify, amend, limit or n:sfrlct
the coniiactual obliptions of the parties.
l 0.
Sm;rahUib:. In the cvcat that any one or more af the prov.tsi.<ms comaiued In this
Agrcemcrlt. ahall ft11: my reason be: held to bo invalld, Ille~ or UllQ'lforceablc fn my respect.
sueh b.tvalidity, illcplity orUDCl:lf'orceebilit,y sball not afi'cct rmy. other provision of this

Agreecii;ot; and this Agreement shall be col:lSlrucd as ifsuch i.n.valid illegal or ~le
provision bad JJfJVct bcCl1 con.tairu::d heroin, \lnlcss tbc deletion of the provision ma.ter.ially affects
the overall plan and agr=mcnt of the parties as rdle<:ted ~
11.
Wlfym:ofBIJCAQh. The wa.i'verby any party hereto ofa bn:ach ofpny provision of
this AgreemCD.t by 11Z1Dtbc:r party shall not operate or be comtrucd as a waiver of any subsequent

..;

brcaoh.

12. ~I Law. This Agrccatcnt shall be governed by and consttUcd and
cmfoteed in accordimco' with tbe laws of tho State o!Idaho,
13. ahldina'l?;ffc.Qt. Th.ls Agtecmc1;lt sbJll lnum fl) tho benefit ofBlld be bhld.iDg upon
Company, its~ and assigns, lnclud:fng, witboutllmitatlon, my person. parln8"hip,
company or cmponslion which may ~ substantially all of Compauy's wets or business or
with or lnto which ColXlpany may be llquidaicd, consolid.atcd, merged or otherwise combined. Jn
addition, this Agreement shall hn,m: to the bc:ocfit of md be bll1dirlg upon Consultant, hiJ heirs,
dlstn'butccs aod pcrso.oal Jt¥CSt:n1aiivcs.
14. enliai Aireement This Agree.meat and lhi: Nonco.Qlpctition A.grecmcnt to be
oo.tc.ccd into concw:rcut with the c:xaeut:ion of·tbia Ag:mcmtmt. conJa1n tho mllUo agreement of tbc
P.&rtlcs with ttSpcct to comultmg =vices Gld .1U1Doompctitiou. and may DOt be changed orally

,,I•

I:
,.
I

.

;j '.·.
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•

but only by an a~cat in writing .signed by the party against whoi;o. co.f.orccmcoL of my
waiver,, cbango moditlcation. exteusion. or d!.schm:&"I is sought.

15.

&1prorq's &;es. In tho r:vcnt tbatlllt)'party sbliU briug an.action in conncc;tion

with~~ 'bnaoh qr iateql,re;tation of thls Agrac:m.cn.1. then ihc ~vailing parly in
such action as. deteml.fncd by tho eomt hs.vingjm:fsdictian ~ shall be CZJtitled 1X> recover

from the lodng party in stJCb. aation, u de~ by tbc cotld bavingjtnisdictioc, all ·
rcasooahlc court costs and i::xpenscs ofsuch litigation, indncdng ~YJ' fcCs, court costs, ·
costs tif hxvcstigal:ion and other costs .reasonably rclaicd to suc:h litigstion, in such amoUIJts as
lllll.Y bCJ dcti:rmincd in the dlsctr;tion. DfthD court having jurisdic:ticm.

lN WJ.TNBSS WHEREOF. tho parties .have cxc:outc:d this Agreement as of the day first
ht:reinabovc written.

..

COMPANY:

• CONSULT.ANT:

2ll774B.M55
I

I
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Exhibit&

NoI1compctffio11 Agreement
'Ihfs
("

Noncom~tition.Ai:reomcnt ("Agn:cmtatj is entc:tcd irlta as of the u)1. l, of
1995, by amt bctWet-.nAJA Service$ Coxporattan, anld.aho co.tp0~on
and Reed J. Ta:rfor ("Qlnsultant").
~

..

A.
Compan;y llild CoEIS'llltlw1 arcics In that certdn Stock R.cdcmptioll .Agrtement
(tho "Redemption Agxcemcnf!') dafl:d as of
·U..- ·..• 199S. pmsuant to whlcb..Cumpany
!Ja.s given Comiiltant a promissory note (the~") as conSideta1:1on hi. part for fut) rcd=tftion
of 613;494 ~of tho Cora:par.iy's commo1ulockowned by Co~tant.

~·
~

B.
ConsUltant bu been active in tho opc:ratiom of Company in the past. and has
entered iJJto a Ccmsu!ting Agrcei:ncat with Company ofC'VCl1 date hen:witb.

•

.#

C.
In connection with~ Jt1:dmlption A~ tho Consulthlg A.grcemtat, and the
traDsacl:i.ons cont=platcd thcteby, Company SDd Comalt.unt wish to sc:t fbrth ~ teans and
~adilions cm whkh Consultant sgrces to observe ccrfain nODCO~on aod nonsolicimtiGll
obligations spcd1icd hi:rciu.

For atld in oonsidcniion of~ foregoing ptCtllisc:s aad fer other good and valuablo
con.sidc:ration, tho rccdpt and sufficimlio/ of which am h=by acknowledged. Company and
Q).tJ.Wltiu:rt ~ agxcc BS .fulloWS:

..

Imm. Consultant•s obliga.!io.m hc::reundct" shall t.enninatti. upon !he latter of tho third
annivmaq :fbllow.ing txp.ln!ion otthc CotLSUlthlg .Agreement or tho satisfitclion of the
1.

·'

n

Company'• obllpdom undettho Noto (the "Tl':Qll"),

2.

Qminan&NotTo,Conuletc.

CODSDlmuthm:by~tbat, duriDg1hcT~

CoDSultantwill not. withol,Jt the prior conse:Dt of Co.oipany, d1tec.t1y or indinictly, whether as
'pkfucipal or as agent, officer, dhec.fix, catployce, salcsmau, consulrant or othctwisc, alone or In
anoclation with Ill)' other pezson, finn. eotp0ralion or other business orpnlzation:

(a)
Butcr into, partidpate. Jn. migagc in or own llll)' mafedaf mt~ in the
,0;t;._
business of any pCfSOll, fum, cmporatlon er other business oiganha1ion 1hat is engaged in or
~~
proposea ta become engaged in a~ assoclafion 11iid1. . lu a taklic ithipt:':li&ll s fr;;ap::_
'* l"!l.\4. insuranoc business 1h:at is in substantial competition with rmy part of tho business ·
now or ~r engaged 1n by Compazq lu any sl31c whcte Company at such time has or has
had a rolationsblp with a iimn asaocladon; or
.:t -

.:·
• I

' I

..

;;;

~
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(b)
Solicit any timn-Idatcd WQClatlou insurance busix:lcss of.my type now or
hereafter cnga.gcd ill by Campany .from axry J'COODS, groups or 12lt!.ti~ 'Who at such 1ime m
tium-rolatcd association insurmcc poliay holders,

3.
!Wimcfi;yoRolief: Ifthere is ab~ artbrcatcned breathof1hcprovisions of
Section 2 above, Company mall bc entitled to a h:mpomy rcstrai:a!J.1s mdc:r and au injullction
restraining Cowulbmt from S'elCh breach. Nothing bcrcin shall be co.osfrllcd as prohibiting
Com.panr from pumli.og any other remedies :for sw:h breach or threatened bzeach.
4.
~. /UJ:!f. notice required or permitted to ba given u.udcr this Agrccmc:nt shall
be i:a writing md Shall be deemed to have b~ duly given or dclivcr:cd if dclivcfed pe.rscmally or
mailed by reglsttred cir ocrtificd mail, rctum rcceipt RqUCSled; mth :fuit elm postage prepaid, to
bis
in the case bf Comultaat, and to its prlndpal offki: in tJ:ic ~ of Company.. •

·..:

rcs!dcmca

S.
Cmls.tmctioJL Captions and othar hcadbigs con'lained Jn this A.grccmc:at ere for
reference and idemificadon purposes only and in no way alter, modify, amend, limit or n:strict
l:hc contrao1llal obligations ofthe parties.

•"

6,
Scycmlzmtt. In the event that any one or r:non: of the provisions contained ill this
Agrccine;Jlt sh.a.11 for any reason ba held to be il'lvalid, illegal or uncnfcm:eablc hi any respee~
sueh inwlidity, illegality or uncnfo~ility shall not a1fcct any othc:-r provision of this
A.gR.c:mait; and this .Agrccmc;nt shall be col.lS'trUcd ~if sach invalid Illegal orunc.nibrccablo.
provision had never be= contained. hcrdD, tuilcsa the dt:lction oftbo provision matctially a:ff®ls
the overall plan a,nd agreement oftb.c parties a.s roflectcd hcireiD.

7.
Waivi;r Qfllrr.aeh. The waiver by any party hcrctD of a breach ofauy provision of
this Agn::amcnt b,y molhcr party .sb.a.1.1 not opm;tt; or be cousb:ucd as a waivct of mry subseqw:Dt

breach.
8.
· QQmnfni Law. lhis ~shall be govrmcd·by md cousb:uetl and
enforced In accordauco with the laws of1hc State ofldaho.

9.
6indinr Bffcct. ThU Agreemc:at and tho Comulting AgreCDlt:Dt shall inure to the
benefit of and be binding upon Company, itJ successOtS and us.igns, int:luding. without
limitrti.ou, any pcnon, partnership, CO!llpany or carporaf:ion whlch may acquh'c substantially all
of Company's assets or business ot with or into whlcb Compazzy may be liquidsmd,
consolidated. merged or othcrwtso combined.

•'
i;:

..ti
4

l O.
IWtim Agmemont. This Agretmr:at cout.ains the Ct1tirc agteCmCDt of the parties
with respect 10 no11competition, and may not be clumgcd orally but oaly by an agrccmimt in
writing signed by 'the party agaimt whom c:nfo:cccmeut of my wai"Vcr, change modificanon.

l

extcmion or dl.schargo ls sought.
~.

•

-2-

RJTQ000855
·,

Taylor 000859

002220

.e
11.
Attorney' .s FQC!I. In tho event 1ha1 uy party shall bring an action in cono.eation
wi.1h !he pctfcmnmcc, breach or lntetptetation of1bls Agttemcsi.t, then the pma.Wng party in
sueh action as dctcnllincd by tho ~Prt having jmisdicd.on tbcrco~ .shall bo entitled to recevc.r
from tho losing pad)' in such action. as ~cd by the court having jurlsdicliOD, all
reasonable couxt costs and t:XpCJlSCll of such 1!1ip.l:ion, iuductins attomtys• fees, court easts,
costs of fnvcstigation aJld othc:t costs reasonably rclat:l:d to wch litigation, .in mch amounts as
may be detczm.lned in the dlzcretio~ of the court hllvingjllrisdiotion.

IN ~S WHEREOF. the parties have executed this Agreement as of the day fiist
heicinabpvc wrl.tt.en.
COMJ>ANY:

CON:St.JLT.ANT:

135680C.M44

.t..
I

~

I
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B:tLL o:r s.U,.B

IC.NOW J\LL l4E.N :SY !'B:ESE PIUlSEN:rS:

BFJ'EC!l.'l:V.E as ct the

wt!.

~

day of August, 1995 1 A.IA DiS'l1lllllCB,

INC .. , an Idaho corporation ( "'.rransferor11 ) , 'for good and valuable
consideration ':Tiven in th~t certain Stock Redemption Agre.e.111ent
l:>etvee.n Transferor and t.rransfex-ee elated July 22.

1995 . ("Stock
•

r

Rede:mption Agree.Jae.nt"J 1 the receipt and legal sufficiency o:f vlilch

is hereby a.c:kno~le.dged, does by these presents grant, bargain, sell
and

convey unto QED J. !l'AYLOR ( 11 1'ransferee") the CA? Program

'?angib~e

••

~

"'

Prope.rty ite.miied on Exhibit 11A11 , attached bereto and by

this reterem:e 111ade "' part .hereat' as i ! set .faJ;tb in tull ("CU'
Prog-rua Tangible Property"), 'l'O HAVE ANtl TO HOLD the CAP P:r:ogru

Tangible .Property to

'l'nnsferee,

his

successors

and

t·

I

assiqns

eo~ava~.
J:N

HX'1N2SS lt'XER.EOF 1 the Transteror has eKecated this Bill at

Sale as of the day

:.,

ii
ff

..~

..
~

•
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Propared by Brian Petacs 8111/95
CAP FURNITURE. FIXTURE & EQUIPMENT INVENTORY
Adding Machines: 2 · Sllarp a,219?.G
2 " .. El.,263QA

1. • • vx1asz
1

... VX2652

aookcasu:

1 ..c.o".x4rwood

Chairs:

2 Bgonomlc- bluo high bac:lt
1 M~ger .. blue
1 •·
" .. brown wl chroma arms
1 "
" - brown leather
1 Secretarial - blac;l(

1

Fiiing cabinets;

'

•

1

•

.. - burgandy
"-grtty

3

".

"·Ol'ilnQIJ

.

Storage rack$':

.1

WorkstaUons:

f

24~6"

a.shelr unl!s ~gray

48"Jc50.. llteralura raclc

1 2-4"JdlO" Orange lamlnala top
4 30"X60.. Wood g1'11n laminate top wt pencil drawers
~

1 IBM wneelwrflere (#22013)

1O Knoll· standard m1..d11larwor1tS1aUans
t JOX60 w:xXleD de.slc
l wbeel c:;arf
l 2 I X 6' I Credenza & desk

...
Reed T.ayl.o.r 1s offic:e
Q:xJputex:s:

:

1 2 drawer ver1ical • belua

lateral" -~nd
1
1 4 drawer Jaleraf - black
. 1 4 drawer vertical JegaJ 51ze .. ~ btOWn
-4

Typewriters:

..

...

• .:.bf11e

*::$

'teel shelving:

rabies;

..

·,

..'•

..

!Umiture.

l Q:nll'ac OJnt.ura 3/2SC (w/ m::mitnr
l Dell P75
l Pad:atd Bell 4BG/6'6 ·
G 386 notebooks (va.rl.oos)
1 HP Series II Laser.Jet pr;.int.er
l Pana.sanic PX-i'44l0 px:inter
l. 3 t pr.Inter table

1'

i

{

&keyboaJ;d)

:

..
I

~

I
I

•I

•

~·

..

~

.'
~

~·

• c:ae ~ ~ tD be of transferor's choice

......

£::'

.,
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CA fRffCROSS

EsERL.E, Be:Rt.IN1 KADING, TURNaow & MCKLVEEN,

CHARTE:RE:O
ATTORHC,.._ A!fll C0UHll(.L011:0 AT

C-irvi. PARol

I'\.~

i...w
TU.ll:l'OIQ"'c;

300 NOrn"H :SllCl'H 1$T11r:n

(COIJ,,_...•QU

POST 0Fn~C 80X 13150
8015£, IOAHD 03701

taotJlM"·ll•~

August lS, 1995

f'M;alMILC

J ..WCSC..DUUH
Of' C:0UH41CL

T.11.C6C-.•C f10&&•10U)

Reed J, Taylor
P.O. BoxS38
~winon ID 8350 l
Re:

Common Stock ~cmptioc

Dear Mt.' Taylar:

'Ibis opinion is being deliv~ to you punuant to Section 2.S(j) of the Stock Redemption

I

Agreement. dated July 22, 1995 ( •Agreemenr) by and 'between IJ.A Services Corporation, an
Idaho corporation ('Company•) and 'Recd J, Taylor. All capltall.?.ed·t.crms not defulod herein
shall have the respective meanings a.scribed lo them in the .Agreeme»t. The phrase •Tramaction
Pocumenu; refctt c:ollo::tivcly to the Agreement, together with thr. Note, the Pledge Agxeement,
the Security A.gn:ement, the Consultl.Dg Agreement and the No.ncompetition Agreement, as such
documents are defined in the Agreement.
We have acted as general counsel for the Company in connection wlth tho tnnsaclio~
contempla.fed by the AgreemenL As such gcneJ:al counsel, we have wisted in the negotiation,
and have examined executed coun~ (or photomtic copies of c.iccoutcd counterparts) of the
A~mcnt and otber Transaction Documenta.
In iddlt1011 1 we have c:um.incd ot!gicals, aecuted counterparts or copieG of such

agrcemenu, corporate records, instruments and ccrtilicatcs., certifica~ of public authorities and
such matter~ of law as we have deemed n.cocssaxy for the purpose of xendering \he opinions $Ct
forth herein. To the extent we deemed necessary for the purpose.s of this opinion, we have
relied upon (i) th~ statement.s and reprmnta.tions of the Company as to factual ma~, (ii) the
corporate records provided. to u.1 by tbc Company, and (iii) certificates and other documents
obtained from public officWs. We haVf; furthcc relied as to factual matters on the J'CPft\3Cntat1ons
and wmanties contained in the Agr~cnt and the other 'ITiulsaotion Documents (mcluding 1
withoul llmitadon, Mt. Taylor's representations in Article IV of the AgrcemCDt) and on the
Company.'g ICprestoUUiODS in Schedule m (a.nachcd) lo the Agimllcnt; and we bavo a.uumed
the complelcneS.s a.nd accuracy of a.U &uch n:pn:.sentalions and wmantic:s as to factual mat.ten.
We hiivo usumed the genuincucsa of all sl&natures (other than tho$0 of the Company), the legal
to cxceu11; the Agmemcnt and all other documents we have reviewed,
the authenticity of all document& submitted to us u origilla.ls, and the conformity to original
doc:u.menti of all documents submitted to us as certified, photostal.io, reproduced or confonned
coplc:i. We have fUrther assumed tha\ the Agreement and !he other Transaction Documenu have
capacity of Mr. TaylQr
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been duly authorized, CJ:~Uted and delivered by Mr. Taylor and are enforceable agaiD.9t him J.n
accordance with their respective tenns, and that the execution, delivery lUld perfonnance of the:
Agreement and the other Trausaclion Documents by Mr. Taylor doc:a not and will not result in
· a breach of, or constitute a default under, any agreement, instrument or other document LO whlch
Mr. Taylor ls. a pa.tty, or any order, judgment, writ or decree applicable to such party ia which
fytr. Taylor's property ii wbject.
Whenever our opinion witb respect to the wstence or absence of facts is indicated to be
based on ,our knowledge, we arc refc:rrlog to the actual knowledge of R. M. Turnbow and
Richard A. Riley, whom tb~solcatto~sin Eberle, :e~lin, Kading, 'l\Jmbow &Mciaveen,
Chartered who have reprcse.nted the Company duriIJg the course of our reptesentation in this
t:ramaclion. Except as expressly set forth t,x:rmn, we: have not undcttakcn any independent legal
or factual lnvcstigation ta dctcrmiDc the~ or ab$Cll.CC of such facts, and oo inference as
to our knowledge of the exbtencc or abscncc of such facts should be ~wn from such
representation.
BaScd upon and subject to our examination and assumptions u aforesaid and s~bjcct to
lhc qualifications hCn:.ma.ftu set forth, we a.re of the opi.Won !hat, except a..s set forth in the
attached Schedule mand/or the Schedules attached to the Agreement:

1.
'l'be Company is a corpora.don duly organiDxl and validly existing \llldcr'
the laws of tho State of Idaho. Based solely on this JU1aehed CCf11ficatcs of Corporate Status
issued by the ldaho Sccn:taty of State, the Company, Tbc 1Jnlvme Ufe Insutance Company
("Universe•), A1.A Insura.nc:o, Inc. AIAI1 ) llld Fanne.ll Health Alllance Administtaton, Inc.
("Farmer'S•) a.re coipOntions incorporated under the cmporaUo.11 laws of the State of ldaho IUld
in good standing on the records of the Idaho Secretary of State.

c•

2.
Tho Company and ibl Su.bsidlarles have full corporate power a.od authority
to enter into, t:Xecute aiid deliver the Tran$actf.OJ\S Pcx:umi=nts a.ad to perform theit respective
obliptlons thert.uuda; all ~ don CiJ11':~:pUtt>f:C::ompa.ny and its Subaidiarle5, and
their ~ve~ BadlhatehOkkn, ·necesmy• for tbo authorization, ClCc:catioa, delivcey
Ud· perfonnance b)' Company and Jq SUblldiarles of .the '!'ramction Documents and the

C01'1$UJ11mation of the ~om ~ thereby has been ta.Iceni and th~ Transaction
DoaJmeou have been duly exccu~ and dCliY~'by ~·and its SubsidJaries. ne
Transaction Docume11ts conati1uio the ~· ~ biacBn, obllgatk>n· of Company and ·its
Subsldlutes cnfor~Je agahut tbem in .aceot. . . with thdt ~tlve terms, except that
enforceability . may be limited by (a) applJcablc bankruptcy, Insolvency, moratorium,
reorganization, fraudulent transfer, tt:ee:iveaahlp, conse.MtOr&hip or ~mllar Jawa af!tctlt>#
Creditor's rights generally, (b) the exercise of judiclil dhcn!tion in~ wiU, .geMriil
prineiples of equity (whether applied by a court of law or cqultY) and (0c).0>Daid~adons of pul>Uc
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policy.

3.
Neither the execution and delivery of the 'l'TaNaction Documents by
Company and its Subsidiaries, Dori.be conswnmation of the transaciioos contcmplat.ed thereby,
will (a) confJiet whh or violate any provision of their respective Artie!~ of'Incorporation or
Bylaws, as amended; or (b) consdtute a Vloluioa or dciwt under any fndebtedness, µidenture,
mortgage, deed of tru.s~ oota. bond, li~ l.Welgroement. or other materl1l agreement or
i.nstrUment lo which Company or any of its Sub~ ls a pa.tty or to which any of its assets
or the ass~ of lts.Sub.dcilarlcs may be subject• or (c) to the be.st of our knowledge, violite an)'
law, rule, Ji~, regulation, judgment, order, iullng, or da::ii:c, iilcludiDg any in3urance laws
or regulations of any jurlsdlctlon to which Company or any of iu Subsidiaries are subject,
governing or affo:tlillg the operation of Company or its Subsldlarl~ io my material respccL
Neither the eJCecution and delivery of the ~clion Documents by Company and its
Subsidiaries, oor the consummation of the transactions contemplaic.d thereby, will constitute an
event permitting termination of any matcrlal agreement or th~ acceleration of any indebtcdoe:55
of the Company or other liability, with or without notice or lapse of time, or result in the
creation or ~lion of Bll)' lien \lpon the COllateraI.
· 4.
No consent, authorization, approval or exemption by, or filing with, any
Perron or any Governmental Authority is tcqWm.l in connection with the execution, delivery Blld
peno.rntallcc by Company and its Subsidiaries of the Transaction Documents, or the taking of
any action contemplated thereby, cxccpt such as have been obtailicd prior to Clo5Jng.
S.
All of the cum:ntly outBtand.hlg Pledged Shares arc owned beneficrlally wd
of record by Company and, to tho best of our knowledge, thtrc are no wanants, optiom, or
other rights to purchase S\1Ch Pledged Shares.

6.
Except fot the lien of First Interstate Lien upon the First Interstate Shares,
and any intctc:st in the Commission collateral created or granted in favor ofThr: Centcmlial Life
ln.ruranc:e Company pumiant to that certain Reimbursement Agreement dated August 1L, 1995
among Tho Centennial Life Jnsura.nce Cowpany, AlA Suviccs Corporation, AJA Jn.surance,
Inc., The Univene Life In$urance Company and MA MidAmcrica, lne., the Collateral is free
and clear of all pledges, llcru, encumbranc:c:s, &CCwity intcrcsls, equities, claiml1 or options.
Upon delivery of ccr1iftcatcs xeprc$enting lhe 'Pledged Shares of AlAl and Farmen to
Shareholder 1.t Closing, Shareholder shall. bavo at Clo$ins a
Jnterest in such Pledged Shares.

••

perfect~

first priority security
·

7.
To our knowledge, there arc: no claims. actipns, .suits, proceedings or
Investigations pending or tbtcatentid against or relatin& to Company or any of its Subsidiaries,
at law or i~ equity before Ot by any Govr:rnmeotal Authority, nor has any such acclon, suit,
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proceeding or investigation been pending during the lhreeryea.r period preccdi.Dg the date hereof.
Neither Company nor any of its Subsidiaries l$ md.c;.faultwilh r~toany adjudicatory order,
writ, injunction or decree of 1111y Goverrunent.al aut®ritY. a.nd .~Oler: Company !l<)r -.z>Y of its
Subsidiari~ is a party to any cease and des.isl order, $Upervisory ag:recment or arrangement,
consensual or olh&Mse, with any GovcrnmMtal Authority,
The foregoing opinions are limited to the laws and regulations of the State of Idaho
(excluding Lbe principles of contllcu of lawa)i and we have not consldcrcd and expressed no
opinion oq lhe laws or regulations or any other jurisdiction. This opinion ls renck.rcd only with
.respect to the. Jaws and the. rules, icgulations and orders (excluding the principles of conflicts
of laws) of the State of Idaho (hlt are in cffoc:t as of lhe date hereof, We usume no
responSJ"bUity for updating thia opinion to take into a.ccount any event, action, interp~tation or
change of law occuning subsequcnl to the date hereof that may a.ffeel lh~ validity of any of Uie
opinions expressed herein.
The enforceabilily opinion expressed ln opinion 12 of lhb letter ls subject to the

. following additional qualifications:
(i)
The terms of any commi5s!on agrccmcm, lockbox agreement or other
account agreement which may affect the Commi~sion Collateral, the tights of lhe partieJ
(olh~ than Company or any of its Subsidiaries) to any such agR:emerit, and any claim

or defense of such parties agalast lhe Company or any of iii Sub1ldlarles rising under or

outside any such agreement,
(ii)
The quallficati.on lhat certafo righl4, remcdi~ and waivc:n contained in the
Transaction Documents may be rendered ineffective, or be limited, by applicable Idaho
laws or judicial decisions govcmiog such rigbts, remedies and waivers; but the inclusion
of such rights, remedies and waive:rJ does not affect the validity or enforceability of other
provisions of tbc Transaction Doc:umeou a11d, in the event the Company or any of ils
Subsidiaries does not comply with the me.terial lcrms of the Traruaction Documents, Mr.
Taylor may e.xerc.ise remedies thal would oonnal.ly be available under fdaho law to a
secured party provided Ida.ho law applies and Mr. Taylor proceeds in acc:orda.oce with

SlJCh law.
(iii)
We elepress no opinion with respect lo the pedcctJon or the relative
priority of the security interests granted to Mr. Taylor in lhc Commission Collateral.

-,,..

....
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TWa oplnloo is furnished. by ua solely fOr your benefit for use ill eonnectlon with lhe
TraD$aetion Documents Md tho transactions coutemplated lherebyl as:id it may not be furnished
or quoted:to 1 or relied upon, by my other person.

Very trUly yours,

l

I
s/

·-·
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SCHEDULE ID TO STOCK PURCUASE AGREEMENT
This Schedule sets forth the cxceptio11s to representations and warranties made by the

Com~y ~o the Shareholder in Article m of Ille Stock Redemption Agr:t.ement dated July 2?,

1995 ( Agreement") between AlA Services Corporation (•Company•) and Reed J, Taylor
("Shareholder").
·

l.

EXCEPTIONS APPLYING TO THE COMl'ANY GENERALLY.

A.
Section" 3. 3 and J 11. Tbe Company's reprcscnt:ation thal the cxc::cutio~, delivery
and perfonne.nce of the Agreement aod the consummation of the t:ransactiol13 contemplated
thexeby will not result jo a violation or default under any material agreement or olhcr instroment
by which. the Company or any Subsidiary b bound and lhe Companyts .represen01tion that it is
not in violation of any such agreement or instrument arc qualified as foUows:

Th,c.Co~p~)l.ls currently in, t.~nl~ ~a\11~ e>f .~~ ftnaooiaJ c.avenallts contalnod
jn t.hc FI~t lnteistate'LOan agreement. Those CC>VCDaDl dcf&Jlts are described i.ll the attached
letier to Fits! Interstate Bank from Rick L Johnson, tile Company Vice Prc.sfdtnt, Fiaance.
· Absent the Ba.nlC's writ1en consent, completion of tra.snactio.os c»ntcmplated in the Agreement
runy cause a~d.itional technical defaults of negative financiAI covenants contrlned in the Bank
loan agreement.
The Company bas thoroughly disclosed to the Bank all details regarding the proposed
uansactions. 1n view of the current defaults, lhe Company baa not asked for nor has the Bank
volunteered written consent.
As the Company is current in all payments due to Bank, lhe Company does not anticipate
adverse action by the Bank prior to lhe sche9ulcd loan payoff date of July 20, 1996.
B.
S~ons 3,2 and '.!J:l. The Company'$ repre.1entations concemlng consents in
Sections 3.2 llJld 3.3 are qualified as follows:

1.
The Company has been made a.ware that \he Texas Department of
lnsurance has mken the position that the disuibution of AJA lllSl.IJ'a,llce, lnc. requires prior
deparlmental approval du~ to the status the CompaDy's Subsidiary, The Universe Life Insurance
Company ("Ul.JC•), as •commercially domiciled" in Texas. The Company1 while dlspudng.thc
necessity of such approval, ha11 none the less ftlcd lhe n~sary fonns to obtain .sucil approval.
Th~ Texas Insurance Department has not yet given lu approval for distribution of AlA
Insurance, Tnc.

••

'The Californla Departm~l of Insurance require$ !he submission of a prior
approval form for the D!n~a.I reinsurance treaty. Since !he transaction docs not affect any
Ca.lifomia in.surc:ds, and ULlC i' not beina dissolved or merged, approval is expected in dut:
course. Approval from Cali!orrua ha.s not yet been obtalned .

s<:Hl!DVl.~

m • P~e 1
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2.
As tlescribed above in connection with Section 3.3., certain traJ'lsactions
contemplated by the /\greemem would violate provisions of tho First I111erstatc &.nk Loan
Agreement and related documcnt.s.
i1rC

C.
Sei;tjpo 3,6. Tbc Company'.o; financial reprcscnla.tions contained. in Sc:cliun 3.6
supplcmcnt.cd by the following attached fiIWlCiaJ statements related to the quarter ended June

30, 1995:
Af.A Services Con.o;olidatcd Balance Sheets at June 30, 1995.

AlA Services Consolidated Statement of Income For S!:t Months Ending June 30, 1995.
The Universe Life Preliminary '.Results of Operations (Statutory Basis) For Three and Six
Months Ending June 30, 1995.

GtcaL Fidelily Prellrninary Results of Opc:rations (StalUtory Basis) For Three and
Six Months Ending June 30, 1995.
AJA Sel'Vices Consolidated Preliml~ Results of Operations For Six Months Eoding
JUJle 30, 1995.

U.

.EXCEPTIONS APPLYING SOLELY TO lJNIVERSE LIFE •

.
Sr&Jions 3.1. 3.9 and 3.11. The C,:ompany's repmentations concerning Universe Life's
good standing aod qualification to transact business in various st.ates and its compliance with
state insurance laws: arc qualified by the following de3Cription of regulatory proceedings in 1he
various slat.cs In which the insurance company transacts business.
~. On March 22, 1994, lhe State of Texas lSS11ed Cease and Desist Order No. 94~
0282 again.!lt Universe Life and lts subsidiary, AJA Insurance, Inc. The Order was based on
preliminary examination findings reported to the Ttxa.s Department of Insurance (~'IDl ") by the
examiners. The Order aJleacd that Universe Ufe and its affiliate engaged in unfalr methods of
competition and deceptive practice of insurance and that Universe. Ll!e was in hazardous
financial condition. Following dl.sclJsslons with th~ compa.ny mi receipt of. additional
documentatioo, TD1 is.sued a Consent Order dated May .J7, 1994 wbieh 5uperseded lhe Cease
and Desist Order in its entirely. The Consent 0.rdcr abandoned allegations of unfair competition
a.ud deceptiv~ practices and focused on 'IDl's conccma wilh the proper reserving for the
Supplemental Benefit Accumulation ("SBA~) feature of Universe Life's GUH product and the
valuation of Unlverse Life's investment ill its subsidiary, AJA Insurance, lnc.

•

. To address its, concern with conflicting actuarial opinions on the proper reserves for the
SBA, the May 171 1994 Consent Order directed Universe Ufe to select an independent actuary
to r~view · Universe Life's SBA reserving methods and factors. Universe Life and lh~
Oepartmeol agroed that this acluarlal rc:vi~w would be performed by Donna R. Claire, F.S.A.,
of Claire Thlnlcing, an indcpcndcal consulting acl1la1Y. Ms. Claire pcrfonned an asset adequacy
analysis of Ua.iverse Ufe's reported Deoeinbcr 31, 1993 SBA reserves, iacludin& a thorough
review of GUH product features, actuarial assumptions, acrual experience and historical trends .
Ms. Claire's analysis: is con!alntrl in her Asset Adequacy Report dated June 12, 1994.
SCHl!bUU: Ul • ragv '2
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Jn her Report, Ms. Claire obscl'\lcd tJmt Universe Life's OUH product, with il.S SD.A
feature, ls an innovalive product and that , "[a]s such, there is no current rcst:r"/c standard fur
the SBA In siate law that specifical.Jy fits this benefit•, Ms. Claire concluded the\ (i) Universe
Life's independent consulting actuaries, Mi.Illman 1md Robc:ruon, had developed •a methodology
which follows Lbe. basic sla.Jldards of establlshing reserves that re.fleet the underlying rlska of the
product"; (ii} "[t]he r~e methodology used by [Universe Life's actuaries) docs appear to be
reasonabl~"i and (ill) "given the experience that was developed th.rough 1993, the reserves
reported m the [1993) Annual Statement wer:e adequa1e•. Based on 5ensitivity l.e$l.s which
showed that lhe reported reserves may be inadequate 1f adverse trends occur, however,. Ms.
Claire m:ommcnded that the rcscrvt:.S be increased on lbe ba5.ls of "&omewhat stronger• re.serve
tUSumptiOll;S· Applying the same gTQS$ ~rem\um valuation me~1o3y uSed by Universe Life
to develop Jls reported reserves, Ms. Claire developed oew ~ng ~$ reflcctiiJg lier t®rc
conservative wumptions. Univ~ Life agro::d with TDI that the SBA roserves for ~.TClJU
ceroficatebolders under GUH policy would be detennincd prospectively in accordance wilh the
factors developed by Donna Claire, with any increase ill re.serves being applied ratably beginning
July 11 1995 and wltb the final entry bciD~ made Pc:cetnbcr 31 1 1995.
With respect to the valuation of NA Insurance, lnc., TDI aclcnowledge.d that Universe
Life's accounting for the value of AJA Insurance was permissible under Teitas lawj but, in light
of a Texas statute allowing the Commissioner to ascn'be any other valuation be belic:ves more
appropnate (after hearipg) and the ilnpcoding st.alutory change io the Idaho Jnsurance Code
effective July I1 1995 (see below), tbe May 17, 1994 Con.sent Order directed that Univcrsc
Life's inves,t:mcnt in AlA Insuran~, Inc. be taluccd 1 ratably over a three-year period bcgiuning
December 31, 1994, to the lesser of net wor$ as detenni.ned In accordance with gcneraUy
ac.eeptod accounting principle! or the valuation amount reflected in I.he .final report of this
cxa1IUnation.
·

1
\

During the period of discussioos between Universe Life and 'fDI, Lb.e Texas Insurance
Commissioner approved Universe Ufe's new GUH Ill product and- th¢ ttlllsfet of Unive3e
Life's group health and lifclo:surance businwin1'cxls by reinsuring, on a~·~m.J)U()n f>asis,
all of such businc.ss with The Centi:nnW Life Ins~ eompauy. ·see "~l Conduct
Activioes - Policy Form Filings and Approvals" and •Substqueot livents-Sale Qf Group
Universal Health :Business' above.
On October 13, 1994, TDJ issued a fwtbcr Con!Cllt Order which superseded the May
17 1 1994 Coosent Order in ils entirety. The Ociobcr Order recita.i Uo.iverae Life 1 s agreement
conceroing the implementation of the Clnire factors for reserving for lbc SDA and ordered that
Universe Life: reduce the reported value of lts wbsidiary,.A..?A ln~Jnc., lO UieJessct or
net worth (as determined in accordance with generally accepted accounting vri.lloiPles) or !he
valuation amount reflected io the final report offhis cxamtnati.on, pro,vidcd lbat tb,~J1djustrnent
in the AJA lnsunuicc ca.nying value would be made ratably overt thn»>year period beginning
December 31, 1994.
•

••

lsialw. Based on lhe fioanclal concerns raised by r.he preliminary examination rcsuUs and
the isslWlce of the Texas Cease ud Desist Order, th!: ldal><> Department of lnsUta:Dce
("Departmcn1") initia1ed an lnqwry resulting in a Volunt.uy Agreeinent~oneeming SupcrViilor,
<.luted April 26, 1994. between Universe Llfe and the Departmeo1. Under the Agrcernenl,
Universe Llfc has provided financial and other iofonnation to the Department on a regutar basis
!iCllliDl1Lli W Par.c J
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lo enable I.he Depa.rtmeol lo infonaally monitor Universe Llfe's financial condition and
operations to assure that policyholders' iotetesl.S wae protected dwiog the period required to
r~olve the financial and other examination issue.!, During the period of discussloos the
Department has approved Umverse Life's new GUH product, the transfer of Universe Li.re's
indivkhJal bt:alU1 ill~wi.!.11'-C bui.i.ut:~$ lo States GCl\Gral Ufe ln.suraJ>ce Company 1111d the transfer
of its group health and life ioswance business to The Centennial Ufe Insurance Company.

m

1

By :agreement dated December 23, 1994, the Idaho Department approve<.! Donna Claire 13
gross premitiro valuation method and Ms. Cla.ire's reserving factors for calculating SBA reserves
in accordance with her Asset Adequacy Report dated June 12, 1994. The Department agreed
that Universe Ufe would nol be required lo restate its 1992 or 1993 A.onual Statements and that
implementation of the Donna Claire reserve: adjustment will be made prospectively, in
iiccordanc.e with TDl's October 13, 1994 Conseot Order, on a quamxly basis begilllling with the
third quarter of 1995 and ending December 31, 1996. The following table sbows the effect of
the Donna Claire adjustments to Universe Llfe's reported aggregate re.wve for accident and
hc.alth policies and to its capilal and surplus at December 31, 1992, 1993 a.nd 1994:

Caplll! & lillrplua ropo~d by

e

•
.

Univonc Llf11:

lm

lm.

.lW

$ !i,418,748

S S,140,830

s 4,l&l,7&1

10,376,371
7,1143,186

14,040,419

9,193,&SO
9,S79,S81

Auregale re,,uvt for A & H policies
.

Ju

rq,ortcd

As c1alcult.tcd by Clain flew
Cl.tic t'atlor a.dj111tn1•1t
I

Caplu.I .l 111rJ>l11s After Clair~

~lor adj1uU11c111:

:l,S33 1)f1

§ 712SM33

14,801,6~1
76!,241~

c

!

i'~~a!

I ~.1~oso

n~.:zw

.

ln the Decembet 23 1 1994 agmment, the Idaho l.Dsurancc Department acknowledged
that, until July 1, 1995, the ldaho lnsurana: Code pccmtts Univ~ Life to condnue to report
tts inv~t mAJA ~ tnc. at historical cost (subjccrto a lS %of assets limitation) on
its'l992, lgf.J, l1lld 1994AnJ1UalSWCllenl$, .Altbough~by Idaho statute, this valuation
of AlA Tnsiim~i ioc. deviates· ffuin the NAIC s"nduds for inv(:Stment in ~bMiarics as set
forlh in the NAlC AecoUDting Praclir.es and Proeedu.res Manual ·for Life l!Dd A;ccldeat and
Health Instirancc Companies. See ·vaiuatlon ofAIA lnsUtanct; 111~ i. a!:>ovcJu1der~lhe:caption
•Comments on 1992 Financial Statements: Common Stoek". Oil July 1. 1995. U~·Life .
will be required to reduce the value of its investment in AlA lruurance1 Inc., for statutory
accountingipurposes, to the net book value of AJA Insurance, Inc (which was S2,424,097 at
December 91 1 1992).
OtbS}f Stilt§. n1e following regulatory proceeding~ in other jwi:1dlctions were
precipitated by lhe issuance of the Texas Cease and Deslst Order and/or the pn::liminary
eum.ination .findings conla.i.ned therein;

••

A NoUce of He.arlog and Orde:r to Show Cause with Suspension Inst.anter was lssuod by
the Oklahoma Insurance Commi&aionc.r on April 6, 1994 ba.scd on lhc Tc.xu Cease and DC3lsl
Order. On'May 26, 19514, by lener agreement~ on the May 17. 1994 TOI Consent Order
a.11<.l Universe Ll!e's April 26, l994 Voluntary Agreemenl with lheldaho Insurance Department,
the Oklahoma Department agn:ed lo suspend and termiaa.tc the prior Notice and Order to Show

~,<.·•'
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Cause and Ito allow Universe Life 10 continue lo solicit bu.'iiocss from j1.3 cxisling policyholder

R.Ssoclations.

An Order of Suspension based 011 the Texas Cease and Desi.sl Order wu issued by the
~noi& Department of Insurance on April 26, 1994. The> Suspension Order wu lifted by
StxpulationJand Consent Order dated 1uty 27, 1994, pursuant to which Univme Ufe agreed to
notify the lllinol! Department before transacting new business in the state durlng the next three
years.

A notice to show cause regarding suspension from dolng business in the State of
Mississippijwa.s issued by the Mississippi lnsurancc Department on May 6, J9!M 1 based on the
Texas Cease and De.slst Order. Suspension of Universe Life'$ ~te of authority was
initially stay~ by tbc Departmcotj howevc.r, on Sept.ember 81 1994 1 a Suspeasio11 Order was
entered based upon lhe appearance \bat Universe Llfe WM theu in an u.n.sound condition.
n,e AJaslol Insurance Deputment issued an Order ruspcading Universe Life's certificate
of authority on May 19, 1994, based on the Texas Ctase and Desist Order, Universe Life
entered into an Agreement to Suspend New S~es on 11,lly 27t 1994: and the Alas.lea Insurance
Department withdrew the i;uspension order, Universe Life had not ~n writing new business
in A.Wk.a, so lhe Agreement to Su~d New Sales has bad no financial effect on Universe
Life's operations. .
ThelMissouri Insurance Departmcnl issued a. Notico or Institution of Case and Stal.emenl
of Cbarges dated lune 2, 19941 based upon the Texas Cease arid Desist Order. A bearl.ng in I.be
·matter bas been continued indefillitely, to be ro-set upon further notice to Universe Life.
In June 1994, the California Insurance DepartpleDt initiated an informal inquiry based
on the Tt:Xa& Cease
Desist Otdcr. Universe Life entered into a confidential voluntary
agreement to cease writing new bll.'lincss In California, Universe U!e had not bcco writing new
business in Californi.ai the confidential a.grccmcnt has bad no financial effect on Universe
Llfe's operations.

and
'°

On June 61 1994, a Suspension Order Willi issued by lbc Wyoming Department of
Insurance without prior not.ice or hearing, based on the IlUnols Suspension Order. :Based upon
sUbSCttuent withdrawal of the Illinois and Texas orders, Wyoming llitod the Order of Suspeosion
and ente~ a Stipulation and Consent Order dated July 28, 1994, purniant lo which Univcr&e
Llfc was penniru:d to continue $0Ucitlog !u existing policyholder assoelatioo but agreed not to
solicit othet business in Wyoming without the Department' a consent.
Universe Ufe voluntarily agreed lo suspend new busines11 in Oregon pending resolution
of I.he Oregon ln~urance l.>cpartment's c11nCWJs under a unique Oregon statute regardiag
valuation·or Universe l.Jfc'a investment in AlA Insurance, Inc. A Consent Otder was issued
June 30, 1994. A Suspension Order WO.! iMued Augu.st 23, upon expiration of the Consent
Order, Un\versc Ll!c requested a hearing; and an Amended Suspension Order prohibiting new
WC:i was entered Novembc::r 2, 1994.

••

A Notice of Summary Suspcm.tion was issued by the Iowa Division of Insurance on
August l5, 1994 1 based on failure of Universe Life to file i1s annual audited financial report by

..-.•"
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June 11 1994. (The auditor's Jq>Ort on Universe We's 1993 financial slalements was delayed
pendJng Idaho's determination of financJal issues raisod by the examination. A draft of lbe
audittd financial statements had p.rcviou!ly been provided to ltiwa l>ivmon of Insurance.) The
Order of Suspension was rcscindcd and the admlnisb:ativc proceeding dismissed on Sept.ember
6. 1994. On J"anuary 6, 199S, the Division Issued a Notice of Hca:rlng to dctcnnine whether
Universe Ufc'1 surplua met starutorY miDb:'llums. Oullldo counsel lnfunnal Umvem Ufe on
Apti.110, 1995 dllll Iowa is dropping the aclion.

.

Universe Life e.nleled lnt.o 11.n Agreement with tho Washlogton Xnsurancc Department dated
Augu~ 18, 1994, ln which Universe Life voluntarlly agreed not IO write any new business in
the State withoul prior approval of the Commissioner, pending aubroission of lnfonnatio.n
establishing that Unlvem life's financlaJ condition b Dot detrlroeotal to Washington
JlOlicybold=-a.

On September 9, 19~4, the Utah Insuranc.e Depaxtmcot issued a Notice of Inform.al
Adjudlcatlvc Pto<:cieding aummarll)' su~g Univ~ Ufc'1 Certificate of Authority for
talluro co maintain mimmum capital and &uiplUl 118 c:alcUla.tcc.l under unique Utah statu~.
Universe I.Jfe's hearing request was 'Withdmwn after the Pepartment's Chlef Bxamincr advised
that th~ .sospeosloo order could be lifted upon infOJ:mal pr*'1ta1ion by Universe life's
management aft.er year-au! demonstrating co1Dplla11,ce with mioimum· capital and surplus
requin:ments.
The Ncbraslca DepartmC1lt conW:~ Univ~ Life on October 14, 1994, concerning
Universe ~·is fi.Danclal condition. Univcnr> Life signed a Consent Order to auspend n~ ~ale.s
Dtl ()ctobel" 28, 1994•.

_
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SCHEDULE l
The following terms shall take the following ascribed meanings
for the purposes of the stock Redemption Agreement made and entered
into as of July 22, 1995, by and among AIA Services Corporation
·"company" and Reed J. Taylor 11 Shareholder" •
"Cap Program." a non-profit corporate line of business related
to college advantage planning, and all right, title and interest to
said program

ncAP Program ..rangible Property" All that property listed on
Exhibit 1-A attached hereto and incorporated herein.
"CAP services center Balance"
"Debit Ba.lance"

the sum of $98,680.00

the sum of $469,995.94

,

••

EXHIBIT
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SCHEDULE 2.1.2

I, DANIEL 'L. SPICKLER, hereby certify that I am the duly
elected, qualified, and acting Secretary of AIA Services
corporation, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
the state of Idaho, and as such Secretary am the keeper of the
records and seal of said Corporation.
The company certifies that as of August· 15, 1995, the
following· constitute all of the liabilities secured by the
Airplanes, and that the company is not in default with respect to
any of such liabilities.
1.
The 1981 Cessna 441, FJ\A Registration #N2722Y is
collateral for payment of an approximately $672,339.85
remaining principal balance pursuant to Note and Security
~greement with Cessna Finance corporation dated 9/4/92 .

•
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SCHEDULE 3,6

r, DANIEL L. SPICKLER, hereby certify that I am the duly
elected, qualified, and acting Secretary of AIA Services
corporation, a corporation organized and exi:sting under the laws of
the State of Idaho, and as such secretary am .the keeper of the
records and seal of said Corporation.
The company certifies that as of
following is true, correct and complete:
l.

August 15,

1995,

the

Attached are true, correct and complete copies of the
company's financial statements for the years ended
December 31, 1994, 1993 and 1992, and for. the quarters
ended March 31 and June JO, 1995.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
the corporate seal of AIA Services Corporation this i1,;d day of
'
August, 1995.
.,(}
{!Jl(.l,IU:,a <: _'j
Daniel L~Spt~cretary

k__,..--
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SCHEDULE J.7
I, DANIEL L. SPICKLER, hereby certify that I am the duly
elected, qualified, and acting Secretary of AIA Services
corporation, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
the State of Idaho, and as such Secretary am the keeper of the
reco~ds and seal of said corporation.
The company c~rtifies that as of August 15,
following is true, correct and complete:

1995,

the

There are no claims, actions, suits, proceedings or
investigations pending or, to the best of company's knowledge,
threatened against or relating to Company or any of its
subsidiaries, except as follows:

I

CHAPLIN, Vickie vs. Universe Life & OLKIGA
COURT: District court, Oklahoma county, Oklahoma
CRAWFORD, Kelly vs. universe, et al.
COURT: 6th Judicial District, Lamar county, Texas
GILES, Ida M. vs. Universe, AIA Insurance
COURT: An appeal to Texas supreme court

~ AIA services

I

HARTM.l\Nr Rosemary vs. universe, et al.

COURT: 3l9th Judicial District, Nueces county, Tex.as
KAZELWOOO, Antje vs. universe & AIA Insurance
COURT: 345th Judicial District court, Travis county, Texas
HURPRY, Barbara vs. Universe Life, Washington National & Preusz
COURT: circuit court, Knox county, Indiana
sWADLEY, William vs. universe Life & AIA Insurance
coURT: BOth Judicial, Harris county, Texas
The above listed cases are claims related litiga,tion occurring
in the normal course of business.

GROSECLOSE, Diana vs. AlA Insurance & AIA services
coURT: Second Judicial District, Nez Perce county, Idaho
The above listed case is a wrongful termination action.
The company further certifies that as of August is, l995, the
following is true, correct and complete:
Neither the company nor any of its Subsidiaries is in default
with respect to any adjudicatory order, writ, injunction or
decree o.f any Governmental Authority 1 nor a party to any cease
and desist order, supervisory agreement or arrangement,
consensual or otherwise, with any Governmental Authority,
except as set forth belo~:

EXHIBIT
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SCHEDULE J.11

! , DANIEL L. SPICKLER, hereby certify that I am the duly
elected, qualified,
and acting Secretary of AIA Services
Corporation, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
the State of Idaho, and·as such Secretary am the keeper of the
records and seal of said Corporation .

. The company certifies that as of August 15,
following is true, correct and complete:

1995,

the

Absent the Bank 1 s written consent, certain of the transactions

contemplated by the stock Redemption Agreement would violate
various provisions of the First Interstate Bank loan documentation.

Negative covenants in Section 4 of. the First Interi:;tate Bank
Loan Agreement dated December 1 1 i986 would be violated by (i) the
issuance of the Series C Preferred Stock, if and to the extent such
Series

C

Preferred

Stock

of

the

company

could

constitute

"indebtedness for borrowed moneyt1; (ii) redemption of Reed J.
Taylor's co11UUon stock of the Colllpany; (iii) issuance of the
company's promissory notes to Reed J. Taylor in payment of the
redemption price for his stock; and. (iv) the grant to Reed J.
Taylor of a security interest in the. stock of AIA Insurance, Inc.
and Farmers Health Alliance Administrators, Inc. stock.
The
distribution of AIA Insurance, Inc. stock to AIA services
Corporation rni9ht also violate the Loan Agree~ent covenant against
purchase or other acquisition of the securities of any other person
or entity.
The grant to Reed J. Taylor of a security interest in the
stock of AIA Insurance, Inc. and Farmers He.alth Alliance
Administrators, Inc. could violate the Security Agreement related
to the First lnter~tate Bank Loan Agreement, which requires that
dividends on the Universe Life stock pledged as collateral for the
First Interstate Bank loan, "including cash and stock dividends",
must be delivered to the Bank to be held as additional Collateral.
Further, to the extent AIA Insurance, Inc. 1 s commission income is
deposited in any deposit account with First Interstate Bank, such
commissions constitute Collateral for the First Interstate Bank
loan pursuant to the terms of the Security Agreement; and the
pledge of such commissions to secure the company 1 s red.emption
obligation to Reed J, Taylor and the subordinated pledge of such
coillltlissions to secure certain obligations to Centennial Life
Insurance Company would violate the Security Agreement.
The
Security Agreement would also be violated, absent the Bank 1 s
written agreement, by the pledge of stock of The Universe Life
Insurance Company to secure the Company's redemption obligation to
~eed J, Taylor.
Absent prior written consent of the Bank, the redemption of
Reed Taylor's common stock (and the issuance of the $1.5 million
note or the $6 million note payable to ~ed J. Taylor if such

EXHIBIT
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SCHEDULE 5.1
I, R. JOHN TAYLOR, hereby certify that I am the duly elected
qualified, and acting President of AIA services corporation, ~
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of
Idaho.
The Company certifies that as of August 15, 1995, there are no
present exceptions to the covenants set forth in section 5.1 of the
stock Redemption Agreement dated July 22 1 1995, by and between Reed
J. Taylor as 11 Shareholder" and AIA services corporation as

"Company".

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set iny hand tJ'i af f ix:ed
the corporate seal of AIA service[ 'rporation this ~ day of
August, 1995.
{, ~
(,.11
..

l.

1

e
J)
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I, R. JOHN TAYLOR, he.reby certify that I am the duly elected
qualified, and acting President of AIA servic.es Corporation, ~

corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of
Id'fillo.
·•
·
The

Company certifies

that

as

of .August

(a)

The Debit Balance of Reed J, Taylor has been eliminated
and no further obliqations are owed by him to the
company;
, - ~?-

following is true, correct and complete:

15,

1995,

the

r' '/"

.
CJ~·.s;r
The CAP Service Center Balance a.s o: )la:zt : 1 ~9-9i-has bee?\
el.iminated Md no further obligations are owed by Reed J.
Taylor with respect to the CAP Progrm except for ll.lnounts

(.b)

~ue

for equiplllent, services or pay.roll incurred after May
l, 1995 but not yet· reimbursed by the CAP Program to A.!.A
Insurance, Inc.;

(c) All conditions to Closillg as set torth "' section 7. l cf
·.· ...• :tll.e ·Stock Re'deiPtj;pn Agr~f!l1tiU\t.1\il.y:~<•l,)een satisfied,
· <

'.~lf~~~!~...,.~~f!Y~~!

c'.j4)
<·.· ...

<e)

exoept as !le;t f.or:t.:J1 on. the attached SC:hedlil.e. Ir! aJ1d/ or
on•. :tlt•fwriou.s other Schedules referenced in Article III
'of /the: stock Recl8J11Pt:itin !l9;~1?11en~;

a,ttd/o,:/ orr th,e>~.iow;; .... oth&r Scbeduh:s reterenced in
llI of tne stocle Rl!de111ptfon·. lgr:~~emt1
·

~~cle

Except as set forth in the attached Schedule III OI
I.C.), the conditions set forth in Section J.2 of the
stock Redemption

Agre.e~ent

have been satisfied;

(f)

{g)

The

Company's working capital is eqi.ial to at

$500,000;

•

least

'

(h}

The Company's cm:rrent ratio is equal to at least l,1 to
l;

( i)

The corapany•s ratio of Consolidated Long-Tenii De.bt-toConsolidated Nat Werth, as described in Section 5,l(f) cf
the Stock Rede~ption Aqree111ent is equal to at least 3,6
to. 1; and

(j)

Reed J, Taylor is hereby fully ancl forevar released,
discharged and indemnified by the Company trom all
- l -
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clans, causes of action, delUands, rights, damages,
costs, expenses, "fees, compensation, liabilities and
other obliq!ltions to the Company or any of its
subsidiaries o! whatever Jdpd or nature now possessed by
·or which may nereaftel:' accrue to co111pany or any of its
Sul:i:;idiarie~, on acootmt of or arising out ·. of any
agreement with or a,ny act or emission by Hr. ~aylor at
any time prior to the date hereof, whether tbe
consequences thereof are now existinq er may liereafte.r
arise., or whether tb.e.y are. known or unknown; anticipated
..

or . unanticipated (except those sucll obligation.a that
arise unde~ the Agreement, the AIA Insurance, Inc.
General Agency Agreement and Addendum thereto dated
August 1 1• 1995 and any and all u.ndisplosad obligations of
which Reed
J, Taylor had ac:tual knowledqe, vhich were
incurred bY Reed J. Taylor on bellal~ of the company or
any of its subsidiaries and ~hich are· not reflected on
company's l:looJcs and records or its finanoial sta.te.mants}.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set 'J1I'.f hand and affixed
the corporate seal of AIA services corporat n on this ~ day of
August 1995.
·
J

l

I
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President

'
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April 18, 1996

Mr. R. Jolin Taylor
Chairman
AJA Services Corporation
P.O. Box 538
111 Main Street
Lewiston. Idaho &3501

Oe.ar John:

The pmpose of this letter is to demand payment of nioney owed putSUant to AJA Senrice Corporation's
Promissory Nole in the original principal amount of Sl,S00,000 i.&sued under the Addendll!D To Stock
Redemption Agreement (the "Down Payment Note") and to give notice of default under the Stock
Redemption Agreement
Down Pavment Note
On July 12, 1995,_you, acting on behalf of AIA Services COrporatiwi. signed the Down Payment Note in
my favor. The 1mpaid principal balance of this Nore is $1;147,175, excluding"CAP" payroll and reotwhich arc separate obligations of'!C.AP". In additioD,, as ofOctober.. 21, 19.95, default interest began tQ
accrue at a rate offburteen percent (14%) per amma As of April 16, 1995, the-amolintof act;rued interest
the corporation owes me is 573,674.96.
As you know, the corporation is now considerably past due in making payment and appears to have no
immediate or planned intention and/or ability of making such payment in the foreseeable ful.llre.
Therefore, this letter is to advise you that demand is hereby miido upon AlA Services C01poration for full
payment of the unpaid principal balance plus accI1led interest in .the total amount of Sl,220,849.96:
Further, for each additional day in which the:: total due remains unpaid, you will need to add $385.96 in ·

accrued inter~!.
lf payment is not made by May 1. 1996, legal action to enforce the corporation's obligatio11S -under the
tenns of the Down Payment Note wiffbe taken.

..'

l

You are hereby given written notice of various events of default by AIA Services Coiporatlon under the
Stock Redemption Agreement also dated July 22, 1996, as amended (thi:''Agrccmentj. Specifically, tbe
following outline sets forth those areas where the corporation is either in actual default or alleged default:

...
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I
L Failure to pay my attorney fees, as required under the AgreemeaL
2. Failure to provide me with. 9uartllrly illumciaJ statements, prepared in accordance
with GAAP, within 45 da)'ll of the end of each fiscal quarter.

3. Failure lo pay the balance of Interest aoorulng in February and March of 1996 on the
$5,000,000 Promissory Now wcler the lerms of tbe Agreement in the amount of $32,975,
whicll became due an payable as a result of Donna Taylor's letter of'. rc:cc:ssian, dated April 16,
1996, of the July 18, 1995 Jetler of agreement limiting such interest paymelll:s lo me.
4. Alleged failure to comply "'.ith financial covenants as outlined in Sections 5.1, (c), (d), (e),
and (t) ofthu Agreement.

i.

In the event that each event of defa.ult under (1), (2), and (4) above is not cured within 30 days, and the
event of default under (3) above is not cured within 5 days, from the date of this letter, l shall have no
recourse other than to exercise all remedies available to me UDder the Agreement. Please give these
matters your prompt attentiOJ1.

r;1if.
RcooJ. Taylor
..I

cc: Ml". Al Cooper, Director
Mr. Bruce SWeeney. Director
Mr. Climer Green
Mr. Michael Cashman
Mr. James Beclt
Mr. David Larson
Mr. Richard Riley
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Al.A Sorvlc•c Colpor.:ollon

One Luwia Clwk Pleza

AIA Services

POl!oxSaB
Lewiston, Idaho 83501-0538
{20!!) 79g.9000 F>J< (206) 746-81511
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Apr.ii 22, 1996

Mr. Reed Tayli:ir
4080 Old Lapwai Rd.
Lewiston ID 83501

!

I

'·

Dear Reed:
Let roe respond to each ofthe issues raised in your April 18, 1996 letter.
.Down Payment Note.
It was the intent of all parties that the Down Payment Note would be used as a vehicle to allow the
closing of the sale of preferred stock to Messrs. Cashman and Beck to fund the transfer of AJA
Insµrance from Universe Llfe i!Ild to effect the reorganization of AJA Services and its subsidiaries
that was necessary for all parties in interest.
In ~to the Down Payment Note, the parties contemplated that the principal of the Note would

not .be paid uatil t4e Company had sold additional Serles C Preferred Stock in sufficient amount
(approximately $3.S million) to pay off the Fll'St Interstate bank loan, to pay Donna Taylor $700,000
towards redemption of her Serles A Preferred Stock pursuant to the July 18, 1995 letter agreement,
and to pay you the principal of the Down Payment Note for your common stock. To date, the
Company has been able to selfsome additional preferred stock to meet obligations of the Company
and, through Wl mangement with the Company's profit sharing trust, has paid off the First Interstate
bank loan by substituting an obligation to the trust. The additional sales of preferred stock ·!13.ve not
yet been sufficient, however, to pay the principal of the Company's redemption obligations to Donna
and to you. Our preferred stock sales efforts continue; and I would expect that AIA will be able to
pay the principal in the near future.

The Januazy 11, 1995 letter agreement among Donna Taylor, you and the Company subordinates
all principal payments to you for redemption of your common stock to the payment of $700,000 to
Donna for the redemption of a portion of her Series A Preferred Stock. That agreement was
superseded by July 18, 1995 Jetter agrec;Illent among Donna, you and AIA which permits monthly
interest payments to you not to exceed the amount of the monthly redemption payments to Donna,
approximately $24,000 per month, and allows payment of the principal of the Down Payment Note
oaly if and to the extent equal principal payments are made to Donna up to $700,000.

I
I
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Reed Taylor
April 22, 1996
Page2
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~··

My first priority now is to raise the necessary money to first pay DoIUJa Taylor the required amount,
including the catch~up, and then to retire the balance ofyour Down Payment Note. The current
principal balance, according to iny figures. is less than $900,000 (copy attached). My biggest
challenge is to completely pay off your Down Payment Note. I have been encumbered in that
process because I first must also raise $650,000 for DoIUla Taylor before you get full payment of
your Down Payment Note balance. I would agree to a waiver of the July I 8 agreement in order to
pay you first, before Donna.
I flatly reject any contention that AJA's payments of CAP expenses were not part of either the Dowr,i
Payment Note principle or interest thereon, or somehow unconnected with the transaction.
However, because you take .such a contrary position, I will be forced to discontinue all CAP
payments to protect the Company. AI.A will discontinue the CAP payroll functions immediately.
In addition, all agents who hiJve nol been producing will be or have been terminated, including CAP
agents.
Default
. All of your allegations of default are without merit.
1.

Attorney Fees. We paid your attorneys' fees in the amount of$25,000 on 1119/95,
and· an additional amount of $22,461 on 12/29/95 for payment in full of the
Caimcross bill. The Stock Redemption Agreement docs not require payment of postclosing attorney m; and AfA is not responsible for billings for post-closing services
by your lawyers.

2.

Financial Statement!;. I have previously provided you 1995 year-end financial
statements (including results of operations for tjle fourth quarter) for each of the
operating: companies. The yeai::-end consolidated financial statements are now being
reviewed and audited by Peat Marwick. Traditionally, the consolidated statements
have been available on May 1, and that was contemplated by the Stock Redemption
Agreement. AI. you know the consolidated statement3 are more difficult this year
because of the discontinuance of insurance operations. I would assume that you
would have some patience with tbat.

3.

$6 Million Note Interest. Your assertion that AlA is in default for failure to pay
interest accruing in February and March 1996 on the $6 million note is
unsupportable. I remind you that the July 18, 19.9~ letter agreement is a three-party
agreement in which you agreed with Donna and the Company that monthly interest
on the $6 million note would be paid to you in an amount not exceeding the monthly
redemption payment to Donna, with the balance of the interest being accrued and

I
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payable only;after Donna r~ceived the entire .$700,000. You and Donna may not
·umlaterally Change that agr-eement without the Company's approval. k a beard
member, all modifications.affecting you need to have :full board approval Further,
even if the April 16 letter agreement were valid, it would only be effective
prospectively. You cannot retroactively impose an obligation for payments where
such an obligation did not previously exist.
4.

''•
~·

..

FimmciiiJ Cqvenants. The alleged financial oovenant defaults are without merit.

;

With some diffieulty and disl.Tactioii, we have been able to move the Company forward from
substantial losses in 199:4 an~ 1995. The situation is that we now have quarterly profits, The pre-tax
profits for this quarter will be about $471,000. The Company has paid off the First Interstate Bank
loan. We have. downsized the c.orp.Qra:tion· as necessary to restructure and streamline the
organization. We have done so without yoµr assistane~ encol.li'~gement or'support. In fact;. this is
illuStrated by the fact that we receiv.ed onlY. .a few pieces ofbminess from younigency, which was
to provide a silbstantial amount of pre;nillm over t~s last.few months duririg this transition.
A1A b11S :also been.generous to you in ·pr.ovidiU.!P~nd payiilg for1aur exp~nses. Let me remind you
that, on a monthly blJSis, y.Qu are 1alcing between .$80,000 to $100.;000 .p~F month Qut ef 'this
Company. That includes $20;000 plus benefits in s!llacy; $24,000 to $42,000 interest .payments;
$18,00Q in various CAP expenses; Sl0,000 to ·$12,000 per month in commission payments tq your
agents who ure providing servic~ to CAP; and ether miscellaneous expenses Jike the airplane'~
insurance, Bob Petorsen, etc.

lt is apparent that we need a "Come to Jesus" meeting with more than just you and me iil the room.
Each of the principals should be represented including Beck-Cashmllll, Donna Taylor (through
Cwner Green), you, AJA. and our respective counsel, if needed.

vezy

I have a
importanl propo~ transaction meeting Dtlxl week, Aprll 24-26, hopefully to sell Great
Fidelity and Universe Life and to secure an fovestrnent from µiajor insurer. This is subject to the
Rehahilitator's approval, the. sinking fund agreemen·t and the Cashman ~ Beck Agreements. I would
be pleased to meet with you after tha~ offer is made.

a
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On Tuesday, Wednesday ami Thursday, April 30 ~ May 2, I have meetings in Ka'.nSl!lii City and
Minneapolis. The week after that is the AJA.Boanl meeting, ~d ~ OOMIT Ex~tive C.ommittea
meeting on May 9 and 10. I wo.uld propose a meeting on either May J, 4, 6 or 7. By then all
fimmclals should be done. The. regular Boan! meeting is soheduled for May 7.

.
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AJA. !:ervlees CotJ>otatinn - Redemption of Reed Taylor's Stock: Notice of
Additional DmulU
j
.

i

Dear Dick:

'

M you know, R.eo4 T~lor QoliV•ed 1o A.IA. !m:ma1 notice Qf the followini defaults by a

~
f

letter dated April 18, 1996:

.

1.

Failure tn 1'8f1he Down ra.ym1mt 'Nate whim dnl;

2.

Palll!lO to pay 11UotllC)'IS' ("''

3;

Fallin to provide qllllrlefly Jlwmoial statcmtnts;

4.

Faihiio to mm b*le.st ~cn1S l1Jldcr the $6,000,000pmmissoq m>te; and

•

I

'

r

•

5..

'.I

~!

.,·

•

witbl c.et1zJn qocUied ~ eovtnanfll CDlltAln~ in th=
StQclt lledempliol) Agteemc:nt.
_ •

Feil.UR: 1.g comply

Jm

W~
ha.vc l'CC~ve4 a copy of a letter
MJril 22 1996 :fhml 1olm T•yior to Rted addressing
caoh of these drlaiilrs, and it~ tbD ptlrposa of!hi.J leue:t 10 mJlOlld to J'obn Tay1or'11 Mtc:r af
1

r'

pf tb1s ldtcr is 1o gi.VCJ AJA fm:ma1 notice of addh.irmal

....

--""'-"""""""'r"'"'""'Aprl122nd. Iil lldditlnn, the puzpose

~··

l

.\

!.

I

i

l"
I
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Paeel

.

I

l.
Fallin lP Pay tbe pgwnlPaym§nl Note When D11i Payment under the DoW%I
P,:yment Note was in no way c011.ditiolied UlJOll. the closhlg o! 'th~ l!Bli:i of Seda c P.rcfemd
Stoel: or tb.11 f'll)'mr:nt of swm to Donni Taylar in micmptlon of her Series A PI\lfcrxed Stock.
The Down Payment Note was a lasi mtnute at:CollUil!>datlOD to A!A in lieu. tif·1be cas1i. tJO,wu
payo:iem. O'nllb Lhti S6,000,000 ~sol'1,. :iioto, ~· 1'~ ~-l!)'il:illllt N~te wu u.ot 'tliatie
subordiaaW t0 tho redomptlon. .obligatibhs Of AfA to .Donlla Taylor. Mote:crver, 1ho agreement
made among D.Dmla Ta.ylor, AJA, and.~ by:l~·Uz:ln!J, ftil~.s,~.1 to the pa_ymont· of'!nter~
Ul1der 1hll' ~6~000,0.00 iiote and 1.iot to· Wf Down 'PaymC'llt Note. The martion mid~ by !olm in
his April-22.1996· lcttcr ~- tll11 paymeqt .of the DoWl1 Pa)'?DCnt Nott wu conditioned upon. 1h•
prior pa.~em t() Doit.M T~lor ot ~· rcaer.apt1011 pdec lbt her ~'t Is !NM:INrltc ii=d
U11SUPPortlld b)' a:ry of the'~~ FtJitatlcm. 011 the face of tho Down h.ymcJai Note
mi \))' the terms of all ~D.811 do~tr, payment Mdcr tho Down Payment Note ii
\\s'ICOllc!itional, aad that note hu boen in ~efau1t i:be October oft~.
..
I
,
.
Contmy to John•s ~9Jlf, paj-men1S made by AJA wJih respect to CAP~ llllL)' •
not be offset against Jlll)'l'l'IL'lnl"i owed unjfer thO Down Payment Note. Tho Dovm. Piymcnt Note
ls e:icpllcit that >J.A has 110 ri&ht to .otrsef. ID addition, to tho txtmll AJA llas paid CAP ex:pmse5
inllurrcll ld\er tho closlni=:. llles!I w=~ of Aiht&%1fago b:muiMco Ageney, JDQ. .mil nm
Reed, 11.Dd at most could be consi
a separate Joan made by /JA to Advantage Insurance
Aaency, me. F'1ttbennore, 'Rt:ed d1 · . 'the: caltndation "Of C.A:li expenses paid by AJA.
PUtSUDnt to -tho 11ttac:bcCI i.nvole11 and ~st clil~tlon w~ut,. the total CAP- expc.nses owed
by A<h'antagc lu.mance Agency,
tojAIA ~ounuo $143.662.

Inc.

Jn addition. there was no ovetpjiym~ in the amount of $22,040.~ refem:d to on the
auaobmw to John'' lcuer; AlA mitjally paid $42,6D.O :f'ot August accnied Interest Oil the

'

$6.00Q,OOO uotc:.. Tho cc:mect lllXIDmrt should have bell1I. S4 t,250, MUltlns in an oveip:1)'mellt of
axily :Sl,3S~ Ths assertion ~thcco w+s a $22.640.:Z.5 oVm:plYJllml was based on tho l:l':rol!COUI.
assuar,ption that Intere:it on iho no11 accrued fio111 the closing date mtb:r tlllm. Auiust l, 199-'·'
'Wh= cQnfranted with this fln'tlfs Ru 'Rr~ and Rick: Johmon admiUad the
Mditionally;
the Sl,350 OYCJpt.ymcnt may not~ offset apfnst th; balwco of the Down Payment Note.- but
in!if.ead has been applied lO ~ hll1a~l PIS)'lllCl.\W llndi:r tho $6,0001000 i.10tc.

cuor.

adj~

Accounlitlg for these
this total ainount of payments mado by AlA with
to tbt Down P~t Nole l;!S3$2,S:25. Notwithsuwf'llll the attacbed $Chedul.1,. my
mu:h pa)'lI!em made ptio:'fo Oct0ber :21. 19~5 wi:rc applied to pdnt;ipal; payment8 after that
date were llPJllied first to aey at:¢l"Ued intere:st balance st tbl. i1mc of payimml. iWd l1JCU to
principal.
.

l'tSpect

I

2.
F!llm1o PuAttpm;;v( Fm. ~to Saoticm2.S oftbt StockltldCZZ1pdon
Ag:r=mc:nt and Se~on 3 of1hc Addcn~um m Stock Red11mption Agremnent, iJ.A undertook to

..•

··"";
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April lS, 1996
Pll_ee3

I

pay all of R.eed'li attomeys' feea ino.\imd in con.ncctlo.a with 1M comummatioa of me
transactions contemplated by !be StoCk RJxianpiion. Agi;Wlle!U and ;mcil.buy docummtJ..
Nowbce was this oblislltil>n limited costs lncumd priar 10 thll closing date, ancl it was or
sboald bave been contcmplafld by thl parties !bat attomeys• 'fen would 'be ~ after the

to!

i:losins date meo~on. 'Witb tlu: c:tnlllWllllllitim of tho stock s11*31pdan tnncactiwi. bed is

entl.t1ed to thi::prompt p&)'D:IOlll of all the ~ys' fees associated with post-elosing scrviDes that
relate sp1Jcifically to matters D=t:SSll1 llOder llld contemplated by the stock tcdcmptlon
tr~oa. documento. Invoicet for~ fees have been funVar&d 10 AJA and !be lJOll.•pA,Yment
of thes& Invoices in tlmoly manner eonstl\\lteS •default under the Stock Rcde:mption AgrecmcnL

t~

'

!allilm.to Pra.vtda Quart1v Ffnmlillll smtmilDJS.. Pursuant ta Section s.1 (a) or
the Stock f.=dernption Agre~ Af4. is obllgated to :providt Recd with ql1ill'lCrl.y ii'.naoclal

3.

swemems ~ in acw.idaziec: wi~ GA.AP within forty.-five (45) days of 1be end or each
fiscal qum;tcr. To date. Recd hu Dot IfCivcd ~ancial Slll.tel:ncnl$ for AJA. 'While Reed lw
received finani;ial $Wtcm~ for ·s0ma or the opcratins companies owned by AJA. ~
oelivtdoJ do ~Hatis~ Section S.l(a.) Mtho Stock Redemption .AgrcllUWlt 8Ild aro insufficiimt
to allow Reed 11> .evafuale AfA's compliance with its _fmimcial covmants. Purthor delay .in the
dtllvery of adt:q,uat.$ fllll!DCJ.al sum:m~ts :is nut ~a~bJo. ln 1Jm ab.'SO%IM or ~sa Iinaceial
statr:ments. R~ must assume that thll mpany ls oum:ctly in. default 11%)der all crf' the fi:D!ncial
covCllllllts oon1llin-=d in Smioa ,.1 o tho Stock Re4~~ Agreement. includin1 without
llmit.t!OJ2, Si:ctions 5.l(o) throup (i),
to "!he ~t Reed 'hru: not previa~ly Biven MA
fonnal l!Oticc: of default~ $Ueh · ons, he does so now.

!

i
I

·I
I

i

I·
I

4.
l:pllnm ~n ~111 Tm~JtJJnder tbe ·S6.<2QfMOO NWC. Wt dfaaereo wi1h yom
chara~tediatioll of tlu: $6,000.000. note ~ \Ul obHgation contins=tt upon the pa)'lllCllt of' $lllll! 10
DoJJnL Wbilo R.ccd 'lmf1. ~ 4Q'cd io 111.1boidhia!c corlain p~llllts ua.dn bis note to certain
pa}'Jnentll to D0ima, this dollt ~at aJihw AIA to· a.void a dermlt llllder the l10~ but mimly
cstablis'hes ihe priority 'between Donna And Reed u 10 thll collection Dfsueb paymms 5'aa1 Al.A.·
Mor•over, bed's ·~ with Dopm waa induced by John's rcprese~ons that ht bad
investors w:lth cash in baud and tMt ~mentJ would be •
bnmcdiattsly. In liahi of this
default and the otller defaults d!SCUSSed!ln this J11tlllr, &ell hcircb7 Jives AJA fmmol uoilo• of.'tJni
a.ccolera!lon Qf tho cmtin: b~ of t!ilo S6,00l>,OOO notes, which is now imwedialcly clue and

:P.aya!ile.

"

5.
Flliille 1Q C.Om~ Witb fjnarjofal Covenane,,. ~ ~sedin pmgraph 3 above,
muit assume that t1w company is WimlUy ll1 dtfl.ult UDdlll' tbo 1lnancllll COYC'tllllll:i i:un~d
in Section 5.1 nf Iha Stock Rodcmpdoii Ail'Cml=1. as Reed's iequms fQI adequate fillanlial
information to confimz th~ ccnnpaziy'• compli&n\:O with tbCIPf covm:iants has not bcciii

!
j.

Wll

fuN~mhlg.

iI•

·

I
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In addition to these dcfa.ul.1$.-·of which. AJA Wa.S Jl?Ov.lously
hcrc'by pvt AJA formal no1ice ofthe.foJJpWini.Bllditloblll d'lif'a'li).ts;

~veil formal notice, -we

\

Failure to comply with 11\0 finmolal ::ovenants contained in S.l(g) thwugh (i) as

1.

disemscd 1n parqtapb 3 above; .

I

,

Failuro to dc:livct the executed orl&]nal letter fi:Om AlA to l"ir5t lntmlale 'Bllllk

2.

i~S tho \mlk'I ooligatl.om· to dt:livotibe U~ c:erlifiClteS to ).teed Taylor upon IJA's
1afisfaotion of'1hc blllk loan punwmt'to ~eclion l.5(d).of1hc StockRedemption Agreement;
~

Faill.IM to establish·o. C~om Collatml Account, to provide 811 executed
lock box agremnmt in COS\lllCtit>n wlth .the establishm.~ and ~DU'lce of the Commissions
Collawal Acww11, and to pnwldo \'Mdcllce. of the e.st11'bllshmm1 cf $nch account rurr;imat to
Stction 4 of tllll Secmit::Y Apctncnt. d~ ~eral rc:qt1CSIS, iDcludin.g a xequest made by lc:tt=
tD )'OU d$d October 10, 1995;
I
0

. ;,

4.
FailllrC to provide Rec~ -wilh monthl7 ctimmissiDD statements. ' list of aceount
debtor1 .and ln!ormatloi1 ;requested. purjllllWt to 'Recd'• letter dllt!ld A.pdl Uf, 1996. miuesi for
1
which is ae.ain m~ by tbia lettci:; ud ~

th~t

JIDll.~lble

Wo apo•
th• p:mi.11 ncseJ to me<et ., .soon as
to diswss. these issues.
However, untiI such a :meeting 'lakes p~aca. Reed nas J10 cboloa but 10 ·puxauc vl.gorousJ.y those
remedies wbicb he ls afforded 1111der the: Stock R.Ddl:ltl¢on AgrcemmtL imiJ 1u.1clll1r1 doeuxn=its.
I

!

i

~

.

I

:
'

I
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~
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May 3, 1996

Mr. Scott T. Bell
Caimcross & Hempelmann, P.S.
70th Floor, Columbia Center
701 Fifth Ave.
Seattle, WA 98104
Re:

AIA Services Corporation - Redemption of Reed Taylor's Common Stock
Response to Default Notice

Dear Scott:
The purpose of this letter is to respond to your April 25, 1996 letter.
•

1.
Downpa}'.ment Note. As you know, AIA Services Corporation attempted a private
placement to raise capital in the early part of 1995. The Kinnard offering contemplated
sufficient equity infusion to recapitalize The Universe Life Insurance Company and to finance
the $1.5 million downpayment on Reed Taylor's common stock redemption and at least a partial
redemption ($700,000 minimum) of Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred Stock. In connection
with the private placement, Reed Taylor, Donna Taylor and AIA Services Corporation entered
into a letter agreement dated January 11, 1995. In that agreement, the parties agreed that any
note payable to Reed Taylor for the $6 million balance of the redemption price for his stock
would be subordinated to full payment of the redemption price for Donna Taylor's preferred
stock.
The Kinnard Offering was unfortunately unsuccessful. Subsequent efforts to raise capital
resulted in an Investment Agreement with Messrs. Cashman and Beck to purchase $1.5 million
of Series C ·Preferred Stock. The Company had hoped to sell additional shares as well but, as
of mid-summer, had not been able to do so. At the time of the July 18, 1995 AIA Services
Corporation Board meeting in Lewiston, it became apparent that, in order to proceed with the
Company's restructuring and development of its marketing business, it would be necessary to
close the Cashman/Beck transaction, contribute the $1.5 million proceeds to Universe Life and
spinout AIA Insurance. All parties acknowledged the necessity to complete that part of the
transaction and to continue efforts to raise additional capital to fund Reed's downpayment and
the partial redemption of Donna Taylor's stock.
Accordingly, Reed, Donna and AIA Services Corporation entered into a July 18, 1995
letter agreement, which superseded the earlier letter. That agreement restated the previous

EXHIBIT
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agreement concerning the subordination of Reed Taylor's $6 million note to the complete
redemption of Donna Taylor's stock. In addition, Reed agreed to accept a second, interest-free
note for the $1.5 million downpayment. All parties contemplated that additional proceeds of sale
of Series C Preferred Stock would be received over the next 90 days; and Reed Taylor agreed
that the funds received from additional sales of Series C Preferred Stock following the
Cashman/Beck transaction would be allocated as follows:
(i)
The first $100,000 shall be (and was) paid to Donna Taylor for
reimbursement of professional fees.
(ii)
The next $1.4 million is to be paid, as received, in equal amounts to
Donna Taylor and Reed Taylor until Donna Taylor has been paid $700,000 for
redemption of her preferred stock.

Thereafter, the next $800,000 is to be paid to Reed Taylor until he has
received the full $1.5 million downpayment for redemption of his common stock.
(iii)

Shortly after the Board meeting, I left on vacation. Your office prepared the Addendum to the
Stock Redemption Agreement and the Downpayment Note which, because of my absence, I did
not review before it was signed. It is true that the Downpayment Note was not made expressly
subordinate to AIA's redemption obligations to Donna Taylor. However, in the July 18, 1995
letter agreement, Reed clearly agreed that the principal of the Downpayment Note would not and
could not be paid except as the Company is able to pay an equal amount to Donna Taylor up to
$700,000. Further, the parties clearly contemplated that the requisite capital might not be raised
within the 90-day target period and therefore provided for the accrual of interest if the
Downpayment Note were not paid by that date.
Accordingly, your assertion that the July 18, 1995 agreement relates only to payment of
interest under the $6 million note and not to the Downpayment Note is incorrect. The Company
has paid Reed the default interest on the Downpayment Note; and, as Reed agreed in the July
18, 1995 letter agreement, the Company has paid Reed interest on the $6 million note in the
amount of the monthly payment to Donna Taylor for redemption of her Preferred Stock and has
accrued the balance of those interest payments. The accrued interest, pursuant to the July 18
letter agreement, is not due and owing until after Donna Taylor has received the full $700,000
redemption payment.
As you know, the Company has sold some additional Series C Preferred Stock and is
continuing efforts to raise capital. In these fund raising efforts, the Company has made
representations to investors and potential investors concerning the terms and amount of its
obligations to Reed and Donna under these agreements. These agreements cannot be unilaterally
Taylor 001066
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amended by Reed and Donna, as they purported to do in an April 18, 1996 letter, to the
detriment of the Company and its investors.
The principal of the Downpayment Note, due in October 1995 by the terms of the note,
has not been fully paid. However, the Company has made advances on behalf of Reed particularly advances to the CAP Program because of its negative cash flow - which Reed and
John agreed would be offset against the principal of the Downpayment Note. On the same basis,
the Company also assumed Reed's personal loan payable to West One Bank in the principal and
interest amount of $172,825.04. Absent Reed's agreement to offset those amounts against his
Downpayment Note, the Company would not have entered into those transactions. Indeed,
loaning money to CAP would have violated the covenant in Section 5.1 (h) of the Stock
Redemption Agreement; and it would have been fiscally imprudent to do so given the
Company's financial situation.

•

Your letter asserts that the Downpayment Note is explicit that AJA has no right of offset.
However, the pertinent clause provides that the Company "waive(s) any right to offset against
amounts due to Payee hereunder any amounts due to the [Company] pursuant to the Addendum
or the Redemption Agreement or any agreement (or exhibit thereto) listed herein .... " This
clause does not cover the CAP advanees or the loan assumption, because (i) they did not involve
any amounts due from Reed to the Company and (ii) did not arise under the Addendum, the
Redemption Agreement or any other agreement listed therein - or indeed, any agreement
existing at the date of the note. Rather, the offsets arose by subsequent agreement of the parties.
The Downpayment Note is unsecured. While the unpaid balance of the Downpayment
Note became due in October 1995, the Company has been making timely payments of the default
interest; and Reed is estopped by the July 18 letter agreement among Reed, Donna and the
Company to attempt to accelerate that note.
2.
Attorney Fees. Section 2.5 of the Stock Redemption Agreement and Section 3
of the Addendum to Stock Redemption Agreement require the Company to pay, at closing,
Reed's attorney fees incurred in connection with the negotiation and drafting of the Agreement,
the Addendum and ancillary documents and the transactions contemplated thereby. These
provisions clearly contemplated payment of Reed's attorney fees incurred through the date of
closing. The provisions just as clearly do not contemplate a continuing obligation to pay
attorney fees subsequently incurred by Reed. Your firm's bill for services rendered through the
closing date has been paid in full.
3.
Pmvision of Quarterly Financial Statements. This alleged default was previously
addressed in John Taylor's April 22, 1996 letter to your client. Reed has previously received
from the Company its year-end financial statements for the operating subsidiaries. In accordance·
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with historical practice and practical necessity, the audited financial statements are not typically
completed until June.

•

4.
$6 Million Nptc. The $6 million note expressly provides that "this note is
subordinate to the payment of the redemption obligations owed by the Company to Donna Taylor
pursuant to that certain letter agreement dated January 11, 1995, signed by Company, Payee,
Donna Taylor and Cumer Green. The January 11, 1995 letter agreement, as well as the July
18, 1995 letter agreement, both expressly state that "Reed Taylor will receive no principal
payments on said note until Donna Taylor's stock has completely redeemed." As to the payment
of interest, your client expressly agreed in July 18, 1995 letter agreement that his interest
payments on the $6 million note "shall be reduced to the amount of monthly payment to Donna
Taylor for redemption of her Preferred Stock" and that the excess amount of such interest due
to Reed on the $6 million note shall be accrued and payable "only if and after Donna Taylor has
received the full $700,000 redemption payment." I applaud you for the creativity of your
argument that Reed's agreement "does not allow AIA to avoid a default under the Note, but
merely establishes the priority between Donna and Reed as to the collection of such payments
from AIA". However, I do not think a court would buy it. No reasonably prudent person
would enter into a debt transaction in ·which it would be in default and the debt subject to
acceleration immediately upon consummation of the transaction. The Company has relied to its
detriment upon Reed's July 18, 1995 agreement; and I believe he is estopped to assert your
argument. I would certainly be interested in reviewing any contrary Idaho authority which
supports your position.

5.
Finaru;jal Covenants. As discussed in Paragraph 3 above, Reed has received all
financial information to which he is entitled by the Stock Redemption Agreement; and that
information is certainly adequate for Reed to confirm the Company's compliance with financial
covenants. Further, in your analysis of the financial covenants, you should consider the effect
of Reed's August 15, 1995 Shareholder's Closing Certificate. As I recall, there was significant
fre'Closing discussion of the Company's financial condition - including discussion of the effect
otthe redemption of Reed's common stock on the Company's equity. I believe you and Reed
will understand that the financial covenants were problematical and that Reed waived technical
covenant defaults in his Closing Certificate.
The last page of your April 25 letter asserts certain additional defaults. As I indicated
in yesterday's telephone conversation, the Company delivered to Reed, at closing, an executed
letter instructing First Interstate Bank, upon satisfaction of the Company's obligations to the
Bank, to deliver Universe Life Stock Certificate No. 1 to Reed. I am enclosing a copy of that
letter which evidences the Company's satisfaction of its obligation in this regard.
You are correct that the Company has not established a commissions collateral account
Taylor 001068
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or entered into a lock box agreement in accordance with the terms of the Security Agreement.
I apologize to you and Reed for failing to realize that the lock box agreement with Centennial
did not suffice. Dan Spickler is preparing a draft agreement for your review. In the meantime,
I am enclosing a draft notice letter to First Interstate Bank to advise it of the existence of Reed's
Security interest in the commission collateral. If the letter is acceptable to you and Reed, I will
fax it to the Bank immediately.
Reed has been receiving weekly production reports of AIA's sales. While these reports
do not include commissions earned by AIA, the Company assumed that Reed was receiving the
information he desired to monitor his collateral position. However, Reed is entitled to monthly
commission statements; and the Company will cure this default within the cure period and in the
future will provide monthly statements of commissions earned by AIA's agency subsidiaries in
lieu of production reports.

•

Your letter asserts that the Company is in default for failing to provide a list of Account
Debtors. Reed's April 18, 1996 letter does not request that information; and, to our knowledge
Reed has not previously requested that ii:iformation. Reed's April 18, 1996 letter requests
detailed information about the Company's employees and agents matters which have no apparent
relationship to his security interest in Commission Collateral. Further, particularly in view of
recent downsizing, the Company has neither the personnel nor the financial resources to
assemble the detailed information requested in the April 18 letter. Nevertheless, the Company
will certainly provide reasonable access to the books and records from which Reed (or a
designated representative acceptable to the Company) may obtain this information, conditioned
upon receipt of Reed's statement of a proper purpose for his need or use for such information,
his warranty that such information will be used solely for purposes related to his security interest
and his agreement to maintain the confidentiality of that information.
This letter confirms that you and Reed will meet with the Company and its counsel
beginning Monday morning, May 6, 1996, to discuss these issues.

RAR/s

Taylor 001069

002258

SENT BY:

J.

QS/l!/98

,.

5-16-96

EBERLE. BERL,P'·

208 799 9172:# 3/12

\

CURNCROSS

d SS1 2309

~001

CAil\NCRUSS & HEMPELMANN
Al~SWICStcUCL\TDI

7Drll PLOOll.. COlliMl!rA r:F.1'lTF.R. JQl l'lflM AiliNl?R .
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May 15.1P96
lUabud Riley
Eborft, Berlin, .Kadin£1_. 'fluuow
le Mc.K.Jvecn, C:hartftr~

300 Nonh Sixth Street
P.O. Do1dJ68
Boise, IdahD 83?01-1368

Re:

Foxbeara'llce A~e.nt

Dou Dick:
.E'.nt'Josed for your rev.tow ii 1. draft Po:bc4mncc Agn:11111ont wblch wuultl puL in!o effiic,f tht
changes we discussed dlU'irlp; n11r b1..t vi•it to Lewiston. We undemand toot Recd l!nd the Compnny ill~
disounina tht numbm which will atr¢Gl the princJpal bnlnncft nf th~ Amended 11Dd Re.rtated Down
'P11ymcnt Noto. 1n tru: meantime, we 'WOUid appniclate your comments reaan1illl the en1:lo~t".rl rlf.lllllmt.flt.
We have Jtot yet afrovlllhKf this draft to Out ollmnt, md, of .:;ouno, It U &ubjllct [II Chll!Jge,
We unders18Jld 'tbac Ule Company still ha' not deliw.red

j~

calcvl..tioo of the noti.

baJ111:1~11 tQ

Ende and Recd for thoir zcvlew. We would appreciate It if you. wouki lmlirtre ffiAf thet~ numh.rc •n•
delivanid f<• Reed inimediotoly. 111 addition, wo unckrsl.llnd lh11t tho "profei;tcd &&ents'' have DOI' been
paid. their t\tll commicsi0111 c11spile tl19 agn~ mado in Lewisto1.1. Wo would 11.pprecla.tc It if you
would cul mo or ~cott Hell as Noc.>n ns possible to disi:n&1 these rmtters.
We look forward to talking lo y<Ju.

Vuy trulyyours,

W. -~t--U~~w. Pranlc T:t.ylor
STI:Vmwc
4'

..
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Forbe1ranc11 Aueement
Thi,, F1;1rbeau1occ Agn:Clllent (this u Agreement") ill ma.de 2.%ld entered into as of this
r:W.y ofMlly, 1996, by auu bel WCtlll AJA Services t:cnporation.. an Id11bo cmpora.tion
("Company'') and Rm J. Ta.ylo1 ("Sbw:holder'j,

RKita/s
A.
Comptmy i~ the parent bolJwii. compa?>.y ;w.d owner of all of the capital stock of
AI.A. Jiauranco, Ino. (11AIAI"), Frnmcra Health Alliance Administrators, Inc. (''Fmne.n"), Oreat
1"idelity life Insw:ance Compnny, a Moci>.~ hUlllum.;c:: company dO!Jliciled in Indiana ("6re11.t
rfrlelity''), a wholly-owned subsidiru:y o!Univci:sc, and The Universe Life I.nturance Company,
an fdahn ~Otnestic ixmurance comp1111y (''Uni-vcr!c") (othc1 tlllUl certain shares held by directors
ofUniversc u requited by law). Company, Unlver51:, AIAI, Fannon md Great Fidelf'ry are
coll4':tively rtltC:rred to .her11!n aa the "Comp.vilee".
B.
Pursuant to that certain Stcdt Rsdem.ptio.a Agrcl:'mcmt bc:tweon Company and
Sluucholder dat.ed July 7.7., 1995, as amended by that certnin Addendum to Stuck :Redemption
Agcome.nt also dated Jul)' 22, 1995 (toseth1r, the "StockR.edomptionAgrcomont"). all of
S~eholder"s shares of eommon ~tor.It <•f Cuuipany Vlllte r:edecmod.
C.
As part consldera!ion !or the re.demptinn Dl'ld Shareholdor'11 tTXccution of a
Non\X>mpmtion Agrccrmmt (lhr. "Noncompetltion Aareement"). Comp.m:v (i) exocuted u
promi3:1ory noto payable Lu Shlrcholder Jn the prl.ncipal amount o:f'Sl,!00,000 (the "Do?.71
Payment Noti;"). which Dow.u P"Ylll~ Note was due snd payable in full by its te.tms 011 OQf:oba
:n, 1995; (ii) cgc;wted a promisso1y note payable 10 Shareholder in the principal amouo.t ot
$6,D00,000 (the "S6M N~j. whlcb S6M Note was SftCUied by (iii) th.1tt certain Stock Pled15c
Ape.meat {th1:1 "Stook Plodg~ Aueou1cJ1Li grantilli Shareholder 11 security Interest in all of the
mares of capital stook o!Univcm:, Al.AI, Pa.u.ui:.rs, and, in the cvenI of a dilltrihution of such
shares to Company, Gteat Fidelity {the "Tl~&td Sl111u:s"), and Ov) th.al certllin Security
Agreement (tn• "Security A.aroomcnt'') grA11tfug Sllialcholdw 1 securli:y interei;t In all
commis.~ons from the sale ofl.aButwu:corn:latcd scrvi~ by, on behalfoforpayableto
Companiei: (the "Commission.c Coll1lozaP'); (v) qrccd to pay Sh11cholder a sal31)' equal to
S20,000 per month Until the Down I"ll)'mcnt Note :Cs pllid iD. full; (vi) entered inm a Consulting
Aiireement (the "CnMulting A1recmmt'' pur~uanl to whii;h Slwcboldcr is entitled to l'flOf:i.ve
$12.2~0 per month for a prrrinrl of tlwit (3) yell.Tit &llow:iug tho pll)'.o.tcnt iu full of the Down
l'ayw1;;ut Noli:.
D.
Dy letters dated April 18, l 996 and April 25, 1996 (r.l,lleotivoly, the "Noli~ ut
Dc:fault"), Shareholder i!l!DgCll aud gavo Company fonnal notice ofnum1rous defaults, inciucllug
but not limited to (i) the failure to µay lll1;; Down Payment Not,, when due, (ii) the failure to make
i nt.r."'1$t payments WJ.dor the S6M .Noi~ (.tii) Uio Iii.lure 10 provide adequate fin~ial in.formation
and to comply with various finwwial covenants in violation oftlu: Stoel< RcdC'.mptioo Agreement,
(iv)lhe failure to pay Shareholdcr's .utomcy11• fce:s a.u~uitcd by the Stock KedP.mptiOD
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Ag,recwcut. rind (v) the fe.iJiire ro ".omply w.ith cerllln n:quircmcms o:f tJ11: s,cnrity Agreement
rcJ:anling Lh.t: establishment and control of a eommi&ciiom collatcrw 11cro1Wt.

E.
The partles now wish t1> restnicturo the stoc:k rcdcmptiou l.nwlrdcffoo by (i)
ailjwiting the prtnclpal arnollft! ot'thc Down Ptymw Note, oxtc.nding it1 .wu.turlty date, providin&
for .inleltllll to acciuc on th" prltr.ipa! balanee of the Down Ptyxncnt Note, c1:quirln3 monthly
paynao.ullf ofprinGipll and intuest undor the Down Paymem No~ and providW.ic 1:>c1."Urity for the
ps.;ylllCllt of the: Down Payment Note: (fi) termina%ing the CollSlllting AgrcQllent, tbi:
Notl.C'.ompetitlo.u Agrecmc:nt, and tho Cc11nJ:13ny's ubligation to pay ShmTiholdc;r a muuilil.y :Wary;
(iii) amondiag tbs terms of the Security Agrecmlri mid the Stoclc Pledge Agro.mcnt; a.ml (iv)
rc:Msin1 certain @vcmml'> coutailled In the Stock Redemption Ag.ruement. 111 oxchzmgc fo1· this
restruoturing of tho Complllly' s obli,gadoDS to Shl1'6h.older, Shateboldcr is w!l!Jn.I to ape to
forbear from C7ttll1::ising any 1e!llCllic:11 }~ may have far tbe detllults al,l.eged in tho Notice: of
De&ult

For good and vuluabl• considera.1fon, the ~iµl amt l!ufilciency of which ;1.rl:! hereby
acknowledged, the partie1 11&rec:

l.l
Ame11'1ed and Rost;rtcd)2mm Pa)'meclNCJlli. Co.Qcwu;ntwilh its execUlion of
this Al?l'eement. Company shall execute m.Amsndsd. md Rwated Down Pays.mmt Note (the
"Amended .Down Paym11nt Note"). The Amended Down Payment }fota ~hall ~tliu.st the principal
umrJunt of tho Down Payment Note to S
whiob 111.llJ b hm:by 4'1lwuw1~ by the
CuWJ>ifD.Y to retlect all paym11nrs made againAt :utd all ofi'aats which Company lillLY claim aglli.nst
$l11'h Nole llli of the date oftbla Agreement. "Ihe Amended Down P.11ymo11t. Noto shull b1;ar
iote1est i.l the lllle of9,,% per annum (14% whiJ~ in default), and ahllll Clltitlo ShaLehollkr to
mo11thlr payn1cab u! prii:ic:fP11! and mterest equal to S
per month, p•yablo on the wl
day of oai;h month comm~cinx with the month 111 whir.b such. Note is made and continuing mitll
paid in Ml. Tho cnt~ bal2Ulcc: tJf p1inc.!pal and accnied ~ut UI1paid interest C)l1 the Amcnded
Down Payrncn~ Note :ihall be due and payable on October 'i 1, 1996. The monthly P4YJl'lcnt of
prinolp.al and intexe:rt un the Amend«\ Down Payment Note shall be secured by the Co.mmissiol)s
Collatu.l ~ provided la tho Fi.rat Amenclmont Lu Sccurity JWecplent (as dMned below), and uU
nhliet1tions of Company under the Am~ed DC>w11 P".symcmt Nore 9.hall be securati by th~
Pledgen SMres as pro11id.d mthe Fir:it Am-.zidm.eut lu SLuuk Pledge Aiireement (11.q defined
below).

l.2
First Amendmentto Srcurit,v A=ment, Conc:uncnt with llu:i execution of this
Agieeweui, Lhc parl!es shall exeonfe" l."ll'St Aml!lldment to Security Agiec1m:nl (I.he "Firs~
Amcndwcat to SecuritY Agreement''). 1·he 1-'irst Amendment to Security Agreeiueul shall
prc;ividc that the Commissions Collat6r81 is 5ecnri1)1 only for the payment of monthly l111yments of
pxinoipsl and imore3t under the &liended Dow.n Payment Note aud for monthl;y paymgrt.s of
interest undor the $6M Nole. In the r:vcut of a default In tbc timA!y payment of any of :ruch
Pagc2
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mQn1hly paymcui:., Shareholder shall be entitled to ll.llilatarally require that all Commissions
Collateral then in tW: Cullatttral Account (as defuled in the Security Agiccmcui) and any
Commi:s:iio:n.s Coll11tcwl ui;poslted into lhe Collateral Account durmg the fi~ (5) dav period
follov;iD.g such lQ4W:lil, up to the amOl.lnt than in default, bo immedlatcl)· transfened to an
aooount «>ntrollcd 1olcly by Shareholder. Iri ttJt. event that such defiluh is not cured by the
transfer of Commi:imons Colllltcral as ptoVided ahovl!, Shareholder may elcx:t to ~c;cl..rlilll tho
.maturity date undr=r the Amc;nd~ Down Payment Nate snrl the S6M Note and ma.y cxerci:se th1:
other :rcmedias prqvidcd in the S<;curlly AilCeme.nt lUld the Stnr.k; Pledge AgreGitlont, includiiiK
the right to foreclose upon tlie rlcdged Shlaes. Shareholder ~h11ll h11ve llO reCOUl'll to the
Com.missio:a.B Collatetal in tbc event of 1t nun-monclll!y default und11T thi1 Agreemmt, the
Ser.mi1y .A.81'•&ment, or the Stock l'Jedse AgrcC1J1imt, but .nothing c:antllinC\d in this Ap111t1cnt or
the .first Amenchnont to Securitt Agreemont :iJndl a{l'ect Shueho1der' 11 ntlw remedies \llldor !his
Aerer,ment,. 'the Sec.urity Agraement or the Stock Pledge AilCl"JT.lent for mouetm:y and nonmoneraey cil'.taults.
l .J
l'jrst AmMQment to Stp;k PIMic Amcmeut. Concumm wllh the execution of
thJs Agreement, tf1e piitfies shall enter into o. First Amcndme.ot tu Slvck Pledii;e Aarer.ment (the
"First Amendment In Stllr.k Pledge Agre41mtnt''), The F~t Amc.u~ua~l to Stock .Plecfle
hgreement shall provide th11t the Pledged Shares ahnil :iccure the Co1n~y· s pelformanca llilder
the Amended Down Payment Note. In addi1icm, the F°ll'.st Amendment to Stoc:k Pledge
~tm.t shall :pl'ovlde thaI (a) tbe only bon4.li w.bic:h llll1f be subslitut~ fbr lhD Plc:died Sbarc.q,
shall be um:: or mo:re bonds .ba.vlna a tair marbt. valuo equal to $6,000,000 mid which mature on
th1:: inatwily wto; uf 1he S6M noie. (b) such bonds ma)' be substi"N&ocl for1hc Pttd1ciJ Sbare5 oDly
if the Amended Down 'PayruentNo~ has been J.'l!id in full, (e) the Commiseiom Culla1mal lilWI
ramain WJ security for the Jll'YmcnL ofil#O.rcst under the $6M Note until 112Gh Noto Is paid in full,
and (d} in the event of the .wNtitulion of su~h bonds for tl'I!'! Pledged Sharua, Compa.11}' /Shilll have
the rlaht. throupo\lt the i:cmmniu" lcnn uf the S6M Note, ro prt!p8y all, bvt not part, oftht
outmnding balance of principal and acc1w::ll bul UD.Paid iDtereRt without pmruum. or pmalty.

1.4
Imninatjpn (lfEmplaymsmt, ConS!l!tin2 Aereeim;nt and Nonrpmpetitiog
Airecmcnt. Effectivr: aa of the dote 0£ tllis AgTCGmeut, the panll!ls berehy te.mWtau the

CODSUlting Agreement aul! lhe Nonciompctition Agreement. In addition. Sharel.loJder's
employm.ant b;y CODlflMY and Com.panf :1 obligatiov, 1o pii.y Shareholder a. !lahrry ls tmninat.ed
cflP.etlve as of the lm;1t day of the month pioccJing lhe month in which this Agre~ment is
t:MCUted.

1.5
B.Dvlsions ta Certain Cpyml.nt# oH::mn;il!nl' the eovi;.Llllllll! made by Compimy
in Scctiom _
_ _ of the S!oc4:: Rede:m.}'tiou. A8foemont lll'C hcrnby tlvlcstcd. In lieu of
r::uoh .financial co~, Company hereby eovenanrs that it will
---------·
• The quarterly financial
statement• whi"h Company i:s obligattid to provide lo Shamholder shall be oon:Jolidated fiwwcrdl
~tcme.ntii for aU oftlie Compmiios. In addition, Company shall provide Shareholder with
copies m·_
.
,__ each mnnth .CXCCpt for the specl:fic
rcpons and financial i.oform1ttio11 rc').Ub:ed to be provided IO Sharcbol4er purimimt to thi~
Agt-ec1m:nt, the Stock Rcdempti0J1 Agreem..mt, thu Security A&• c~ment and rhe Stnc!{ Pledge
Piige3
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AJ1,!'ccmcnt. Company .~hall have no obligation to prepare and provide to Sbareholder any reports
or .fimi.ucial information which it does not ~Y prcpure in the coursu uf its bmlness.
I .CS
omcc 1..Cmc. l :nmpany shall enter into Q lDlJSC With_
Inc.
("AUv.wh•id') fur approxl.malely _
sq111rt fHt of office 1pacc, currcotly occupfod by
Ad~. on the ~ound tloor nf fhe buUcling known a:; Omi Lowis Clllrk Plaza. on temlS
a1ii:optablc lo tho puties. Tllo JcDBC i:hall pro'lide for the pll.)'Jnr:llf. of monthly rent In the amolJDt
of S· - - - .iUld shall be for a term of one year from rh11 date of this Agreement or such
enrlicr dme U,PUll which AdVWlUie ls able to fiDd suitabl• aher.na'tive sp11G1; and mabis m
cl~tioo. to shorten tbc lease term. In the eYflllt that Advanl*IJ• is able to find :such a!tmmtive:s
space end elects tu ~hutl.c.o Ille tease tmn and .mnve its of&es prior to 1bv payment in 1blI uf lh11:
Amonc!cd Down Payu1i::nL Note:, OlmpJ.Qy shill mRke a prepayment ofprhivlpol on the:: Amemll:ll.l
Down PaymQDt Note, maddition lo the n::gularJr schcdnl!d mauthly pa~ou~. in an mnour1L
equal to Advantago'' rcuonable movine e"XPCllSIS.

2.
AdditiP!lg! Condjtj1ip11 tg RC5tru4;tw:s;. On Qr before the ex11cutici.n oftbis .4ifoement, 1111d
as a conditi.011 to Shareholder's agreement to fudx:ar, Company shall cause th11 following- to
occur:
2.1
Ds;livccr ofUn!'V!lr:;e Certifii;Qtes. Compllily .!l!.uill have ensured that First
loterstata Hank has dolivered to Shareholder CD)' and all ori&Jllll ~tuuk cati11catcs rcpre&emlni
capital stock nfl Jl'liVarAe co.ll.Sihuting Pledged SMrc.s.
2.2
.fmbljsbDJcnt of C.P!l!ftteral ~ Company 3b&U ban c:itabllBhed the
Collateral Account (as dRfi~ in the Security Ai:ne.aumt}. ID addition, Company, 8ha.rd!o.lder
anil I.he: d1J>Qrdtoi:y illS1ftution adminl11.tlll'i:is thD Collateml AA;c;ou.nt ahall have ~en:cl into a
loclcbo;( ~malt in form artd substance satisfactory tu Sharaholdor. In Ddditiou, Cumpany
shall have outmd into IW ~nt with Sharebolde! mid Mark Tw4!n Kama.s Baak (".Bank'')
whic.h pwvides lhat (a) the terms and r.miclition& of that certain Loclcbox AgtCeJllcllt dalcd
June 1, 1995 111uw1M. AIAI, Uui\/Crsc, The Ccntenni11I Life lasuraa.ce Company C'C011t=nial")
and Bo.nk may no~ be at11eudc::d without the priorwritte11 CO.llSmt of Shueholder, and that (b)
Bu.k tlhall, daily and wtomlltically, transfer all Commi!iruons Collateral deposited into Account
No, 8613004124 at s~h Dank into lhe Collamal Account.

2.3
~·riant pf Ccrt.uiu Bms. COUWilDY shall havt paid in ftJll bills 1o Ph11lp1 Field
thT r.l'lrtAlli. repairrr mad., to tho oirplan-. :sold by COIOJ1MY to Shareltolder f11l~n11nt to the Stock
R.edemptinn A.iµeement "'hich We.N t>o:i:runcn~ p1lo1· tu ll.tc 1:losing otthc stock rl'.rlemptfon,
wblch bllls are attnchcd hereto as Exbildt A Compim,y aba.ll han paid to Caimcros.<: &
HempefmllllD. P.S. C"Cit.H"). in addition to :my paymC?JU ~by Compan_v to C&H pnOT ro
Moy 1, 1996, the swn ofS
• Thill paYnt11nt shall be bl Nil sat.isf1&1ition of
Co.mpauy ':i ubJ1~tion to pay Sharehnider' £ attorneys' fe115 wme out of the can.i.-ummation of
the t:r@•iuitia.us cuutc:mplaied by the !'.'tnclc: Redemption Aareomcnt, md in full satMilction of
Compnny's obligatioo to pay any of Sharchr>ld.er' s attomeys' fees inourrcd in c.ollllCCJion with
any defaults alleged in t,hQ Notice ufDcfalllt and Shareholder's r.:r.:ercisc of :tny n;medic~ .fur .such
defaults.
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2.4
Vestln1 o.ffxotected Agents. Company shall ho.ve restortd those agents listed on
Exhibit D attached hereto to 100% vesting-with ~pect to all collllllissioos on policitl$ sold by
such agents prior to the °"ccutlon of this Agreemont, and sueb agents shall remain, at all times,
fuI!y vest.ad with respect t.o commis:il.a11s'eamcd on such policies.
2.5
ASJ!lll1pt!o,p gf Pm.onal NQll!· Compl.El)' shall have 11.5swned in writing that
certain persoDal note marla by Shareholder and attached .hei:eto as EWibit C, and shall have
obtained from the holder of such note a 'Written. fUll .rslt!A50.

2.6
Delivm ofCemennjaJ Asr~. Company shall have delivered to
Shareholder all aateenients between or among any of1he Companies and Centennial.

3,

ReprcseQWions and Wammties

3 .1
Bring Down ofRcpreseuJ:Qtions and Warranties.. Each of the representations and
warranties made by Company in tho Stock Redemption Agreeznent is incozporated herein by this
reference, and such mpresen1atiom end wammt.i.es are now and ha\le been at all Umes since the
closing of the stock xedemption true and conect.
3.2
Power and Authorjty. Company has full corpol'ate power and authority to
cxecllte, deliver and perl'oz:m this Agreement and to 1;on:nmunatc ~ transactiollS contempla~d
hereby. Company's Board ofD.irectors have duly authorized thia Agreement and itS execution
and deliveqy by Company. Company has either obtained the consent of its shareholders t.o .the
execution a.ncl delivery of thi1Agreem.ont11.Ild the con.summation of1be traDSactions
.
oontemplatecl hereby, or it has d~ermined.1hat no such tl"lnsent is required and the Company has
delivered to Shareholder an opinion of counsel that no such consent is required. TILis Agreement
.and the agreements ancilhuy heroto IQ'C legal, valid and binding obligations of Company
c.aforceablc against it in accordance with their tenns, ex:ccpt as enforceability may be l.imit.E'.fi by
banlauptcy, insolvency, reorganization or other similar lawa a.ff'ccting the enforcement of
ercditors1 rights generally or tbc avaUability of equitable remedies subject to the discretion of the
court.
3.3
CQnsent~: ?:[Qricontraventi2n. The execution and de!iveiy of thls Agreement and
I.be performance oftbe tpuwactions contemplated h1;reby will not result ma Ylolation of any of

tho tmxis or provuions of the articles otineorporaticn or bylaws of Company or any of its
subsidiaries or any amendments thereto, or eonstitulB a violatlon or default tDldel: WlY
indebtedness, indc.ature, mortgage, deed of trust. note, bond, license, loasc agreeinout or other
material agreement or instrument to which Company or any of its subsidiaries is a party or by
which it or any ofits assets may o1horwlse be bouo~ or of any law, rule. license, rcgu!Atio.n,
judJlllc:nt. order, ruliDg or ~ree govemins or affecting the operation of Comi'any or any of ito
subsidiaries in any material respect; nor will the smne constitute 1111 event pemrl.tti.ne tf'.rmin.atlon
of any 1u~rial agxeement or the acce!eratlon of any indebtedness or other liability of Company
or IUlf of its subsidiaries. with or without nQticc or l!!pJe of time, or result tn the creation OT
impositio!l of an.y lion upon the Collateral. No consent, authorizatioD, approval or exemption hy.
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or filing with. any person, entity or authority is required in c:Onnection with the execution,
delivery and pcrfonna.o.ce by Company of this Agreement or the taking of any action
wntemplat.cd hereby.
£.irumcial Condition. The consolidated financial statements of Company and its

3.4

subsidiaries forth= years ended Dccernbor 31, 1995, 1994, 1993 and 1992 and for the quarter
ended March 31, 1996 Bitached hereto as Exliil,?it I), including any adjustmellts thereto nsflccted
on ]3xbjbit Q, pr~m1nt fairly tM ftnmcial condition and results of operations and changes in
:financial position of Company and its Sllbsidiaries as of such respective dutcs and for ihe
respective periods then ended in c:onfannity with GA.AP applied on a consistent basis, and sinco
Mateh 31, 1996 no material adverse thanges havci occumd affecting th~ consolidated financial
condition of Company and its subsidiaries.
Mutun! Release. Each of the parties hereby releases the other from any and all k!'1own
claims such. party may have arising out of previous agreemcnt.s or business arrangements
'botween the p1rties or arising out of Shareholder's ow.o.ership of or employment by Company
prior to the daie of this Agreement, other 1hrm those obligations set forth herein. In particular.
the piartics hereby rolou.sc each othor from any obligatiorui arising out of the payment of expenses
associated with tho CAP Program (as de.tined in the Stock Redemption Agreement). and
Company hc:rcby re:l11ase$ Advantajc from any su'h obliaatiOIJS> except to the ex.tent that such
obligations are reflected in the adjustments m4do to tha principal balance of the Am.ended Down
PaYIJICnt Note. Except as such amounu arc reih:cted in the adjustm~ts mado to the principul
balance cf the Amended Down :Payment Note, Sharcholderreleases Company fi'om any liability
4.

of

for the paym~t of overdue or defilult ~for mxy period p.tior to the eftect!vo date tllb .
Agreement [remember tbllt S6M JWtfl ba~k inteNat mq1t be rolled into amended DP note].
The parties agree that all cam:.ntly eidsting monetary obligations betwco11 the partie~ ii.re reflected
in the Amended Down Paymr:nt Note and tho S6M Note. and Company has no right to future
offsets against eith~ note for any mom:tary obligations arising prior to tbc date of th.is

Agreemont

s.

~

5.1

;ey<:nt<:

of Default. ''Event ofDeUwlt," wherovcr used horei.D, means any one of

the follow.ing events:
(a) Company fuil$ to observe or pe:rfmm any tezm. covoaa.nt or agrc:cmem of
Company in tbis Agrcemee1t, and such faili.w is tt0t eur:d within thirty (30) days following
written notice of sucl1 failure from Shareholder;
(b) Any representation or war.ranty made herein shall pro"·e to ho.ve been
incorrect whon made or deemed made, and ewe shall not have been mtde within thirty (30) rkys

of written notice thereof from Shateholder;
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(c) Company dcfanlts under the Amended Down Payment Note. the $6M Note,
the: Plc:dae Agreement, or tho Security Agreement after the expiration of any applicable cure
period.
5.2

Rqnedit;1s for "PGfault.

Upon the occurrence of any Event of Default or at any
Shareholder may, without notice (or
without further notice, if jnitial nolice was -required purn1antto ~ction s.1 a"bove). in his
discri:ti on:
tim~ thereaftar, if any Evant of Default i$ then continuing,

(a) declare 1he entire unpaid balance of principal and accrued interest on tho
.Amended Down Payment Note and tht- SOM Note immediakly due and pa.yablc by Company,
without prosentmezrt. demand, protest or any notice of any kind, 1111 of whii;;h are hereby
expressly waived by Company;
'

(b) subject to the requirements ofapp.lica.ble .law then in effect,. proceed to enforce

thfs Agreement or any document con1'lmplated hereby by &xorcising such remedies as are
available thereunder or in respect "thereofunder applicable fa.w, wb.c:thet for damages, speci:.fic
pcdormance of any covenem or other agreement, or in th.a exercise of any ]lOWct 2f'anted hare1n
or In the documimw contemplated hereby;
(c) in addition to the exercise of any rights now or hemd\er existing lllldcr
applieable law, ~se all :rights of a scWied creditor under tho Uniform Co.IIIDlClCial Code in
all relevan1 jwisdictions, and proceed to protect and enforce hls rights hereunder or realize on
any or all security gn1ntt:d pnrsuant hereto or under the Pledge Apement, tho Security
Agreement. the Amended Down Pa.ymeot Note or the $6M Note in any manner or order he
deems expedient without :regard to any equltable principles of lXIZll'sb.aling 01· Qtb.Cl'Wise; 11Ddlor
· (d) give written notice to Company of hiR desire to become "agcat of record" for
all fam:l association trust& and/or policies for which Complll,)' or MY of its subsidiaries, at the
time of giving such natice, serves u agent ofrecotd. Upon receipt of such notice, CompDny
shall promptly deliver written notice, info.rm and IUbst:an~ satisfactory to Shareholder, to all
such tnlsls, poliiry holdm and other appropriate parties ofthe appointment of Shareholder ii!!
agent of record.

6. 1
~li\tllS of Donna Tuylor Afp·eewi;it. Company hereby acknowledges and agrees
to the ter1us of that certain letter agreement between Shareholder and Donna J. Taylor dated
April 16, 1996, which letter allows for'fhe unconditioiutl payment of in,exest under the $6M
Note. Company acknowltdges that its obligation to make timely interest pAymcnts wuler the
$6M .note and its obligation to make timely monthly payments under th.II: Amended Down
Pity:ment Note and to pay such Nore in fi.tll on October 31, 1996 are unconditional, and that the
failuro to make such paymciits when due shall constitute a breach of such obllptio.ns
notwi!lmanding Company's tAUurc to raise sufficient capital to make such payments or to pay
any obligations owed by Company to Donna Taylor.
Pagc7
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6.2
Stains of Stock Redempdon A;reemQDt lllG AneiUery Oru;umonts, Those
provisions ofthe Stock R.edcmption Agreement which survived the ciosini of the s1oek
redemption, and the temtl! imd provisions of the Stock Pledge Agreement and tho Security
Agreement. shall remain in full force and eiiect except aS' amended by this Agreement or the
doeWIJent5 contemplated hereby.
6.3
aurYival gfBmsent.ations anr.l Wammties. The re(iresentations, warranties,
eovcnaQts and agreements contained herein shall survive until lhe later of three (3) years from tbc
date of th1s Aifee.tnent or the payincnt in Ml of tho $ISM Note.
6.4
Am«mdmenu and Waiver.1. The provisions of this A~em may be nm.ended
only by the written agreement of the parties hereto. Exc:~t as othetw.ise provided herein. any
waiver, permit, consw or approval of any kind or cW.raclllr on the part of either party of any
provision or condition of this Agi:eenient must be made in writing and shall be effective only to
the extent specifically 5et forth in such "M.itiog. No won taken pur.suant to tbis Agreement.
including any in.vestigallon by or on behalf of either party. shall be deemed to r.onstitute a waiver
by the party taking such action of complianc@ with any repres1:1ntatio11, wamnty, covenant or
agreement contained herein. The waiver by any party hereto of a breach of any provlsion of t1U5
Agreement slulll not opcriAte or be const.r"u'ed as a waivei: of any lllbscq'tlctl.t bte~h.
6.S
Qovmhii Lm. The validity, meming awl effect of this Agreement shall be
de:wmined in accordance with the laws of the State. ofidaho.
6.6
J:lntire A~cemc:m. This Agreement, including the exhibits hereto, and the
ancillary documents expressly rcfcrted to herein, co.nsti.tute the entire asxeczm:Jlt of the parties
conceming the mattas refwed to herein t11ld supersede all prior agree:tnel'lts and undemao.dings,
oral or written, nil of which are b.ercby superseded and canceled.
&ecution jn fnuntMJJart.3· This Aareement may be exec11ted in any number of
each ofwllich when so e.xecutcd and delivered sbaU be deemed an original, and
such coiwtcrputs together sba11 constitute one Wstrument.
6.7

i:;oun~,

EFFECTIVE a3 of the date first set fOI1h above.
COMPANY:

AlA SERVICES CORPORATION
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CAIRNCROSS &.HEMPELMANN
.,
!Ou11!.QQI\. G'O~CD11U. )II Plllnl A\ll'!llll~
5!A111.I!,. ~I~ """'"NIO
CWlllJ.lllOQ

May21, 1996

Riobud Rilo)'

EDerle-. Bttlln, Kadln5, Turnow
& McKJveen. Cbarulred
300 Norlh Sb1.1h Street
P.O. Dox 1368
Boise. Idaho 83701-1368

R.e:

AU\ Sorvkcii CorporntlOlllReod T&Ylor

Jhit lwaar i& io l:llJI ruu1 uu1 .:011vimAtion earlier toda.y reprdiug coJXLact made by our:fum with
Mark Twain Danit. "!LG omr CIOllfoDt th~ OW' firm or, to 0111' Jcnowled,¥, lleed or Frnie have had with
M0tk Twain Danie ia a phone e111ll 1:11.1d• 'b)' "• prior to our llUldin,c in Luwmon. In lhll1 phoue \;Ill~ we
asked Mark Twain Bank to confirm rile eJClstcnce an account ID. the .aamc of AIA. Thi,
an c:flOrt
on ov:r part to verify dlAt a c:ommbdo11i c;oll11tcral aO«lQfW had blfll'l Oltabl.bQed fWIUlllt '1o tho itoarii,r
Agn:CJm:ul. Mark Twain Dmktold va 1hat tbcn W4llW vario11111CCOUD11; eltablicbed with their blink with
hotlt Contemrlal ed AlA, but could not give us llll accollllt m1roher.

or

wa•

Wo Wiah to underacorethatReed .bas norllbn any acliQIJ wltlutapeetto1bc ~mmlssions

collaten.! to data, nor docs he inlaw tu lab any ai;tion while: tho putic;a = negotiating in goo! fa.ith
tl:JMltd P. rosolutioll of tho rode111ptlon l\d'angemll!lf.
If )nl1 have :my questioas. please t'UJ free to QJJ.
Vvy t1111y youn,

~~~:to/Wl<T:aJt

EXHIBIT
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~

a.as S8'1·0lal

Ja!Of-111111

May28, 1996

Richard Riley, Esq.
Ebeirley, BerliD., KeatiD;. Turnow and Mu.cclvin Chm:1en:d

300 Nnrth ~f1tlh St.

P.O. Bux 1368
8.3701-l~liR

Boise. ID

Re:

Negotiations between Rr.tid Taylor md AJA Scrvi'1u, CQ:ipomtion (the
"Company")

D~Dick:

& yau know, Rud has wntinub>i concems abom both the e1trrent :tiDancial health of1ho
Coznpany and the dim;tion of cha Company's finances. P.achday Recd forbrJU"s from exercising
hi11 tomodiOD for ew:mit detaulm under tlu:: ~w1;k. redemption aaroement and relatNI documents,
Reed runs the riak of the :filrthi:r diminution of tho vidu1:: o!hls collatc:xal. and thui; incr811sl'IS the
rlsk of no.11paym•nt under hl9 notes. Pot this ms30n, it is impcrai!ve to Recd that, ifthere 111 m ~
any res1nlcturlug uf hf5 arrangement~ the Company, it bo pul. in place immediately. The
intent of t1Us letter a to ~ tho cumn:t status of thc:.sc nogotiitiWJJ fn an ettort to
determine 'Whether eontllmed di~i;in» AN ~tcd and to .i.ucica:ie lfa; pacci ofOW' PfOif'e!ll.•
towards some negotiated resolution.

The following pnint.ci Are not negotiable, rmd if the Company is tJJIWilling to
w.::cowmodato these points we wcmltl like to know 1hi1 ~ly :ro thllt Recd can comider hb

alternati v<i~:

•

The Down P11ym.ml Note must be secured by the stock pledge.

.

YJ

Vrr-J?
EXHIBIT
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Richau.I Riley, :Bsq.
May28, 199d
Pa~c:r2

• Thc:.r~ will be: .DO omet filt rhf! canceled premiums U$00illtad ln'VastQl'll We of
7
Nobraska.. All panit:S were llware of 81IY rislc llSSocimd with those promlU121$ at the Liwt: that the ,
Company decided to llilc thom.
• ThC1'0 will be no o.ffilel or liability for the tw=t)'·five percent of commis1\o:n.t paid tu
pfClt.eted agents between Jeua.ry 1, 19915 and the dates ot·termination of those agem:i. Th~
'1
Ccmp;uiy hAt alrGady o~ to tn:¥l I.hose ai!C1II u 1\llJy vested from Januaey 1 forwmd, md
this agrcc:ment WG# .D.Ot made iu ext!iwlge for any promise to reimhtlfSe the Company for thcso
eommisaions.
• Read and tbe Compoa.y must make m1111gcmcms with appropriate parties. including
any tnvt,ilvcd baab, which will imurc: thcit i;omruillltlum; collateral will :Qow aulomattcally from
the trwlt accounts Ul1der the Centennial lock-box agreomcnt lo the AJA accoum and then t.nto the
,,.
special collalcmtl DCOount witholll 1he ability of tho Com.pally lu llDilaterally stop tbls :flow of
I)'\ 0
commis.tjons. Reed doc• not have my desire to int6ri'oic with auy UJJgomg relationship beiwem{
the Company and C'.t"Atcll!lial, but rather merel:y wants to lnlurc ilia~ w!.hi: event an Interest
paymem is mil'-'ed, fiv11
worth of com.mk.nlons collataral OIUlh flow 9iill wme UirouP the.

11..,.•

speci8l collateral account which is 11ubjcct to tho proposed li,iuk-bux lllDDIGlllcnt.

1n addition to these poinbl. which are not ~otiable, tl:te pa:ttiCIJ mer di111<1K11.ing the
miolution of the :tbllowhli Issues:
-·
• CAP E.iwmses. Kced believes t.he stock redemption agreem.ent i& cleat thlltlhc
Company i5 TOSpoualble for payJni all CAP expBllses through the ciosius date. Reed 4t1d the
Company appcm: to be in ~eDt about the amoun1 rif ;pn1t..c:J@na CAP C."CJ>en&CS, with tho
exception of cpptoxhuallly iif\cfll thousand dollm of thaSll expenses which a.re dlaputad by
Recd. The Company w takl:.:n the pu~iliun J.hat Jobn Taylor's cerrifl<-.ate was somehow a
modifiO&ti021 of thi:: Compllily':i llgI'Nment tu Pll.Y CAP expenses through the closing d.&U, a
po:iitio11 with which lt.ccd vchcmcntly dlsaw.=s.

\?)

• Aiwtanct R'Ulaim, Tho pm:ti~ me. Ll w1111~11mont about which of them unriflf'took the
obliption to p:iy for these repain. Deopito Rc>ed•s po31tion that ~c lCPllir$ were the
Company·s re&ponsibility. Rei::d is willing to eplit 'tho 1o1&l amowt of the rcpalts In m effort.to
n:-ovc: discussions forwnrd..
·

• AtLumeys• 'fees. .Reed heliev~.s 1he Company'c obligatio11 t.o pay bis l<Uuwc:y:o' fees ls
elem:. Tb~ Cowpmy has C1'Pl'c.9sed its willingness 10 p&y som.e atto~s· fcca but would like to
place ll ccillDg on 1'.hc lulal mnount offees.

AIA0028989
RILEY 001013

002271

.

(

SENT BY:
'

5-28-96 : 5:18PM :

EBE'RLE. BERU.

208 799 9172 :11 5/ 6
laJO(l(

CAIJlNCROS.!J

15:311

OS 121310!1

Richaxd Kifoy. Esq.
May2B, 199(i
1'11go3

1'J D

u)~·y

• Las. 'Ihc p<ll'tics both aarco that a fmmal 'Witttll leue it ruicc:uwy and showd bt
exeoutcd Q pmt of this 1-=structure pso~ca. 1he partie.~ .11lso agree that tha lell:HI :ibould not be
terminahlo prior to the pll)'Illmt in full of tho Down l'll)'Tnent Note. Reed feels strongly that
AclvantAp will JU:cd at 1~ six mouths :from tho Down Payment Note due date in ordec to find
or build sui'tabl• roplacanc.nt ~· The company ls ukiil& for a '-horler tmn.
• Suborgjpatiap 9f Ptmn1 T.qylor's Rad!!!JJmion Papncnw. A<i WP. nndeu!W l.t, 1ohn
Taylor has proposed 1lw, In oxohongc for Do.Dua agr.cciu;: to allow Reed's TJown .Payment Noto
to be pllid in full prior 10 her r.lllipt ofthe balance ofber tcdcmptlou pa:yment'I, th11 Compan,r
Wi.11 execnre a prainissozy .note to DoJUUl whi.eh ptovidcs wr her to be paid her regTilm-montbly '1-.
payments acr.nrdmg to the most ncont 111I1<>rtimtion sdlodulc »Im additional pay.ml!llts of
&
principal in the amnunt approximately oue hundred thousand dulhas every six mombs fallowing
{ "'~J
11
the Down PaYnient Note d\lc dale. Recd ii willing to disOUR this option with Donna as soon u {';~
the Company ba."i amfinnt.d that it is willing to enter .int.o tbill arrangew.cnL All 11arlies agree that
Donl'Ul wi}J have to bes pitrty tu !he t~ aireemen1.

ef

l.
~

I

v/7

• Mtmtbl;y PA}'D'lent Amrnmr 1Iudq Qow Paxment Nat;. 'rhc panica llccd Lu
detctmine the amount of the monthly piymMt wbic:h will be made to Recd un~ 1hc Dowll
Pa:ymeat Nuie: This amount will tlClt be lei~ th1n11he CllOlmt Reed was t<ntitlod w Jomvci on a tf
montl1ly basis prior lo the 1brbcarance atr8I1Sl!lmen1 R~ bu propo~d that th~ tob:il amount of ~;,..
ctl:lh to be paid to him aachmontb.uotll lhc Down i'A)"m~utNote due elate on Ootolxlr3l, J996, Jv j1
mcludlng monthly int;.rm p&}'l'l1cmts under the $6.000.000 note. be $100,000.
I V•
I

Financiol Coymnnq. Brmmsnwrfons and W•r:r.e!lfio_t nnd fnfonnation P!Hv•t)(
The parties arc havi:og fiuillul di~slons about teVi~\ons to these requirements
to accommodaui tn. needs of both partit1.
•

Rc!miremmm.

us by

,..
Correspond.co.ea doli~ to
iho CowPllDY shows an ot!'set against the Do~-V
( 1layment Note fo.r advqQCS made to 1!.Ml Taylor. 111.csc udvl£l.lce;iH are ~ted tn Reetf' s
.
~redemption amngem.=ts with the Compmir aDd aio not app1opdllll:ly otrscta2ainst Reed's~

--

-·- ·------ ..

Recd is w.l.l.lins 1.0 allow partial prepaym.m of his $6,000,000 .u.u~ in the event of the
5Ubstitlltfon offair market value bonds for the stock celhi.wad, and to pcnnit u pllrlilll ~lease of
thDse bonds pruvidcd that the fair mar.Jcet value of the bonda ~a in place is al least ~l O"Ai
ofthc faee amOUDt ofll1c balance of the S6,000,000 note. Also, Recd la willing to sign a
cCrtifioDtc; 11t c:losing indicathJi thG exnct amounts of monthly payments owed to him, cc;Jtifyi.ug
that, iftbo5o runount:s ate paid, W: wilt have no recoun;c to llOmmissions collatel'll.I.

---·---
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R.iabard Riley, Etq.
May 28, 1996

Pai• 4
We are hopctul tbo.t th.ill leLlUr will help to frame the remabiing illbucs. Poudinl! the
re'°lu1io:a of thasfl iasuea, ~ '2q!CCt GXe<:UdOll of the reS11'1lcture docum.out5 on May ~ 1, 1996.
PIMae let me know if you hiiv~ any questions or comments. Ree~ will .net o.grcc to forb¢ar
loneer unless a resolution fa imm~

Very lrnly yours,

f;J¥..~r-~
W. Frlllk Taylor

WFT;iab
cc:

heed J, Taylor
EmiCI Dantlnl

Scott Bell
'0""61.D56
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May31, 1996

FranJi. Taylor
Caimoroa & Hcmpclmilllll, P.S.
70th floor, Columbia Center
701 Fifth Avenue
ScuUlc, Washington 98104

Ro:

Rood J. Taylor
Forbearanco Agxamont

Dear Frank:

.Enclosed is a redraft of lhe Forbearance Agreement, marked to show chanses from your
May 1S draft. AJ. I stated in our telephone conversation earlier today, I am forwarding thi1 draft
wirhm1t it having been reviewed by my clients.
However, I did convey to Dan Spickler Reed's position that he needs an overall number
for the Down Payment Note today: and T have been a11rhorl1.ed tn fix the principal amC\Unt of
lhe Down Payment Nore at Sl.47$M, on the assumption dw: this overall nwnber will include
all chdms iUlll offsets of cifhcr party Cincludin&, without limitation, the Phelps Field bill, your
firm's ai.tumey fees, the Company's claims for offset of cancelled Investors' Ll!e premiums,
prolecled ag1:.uts' wmrui~uns Crom January 1, 1996 through the date of their termination and
all CAP ~pcua. anll lll."{;1u;d but URJT4.id interest under the S6M Note). I have also been
authorized to fix ~amount ortlie munlhly puym~nt at $Sj ,000 whidl. at a 9.SS annual intctcst
rate, will i:;onsist of both principal and hltcrest on the da:.li.niug principal bltlance. Also, I have
been instnicted u to the provisions of Section 1.6 co11"1"ning the office lc:aac.

The enclosed draft reflects the Company's agrc:cmcnt to secure the principal of the: Down
Payment Note by th~ Pledged Stock, provided that the maturity date will be December 3 t, 1996,
and further provided that the maturity date may be extended to the closing date of a refinancing
transaction if, on or before December 31, 1996, the Company receives a letter of intent (or
definitive tnnsaciion documentation) which will provide sufficient funds to pay the principal of
rhe Down Jlayme.ntNote at such closing. If Reed insi!ls on the October 31, 1996 maturity date,
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the Company will not agree to xcuic the principal amount of lhc Down Payment Note with the
Pledged Stock.
A.a we discl.IS$ed Jut week, l have drafted the Forbearance Agreement on the supposition
that all of the original documents will be ~ in their entirety and the parties' respective
rishtt and obligations shall be governed .sole.ly by the amended documont.lltion once the
restructurina t:ramaction is closed. Consequently, we will need to rednft mch of the underlyins
transaction documents to address covenanll, representations al1d warranties, etc.

Jn ™J)Onse to your telepbone mepqe concernma the $24,000 payment of interest on the
S6M Note, that interest has always been paid by an AlA Insurance, Jnc. check rather than an
AIA Services Corporation chec1'; and T am sure that it is properly accountfld for as an
lntcrcompany ttan53Ction.
I look forwant to he.arlni from you next week for further dir.cu.~tjon.111 and completion of
our ncgolialious.
Very truly yours,

-7)1t-.
Richard A. Riley
Iinc:l1111utu
cc:

Dan Spiclcl~r
Jcma T•1lar
(wt t.nd.)
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Deat 1lic.k:

We have ieedved tb~rovised for~ agrmncat which you sent tn 11, on Friday. May
31. 19915, and reviewed 1he aateenlentwi1h. Reed. PwllU1111:Wus.reasons. an of 'Which we J:i;rvo
ill~u:swd on sevl:ltl DCCilsions, tba propml ia ~table 10 Rr:cd.. We find ltpartir.ulady
di:swn=n!nr; that. tar flnm nW:blg my Jllfmlmgi\il compmntlso, AlA Sctvices Corpo:ati011 {-the
"Cumpany") appc:m to he lw'Jdng &'W.J from it:; ow.a positiom ~iDg the Down Payment
Neb!! d11i;. dsc md i1s williogn!$~ kl fulfill n. oblipdon to ,pa7 llitomcy.s• fee$. & we have
di:lcu:latd. R=d fa w:r:y com:m:ned·abmlt the Com~'s ~S :sab vallllncs and other
indicatim\$ thiat tm CQmpaU)"'s tinanciat cosiditiou u wonoi.W1g, a he; eauuol allow his
colh:atemJ to diminish. inddinlte)J where no sip.i.6c111t FOllW' is o~.
M~ we widcr.il.lmd.11!at1bo C4mpany his reftlscd to ~ledge Rci::cJ.'3
entitlement to po*'1:1io.n offltc ~cafCS~ mck i11 The '(J:i»VCJSQ Lil'c ~o.i1,c;e
l!ompmy u reqtl81ted by First Inlcisf&lc Bank. It WS11.B,Bn'1.d by all that. upon th¢ p~t .in
full ofF'im Intemac. B=k.1h-. ccrtiflCC11C1J would be delivcrr.tt rlirectlyto R.od. Tbc
·'

Company's \'IJlwillinpKs: to 'QCCQ~t6 flic: :Bank's Ieqttest fur cnnti:mlD.icm of thli; toot is 81)
JJK!ieul!on fhst the Co.tnpasi)' Ui 12ot d=lhi1 wi.1h Rt.eel in good faidl.

In light o!tbese t~. ~ h=by give thi: Ccmiptny uo~ of~'s praposal m retain aJI
of 1bl; P!Wgcd. Collatmll (as SUC'.h tam is d.m,..d. In 1h~ Smelt Plc:~c Agreement betwf'tlll Rl!ed
and the Company) in:full sali!llaction ofthe Comp:llly'll pi:1:1mi:11101.y o.oto obllpllon. to Reed in
th~ principal 11motJnt ofS6,00o,oon. PmsUBllt to Jc:bho oodc ~on 28-9-:;os. ~Company lllls
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1hitly (30) dqri ~ ini'i;imi. Reed Of sny objcetion it may h1.vo to &i9 n:tcntion Qf such collateral in

AAti.sfactio11 of'thb obllption. Iftbc ~does objert, this lettor constitult!S Ri:ctl's notice to
the. Compc.y fl( bis intenti.011 fD sol! :nich co.llatenl, immediately and witbolXt turthe:i
·. llC«lrdanc.o with.applioablc statnto,., rcq~.

uutice, Ip.

ln Addition, to ihe ~ wr'piio1: awli<:es of defaUJ.t dicf not cover th• following ~l,

we :hmby ,ejvc notice ta th. Compmy of sudl ckt11.1h: the Cotn1'9JlY's uso of iUo.d.t ra.!~ccl l.n thr;:
"Serles C" nffering far pmposes other 1haa. tho payment ofDontia taylor or Reed Tllylor, which
was in violaii0J1 of'!Jle agrec::m.cnt miiong the p111ili$ conta!w:d in that cemUu. leitcr agIOeQl.ch't
dated JUly 18. I!i!IS and addmi>ed 10 Cumcr L. <l.tc;QI.
Vg:y ~ yoius.

WfT:I&
co:

ltcod.J. T111lur

Emic; Dan.ti.nl
Scotf T. Bell, Esq.
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N. Frank Taylor
cairncross & Hempelmann, P.S.
10th Floor, Columbia Center
701 Fifth Avenue
Seattle. Washington 98104
Re:

Restructure of AIA

VIA FACSIMILE TO

(206) 587-2308

Se~ices

Corporation Redemption Obligations

Dear Frank:
Thank you for your June 5, 1996 letter. It appears the parties are in substantial
agreement on the significant terms of the redemption restructure arrangements. I will review
the significant terms in order of the bullet points in your letter:

•

Down payment note principal is $1,550,000 bearing interest at 9.5 % per annum .

•

Down payment note due date is October 31, 1996.

•
Monthly cash payments to be made to Reed in the amount of $75,000,
representing $41,250 of interest on the $6M Note and $33, 750 of principal and interest on the
Down Payment Note. Monthly payments will commence July 1, 1996 (rather than June 1).
•
At their meeting late Monday, John and Ernie discussed a front-end lump sum
payment to Reed in reduction of the principal balance of the Down Payment Note. However.
it is my understanding that that item was deleted from the agreement. If there has been any
further discussion on this point since that meeting, I am unaware of it.
•
$6M Note.

The Down Payment Note· will be secured by the same collateral now securing the

•
The Company will make periodic installment payments to Reed, on an agreed
schedule, to reimburse Reed for Cairncross & Hempelmann's reasonable attorneys' fees through
the date of the Forbearance Agreement; and such payment shall not reduce the principal balance
of the Down Payment Note. Please advise the Company of the attorneys' fees accrued to date.
•
The Company will reimburse Reed for 50 % of the Phelps Field bill. Reed will
indemnify the Company against any claims by Phelps Field in connection with the airplane repair
bill. To satisfy such indemnity. the Company shall be entitled to offset against monthly
:

EXHIBIT
Taylor 001073

002278

------------------------------------------\

•

N. Frank Taylor
June 6, 1996
Page 2
payments to Reed under either of the notes and/or the principal amount of the Down Payment
Note (or the $6M Note, if and to the extent the Down Payment Note has been paid off), in its
discretion.
•
The Company and Advantage will enter into a written lease, expiring six months
from the date of payment in full of the Down Payment Note. No penalty for earlier vacation
of the premises. Monthly lease payments will be $1,500 per month.
•
The restructured redemption obligations will be embodied in a single set of
documents which will amend, restate and supersede all' of the prior documents. Reed will waive
all defaults alleged under the original agreements and forbear from exercising any remedies
thereunder. The Stock Redemption Agreement, Security Agreement and Stock Pledge
Agreement will be amended and restated as we have previously discussed, particularly th9Se
provisions relating to financial covenants and provision of information by the Company to Reed,
as well as the Collateral Account lock box provisions. As we previously discussed, Reed will
have no recourse to the Commission Collateral in the event of a non-monetary default. Further,
Reed will not be entitled to accelerate either of the notes for a non-monetary default which does
not impair the value of his security. The financial covenants will be a limited number of
meaningful measures of the value of the security of the notes.
•
The Consulting Agreement and the Employment Agreement will be terminated
upon execution of the restructure documents. The Non-Competition Agreement, which restricts
Reed from contacting the commodity associations and related trusts, will remain in effect.
•
Subject to the condition described in the following bullet point, all terminated
agents who Reed previously designated as protected agents will continue to be paid directly by
the Company an amount equal to their vested percentage of earned commissions; and the
Company will pay Reed the difference between the vested percentage and 100 % of such earned
commissions. Protected agents will be defined as those agents listed on the attached schedule,
as long as such agents are under contract with and actively working for Reed and/or Advantage
Insurance Agency. The final documentation should provide that the agents are not parties to or
third party beneficiaries of the Company's agreement with Reed and that the agents have no
entitlement to receive from the Company the non-vested portion of the earned commissions.
Any distribution of all or any portion of the non-vested portion of the earned commissions by
Reed tO the agents will be strictly a matter between Reed and the agents. AIA's relationship
with its agents will continue in accordance with its existing agency contracts. If any of the
protected agents has a debit balance with the Company, that debit balance must be reimbursed
out of the vested commissions before distributions of the vested commissions are paid by the
Company to the agent.
•
Any agent found "rolling" any policies (not just health policies, but rather all
policies on which the Company is paying vested commissions) will have all of his commissions
Taylor 001074

002279
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terminated in accordance with the terms of the applicable agency agreement. The corresponding
payment to Reed of the non-vested portion of the earned commissions will also be terminated;
but such termination will not affect any other agents receiving override commissions on the
rolled policies.
•
Donna Taylor will receive her regular monthly redemption payment for her
preferred stock in the approximate amount of $25,000 per month. In addition, at the end of
each six-month period following full payment of the $1,500,000 Down Payment Note, the
Company shall pay Donna $100,000 principal toward the full satisfaction of the redemption
obligation. Reed will indemnify the Company against any claim by Donna that her consent to
the modification of her previous agreements with the Company and/or her consent to the
Company's restructured obligations to Reed are void. To satisfy this indemnity, the Company
shall be entitled to offset against monthly payments to Reed on either of the notes and/or the
principal of the Down Payment Note (or the $6M Note, if and to the extent the Down Payment
Note has been fully paid), at the Company's discretion.

•

•
The redemption obligation to Donna is reflected in the Company's Articles of
Incorporation and subsequent letter agreements. There is no promissory note to amend. Donna
will be required to be a party to the documentation of the restructured obligations and to
expressly agree to waive and modify the prior agreements which limit payments of interest and
principal to Reed. The Company would prefer that Donna receive the advice of independent
legal counsel before entering into such agreements, but will not require such advice as a
condition to the restructuring transactions.
I expect we will need to discuss some of these matters in greater detail. However, I
believe it is appropriate to continue our prior efforts to prepare the necessary documentation.
Subject to incorporation of the newly agreed terms, the redrafted Forbearance Agreement I sent
you on Friday should be the appropriate starting place and creates the necessary framework for
the documentation.
I look forward to hearing from you.
Very truly yours,

RAR/sp
Attachment
cc:
John Taylor
Dan Spickler
R.M. Turnbow
(all w/ attachment)

Richard A. Riley
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To:

Original lo fol/aw via:
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0 Hand Delivery
Dick Riley
Facsimile:
Telephone;

From:

(208) 344--8542

W. Frank Taylor

Number of pages, including this cover: 89
Please call at (206) 587-0700 if you do not receive all pages.
Re:

File No.:
Remarks:

3224-001

Enclosed are drafts of the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreenien1, Amended
and Restated Down Payments Note, Amended and Restated Security Agreement,
A.mended and Restated Stock Pledge Agxeement, Amended and Restated
NoncompetitionAgreement, and Amended and Restate Promissory Note. Reed
has not yet 1eviewed these documents, and therefore they are subject to change.
However, we would obviously like to finalize these documents as soon as
possible. I am awaiting from you drafts of the Lease and Lockbox Agreement.
With respect to the Lockbox Agreement, we would like to 1eceive that draft as
soon as possible, as we will need to have the bank approve the fonn of that
agreement and we will not want the agreement to hold up the closing. For your
infonnation, we estimate that Cairncross & HempelmBDn bills wjJ} be between
S40,00Q and $45,000 by the time the transaction is complete.

This facslmlle communiC:1tion ls Jotended only for the use oftbc Individual or entity to which It is .addressed
and may contain information that is privileged and confidentfaL If the reader of this cover page is not the
addressee, or the cmploy<!e or agent of the addre.ssee, please be advised that any dissemination, distribution,
or copying or this communication i.9 strictly prohibited. If you receive this facsimile in error, ple11sc notify us
immediately by telephone and mall this facsimile to us at the above address. Thank you,
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June 13, 1996
N. Frank Taylor
Caimcross & Hempclmann, P.S.
70th Floor, Columbia Center

VIA FACSIMILE TO
(2(16) 517·l308

701 Fi.flh Avenue

Seattle, Wasblugton 98104
Re:

Recd Taylor Stock RcdcmpLioo Rcsltuctu~ Agn:ements

Dear Fronk:

Enclosed for your review are drafts a Lock Box Agreement and a .Lc:uc.
The recitals in the Lock Box Agreement will need to bo conformed to the tltlc11 tu the
documents that you an: drafting; and, as we dis<:uuod yesterday, I will try to determine which
hank' will act as depository for the Collateral Account. H the Lock Box Agreement is acceptnblo
to Reen, we will forward it lo the appropriate bank for its review.

As l menrioned in ye.~lerday's telephone conversation, Dan has not yet diacuued with
Brnle two panieular provisions of the. enclosed I~. Une of those provisions charges
additional rent for cerr.ain furnirure, fiuure.~ and equipment which is being used by Advantage

bul which i5 not Included in Ille FF and B tram;ferre.d fll C:AP !IS part of Rtt-d's stock :redemption
l.raJ15lLCLiun. It b my understandin& !bat CAP will be aU'ed either to return that equipment, buy
it or rent il at a n:ntal to be agreed and inserted In the enclosed Lea~. Secondly, lhe Lease
contains a provisiun 11'QUirlt1i Advantaie to pay a separate charge for it~ prornr.a share of the
oosb" of U3C of the 1elcphc11c: 11y~1c:111 fn the building. I undersrand rbal Dan will be speaking with
Umic about this matter as well.
The Lease also include.'! a right of offsc;L ag.W1sl i11~1t or principal due ro Reed in the
event Advlllltngc dcfaul~ on the Lea.le. The Lock Box Ag.reemeuL llll1y na:U tu be lldju~ted to
allow for that offset since, as currently structured, the Lock Box Agreement provides fur
automatic payment of sel amounts to Recd.

I will be reviewing your revised drafts of the other documents today and will respond as
quidcly as l can after confinning with AIA.

Very truly yours,
l'..... Wl-lfaDI.....

1a-na•1.i......1a

EXHIBIT

4VOMI llolq

RAR/1

Richard A.

~iley

zg

Huclosures

AIA0028995
RILEY 001025

002282

·

v6/li/96

20:03

'5'2G

<>87 2308

laJ 002

CAIRNCROSS

1.
CAIRNCROSS & HEMPELMANN

'°'"

.\ ~ S'flMCli C.UU'OMTTON

FLOOR. COlUMB!A CENT,61l. iDI l'lml AVENlJl!

SEATTI..E. IW.SlilNOTOt-1 91!J04·701~
1206) Sln-0700
T<Ux: -l!IJ.&o,I
F·~:

1206) S87-2JOa

June 17, 1996

VIA FACSIMILE (208) 344-8542

Richard Riley, Esq.
Eberley, Berlin, Keating, Turnow & Macelvin Chartered
300 North Sixth Street
P.O. Box 1368
Boise, ID 83701-1368
Re:

Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement

Dear Dick~

I am sony to hear that you were ill today. I wanted to get back to you about the issue of
the zero coupon bonds which we discussed on Friday. The reason that the use of zero coupon
bonds is problematic is that those bonds will have a fair market value equal to $6M only on the
maturity date. In the event that the Company were to default under 1he S6M Note, and Reed
were forced to foreclose on the zero coupon bonds prior to their maturity, the fair market value of
the bonds would likely be substantially less than $6M. Thus, with a z;ero coupon bond rather
than $6M fair market value bonds, Reed would be significantly undersecured.
As you know, this issue was discussed in Lewiston and the Company agreed to eliminate
the provisions relating to zero coupon bonds. In exchange, Reed agreed to allow partial
prepayment of his Note and a corresponding partial release of the bond collateral, both of which
were prohl'bited under the prior agr~cnt.

Nevertheless, you have told me that it is a significaI!t hindrance to the Company's ability
to raise money from outside sources if the Company is required to use fair market value bonds.
In an effort to accommodate the Company, Reed will be willing to accept a replacement of the
stock pledge with zero coupon bonds, but only if the Company first takes the principal balance of
the $6M Note to $SM. The replacement :zero coupon bonds in such a case would be bonds
having a value of $SM upon maturity. The Company would continue to have the right to use fair
market value bonds as an alternative.

.,.;--•Ex•H•l•BllllT--illl.
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I hope that this accommodation provides the Company with the flexibility it needs to
pursue its potential investors. While I believe that this would put Reed at greater risk than the
use of fair market value bonds, 1 also believe that it is in Reed's best interest to assist in creating
a climate in which the Company is able to raise the capital it needs to satisfy its obligations to
Reed.
I believe that you have received my marked-up copy of the Lockbox Agreement. I am
hopeful that we will have this finalized and have the bank approve the fonn of this Agreement in
the next day or so. In addition, I am assuming that you will be developing w~tever agreement
the Company will have with Donna Taylor, and that you will be drafting the letter agreement
among the Company, Reed and Mark Twain Kansas Bank meeting the requirements of the
proposed Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement. Both Qf these aius;ements muat be in plru;~
prior to the conswnmation ofthe restmcture trarnsaction. In addition, we have not yet received
the original stock certificates for Universe Life Insurance Company, and would appreciate it if
you and the Company would assist in their delivery to us.
Finally, we have received Dan Spickler's letter regarding our comments to the proposed
Lease Agreement. Most of these comments are acceptable. The following are my responses to
Dan's comments.
1.
It is my widerstanding that the date of the lease and all of the Restructured
Obligations will be as of the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement execution date. CE.Sh
would be paid to Reed on the execution date in the amount of $50,000 plus one-half of the
Phelps Field Bills plus the amount of Reed's attorneys' fees which the Company and Reea agree
will'be paid on the execution date, if any. The first monthly payment under the two notes would
be made July 1, 1996. Is this not everyone's understanding? I will confirm this with Reed.
2.
With respect to thi:: personal property, it is my understanding that Reed is willing
to use only that personal property currently owned by him or by Advantage. I will forward the
list of property enclosed with Dan's Iett~ to Reed to make sure that he has an accurate
understanding of what prop~rty is owned by him or by Advantage.
3.
It is acceptable that the Lessee will be responsible for indemnifying AIA for
liabilities arising out of suits brought by Lessee's business invitees. I.;essee should not be liable
for actions arising out of occurrences involving AIA 's invitees or invitees of any other tenant of
the property in which the Premise~ are located.

4.

Dan's comment about the payment of personal property taxes is probably moot,

and otherwise acceptable.
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5.
I will discuss the parking issue with Reed. As I understand it in Dan's proposal,
two parking spaces would be made available in the lot adjacent to the building as reserved spaces
for Advantage (one of which is Reed's spot), and any other employees of Advantage would be
required to park in the lot across the street Presumably, business visitors of Advantage would be
permitted to park in the adjacent lot?

6.
I recognize the reasonableness of providing a cun-ent offset to the Company in the
event of a default .in the payment of monthly installments under the Lease. HoWever, I am
concerned about the complmty that this wouid add to the Lockbox Agreement and our ability to
get a bank to agree to a process that would allow the Company to change the amount of the
automatic payment under the Lockbox Agreement under certain circumstances but not under
others. Given that the monthly lease payment is relatively small in proportion to the other
monthly payments, we would propose that the offsets be made to the principal of the notes rather
than to current payments, However, I am open to any suggestions from you about the best way
to handle an offset without unduly complicating the Lockbox arrangement.
7.

1 will discuss the default notice penalty with Reed.

8.

The remaining comments in Dan Spickler's letter are acceptable.

We would like to plan on a closing by the end of this week. Obviously, there is much to
be done in preparation for closing. Please let me know how I can assist you in moving the
p~ocess forward.
Very truly yours,

lAJ ,}w-Jc
W, Frank Taylor

"¥-

WFT:lfs
cc:

Reed Taylo;r
Ernie Dantini
Dan Spickler
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June 21, 1996

N. Frank Taylor
Caimcross & Hempelmann, P.S.
70th Floor, Columbia Center
701 Fifth Avenue
Seattle, Washington 98104
Re:

Restructured Obligations

RECE\\IED

L. ..... ~."

er CCIUN•C~

VIA FACSIMJLE TO
(206) 587-2308
AND REGULAR MAIL

JUN 2 41996
b•

Dear Frank:

·-

Thanks for arranging E-Mail of your document files. In the interests of clarification and
simplicity, I have done some rearranging of the documents. Let me explain the ra'tio.nale.

Under the Lock Box Agreement, Reed will receive monthly payments automatically from
the Collateral Account. If at any time the funds in the Collateral Account are not sufficient to
pay his monthly payments, the first dollars deposited in the account go to Reed until he is paid
current. Reed does not need default provisions in the Security Agreement beaiuse he already
has direct assess to the Collateral Account.
What he does need, however, is a remedy if the monthly payments cannot be satisfied
out of the Commissions Collateral within a reasonable period of time; and he needs a remedy
if the value of his security interest in the Pledged Shares is adversely affected. Consequently,
it appears to me that the default and remedy provisions - as well as the representations,
wam.nties and covenants which trigger them - should be located in the Stock Pledge
Agreement.
Accordingly, you will see that I have deleted default provisions from all documents other
than the Stock Pledge Agreement and have moved all representations, warranties and covenants
to the Stock Pledge Agreement. I have also attempted. to simplify the default and remedy
provisions in accordance with our agreement in principle. If I have accomplished my purpose,
the Restructure Agreement will be extinguished upon closing; and the operative documents
following closing will consist of the two Notes, the Amended Security Agreement, the Lock Box
Agreement, the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement and the Amended Noncompetition
Agreement.

•

I have enclosed a clean copy and a markup - showing changes from your draft - of
each of the Restructure Obligations other than the Noncompetition Agreement. These· drafts
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incorporate comments from Dan Spickler and, through Dan, John Taylor. However, neither of
them has had an opportunity to review the enclosed draftsi and they will both be out of the
office. until Monday. In order to expedite your review and consideration of the revised
documents, I am delivering them to you subject to whatever further comments I may receive
from them early next week.
In the meantime, it is my understanding that Dan has forwarded the Lock Box Agreement
to West One Bank for its review. Dan is also initiating contact with Felts Field concerning the
airplane repair bill. In addition, the Company is contacting West One Bank to request a release
of Reed on the $150,000 Note assumed by the Company from Reed.

•

Two key financial covenants are proposed to protect Reed's security interest in the
Pledged Shares: Sections 4. 7 and 4.8 of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. At this stage,
both of these covenants are presented for conceptual and discussion purposes only, as they need
to be further reviewed and refined even if conceptually acceptable. With respect to the retained
earnings test, we need to CQnfirm that retained earnings have not decreased since the 1995 yearend figure, as the Company will not enter into an agreement already in default. With respect
to the appraisal of the stock, Paul Durant is visiting today with the independent business
valuation experts who are providing the annua,l appraisal of the Company's common stock for
the Employee Stock Ownership Plan. In the course of that discussion, he will determine
whether, in the course of appraising AIA Services' common stock; the appraiser can provide
valuations of the principal subsidiaries whose stock is pledged to Reed. If the subsidiary
valuations are not directly funtlshed in the appraisal of AIA Services' common stock, we will
need to develop an appropriate formula .to back into the value of the pertinent subsidiaries.
After we receive the appraiser's input, perhaps you and I - with help from a~counting experts
- can refine the covenant.
I will be out of the office Friday afternoon, but will be available first thing Monday
morning for further discussions.
. Very truly yours,

L)~
Richard A. Riley
RAR/s
cc:

Dan Spickler w/eocl.
1olui Taylor w/cucl •
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June 27, 1996

VIA FACSIMILE 799-9144
Reed Taylor
One Lewis Clark Plam
Lewiston ID 83501
Re:

Series A Prderrcd Shareholder Agreement

Dear Reed:

••

At Frank Taylor's request, I have revised the draft Series A Preferred Shareholder
Agreement by deleting the final clause in Section 3 as indicated on the enclosed Page 4 of the
Agreement. In addition, at Frank's instruction. I am forwarding to you a clean copy of the
revised draft. which 1 understand you will deliver to Donna for review by her and her counsel •

To minimize the risk of any later challenge, we need to assure that Donna and her
counsel are fully cognizant of the background and effect of the Series A Preferred Shareholder
Agreement and the changes which that Agreement would mnke in the financial relationshipS
among the parties. Please let me know, either directly or through Frank Taylor, who Donna
retains as legal counsel to review this Agreement, I will need to have direct contact with her
counsel to provide copies of the Company's Articles of Incorporation and the various Letter
Agreements which arc being superseded, and to specifically identify those provisions of the
Letter Agreements which are affected by the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement
Very truly yours,

v~

Richard A. Riley

RAR/s

cc:

Frank Taylor w/encl {via fax)
Dllll Spi"1e.r w/encl (via fax)
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Nose and SecutilY Therefor.

Series A Preferred Shareholder hereby consents to (i) Company's payment of its obligations to
Creditor in accordance with the terms or the Amended Down Payment Note and the Restructure

Agreement; (ii) Company's payment to Creditor of its obligations to Creditor in accordance with
the terms of the $6M Note, subject however to the subordination provisions of Section 3 hereof;
(iii) the grant of security interests in the Commission Collateral and Pledged Shares to secure
payment of the two notes; and (iv) the possibJe future pledge of bonds pursuant to Section 10
of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement and the release of security interest in part or aJl of the
Pledged Shares and the Commission Collateral.
3.

Subordiwrtion of Certain PrinLibNI Payments tg Creditor, Payment of principal

to Creditor on the $6M Note (whether at maturity or at.any earlier time in accordance with

any

right of prepayment) shall be subordinated to payment in full of Company's obligation to redeem
the Serles A Preferred Stock. Company shatJ not pay any principal on the $6M Note until the
Series A Preferred Stock is completely redeemed (provided, however, that this limitation shall

not preclude Company from exercising any contractual or equitable right of offset against the
principal of the $6M Note)!; and Company s:hall: net PftY interest le GfediteN>e the $6M Note
at any time at whielt €ompany i:; in deft11dl en prifleipal or int:e.rest paymeots

4.

k>

Series A.

Unconditional Release. Series A Preferred Shareholder releases Company and

its subsidiaries, their respective directors, officers, shareholders, employees, affiliates and other

agents in their official capacities, from all claims arising prior to the date hereof including,

without limitation:
(i)

the assertion of purported dissenter's rights in connection with certain

tran:sactiorus between ULIC and The Centennial Life Insurance Company;
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DRAFT
SERIES A PREFERRED SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT
THIS SERIES A PREFERRED SIIAltEBOLDER AGREEMENT (" Agreement11 ) is

made and entered into this _ _ day of June 1996, by and among AIA SERVIC.ll'.S
CORPORATION, an Idaho corporation (•Company"), REED J. TAYLOR (nCreditor) and
DONNA J. TAYLOR C'Series A Preferred Shareholder11 ) .

RECITALS:
A.

Series A Prcfem:d Shareholder is the owner of all of Company's issued and

outstanding Series A Preferred Stock.

•

Company is redeeming that stock pursuant to (i)

Company's articles of incorporation and (ii) that certain letter agreement among the parties

hereto and Cumer L. Green ( 0reen") dated January 11, 1995, as amended by (a) that certain
11

letter from Green to Richard A. Riley ("Riley") dated March 22, 1995, (b) that certain letter
agreement among the parties, Green and Richard W. Campanaro dated July 18, 1995 1 and (c)
that certain letter from Green to Riley dated August 10, 1995 (collectively, the "Series A
Preferred Shareholder Letter Agreements"). Pursuant to the Letter Agreements, Company has
reamortb:ed its redemption obligation to Series A Preferred Shareholder over a shorter period

and has increased the rate of interest paid t.o Series A Preferred Shareholder in exchange of
waiver by Series A Preferred Shareholder of alleged. defaults by Company and other
consideration.

B.

Pursuant to that certain Stock Redemption Agreement between Company

and Creditor dated July 22, 1995, as amended by that certain Addendum to Srock Redemption
Agreement also dated July 22, 1995 (together, the 11Stock Redemption Agreement") and related

Taylor 001081

002290
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ag:rccmc:nts including (without limitation) a Stock Pledge Agreement (the "Stock Pledge
Agreement") and a Security Agreement (the "Security Agreement"), each dal.ed July 22, 1995,
granting a security interest in certain collateral to secure payment of the $6M Notet aU of

Creditor's shares of common stock of Company were redeemed.

C.

As part consideration of the redemption of Creditor's common. stock, Company:

(i) executed a promissory note dated July 22, 1995 payable tD Creditor in the principal amount

of $1,500,000 (the "Down Payment Note") and (Ii) execut.ed a promissory note dated August
1, 1995 payable to C..Teditor in the principal amount of $6,000,000 (the "$6M Note'').
D.

Simultaneously witb the redempUon of Creditor's common stock, the Company

reorganized by selling 150,000 shares of Series C 'Preferred Stock for $1.S million, contributing
that $1.5 million to the Company's wholly-owned insuranee subsidiary, The Universe Life

Jnsurance Company ("ULic·). and distrtbuting UIJC's stock of its subsidiaryt AI.A Insurance,
lnc. to the Company ("Reorganization").

E.

In connection with the redemption of Creditor's common stock and Company's

reorganization, the parties entered into the Letter Agn:ement dated July 18, 1995 which, among
other things, imposed certain restrictions on Company's payment of interest and principal to
Creditor.

F.

Concurrent with the execution of this Agreement, Company and Credit.or have

entered int.a that certain Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement (the "Restructure Agreement")
pursuant to which Company's obligations to Creditor under the Stock Redemption Agreement
and related agreements have been restructured (the "Restructure•).

G,

As a part of the Rcmucture, Company and Creditor have agreed to amend and

restaa: the Duwn Payment Note (as amended pursuant to the Re,,tructure, the "Amended Down

Payment Note"), the Security Agreement and the Stock Pledge Agreement.

SBRI.BS A PRBFBRRED SHARBHOLDBR AORBBMBNT - Page 2
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In consideration of Company's willingness to accelerate principal payments to

Series A Preferred Shareholder on its redemption of the Series A Preferred Stock, the Series A
Prcfcrted Shareholder is willing to release Company and Credit.or from certain of those interest
and principal payment restrictions contained in the Letter Agreements and to release Company
from any and all defaults under Company's Articles of Incorporation or the Letter Agreements,

and

to

consent to the restructure of Company's obligations to pay principal and interest

to

Creditor pursuant to the terms of the Amended Down Payment Note as provided therein and In
the Restructure Agreement.
AGREEMENTS
1.

Serles A Preferred stock BedemPtiPJl.
(a)

•

Company will continue monthly payments to Series A Preferred

Shareholder in accordance with a ten year amortization (from the date redemption commenced)
at prime rate plus ~ % pursuant to paragraph 1 of the January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement.
(b)

In addition to (and withoutaffe<.1ing the amount of) the regular amortized

payment, Company will accelerate payment of principal by paying Series A Preferred
Shareholder $100,000 al the end of each six-month period beginning at the end of the six-month

period commencing upon full payment to Creditor of the Amended Down Payment Note.
(c)

Series A Preferred Shareholder will be entitled to accelerate the total

redemption obligation with respect to the Series A Preferred Stock upon lapse of thirty (30) days

after default by Company in payment when due of principal or interest on such obligation, unless
Company shall have cured such default within such 30-day period.
2.

Carurcnt to Amended

oown Payment Nr,m;, $6M Note and Secy[icy Therefor.

Series A Prefer.red Shareholder hereby consents to (i) Company's payment of its obligations to
Creditor in accordance with the terms of the Amended Down Payment Note and the Restructure
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Agreement; (ii) Company's payment to Creditor of its obligatioru to Creditor in accordance with
.the terms of the $6M Note, subject however to the subordination provisions of Section 3 hereof;
(iii) the grant of security interests in the Commission Collateral and Pledged Shares to secure

payment of the two notes; and (iv) the possible future pledge of bonds pursuant to Section 10
of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement and the release of security interest in part or all of the
Pledged Shares and the Commission Collateral.

3.

SuJx.u:dinatiQa of Certain l'tincipal Payments tQ Credit.or. Payment of principal

to Creditor on the $6M Note (whether at maturity or at any earlier time in accordance with any

right of prepayment) shall be subordinated to payment in full of Company's obligation to redeem
the Series A Preferred Stock. Company shall not pay any principal on the $6M Notb until the
Series A Preferred Stock is completely redeemed (provided, however, that this limitation shalt

•

not preclude Company from exercising any contractual or equitable right of offset against the
principal of the $6M Note),

4.

Un@ruUtional Release. Series A Preferred Shareholder releases Company and

its subsidiaries; their respective directors, officers, shareholders, employees, affiliate& und other

agents in their official capacities, from all claims arising prior to the date hereof including,
without limitation:
(i)

the assertion of purported dissenter's Tights in connection with certain

transactions between ULIC and The Centennial Life Insurance Companyj
(ii)

all claims against Company which are the subject of the various pleadings

filed on behalf of Series A Preterred Shareholder in her divorce action against Creditor in Case
No. 51087 filed in Nez Perce County, Idaho;
(iii)

any breach of Company's articles of incorpomtion or the terms or

conditions of any of the Letter Agreements;
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any and all claims arising in connection with the Restructure, including

(without limitation) any dissenter's rights in connection therewith; and
(v)

any acts or omissions by Company, its subsidiaries, affiliates, shareholders,

directors, officers, employees or other agents.
5.

A&rccmcnt tQ Eorbr.ar. Notwithstanding the foregoing release, Series A Prefcm:d

Shareholder's rights and protection under Company's articles ofincorporation shall be preserved;

provided, however, that so long as Company has not failed to pay principal or interest for
redemption of the Series A Preferred Stock hereunder when due or within the tbirty·day cure
period provided by Section l(c) hereof, Series A Preferred Shareholder agrees to forbear from

alleging any default under Company's articles of incorporation and further agrees to forbear

from exercising or attempting to exercise any remedy for such default, whether arising from the

•

terms of the articles of incorporation or under legal or equitable principles•
6.

Bsto.ppel Certificate. Serles A Preferred Shareholder acknowledges that> to date,

Company has (i) paid $

principal of it.s obligation to redeem the Series A

Preferred Stock and (ii) has redeemed - - - - - - shares of the 200,000 shares of
Serles A Preferred Stock originally issued to Series A Preferred Shareholder; and Series A

Preferred Shareholder further acknowledges that (iii) the unpaid principal balance of Company's
obligation to redeem the Series A Preferred Stock is

$_______

and (iv)

- - - - - shares of Series A Preferred Stock remain outstanding,

7.

Representations and Wmanties. Serles A Preferred Shareholder represents and

warrants to Company and to Creditor as follows:
(a)

Serles A Prefem:d Shareholder owns beneficially and of record all of the

outstanding Series A Preferred Stock, free and clear of all pledges, liens, cncumb,ranccs, security

interests, equities, claims, options or other limitations on Series A Preferred Shareholder's
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ability to transfer such shares to Company upon payment of the redemption price. Series A
Preferred Shareholder has full right, title and interest in and to the Series A Preferred Stock, and

the legal capacity and authority to execute, deliver and perform this Agreement and the
Restructure Agreement and to consummate the transactions contemplated hereby and thereby.
(b)

Company and Creditor have advised Series A Preferred Shareholder to

consult legal and other professional counsel in connection with this Agreement and the
Restructure Agreement and has had the opportunity to do so. Series A Preferred Shareholder
has consulted such attorneys, accountants, family members and other advisors as she has deemed

necessary or desirable to assist her in reviewing this Agreement and the Restructure Agreement
and in determining whether it is in her best interests to execute and deliver them. Serles A
Preferred Shareholder has read and understands the terms and conditions of this Agreement and

the Restructure Agreement, as well as the Letter Agreements which are being supersede.d and
replaced by this Agreement and the Restructure Agreement. Series A Preferred Shareholder
acknowledges that she has had no contact with Company or any of its directors, officers, legal

counsel or other agents concerning this Agreement or the Restructure Agreement; that this
Agreement

and

the Restructure Agreement have been drafted by counsel for Company and

reviewed by counsel for Creditor; and that neither Company, Creditor nor their respective
counsel have represented Series A Preferred Shareholder in connection herewith or therewith.
Series A Preferred Shareholder acknowledges that her execution and delivery of this Agreement

and the Restructure Agreement have not been obtained by fraud, duress, undue influence,

coercion, breach of fiduciary relationship or breach of relationship of confidence and trust; and
Serles A Preferred Shareholder hereby indemnifies Company against any and all claims that her

execution and delivery of this Agreement or the Restructure Agreement was obtained by any
such means.
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Terms.

All capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings

assigned in the Restructure Agreement.
(b)

This Agreement supersedes any replaces the Letter Agreements in their

entirety. The Letter Agreements shall hereafter have no further force or effect.

(c)

All notices, requests, demands and other conununications which are

required to be or may be given under this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be deemed
to have been duly given when delivered In person or transmitted by telex, facsimile, cable or
telegram, or by certified or registered fmt class mall, postage prepaid, remrn receipt requested.
to the respective parties

as follows:

If to Company, to:

AIA Services Corporation
P.O. Box 538
One Lewis Clark Plaza
Lewiston ID 83501
Attention: John Taylor

With a copy to:

Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &
McKlveen, Chartered
P.O. Box 1368
Boise ID 83701~1368
Attention; Richard A. Riley

H to Creditor to:

With a copy to:

Reed J. Taylor
P.O. Box 1165
Lewiston ID 83501

Cairncross & Hempelmann
70th Floor, Columbia Center
701 Fifth Avenue
S~ttle WA 98104-7016
Attention: W. Frank Taylor

If to Series A Preferred
Shareholder, to:

Donna J. Taylor
c/o

-------
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or to such other address as any party may have furnished to the others in writing in accordance
herewith, except that notices of change of address shall be effective only upon receipt.
Company's payments of its redemption obligation

to

Series A Preferred Shareholder shaJI be

delivered to Series A Preferred Shareholder at her notice address as provided ubove.
(d)

This Agreement and the other Restructure Agreement contain the complete

and final expression of the entire agreement of the parties concerning Company's redemption
of the Series A Preferred Stock. No provision of this Agreement may be amended, modified,
waived, or supplemented, except by a writing signed by all parties to this Agreement.
(e)

This Agreement shall be govemed by, and construed in accordance with,

the Jaws of the State of Idaho, without giving effect to any provisions or principles regarding

conflict of laws.
(f)

Headings used herein are for convenience only and shall not in any way

affect the construction of, or be taken into consideration in interpreting, this Agreement.
(g)

Each provision of this Agreement is interdependent with and inseparable

from every other provision hereof; and each covenant herein is given in consideration of every
other c:Ovenant herein, If any provision of this Agreement is invalid, illegal, unenforceable or
inapplicable to any person or circumstance to which it is intended to be applicable, in whole or
in part, this entire Agreement shall be void.
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BFFBCilVE as of the date first set forth above.
COMPANY:

AJA SERVICES CORPORATION
By _________________

Its:---------

CREDITOR;

REED J, TA VLOR

SERIFS A PREFERRED
SHAREHOLDER:

DONNA TAYLOR

APPROVED:

By~-----~--~--Counsel for Series A
Prefcrred Shareholder
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July 1, 1996
VIA FACSIMILE: 206-587-2308
AND U.S. MAIL
W. Frank Taylor
Caimcross & Hempelmann
70th Floor, Columbia Center
701 Fifth Avenue
Seattle, WA 98104-7016
Re:

AJA Services Corporation

Dear Mr. Taylor:

:J 19.gs
LEGAL Llr:,_ ,•

.

'·

This letter responds to your June 4, 1996 letter, which alleges an additional default
against AIA Services Corporation under the Stock Redemption Agreement between the Company
and Reed J. Taylor and notifies AIA of Mr. Taylor's proposal to pursue strict foreclosure upon
the Pledged Collateral (as defined in the Stock Pledge Agreement) pursuant to Idaho Code §28-9505.
Your June 4, 1996 letter alleges that "the Company's use of funds raised in the Series
C offering for purposes other than the payment of Donna Taylor or Reed Taylor• is a violation
of the agreement between the parties contained in a certain Jetter agreement dated July 18, 1995.
AIA denies this alleged default. The pertinent portion of the July 18, 1995 Letter Agreement,
which applied to the payment of Mr. Taylor's $1.5 million Down Payment Note, states:
Funds received by the corporation from additional sales of Series
C Preferred Stock or new authorized borrowing (or any
combination thereof) in excess of such $1.5 million proceeds of the
Reorganization shall be allocated as follows:
(i)
The first $100,000 shall be paid to Donna Taylor
for reimbursement of professional fees incurred.
(ii)
The next $1.4 million will be paid in equal
amounts, as receive<l, to Donna Taylor and Reed Taylor
until Donna Taylor has been paid $700,000 for redemption

EXHIBIT
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W. Frank Taylor, Esq.
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of her Preferred Stock (in addition to the regular
amortization payment).
(iii)
Thereafter, the next $800,000 shall be paid to Reed
Taylor until Reed Taylor has been paid the full $1.5
million downpayment for redemption of his Common
Stock.

The Company did sell Series C Preferred Stock in excess of the initial 150,000 shares sold for
$1.5 million (or $10 per share) to Messrs. Cashman and Beck, specifically 55,000 shares sold
for $10 per share or $550,000. In addition, the Company's 401 (k) plan purchased 50,000 shares
at $10 per share. The Company then paid off its obligation to First Interstate Bank, thereby
removing the Bank's prior security interest in the Universe stock which is included in the
Pledged Collateral. While we do not believe the 401(k) plan transaction falls within the intent
or purpose of the July 18, 1995 Letter Agreement, we will assume for the sole purpose of this
letter and for analysis of the alleged default that the $500, 000 proceeds of that transaction should
be added to the $550,000 received from the other Series C Preferred Stock purchasers.
In accordance with the July 18, 1995 Letter Agreement, AIA paid $100,000 to Donna
Taylor for professional fees. Mr. Taylor's one-half of the $950,000 balance of the excess Series
C Preferred Stock sale proceeds is $475,000.
During the period in which those proceeds were received, the Company made payments
to or on behalf of Reed Taylor far in excess of that amount. In negotiating the restructure of
the Company's obligations to Mr. Taylor, the parties closely evaluated such payments in cash
and in kind. We have enclosed a schedule of such payments prepared by the Company and a
similar schedule prepared by Reed Taylor and Ernie Dantani. It is readily apparent from Mr.
Taylor's own schedule, without attempting to resolve the different views of the parties on the
exact amount of such payments, that the Company paid Mr. Taylor (or advanced to CAP on his
behalf) over $500,000 of the $1.5 million Down Payment Note obligation covered by the July
18, 1995 Letter Agreement (including cash payments of$180,000 to Mr. Taylor, CAP advances
exceeding $137,000, and the assumption and payment of $172,825 principal and interest on Mr.
Taylor's West One loan). Mr. Taylor is in no position to assert breach of the July 18, 1995
Letter Agreement.
Further, AIA reiterates its denial of defaults under Stock Redemption Agreement, Down
Payment Note, $6M Note or related security agreements which Mr. Taylor has asserted in
previous correspondence. We refer you to our April 25, 1996 and May 3, 1996 letters (copies
enclosed).
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This letter constitutes formal notice to Mr. Taylor that AIA objects, pursuant to Idaho
Code §9-505(2), to Mr. Taylor's proposed retention of the Pledged Collateral in full satisfaction
of $6M Note. AIA requires that Mr. Taylor fully comply with the requirements of Idaho Code
§28-9-504 concerning the disposition of the Pledged Collateral, including (without limitation)
giving AIA Services formal and commercially reasonable notice of any and all proposed sales
of Pledged Collateral, and advertising and selling the Pledged Collateral in a "commercially
reasonable manner.•
As your client is well aware, the value of the Pledged Collateral greatly exceeds the
obligations owed to him by AIA. This value is evidenced by the annual appraisals of the
Company which are obtained for purposes of the AIA Employee Stock Ownership Plan. The
preliminary appraisal value of the Company as of December 31, 1995, net of all liabilities
including the Company's obligations to Mr. Taylor, exceeds $2.S million. The principal
component of this value is the value of the Company's subsidiary, AIA Insurance, Inc.
Information supporting the long-tenn value of AIA Insurance, Inc. in substantial excess of
amounts due to Mr. Taylor are contained in the private placement memorandum approved by
Mr. Taylor, in his capacity as a Director of the Company, in connection with sales of
Company's Series C Preferred Stock. AIA has a material interest in ensuring that the Pledged
Collateral is sold for its fair market value so that the Company's equity in its operating
subsidiaries is preserved.
It is incumbent upon Mr. Taylor to conduct, and prove that he conducted, a
"commercially reasonable" sale of the Pledged Collateral. See Idaho Code §28-9-504 and §28-9507; Rotta v. Early Industrial Corporation, 47 Wash. App. 21, 733 P.2d 576, 578 (1987).
Whether a sale has been conducted in a "commercially reasonable" manner is a question of fact;
and the courts have consistently held creditors to a high standard in meeting this burden. The
Idaho Court of Appeals, in Deutz-Allis Credit Corp. v. Logging, 121 Idaho 247, 824 P.2d 178,
184-185 (Ct.App. 1992), addressed some of the factors the court considers to determine whether
the creditor has held a "commercially reasonable" sale. Following Idaho Code §9-504(3), the
court reiterated that "every aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place
and terms must be commercially reasonable." M.. In determining whether the creditor has
complied with these requirements, the court will consider whether the sale was conducted in a
place or market in which prospective bidders were reasonably expected to attend or bid, whether
bidding was competitive, and whether the price obtained was commensurate with the value of
the collateral as estimated by various experts. Id..

\

The court in Rorta vs. Early Industrial Corporation, fil!l!Ul, dealt with the sale of stock
certificates and set forth applicable factors in more detail. The court quoted the Washington
Supreme Court in Foster v. Knutson, 84 Wash.2d 838, 549, 527 P.2d 1108 (1974):
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The sale is valid where notice of the sale is (1) given to the
defaulted debtor and to the public sufficiently in advance to allow
interested bidders a reasonable opportunity to participate, (2) given
to a "public" reasonably expected to have an interest in the
collateral to be sold and notifying the public of the exact time of
sale and place of sale, reasonably convenient to potential bidders,
(3) sufficiently replete with information describing the collateral to
be sold and the amount of the obligation for which it is being sold
to allow potential bidders a genuine opportunity to make an
informed judgment as to whether to bid at the sale, and (4)
published in a manner reasonably calculated to assure such
publicity that the collateral will bring the best possible price from
the competitive bidding of a strived-for lively concourse of
bidders.
The appellate court continued:
Other factors may include the relationship of the price obtained to
the recognized market price, if any; conformity of the sale to
commercially accepted standards; presence of a recognized market
and its utilization in the sale; and the overall reasonableness of
means and methods of disposition under the circumstances.
The Washington court held that the creditor had failed to sustain its burden of showing a
commercially reasonable sale, finding that the creditor failed to make efforts to reach segments
of the public reasonably expected to have an interest in bidding, and failed to engage in any
analysis to determine a fair market price for the collateral.
Unlike a typical UCC financing in which the collateral consists of goods for which a
ready market exists, the Pledged Collateral which secures AIA's obligation to Mr. Taylor
consists of the stock of AIA 's operating subsidiaries, principally AIA Insurance, Inc., a general
insurance agency and third party administrator, and The Universe Life Insurance Company, an
Idaho domestic insurance company which has certificates of authority in 25 states and whollyowns Great Fidelity Life Insurance Company, an Indiana domestic insurance company.
Although currently under regulatory oversight, the two insurance companies have residual value
in their respective certificates of authority to transact insurance business in various states and
in the income stream from ex.isting blocks of insurance business and reinsurance contracts.
Further, as you know, AIA Insurance is the designated insurance agent of record and the third
party administrator for several multi-state farm commodity and farm-related associations which
sponsor insurance products marketed by AJA Insurance. AIA Insurance has developed a
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specialized niche market for its products, a market which is now a multi-state regional market
and has growth potential to expand into all agricultural commodity-producing areas of the
country. As established by the Company's efforts to obtain additional capitalization over the
past few years, the market for the Pledged Collateral consists of relatively large investors with
an interest in acquiring a regional farm-related insurance marketing and distribution network
and/or insurance companies with certificates of authority in agricultural states.
To target these potential investors and to properly market and sell the Pledged Collateral
in a "commercially reasonable manner" will require substantial effort on Mr. Taylor's part,
including retention of an investment banker or other broker knowledgeable and experienced in
buying and selling regional and national insurance companies and agencies; careful evaluation
of the fair market value of the operating subsidiaries, through insurance industry experts and/or
expert business appraisers; development of an appropriate, complete and accurate prospectus for
AJA 's operating subsidiaries; negotiating with prospective buyers for the stock of those
subsidiaries; and compliance with applicable securities and insurance regulatory requirements.
Absent such measures, neither a public sale (whether or not Mr. Taylor bids in the amount of
the Company's debt to him) nor a private sale to a third party for an amount substantially less
than the Company's appraised value would be commercially reasonable.
As you are further aware, failure to conduct the sale of the Pledged Collateral in a
commercially reasonably manner would expose Mr. Taylor to Ji~bility for substantial damages
to AIA and its owners. The courts have consistently allowed debtors to recover damages from
creditors who foreclose on collateral in a commercially un.-easonable manner. See Blaine Bank
of Montana v. Haugen, 858 P.2d 14, 18 (Mt. 1993); Lamb Bros., Inc. v. Fin.t State Bank, 589
P.2d 1094, 1101 (Or. 1979).
Since the Company has not defaulted on its obligations to Mr. Taylor, any attempt by
Mr. Taylor to sell or retain the Pledged Collateral would constitute conversion. Even if the
Company were in default, Mr. Taylor should be aware that the Company insists on his strict
adherence to the commercial reasonableness standards applicable upon any attempt to foreclose
on the Pledged Collateral.
ry
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W. Fiank Taylor

Caimcross & Hempe.lmann
70th Floor, Columbia Center
701 Fifth Avenue
Seattle, WA
Re.:

98104·7016
AlA Services Co:rporation

Reed Taylor Restructure Agreement

Dear Prank:
Enclosed are revised drafts of the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement, the

Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreemc:nt and the Amended and Restated Security
Agreement, highlighted to show changes from the July 3, 1996 drafts. These revi.sc:d drafts
incorporate my understanding of the agreements reached by the parties in our telephone
conference on JuJy 3, 1996 and your handwritten comments which I n:ceived by fax this
morning. Also enclosed is a handwritten markup of the letter agreement with Mark Twain
Bank. As you point out, if Mark Twain Banlc turns out to be the depository for the Collateral
Account, the letter agreement provisions can be incorporated into the Lock: Box Agreement.
Give me a call on Monday after you have a chance to review the enclosures.

RAR:s
Enclosures
cc:

R. John Taylor w/encls.
Daniel L. Spickler w/encls.
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STOCK REDEMPTION RESTRUCTURE AGREEMENT
This Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement ("Agreement") is made and entered into as
of the 1st day of July, 1996, by and among AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation ("Company"), REED J. TAYLOR ("Creditor11 ) and DONNA J. TAYLOR ("Series A
Preferred Shareholder").
RECITALS:
A.
Company is the parent holding company and owner of all of the capital stock of AIA
Insurance, Inc_ ("AIAI"), Farmers Health Alliance Administrators, Inc. ("Farmers"), and The
Universe Life Insurance Company, an Idaho domestic insurance company ("Universe") (other than
certain shares held by directors of Universe as required by law). Great Fidelity Life Insurance
Company, a stock life insurance company domiciled in Indiana ("Great Fidelity"), is a whollyowned subsidiary of Universe. Company, AIAI, Farmers, Universe and Great Fidelity are
collectively referred to herein as the "Companies".
B.
Pursuant to that certain Stock Redemption Agreement between Company and
Creditor dated July 22, 1995, as amended by that certain Addendum to Stock Redemption
Agreement also dated July 22, 1995 (together, the "Stock Redemption Agreement"), all of Creditor's
shares of common stock of Company were redeemed.
C.
As part consideration ofthe redemption and Creditor's execution of a Noncompetition
Agreement dated July 22, 1995 ("Noncompetition Agreement"), Company:: (i) executed a
promissory note dated July 22, 1995 payable to Creditor in the principal amount of $1,500,000 (the
"Down Payment Note"), which Down Payment Note became due and payable in full by its terms
on October 21, 1995; (ii) executed a promissory note dated August 1, 1995 payable to Creditor in
the principal amount of $6,000,000 (the "$6M Note"), which $6M Note was secured by (a) that
c.ertain Stock Pledge Agreement dated July 22, 1995 ("Stock Pledge Agreement") granting Creditor
a security interest in all of the shares of capital stock held by Company in Universe, AIAI, Farmers
and, in the event of a distribution of such shares to Company, Great Fidelity (the "Pledged Shares"),
and (b) that certain Security Agreement dated July 22, 1995 ("Security Agreement"). granting
Creditor a security interest in all commissions from the sale of insurance or related services by or
on behcilf ot: or payable to, the Companies (the "Commission Collateral"); and (iii) agreed to pay
Creditor a salary equal to $20,000 per month until the Down Payment note is paid in full. Company
and Creditor also entered into a Consulting Agreement dated July 22, 1995 ("Consulting
Agreement"), pursuant to which Creditor is entitled to receive $12,250 per month for a period of
three (3) years following the payment in full of the Down Payment Note. The Stock Redemption
Agreement, the Down Payment Note, the $6M Note, the Security Agreement, the Stock Pledge
Agreement, the Consulting Agreement and the N oncompetition Agreement are collectively referred
to herein as the "Original Documents". The Original Documents other than the $6M Note are
collectively referenced herein as the "Superseded Documents".

,

('.;.~•~
•..· ~
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D.
By letters dated April 18, 1996, April 25, 1996 and June 4, 1996 (collectively, the
''Notice of Default"), Creditor gave Company formal notice of numerous alleged defaults under the
Original Documents, including but not limited to; (i) the failure to pay the Down Payment Note
when due; (ii) the failure to make interest payments under the $6M Note; (iii) the failure to provide
adequate financial information and to comply with various financial covenants in violation of the
Page I
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Stock Redemption Agreement, (iv) the failure to pay Creditor's attorneys' fees as required by the
Stock Redemption Agreement, (v) the failure to comply with certain requirements of the Security
Agreement regarding the establishment and control of a Commission Collateral account, and (vi)
the failure to pay funds raised in the course of the Company's "Series C" preferred stock offering to
Creditor as required by agreement among Company, Creditor and Series A Preferred Shareholder.
Company disputes each ofthese allegations of default

E.

The parties now wish to restructure the stock redemption transaction by (i) adjusting
the principal amount of the Down Payment Note, extending its maturity date, providing for interest
to accrue on the principal balance of the Down Payment Note, requiring monthly payments of
principal and interest under the Down Payment Note, and providing security for the payment of the
Down Payment Note; (ii) tenninating the Consulting Agreement, revising the Noncompetition
Agreement, and tenninating the Company's obligation to pay Creditor a monthly salary; (iii)
amending the terms of the Security Agreement and the Stock Pledge Agreement; and (iv) revising
certain representations, warranties and covenants contained in the Stock Redemption Agreement;
and (v) simplifying and consolidating the various default provisions and remedies therefor. In
exchange for this restructuring of the Company's obligations to Creditor, Creditor is willing to agree
to waive, and to forebear from exercising any remedies he may have for, any existing defaults under
the Original Documents, including (without limitation) those defaults alleged in the Notice of
Default.

•

F.
SeriesAPreferred Shareholder is the holder of all of the shares of Company's Series
A Stated Value Preferred Stock. Pursuant to (i) Company's Articles of Incorporation and (ii) that
certain letter agreement among the parties hereto and Cumer L. Green ("Green") dated January 11,
1995, as amended by (a) that certain letter from Green to Richard A Riley ("Riley") dated March
22, 1995, (b) that certain letter agreement ainong the parties, Green and Richard W. ·Campanaro
dated July 18, 1995. (c) that certain letter from Green to Riley dated August 10, 1995, and (d) that
c.ertain letter from Creditor to Series A Preferred Shareholder dated April 16, 1996 (collectively, the
"Series A Preferred Shareholder Letter Agreements"), the parties thereto agreed that Series A
Preferred Shareholder would have her stock in Company redeemed in accordance with a specified
payment plan, and that certain payments to Creditor under the Original Documents would be
subordinated to the Company's obligation to pay.Series A Preferred Shareholder. Concurrent with
this Agreement. Creditor, Company and Series A Preferred Shateholder have entered into a new
agreemEil'lt ("Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement") which supersedes and replaces the Series
A Preferred Shareholder Letter Agreements_
G.
It is the intention of the parties that this Agreement will supersede and replace the
Stock Redemption Agreement with respect to any and all representations, warranties and covenants
which were made in the Original Documents and which survived the closing of the stock redemption
transaction, and that neither Creditor nor Company will have any right to claim default under any
of the Original Documents (as they may be amended by this Agreement) merely because any such
representation, warranty or covenant was or in the future becomes false or unperformed. The parties
wish to rely entirely upon those representations, warranties and covenants contained in the Amended
Stock Pledge Agreement (as defined below). All such representations, warranties and covenants
shall be deemed to have been made on the date of this Agreement

AGREEMENTS
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In consideration of the mutual ·promises contained herein and other good and valuable
consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties agree:
1.

Restructure of Red~mption Ai:reement.

1.1
Amended and Restated Down Payment Note. Concurrent with its execution of this
Agreement, Company shall execute an Amended and Restated Down Payment Note ("Amended
Down Payment Note") in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A; and the original note shall be
marked "Amended, Restated, Superseded and Replaced". The Amended Down Payment Note shall
adjust the principal amount of the Down Payment Note to $1,500,000. The principal amount of the
Amended Down Payment Note is hereby acknowledged by the Company to reflect all payments
made by Company with respect to, and all offsets which Company may claim against, such note as
of the date of this Agreement, and any other liabilities Creditor may have to Company (other than
liabilities arising from claims by third parties and liabilities arising under this Agreement or any of
the other Restructured Obligations). In addition, the principal amount of the Amended Down
Payment Note is hereby acknowledged by Creditor to include all amounts (or the present value
thereof) now due or to become due from Company to Creditor under the Original Documents and
all other claims of Creditor against Company whatsoever as of the date of this Agreement, other than
the obligations arising under this Agreement or the other Restructured Obligations. The Amended
Down Payment Note shall bear interest at the rate of9.5% per annum (14% while in default), and
shall entitle Creditor to monthly payments of principal and interest in the amount of $33, 750 per
month, payable on the first day of each month commencing August I, 1996 and continuing until
such Note is paid in full. The entire balance of principal and accrued but unpaid interest on the
Amended Down Payment Note shall be due and payable on October 31, 1996. The monthly
payment of principal and interest on the Amended Down Payment Note shall be secured by the
Commission Collateral as provided in the Amended and Restated Security Agreement (as defined
below); and all obligations of Company under the Amended Down Payment Note shall be secured
by the Pledged Shares as provided in the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement (as defined below).
1.2
Amended and Restated Security Agreement. Concurrent with the execution of this
Agreement, Company and Creditor shall execute an Amended and Restated Security Agreement
("Amended Security Agreement") in the fonn attached hereto as Exhibit B; and Company shall
execute such financing statements and other similar documents necessary to penect Credito~s
securitj·interest granted pursuant to the Amended Security Agreement. The Amended Security
Agreement shall provide that the Commission Collateral is security only for the payment of monthly
installments of principal and interest under the Amended Down Payment Note and for monthly
installments of interest under the $6M Note. Creditor, Company and the depository institution at
which the Collateral Account (as defined in the Amended Security Agreement) is established shall,
on or before the date ofthis Agreement, enter into an Escrow Agreement in the form attached thereto
as Exhibit C ("Escrow Agreement").
1.3
Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement. Concurrent with the execution of
this Agreement, the parties shall enter into an Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement
("Amended Stock Pledge Agreement") in the form attached hereto as Exhibit D.
1. 4
Termination ofEmployment. Termination of Consulting Agreement and Amendment
of Noncompetition Agreement. Effective as of the date of this Agreement, the parties hereby
terminate the Consulting Agreement In addition, Creditor's employment by Company and
Page 3
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Company's obligation to pay Creditor a salary is terminated effective as of the last day of the month
preceding the month in which this Agreement is executed. Concurrent with the execution of this
Agreement, Creditor and Company shall enter into an Amended and Restated Noncompetition
Agreement ("Amended Noncompetition Agreement") in the form attached hereto as Exhibit E.
l. 5
Amendment to Certain Rqlresentations. Warranties and Covenants of Company. The
representations, warranties and covenants made by Company in the Stock Redemption Agreement
or any other Original Document are hereby superseded and replaced by the representations,
warranties and covenants set forth in the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement; and neither Company
nor Creditor shall have any claim for any past, existing or future breach of any representation,
warranty or covenant made in any of the Superseded Documents or any claim for any breach of the
$6M Note if such breach occurred prior to the date of this Agreement.
1.6
Payment of Attorneys' Fees. Concurrent with the execution of this Agreement,
Company shall have entered into a written agreement with Creditor ("Attorney Fee Reimbursement
Agreement") to make periodic installment payments to Creditor's attorneys, Caimcross &
Hempelmann, in addition to any other payments described herein, in accordance with the schedule
attached hereto as Schedule 1.6, to reimburse Creditor for his attorneys' fees incurred prior to the
date of this Agreement in connection with the consummation of and enforcement of the Company's
obligations pursuant to the stock redemption transaction and the drafting of the Restructured
Obligations.

•

1. 7
Office Lease. Concurrent with the execution of this Agreement, Company shall enter
into a lease in the form of Exhibit F attached hereto with Reed J. Taylor and Advantage Insurance
Agency, Inc. ("Advantage") for the office space currently occupied by Advantage, on the ground
floor ofthe building known as One Lewis Clark Plaza, on terms acceptable to the partieS. The lease
shall provide for the payment of monthly rent in the amount of $1500 and shall be for a term
commencing on the date of this Agreement and continuing until the date which is six (6) months
from the date on which the Amended Down Payment Note is paid in full.
1.8
Agreement with Series A Preferred Shareholder. Concurrent with the execution of
this Agreement, Company and Creditor shall have entered into the Series A Preferred Shareholder
Agreement in the form attached hereto as Exhibit G. Such Agreement shall supersede and replace
all of tlie Series A Preferred Shareholder Letter Agreements.
1.9
Definition of Restructured Obligations. "Restructured Obligations" shall mean this
Agreement, the Amended Down Payment Note, the $6M Note, the Amended Security Agreement,
the Esaow Agreement, the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, and the Amended Noncompetition
Agreement.
2.
Additional Conditions to Restructure. On or before the date of execution of this
Agreement, and as a condition to Creditor's waiver of default and agreement to forbear from
exercising remedies under the Original Docµments, the following shall have occun-ed:
2.1
Delivery of Universe Certificates. First Interstate Bank shall have delivered to
Creditor any and all original stock certificates representing capital stock of Universe constituting
Pledged Shares.
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2.2
Establishment of Collateral Account. Company's subsidiary, AIA Insurance, Inc.
(" AIAI"), shall have established the Collateral Account; and Company, AIAI, Creditor and the
depository institution at which the Collateral Account is established shall have entered into the
Escrow Agreement In addition, AIAI shall have provided written instructions to Mark Twain
Kansas Bank ("Bank") which provide that Bank shall, in accordance with currently effective
instructions and procedures, transfer to the Collateral Account all Commission Collateral deposited
into Account No. 8613004124 at such Bank. Further, Company, AIAI, Creditor and Bank shall have
entered into an agreement which provides that (i) Bank shall immediately notify Creditor of its
receipt of any (a) instruction by AIAI or Company to take any action which would interrupt or
redirect the flow of Commission Collateral into Account No. 86513004124 from any other account
at Bank or the transfer of Commission Collateral from such Account to the Collateral Account, or
(b) request by AIAI or Company to amend that certain lock.box agreement (the "Centennial Lockbox
Agreement") dated June I, 1995 among AIAI, Universe, The Centennial Life Insurance Company
("Centennial") and Bank, or any notice or instruction delivered to Bank pursuant thereto, or (c)
request by AIAI or Company to move existing bank accounts or establish new bank accounts under
the Centennial Lock Box Agreement; and (ii) Bank shall not implement any such instruction or
request until the lapse of thirty (30) days from delivery of such notice by Bank to Creditor or Bank's
earlier receipt of Creditor's written consent to such instruction or request.
2.3
Payment of Felts Field Bill. Company shall have paid Felts Field Aviation, Inc. the
sum of$15,968.83, which sum constitutes one-half(~) of the total amount claimed by Felts Field
as of July 1, 1996 for repairs to the airplane sold to Creditor pursuant to the stock redemption
transaction Creditor shall be responsible for the payment of the balance of the Felts Field bills; and
Creditor hereby agrees to indemnify Company from and against any and all claims made by Felts
Field relating to the Felts Field bills. In the event Company is sued by Felts Field with respect to any
Felts Field bill, Company may offset any payments it makes to Felts Field and any litigation
expenses incurred by Company in defending such claim against the principal balance of the
Amended Down Payment Note or (if the Amended Down Payment Note has been paid off prior to
such offset) the $6M Note.
Vesting of Protected Agents. Each insurance agent listed on Schedule 2.4 was
2.4
formerly ao agent of one of the Companies, is now an agent of Advantage Insurance Agency Inc.,
and is now and will remain a "Protected Agent" unless and until such agent loses his Protected
Agent status as provided herein. On or before payment in full of the Amended Down Payment Note,
Company shall pay Creditor the difference between such agent's vested percentage of earned
commissions on insurance policies sold by such agent prior to the date of this Agreement and one
hundred percent {100%) of such earned commissions attributable to the period between Company's
termination of such agent and the date of this Agreement. In addition, for so long as such agent
retains Protected Agent status after the date of this Agreement, Company shall pay Creditor the
difference between such agent's vested percentage of earned commissions on insurance policies sold
by such agent prior to the date of this Agreement and one hundred percent (100%) of such earned
commissions. Such agent shall lose his Protected Agent status, and Company's payments to Creditor
hereunder shall cease:

·~·
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(a)
immediately if such agent breaches his agency agreement with Company,
including (without limitation) breach of his agency agreement by "rolling" any policy on which one
ofthe Companies is receiving premium or a commission; provided, however, that loss of Protected
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Agent status of any such agent shall not affect any obligation of Company to pay override
commissions to any other agent relating to any rolled policy; or
(b)
immediately if such agent becomes an agent of AIA Insurance, Inc on or
before October 31, 1996; or

(c)
the date of termination of his agency relationship with Advantage if such
agent's relationship with Advantage is terminated for any reason. Creditor covenants and agrees to
notify Company promptly upon termination of any Protected Agent by Advantage.
2.5
Lump Sum Payment. Upon execution of this Agreement, Company shall pay
Creditor the sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000), and shall deliver a bill of sale in the form
attached hereto as Schedule 2.5 for furniture, fixtures and equipment now located on the premises
currently leased to Advantage. The parties intend that this bill of sale shall replace in its entirety the
bill of sale delivered to Creditor at the original closing of the redemption transaction.
3.
Mutual Release. Each of Companies and Creditor hereby releases the other from any and
all claims (whether known or unknown, anticipated or unanticipated, contingent or liquidated) such
party may have arising out of previous agreements (including, without limitation, the Original
Documents) or other business arrangement between Company and Creditor or arising out of
Creditor's ownership of or employment by Company prior to the date of this Agreement, other than
those obligations set forth in the Restructured Obligations. Specifically excluded from this mutual
release, however, are unknown claims that might arise out of claims by third parties~ provided that
this exclusion shall not apply to claims against Company by Donna Taylor except to the extent such
claims are based on acts or omissions by Creditor. In particular, Company and Creditor hereby
release each other from any obligations arising out of the payment of expenses associated with the
CAP Program (as defined in the Stock Redemption Agreement), and Company hereby releases
Advantage from any such obligations, except to the extent that such obligations are reflected in the
adjustments made to the principal balance of the Amended Down Payment Note. Except as such
amounts are reflected in the adjustments made to the principal balance of the Amended Down
Payment Note, Creditor releases Company from any liability for the payment of overdue or default
interest for any period prior to the effective date of this Agreement. Company and Creditor ,agree
that all currently existing monetary obligations between Company and Creditor are reflected in the
Amended Down Payment Note and the $6M Note, and Company has no right to future offsets
against either note for any monetary obligations arising prior to the date of this Agreement.

4.

General Provisions.

4.1
Capacity in Which Series A Preferred Shareholder is Signing: Consent to
Transaction. Series A Preferred Shareholder is a party to this Agreement for the purpose of
expressing her consent to and approval of the terms of this Agreement and the accuracy of the
representations made by her in this Section 4.1, and not as a direct beneficiary of the terms hereof,
and she shall have no right arising solely out of this Agreement to e~orce, or to seek any remedy
for the breach of, any of the terms of this Agreement. Rather, her rights shall be governed by the
Company's Articles of Incorporation and the terms of the Series A Preferred Shareholder
Agreement. Series A Preferred Shareholder represents and warrants to Company and to Creditor
that she has been advised to consult, and has had the opportunity to consult, with independent legal
counsel regarding this Agreement and the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement, that she has
Page6
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read and fully understands the terms of this Agreement and the Series A Preferred Shareholder
Agreement, and that she consents to and approves the terms hereof and thereof: including but not
limited to Company's agreement to pay Creditor in accordance with the terms of the Amended Down
Payment Note and the $6M Note (subject, however, to the subordination provisions of the Series
A Preferred Shareholder Agreement).

4.2
or effect.

StatusofSupgsededPocuments. The Superseded Documents are of no further force

43
Waiver; Forbearance. Creditor hereby waives any and all defaults alleged in the
Notice of Default or which could have been alleged under the Original Documents prior to the
effective date of this Agreement, and further agrees to forbear from exercising any remedy he may
have had for any such default under the Original Documents.

•
.

4.4
Amendments and Waivers. The provisions ofthis Agreement may be amended only
by the written agreement of Company, Series A Preferred Shareholder and Creditor. Except as
otherwise provided herein, any waiver, permit, consent or approval of any kind or character on the
part of either Company, Series A Preferred Shareholder or Creditor of any provision or condition
of this Agreement must be made in writing and shall be effective only to the extent specifically set ..
forth in such writing. No action taken pursuant to this Agreement, including any investigation by
or on behalf of either Company, Series A Preferred Shareholder or Creditor, shall be deemed to
constitute a waiver by the party taking such action of compliance with any representation, warranty,
covenant or agreement contained herein. The waiver by either Company, Series A Preferred
Shareholder or Creditor of a breach of any provision of this Agreement shall not operate or be
construed as a waiver of any subsequent breach.

4.5
Governing Law. The validity, meaning and effect of this Agreement shall be
determined in accordance with the laws of the State ofidaho.
4.6

Entire Agreement. This Agreement, including the exhibits hereto, and the ancillary

documents expressly referred to herein, constitute the entire agreement of the pai:ties concerning the
matters referred to herein and ~upersede all prior agreements and understandings, oral or written,
all of which are hereby superseded and canceled.

4.7
Execution in Countewarts. This Agreement may be executed in any number of
counterparts, each of which when so executed and delivered shall be deemed an original, and such
counterparts together shall constitute one instrument.
EFFECTIVE as of the date first set forth above.
COMPANY:

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION

CREDITOR:

REED J. TAYLOR

Page?
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SERIES A PREFERRED
SHAREHOLDEK

DONNA TAYLOR

~M-~:/vv

•

(i.'
,,
('"' .
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SCHEDULE 1.6
CAIRN CROSS & HEMPELMANN AITORNEY FEE
REIMBURSEMENT SCHEDULE

nv€
~'left

(5)
(l!T installments of $5,000 each payable directly by Company to Cairncross &

Hempelmann commencing upon the first payment due to Creditor under the Amended Down

U-f C-- ti..<..

Payment Note
1

&. --h

pu
~

+.

'~

EXHIBIT

(f.

/··

,3(}
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LETTER AGREEMENT

July 1, 1996

Reed J. Taylor
One Lewis Clark Plaza
Lewiston ID 83501
Re~

Reimbursement of Attorneys' Fees

Pursuant to Section 1.6 of the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement dated as of July 1,
1996 ("Agreement") among AIA Services Corporation ("Company"), Reed J Taylor ("Creditor")
and Donna J. Taylor, Company agrees to pay directly to Caimcross & Hempelmann, on behalf of

•

Creditor, attorney fees incurred by Creditor prior to the date hereof in connection with the
consummation of and enforcement of Company's obligations pursuant to the stock redemption
transaction and the drafting of the Restructured Obligations (as defined in the Agreement); provided
that such fees shall not exceed $55,000 and shall be payable in accordance with Schedule L6
attached to the Agreement.
COMPANY:

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION

By

71~<\M

R. John Taylor, CEO

CREDITOR:

EXHIBIT

31
Page IO
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SCHEDIJLE 2.4

PROTECTED AGENTS

JeflY Legg
AIYiS Johnson

Buddy <=addeU
Randy Alexander

GaiyModrell
Ronnie Wiiiams
Charleen Lenz

•

"':;;
.\!
!!'

.!i
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SCHEDULE 2 .5
BILL OF SALE

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

!~fl
EFFECTIVE as of the :t51=h day of August, 1995, AIA INSURANCE,

INC., an Idaho corporation ("Transferor"), for good and valuable
consideration given in that certain Stock Redemption Agreement
between Transferor and Transferee dated July 22,

1995

("Stock

Redemption Agreement"}, the receipt and legal sufficiency of which
is hereby acknowledged, does by these presents grant, bargain, sell
and convey unto REED J.

TAYLOR

("Transferee")

the CAP Program

Tangible Property itemized on Exhibit "A", attached hereto and by
this reference made a part hereof as if set forth in full ("CAP

•

Program Tangible Property"), TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the CAP Program
Tangible

Property

to

Transferee,

his

successors

and

assigns

forever.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Transferor has executed this Bill of

Sale as of the day and year first above written.

,,

·

I

1

AIA INSURANCE I -IN/

I <ft-'
IrI __J,---1.-·
C, ~-( / \

R.'Jdhn Taylor,{fresident

Pursuant to the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement, to which this Sched~le 2.5 is
attached, Exhibit A to this original Bill of Sale with preparation date of 8/11/95 shall
be replaced by Exhibit A with preparation date of 7/15/96 and the furniture, fixture &
equipment inventory as set forth shall be sold and conveyed to Reed J. Taylor.
DATED this 23d day of July, 1996.

EXHIBIT

3q
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Prepared by Brian Peters 8/11/95

-

CAP FURNITURE, FIXTURE & EQUIPMENT INVENTORY

Adding Machines:

2

1

Sharp El2192G
El2630A
" " VX1652
" .. VX2652

Bookcases:

1

40"x42" wood

Chairs:

2
1

1
3

Ergonomic - blue high back
Manager - blue
- brown wf chrome anns
- brown leather
Secretarial - black
- blue
- burgandy
"
- grey
" - oranoe

Filing cabinets:

1
1
1
1

2 drawer vertical - beige
lateral" - sand
4 drawer lateral - black
4 drawer vertical legal size - tJta:ck brown

Steel shelving:

4

24"x36" 6 shelf units - grey

Storage racks:

1

48"x60" literature rack

1
4

24"x60" Orange laminate top
30"x60" Wood grain laminate top w/ pencil drawers

1

IBM Wheelwriter 6 ( # 22013)

2

1-

1
1
1

1
*~

Tables:

.
.

.

..
.

.
..
.

Typewriters:

Workstations:

10

Knoll - standard modular workstations

I 30x60 wooden desk
1 wheel cart
1 2' x 6' credenza

&

desk

Reed Taylor's office fUnliture

Conputers:
1 Cool.Pac Contura 3/25C (w/ rronitor
1 Dell P75
1 Packard Bell 486/66
6 386 notebooks (various)
1 HP Series II Laserjet printer
1 Panasonic FX-P4410 printer
1 3 I printer table

&

keyboard)

* one burgandy chair to be of transferor's choice
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Prepared by Brian Peters 7/15/96

CAP FURNITURE, FIXTURE & EQUIPMENT INVENTORY

2
1
1

Sharp EL2192G
EL2630A
VX1652
" " VX2652

1

40"x42" wood

Adding Machines: 2

Bookcases:

Ergonomic - blue high back
Manager - blue
" - brown w/ chrome arms
" - brown leather
Secretarial - black
1
" - blue
2
" - burgandy
1
" - grey
3
" - orange
* Plus one burgandy chair of transferor's choice

Chairs:

2
1
1
1
1

Filing cabinets:

1
1

1

2 drawer vertical - beige
" - sand
4 drawer lateral - black
4 drawer vertical legal size - black

Steel shelving:

4

24"x36" 6 shelf units - grey

Storage racks:

1

48"x60" literature rack

Tables:

1
4

24"x60" Orange laminate top
30"x60" Wood grain laminate top w/ pencil drawers
3' Printer table
IBM Wheelwriter 6 ( # 6747-11-6111145)

1

Typewriter:
Computers:

1
1

1
1
1
6

1
1

Officer's set (ensemble from 2nd floor)

Reed's office
Ernie's office

1
1
3
4

Single oak secretary desk
Officer's set - Matching desk, credenza and book case
High-back brown leather chair
24" square end table
Burgandy side chairs w/ dark wood arms
White laminated storage lockers

2

Literature storage racks - 24 bin

1

1

Mailing area

ComPac Contura 3/25C (w/ monitor & keyboard)
Dell P75
Packard Bell 486/66
386 Notebooks (various)
HP Series II Lasejet printer
Panasonic FX-P4410 printer

002319
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1

2
Jud/Diane

1
1

1
1
2

•

-----------~---~

-------------- - - - - - -

- ------ ---- -

Prepared by Brian Peters 7/15/96

•

8' Folding table
Grey wing desk
Salmon colored side chairs w/ golden oak arms
Single oak manager's desk
Single oak secretary desk w/ computer keyboard tray
Cylindrical plant stand oak laminate w/ plant
Oak right-hand wing desk
Salmon colored side chairs w/ golden oak arms

Lil's station

Oak laminate supervisor's station
Typing stand wt plywood top
Single oak secretary desk
TAB 2 shelf storage cabinet
Salmon colored side chairs w/ golden oak arms

Paige

Oak right-hand wing desk
Salmon colored side chairs w/ golden oak arms
TAB 2 shelf storage cabinet

Diane Shaul

Oak computer table (Being used as coffee station)
Oak right-hand wing desk
Salmon colored side chairs w/ golden oak arms
TAB 2 shelf storage cabinet

Katie

Oak right-hand wing desk
Salmon colored side chairs w/ golden oak arms

Selina

Oak right-hand wing desk
Salmon colored side chairs w/ golden oak arms

Typing station/
Misc.

1
1
1
1
1

y~
'\~

Salmon colored side chairs w/ golden oak arms
Single oak secretary desk
30"x60" wood grain top table w/ pencil drawer
30"x1 o· grey laminate work table
30"x48" grey laminate work table (FAX stand)

002320
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AMENDED AND RESTATED PROMISSORY NOTE

July 1, 1996

$1,500,000

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, AIA Services Corporation, an; Idaho corporation
(''Company"), hereby promises to pay to the order of Reed J. Taylor ("Payee") the principal sum of
One Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,500,000) together with accrued interest on the
unpaid principal balance from the date hereof at a per annum rate equal to nine and one-half percent
(9.5%)..

This Note is the Amended Down Payment Note referred to in the Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement of even date herewith among Company, Creditor and Donna Taylor (the
"Agreement"). Terms used but not defined herein have the meaning given to them in the
Agreement. This Note is secured by the Amended Security Agreement and the Amended Stock
Pledge Agreement, to which reference is made for a description of the collateral subject thereto.
This Note amends, restates, supersedes and replaces that certain Promissory Note made by
Company to Payee dated July 22, 1995 (the "Original Note"), and evidences the continued, adjusted
debt obligation of Company incurred in connection with the redemption of Payee's ownership
interest in Company pursuant to the Agreement. Upon execution of this Note, Payee will clearly
marlctheOriginalNote"AMENDED, RESTATED, SUPERSEDED AND REPLACED" and return
it to Company.
This Note shall be paid in equal installments of principal and accrued interest in the amount
of Thirty-Three Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($33,750) on the first day of each month
commencing August 1, 1996, with the entire balance of unpaid principal and accrued 1nterest due
and payable on October 31, 1996 at the address of Payee to which notices are to be sent under the
Agreement, or at such other place as the holder hereof shall designate in writing.
This Note may be prepaid without penalty. Reference is made to the Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement for the provisions defining a default under this Note and the remedies therefor. In the
event of such a default, the unpaid balance of principal and interest of this Note shall incur interest
at the lesser of fourteen percent (14%) or the highest rate permitted by applicable law. It is
expressly understood and agreed that the timely payment of this Note is an unsubordinated and
unconditional obligation of Company.
Except as otherwise provided herein, the undersigned and all endorsers and all persons liable
or to become liable on this Note hereby (a) waive diligence, presentment, demand, protest, and
notice of any kind, (b) consent to any and all renewals and extensions in the time of payment hereof,
(c)waiveanyright to offset against amounts due to Payee hereunder any amounts due to Company,
including but not limited to any amounts due to Company pursuant to the Restructured Obligations,
except to the extent the right to offset is expressly granted to Company by the Agreement, and (d)
agree that at any time the terms of payment hereof may be modified without affecting the liability
of any party to this Note or of any person liable or to become liable with respect to any indebtedness
evidenced hereby.

In the event this Note is placed in the hands of an attorney for collection, or suit is brought
on the same, or the same is collected through bankruptcy or other judicial proceedings, then the
';~~-ll!E'!l!l!XHl!l!l!IB~IT~~
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undersigned agrees and promises to pay reasonable attorney fees and collection costs incurred in
connection therewith, including all out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the holder hereof, with or
without suit, on appeal or in bankruptcy or other insolvency proceedings.
Company acknowledges receipt of the following notice:
ORAL AGREEMENTS OR ORAL COMMITMENTS TO LOAN MONEY, EXTEND
CREDIT, OR TO FORBEAR FROM ENFORCING REPAYMENT OF A DEBT ARE NOT
ENFORCEABLE UNDER IDAHO LAW.

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION

~

By: --=----"-_;:...._..;:;..il
ns: -~c-~ £0c..M<..._ __

...

•

--

c : t a _ . . . . . _ _ ._

.....

~~,·------
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AMENDED AND RESTATED SECURITY

1=x·1-1191T
AGREEME~
' I I I ·1 i
8

This Amended and Restated Security Agreement (the "Agreement") is entered into as ofJuly
I, 1996, by and among Reed l Taylor ("Secured Party"), AlA Services Corporation, an Idaho
corporation cicompany"), and AIA Insurance, Inc., an Idaho corporation ("AlAl") (together with
Company, the "Companies").

RECITALS
A
Company and Secured Party are parties to that certain Stock Redemption Agreement
dated as July 22, 1995 (the "Redemption Agreement"), pursuant to which Company redeemed
613,494 shares of its Common Stock held by Secured Party in exchange for, in part, a promissory
· note in the principal amount of $1,500,000 (the "Down Payment Note") and a promissory note in
the principal amount of$6,000,000 (the "$6M Note"). Company and Secured Party also entered into
a Security Agreement (the "Security Agreement"). and a stock Pledge Agreement (the "Stock Pledge
Agreement"), each dated July 22, 1995, granting security interests in certain collateral to secure
payment of the $6M Note. Company and Secured Party also entered into a Consulting Agreement
(the "Consulting Agreement") and a Noncompetition Agreement (the "Noncompetition
Agreement"), both dated July 22, 1995.
B.
Concurrent with the execution of this Agreement, Company and Secured Party have
entered into that certain Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement (the "Restructure Agreement")
pursuant to which the obligations and agreements referred to above have been restructured (the
"Restructure").
C.
As a part ofthe Restructure, Company and Secured Party have agreed to· amend and
restate the Security Agreement to provide, among other things, for security for the Down Payment
Note (as amended pursuant to the Restructure, the "Amended Down Payment Note") and for new
arrangements relating to the location and disposition of Commission Collateral.
D.
As a part ofthe Restructure, Company and Secured Party have agreed to simplify and
consolidate the Restructure default and remedy provisions into an Amended and Restated Stock
Pledge Agreement ("Amended Stock Pledge Agreement").
E.

This Agreement amends, restates, supersedes and replaces the Security Agreement.

E.
Capitalized te11Ds used herein but not herein defined have the meanings ascribed to
them in the Restructure Agreement

AGREEMENTS
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, and for other
good and valuable consideration the sufficiency and receipt of which are hereby acknowledged,
Secured Party and the Companies agree as follows:

EXHIBIT

4!
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1.

Definitions
As used in this Agreement:

"Commission Collateral" means all commissions from the sale of insurance or related
services received by or on behalf of, or payable to, any of the Company, AIAI or any of Company's
other Subsidiaries, and any interest thereon
"Collateral Account" has the meaning given such term in Section 4 of this Agreement
"Secured Obligations" means the punctual payment and perfonnance by Company of any
and all monetary obligations, liabilities and amounts now or hereafter owing, due or not due, direct
or indirect, liquidated or contingent, to Secured Party pursuant to the Attorney Fee Reimbursement
Agreement, the Amended Down Payment Note and the $6M Note.

"Subsidiary" of a person means (i) any corporation 50% or more of the outstanding voting
securities having ordinary voting power of which shall at the time be owned or controlled, directly
or indirectly, by such person or by one or more of its Subsidiaries or by such person and one or more
ofits Subsidiaries, or (ii) any partnership, association, joint venture or similar business organizations.
500/o or more of the ownership interests having ordinary voting power of which shall at the time be
so owned or controlled_
2.

Security Interest

As collateral security for the prompt and unconditional payment and perfonnance of the
Secured Obligations, Companies hereby grant to Secured Party a security interest in all of their right,
title and interest in and to the Commission Collateral.
3.

4.

[Intentionally Omitted.]

Collateral Account

All Commission Collateral shall be received and held by Companies in trust for
Secured-Party, and shall be immediately, upon receipt, deposited in a special bank account (the
"Collateral Account"). Companies shall segregate any Commission Collateral from any of
Companies' other funds or property, and will hold the Commission Collateral separate and apart
from any other funds or property and upon an express trust for Secured Party until deposit thereof
is made in the Collateral Account. On or before the effective date of this Agreement, AIAI, Secured
Party and the depository institution at which the Collateral Account is maintained shall enter into
an irrevocable lock-box agreement (the "Lockbox Agreement") in the form required by the
Restructure Agreement. Funds in the Collateral Account shall be disbursed in accordance with the
terms of the Escrow Agreement. Companies may, subject to applicable notice provisions in the
Escrow Agreement, change the Collateral Account or change the Collateral Account depository as
long as the new account is subject to the terms of the Escrow Agreement or a Iockbox agreement
with the new depository containing substantially the same terms as the Escrow Agreement. In
addition, AJAI shall provide written instructions to Mark Twain Kansas Bank ("Bank") which
provide that Bank shall, in accordance with currently effective instructions and procedures, transfer
to the Collateral Account all Commission Collateral deposited into Account No. 8613004124 at such
Page2
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Bank. Further, Company;·AIAI, Creditor and Bank shall enter into an agreement which provides
that (i) Bank shall immediately notify Creditor of its receipt of any (a) instruction by AIAI or
Company to take any action which would interrupt or redirect the flow of Commission Collateral
into Account No. 86513004124 from any other account at Bank or the transfer of Commission
Collateral from such Account to the Collateral Account, or (b) request by AIA or Company to
amend that certain lockbox agreement (the "Centennial Lock Box Agreement") dated June 1, 1995
among AIAI, Universe, The Centennial Life Insurance Company ("Centennial") and Bank. or any
notice or instruction delivered to Bank pursuant thereto, or (c) request by AIAI or Company to move
existing bank accounts or establish new bank accounts under the Centennial Lock Box Agreement;
and (u) Bank shall not implement any such implement any such instruction or request until the lapse
of thirty (30) days from delivery of such notice by Bank to Creditor or Bank's earlier receipt of
Creditors written consent to such instruction or request.

5.

Defaults and Remedies. The circumstances constituting Defaults under this Agreement and

the remedies therefor shall, for the purpose of the convenience of having all such provisions
contained within a single document, be determined in accordance with the Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement. Secured Party shall have no recourse to the Commission Collateral in the event of a
non-monetary default under the Restructured Obligations; but nothing contained in this Agreement
shall affect Secured Party's rights and remedies under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement for
monetary or non-monetary defaults.

•

6.

Revival of Security Interest

To the extent. Company· makes a payment to Secured Party, which payment is later
invalidated, declared to be a fraudulent transfer or preference, set aside or required to be repaid
under any bankruptcy law, other law or equitable principle, Secured Party's interest in the
Commission Collateral shall be revived and continued as if the payment or proceeds had never been
received by the Secured Party.

7.

Miscellaneous

7.1

Financing Statements, Etc. Companies will sign any financing statements and other

filings with governmental offices or agencies., and other documents relating to the Commission
Collateral that Secured Party may reasonably request. Secured Party is nevertheless authorized to
file such documents without Companies' signatures and Companies hereby grant to Secured Party
a power of attorney to execute any such documents as Companies' attorney-in-fact. Such power of
attorney is coupled with an interest and shall be irrevocable until Secured Obligations have been
fully and finally paid. Companies will reimburse Secured Party upon demand for all expenses
incurred for the perfection and continuation of perfection of Secured Party's security interest in the
Commission Collateral.
7. 2
Amendment This Agreement and the other Restructured Obligations entered into in
connection with the Secured Obligations contain the complete and final expression of the entire
agreement of the parties. No provision of this Agreement may be amended, modified, waived or
supplemented, except by a writing signed by the party sought to be charged with the amendment,
modification, waiver or supplementation.

Page 3
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7. 3
Remedies Cumulative. All rights and remedies of Secured Party shall be cumulative
and may be exercised at such times and in such order as Secured party detennines. The failure of
Secured Party to insist upon or enforce strict performance of any provisions of this Agreement, or
to exercise its rights or privileges hereunder or any of its rights as provided by statute or law or in
equity or otherwise, shall not impair, prejudice or constitute a waiver of any such right, power,
remedy or privilege or be construed as a waiver of any Default or as an· acquiescence therein or
preclude the exercise or enforcement thereof at a later time. No waiver by Secured Party of any
Default shall be a waiver of any other Default. Nor shall any single or partial exercise of any such
right, power, remedy or privilege preclude any other or further exercise thereof or the exercise of
any other right, power, remedy or privilege.
7. 4
Effectiveness. This Agreement shall remain in full force and effect until the earlier
of(i) the pledge of fair market value bonds for other Collateral in accordance with Section lO(a) of
the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, (ii) the indefeasible performance or payment in full in cash
of all the Secured Obligations, or (iii) the termination of this Agreement in writing by Secured Party.

•

7. 5
Termination; Further Assurances. This Agreement and the Escrow Agreement shall
terminate and be of no further force or effect upon the earliest to occur of the events set forth in
Section 7.4 hereof. Secured.Party's security interest in.the Commission Collateral shall thereupon ...
cease; and Secured Party shall execute and deliver any and all additional papers, documents and
other instruments (including, without limitation, UCC termination statements), and shall do any and
all acts and things reasonably necessary in connection with the performance of his obligations
hereunder and to carry out the intent of the parties as expressed in this Agreement .
7. 6
Notices. Any notice under this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be given as
provided in the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement.
7. 7
Governing Law. This Security Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in
accordance with the laws of the State ofldaho.

7.8
Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts and
by each party on a separate counterpart, each of which when so executed and delivered shall be
deemed an original and all of which taken together shall constitute but one and the same instrument
7.9
Restatement of Security Agreement. The Security Agreement is hereby amended,
restated, superseded and replaced in its entirety and shall hereafter have no force or effect. Ssecured
Party hereby waives any and all right to claim any breach of the Security Agreement or to exercise
any remedy thereunder.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have duly executed and delivered this Agreement as
of the date first written above.

CO:MPANY:

SECURED PARTY:

•

Page 5
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ESCROW AGREEMENT
THIS ESCROW AGREEMENT ("Agreement") is made and entered into this Z.-3 day
of "-\ v.- \ '1 , 1996, by and among REED J. TAYLOR, a single man residing at Lewiston,
Id~ed Party"); AIA INSURANCE, INC., an Idaho corporation with its principal
place of business at Lewiston, Idaho ("AJA"); AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation with its principal place of business in Lewiston, Idaho ("Services"); and Mark
Twain Banks ("Bank").
WHEREAS, Services and Secured Party entered into a Stock Redemption Agreement
and related agreements, which agreements have been restructured pursuant to a Stock
Redemption Restructure Agreement of even date herewith (collectively "Redemption
Agreements"), including (without limitation) an Amended and Restated Security Agreement
(the "Security Agreement"); and

•

WHEREAS, pursuant to the Redemption Agreements, Company is obligated to make
certain monthly payments to Secured Party (collectively "Payments" and each a "Payment")
in the amount of $75,000 per month until full payment of the Amended Down Payment Note
and thereafter in the amount of $41,250 per month until full payment of the $6M Note
(provided that, in the event of any partial prepayment of the $6M note, the amount of such
monthly payment shall be reduced to an amount equal to .6875% of the remaining principal
balance of the $6M Note); and
WHEREAS, this Agreement is entered into pursuant to Section 4 of the Security
Agreement; and
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 4 of the Security Agreement, Services and AJA have
agreed that all Commission Collateral shall be remitted for deposit in a Collateral Account at
a bank designated and appointed by AIA; and
WHEREAS, the Security Agreement provides for Secured Party to establish a special
bank account controlled solely by Secured Party ("Secured Party Account"); and
WHEREAS, Bank has been, and hereby is, designated and duly appointed by AJA as
the bank wherein the Collateral Account is established; and
WHEREAS, AIA, Services, Secured Party and Bank desire to enter into a written
agreement setting forth with particularity the agreed-upon practices and procedures with respect
to the operation of the Collateral Account; and
WHEREAS, Bank and AIA are parties to that certain Lock Box Agreement with The
Centennial Life Insurance Company ("Centennial") dated June 1, 1995 (the "Centennial Lock
Box Agreement") pursuant to which certain payments deposited in various trust accounts at
Bank are separated and deposited into other accounts at Bank, including AIA Insurance, Inc.

EXHIBIT
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Account No. 8613004124 (the "Mark Twain Account"). The Mark Twain Account contains
Commission Collateral commingled with other cash.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing recitals and of the terms and
conditions hereinafter set forth, and for other good and valuable consideration, the parties
hereto agree as follows:
1.

For purposes of this Agreement:

(a)
"Commission Collateral" means all comm1ss1ons from the sale of
insurance or related services received through the Centennial Lock Box Agreement by
or on behalf of, or payable to, any of the Companies (as defined in the Security
Agreement) or any of their subsidiaries, and any interest thereon.
(b)
"Collateral Account" means the account at Bank established under
Section 3 hereof and into which all Commission Collateral must be deposited in
accordance with Section 4 of the Security Agreement and Section 4 of this Agreement.

"Amended Down Payment Note" means that certain Amended and
(c)
Restated Down Payment Note dated July 1, 1996 payable by Services to Reed J. Taylor
in the principal amount of $1.5 million.
(d)
"$6M Note" means that certain Promissory Note dated August 1, 1995
payable by Services to Reed J. Taylor in the principal amount of Six Million Dollars
($6,000,000).
(e)
All capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the
meanings assigned in the Redemption Agreements.
2.
Subject to the terms and provisions of this Agreement, Services, AJA, and
Secured Party have requested that Bank accept and deposit in the Collateral Account all
Commission Collateral included in the funds deposited in the Mark Twain Account pursuant
to the Centennial Lock Box Agreement; and Bank has agreed to accept such deposits under the
terms and provisions of this Agreement.
3.

The parties hereto have established at Bank the Collateral Account (Account No.
J7.? !9S<JO ) in the name of AIA Insurance, Inc.; and Secured Party has established the
Secured Party Account (Account No. 0191314244) at First Security Bank, 9th & Main,
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 in the name and under the sole control of Reed J. Taylor. Funds
deposited in the Secured Paity Account shall be available for immediate withdrawal by
authorized signers on the Secured Party Account.

•
.

.

.

4.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 of the Security Agreement, the
Companies shall remit all Commission Collateral to Bank for deposit in the Collateral Account.
AIA shall deliver to Bank, on at least a weekly basis, a written report of the amount of
Commission Collateral then on deposit in the Mark Twain Account and shall direct Bank to
transfer such amount to the Collateral Account; and Bank shall promptly transfer such amount
from the Mark Twain Account to the Collateral Account. Except as provided in Section 5 of
ESCROW AGREEMENT - Page 2
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this Agreement, all funds in the Collateral Accowit shall be disbursed to or upon the order or
direction of AIA.
5.
Secured Party shall provide Bank with wire-transfer instructions to enable Bank
to transfer funds to the Secured Party Account in accordance with this Agreement. On the 1st
business day of each month beginning August 1, 1996, Bank shall automatically wire-transfer
the Payment from the Collateral Account to the Secured Party Account. In the event the funds
in the Collateral Account are insufficient to pay the full amount of the Payment then due, Bank
shall wire-transfer to the Secured Party Account, on a daily basis, all funds subsequently
deposited in the Collateral Account until the full amount of the Payment has been wiretransferred. This obligation to transfer the P.ayment from the Collateral Account to the Secured
Party Account shall supersede any contrary or inconsistent instructions or directions given by
AIA under Section 4 hereof Once the full amount of any and all Payments then due has been
transferred to the Secured Party Account, however, the provisions of Section 4 hereof shall
govern the withdrawal or disbursement of funds from the Collateral Account.
6.
The amount of the Payment shall initially be $75,000 per month. Bank shall
reduce the amount of the Payment to $41,250 per month, effective as of the next payment date
following presentation by AIA of a copy of the Amended Down Payment Note marked paid
or cancelled by Creditor. Following presentation by AIA of a receipt from Creditor
acknowledging partial prepayment of the $6M Note, Bank shall further reduce the monthly
payment to an amount equal to .6875% of the remaining principal balance of the $6M Note.

•

•
,

7.
Bank shall immediately notify Secured Party of its receipt of any (a) instruction
by AJA to take any action which would interrupt or redirect the flow of Commission Collateral
into the Mark Twain Account from any other account at Bank, or which would interrupt the
transfer of Commission Collateral from the Mark Twain Account to the Collateral Account,
or (b) request by AJA or Company to amend the CenteIUlial Lock Box Agreement, or any
notice or instruction delivered to Bank pursuant thereto, or (c) request by by AIA or Company
to move existing bank accounts or establish new bank accounts under the Centennial Lock Box
Agreement. Bank will take no action in accordance with any such instruction or request until
the lapse of thirty (30) days from delivery of such notice by Bank to Secured Pru:ty or Bank's
earlier receipt of Secured Party's written consent to such instruction or request; provided that,
upon lapse of thhty (30) days from the delivery of such notice, Bank will act in accordance
with such instructions or request notwithstanding any written or oral objection by Secured
Party, unless Secured Party delivers to Bank a certified copy of a complaint, filed in a court
of competent jurisdiction, seeking a court order enjoining Bank from acting in accordance with
such instructions or request. This Section 7 of this Agreement is not intended to affect the
rights or obligations of Bank or Centennial under the Centennial Lock Box Agreement.
However, Bank shall immediately notify Secured Party of any instruction or request by
Centennial which would or could affect the Mark Twain Account or the flow of Commissions
Collateral into that account under the Centennial Lock Box Agreement or the transfer of funds
from the Mark Twain Account to the Secured Party Account under this Agreement.
8.
Bank shall have the right to terminate this Agreement upon thirty (30) days'
prior written notice to Company and Secured Party.. This Agreement may also be terminated
by mutual agreement of AJA, Services and Secured Party. Unless sooner terminated by Bank
or by mutual agreement of AIA, Services and Secured Party, this Agreement shall remain in
ESCROW AGREEMENT ·Page 3
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full force and effect until the earlier of (i) payment in full of both the Amended Down Payment
Note and the $6M Note, as evidenced by AlA's presentation to Bank of the cancelled $6M
Note, or (ii) written acceptance by Secured Party of other collateral or security for the $6M
Note in substitution for the Commission Collateral.
9.
In the event Bank is threatened with litigation as a result of any dispute among
Services, AIA and Secured Party, Bank is hereby authorized to file an interpleader action in
any court of competent jurisdiction and to deposit with the clerk of the court the amount of the
disputed funds, less any court filing fees.
10.
Bank shall have no duties not expressed in this Agreement. Bank shall have no
duties, expressed or implied, relating to any other agreement among Services, AlA and Secured
Party. Bank shall have no duty to determine if the division of funds between Secured Party
and AIA is correct Bank shall not be required to verify, prior to making disbursements under
Sections 4 or 5 hereof, that the funds on deposit in the Collateral Account are "good funds".
Bank shall not be required to determine whether Secured Party or AIA is entitled to any funds
which may be disputed, should such disputes arise out of this Agreement or any other
agreement.

•

11.
Services, AIA and Secured Patty hereby agree, jointly and severally, to
indemnify and save Bank harmless from and against any loss, liability or expense reasonably
incurred, without negligence or bad faith on Bank's part, arising out of or in connection with
this Agreement, including the expense of Bank defending itself against any claim or liability
hereunder or of filing any interpleader action. This indemnity provision shall survive
termination of this Agreement.
12.
Bank shall charge the Collateral Account directly for any and all customary and
usual costs and expenses (including, without limitation, wire-transfer charges) in connection
with this Agreement, as specifically set forth in the fee schedule provided by Bank and
attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
13.
This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with, and shall be governed
by, the laws of the State of Missouri.
14.
This Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of which
shall be deemed an original, but all of which together shall constitute one and the same
instrument.
15.
The provisions of this Agreement may be waived, altered, amended or repealed,
in whole or in part, only in a written instrument signed by all of the parties to this Agreement.
16.
The invalidity or unenforceability of any particular provision of this Agreement
shall not affect the other provisions hereof; and this Agreement shall be interpreted in all
respects as if such invalid or unenforceable provisions were omitted.
17.
This one, single Agreement shall constitute the full and complete embodiment
of the intentions of the parties regarding the Collateral Account.
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18.
All notices, requests, demands and other communications which are required to
be or may be given under this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be deemed to have been
duly given when delivered in person or transmitted by telex, facsimile, cable or telegram, or
by certified or registered first class mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, to the
respective parties as follows:

If to AIA or Services, to:

AIA Services Corporation
AJA Insurance, Inc.
P.O. Box 538
One Lewis Clark Plaza
Lewiston ID 83501
Attention: John Taylor
Fax: (208) 799-9172

With a copy to:

Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &
McKlveen, Chru:tered
P.O. Box 1368
Boise ID 83701-1368
Attention: Richard A. Riley
Fax: (208) 344-8542

If to Shareholder, to:

Reed J. Taylor
P.O. Box 1165
Lewiston ID 83501
Fax: (208) 799-9144

With a copy to:

Caimcross & Hempelmann
70th Floor, Columbia Center
701 Fifth Avenue
Seattle WA 98104-7016
Attention: W. Frank Taylor
Fax: (206) 587-2308

If to Banlc

Mark Twain Banks
Trust Division
4901 Main Street
Kansas City MO 64112-2636 .
Attention: Lorri Willms
Fax: (913) 261-5249
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Services, AIA, Secured Party and Bank have executed this
agreement in manner and form sufficient to bind them as of the day and year first above
written.
AIA
By:

Date:

By:

Date:

•

Date:

--7, ·;! '3 .-

:?6

MARK TWAIN BANKS
By:

cry.~.9~ Q"a..."0rru
\l \ <.s:

Date:

1

?

res.

OSbv

Attest:

1<k"I

/1 & /q f,

•

tA
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EXHIBIT A-1

TO
AMENDED AND RESTATED STOCK PLEDGE AGREEMENT
ASSIGNMENT SEPARATE FROM CERTIFICATE
[UNIVERSE)

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned hereby assigns and transfers to REED J.
TAYLOR 999,995 shares of the common stock standing in the name of the undersigned on the
books of The Universe Life Insurance Company and represented by Certificate(s) No. 1 herewith,
and hereby irrevocably constitutes and appoints the Secretary of The Universe Life Insurance
Company as attorney to tr'ansfer that stock on the books of such corporation with full power of
substitution in the premises. This assignment is made pursuant to the Amended and Restated Stock
Pledge Agreement dated as of the date hereof and in connection with the Stock Redemption
Agreement dated July 22, 1995, between the undersigned and Reed l Taylor, and may be used to
transfer the above-described shares of stock after a Default as such is defined under said Amended
and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement.
DATED this 22nd day ofJuly, 1995
AJA SERVICES CORPORATION

By
Its
STATE OF IDAHO

County of

l~<(~

)
:ss.

)

/

~

day of
, 1995, before me,
, known or
identified to me to be
,
of
L
, the corporation that executed
the instrument and the p on who executed thyirtstrument on behalf of said corporation and
acknowledged to me that sue orporation exe ted the same

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I h e hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day
and year in this certificate first abo

Notary Public
.
Residing at -------~
My Commission Expire . ~--
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EXHIBIT A-2
TO
AMENDED AND RESTATED STOCK PLEDGE AGREEMENT
ASSIGNMENT SEPARA TE FROM CERTIFICATE
[FARMERS HEALTH ALLIANCE ADMINISTRATORS, INC.)

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned hereby assigns and transfers to REED l
TAYLOR 1,000 shares of the common stock standing in the name of the undersigned on the books
of Farmers Health Alliance Administrators, Inc. and represented by Certificate(s) No. 1 herewith,
and hereby irrevocably constitutes and appoints the Secretary of Farmers Health Alliance
Administrators, Inc. as attorney to transfer that stock on the books of such corporation with full
power of substitution in the premises. This assignment is made pursuant to the Amended and
Restated Stock Pledge Agreement dated as of the date hereof and in connection with the Stock
Redemption Agreement dated July 22, 1995, between the undersigned and Reed J. Taylor, and may
be used to transfer the above-described shares of stock after a Default as such is defined under said
Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement.
DATED this 22nd day ofJuly, 1995 .

•
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Nez Pe e

)
:ss

)

On this
d of
1995, before m , appeared
known or
identified to me to be the
of
the corporation that executed
the instrument and the perso who executed e instrument on behalf of said corporation and
acknowledged to me that such cor ration , ecuted the same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I ave
and year in this certificate first a

•

eunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day

ve written

Notary Public ·Idaho
Residing at---~--'
My Commission Expire ".,-----

.

..

10

~

I
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EXHIBITA-3
TO
AMENDED AND RESTATED STOCK PLEDGE AGREEMENT
ASSIGNMENT SEPARA TE FROM CERTIFICATE
[AIA INSURANCE,INC.]

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned hereby assigns and transfers to REED J.
TAYLOR 6,219 shares of the common stock standing in the name of the undersigned on the books
of AIA Insurance, Inc. and represented by Certificate(s) No. 10 and 11 herewith, and hereby
irrevocably constitutes and appoints the Secretary of AIA Insurance, Inc. as attorney to transfer that
stock on the books of such corporation with full power of substitution in the premises. This
assignment is made pursuant to the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement dated as of the
date hereof and in connection with the Stock Redemption Agreement dated July 22, 1995, between
the undersigned and Reed l Taylor, and may be used to transfer the above-described shares of stock
after a Default as such is defined under said Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement
DATED this 22nd day ofJuly, 1995

•
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Nez Perce

)
:ss

)

///
On this _ _ day of
, 1995, before me, a,,ppeared
, known or
identified to me to be the
of
the corporation that executed
the instrument and the person wh xecuted the instrument on behalf of said corporation and
acknowledged to me that such corporat
exe9uted the same .
./·

lN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hav~,hereu o set my hand and affixed my official seal the day

and year in this certificate firs/tten.

•
\

Notary Public for I
Residing at _ _ ____,,,_,
My Commissi~n Expires: __,..__ _

..
;;;
~

07/1"1196 2:llpmfs ·

!!'

'

.!l
E
:i!

.,
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AMENDED AND RESTATED STOCK PLEDGE AGREEMENT

This Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement is entered into as of July 1, 1996, by
and between AIA Services Corporation, an Idaho corporation ("Pledgor"), and Reed 1- Taylor
("Secured Party").
RECITALS
A
Pledgor and Secured Party are parties to that certain Stock Redemption Agreement,
dated as of July 22, 1995 (the "Redemption Agreement"), pursuant to which, Pledgor redeemed
613,494 shares ofits Common Stock held by Secured Party in exchange for, in part, a promissory
note in the principal amount of $1,500,000 (the "Down Payment Note") and a promissory note in .
the principal amount of$6,000,000 (the "$6M Note"). Pledgor and Secured Party also entered into
a Stock Pledge Agreement (the "Stock Pledge Agreement") and a Security Agreement (the "Security
Agreement"), each dated July 22, 1995, granting a security interest in certain collateral to secure
payment of the $6M Note. Pledgor and Secured Party also entered into a Consulting Agreement (the
"Consulting Agreement") and a Noncompetition Agreement (the "Noncompetition Agreement"),
both dated July 22, 1995.
R
The Universe Life Insurance Company, an Idaho domestic insurance company
("Universe"), Farmers Health Alliance Administrators, Inc., an Idaho corporation ("Farmers"), and
AIA Insurance, Inc., an Idaho corporation ("AIAI"), are wholly owned subsidiaries of Pledger.
Great Fidelity Life Insurance Company, an Indiana domestic insurer ("GFL"), is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Universe. Universe is in rehabilitation under the laws of the State ofldaho, and GFL
is under supervision under the laws of the State oflndiana. Pledger, AIAI, Farmers, Universe and
GFL are collectively referenced herein as the "Companies".
C.
Pursuant to the Stock Pledge Agreement, Pledger pledged all of the shares of capital
stock of each of Universe, Farmers and AIAI (collectively, the "Pledged Shares") as security for the
$6M Note and other obligations. of Pledgor to Secured Party arising under the Redemption
Agreement.
D..
Concurrent with the execution of this Agreement, Pledgor and Secured Party have
entered into that certain Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement (the "Restructure Agreement")
pursuant to which the obligations and agreements referred to above have been restructured (the
"Restructure").

•

E.
As a part of the Restructure, Pledgor and Secured Party have agreed to amend and
restate the Security Agreement (as amended, the "Amended Security Agreement") and to amend and
restate the Stock Pledge Agreement to provide, among other things, security for the Down Payment
Note (as amended pursuant to the Restructure, the "Amended Down Payment Note"), to modify
provisions relating to the substitution of bonds for the Pledged Shares, to allow partial or complete
prepayment of the $6M Note and to provide for partial release of Pledged Shares upon partial
prepayment of the $6M Note.

F.
As part of the Restructure, Pledgor and Secured Party have agreed to simplify and
consolidate the Restructure default and remedy provisions.
EXHIBIT
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G.
Agreement.

This Agreement amends, restates, supersedes and replaces the Stock Pledge

H.
Capitalized tenns used herein but not herein defined have the meanings ascribed to
them in the Restructure Agreement or the Amended Security Agreement.

AGREEMENTS
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, and for other good
and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the
parties agree as follows:
1.

Secured Obligations

This Agreement is made to secure the punctual payment and perfonnance by Pledgor of any
and all obligations, liabilities and amounts now or hereafter owing, due or not due, direct or indirect,
liquidated or contingent, to Secured Party pursuant to the Amended Down Payment Note and the
$6M Note and the prompt observance and performance by Pledgor of its covenants, agreements and
obligations hereunder (collectively, the "Secured Obligations").

2.

•

Pledge

As collateral security for the payment and performance in full of the Secured Obligations,
Pledgor hereby pledges, assigns, transfers, delivers and grants to Secured Party a security interest
in all right, title and interest of Pledgor that presently exists or that hereafter may arise in, to and
under (i) the Pledged Shares and all rights and privileges of Pledgor with respect thereto; (ii) all cash
dividends, noncash dividends, stock dividends, interest, cash, instruments and other property from
time to time received, receivable or otherwise distributed in respect of or in exchange for any or all
of the Pledged Shares; (iii) all subscriptions, warrants, options and any other rights issued upon or
in connection with the Pledged Shares; (iv) any additional shares of capital stock of the issuers of
the Pledged Shares hereafter issued; (v) any and all certificates or other instrument or documents
representing any of the foregoing; and (vi) all cash and noncash proceeds of the foregoing (all such
property, collectively, the "Pledged Collateral").

3.

Representations and Warranties
Pledgor represents and warrants to, and agrees with, Secured Party as follows:

/a

""

3.1
Organization and Good Standing. Each of Pledgor, AIAI and Fanners is a
corporation duly organized, validly existing and in good standing under the laws of the State of
Idaho and has all requisite power and authority to own, lease or operate its properties and to cany
on its business as it is now being conducted. Universe is a domestic insurance company duly
organized and validly existing under the laws of the State of Idaho, subject to the rights and powers
ofthe rehabilitator appointed by court order dated March 5,. l 996 ("Rehabilitator"). Great Fidelity
is a stock life insurance company duly organized and validly existing under the laws of the State of
Indiana subject to the rights and powers of the supervisor appointed under Indiana law. Pledgor,
AIAI and Farmers are duly qualified to do business and are in good standing as foreign corporations
in all jurisdictions where the failure to be so qualified would materially adversely affect them. As
Page2
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of the date of this Agreement, Pledgor owns all of the outstanding capital stock of Universe (except
for Directors' qualifying shares), AIAI and Farmers; and, subject to the rights and powers of the
Rehabilitator, Universe owns all of the outstanding capital stock of Great Fidelity.
Power and Authority. Pledgor and each of the other Companies has all requisite
32
power and authority to execute, deliver and perform the Restructured Obligations and to
consummate the transactions contemplated thereby. In particular, but without limiting the foregoing,
Pledgor and AIA have full requisite power and authority and full legal right to grant a security
interest in the Commission Collateral in the manner and for the purpose contemplated by the
Amended Security Agreement Pledger's Board of Directors has duly authorized the Restructured
Obligations and the execution and delivery thereof by the Companies and the performance by
Companies of their respective obligations thereunder, including (without limitation) the pledge and
grant to Secured Party of a security interest in the Pledged Collateral and the Commission Collateral
in the manner and for the purpose contemplated by this Agreement and the Security Agreement
Pledgor has either obtained the consent of its shareholders to the execution and delivery of the
Restructured Obligations and the consununation of the transactions contemplated hereby, or it has
determined that no such consent is required.
3.J
Binding Contract The Restructured Obligations have been duly executed and
delivered by Companies and are legal, valid and binding obligations of Companies enforceable
against them in accordance with their terms, except as enforceability may be limited by bankruptcy,
insolvency, reorganization or other similar laws affecting the enforcement of creditors' rights
generally or the availability of equitable remedies subject to the discretion of the court.
3 .4
Consents: Noncontravention Except for any such violation or default which is
waived by the Series A Preferred Shareholder pursuant to the Series A Preferred Shareholder
Agreement, the execution and delivery of the Restructured Obligations and the performance of the
transactions contemplated thereby (including, without limitation, the pledge and grant to Secured
Party of a security interest in the Pledged Shares pursuant to this Agreement and the grant of a
security interest in the Commission Collateral pursuant to the Amended Security Agreement) will
not (i) result in a violation of any of the terms or provisions of the articles of incorporation or bylaws
of Companies or any amendments thereto, or (ii) constitute a violation or default under any
indebtedness, indenture, mortgage, deed of trust, note, bond license, lease agreement or other
material agreement or instrument to which Companies are a party or by which they or any of their
assets may otherwise be bound, or under any law (excluding, however, any law or regulation
pertaining to the Rehabilitator or the rehabilitation of Universe under the Idaho Insurance Code),
rule, license, regulation, judgment, order, ruling or decree governing or affecting the operation of
Companies in any material respect; nor will the same constitute an event permitting termination of
any material agreement or the acceleration of any indebtedness or other liability of Companies, with
or without notice or lapse or time, or result in the creation or imposition of any lien upon any
collateral granted to Creditor pursuant to the Restructured Obligations. No consent, authorization,
approval or exemption by, or filing with, any person, entity or authority is required in connection
with the execution, delivery and performance by Companies of the Restructured Obligations or the
talcing of any action contemplated thereby.

(~·

3.5
Title to Pledged Shares: Encumbrances. The Pledged Shares include all of the issued
and outstanding capital stock of each of Universe, Farmers, and AIAI. Pledger owns beneficially
and of record all of the Pledged Shares, free and clear of all pledges, liens, encumbrances, security
interests, equities, claims, options or limitations on Company's ability to vote such shares or to
Page 3
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transfer such shares to Secured Party, except for any interest in the Universe stock on the part of the
Rehabilitator and the liens in favor of Secured Party created in connection with the transactions
contemplated by this Agreement. Subject to the rights and powers of the Rehabilitator in connection
with the Universe shares, Pledgor has full right, title and interest in and to the Pledged Shares, and
full authority to pledge the Pledged Shares to Secured Party as security for performance of the
Secured Obligations. All of the Pledged Shares have been duly authorized and validly issued, and
are fully paid and nonassessable. Secured Party acknowledges he has physical possession of the
certificates evidencing all of the Pledged Shares. Upon execution of this Agreement, Secured Party
will have a first priority, perfected security interest in the Pledged Shares. There are no options,
warrants, calls, subscriptions, rights, agreements, commitments or understandings of any nature that
call for the issuance, sale, pledge or other disposition of any Pledged Shares or which entitle any
person to acquire such shares, other than those rights arising under this Agreement
3.6
Title to Commission Collateral. Companies are the sole owners of the Commission
Collateral, free of any liens, security interests, claims or other encumbrances of any kind, except for
(i) standard rights of insurers to recover commissions paid on subsequently lapsed or cancelled
policies or certificates of insurance, (ii) the liens and security interests granted to Secured Party in
the Amended Security Agreement and (iii) a previously granted security interest granted to
Centennial Life Insurance Company ("Centennial").
J _7

Protection of Security Interest.

(a)
Companies shall, at their owrt expense, keep the Commission Collateral free
of all liens and encumbrances except the security interests of Secured Party and Centennial.
Companies shall not make or agree to make any discount, credit, rebate, set-off or other reduction
in the original amount owing with respect to Commission Collateral other than in accordance with
its present policies and in the ordinary course of business. Companies shall collect and enforce al!
commission receivables Companies will keep adequate records and books of account, in which
complete entries will be made in accordance with industry practice, applied, reflecting all
Commission Collateral and related transactions.

•
'

(b)
To Pledgor's knowledge, the Pledged Collateral is not subject to any option,
agreement, assessment, charge or other contractual restriction of any nature that might prohibit,
impair, delay or otherwise affect the pledge of the Pledged Collateral hereunder or the sale or
disposition of the Pledged Collateral pursuant hereto by Secured Party. Secured Party acknowledges
that applicable insurance regulations may require regulatory approval prior to strict foreclosure upon
or sale of insurance company stock Pledgor will not suffer or permit any lien or encumbrance of
any nature, other than those granted to Secured Party, to attach to the Pledged Collateral. Pledgor
will fully and punctually perform any duty required of it in connection with the Pledged Collateral
and will not take any action that will impair, damage or destroy Secured Party's rights with respect
to the Pledged Collateral. Pledger will remain the sole shareholder of all of the outstanding capital
stock of Universe (other than Directors' qualifying shares), Farmers and AIAI. Pledger will not
permit Universe, Farmers or AIA1 to issue any additional capital stock; and any attempt to issue
additional shares of such capital stock shall be invalid.
3.8
Financial Condition. The consolidated financial statements of Pledgor and its
subsidiaries for the years ended December 31, 1995, 1994 and 1993 and for the quarter ended March
31, 1996 attached hereto as Schedule 3.8, including any adjustments thereto reflected on Schedule
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3.8, present fairly the financial condition and results of operations and changes in financial position
of Pledgor as of such respective dates and for the respective periods then ended in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") applied on a consistent basis, and Pledgor has
no actual knowledge of any change in the financial condition of Companies since March 3 1, 1996
which a reasonable person would consider likely to have a material adverse effect on the value of
Pledged Collateral or the Commission Collateral, or on Secured Party's ability to enforce its
remedies hereunder, except for matters already disclosed by Pledgor to Secured Party_
3_9
Compliance with Laws. Pledgor, AIAI and Farmers are in compliance in all material
respect with all federal, state and local laws, statutes, rules, regulations and orders of all
governmental authorities material to its business_
3 _l 0 Defaults_ Except for any such violation or default which is being waived by the
Series A Preferred Shareholder in the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement, none of Pledgor,
AIAI or Farmers is in material violation of any of the terms or provisions of its articles of
incorporation or bylaws or any amendments thereto, or in violation or default under any
indebtedness, indenture, mortgage, deed of trust, note, bond license, lease agreement or other
material agreement or instrument to which any of such Companies is a party or by which it or any
of its assets may otherwise be bound, or of any law, rule, license, regulation, judgment, order, ruling
or decree governing or affecting the operation of such Companies in any material respect.

•

3 .11 Litigation. There are no claims, actions, suits, proceedings or investigations pending
or, to the best of Pledgor's knowledge, threatened against or relating to Companies, at law or in
equity before or by any governmental authority, the adverse resolution of which a reasonable person
would consider to be likely to have a material adverse effect on the value of the Pledged Collateral
or the Commissions Collateral, or on Secured Party's ability to enforce its remedies hereunder,
except for matters already disclosed by Pledgor to Secured Party.
Covenants. Pledgor hereby covenants to Secured Party that, until the earlier of (i) the
4.
pledge of bonds having a fair market value equal to the principal amount of the $6M Note in
substitution for the Pledged Collateral and the Commission Collateral in accordance with Section
IO(a) of the this Agreement, or (ii) the payment in full of the Amended Down Payment Note and the
$6M Note, it will perform and observe the following covenants:
4.1
Pledgor will provide Secured Party with quarterly financial statements for the first
three fiscal quarters for each of the Companies, prepared in accordance with GAAP _

•

Pledgor will provide Secured Party with consolidating financial statements, if
4. 2
available, or if such statements are not available, consolidated financial statements, for the first three
quarters for Pledgor and all of its direct and indirect Subsidiaries, prepared in accordance with
GAAP; provided that, if such statements have not been completed and made available to Pledgor's
management within 60 days of the end of fiscal quarter, Pledgor shall provide Secured Party with
quarterly financial statements on an estimated combined basis by such date; and Pledgor shall not
be deemed to have failed to satisfy this covenant if Pledgor delivers final consolidated financial
statements to Secured Party as soon as they are available to Pledgor's management
4.3
Pledgor will provide Secured Party with annual audited consolidating financial
statements, if available, or if such statements are not available, consolidated financial statements,
Page 5
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including the fourth quarter of Pledgor's fiscal year, prepared in accordance with GAAP; provided
that, if such statements have not been completed and made available to Pledgor's management within
180 days of the end of the fiscal year, Pledgor shall provide Secured Party with annual financial
statements on an estimated combined basis by such date; and Pledger shall not be deemed to have
failed to satisfy this covenant if Pledgor delivers final annual audited consolidated financial
statements to Secured Party as soon as such statements become available to Pledgor's management
4. 4
Pledgor will provide Secured Party with monthly income statements for Pledger on
an estimated combined basis as soon as they are available to Pledgor's management.
4.5
Pledgor will provide Secured Party with a weekly summary of new insurance
business submitted, showing weekly, month-to-date and year-to-date summaries.
4 .6
Pledgor will provide Secured Party with monthly statements of commissions earned
by any of the Companies as soon as they are available to Pledger's management, and copies of
AIAI's monthly bank statement for the Collateral Account and for Mark Twin Kansas Bank Account
No. 8613004124 or any substitute account immediately upon Company's receipt of such statements.

•

4. 7
As of the last day of each fiscal quarter, Pledger shall maintain retained earnings,
calculated in accordance with GAAP, equal to or greater than retained earnings for Pledgor as of
December 31, 1995 as shown on Pledger's audited annual consolidated financial statement for the
year ended December 31, 1995 attached hereto as Schedule 3.8 .
4.8
Pledger will not loan funds to any affiliate other than its wholly-owned Subsidiaries
or as authorized by its existing Articles of Incorporation, or except to pay loan reimbursement to
John Taylor for income tax liabilities attributable to the 1988 reorganization of the Pledger incident
to Secured Party's divorce;
Pledgor will not mortgage, pledge, subject to lien or other encumbrance, sell, assign
or transfer any collateral granted to Creditor pursuant to the Restructured Obligations_
4.9

4.10 Pledgor will use its best efforts to ensure that Creditor or his designee remains a
member of Pledger's Board of Directors until fuU payment of the Amended Down Payment Note
and the earlier of (i) the pledge of bonds meeting the requirements of Section IO(a) hereof, or (ii)
the pledge of bonds meeting the requirements of Section lO(b) hereof, or (iii) t~e substitµtion for
the Pledged Shares and the Commission Collateral of other collateral or security acreptable to
Creditor or (iv) the payment in full of the $6M Note .
4.11 Pledgor will ensure that no additional shares of capital stock are issued by Universe,
Farmers, AIAI or GFL;
4.12 Pledgor will use its best efforts to obtain and pledge to Secured Party, as soon as
possible, but in no event later than the consummation of a public offering by the Pledgor, bonds
meeting the requirements set forth in Section 1O of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement.

•

Pledger shall have no obligation to prepare and provide to Secured Party any reports of
financial or other business information, other than information expressly required by this Section
4. With respect to the covenants set forth in Sections 4.4 and 4.5, it: as a result of future changes
Page6
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in Pledgor's structure or operations, any required infonnation is no longer regularly prepared or
available to Pledgor's management, Pledgor and Secured Party shall negotiate in good faith to
substitute other reports of such equivalent information as may then be available.
Secured Party agrees that neither he nor any of his agents shall communicate with any of
Pledger's personnel concerning the Pledgor's financial condition or results of operations, except
through Pledger's president, chief financial officer or legal officer.

5.

•

(a)
On or before the effective date of this Agreement, Secured Party has obtained
physical possession of all instruments and stock certificates pertaining to the Pledged Shares.
Pledger agrees to deliver to Secured Party promptly upon receipt all instruments and stock
certificates pertaining to the Pledged Collateral acquired in the future. Without limiting the
foregoing, if Pledgor shall purchase or otherwise become entitled to receive or shall receive, in
connection with any of the Pledged Collateral, any: (i) stock certificate, including without limitation
any certificate representing a stock dividend or in connection with any increase or reduction of
capital, reclassification, merger, consolidation, sale of assets, combination of shares, stock split,
spin-off, split-off, split-up or liquidation, (ii) option, warrant, or right, whether as an addition to or
in substitution or in exchange for any of its securities, or otherwise; or (iii) dividend or distribution
payable in cash or property, including securities issued by other than Universe, Farmers or AIAI;
then Pledgor shall accept it in trust for Secured Party and shall immediately deliver it to Secured
Party in the exact fonn received, with Pledgor's endorsement when necessary, or appropriate stock
powers duly executed in blank to be held by Secured Party as part of the Pledged Collateral.
(b) Pledgor has previously delivered to Secured Party Assignments Separate from
Certificate C'Assignments"), in the form attached as Exhibits A-1, A-2 and A-3 to this Agreement,
covering all the Pledged Shares Such Assignments have been endorsed in blank by Pledgor before
delivery to Secured Party. Secured Party may not use such Assignments to transfer the Pledged
Collateral except in realization on its security interests in the Pledged Collateral after the occurrence,
and during the continuance, of a Default (as defined in Section 8 hereof).

6.

•
'

Possession of Pledged Collateral; Assignments

Pledgor's Voting Rights

So long as no Default under this Agreement has occurred and is continuing, Pledgor shall
be entitled to exercis~ any voting rights incident to the Pledged Collateral, subject to any restriction
on such voting rights contained herein. Upon the occurrence and continuation of a Default,
Pledger's right to exercise such voting rights shall immediately cease and terminate and all voting
rights with respect to the Pledged Collateral shall rest solely and exclusively in Secured Party. The
foregoing sentence shall constitute and grant to Secured Party an irrevocable proxy coupled with an
interest to vote the Pledged Collateral upon the occurrence and continuation of such a Default, and
any officer of Universe, Fanners, or AIAI, as the case may be, may rely on written notice from
Secured Party as to the existence of a Default and Secured Party's right to vote such Pledged
Collateral. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this Section 6, Secured Party's right to vote
the Universe shares is subject to all insurance regulatory requirements applicable to Universe and/or
GFL.

7.

Default
PaRe7
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Any one of the following events shall constitute a default by Pledger under this Agreement
(a "Default"):
(a)
Failure of Pledgor to pay, either directly or through Bank pursuant to the
Escrow Agreement, within ten (10) days of the date due any principal or interest under the Amended
Down Payment Note or the $6M Note; or

(b)
Failure of Bank to transfer to the Secured Party Account (as defined in the
Escrow Agreement). within ten (10) days of the date due, any principal or interest under the
Amended Down Payment Note or the $6M Note, provided however that a Default under Sections
7 (a) or 7 (b) hereof shall not be deemed to have occurred if (i) the amount due is paid directly by
Pledger or (ii) if Bank's failure to transfer such funds to the Secured Party Account results from
Bank.ts negligence or intentional malfeasance or any other reason not within Pledger's control (other
than insufficiency of deposits into the Collateral Account) and, within five (5) days of Pledgor's
discovery of such failure to transfer such funds to the Secured Party Account, Pledger instructs Banlc
in writing to immediately transfer the amount then due to the Secured Party Account and, within
thirty (30) days of such discovery, either Bank or Secured Party pays Secured Party the amount then
due; or

•

( c)
Default by Company in the performance of any of its obligations pursuant to
Section 4 of the Amended Security Agreement or pursuant to the Lockbox Agreement which default
continues after notice and a three (3) day opportunity to cure; or
( d)
Breach of any representation, warranty, covenant, term or condition contained
in this Agreement which breach materially and adversely impairs the value of the Commission
Collateral or the Pledged Shares or Secured Party's ability to enforce its rights with respect thereto,
and which breach continues after notice and a thirty-day opportunity to cure; or
(e)
Any levy, attachment or execution on, or seizure of, any of the Commission
Collateral or the Pledged Shares which materially and adversely impairs the value of the
Commission Collateral or the Pledged Shares or Secured Party's ability to enforce his rights with
respect thereto, and which breach continues after notice and a thirty (30) day opportunity to cure;
or

(f)
Dissolution or termination of existence of Company or a:ny of its material
Subsidiaries; provided that the dissolution or termination of existence of a Subsidiary (in the absence
of insolvency or bankruptcy) shall not constitute a Default if bonds meeting the requirements of
Section lO(a) the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement are acquired and pledged to Secured Party
pursuant thereto; or
(g)
Insolvency or bankruptcy of Pledgor or any of its material Subsidiaries or the
appointment of a receiver to take possession of any of the Commission Collateral or the Pledged
Shares.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, rehabilitation, supervision or liquidation of Universe
and/or GFL under applicable insurance laws or the sale of Universe or GFL stock in connection
therewith shall not constitute a Default hereunder.
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9.

Remedies

9.1
General. In the event of a Default by Pledger under this Agreement, Secured Party
may, at its election and in its sole discretion, without further notice of such election and without
demand upon Pledgor, do any one or more of the following:
(a)

Accelerate and declare the Secured Obligations immediately due and payable

in full;
(b)
Subject to receipt of all necessary regulatory approvals, sell all or any part of
. the Pledged Collateral at public auction or private sale in accordance with the laws of the State of
Idaho, for cash or credit at the election of Secured Party, Pledgor to be credited with the amounts
of any such sale only when the cash proceeds are actually received by Secured Party. Under no
circumstanc;es shall Secured Party be required to expedite or delay sale of all or any part of the
Pledged Collateral due to prevailing or expected conditions in the market for such Pledged
Collateral Each purchaser at any such sale shall hold the property sold absolutely free from any
claim or right on the part of Pledger. Secured Party shall not be obligated to make any sale of
Pledged Collateral regardless of notice of sale having been given. Secured Party may adjourn any
public or private sale from time to time by announcement at the time and place fixed therefor, and
such sale may, without further notice, be made at the time and place to which it was so adjourned;
and/or

•

•

(c)
Exercise all of the rights and remedies available under the Uniform
Commercial Code as enacted in the State of Idaho or under other applicable law
92
Sale of Pledged Collateral Pledgor recognizes that, subject to receipt of all
necessary regulatory approvals, Secured Party may sell all or any part of the Pledged Collateral
pursuant to Section 9.1 above, as and when applicable by means of one or more private sales to a
restricted group of purchasers who will be obligated to agree, among other things, to acquire such
securities for their own account, for investment and not with a view to distribution or resale. Private
sales shall be proper if made in a commercially reasonable manner; and Secured Party has no
obligation to delay the sale of any such security for the period oftime necessary to permit Universe,
Farmers, AIAI, or any other issuer of the Pledged Shares to register such securities for public sale
under any applicable securities laws or regulations. In the event any notice is required to be given
to Pledgor with respect to any such sale or disposition of any of the Pledged Collateral, ten (10)
calendar days notice of any such action shall be deemed to be a sufficien~ and commercially
reasonable notice .
93
Sale of Substitute Collateral. The parties acknowledge and agree that, in the event
zero coupon bonds meeting the requirements of Section I O(b) hereof are substituted for the Pledged
Shares, such bonds are intended to secure payment of the principal of the $6M Note at its stated
maturity date, and that the security interest in Commission Collateral granted in the Amended
Security Agreement is intended to secure Company's obligation to pay the interest on the $6M Note
prior to stated maturity. In the event of a Default occurring after zero coupon bonds meeting the
requirements of Section I O(b) hereof are substituted for the Pledged Shares, Company shall convey
such bonds to Creditor in lieu of foreclosure; and such conveyance shall discharge Company's
obligation to pay the principal of the $6M Note at maturity. However, the Company's obligation to
pay the interest on the $6MNote shall continue in the form of a monthly annuity of$41,250 (or, if
Pal!.e 9
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such Note has been partially prepaid prior to the Default, such lesser monthly amount of interest due
on the unpaid principal balance immediately prior to such Default) payable until the stated maturity
date of the $6M Note; and such obligation shall continue to be secured by the security interest in
Commission Collateral pursuant to the terms of the Amended Security Agreement
9.4
Attorneys' Fees. In the event either party is required to retain the services of an
attorney in order to enforce the terms or provisions of this Agreement or any of the other
Restructured Obligations, the prevailing party in any litigation arising therefrom shall be entitled
to recover reasonable costs of collection and sale of collateral and reasonable attorneys' fees

10.

Substitution and Release of Security

In the event that Pledger is able to obtain for the benefit of Secured Party (a) bonds having
a fair-market-value equal to Six Million Dollars ($6,000,000) or (b) bonds the aggregate face
amount of which equals $6,000,000 as of August 1, 2005, then Secured Party will allow Pledger to
substitute such bonds for the Pledged Collateral; provided that in either case the following
conditions are satisfied:
(i)

The bonds are issued by the US. Government or an obliger approved by

(ii)

The bonds are pledged to secure the Secured Obligations;

Secured Party,

•

(iii)
Secured Party receives a first priority security interest in such bonds which
is perfected prior to or simultaneously with the release of the Pledged Collateral;
Unless such requirement is waived by Pledgor, Pledgor provides an opinion
(iv)
oflegal counsel that Secured Party will have a first-priority perfected security interest in the bonds;
(v)

The Amended Down Payment Note has been paid in full; and

(vi)
Such arrangements are evidenced by executed documents, including a bond
pledge agreement, in form and substance acceptable to Secured Party and Secured Party's counsel.

If such conditions are met, Secured Party will release the Pledged Collateral and return any
and all certificates and instruments representing or evidencing the Pledged Collateral to Pledgor,
including, without limitation, the certificates for the Pledged Shares and the Assignments. In
addition, if and only if bonds meeting the requirements of Section lO(a) are pledged to secure the
Secured Obligations and if Company otherwise meets the requirements of this Section I 0, the
security interest in Commission Collateral granted in the Amended Security Agreement shall also
be released.

•

Pledger shall have the right, throughout the remaining term of the $6M Note, to prepay all
or part of the outstanding balance of principal and accrued but unpaid interest without premium or
penalty. In the event of any partial prepayment of the $6M Note after substitution of bonds for the
Pledged Collateral, Company may reduce the amount of bonds securing the $6M Note, provided that
the fair-market-value (in the case of bonds meeting the requirements of Section IO(a)) or the
aggregate face value (in the case of bonds meeting the requirements of Section 1O(b) of the
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remaining bonds shall not be less than 110% of the remaining principal balance of the $6M Note.

11.

Miscellaneous

11.1 Survival. All representations, warranties and agreements made in this Agreement or
in any related documents shall survive the execution and delivery of this Agreement and any such
related documents.
11 2 Further Assurances. (a) Pledger will sign such additional documents relating to the
Pledged Collateral as Secured Party may reasonably request in order to provide Secured Party with
the full benefit of this Agreement. Pledger hereby grants to Secured Party a power of attorney to
execute any such documents as Pledgor's attorney-in-fact. Such power of attorney is coupled with
an interest and shall be irrevocable until the Secured Obligations have been fully and finally paid.

•

(b) Upon the pledge ofbonds under Section 10 hereof, Secured Party will deliver the
Pledged Shares and attendant Assignments to Pledger, and will sign such additional documents
relating to the Pledged Collateral as Pledger may reasonably request in order to provide Pledger
with the full benefit of this Agreement. Secured Party hereby grants to Pledgor a power of attorney
to execute any such documents as Secured Party's attorney-in-fact Such power of attorney is
coupled with an interest and shall be irrevocable upon Pledgor's satisfaction of the conditions of
Section I 0 hereof
11 -3 Amendment. This Agreement amends, restates, supersedes and replaces the Stock
Pledge Agreement which shall hereafter have no further force or effect. This Agreement and the
other Restructured Obligations contain the complete and final expression of the entire agreement
of the parties
No provision of this Agreement may be amended, modified, waived, or
supplemented, except by a writing signed by the parties to this Agreement. No waiver by Secured
Party of any default shall be a waiver of any other default.
11 A Remedies Cumulative; Waivers. All rights and remedies of Secured Party shall be
cumulative and may be exercised at such times and in such order as Secured Party determines. The
failure of Secured Party to insist upon or enforce strict performance of any provisions of the
Restructured Obligations, or to exercise its rights or privileges hereunder or thereunder or any of its
rights as provided by statute or law or in equity or otherwise, shall not impair, prejudice or constitute
a waiver of any such right, power, remedy or privilege or be construed as a waiver of any Default
or as an acquiescence therein or preclude the exercise or enforcement thereof at a later time Nor
shall any single or partial exercise of any such right, power, remedy or privilege preclude any other
or further exercise thereof or the exercise of any other right, power, remedy or privilege.
11. 5 Effectiveness. This Agreement shall remain in full force and effect until (i) all the
Secured Obligations have been indefeasibly performed or· paid in full in cash, and (ii) this
Agreement has been terminated in writing by Secured Party.

•

11.6 Severability. If any of the provisions of this Agreement shall be or become illegal
or unenforceable, the other provisions shall remain in full force and effect

'

11. 7

Notices.

All notices, requests, demands and other communications which are
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required to be or may be given under any of the Restructured Obligations shall be in writing and
shall be deemed to have been duly given when delivered in person or transmitted by telex, facsimile,
cable or telegram, or by certified or registered first class mail, postage prepaid, return receipt
requested, to the respective parties as follows:
Ifto Company, to:

AIA Services Corporation ·
PO Box 538
One Lewis Clark Plaza
Lewiston ID 83501
Attention: John Taylor

With a copy to:

Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &
McK.lveen, Chartered
P.O. Box 1368
Boise ID 83701-1368
Attention. Richard A. Riley

Ifto Shareholder, to:

•

Reed J. Taylor
P.O. Box 1165
Lewiston ID 83501
Cairncross & Hempelmann
70th Floor, Columbia Center
701 Fifth Avenue
Seattle WA 98104-7016
Attention: W. Frank Taylor
Donna l Taylor
c/o Jvo TA--tl0'.'<r2'. ~ . CJ ~ S" SS:-

With a copy to:

If to Series A Preferred
Shareholder, to:

or to such other address as any party may have furnished to the others in writing in accordance
herewith, except that notices of change of address shall be effective only upon receipt
11.8 Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in accordance
with, the laws of the State ofidaho, without giving effect to their provisions or principles regarding
conflict oflaws
11 . 9 Headings. Headings used herein are for convenience only and shall not in any way
affect the construction of, or be taken into consideration in interpreting, this Agreement
11. I 0 Assignment. This Agreement is not assignable by Pledgor. Secured Party may
assign its rights hereunder to any corporation or other entity controlled by Secured Party.. All the
terms and provisions of this Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of and
be enforceable by the parties hereto and their respective successors and pennitted assigns.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have duly executed and delivered this Agreement as
of the date first written above.
Page 12
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PLEDGOR:

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION

By

ns

SECURED PARTY

Lkcr~
CM

~~/

•
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EXHIBIT_£
AMENDED AND RESTATED NONGOMPETITION AGREEMENT
This Noncompetition Agreement (the "Agreement") is entered into as of the I st day of July,
1996, by and between AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho corporation ("Company"), and
REED J. TAYLOR ("Reed").
RECITALS:
A.
Company and Reed are parties to that certain Stock Redemption Agreement (the
"Redemption Agreement") dated as of July 22, 1995 pursuant to which Company redeemed 613,494
shares of the Company's common stock owned by Reed. Pursuant to the Redemption, Company
made a promissory note dated July 22, 1995 payable to Reed in the principal amount of $1, 500, 000
(the "Down Payment Note"), and a promissory note dated August I, 1995 payable to Reed in the
principal amount of $6,000,000 (the "$6M Note"} The $6M Note is secured by a Security
Agreement (the "Security Agreement") and a stock Pledge Agreement (the "Stock Pledge
Agr~ment"), and the parties also entered into a Consulting Agreement (the "Consulting
Agreement") and a Noncompetition Agreement (the "Noncompetition Agreement"), all of which
were dated July 22, 1995. The Redemption Agreement, Down Payment Note, $6M Note, Security
Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement; C-onsulting Agreement and Noncompetition Agreement are
herein referred to as the "Original Documents."

•

B.
Concurrent with the execution of this Agreement, the parties have entered into a
Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement (the "Restructure Agreement") pursuant to which the
transactions and obligations evidence by the Original Documents have been restructured. Pursuant
to the Restructure Agreement, the parties have agreed, among other things, to amend the
Noncompetition Agreement.
·
C.
Agreement.
Agreement.

This is the Amended Noncompetition Agreement referred to in the Restructure
This Agreement amends, restates, supersedes and replaces the Noncompetition

AGREEMENT
For and in consideration of the foregoing premises and for other good and valuable
consideration, the sufficiency and receipt of which are hereby acknowledged, Company and Reed
agree as follows:
1.
Term. Reed's obligations hereunder shall terminate on December 31, 1998, unless
earlier terminated pursuant to the terms hereof.

•

Covenant Not to Compete. Reed hereby covenants that, during the term of this
2.
Agreement, Reed will not, without the prior consent of Company, directly or indirectly, whether as
principal or as agent, officer, director, employee, salesman, consultant or otherwise, alone or in
association with any other person, firm, corporation or other business organization, enter into,
participate in, engage in or own any material interest in the business of any person, finn, corporation
or other business organization that is engaged in or proposes to become engaged in:

(a)

the sale of life, health, workers' compensation or other disability insurance or
Pagel
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annuities to any farm-related association or the members thereof in any state where Company or any
of its Subsidiaries now or in the future has a relationship with such farm association;
(b)
solicit any farm-related association insurance business of any type now or hereafter
engaged in by Company from any person, trust, group or entity who at such time is a farm-related
association and holder of any insurance or annuity policy sold by Company or any of its Subsidiaries
or other agents.
Notwithstanding the foregoing covenants, nothing herein shall prevent Reed or Advantage Insurance
Agency, Inc. (or any other insurance agency controlled by Reed) from selling life insurance
products, in connection with the College Advantage Plan, to persons who are members of any farmrelated association which sponsors Company's insurance and annuity products.
3.
Injunctive Relief. If there is a breach or threatened breach of the provisions of
Section 2 above, Company shall be entitled to a temporary restraining order and an injunction
restraining Reed from such breach. Nothing herein shall be construed as prohibiting Company from
pursuing any other remedies for such breach or threatened breach.

4.
Notices. All notice required or permitting to be given under this Agreement shall be
in writing and shall be deemed to have been duly given or delivered if delivered personally or mailed
by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, with first class postage prepaid, to his
residence in the case of Reed, and to his principal office in the case of Company.

•

5.
Construction. Captions and other headings contained in this Agreement are for
reference and identification purposes only and in no way alter, modify, amend, limit or restrict the
·
contractual obligations of the parties.

6.
Severability. In the event that any one or more of the provisions contained in this
Agreement shall for any reason be held to be invalid, illegal or unenforceable in any respect, such
invalidity, illegality or unenforceability shall not affect any other provision of this Agreement; and
this Agreement shall be construed as if such invalid illegal or unenforceable provision had never
been contained herein, unless the deletion of the provision materially affects the overall plan and ~
agreement of the parties as reflected herein.
7.
Waiver of Breach. No waiver by any party hereto of any breach of any provision
ofthis Agreement by another party shall not operate or be construed as a waiver of any subsequent
breach.

8.
Govemine Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed and enforced
in accordance with the laws of the State ofldaho.
9.
Bindine Effect. This Agreement contains the entire agreement of the parties with
respect to noncompetition, and may not be changed orally but only by aq agreement in writing
signed by the party against whom enforcement of any waiver, change modification, extension or
discharge is sought.

•

10.
Entire Agreement. This Agreement supersedes and replaces the Noncompetition
Agreement in its entirety and contains the entire agreement of the parties with respect to
Page2
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noncompetition. This Agreement may not be changed orally but only by an agreement in writing
signed by the party against whom enforcement of any waiver, change, modification, extension or
discharge is sought.

11.

Attorneys' Fees. In the event either party shall bring an action in connection with

the performance, breach or interpretation of this Agreement, then the prevailing party in such action
as determined by the court having jurisdiction thereof, shall be entitled to recover from the losing
party in such action, as determined by the court having jwisdiction, all reasonable court costs and
expenses of such litigation, inducting attorneys' fees, court costs, costs of investigation and other
costs reasonably related to such litigation, in such amounts as may be determined in the discretion
of the court having jurisdiction.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have duly executed and delivered this Agreement
as of the date first written above.
COMPANY:

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION

~;,= 4~~t

•

di/~

REED:
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EXlilBIT_1:::_
LEASE AGREEMENT
TIIlS INDENTIJRE, made this 1st day of July, 1996, by and betWeen Reed J. Taylor and
Advantage Insurance Agency, Inc. hereinafter collectively referred to as LESSEE, and AIA
Insurance, Inc., hereinafter referred to as LESSOR.
WI1NESSETH:
I.

PREMISES:
The LESSOR hereby leases and demises to the LESSEE, subject to the terms and conditions
hereinafter set forth, the following described premises and parking , (collectively "Leased Property"),
to-wit:
The northeast wing and the common area related thereto consisting of3001 square feet, more
or less, of the first floor in the building known as the Lewis Clark Plaza, located at 111 Main Street,
in the City ofLeWiston, Idaho, (Premises).

•

Together with the non-exclusive use of all vehicle parking areas located at 1st and C Streets for
use of employee and customer parking. One parking place will be reserved for the use of Reed J.
Taylor in the Main Street parking lot located east of and adjacent to the leased Premises, in the space
currently marked with his name: One space, currently marked with the name D. Whisner shall be
available for the use of LESSEE. LESEE shall also be entitled to park one vehicle in the
temporaryparking area immediately east of the building for the purposes of providing mail
transportation. All other vehicles must be parked at the above described 1st an "C" Streets parking
lot.

II.

. USE:
LESSEE desires to use said Premi5es as an office. IBSSEE shall procure all necessary
licenses from the City ofLewiston, Nez Perce County, and the State of Idaho to conduct its business.

m.
TERM:

The temi of this lease shall commence upon the closing and execution of a "Restructure"
agreement between Reed J. Taylor and AIA Services Corporation, and terminate six months from the

•

1
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.

date of payment in full to LESSEE of the Amended and Restated Promissory Note (Amended Down
Payment Note) executed by AJA Services Corporation contemporaneously herewith. LESSEE shall
have an option to terminate this lease earlier, without penalty, upon five days written notice to Lessor.

2
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IV.
RENT:
LESSEE agrees to pay to LESSOR rent payable in monthly installments of ONE
TIIOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOILARS ($1500.00) for the Premises. All monthly installments
shall be payable in advance on or before the first day of each month and paid to LESSOR at P .0. Box
538, Lewiston, Idaho. Rent for partial month(s) shall be prorated .

v.
POSSESSION:
LESSEE is currently in possession of the premises ..

VI.
LESSOR COVENANTS:

•

•
.

The LESSOR further covenants and agrees with the LESSEE as follows:

A

Quiet Possession: LESSOR agrees, upon LESSEE paying rent as set fort herein, and
upon LESSEE complying and performing the agreements and covenants contained
in this lease on LESSEE'S part, that LESSEE shall and may at all times during the
term granted peacefully and quietly have, hold and enjoy the Leased Property without
any manner of let, suit, trouble, or hindrance from LESSOR, its heirs, assigns,
personal representatives or any other persons.

B.

Taxes: LESSOR shall promptly pay the real property taxes assessed against the land
and Premises.

C.

Fire Insurance: Lessor shall procure fire insurance on the Premises and pay the
premiums thereon.

D.

Present Improvements: During the term of the lease, LESSOR will maintain the roof
and exterior of the building in which the leasehold Premises are situate (excluding
glass breakage covered under paragraphs VII. B and C), and all common areas, such
as elevator, lobby, hallways, and parking lot, and to maintain, in original working
condition, all electrical wiring and fixtures (excluding the maintenance of bulbs in the
electrical fixtures located in the leasehold Premises and excluding janitorial services
for the leasehold Premises), all plumbing and sewage facilities, and all heating and air

3

002355

•

conditioning to meet the climatic conditions from time to time existing so that the
leasehold Premises may be comfortably used and enjoyed by LESSEE, its clients and
business invitees.

VII.

LESSEE COVENANTS:
The LESSEE further covenants and agrees with the LESSOR as follows:

•

A

Rentals: To pay each of the monthly installments of rent and the whole thereof as
above provided promptly and at the due date thereof.

B.

Maintenance: To maintain the leased Premises in as good condition as the same are
now, reasonable wear and tear excepted; not to suffer nor permit waste upon the
Premises, nor permit acts that will violate policies of insurance of the LESSOR, or
cause higher premiums thereon; and to keep the interior of the Premises in a suitable
condition.

C.

Repairs: To repair promptly, and at its expense, any damage caused to the Leased
Property by the LESSEE or its agents, invitees, or by anyone on the Premises (other
than LESSOR, or its agents), ordinary wear and tear excepted.

D.

Possession: Upon the expiration of the lease, or its sooner terminati!>n as herein
provided, to surrender to the LESSOR all keys to said Leased Property, and to quietly
have, surrender, yield and give up possession of the demised Leased Property.

E.

Assignment - Subletting: Not to assign this lease nor sublet the Leased Property or
any part thereof, without the express prior written consent of the LESSOR, and no
assignment or subletting hereof shall be valid by operation of law or otherwise
without such prior written consent.

F.

Alterations: Any alterations, remodeling, restoring or improvements to the Premises
shall require LESSOR'S written consent, which shall state the nature of the
alterations, whether or not the same shall be removable by the LESSE~ and if so,
when, whether and how the LESSEE shall repair any damages caused to said
Premises by the making, existence and/or removal of such alteration. At the end of the
lease, or any extended tenn thereof, said improvements, if pennanently affixed to the
Premises, shall be left on the Premises and revert to the benefit of LESSOR

G.

Lawful Occupancy: The LESSEE agrees that in its use and occupancy of the
Premises, it will not violate, but will observe and comply with all laws, ordinances and
4
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lawful regulations applicable thereto, and will not perform nor permit any unlawful
act upon said Premises.
H.

Hold LESSOR Harmless: To save and hold the LESSOR harmless from all claims for
damages on account of injuries to persons or property, occurring on the leased
Premises, or the approaches thereto, from any cause whatsoever, except for
negligence of LESSOR. LESSEE shall carry, at LESSEE'S sole expense, public
liability insurance covering any such risks with limits of not less than $100,000 per
person, $300,000 per occurrence, and $100,000 property damage. Such insurance
shall name LESSOR as an additional insured. LESSEE shall furnish LESSOR with
a certificate showing such insurance to be in full force and effect, and providing that
LESSOR shall be notified if such insurance should lapse.
VIII.

UTILITIES:

LESSOR will pay all costs of furnishing electricity, heating, air conditioning, garbage disposal,
water and sewage services rendered the leasehold Premises during the entire term of this lease.
LESSOR shall bill, and LESSEE shall pay within five business days of receipt of said bill, LESSEE'S
pro rata (based on percentage of use) charges relating to any shared telephone services.

•

IX
PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES:

.
LESSEE shall pay personal property truces on all trade fixtures and other personal property
of its business, including without limitation, and hold LESSOR harmless therefrom.

x.
SIGNS:
. IBSSOR agrees to install and maintain a directory listing the name and location of LESSEE
near tlie entrance to the building in which the leasehold Premises are situate. LESSEE shall be
entitled, at its sole cost, to install a sign of moderate size on or near the entry to the leasehold
Premises within the building; provided the sign shall be consistent in style and form to the signs
provided by LESSOR.
IBSSEE shall install no signs on the exterior of the building, including lettering on exterior
windows in which the leasehold Premises are situate, without first having obtained the written consent
ofLESSOR and also having obtained a certificate of appropriateness from the Lewiston West End
Historical Commission as provided under Section 19-1/2 of the Lewiston City Code .

•
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XI.

PARKING LOT:
LESSOR shall, at its cost, maintain and make available at all times off-street parking facilities
for LESSEE and its business invitees at LESSOR'S employee parking lot located at 1st and "C"
Streets.
Parking facilities to accommodate business invitees of LESSEE shall be provided and maintained
by the LESSOR on a non-exclusive basis. LESSEE and its employees shall not utilize the area
designated for paid parking and Lessor's customers and business invitee's in the lot directly east of • - ..
the descnbed Premises, other than as descnl>ed in paragraph I.. hereof LESSOR shall maintain such
procedures, rules and regulations as it deems necessary to enforce same.
XII.

NOTICES:

•

Any notices or demands to be given, seived, or made shall be validly and sufficiently given,
served or made: if from the LESSEE to the LESSOR, if the same is deposited in the United States
Mails at Lewiston, Idaho, by certified mail, return receipt, postage prepaid, addressed to the LESSOR
at: P.O. Box 538, Lewiston, Idaho 83501, AT'IN:: Dan Spickler; and if from the LESSOR to the
LESSEE, if the same is deposited in the United States Mails, by certified mail, return receipt, postage
prepaid, addressed to the LESSEE at: P.O. Box 1165, Lewiston, Idaho 83501, ATTN: Reed Taylor.
The service of such notice shall be deemed complete by the said deposit thereof in the United States
Mails as aforesaid. Either party may, by notice to the other in writing, designate a different place to
which notices shall be sent.
XIII.

DEFAULTS:
In the event of the default of any material provision of this lease by the LESSEE, (and each
covenant, provision, term and condition herein is considered a material provision and a consideration
for th~ execution of this lease, and time is of the essence of each and every of the foregoing), the
LESSOR may, at the time ofthe default or any time during the continuance of the default, notify the
LESSEE in writing thereof, specifically setting forth the item or items of claimed defaul~ and the
LESSEE shall, within fifteen (15) days from the date of such notice, correct the same.
In the event ofthe LESSEE'S failure to correct such default after notice as aforesaid, then the
LESSOR may terminate this lease by giving written notice thereof to the LESSEE in the manner
herein provided, the said termination to be complete upon the deposit in the mails of said notice in
the manner herein provided.

PROVIDED, in the event the LESSEE'S default and notice of the default is given and such

•
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default is corrected witlil.11 the tiine required, three (3) times during any one calendar year, then
thereafter no notice of default shall be required prior to the LESSOR'S exercise of its right on default,
but such default may be declared without notice.

XIV.

WAIVERS:
No waiver by the LESSOR of any term, covenant, or condition of this lease shall be
construed as a continuing waiver thereof: nor a waiver thereof: nor a waiver of any other term,
covenant or condition of this lease. Each and every default on the part of the LESSEE shall be
considered a separate and a new breach of the lease, irrespective of whether or not other defaults
exist at that time.
XV.

ATTORNEY FEES:
In the event of the necessity of legal process to enforce any covenant of this lease to be
performed on the part of either LESSOR or LESSEE, the prevailing party in such suit shall be
entitled to receive from the losing party a reasonable sum as attorney's fees in such action to enforce
the covenants of this contract, and the Comt in which judgment is rendered in such suit or action shall
fix the reasonable attorney fees to be taxed as costs in such suit.

XVI.

MODIFICATION:
This lease contains the entire agreement between the LESSOR and LESSEE. This lease and
the teJ¥18 hereof may be altered or modified only by the same being reduced to writing, signed by the
parties, ""specifically stating that it modifies said lease in the respects therein stated, and that it is to be
attached to and shall become a part of this lease. No such change may be affected by act or conduct,
or in any manner other than above stated.
XVII.

FIRE:
IT IS FURTIIER AGREED that in the event said Premises shall become untenantable by
reason of fire or other casualty, this LEASE shall terminate immediately.

•
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XIIL

POSSESSION SURRENDERED:
At the termination of this lease, whether at the expiration thereof or at the- election of
LESSOR as herein provided, LESSOR shall, at its option, re-enter the Premises and eject the
LESSEE therefrom, and in such case the LESSEE shall give immediate possession of the Leased
Property to the LESSOR, and the LESSOR may maintain an action for possession of said Leased
Property, after the right of re-entry has occurred, without notice_
XIX

LESSEE'S PROPERTY:
Any property belonging to the LESSEE and subject to removal by it shall be removed not
later than the close of business on the day of the expiration of the full term of this lease, or within ten
(10) days after the termination of the lease from any other cause_ A failure to so remove said property
or any part thereof, as aforesaid, shall entitle LESSOR to remove said property from the premises
without further responsibility therefore.

xx

•

WAIVER OF SUBROGATION:
LESSOR and LESSEE each hereby release the other from any and all liability or responsibility
(to the other or anyone claiming through or under them by way of subrogation or othe~se) for any
loss or damage to property caused by fire or any of the extended coverage perils, even if such file or
other casualty shall have been caused by the fault or negligence of the other party or anyone for
whom such party may be responsible; provided, however, that this lease shall be applicable and in
force and effect only with respect to kiss or damage .occurring during such time as the LESSOR'S and
LESSEE'S policy shall contain a clause or endorsement to the effect that any such release shall not
adversely effect or impair said policies or prejudice the right of the releaser to recover thereunder.
LESSOR and LESSEE each agree that its policies will include such a clause or endorsement.
XXI.

BINDING ON HEIRS:
This lease shall be binding upon the heirs, successors, personal representatives and assignees
of the parties hereto, PROVIDED that the provisions of this paragraph shall not be construed to
authorize any assignment hereinabove prohibited.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and
year first above written_

•
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LESSOR:

LESSEE:

•

STAIB OF IDAHO )
: SS.

County of Nez Perce )

S w. '-4

On this ....;&-cl day of

, 1996, before me a Notary Public in and for the State of
Idaho, personally appeared ij~ L. S~iclclerK-known or identified to me to be the SJ'.Gr~1>fthe
corporation that executed tlie a'i>~~e ~/Jent, and acknowledged to me that sdc'h""~qroration
executed the same.
..~~~~OF, I have hereu
and year fir~a-Oove wvd,.,.,~

,'

:.

\
.,.
~ .

\

··-.?~·\
··..•<"
DL-

, .....; t 1"'\; 1 r

!

·--0---

:

. II\

. Pusuc. :

*

{s
·.•
,, ..
\ .5'7 ·• •••••••• ··~~

.

ed my official seal the day

' 11£ OF \\J'f.

Notary Public in and for th
residing at Lewiston
My Commission Expires: _.3=1-/,_1-:>~--4--/~•o=----

STAIB OF IDAHO )
: SS.

•
.
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County of Nez Perce )
On this ::Btz..t> day of S ~ , 1996, before me a Notary Public in and for the State of
Idaho, personally appeared AQ.&_ __;[_ __4Mt+: known or identified to me to be the
1l ! ce. Pre. si krJof the corporation that executed the above instrument, and acknowledged
to me that such corporation executed the same_

STATE OF IDAHO

·~

)
)ss.

CountyofNezPe e)

_/··

On this
of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 19_ _~enW:
,
a Notary Public,
in and for the State of Idaho, rsonally appeared _ _ _ _ _....,...L_.__
_ _ _ _ _ _ ____;.
known or identified to me to be tli erson whose name is subs ·t?ed to the within instrument, and
acknowledged to me that he execut

•

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have her
and year first above written.

(S~

•

to set my hand and affixed my official seal the day

Notary Public in and for e State of
Idaho; residing at Lewiston,
My commission expires: _ _ _ __

10
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SERIES A PREFERRED SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT

THIS SERJES A PREFERRED SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT ("Agreement") is
made and entered into this 1st day ofJuly 1996, by and among AIA SERVICES CORPORATION,
an Idaho corporation ("Company"), REED J. TAYLOR ("Creditor) and DONNA J. TAYLOR
("Series A Preferred Shareholder").
RECITALS:
A.

Series A Preferred Shareholder is the owner of all of Company's issued and

outstanding Series A Preferred Stock. Company is redeeming that stock pursuant to (i) Company's
articles of incorporation and (ii) that certain letter agreement among the parties hereto and Cumer
L Green ("Green") dated January 11, 1995, as amended by (a) that certain letter from Green to

•

Richard A Riley ("Riley") dated March 22, 1995, (b) that certain letter agreement among the parties,
Green and Richard W. Campanaro dated July 18, 1995, and (c) that certain letter from Green to Riley
dated August 10, 1995 (collectively, the "Series A Preferred Shareholder Letter Agreements")..
Pursuant to the Letter Agreements, Company has reamortized its redemption obligation to Series A
Preferred Shar·eholder over a shorter period and has increased the rate of interest paid to Series A
Preferred Shareholder in exchange of waiver by Series A Preferred Shareholder of alleged defaults
by Company and other consideration.
B.

Pursuant to that certain Stock Redemption Agreement between Company and

Creditor dated July 22, 1995, as amended by that certain Addendum to Stock Redemption Agreement
also dated July 22, 1995 (together, the "Stock Redemption Agreement") and related agreements
including (without limitation) a Stock Pledge Agreement .(the "Stock Pledge Agreement") and a

•

Security Agreement (the "Security Agreement"). each dated July 22, 1995, granting a security interest

.
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in certain collateral to secure payment of the $6M Note, all of Creditor's shares of common stock of
Company were redeemed.

C.

As part consideration of the redemption of Creditor's common stock, Company: (i)

executed a promissory note dated July 22, 1995 payable to Creditor in the principal amount of
$1,500,000 (the "Down Payment Note") and (ii) executed a promissory note dated August 1, 1995
payable to Creditor in the principal amount of $6,000,000 (the "$6M Note").
D.

Simultaneously with the redemption of Creditor's common stock, the Company

reorganized by selling 150,000 shares of Series C Preferred Stock for $1.5 million, contributing that
$1. 5 million to the Company's wholly-owned insurance subsidiary, The Universe Life Insurance
Company ("ULIC"), and distributing ULIC's stock of its subsidiary, AIA Insurance, Inc. to the
Company ("Reorganization") .

•

E.

In connection with the redemption of Creditor's common stock and Company's

reorganization, the parties entered into the Letter Agreement dated July 18, 1995 which, among other
things, imposed certain restrictions on Company's payment ofinterest and principal to Creditor.
F.

Concurrent with the execution of this Agreement, Company and Creditor have entered

into that certain Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement (the "Restructure Agreement") pursuant
to which Company's obligations to Creditor under the Stock Redemption Agreement and related
agreements ha•;e been restructured (the "Restructure")..
G.

As a part ofthe Restructure, Company and Creditor have agreed to amend and restate

the Down Payment Note (as amended pursuant to the Restructure, the "Amended Down Payment
Note"), the Security Agreement and the Stock Pledge Agreement.
H.

In consideration of Company's willingness ta accelerate principal payments to Series

A Preferred Shareholder on its redemption of the Series A Preferred Stock, the Series A Preferred
Shareholder is wil1ing to release Company and Creditor from certain of those interest and principal
SERIES A PREFERRED SHAREHOillER AGREEMENT - Page 2
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payment restrictions contained in the Letter Agreements and to release Company from any and all
defaults under Company's Articles of Incorporation or the Letter Agreements, and to consent to the
restructure of Company's obligations to pay principal and interest to Creditor pursuant to the terms
of the Amended Down Payment Note as provided therein and in the Restructure Agreement.
AGREEMENTS
1.

Series A Preferred Stock Redemption.
(a)

Company will continue monthly payments to Series A Preferred Shareholder

in accordance with a ten year amortiz.ation (from the date redemption commenced) at prime rate plus
114% pursuant to paragraph I of the January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement.
(b)

In addition to (and without affecting the amount ot) the regular amortized

payment, Company will accelerate payment of principal by paying Series A Preferred Shareholder
•

$100,000 at the end of each six-month period beginning at the end of the six-month period
commencing upon full payment to Creditor of the Amended Down Payment Note.
( c)

Series A Preferred Shareholder will be entitled to accelerate the total

redemption obligation with respect to the Series A Preferred Stock upon lapse of thirty (30) days
after default by Company in payment when due of principal or interest on such obligation, unless
Company shall have cured such default within such 30-day period.
2.

Consent to Amended Down Payment Note. $6M Note and Security Therefor. Series

A Preferred Shareholder hereby consents to (i) Company's payment ofits obligations to Creditor in
accordance with the terms of the Amended Down Payment Note and the Restructure Agreement; (ii)
Company's payment to Creditor of its obligations to Creditor in accordance with the terms of the
$6M Note, subject however to the subordination provisions of Section 3 hereof; (iii) the grant of
security interests in the Commission Collateral and Pledged Shares to secure payment of the two
notes; and (iv) the possible future pledge of bonds pursuant to Section 10 of the Amended Stock
SERIES A PREFERRED SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT - Page 3
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Pledge Agreement and the release of security interest in part or all of the Pledged Shares and the
Commission Collateral.
3.

Subordination of Certain Principal Payments to Creditor. Payment of principal to

Creditor on the $6M Note (whether at maturity or at any earlier time in accordance with any right
of prepayment) shall be subordinated to payment in full of Company's obligation to redeem the Series
A Preferred Stock. Company shall not pay any principal on the $6M Note until the Series A
Preferred Stock is completely redeemed (provided, however, that this limitation shall not preclude
Company from exercising any contractual or equitable right of offset against the principal of the $6M
Note).
4.

Unconditional Release. Series A Preferred Shareholder releases Company and its

subsidiaries, their respective directors, officers, shareholders, employees, affiliates and other agents
in their official capacities, from all claims arising prior to the date hereof including, without limitation:
(i)

the assertion of purported dissenter's rights in connection with certain

transactions between ULIC and The Centennial Life Insurance Company;
(ii)

all claims against Company which are the subject of the various pleadings filed

on behalf of Series A Preferred Shareholder in her divorce action against Creditor in Case No. 51087
filed in Nez Perce County, Idaho;
(iii)

any breach of Company's articles of incorporation or the terms or conditions

of any of the Letter Agreements;
(iv)

any and all claims arising in connection with the Restructure, including

(without limitation) any dissente1's rights in connection therewith; and
(v)

•

any acts or omissions by Company, _its subsidiaries, affiliates, shareholders,

directors, officers, employees or other agents.
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5.

Agreement to Forbear. Notwithstanding the foregoing release, Series A Preferred

Shareholder's rights and protection under Company's articles of incorporation shall be preserved;
provided, however, that so long as Company has not failed to pay principal or interest for redemption
of the Series A Preferred Stock hereunder when due or within the thirty-day cure period provided
by Section I (c) hereof: Series A Preferred Shareholder agrees to forbear from alleging any default
under Company's articles of incorporation and further agrees to forbear from exercising or attempting
to exercise any remedy for such default, whether arising from the terms of the articles of
incorporation or under legal or equitable principles.
6.

Estoppel Certificate. Series A. Preferred Shareholder acknowledges that, to date,

Company has (i) paid $384,010 of principal ofits obligation to redeem the Series A Preferred Stock
and (ii) has redeemed 38,401 shares of the 200,000 shares of Series A Preferred Stock originally
•

issued to Series A Preferred Shareholder; and Series A Preferred Shareholder further acknowledges
that (iii) the unpaid principal balance of Company's obligation to redeem the Series A Preferred Stock
is $1,615,990 and (iv) 161,599 shares of Series A Preferred Stock remain outstanding.
7.

Representations and Warranties. Series A Preferred Shareholder represents and

warrants to Company and to Creditor as follows:
(a)

Series A Preferred Shareholder owns beneficially and of record all of the

outstanding Series A Preferred Stock, free and clear of all pledges, liens, encumbrances, security
interests, equities, claims, options or other limitations on Series A Preferred Shareholder's ability to
transfer such shares to Company upon payment of the redemption price. Series A Preferred
Shareholder has full right, title and interest in and to the Series A Preferred Stock, and the legal
capacity and authority to execute, deliver and perform this Agreement and the Restructure Agreement
•

and to consummate the transactions contemplated hereby and thereby.
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(b)

Company and Creditor have advised Series A Preferred Shareholder to consult

legal and other professional counsel in connection with this Agreement and the Restructure
Agreement and has had the opportunity to do so. Series A Preferred Shareholder has consulted such
attorneys, accountants, family members and other advisors as she has deemed necessary or desirable
to assist her in reviewing this Agreement and the Restructure Agreement and in detennining whether
it is in her best interests to execute and deliver them. Series A Preferred Shareholder has read and
understands the terms and conditions of this Agreement and the Restructure Agreement, as well as
the Letter Agreements which are being superseded and replaced by this Agreement and the
Restructure Agreement. Series A Preferred Shareholder acknowledges that she has had no contact
with Company or any of its directors, officers, legal counsel or other agents concerning this
Agreement or the Restructure Agreement; that this Agreement and the Restructure Agreement have

•

been drafted by counsel for Company and reviewed by counsel for Creditor; and that neither
Company, Creditor nor their respective counsel have represented Series A Preferred Shareholder in
connection herewith or therewith. Series A Preferred Shareholder acknowledges that her execution
and delivery of this Agreement and the Restructure Agreement have not been obtained by fraud,
duress, undue influence, coercion, breach of fiduciary relationship or breach of relationship of
confidence and trust; and Series A Preferred Shareholder hereby indemnifies Company against any
and all claims that her execution and delivery of this Agreement or the Restructure Agreement was
obtained by any such means .

•
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8.

General Terms.
(a)

All capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings

assigned in the Restructure Agreement
(b)

This Agreement supersedes any replaces the Letter Agreements in their

entirety. The Letter Agreements shall hereafter have no further force or effect
(c)

All notices, requests, demands and other communications which are required

to be or may be given under this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be deemed to have been duly
given when delivered in person or transmitted by telex, facsimile, cable or telegram, or by certified
or registered first class mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, to the respective parties as
follows:

•

Ifto Company, to:

AIA Services Corporation
P.O. Box 538
One Lewis Clark Plaza
Lewiston ID 83 SO I
Attention- John Taylor

With a copy to

Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &
McKlveen, Chartered
PO. Box 1368
Boise ID 83701-1368
Attention: Richard A Riley

If to Creditor to:

Reed l Taylor
PO. Box 1165
Lewiston ID 83501

With a copy to:

Caimcross & Hempelmann
70th Floor, Columbia Center
701 Fifth Avenue
Seattle WA 98104-7016
Attention: W. Frank Taylor

Ifto Series A Preferred
Shareholder, to:

Donna l Taylor
c/o :Tu d Tar..lcrc
fJ. Ok .tfot $'j\.f'
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•

or to such other address as any party may have furnished to the others in writing in accordance
herewith, except that notices of change of address shall be effective only upon receipt. Company's
payments ofits redemption obligation to Series A Preferred Shareholder shall be delivered to Series
A Preferred Shareholder at her notice address as provided above.
(d)

This Agreement and the other Restructure Agreement contain the complete

and final expression of the entire agreement of the parties concerning Company's redemption of the
Series A Preferred Stock. No provision of this Agreement may be amended, modified, waived, or
supplemented, except by a writing signed by all parties to this Agreement.
(e)

This Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the

laws of the State ofldaho, without giving effect to any provisions or principles regarding conflict of
laws .

•

(f)

Headings used herein are for convenience only and shall not in any way affect

the construction of, or be taken into consideration in interpreting, this Agreement
(g)

Each provision of this Agreement is interdependent with and inseparable from

every other provision hereof; and each covenant herein is given in consideration of every other
covenant herein. If any provision of this Agreement is invalid, illegal, unenforceable or inapplicable
to any person or circumstance to which it is intended to be applicable, in whole or in part, this entire
Agreement shall be void .

•
'
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EFFECTIVE as of the date first set forth above.
COMPANY:

AJA SERVICES CORPORATION

CREDITOR:

SERIES A PREFERRED
SHAREHOLDER:

DONNA TAYLOR

LfL~4F
APPROVED:

- - - for Series A
Preferred Shareholder

•

;

.

•
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tht• com.pany l inal'Ud.1ni th• i:sontd1'UU6n a~ dd..tt.to.nd <:•pit;ll.l
thro~~h A pr1vot• PlaGQlan~ ~O ba cond~Qt•~ Qy J,Q, Xirui«:\11 and

CompAhY1

XAOOt';PCr-~vd.

l..
lU'taot.iv1 Fthr\2.t.)!y .1, i;~s, ·rtft.rdlfl•s o~ tha Oli\tco111.e ot
t:lu~ pr:iva.c• .p:U.o•Hnt:., tl'1i!!I tnonthly .P::d•n4d •t;ol( t'•delll.Pt.i~n
P~f.llltn~Q shall ba OQhveit•~ fro~.~ ~ift••n y•a~ cao~ticatiQn ·at
pri11c 't'ate 1¥H 2.""l/2.' to ~ tan-yaar PIYOU'.lt a.t. p;~a re.ta PlU.41
1/"4:t 1 1:p aonro:i= Vith. th• tierma ot ~' 1ntii;.ipat•4 11at• tia.~en~ to
R~ad ~- '.r~y1or ~c~ r•d~tion ct.hid OQ%21llon stcl:)k, Xn ad~ition,
yo~r olient v111 be •ntitltd to 10~~1·~~• thl ~~de:Jf\p~i~n

oblig~~ion upcn iap•• et f~'taen d~ys atte~ 4•t~u1~ in P•Yll\~nt oi

tho

p~in~i.p~1

or

it•l:'ll•t,

·

.

Ju~th•~t A!A &Al:"'ioa• eo~poration'• note o~ •ny ~ote pkya~1e
~~ ~·•~ J. ~~lo~ ~6r t.l)e $6,000,000 purchaa• pric& tQ: hie pciiuioh
ohar0• "fill l:i• subo~n&.~cd to th• r•d~ptioli r.1¢\t• o: y~u:r oHoht
so th~t 241•~ it. ~•ylor wi11 rGcaiva no ~~incipll P•ina•nts on ·~1~
noh until .Oonn11 TQ)'l1o1r• • •too~ h1u1 baon ocn:.pbt:;~ly r•'<\•m11c,d. :R.eld
J, ~~Ylo~ wl1~ r1oa1v1 tto int•rdlt paYJn.en~• on the nQ\e p~ya.ble to
him it ~~ymsnt• to Conn~ ~•ylot ara in da~&Ult. ShoUld ~s~d J,
'1tJ>lor t~anlltar hb r~airJinq l.l3, 4~4 ~!.\HI ct ~IA Snv~ou QOl\Ul\Qn
stock to th• Ca:rpo~a~ion, dire~tly or indi~otly or •!t•9'2at4 &
r1duotion ~r •li~in~'ion ot hiq n~t• in sOJrie oth•~ lagh~~n, t>onn~
~aylo~•4 redQrnption ob1iqatien ~ha11 ~•qome du• an~ ruily payab1•.
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~o ·c:lodnq ot th.1a ,ri\>ata pta.eia111ent,
yo~~ c1iitn~'• m;i•tinq,Ql~i~• a.ra p~eees:i.t•d •n4 ~icaov4ry

l:n tha in<t;t!:'.tm pdql"

ol
aontinu••

Al.A. S4tVioom

a~~aon

1•

to

cooP.atat~

witn

yo~

in

sat~ln9

1~ the ofta;ing
unsuac~s•lul, ~ithin Ii~ t~ya
t•~in~~ioh ~! tho oefet"ini•

h•arirli,

all

may
a

aftor

:I.
X! t.no }?t'i.Ytta pl.l.cu~nt iia •1Jcc•11tul., AIA 8otv1.QH vill pa.y
to Donni. !L'cayl.o:- & 1wp eull\ rad•!Qpt.iOI\ tJay:niant ct $700, ooo pl\.\$
~100 1 000 far ~rot&teiona~ tees ino\irr•d by your otiant in puro~~g
htt' aldm. t& 41te •
In «dditiot\, to tht extant: th• o!tod.ng

ot '5, JISO 1 ooo, AIA
will. P•Y !fO\tt' olhJ.1.t a•ob doU.._.t' ot nai: atf1u:inw )rQ06tda
in e:tatH .11( th• l!.ltt!JllltJ!l ·iup to . tM fql.l. c=ount ot ~· unpd4
prino1p&l balanue ·of the• ni!.Hl~eion pdee,
rt tll• o.fte:r:inq
proc••dll exac.c~d eA~ lllinL1r1lll1l bu.~ do. Mt ~o~oh the malt;1'lllWD, •ny
p:"ocud• exceed th• lllinilllUll\ ofhr.i,ng. lawl
envio~1

~np~i4

prinoipal ba1&na• 6t

~t

redemption

p~iQa

will

~e

paid in

?110.nthl.y in11taUment.f baat4 upon th• tim-yea.t- aJU<at'tintion. fl1- p:ril'll•
pl'11 1/·O •
.

I

'·
condttiolta4 \\~on th•: •uoa111&at~l oompl'l'tion of tb.• p::ivah
pl.t.oa:ml!.tlt ~!£ yo\U' el.U,flt!s r:ao•i~t ot tha torQc;Oin~ p&;(lllanta,
t>ot\na T11.;rlcr r6leaH.I AtA B•rliQIJI CO:t"pQl'&tion. ant it •~eld~a~j,oa,
thdr :n1pao~ive ottiQflt"•1 d.ir10.tt1r1S1 •h&rehQl.&llt•, .· GlTlpl.oyo<rs I
Qffilia~ •• ~n4

other atJ•~t• in t:ha1r ort1oial d&,,ci~~QS/ fro~ all
li11tLt1tiQn, hA~ •••~ti~n of p~tparc•d «t•a•nt•~'* ri9ht•

c1&im!S' ad•i.n~ ~t'iot: '\I.a o1gdn9 ~f tn4 privatu pl•ot:uen1: U\clu~inq,
wi~hout

in oonneo.t.ion "Jit.h "h• C1:Lnt•nn:ta.1

\t'•rus&i;i\ion and au
kfllnst the eo::pe~1.tion \t)liah ue ·th•· •ubjaat of ti.ha
p~~adingo you h•v• fil~~ on b•b1lt ot to~~ eiitnt in t:bt
a.oti1.;1n (Cu• Ni:l. S.l.0$7) in ~ez 1Qi'Cllil co1.1nty. lfQv•v•r- 1 r:&'Ll.Clh

o1lba
v-.rhua
41vorcv
t'-alean

figt r~l•a•• Ree~ ~a11or irn!ividu~11y trom hi• obl~i•tiQn ta
rray2.o~ 1rJ.ainq .t.::'011 l n;ld divorq1 Mt1on.
ru~s:- 1
Taylor 1 ~ riihta ~n~ p~ot~gtion• 1& ~ pr•tar:t4 •h*tehQlder ~biqh
a~• se\ tort;:h 1h th• Aa•n4•d ~i-1:.Lales ot Inga~or~tion shall b•

do••

oonnl

Donna:

\lddil:l.bn, JUbjtot: tc th.t ~1.211.• oonclitiona, 09tma
ti>, and ag.t'H$ thi:tt rah• Vill not AHnt d1&1anter 1ll
right• in o~nn•otion with •11 co;por~t• trah11ac~ion$
to
p~•nrved.
<%n
!llaylc~ ao1ulfant11

6~fecrt:ua.t. ~e P1'1V1'~• pl.ClOlt.i•nt,

a.10.cndm.tsnt , Of thtt crCt'pQt"llt.ion '•
a.utho:t:-iH the creation ot tha
va~~•nts, th~ i••~&l:lal
1nve1tors, th~ ~•nQy

neo••••l:'Y

iMl\td.inq (1f.:tth~q-; ).;bai~atiqn}
AttiolH ot IrtQo~ot't \ion to

naa~""'l"Y pl:'et•rr•~ 1t~c;; And
e&01.1~iti11 ~o the ~~iv~ta pllcem~nt
Aqralitl!lant With J,
~inn•~d and ~clQPany,

ot 1uoh

o.

InoorpClr11~•d and the conduct of tha 1>r.iv11.t• ph.ce~•nt in ~ooo;rdllnc•
thQ:t'•vith, thtt U•• 91! tlt<1 p.t'OpQlf•d conft4•nt:i6l. p:z:-J.vt.ta :U,tJ•lll.an1:

Me~o~andlllll ~·~r•a•ntin~ th•t f~ur gliont ha# aon••nt~d
tran•~oti9nc, th• •or;er o( ~ic.h. e•~pan&~o'• Pel•~-~

to &ll auoh
corpo:ation

'~to AIA S•rYiaea cor~~ration •nd lll o~har •otiOh.11 n•Q•••~.rt to
.1,hva 1:Jl.Q C.t.pJ.tlll, •b=\1.C~llrd (U of t,he Olotiih'l 9f tht ,p;ri.Vft.t$

plaaamc:i:n~)
(.?b%110l.'kt•

ratl•atci;1 in th• Privitte
tra.nu,otion• w~:l.t not be

Pl.1.0•111.an~ Ki:.ll\...r•nc1Wn~
auoh.
2s5
a.l l.ow•d. to ~;.~~'/fl~ ,•~~ ..c~Lv.-p.\PI.0002

unle&a tni;i ot~inct .1• .uc::a••"'t:':"i.1 •"1ct i::ll•l'~1:Qr• •
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not ~~i~e ~nr ~ights o~ ~· prQj~~ioed by hor gon••nt ta, and ~aivQr
ot d!~s•nt4r'• r1~ht4 i~ donnocticn ~it:h th~•e t~anaaatiotts.
~t the aorp¢~ation g¢~plQtal~ reds•m• yQUr glient'• Rr•t•r~$d
~tcck, Cenn~ ~ayior oomplct~ly ralaa•e• ~IA sar-vte•• co~orAt~on
~nd ~t• ~~•i4{ario~, th•i~ ~•~p~etiv• otficers, d~raatora,
~h&r•holderQ, •~ptoy•e•, •tfiliaths ~n¢ ctna~ &qQttt• 1 and ~aed. J.
r~y1or

aQ

4n Ln4iv14u.&11 trom &ll claimt.

It thl1 l•tt•r •ocu.~~t•ly 1tatq1 ~ur ~greGmo~t, plaa~• •i9n
en~ Obtain ~~\aZ' ~l1Gntts si;nlture b•lb'J, and tax a copy o~ thia
fully ax1duttd. 1att.a:: u ua ac Joon a1 pouibla. Z:1'•2i'h D•l;'lin ~srid
you ".ill mutu.al.ly pre.riarsi a d:ran. o.t a detinit.tva Httlem•nt

aq~aom•nt inootparatin~

nGQ•·•~ry ~o

•tt•otuat•
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tb~•qoinq

th~ t•~
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Qf t:.hi•
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~011;

LAW

OFFICES

WJ7

R,,i,_,, ld•l\o

83701-~~,7

·1tloplu:1110: (10~) J.12·8'!5

·n.to:copier: (Z08) 1"2·2718

March 22, 1995

- v1a telecopy ~iohard

A. ~iley, Esq.

EDERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& Mc!<LVEEN
300

N.

Boi~e,

6th. Street

XD

Re:

83701
Taylo~

v. Taylor

GLO File No.:

4068 00 001

Daa:r Dick:

Just

a

note

to

menorialize

our

understanding

that

the

a?tlortiz~tion cont:emplated under tha letter 0£ January l1 1 1995 (the
Donna Taylor agree~ant) was tha~ recalcuJ.ated payments would begin
in such an amount (a·s of Februa:?:y 1, l.995) that tha amount due tQ

Donna Taylor would be amortized over a period 0£ ti~e which wo\U.d
be ten years from the date the ·:redemption began (107 pay1Mmba
co~~encin9 on Febrqary l, 1995).
· Would you kindly confirm by way of a signed fax cop¥ a~ this
letter and advise ArA Ser'Viaes ··ta ,,111ake the appropriat:Q adjustm'1nta
to those paym~nts which already h~ve been made and wnicb will be
:made uncler.the. Donna Taylor agreement.
Thank you for your courtesy and coperation in theGe regards.

c

~5?·~~~
'-~
c

:;:::::

CUltCar L. Green
Cl.G:df

cc:

Ms. susan·Eastlake, C.P.A.

Ms. Donna Taylor
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AIA Unlver:• lrn:urance Group
One Lawis Clarie Plaza
P.O. eox538
L9wisron, /dahQ 8JS01.Q5J8
(Z08) 799·9000 FAX (206) NS-8159

·•

AIA Universe

July 18, 1995

Cumer L. Green. Esq.
Green Law Offices
P.O. Box 2897
Boise, ID 83 70 !
Re:

AlA Services Corporation/Donna Taylor

Dear Cumer.
1his letter supersedt:s our January 11, 1995, lerter except for those provision already accomplished

and/or modified by your letter of March 22, 1995. This letter memorializes our further agreement
cqnceming Donna J. Taylor's inrerest in AIA Services Corporation as the holder of its Stated Value
Preferred Stock and in the pending reorganizariofl of that company, including the contribution ·of
additional capital through a private placement or aurhorized borrowing.

1.

Your client will be entitled to accelerate the total redemption obligati<>n wi[h respect

to her preferred stock tr pon !apse offifteen days after default in payment of the principal or interest.

2.

Ftrn:her, AJA Scervices Corporation's note or any note payable to Reed J. Taylor for

approximately $6,000,000 of the purchase price for his common shares will be subordinared to the

rede1~1pcion

rights of your clit::nt so that Reed J. 'faylor will receive no principal payments on said

note until Donna Taylor's stock has been completely redeemed. Ret::d J. Taylor will receive no
interest payments on the note payable

to

him if payments to Donna Taylor arc in default. Should

AIA0002288
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Cumer L. Green
July 18, 1995
Page 2
Reed J. Taylor directly or indirectly effectuate a reduction or elimination of his note in some fashion
for consideration received from the Corporation, Donna Taylor's redemption obligation shall
become due and fully payable.

3.

In the interim prforto Donna Taylor being paid the sum of $800,000 (other than from

nonnal amortization), all of yout client's existing claims are preserved. and discovery may continue.
AJA Services agrees co cooperate with you in setting a hearing, if such payment is nor received
within ninety (90) days after the Reorganization,

4.

This agreement contemplate:l char the Corporation wiU close the sa!e of 150,000

sh.ares of Series C Preferred Stock for$ I.S million, the contribution of$ l .5 million to the Universe
Life Insurance Company ("ULIC") and UL!C's distribution of the srock of its subsidiary, AfA
Insurance, Inc., to the Corporation ("Reorganization").

Funds received by the corporation from adq_icional sales of Series C Preferred Stock or new
authorized borrowing (or any combination thereof) in c;<cess of such $1.5 million proceeds of the
Reorganization shall be allocated as follows:

(i)

The first $100,000 shall be paid co Donna Taylor for reimbursement of

professional fees incurred.
(ii) The ne>:t $1.4 million will be paid in equal amounts, as received, to Donna

Taylor and Reed Taylor until Donna Taylor has be.en paid $700,000 for redemption of her
Preforred Stock (in addicion to the regular amon:ization payment),
(iii) Thereafter, the next $800,000 shall be paid to Reed Taylor until Reed Taylor

has been paid the full S 1.5 million downpayment for tedcmpcion of his Common Swck.
If Donna Taylor has noc been paid the full $700,000 within ninecy (90) days following the

Reorganization, the Corporation's monthly payment of interest on the Corporation's approximate $6
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Cumer L. Green
July 18, 1995
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million note payable to Reed shall be reduced to the amount ofmonchly payment to Donna Taylor
for redemption of her Preferred Stock; and the excess amount of such interest payments due to Reed
Taylor shall be accrued and payable to Reed Taylor only if and after Donna Taylor has received the
full $700,000 redemption payment.

Corporation agrees that it will not grant any stock options. warrants or other interest in
~orporation's stock to Richard W. Campanaro unless and until Donna Taylor has received the full

$700,000 redemption payment and the Corporation has obtained $3.5 million in proceeds from the
sale of Series C Preferred Stock or additional authorized borrowing or any combination thereof.

5.

Conditioned upon the payment of such $800,000 to Donna Taylor, Donna Taylor

releases AIA Services Corporation and its subsidiaries, rheir respecdve officers, directors,
shareholders. employees, affiliates and other agents in their official capacities, from

au

claims

arising prior to closing of the Reorganization including. without limitation, her assenion of

purported dissenter's righcs in connection with the ~entennial cransaction and all claims against the
Corporo.cion which are the subject of rhe various pleadings you have filed on behalf of your client
in the divorce action (Case No. 51087) in Nez Perce County. However. such release does not
release Reed Taylor individually from his obligation ro Donna Taylor arising from said divorce
action. Further, Donna Taylor's rights and p~otections as a preferred shareholder which are set forth
in the Amended Articles oflncorporation shall be preserved.

In addition, subject to the same conditions. Donna Taylor consents to. and agrees that she
will not assert dissenter's righcs in connection with, all corporate transactions necessary co effectuate
the Reorganization, including (without limitation) amendment of the corporations's A.nicles of
[ncorporation to authorize the creacion of the necessary preferred stock and warrants, the issuance
of such securities to the private placement investors, the use of the proposed Confidential Private
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Cumer L. Green
July 18, 1995
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Placement Memorandum dated June I, 1995, representing that your client has consented to all such
transactions, and all other actions necessary to achieve the capital structure (as of the closing of the
Reorganization} reflected in that Private Placement Memorandum.

6.

If the corporation completely redeems your client's preferred stock, Donna Taylor

completely releases A1A Services Corporation and its subsidiaries, their respective officers,
directors, shareholders, employees, affiliates and other agents, and Reed J. Taylor as an individuaJ,
from all claims.

If this letter accurately states our agreement, please sign and obtain your cli<!nt's signature
below, and fax: a copy of this fully executed lener to us as soon as possible. Eberle Berlin and you
will mutually prepare a draft of a definitive settlement agreement incol'poracion the foregoing terms
and other documents necessary to effectuate the terms of this Agreement.
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Very truly.yours,

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION

By,~
R. TAYLOR

D. TAYLOR

By~QJ~L
Donna T~~r
.
J.

'i:

APPROVE~D

~

~,,;q =·~
G'reon

· -
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EBERLE, BERL.IN, KADING, TURNBOW & MCKLVEEN,

CHARTERED
ATTORNl(Y:l ""0 COl.JNS!!:L.ORS /AT LA"'
CAP•T01..

F•RK Pr_Az•

;JOO lo/OATH SIXTH ST .. Ee;T
POST 0F"F"IC£

R1cH ... Ro A. RrL£v

Boi:se:,

T11:1..l!:FHONI;':

(<:oei :i ... 4·a!:i_;i:i

eo:.; 1368

IOAHO

6.::3701
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August IO, 1995
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C:OUNSI!:~

Cumer L. Green, Esq.
Green Law Offices
P.O. Box 2597
Boise ID 8370 l -2597

Re:

AIA Services Corporation/Donna Taylor

Dear Cumer:

This letter confirms my understanding of our conversations subsequent to the execution
and delivery of the July 18, 1995 letter agreement among AIA Services Corporation, Reed
Taylor, Donna Taylor and Rich Campanaro. That letter provides that the corporation ~will not

grant any stock options, warrants or other interest in corporation's stock to Richard W.
Campanaro unless and until Donna Taylor has received the full $700, 000 redemption payment
and the corporation has obtained $3.5 millioo. in proceeds from the sale of Series C Preferred
Stock or additional authorized borrowing or any c.ombination thereof." It is my understanding
that you have agreed, and hereby request that you confirm by signing below and returning this
letter, that this provision is not intended to affect and will not affect the corporation's obligation
to issue to Mr. Campanaro 50 1 000 shares of Series C Preferred Stock and attendant Series C
Warrants for $500,000 cash in accordance with.. the terms· of the Investment Agreement dated
June 30, 1995 among the Company and Messrs. Campanaro, Cashman and Beck.
In addition', Section 9.e. of the June 30, 1995 Investment Agreement, as approved by the
Board at the July 18, 1995 meeting, contains the following condition precedent to closing of the
sale of .$1.5 million of Series C Preferred Stock and Warrants:
e.

Donna Taylor Waiver and Buyout. The Company

and Reed Taylor shall obtain a waiver in form and substance
satisfactory to the Investors: (i) waiving any and all defaults,

breaches and/or rights to acceleration of the payments that Donna
Taylor may have been due to her under any of her agreements
with the Company; and (ii) stating that she has reviewed the Reed
·Taylor Buyout Agreement and that it is acceptable in its present

form and she will not make any claim for acceleration for her
payments based on any term contained in the Reel! Taylor Buyout
Agreement or from the consummation of any of the transactions
contemplated therein.
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Cumer L. O~n, Bsq,
AUIU!t 10, 199.S
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Menn, Cashman snd Beok have 1110 requested Donna Taylor's .reaMrmation that <.ion!lstont
wUh the !uJy 18, 1995 Ltltor Aareem~nt she wtUves any cbjection to the tran1&elion1 re.quired
to 11.ccam~lilh the te.otBanlutlon of the Company whloh wero approved by the l3oard of
Directors &t ltJ meeUng July 18, t;~s H weU u the Company'a exch1nge of $,Ol SpClOial

Optlont for Seric11 C Warnnts.

W~ would 1ppr~date your conflrm1na, by signing betow and retu.rnfoa thi1 letter, the
wA.lven required b)J th~ f11ve1tot1 111 d11crlbed above. In lh.11 resard and In r0Qo1nltlan ot the
1i"anctal ~f'fe.ots of the. reorganlutlon, you fttdlcated a wJUlnsness to renegoUuta t:hei tlnano!al
coven1nt1 contalnld ln A.ftlclt Pourth ot Ch• Compan)"r Artictu of Inoorporatlan retadng to the
Serles A Pre~tred Stock or a rnoratotium on •nforcement of th& oUlftnt ooveruant& I.or a
teaRonable time lo enable the Company to fmple1ri1nt i
tended bualncss plan.

RAlll•
CIDI

1\, lc1m 'l'•)ltnr
D1111l.I L. SplD.lcf..,..

By my sljnature below, I ronOrm your und1u11umding o! cur dl1cu11lan1 and s.3n1amentM
u co11talnid in tl\e July 18. t 995 Lellllr Asreemtnt and 111 de1acrlbtd t.bl)ve.

AIA0002294

002382
AIA0002294

------

--

-

----

------

-----------------------------

,,

"

::

'

.;

;i

EXHIBIT

51+
002383

Series A redemption = ltd. to avail smplus funds under law
4.2.3 (b) rt to demand redemption "from any legally available funds ... but only to
extent such red shall not violate IBCA restrictions on corp's red of own shs."
When tested? Svcs probably had adequate surplus @time of commencement of amdt of
Articles to create pfd stk redemption obligation
Reed = subord to Donna re prin pymt
[therefore] no impairment of capital

002384

SUBORDINATION AGREEMENT
Tiris Subordination Agreement ("Agreement,,) is entered into as of December I, 2006, by
and between Donna J. Taylor, a single person ("Donna") and Reed J. Taylor, a single person
("Reed"). Reed and Donna are hereinafter referred to individually as a "Party" and/or collectively
as the "Parties."

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises contained in this
Agreement, the sufficiency of whjch is acknowledged as sufficient, full and complete
consideration for this Agreement, the Parties agree as follows:
1. Subordination. Donna agrees to unconditionally and irrevocably subordinate all
amounts and obligations owed to her under the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement
between AJA Services Corporation ("AIA Services"), Donna and Reed dated July 1, 1996
(including any modifications thereto, if applicable) to be junior to all payments (including
principal and interest), obligations, rights and/or remedies owed to Reed by AIA Services, AIA
Insurance, Inc. ("AlA Insurance") and/or any other person or entity. The effect of this Agreement
shall be to make all obligations and/or amounts owed to Donna Taylor by AIA Services
Corporation, AIA Insurance, R. John Taylor and any other person or entity subordinate and
junior to all amounts and obligations owed to Reed by the foregoing persons and entities under
the agreements identified in Section 2. Reed shall be entitled to collect all amounts owed to him
before Donna's Preferred A Shares of AJA Services are redeemed or any further payments are
made to Donna. The effect of this Agreement shall be to permit Reed to collect, litigate, obtain
judgment, and/or enforce any and all rights and remedies which relate in any way to the $6
Million Promjssory Note, plus all accrued interest, costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees owed to
Reed through the various agreements set forth in Section 2 below. This Agreement may result in
Reed obtaining payment, ·assets, and/or judgments which represent some or all of the amounts
owed to him, while Donna's rights will be junior and inferior to Reed. Donna authorizes Reed to
provide copies of this Agreement to any person. entity or court as Reed may unilaterally elect in
his sole discretion.
2. Agreements Affected by Donna's Subordination •. Donna expressly subordinates all
amounts, rights, obligations, and remedies owed to her in favor.of (and jwiior to) Reed J. Taylor
Wlder the follo'Vt'.ing agreements (including all claims, remedies, rights under such agreements):
(a) $6 Million Promissory Note between Reed and AIA Services Corporation ("AIA Services")
dated August 1, 1995; (b) Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement between Reed, Donna and
AIA Services dated July I, 1996; (c) Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement between
AIA Services and Reed dated July I, 1996; (d) Amended and Restated Security Agreement
between AIA Services, AIA Insurance, Inc., and Reed dated July 1, 1996; and (e) Letter between
Reed, R. John Taylor, and Donna dated February 27, 2001; (£)Series A Preferred Shareholder
Agreement between AIA Services, Donna and Reed dated July 1, 1996; and (g) any other
agreement, contract or promise of any kind or nature.
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3. No Waiver of AIA Services Corporation's Defaults. The Parties acknowledge and
agree that the execution of this Agreement shall not constitute either Party's waiver of AIA
Service's defaults on payments due to Donna. This Agreement simply subordinates all amounts
and obligations due to Donna under the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement in favor of
amounts and obligations owed to Reed.
4. No Waiver of Personal Indebtedness. The Parties agree that this Agreement shall
not waive, modify or extinguish any personal indebtedness which may be owed by R. John
Taylor or Connie Taylor to either Party for any debt, claim or cause of action.

S. Voluntary Execution. In executing this

Agreement~

the Parties acknowledge that

they have either consulted with an attorney prior to executing this Agreement or have elected to

enter into this Agreement without consulting an attorney. The Parties acknowledge that they
have executed this Agreement only after careful independent investigation, voluntarily and
without fraud, duress or undue influence. The Parties expressly waive any and all defenses
which may be later alleged or pied relating to lack of or failure of consideration. The Parties
expressly agree that their mutual promises are adequate and more than sufficient consideration
for this Agreement.
6. Right, Power and Authorirt;. The Parties warrant to each other that they have the
right, power and authority to execute and enter into this Agreement. Donna represents that she
has not assigned her rights to any payments or other rights in the Series A Preferred Shareholder
Agreement to any person or entity.
7. Effect. This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of each Party to
this Agreement, together with his/her agents, spouses, heirs, executors, administrators,
successors, and all persons now or hereafter holding or having all or any part of the interest of a
Party to this Agreement. If any dispute, conflict, or question arises between the Parties regarding
any interpretation of this Agreement and/or the law, the Parties agree that the tenns, conditions,
and obligations created under this Agreement shall not be construed and/or interpreted against
the drafting party.
8. A1mlicable Law. The Parties agree that this Agreement shall be interpreted under the
laws of the State ofidaho and venue of any dispute shaU be in Nez Pef<'.e County, Idaho.
9. Counterpart! and Facsimile or Scanned Transmbsioo. This Agreement may be
executed in counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original instrument. Facsimile or
scanned transmissions of any signed original document, or transmission of any signed facsimile
or scanned document, shall be the same as delivery of an executed original. At the request of any
of a Party, the Parties shall confirm facsimile transmission signatures by signing and delivering
an original document. The Parties may execute duplicate originals of the Agreement.

10. Assignment. Reed may assign this Agreement and/or any rights under this Agreement
without Donna's consent
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11. Further Assurances. Donna and Reed agree to execute any and all further documents,
pleadings, agreements and the like necessary to carry out the terms and intent of this Agr.eement.
The Parties hereby execute this Agreement as of the date indicated above.
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RODERICK C. BOND
NED A. CANNON, ISB #2331
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
508 8th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
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OU'UTI

Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

TN TI-IE DISTRICT COURT OF TiiE SECOND JUDICIAL DIS1RICT OF TiiE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

Case No.; CV-07-00208

V.

FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
Idaho corporation; AIA INSURANCE,

INC., an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN
TAYLOR and CONN1E TAYLOR,
individually and the community ·property
comprised thereof; BRYAN FREEMAN,
a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS, a single
person; CROP USA INSURANCE
AGENCY, INC .. an Idaho Corporatiqn; and
JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK,
individualJy and the community property
comprised thereof;
Defendants.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

submit~

this Fifth Amended Complaint against the Defendants

alleging as follows:
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I. PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. I

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed") is a single person and a resident of Lewiston,

Nez Perce County, Idaho.
I ,2

Defendant AIA Services Corporation ("AJA Services") is an Idaho corporation

with its principal place of business located in Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho.
IJ

Defendant AlA Insurance, Inc. ("AIA Insurance") is an Idaho corporation with

its principal place of business is located in Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho. AIA Insurance
is a wholly owned subsidiary of AIA Services.
1.4

Defendant Connie Taylor ("Connie") is a single person residing in Lewiston, Nez

Perce County, Idaho.
1.5

•

Defendants R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor, were husband and wife until on or

about December I6, 2005 (collectively "John"), and at all relevant times were residents of
Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho. All references to "John" are for acts, omissions, claims,

causes of action, damages, and/or liabilities that accrued on or before December 16, 2005, are for
John individually, and were also performed on behalf of R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor's
marital community (which benefited from R. John Taylor's acts and/or omissions) as to divided

and undivided community property, All references to "John" for acts, omission, claims, causes

of action, damages, and/or liabilities that accrued after December I 6, 2005, are for John
individually and pertain to Connie as to their divided and undivided commwtlty property,
including, without limitation, community property in which Re«! is requesting ro be awarded,
1.6

Defendant JoLee Duclos ("Duclos") is a single person residing in Clarkston,

Washington.
Ill
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1. 7

Defendant Bryan Freeman ("Freeman") is a single person residing in Lewiston,

Nez Perce County, Ida.ho.
1.8

Defendant Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. ("Crop USA") is an Idaho

corporation, with its principal place of business located in Lewiston, Nez Perce Cotmty, Idaho.
l .9
are

Defendant James Beck and Corrine Beck (individually Md collectively "Beck'')

residents of the state of Minnesota. All references to "Beck" are for acts, omissions, claims,

causes of action, damages, and/or liabilities that accrued are for James Beck individually, and
were also performed on behalf of James Beck and Corrine Beck's marital community (which
benefited from James

B~k's

acts and/or omissions) and pertain to Corrine Beck as to damages,

acts and/or omissions on behalf of their community and as to all community property, including,
without limitation, community property Reed L! seeking to be awarded.
1.l 0

The District Court has jurisdiction over this matter under LC. § 1-705.

LI 1

Venue is proper in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Nez Perce

County pursuant to l.C. § 5-404.

II. FACTUAJ.. BACKGROUND
2.1

John, was at all relevant times, an officer and director of AIA Services, AIA

Insurance, and Crop USA. During the certain relevant times in which John was a director and
officer of AIA Insurance, AIA Services and Crop USA, he owed fiduciary duties to Reed as the
single largest creditor of AIA Insurance and AIA Services.

John and Connie are the majority

shareholders in AIA Services and own approximately 40% of the outstanding shares of Crop
USA, specifically 4,645,000 shares as of July 31, 2006.

2.2

R. John Taylor Md Connie were divorced through an Interlocutory Decree filed

on December 16, 2005, under which only a portion of their community assets were divided and

•
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other property remained undivided. This action includes, but is not limited to, acts, omissions,
transactions, debts, claims, and/or causes of action which accrued prior to R. Jolm Taylor and
Connie's dissolution. All references to "John" in this Complaint are for, but not limited to,
claims, causes of action, breaches of duties, fraud, acts, omissions and liabilities incWTed by R.
John Taylor on behalf of the marital community of R. John Taylor and Connie, together with

their community property, whether divided or not through the effective date of their dissolution
decree entered on or about December 16, 2005. Reed ls requesting and entitled to be awarded
shares of stock and property jointly owned by R. John Taylor and Connie.
2.3

After the effective date of R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor's decree of

dissolution, all references to "John" in this Complaint are for claims, breaches of duties, acts,
omissions and/or liabilities incurred by John individually. One of the reasons Connie is named

as a party in this action for her liabilities and/or derivative liability by virtue of her marriage to
Jolm and her interest in the commWlity property of the marriage (including all divided and
undivided community property of their marriage for which Reed is requesting to be awarded
through a constructive trust) all of which is subject to liability for the allegations in this
Complaint of the acts, breaches of duties, claims, omissions, and conduct of John on and prior to
December 16, 2005.
2.4

During the certain relevant times that Connie was a director of A1A Insurance and

AIA Services, she owed fiduciary duties to Reed as the sing!e largest creditor of AIA Services,
Connie is also individually liable for all claims, breaches of duties, acts, omissions and/or
I -

liabilities during certain relevant times in which she was a member of the board of directors of
Af A Services and AIA Insurance.

•
-

Ill

FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT - 4
'

l

'

002391

------------------------~------

2.5

----

Duclos is, and was at certain relevant times, an officer and director of AlA

Services, A1A Insurance, and Crop USA. Duclos is a shareholder in AJA Services and Crop
USA. During the certain relevant timet1 that Duclos was a director and officer of AJA Insurance
and AIA Services, she owed fiduciary duties to Reed as the single largest creditor of AIA
Services.
2.6

Freeman is, and was at certain relevant times, a director and/or officer of AIA

Services, AIA Insurance, and Crop USA. Freeman is a shareholder in AlA Services and Crop
USA. During the certain relevant times that Freeman was a director of AIA Insurance and AIA
Sorvices, be owed fiduciary duties to Recd as the single largest creditor of AJA Services.

2.7

Crop USA was formed and operated using AJA Services and AJA Insurance's

assets, funds, employees, office space, trade secrets, business relationships, equipment, good

••

will, reputation, financial wherewithal (including loan guarantees), and other assets. But for AIA
Insurance's assets, trade secrets, reputation and relationships, Crop USA would never have been
fonned and operated. Since Crop USA's formation, funds were in.appropriately loaned and/or

transferred back and forth from AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance to and from Crop USA and
other entities partially owned by John and/or Connie.
2.8

John and Connie own approximate[y 40% of Crop USA, which also remained

undivided community property at the time Reed filed his original Complaint.
2.9

Beck is a shareholder in A1A Services and Crop USA and acquired Crop USA

shares from the inappropriate and/or unlawful conversation of their Preferred C Shares of AlA
Services to shares of Crop USA. During the certain relevant times that Beck was a member of
the board of directors boards of AJA

lnsuran~.

AIA Services and/or Crop USA, he owed

fiduciary duties to Reed as the single largest creditor of the corporations. During certain relevant
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times, Beck was a member of the boards for Crop USA, AIA Insurance, and/or AIA Services and
directed, consented, approved and/or acquiesced in inappropriate and/or unlawful corporate
activities at AIA Insurance, AJA Services and/or Crop USA.
2.10

Reed was the founder and majority shareholder of AIA Services. ln 1995, John

desired to redeem Reed's 613,494 shares of common stock in AIA Services through a stock
redemption agreement Upon the closing of the transaction of AIA Services' redemption of
Reed's shares, John became the majority shareholder in AIA Services.
2.11

AIA Insurance, a subsidiary of AIA Services, is wholly owned by AlA Services

and where virtually all of AIA Services' revenues arc derived and was the basis for security
interests provided to Reed. AIA Insurance is lessee of the office building located at 111 Main
Street. Lewiston, Idaho.
2.12

On or about July 22, 1995, AIA Services and Reed entered Into a Stock

Redemption Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement Under the tenns of
the Stock Redemption Agreement and related agreements, AfA Services agreed to execute
promissory note to timely pay Reed $1,500,000 Million in 90 days ("Down Payment Note") and
$6,000,000, plus accrued interest due and payable monthly at the rate of 8V.% per annum
("Promissory Note'').
2.13

The Promissory Note was executed by John on behalf of AJA Services on or

about August I, 1995. Under the terms of the Promissory Note, AIA Services was required to
timely pay all accrued interest monthly to Reed and the principal arnowit of $6,000,000, plus all
accrued but unpaid interest was due and payable on August l, 2005. Donna Taylor, the holder
of the Series A Preferred Shares in AIA Services, subordinated all of her rights to payment of the
redemption of her shares in favor of Reed. Through the date of Reed's Complaint, AIA Services
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had not timely and properly paid all sums owed to Donna Taylor.
2.14

Under the terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement. AlA Services and AIA

Insurance also agreed to contemporaneously execute a Security Agreement and Stock Pledge

Agreement, among other agreements and documents. The Stock Redemption Agreement, Stock
Pledge A_gn.,ement, and Security Agreement were all either authoriz.ed by the Board of Directors
of AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance and/or approved by a shareholder vote.

2. 15

When AIA Services was unable to comply with the Stock Redemption

Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement, John, on behalf of AIA Services
and AIA Insurance, entered into negotiations with Reed regardini restructuring the obligations.
In 1996, AIA Services, A1A Insurance and Reed agreed to modify the Stock Redemption

Agreement and executed the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement ("Rutracture
Agreement,,). Contemporaneously with the execution of the Restructw-c Agreement, the parties

executed the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement ("Amended Stoclc Pledge

Agreement") end Amended and Restated Security Agreement ("Amended Security
Agreement").
2.16

Under the tmns of the Restructure Agreement, the terms of the Promissory Note

remained unchanged and were not modified (including the $6,000,000 principal amount, due
date, and required monthly interest payments).

Under the terms of the Amended Security

Agreement, Reed received a security interest in all of AIA Services and AIA Insurance's
commissions and related services (and all proceeds thereof), and AIA Services and AIA
Insurance were required to have a Lock Box for all commissions for the protection and benefit of
Reed.
Ill

•
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2.17

Under the terms of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, A1A S~s pledged

all of the outstanding shares in AlA Insurance to Reed as partial security for AIA Services'
indebtedness to Reed under the Promissory Note, Restructure Agreement, and Amended Security
Agreement. Under the terms of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, AIA Services' failure to
timely pay Reed interest or principal under the Promissory Note or the Down Payment Note
constituted an Event of Default. In an Event of Default for failure to timely pay interest or
principal under the Promissory Note, AIA Services' insolvency, or AlA Services' failure to
maintain the required Lock Box (among other Events of Default), AIA Services' right to vote the
pledged shares of AIA Insurance ceased and tenninated and vested exclusively in Rero.
2.18

•

Under the terms of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, A1A Services and/or

AIA Insurance owed Reed continuing contractual obligations, including, without limitation, the
obligation that Reed was required to be a member of the board of directors of A1A Services until
Reed was paid in full or sufficient security was posted to ensure the payment of the Promissory
Note. AIA Services never posted bonds or other security for the payment of the Promissory
Note. AIA Services, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck have intentionally refused to

appoint Reed to the Board of AIA Services as required and/or unilaterally created new conditions

upon which Reed's appointment would be based. A new right to be a member of the board of
AIA Services is created every year as directors a.re required to be elected yearly under the
Bylaws of AIA Services. Despite Reed's demands and AIA Services' continuing contractual
obligations to keep Reed on the board of directors, AIA Services, John, Duclos, Freeman,
Connie, and/or Beck have refused to appoint Reed to the Board of Directors of AJA Services as
required. Because Reed has not been on rhe Board of ALA Services as required, all Mtions taken
by AlA Services' board were not properly authorized and, therefore, not ratified by AIA

•··
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Services; and such acts are the personal actions of John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck
during their tenure on the board of AlA Services.
2. l 9

Under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, AIA Services had continuing

contractual obligations to not loan money to any affiliate other than a wholly owned subsidiary.

AIA Services has loened money on countless occasions to and/or Jent other services, office space
or benefits to affiliates and other parties in violation of 100 Amended Stock Pledge Agreement,
and such loans or benefits were made during times in which John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie,
and/or Beck were board members of ALA Services and/or AIA Insurance. In addi1ion, the
Amended Articles of Incorporation of AIA Services prevents it or any of it! subsidiaries
(including, without limitation, AJA Insurance), from guaranteeing the loans of any other entity

••

that is not a wholly owned subsidiary of AIA Services .
2.20

The Promissory Note required monthly interest paymentcJ with an acceleration

clause if payments were not timely or properly made to Reed. The acceleration clause requires
written notice from Reed to A1A Services of default and AlA Services would be entitled to a five
day opportunity to cure before Reed could exercise bis rights tmder the Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement or Amended Security Agreement.

The obligations owed to Reed under the

Promissory Note are independent of any other obligations owed by the Defendants and secured
by the Restructure Agreement, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement and Amended Secmity

Agreement.
2.21

During relevant times, the fair-market value of AIA Services and AlA Insurance

was less than the aggregate amount of their total debts, which constitutes AJA Services and AIA
Insurance's insolvency. During relevant times, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance were unable
to pay their debts as they became due (including, without limitation, debts to Reed and Donna

a~\
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Taylor), which also constitutes AlA Services insolvency and AIA Insurance's insolvency.
2.22

During all relevant times, Roed was the largest and most significant creditor of

AIA Services. Because AlA Services has failed to timely and properly pay creditors as required
during certain relevant times and/or was insolvent, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck
owed fiduciary duties to creditors, specifically Reed because of his status as AIA Services'
largest and most significant creditor.
2.23

The value of AIA Services and AIA Insurance's assets (including, without

limitation, if both corporations are sold and/or their assets independently sold) at the time Reed
filed his original Complaint was insufficient to pay Reed the $6,000,000, plus prejudgment
interest in excess of $2,000,000 owed to him. The value of AIA Services and AIA Insurance's

••

assets (including if both corporations are sold) for at least 7 years of time preceding the time
Reed filed his original Complaint was insufficient to pay Reed the $6,000,000 principal, plus
prejudgment interest owed to him.
2.24

During certain relevant times, AJA Services and/or AJA Insurance were in default

of various provisions of the agreements with Ree<l, insolvent and/or unable to timely pay its
debts to Reed and/or other creditors, including Donna Taylor. During certain relevant times,
AlA Services has failed to comply with the terms of the Promissory Note.
2.25

Instead of paying Reed as required, AIA Services, AlA Insurance, Crop USA,

John, Duclos, Connie, Beck, and/or Freeman utilized funds that Reed had a security interest in to

make investments in, transfer assets to, or loan money to, or provide services on behalf of Crop
USA, John and/or entities operated and/or partially owned by John, Connie, Beck, Freeman,
Duclos, and/or one or more of the other Defendants.
// j

•
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2.26

On or about December 12, 2006, Reed provided AIA Services written notice of

default under various provisions of the Restructure Agreement, Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement, and Amended Security Agreement, including, without limitation, AIA Services'
failure to pay principal and interest due under the Promissory Note, failure to maintain the Lock
Box, loaning money to non-wholly owned subsidiaries (including guaranteeing the $15 Million
revolving line-of-credit for Crop USA), failure to provide all required financial information, and
other defaults as set forth in the notice. AJA Services and AJA Insurance have failed to timely
cure the defaults and all applicable cure periods have expired. As of the date of this Complaint,
the principal owed to Reed under the Promissory Note of $6,000,000, plus accrued interest of
over $2,000,000 had not been paid in full as required.
2.27

Prior to Reed's Notice of Default dated December 12, 2006, Reed had never

accelerated any of the indebtedness due Wlder the Promissory Note. Even though AIA Services
and AJA Insurance failed to cure tho defaults specifically set forth in Reed's Notice of Default
date.cl December 12, 2006, AJA Services continued to make partial and inconsistent interest
payments (including the payment of certain employees and other services on behalf of Reed)
before and after the date of Reed's original Complaint. All amounts due under the Promissory

Note are secured by the remedies available under the Promissory Note, Restructlu'l: Agreement,
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement and Amended Security Agreement.
2.28

Despite Reed's demands, AIA Services, AIA Insurance, John. Freeman. Duclos,

Connie, and/or Beck have failed to comply and/or as officers and/or directors to ensure that AIA
Services and A1A lnsurance complies with the obligations owed to Reed under the terms of the

Promissory Note, Restructure Agreement, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, B.nd Amended

••

Security Agreement. Under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, the right to vote all of AIA
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insurance's shares ceased and terminated for AIA Services and became vested in Reed when
AIA Services failed to timely pay the required monthly interest payments due tmder the
Promissory Note and its subsequent failure to pay the $6,000,000 principal due under the
Promissory Note on August 1, 2005 (and other breaches set forth in this Complaint). AlA
Services was in default and had failed to cure such defaults before Reed demanded to exercise
his right to hold a special shareholder meeting to vote the shares to appoint a new board of
directors for AlA Insurance.
2.29

On December 12, 2006, Reed timely provided notice of his demand for a special

shareholder meeting of AlA Insurance for the purpose of removing and appointing new board
members on December 26, 2006. A1A Services, AIA Insurance, John, Duclos, and/or Freeman

•

(and the other Defendants if applicable) refused to comply with Reed's demand for a special
shareholder meeting by representing that AlA Insurance's offices were closed on December 26,

)

;

'

2006.
2.30

Through a letter dated January 3, 2007, John acknowledged Reed's right to call a

shareholder meeting under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement when he stated "l fully
recognize that [Reed) Taylor may take actions he deems appropriate, including calling a special
shareholders meeting."
2.31

On or about January 25, 2007, Reed hand delivered another demand for a special

shareholder meeting for the removal and appointment of the board of directors for February 5,
2007, pursuant to his rights under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. Through a letter from
Duclos, AIA Insurance refused Reed's request and denied that he had the right to call a meeting
to vote the AIA shares

./

Despite Reed's demands, AJA Insurance refused to hold a special

shareholder meeting.
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2.32

Despite Reed's demands, AIA Services and AIA Insurance failed to cure the

numerous Defaults under the terms of the Promissory Note, Restructure Agreement, Amended
Stock Pledge Agreement and Amended Security Agreement, among other obligations (as
described above). Through the date of this Complaint, AIA Services and ALA Insurance's
Defaults were not timely clll'ed and they remained in default of the foregoing Agreements.
2.33

On February 22, 2007, Reed exercised his right to vote the pledged shares by

executing a Consent in Lieu of Special Shareholder Meeting of AIA Insurance removing John,
Duclos and Freeman from the Board ofDiiectors and appointed bimselfthe sole Board Member,
pursuant to hls right to vote the pledged shares Ullder the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement.
Because AlA Services' right to vote the pledged shares had ceased and terminated when it

••

became in Default and failed to timely cure such Defaults, the right to vote the pledged shares in
AIA Insurance vested exclusively in Reed and he exercised his right to vote the pledged shares
pursuant to the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement and the Articles of Incorporation of AJA

Insurance. Because the shares pledged to Reed account for all the outstanding shares of AIA
Insurance, Reed had the authority to waive the notice requirement, notice period, and the
formality of holding a shareholder meeting as he was the only party authorized to vote any shares
of AIA Insurance. Because Reed appointed himself as the sole director of AlA lnBUJ'aDce, be had

the exclusive authority to appoint himself as the officers of AlA Insurance through a Consent in
Lieu of a Board Meeting.
2.34

In the weeks leading up to the filing of this action, Reed discovered that more

than one transfer of assets occurred during the time in which AIA Services had failed to service
its debt to Reed. In 2004, ALA Insurance paid $1,510,693 to purchase Series C Preferred Shares
in A[A Services from Crop USA-

0

1

This transaction inappropriately, unlawfully, and/or
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fraudulently transferred Sl,510,693 of AIA Insurance's funds to Crop USA when such funds
should have been tendered co Reed or been retained to benefit A!A Insurance. This $I ,5 I0,693

transfer occurred at a time in which AlA Services was insolvent. 'This S1,510,693 transfer also
occurrod at the same time that A!A Services' 401(k) Plan (the "Plan") held over $750,000 in
Preferred C Shares in AIA Services. No shares were purchased or redeemed from the Plan, even
though John and Duclos were the Co-Trustees of the Plan at the time of the transfer. This
transaction constitutes the fraudulent transfer of funds from AIA Insurance to Crop USA.
2.35

Reed also discovered tbat John and Connie had purchased a parking lot for $8,000

and later entered into a lease agreement with AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance to leli8e the
parking lot from John and Connie for $1,250 per month. This transaction was aJso the fraudulent

•

transfer of funds to John and Connie, when such funds should have been paid to Reed during a
time in which AIA Services was unable to service its debt to Reed and was otherwise insolvent.
John and Connie also inappropriately paid lump sums for rent before such inappropriate rent was
due. The parking lot is not utilizod by AJA Insurance or AIA Services. Such acts and/or
transfers have occurred during John, Freeman. Duclos, Connie, and/or Beck's tenure as members
of the boards of AIA Insurance and/or AIA Services.
2.36

Based upon the above.referenced acts, transfers and transactions, together with

transactions referenced in the notes to AJA Services and/or AIA Insurance's financial statements,
there are other unauthorized and inappropriate transfers, loans, payments, advances and other
actions which occurred during times AJA Services defaults and inability to timely pay Reed and
at times in which AIA Services was insolvent. Forensic accounting and further scrutiny of AIA
Insurance and/or AIA Services' books and records will reveal additional improper, unlawful

and/or fraudulent tran11fers, transactions and the like that directly and/or indirectly benefited the

d'fl.\ '
~
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individual Defendants. Crop USA and/or entities partially owned by John.
2.37

During times in which John, Freeman, Duclos, Connie, and/or Beck owed Reed

fiduciary duties, they have used AJA Services and AJA Insurance as their personal source of
funds and/or assets, including. without limitation, acts in which John has transferred assets to hls

name; taken advances that John never paid baek; tmnsferred assets. resources, and/or funds to
Crop USA, Sound Insurance and/or other entities partially owned or controlled by John and/or
the other individual Defendants; entered into transactions which constitute a violation of A1A
Insutaace and/or AJA Servi<.:es' Articles of Incorporation; made transfers and/or entered into

transactions which benefited them; and provided services for entities partially owned by them
without such actions being arms-length transactions. The above acts occurred when John,
Duclos, Freeman, Comrie, and/or Beck were directors and/or officers of AIA Services, AIA
•

Insurance and/or Crop USA. All of the above acts occurred during certain relevant times in
which AJA Services was not current with payments of interest and/or principal owed to Reed
under the Promissory Note and when AJA Services was insolvent.
2.38

On February 22, 2007 (after executing the Consent in Lieu of Special Shareholder

Meeting), Reed executed a Consent in Lieu of Board Meeting to terminate all officers, tenninate

the employment of John, authorize the change of locks, and take such other actions deemed
appropriate. When Reed attempted to take action in accordance with the Consents described

above, the Defendants refused to abide by the C~nts.
2.39

Dwing certain relevant times that John, Duclos. Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck

were directors of AlA Services and AJA Insurance, they failed make proper corporate
governance decisions and failed to take appropriate legal action on behalf of AfA Insurance
and/or AIA Services to protect Reul's interests. During the relevant times chat John, Duclos,
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Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck were directors and/or officers of AlA Services and AJA
Insurance, they breached their fiduciary duties owed to Reed.

2.40

Sometime after filing Reed's original Complaint, Freeman and Duclos resigned as

members of the board of directors of AIA Insurance and AlA Services. John, in breach of his
fiduciary duties owed to Reed and in violation of Reed's right to vote the shares and prior vote of
the pledge shares in AJA Insurance, appointed himself, Coanie and Book to the board of AIA
Insurance. John also appointed himself, Connie and Beck to the board of AJA Services in breach
of his fiduciary duties owed to Reed. These appointments were conflicts of interest and breaches
of John's fiduciary duties owed to Reed and the appointed Defendants' acceptance of such
appointments was a further breach of duties owed to Reed. Finally, Beck, John and Connie

••

approved inappropriate payments to the directors of AIA Services and AIA Insurance, which
such payments must all be disgorged and awarded to Reed.
2.41

During certain relevant times that John, Connie and Beck were directors of AJA

Sezvices and AIA Insurance, they failed to talce appropriate legal action on behalf of AJA

Insurance and AIA Services. During certain relevant times that John. Connie and Beck were
directors of AIA Services and AIA Insurance, they breached their fiduciary duties owed to Recd.
2.42

Reed bas a valid and perfected security interest in all commissions from sale of

insurance and related services received by or on behalf of, or payable to, AIA Insurance and AIA
Services, proceeds thereof and interest thereon. Reed demanded that no funds which he had a
security interest in and/or which should be paid to him could be used to pay the legal fees of any
of the individual Defendants.

Despite Reed's demands, the Defendants have unlawfu!ly,

improperly and inappropriately diverted funds to the individual Defendants for their attorneys'
fees and costs, and the Defendants have unlawfully and/or inappropriately accepted such

•
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payments.

Because aU of AIA Services' revenues are derived from AlA Insurance's

commissions and related Rervices that Reed has a valid security interest in, such payments also

constitute an illegal and/or unauthorized dividend from AIA Insurance to AIA Services,
conversion, fraud and fraudulent conveyances.
2.43

Prior to the filing of Reed's original Complaint and without Reed's knowledge or

consent, John paid a debt he owed to ATA Services in the amount of $307 ;1.71 by transferring
said indebtedness to Reed's Prom.issory Note.

Such payment constitutes fraud (as set forth

below) and John later moved the debt back to Reed's Promissory Note.
2.44

Pacific Empire Holdings Corporation d/b/a Sound Insurance has been operating

through AJA Services and/or AlA Insurance and with funds, assets, rent, and/or services
provided by AlA Services and/or AIA Insurance for free or at rates below fair-market-value
during certain relevant times that John, Freeman, Duclos, Connie, and/or Bock owed fiduciary
duties to Reed. Since the filing of Reed's Original Complaint, Crop USA purchased Sound
Insurance from John and/or other unknown parties.

The Defendants' operation of Sound

Insurance and subsequent sale constitutes breaches of fiduciruy duties, conversion, fraud and/or a
fraudulent conveyance.
2.45

Global Travel was a tenant in AlA Jasurance's office building lcx:ated in

Lewiston, Idaho. Since the filing of Reed's original Complaint, Global Travel has relocated as a
tenant in an office building owned by John. Such actions are a breach of John Duclos, Freeman,
Connie, and Beck's fiduciary duties owed to Reed, fraud tUJdlor a fraudulent conveyance.
2.46

Through a letter dated February 27, 2001, John represented to Reed (individually

and on behalf of the corporations) that AIA Services and/or ALA Insurance was developing a
new crop insurance program through a new company called Crop USA. Reed relied on AlA
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Services, AlA l'nsurance and John's representations that AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance
were the owners of Crop USA and developing Crop USA, when AJA Services, AIA Insurance
and John's representations were false in that Crop USA

WllS

never owned by AIA fosurance or

AJA Services, but instead owned by John, Cormie, Duclos, Beck, Freeman, and others. By
John's own admission, Crop USA should have been a subsidiary of AIA Services or AIA
Insurance but for certain liabilities.
2.47

John made representations to Reed and Donna Taylor that he would not be taking

a salary in certain year(s). Reed relied on John's false representation when he did not accelerate

payments due to him or place AIA Services in default, and in late 2006 or early 2007 learned that
John had in fact taken a salary during the respective times to Reed's detriment.

2.48
•

John, Beck, Duclos, and/or Freeman made representations and/or omitted material

facts to Reed through letters and financial statements that AIA Services and AIA Insurance were
being operated for the benefit of AJA Services and AJA Insurance. AIA Services and AIA
Insuran-0e ma.de representations and/or omitted material facts to Reed through correspondence
and their financial statements that they were being operated for the benefit of AIA Insurance and

A.IA Services. Reed relied on John, Beck. Duclos and/or Freeman's f.alse representations and/or
omissions of material mets when in fact AJA Services and AIA fnsurance were not being
operated for the benefit of the corporations, but instead were being operated for the benefit of
John, Froeman, Duclos, Crop USA, Sound Insurance, Beck., and other entities controlled or
partially owned by John and/or Connie. As directors, Freeman, John, Duclos, and/or Beck also
made the false representations and/or omitted material facts by and through the corporations'
financial !!tatements.

I

!

Ill
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2.49

John, Freeman, Duclos, and/or Beck breached their fiduciary duties owed to Reed

when AIA Insurance inappropriately lllldlor fraudulently guaranteed a $15,000,000 loon for Crop
USA. This guarantee is also a violation of AIA Services' Amended Articles of Incorporation,
AlA ServiC¢s and AIA Insurance's Bylaws, and the tenns of the Amended Stock Pledge

Agreement AIA Insurance ree¢ived no benefit from this loan and received no consideration.
2.50

After the inappropriate and fraudulent transfer of $1,510,693 to Crop USA

described above; the wrongful transfer was misrepresented on the financial statements of ALA
Insurance as an investment with a value of approximately $1,500,000, when the "investment''

was worthless. John, Duclos, Beck and/or Freeman were aware, or should have been aware, of
this false fact as AIA Services was insolvent
2.51

Reed believes that there are other acts, fraud, breaches of fiduciary duties,

wrongful transfers and/or fraudulent transactions that he will itemize and detail through future
amended complaints upon completion of discovery and/or at trial.

By and through this

paragraph, the Defendants should be placed on notice that Reed intends to recover every dollar
of funds, assets, servicea, loans, barters and the like that were taken, utilized and/or transferred

from AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance through fraud, constructive fraud, breaches of fiduciary
duties, fraudulent conveyances, and any other causes of action set forth below.
2.52

The unity and conunonality of the ownership, officers and/or directors of AJA

Services, AIA Insurance and/or Crop USA iB such that the separate personalities of the
corporations and the individuals no longer eidst. Equity should prevent the acts and omissions
from being solely those of A1A Services, AJA Insurance and/or Crop USA. As a result of the
commonality of ownership and governance, unlawful acts, conduct, omissions, fraud, failure to
observe corporate governance, and breaches of fiduciary duties as set forth in tlUs Complaint,
~\I
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AIA Insurance, AIA Services and/or Crop USA are the alter-egos of John, Duclos, Freeman,
Connie, and/or Beck and such corporate veils should be pierced thereby imposing personal
liability on John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or Beck.
2.53

AJA Services, AIA Insurance, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck

unlawfully provided Crop VSA, Sowid Insurance, and/or other entities with free or reduced rent,
labor, funds, services, resources, and/or other assets without any and/or fair compensation to the
detriment of AIA Services, AIA Insurance and Reed. John, Duclos, Preeman, Connie, and/or
Beck entered into or approved transactions that were not fair for AIA Services or AJA Insurance,
transactions that were not entered into in good faith, transactions that involved self-dealing, and

transactions that involved any one or more of the interested individual Defendants in violation of

•

applicable conflicts of interest procedrues and/or proper corporate governance.
2.54

During certain relevant times, John utilized AIA Services, A1A Insurance and/or

Crop USA as a means to pay personal bills, obtain loans, and obtain reimbursements for
"alleged" expenses he incurred on behalf of AIA Services, AIA Insurance and/or Crop USA.
However, many of the expenires for food, lodging and travel were inappropriately charged to
AlA Services and/or AIA Insurance. This is further evidenced by the faet that John failed to

remit andlor fully complete forms required by AIA Services and ATA Insurance for employees to
be reimbursed.
2.55

From August l, 1995, through the present time, John owed obligations and duties

to AIA Services and Reed (including, without limitation, obligation to not compete and
confidentiality) through the Executive Officer's Agreement between John and AlA Services
dated August l, 1995. Joh.a has breached tbe forgoing obligations, which such breaches also
constitute breaches of John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck's fiduciary duties owed to
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Reed. AIA Insurance and Reed are also third party beneficiaries of John's Executive Officer's
Agreement and entitled
2.56

to

damages from the Defendants for such breached obligations.

AJA Insurance and AIA Services could have been operated with a substantially

lower number of employees than presently employed and with reduced overhead and costs. The
Defendants have represented that Crop USA (and other parties) have been reimbursing A1A
Services and/or AIA Insurance for all employee labor, expenses, costs, assets, and services
utilized for Crop USA' s benefit, when such representation! are false. The Defendants have
foiled to disclose material facts that AIA Services and AIA Insurance employees, expenses,
costs, assets, and services have also been utilized for the benefit of John, Connie, and entities
partially owned by John and/or Connie without them paying AIA Services or AJA Insurance.

•

2.57

The Defendants have represented through board resolutions, private placement

memorandum, correspondence, agreements, and/or other transactions that AIA Services and/or
AIA Insurance have benefited from transactions with Crop USA (including, without limitation,
Crop USA's $15 Million line of credit and the repurchase of the Series C Preferred Shares of
AIA Services), which the Defendants knew that such transactions were not beneficial to AIA
Services and/or AIA fnsurance. In fact, AJA Services and/or AIA Insurance did not benefit from

such false representations and Reed's collateral was also impaired.
2.58

The Defendants have engaged in the improper and/or unlawful activities of

utilizing AIA Services and AIA Insurance for their benefit and/or for the benefit of themselves
and/or entities partially owned by one or more of the individutt.l. Defendants to the detriment of
Reed.

2.59

Should any part or one or more of the following causes of action or relief be

denied at or before trial, such allegations and requested relief are incorporated by reference here
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to support other causes of action and/or requested relief.
Ill. FIBST CAUSE OF ACTION-BREACHES OF CONTRA.CT
3, I

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim and/or the relief sought under this
cause of action.
3.2

The Defendants owed Reed obligations and/or continuing contractual obligations

to timely pay him and comply

with specific terms, conditions, covenants, warranties and the like

required by the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security
Agreement, and Restructure Agreement.
3.3

••

AIA Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA, John, Freeman, Duclos, Beck, and/or

Connie's acts, omissions and failure to pay Reed the amoWlts owed and comply with continuing
contractual obligations tmder the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement,
Amended Security Agreement and Restructure Agreement constitute a breach of their
contractual obligations owed to Reed (whether or not any of the foregoing agreements were
orally modified as alleged by the Defendants or not).
3.4

As a result of AIA Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA, John, Freeman, Duclos,

Beck, and/or Connie's acts and/or omissions which constitute breaches of their contractual
obligations, Reed has suffered and is entitled to damages of $6,000,000, plus accrued interest in
an amount to be determined at trial, jointly and severally or to be allocated between the
defendants as the evidenre and claims show at trial.

As set forth in this Complaint, the

Defendants are jointly and severally liable for all claims and damages flowing from the various
breaches by and through the legal theories set forth in th.is Complaint. ln addition, Reed is
entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and wsts as under the Promissory Note, Amended Stock

•
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Pledge Agreement, J.C.§ 12-120and/orl.C. § 12-121.
JV. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION-FRAUDULENT IRANSFERS/CONVEYANCES
4. I

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim and/or the relief sought under this
cause of action.
4.2

The Defendants' actions constitute fraudulent transfers and/or conveyances Wlder

I.C. § 55-901, et seq. and/or the common law doctrine of Fraudulent Transfers/Conveyances.
4.3

As a result of John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck's participation,

consent. approval and/or acquiescence of the fraudulent transfers and/or as direct recipients
and/or indirect recipients (also by and through .their ownership of shares in the recipient
corporations) of the fraudulent transfers, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck are
•

personally liable for all fraudulent transfers, plus accrued interest, in an amount to be proved at
trial. All fraudulent transfers should be avoided and/or rescinded to the extent possible and/or all
assets placed in a constructive trust for the benefit of Reed and such asset.s awarded to Reed.
4.4

John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, Beck, and/or Crop USA and other entities

controlled or partially owned by John or the Defendants are and/or were the recipients of various
fraudulent transfers from AlA Services and/or AIA Insurance, and should be required to return
all funds to Reed, rescind all transactions; and John, Connie, Freeman, Duclos, and/or Beck's
ownership interests in Crop USA and such other entities should be placed in a constructive trust
for the benefit of Reed and such shares and/or ownership awarded to him.
!//

Iii
///
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V. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION-MISREPRESENTATIONS/FRAUD
(Fraud, Constructive Fraud, and/or Shareholder, Officer Dire<:tor Fraud)
5.1

Reed

re~alleges

and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim and/or remedy sought under this
cause of action.
5.2

AIA Services, AlA Ins~, Crop USA, Beck, Freeman, Connie, Duclos,

and/or John made, ratified, acquiesced, and/or consented to statements of fact and/or omitted
material statements of fact, including. without limitation, those facts and/or omissions of fact set
forth in Paragraphs 2.23, 2.36, 2.44~2.49 and 2.51 above; such statements of fact were false or
omitted material facts; such false statements or omitted facts were material; ALA Services, AIA
Insurance, Crop USA, Beck, Freeman, Duclos, Connie and/or John knew or should have known

••

the falsity of such statements; AIA Services, AIA Insurance Crop USA, Beck, Freeman, Duclos,
and/or John intended to Induce reliance; Reed was ignorant to the falsity of such statements
end/or omissions; and Reed relied on such statements and/or omissions; Reed had a right to rely
on such false statements and/or omissions.
5.3

By and through the Defendants' fraudulent acts and/or omissions, including,

without limitation, the allegations set forth in this Complaint and a.s specifically alleged in
Paragraphs 2.22, 2.25, 2.34, 2.35, 2.37, 2.40, 2.43~2.49, 2.53, 2.54, 2.57 and 2.58 above, AIA
Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA, John, Freeman, Duclos, Connie, anW'or Beck's acts and/or
omissions constitute fraud, constructive fraud (e.g., the Defendants owed Reed fiduciary duties,
duties to maintain AIA Insurance's assets to protect Reed, and other duties contemplated by the
parties and/or referenced in trus Cornplainr, and the Defendants breached such duties), and/or
shareholder/officer/director fraud (e.g., the siphoning off of corpora1e assets to the individual
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Defendants' gain and to the detriment of Reed), including, without limitation, the Jess stringent
means of proving fraud as set forth in Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 561 P.2d
1299 (1977) (and other law relating to shareholder, officer and/or director fraud), and Reed is
entitled to recover all damages attributable to such fraud. Under the theory discussed in Smith v.

Great Basin Grain Co. (and other cases), AIA Services, AJA Insurance, Crop USA, John,
Freeman, Duclos, Connie, and/or Beck are liable for all funds, assets, and services that were
wllawfully and/or inappropriately transferred and/or utilized directly and/or indirectly to their
benefit dwing their tenure as officers, directors, and/or shareholders in AIA Services, AIA
Insurance, and/or Crop USA.

As a consequential and/or proximate result of AIA Services, AIA Insurance, Crop

5.4

••

USA, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck's fraud (including, without limitation, any
one or more of the types of fraud listed above), Reed has suffered and is entitled to recover all
damages from the Defendants, jointly and severally.
VI. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION-CONVERSION
6.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim and/or remedy sought under this
cause of action.

6.2

AJA Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA, John, Duclos, Connie, Freeman, and/or

Beck's (including, without limitation, as officers and/or members of the boards) conduct and/or
consent to such conduct constitutes the willful interference with Reed's property and money
which should have been paid to him or been held for his benefit (including, without limitation,
money in which Reed had a valid and perfected security interest, e.g., whether through UCC
filings and/or through security interests and/or rights in the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement),

•
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without lawful justification, which deprived Reed of the possession of such money and/or
property. Crop USA, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, Beck and/or entities controlled or partially
owned by John were recipients of the converted assets, funds, labor, and/or services (including
for any attorneys' fees and costs paid by AJA Services and/or AIA Insurance for any of the
individual Defendants).
As a result of the AIA Services, AJA Insurance, Crop USA, John, Duclos,

6.3

Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck's unlawful acts, conduct, and interference with Reed's valid and
perfected security interests and other rights, Reed has been damaged and is entitled to damages
proven at trial.

VU. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTJON-ALTER EGO/PIERCING CORPORATE V~
(A Cause of Action and/or Remedy)

•

7.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim under this cause of action and/or
requested relief.
7.2

Reed also specifically re-alleges and incorporates Paragraph 2.52 above.

7.3

AIA Insurance, A!A Services, and Crop USA have been operated, organized and

controlled, and their affairs are so conducted that they are the instrumentality, agency, and/or
conduit of one another and for John, Beck, Duclos, Freeman and/or Connie to their benefit and
Reed's detriment.
7.4

Because of the lack of proper e-0rporate governance; common officers, directors,

and shareholders; lack of capitalization; fraud; overreaching; breaches of good faith and fair
dealing; and the other unlawful and/or inappropriate acts and/or omissions of AJA Insurance,
AJA Services, Crop USA, John, Duclos, Freeman, Beck, and Connie, the corporate veils of AIA
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Services, AIA Insurance and Crop USA should be pierced thereby holding AlA Services, AlA
Insurance, Crop USA, John, Duclos, Freeman. Connie, and/or Beck jointly and severally liable
for all of Reed's damages that lie in tort or contract (including, without limitation, the swns due
under the Promissory Note) as equity requires such action.
7.5

In addition and/or in the alternative, because of the common ownership, common

governance, fraud, conversion, breached duties, unlawful acts, improper acts and/or omissions of
John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck, the corporations AIA Services and Crop USA
should be liable for all of Reed's damages under the theory of reverse piercing of the corporate
veil.

VIIl. §JXTH CAUSE OF ACTION-CONSTRUCTIVE TRV§T
(A Cause of Action and/or as Remedies)

8. 1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim and/or remedy sought under this
cause of action.
8.2

Reed has a valid security interest in AIA Services and/or A1A Insurance's

commis!iions and all of the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance, among other security interests.
The boards of AIA Services and AIA Insurance owed Reed fiduciary duties to Reed. AIA
Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck fraudulently,
wrongfully and/or improperly used funds, transferred assets and/or provided services (which
should have been paid to Reed or benefited AIA Services and/or AJA Insurance) for investments,
personal use, inappropriate transactions, loans, advances, self-dealing, and/or other wrongful,

fraudulent and/or inappropriate purposes (including, without limitation, approving, consenting,

...

andlor acquiescing in such activities and the failure to take appropriate action)
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8.3

AlA Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or

Beck's acts and/or omissions resulted in Crop USA, John, Duclos, Freeman. Counie and/or
Beck's acquisition of money, securities and/or services which should have been paid to Reed or
retain by AlA Insurance but for their fraud, deepening insolvency, civil conspiracy,
misrepresentatioo(s), bad faith, self·dealing, fraudulent conveyances, breached fiduciary duties,
and/or overreaching activities; and AIA Services, Crop USA, John, Duclos, Freeman, Beck
and/or other entities' retention of the money, investments, securities and property would be
unjust.
Reed requests the imposition of a constructive trust for

8.4

his benefit to recover the

proceeds of all from the Defendants' fraud, fraudulent conveyances, breaches of fiduciary duties,

•

overreaching, conspiracy, deepening insolvency (as a remedy only), improper, self-dealing,
wrongful and/or inappropriate transfers, acts and/or omissions.
IX. SEYENTH CAUSE OF ACTION-DIRECTOR LIABILITY
(A Cause of Action and/or a Remedy)
9.1

Reed

re~alleges

and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim and/or remedy sought under this
cause of action.
9.2

John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck are personally liable for all relevant

breached fiduciary duties, deepening insolvency, wrongful acts, improper acts, omissions,
overreaching transactions, fraud, civil conspiracy, faithless fiduciary activities, loans, advances,
improper loan guarantees and/or fraudulent conveyances which occurred during their tenure us a
member of the board of directors of AlA Service, Crop USA and/or AIA Insurance.

.,

Ill
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9.3

Because John, Duclos and

F~man

were hath directors and officers during

certain relevant times, they owed Reed even more elevated fiduciary duties. John, Duclos, and
Freeman breached their elevated fiduciary duties owed to Reed.
9.4

During the relevant times that John, Connie, Beck, Freeman and/or Duclos were

members of boards of AIA Insurance, AlA Services, and/or Crop USA, they each should be held
personally Hable for all Reed's damages in contract and tort.

X. EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
(A Cause of Action and/or as Remedies)

l 0. I

Reed re-alleges and incorporates ea.ch and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim and/or remedy sought under this
cause of action.

•

10.2

Under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security Agreement, and

Restructure Agreement, Reed is entitled to vote the pledged shares of AlA Insurance {and aU
ancillary rights, including, without limitation, to vote the shares to remove the board and take all
actions related in any way to his right to vote the pledged shares), sell the shares of AIA
Insurance at public or private sale, judicially seU the pledged shares in AIA Insurance, entitled to
timely receive audited financial statements and financial information, and/or seize all of the AIA
Insurance and AJA Services' commissions in the required Lock Box.

When AIA Services

became in Default, it lost its right to vote the pledged shares of AJA Insurance and the right
vested exclusively in Reed.
l 0.3

Despite Reed's demands for the Defendants to comply with the provisions in the

Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security Agreement and
Restructure Agreement, AlA Services, AIA Insurance, the Defendants have refused to comply.

•
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Reed is entitled to the relief afforded to him or reasonably contemplated under the foregoing
agreements and such other rights, remedies and/or relief as may be available under fdaho Code,
including, without limitation, any action, relief and/or order authorized under I.C. § 30-1-701 el

seq. and/or l.C. § 28-9-101 el seq. (including the sale of the pledged shares, protection of
security interest, seizure of security, and any other available remedy).
10.4

As a direct or proximate result of the Defendants' acts and/or omissions, Reed has

suffered and is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs incurred, at or before trial, in
enforcing any provision of the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended
Security Agreement, and/or Restructure Agreement for relief sought before or at trial.

XI.

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION-BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES

11.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim and/or remedy sought under this
cause of action.
11.2

During certain relevant times, John, Connie, Beck, Duclos., and/or Freeman owes

and/or owed Reed fiduciary duties, including, without limitation, because of his status as the
largest creditor of AJA Services, AIA Insurance and/or Crop USA; and because AIA Services
and/or AJA Insurance were insolvent as described ill this Complaint. The individual Defendants'
fiduciary duties include, without limitation, the duties of care and loyalty to Reed. During the
relevant times that John, Freeman and Duclos acted as both a director and an officer of AlA
Insurance, AIA Services and/or Crop USA, they owed even more elevated fiduciary duties to
Reed as the single largest creditor of AJA Services and/or AlA lnsurance.

11 .3

John, Connie, Beck, Duclos, and/or Freeman breached their fiduciary duties owed

to Reed, including, without limitation, when they failed to operat~ AIA Services

••

and AlA
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Insurance for the benefit of Reed. John, Connie, Beck, Duclos, andfor Freeman brMched their
fiduciary duties when they failed to take legal action against past and/or present officers and/or
directors of AIA Services and AIA Insurance, and when they prevented Reed from taking any
action he deemed appropriate under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security

Agreement and/or Restructure Agreement.
11.4

As a result of John, Connie, Beck, Duclos, and/or Freeman's breaches of their

fiduciary duties owed to Reed, they are individually liable to Reed for all damages he suffered
and/or deemed the product of their breached fiduciary duties, including without limitation, all
damages attributable to inappropriate transfers of assets and/or services, inappropriate use of
assets and/or services, inappropriate payment of salaries, the failure to pursue claims againsl

•

other past and/or present officers and directors, inappropriate guarantee of loans, all claims in
this Complaint, and such other wrongful acts and/or omissions that Reed may demonstrate at
r

trial.

XII. TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION-BREACH OF IMPLIED COVENANTS OF
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
12. 1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim and/or remedy sought under this
cause of action.

12.2

There is an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing between the parties in

the performance and enforcement of the terms and conditions of the Promissory Note, Amended
Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security Agreement and Restructure Agreement. This duty
embraces, lll.llong other things, an implied obligation that AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and their
directors and officers, specifically, Defendant~ Duclos, Freeman, John, Connie, andior Beck

•
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shall not do anything to injure or destroy Reed's rights to receive the benefits of the Promissory
Note, Amended Stock Plodgc Agreement, Amended Security Agreement and/or Restructure

Agreement. The Defendants have breached their obligations of good faith and fair dealing owed
to Reed when they, among other things, intentionally injured and/or destroyed Reed rights.
12.3

As a result of the Defendants' acts and/or omissions, Reed has suffered and Is

entitled to damages in the amount to be proven at trial, including, without limitation, all damages

incurred since the Defendants have refused to abide by the tctm8 and oonditions of tho
Promissory Note, Restructure Agreement, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement and/or Amended
Security Agreement In addition. Reed is entitled to recover all damages incurred after his vote
of the pledged shares under because of the individual Defendants' interference wl1h Reed's
contractual rights.

XIlL ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACIJON:QYIL CONSPJMkX
(A Cau1e of Action and/or Remedy)
13. l

Reod re-alleges and incorporates each arul every allesation contained in other

paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim and/or remedy sought wider this

cause of action.
13.2

AIA Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA, John, Connie, Duclos, Freeman, and/or

Beck engaged in a pattern of behavior and/or agreement to BCC-Omplish an unlawful objective
and/or to accomplish a !awful objective in an unlawful manner. AIA Services, AIA Insurance,
Crop USA, John, Connie, Duclos, Freeman, and/or Beck's acts, omissions, and/or acquiescence
constitute civil conspiracy.

13.3

As a result of AIA Services, AlA lnBurance, Crop USA, John, Connie, Duclos,

Freeman. and/or Beck's wrongful and unlawful acts and/or acquiescence, they should all be held

•
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jointly and severally liable for all of Reed's damages in this action.

XIV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Without waiving any claims, rights and/or remedies under any of the above-referenced
agreements and/or Idaho Code as a secured party, Reed respectfully requests the following relief:

14. l

For a judgment against AIA Services for the principal of $6,000,000, plus accrued

pre-judgment interest, in the total amount to be proven at or before trial.

14.2

Reed requests a preliminary and pennanent injunction against the Defendants as

follows (any one or more of the following at or before trial):
(a) Enjoining any of the Defendants from interfering with the actions taken
pursuant to the February 22, 2007, Consent in Lieu of Special Meeting of
Shareholders of AJA Insurance and the actions taken pursuant to the February
22, 2007, Consent in Lieu of Meeting of Board of Directors of AIA Insurance.
(b) Enjoining any of the Defendants from preventing Reed from exercising his
right under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement to vote the pledged shares
in AIA Insurance and taldng any ancillary actions which relate in any way to
voting the pledged shares, including, without limitation, removing the board
of directors of AJA Insurance and appointing a revised board and such other
actions he deems appropriate in his sole discretion as the exclusive person
entitled. to vote all the outstanding shares of AIA rnsurance.
(c) Requiring the Defendants to timely and promptly provide Reed with all
financial information required under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement.
(d) Enjoining John and any of the other individual Defendants from entering the
offices of AlA Insurance, if necessary

•
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(e) Enjoining the Defendants and any entity owned, partially owned or operated
by any one or more of them from interfering with, disturbing, and transferring

any of AIA Services, AIA insurance and Crop USA's customers, trade secrets,
contracts, agreements and business.
(f) Enjoining the Defendants from utilizing, transferring or disposing of any

funds, assets, property, labor, facilities or services of AIA Inslll'ance, AlA
Services and/or Crop USA for any other person, entity or business, unless
such transactions are arms-length and payment is received by AIA Insurance,
AIA Services and/or Crop USA prior to providing such funds, assets, labor,
facilities or services (e.g., no free use or credit arrangements for such

•

activities).
(g) Enjoining the Defendants from disposing of, using, transferring or utilizing

any of the funds, assets (including, without limitation, mortgages) ancVor
property received from AIA Services, AJA Insurance, and/or Crop USA from

the lawsuit entitled In re: Universe Ligui<lator Grain Growers Trust, et al, v.
Idaho Department of Insurance a/k/a GGMIT suit, all other lawsuits, litigation
and disputes in which AIA Services, AJA Insurance and/or Crop USA obtains

any financial gain. All funds, assets and/or property from the foregoing should
be held in trust until further notice from the Court.
(h) Enjoining the Defendants from negotiating or entering into any loans, credit

arrangements, credit facilities, or borrowing any funds under any loan, line-ofcredit, credit facility, open accoWlt and the like for which AIA Insurance or
AIA Services is a guarantor or a signatory, unless utilized for the exclusive

FTFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT - 34

002421

If._·.

t
benefit of AJA Insurance ro provide funding for AIA Insurance and approved
by Reed or such other party appointed by Reed or the Court.
(i) Enjoining the Defendants from destroying) altering, deleting, purging, andlor

removing any documents (including drafts, proposals, elC(:tronic files, email,
back-up media and the like), property, computers and the like from AIA
Insurance, AIA Servioos and Crop USA's offices.
(j) Enjoining the Defendants from advancing or lending any funds, assets or

services to John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, Beck, or AIA Services without
first obtaining written consent from Reed or permission from the Court.
(k) Enjoining the Defendants from entering into or negotiating any substantive

contracts or agreements without first obtaining approval from Reed or
pennission from the Court.
(I) Enjoining the Defendants from holding, calling or participating in llilY

shareholder meetings, board meeting, and/or executing any Consents in Lieu
of the foregoing without permitting Reed to vote the pledged shares or take
such other action permitted to him as the holder of the right to vote all
outstanding shares of AIA Insure.nee.
(m)Enjoining the Defendants from using or transferring any funds, assets, or
services of AIA Insurance for the purpose of providing any retainers or
payments for the legal services for John, Freeman, Duclos, Connie, and/or

Beck
(n) Enjoining John from being paid compensation for work not perfonncd for
AJA Insurance and/or AJA Services.

Jol:m's time expended for Crop USA
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.

and any other entities partially or wholly owned by him shall be paid by the
appropriate entity and not AJA Insurance, AJA Services, but by the entity for
which John perfonned the work.

(o) Enjoining the Defendants from paying any of the members of the board of

,,

directors of A1A Services or AlA Insurance unreasonable compensation for

serving on the board of directors of AIA Services or AIA Insurance.
(p) Enjoining the Defendants requiring AIA Insurance, AIA Services and Crop
USA to accurately and properly itemize every employee's daily time sheet to

reflect the number of hours of work performed for AIA Services, AIA
Insmance, Crop USA and any other entities or persons.

(q) Enjoining the Defendants from such other actions as may be reasonably

•

contemplated from this Complaint, the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement,
the Amended Security Agreement, the Restructure Agreement and/or which
would otherwise protect Reed's interests and to prevent further deepening of
the insolvency at AIA Services.
(r) Enjoining John, Beck, Freeman, Duclos, and/or Connie from appointing any
directors for Crop USA, AJA Services and AIA Insurance.
(s) Invalidating the appointment of Connie and Beck from the Boards of AIA
Services and AIA insurance.
14.3

Enjoining the Defendants from transferring, encumbering or otherwise disposing

of any improperly and/or fraudulently obtained and/or tnUlsferred assets under LC. § 55-916, et
seq. and/or other applicable legal authority.
Ill
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! 4.4

For the imposition of a constructive trust for the benefit of Reed and awarding to

Reed all shares of common andior preferred shares in Crop USA owned and/or held by John,
Connie, Freeman, Duclos, and Beck and for all ancillary actions necessary to transfer said shares
to Reed.

14.5

For the imposition of a constructive trust for the benefit of Reed and awarding to

Reed that certain real property located in Nez Perce County and owed by John and Connie that
was purchased from the Camas Praire Raili'\/et, Inc., recorded under instrument number 672508
in Nez Perce County and all rental proceeds paid from AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance to
John and Connie.
14.6

For a prejudgment writ of attachment against certain assets, funds and/or property

of AIA Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA and any other assets, funds and/or property of any of
.}

the other Defendants sbovvn to be the proceeds or result of any or all of the Defendants'
wrongful, wtlawful, fraudulent and/or inappropriate acts and/or omissions.
14.7

For an order and/or judgment permitting Reed to sell the pledged shares of AJA

Insurance at public or private sale or, in the alternative, judicially. In the event the pledged
shares of AIA Insurance are sold (whether or not Reed is the high bidder), for a deficiency
judgment against the Defendants for all amounts exceeding the amoUJlt received and/or credited

from the sale, including, without limitation, all damages, attorneys' fees and costs incurred by
Reed in this action. In the event Reed elects to purchase or otherwise obtain the shares of AJA
Insurance, he hereby requests that only relief necessary for him to carry out his rights as owner
of the shares of AIA Insurance.
14.&

For a judgment against the Defendants and/or the $200.000 bond posted for the

preliminary injunction against Reed for all damages, attorneys' fees, costs and expenses incurred
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by Reed from being wrongfully enjoined, plus judgment against the Defendants for all amoW1tS
exceeding the $200,000 bond.
14.9

For judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, for all damages

incurred by Reed as a result of the Defendants' breaches of implied duties of good faith and fair
dealing, conversion, deepening insolvency, breaches of fiduciary duties and other claims,
including, without limitation, pre and post filing damages that include, but are not limited to: all
pay to present directors and officers, damages for the compensation and benefits paid to all
employees paid by AlA Services or AIA Insurance that would not have been needed, lost
tenants, misuse of assets and labor, and all other items detailed at trial.
14.10 For an order compelling an audit of AIA Services, AlA Insurance and Crop USA.

••

14.1 l For a declaratory judgment or order requiring specific performance of AlA
Services and/or AJA Insurance's obligations, covenants, warranties and/or other rights granted to
Reed under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security Agreement, Promissory
Note and/or Restructure Agreement.

14.12 For judgment that AIA Insurance, AJA Services and Crop USA have been
operated as the alter-egos of John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or Beck, and their corporate
veils should be pierced thereby imposing personal liability on all of the individual and corporate
Defendants, jointly and severally, for all of Reed's damages and sums owed to him under the
Promissory Note in an amount to be proven at trial.
14.13 For judgment that Crop USA is the alter-ego of AIA Insurance and AIA Services
and all the foregoing corporations for all of Reed's damages !llld sums owed to him in both
contract and tort in an amount to be proven at trial.
14. 14 For a declaratory judgment and/or order enforcing the February 22, 2007, Consent

•
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in Lieu of Special Meeting of Shareholders of AIA insurance and the actions taken pursuant to
the February 22. 2007, Consent in Lieu of Meeting of Board of Directors of AIA Insurance.
14.15 For a judgment for damages and attorneys' fees incurred by Reed as a result of
being wrongfully enjoined by the Defendants.

14.16 For such other relief that Reed may request before or at trial to enforce his rights
under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security Agreement, and/or Restructure
Agreement, including, without limitation, any action or order authorized Wlder I.C. § 30- l •701 et

seq. and/or LC.§ 28-9-101 et seq.
14. 17 For judgment, order and/or declaratory relief as may be necessary for Reed

to

effectuate any and all rights and remedies under LC. § 28·9-101 et seq., including, without
limitation, the sale of the pledged shares, protection of security interest, seizure of security,

•

return of funds protected by his security interest (e.g., attorneys fees paid for individual directors,
etc.) and any other available remedy.
14.18 For the avoidance/rescission of the improper andlor .fraudulent transactions,
transfers of funds, assets and/or services from AIA Services and/or AIA fnsurance to Jolm, Beck,
Freeman, Connie, Duclos, Crop USA, and any entity partially owned by John, and/or any other
party who received such transfers under I.C. § 55-916, et seq. and/or other applicable legal
authority.
14.19 For judgment against John and Connie for $307,271, plus accrued interest, for the
money he owed AIA Services which was improperly paid by inappropriately transferring his
indebtedness to Reed's Promissory Note and then backing out the transaction in 2006 or 2007,
and awarding this account receivable from AIA Services to Reed.

•

.;
"'
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14. 20 For judgment against Connie to tbe fullest ex1ent of her liability by virtue of her
marriage to John and/or his acts during their marriage, and her interest in tbe community
property in an amount to be proven at the time of trial, plus prejudgment interest.
14.21 For judgment against Connie individually for an amount to be proven at trial, plus
pre-judgment interest.
14.22 For a judgment against John (both individually and through his marriage to
Connie) in an amount to be proven at trial, plus prejudgment interest.
14.23 For judgment against John, Connie, Duclos, Freeman, and Beck, jointly and
severally, for all funds, assets, services, property and/or any other benefit fraudulently

transferred, converted and/or fraudulently conveyed, and which such transferred thing of value
may not be avoided, rescinded and/or paid to Reed.
14.24 For judgment against Crop USA for all sums and the fair market value of all
services, labor, funds, and assets wrongfully, fraudulently, and/or inappropriately transferred,
converted and/or conveyed, directly or indirectly, from AI.A Insurance and/or AIA Services.
14.25 For judgment against John, Duclos, Connie, Freeman, and Beck, jointly and

severally, for amounts owed to Reed in an amoruit to be proven at the time of trial because AIA
Services and AIA Insurance are niter egos of John, Duclos, Freeman, and Beck.
14.26 For judgment against John, Connie, Duclos, Freeman, and Beck disgorging all
salaries, compensation (including payments of fees for being board members andJor advisory
board members), benefits, assets, stock (including, without limitation, shares held directly or
indirectly in Crop USA) and other ill-gotten gains as a result of the breaches of their fiduciary
duties, fraudulent transfers, unlawful acts, fraud and/or other causes of action.
Iii
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14.27 For the imposition of a constructive trust for the benefit of Reed and awarding to
Reed all funds, investments, loans, advances, securities, property, transactions, services and/or
self-dealing which were converted or fraudulently, wrongfully, unlawfully and/or improperly
made for the benefit of Duclos, Freeman, John, Beck, Connie and/or other parties or entities
controlled and/or partially owned by any of them as may be requested at trial.

14.28 For the imposition of a constructive trust for the benefit of Reed and awarding to
Reed all securities, stock, options W1.d the like transferred, together with all proceeds thereof,
converted, sold or awarded or acquired by John and/or Connie from AIA Services, AIA
Insurance and/or Crop USA, including, without limitation, shares (and proceeds thereof) and/or
funds, and/or distributions received in or from Pacific Empire Holdings Corporation, Pacific

••

Empire Radio Corporation, and Pacific Empire Communications Corporation .
14.29 For the imposition of a constructive trust for the benefit of Reed and awarding to
Reed all shares and options of A1A Services and Crop USA acquired by the Defend ants during
their employment and/or when they were officers and/or members of the boards of AIA
Insurance, AIA Services, and/or Crop USA.
14.30 For the disgorgemeot of all salary, bonuses, compensation (including all
compensation and benefits received as directors), stock options, benefits, reimbursements (all
proper, improper and/or undocumented reimbursements for travel, meals, lodging, etc.) and any
other payments and/or assets received by John, Connie, Beck, Duclos, and Freeman and award
all such funds and assets to Reed.
14.31 For a judgment against John, Freeman, Duclos, Connie and Beck, jointly and
severally, for all damages re.i;ulting from the breaches of their fiduciary duties owed to Reed
during the periods of time of their relevant tenures as directors of AIA Insurance Blld AIA

•
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Services, in an amount to ~proven at trial.
14.32 For a declaratory judgment imposing personal liability on the individual
Defendants and Crop USA for all loans guruanteed by AIA Services or AIA Insurance.

14.33 For an award of Reed's attorneys' fees and costs from all of the Defendants.
jointly and severally, under the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, I.C. § 12-

120, l.C. § 12-121 and/or as may be available under equity and law.

14.34 For judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, for all damages in tort
and contract proven by Reed at trial based upon one or more of the following: civil conspiracy,
fraud (any type, including misrepresentations), fraudulent conveyances, conversion, breaches of

contract, alter-ego, breaches of fiduciary duties, deepening insolvency, breaches of implied
duties of good faith and fair dealing, specific performance of any of Reed's rights under contract
or law.
1435 John, Connie, Beck, Duclos, and Freeman's wrongful, self-serving, fraudulent,
deepening insolvency, conspiracy, inappropriate and unlawful acts and/or omissions as described
in this Complaint constitute that of "faithless fiduciaries." Accordingly, all salary, compensation
(including all compensation and benefits received as directors), stock options, benefits,
reimbursements (all proper, improper and/or undocwnented reimbursements for travel, meals,
lodging, etc.) and any other payments and/or assets received by Jorm, Connie, Beck, Duclos,
and/or Freeman should be disgorged and awarded to Reed.
14.36 AlA Services and AIA Insurance have alleged that Reed agreed to orally modify
the terms of the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security
Agreement and Restructure Agreement, which such allegations Reed expressly denies. 1f the

•

Defendants are able to prove that such an oral modification exists at or before trial, AlA

F!FTII AMENDED COMPLAINT - 42

)

,/

002429

Services, A!A Insurance and Crop USA are in breach of such orally modified agreements and
Reed is entitled to the damages and relief set forth in this Complaint.
14.37 Reed incorporates by reference into this Section all allegations and requested
relief set forth in the above causes of action and/or remedies. Should any of the causes of action
fail at or before trial, all of such allegations are incorporated by reference into this Section as
requested relief and/or as support for Reed's requested relief
14.38 Reed expressly reserves the right to amend this Complaint upon the completion of
discovery and/or present causes of action and remedies which conform to the evidence at the
time of trial.
14.39 For judgment against the Defendants and/or such relief for all claims and causes

•

of action whlcb conform to the evidence obtained through discovery and/or forensic accounting .

14.40 For such other relief as Reed may request before or at the time of trial and/or that
I

the Court may find just, equitable, or warranted before or at the time of trial.
14.41 The Defendants are placed on notice that future amendments to this Complaint
will be likely and Reed reserves the right to do so, particularly based upon the Defendants•

intentional refusal to respond to Reed's discovery requests.
Ill
///
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14.42 The Defendants are placed on notice that Reed may likely move the Court in the
future to permit him to request an award of punitive damages against the Defendant'> at trial.
DATED this l" day of February, 2008.

SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC

By:4

-7~~~

/Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

•
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CERTIFICATE OF SEfil'ICE

I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the dace indicated below, I served a true and correct
copy of Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Fifth Amended Complaint on the following parties via the
methods indicated below:
David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403

Attorney for Defendants JoLee Duclos and
Bryan Freeman

Via:

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered

( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Ema.ii (pdf attachment)
Via:

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 I 3th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for R. John Taylor

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered

( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)
Via:

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 8350 l

Attorney for Connie Taylor, James Be<;k and
Corrine Beck

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attaclunent)
Via:

Gary D. Babbitt
D. John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite l 000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 8370 l ~I 617
Attorneys for AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and
Crop USA Insurance Agency

•

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)
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James J. Gatziolis
Charles E. Harper

Quarles & Brady LLP
Citigroup Center, 500 West Madison Street

Suite 3700
Chicago, IL 60661-2511
Attorneys for Crop USA Tnsurance Agency

Via:
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

:

I-

Signed this 111 day of February, 2008, at Lewiston, Idaho.
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From: Roderick Bond

Fax: (425) 321-0343

•

Fax: +12083458740

To: +12083458740

Page 2 of 14 8/31/2012 10:35

AUG 3 t 2012
CHAISTOPH!Ft o
Sy CHRISTINE
O!Pury

's~f~· Clerk

MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY, ISB No. 3558
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado St.
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
Tel: (208) 557-5203
Fax: (208) 529-9732
Email: gafthey@.beardstclair.com
RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, WA 98004
Tel: (425) 591-6903
Fax: (425) 321-0343
Email: rod(@roderickbond.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868
Plaintiff,
AFFIDA VlT OF RODERICK C. BOND IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND IN SUPPORT OF REED'S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Robert M.
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING,
TURNBOW & McKL VEEN, CHARTERED,
an Idaho corporation;

I

Defendants.
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Frcm: Roderick Bond

Fax: (425) 321-0343

STATE OF WASHINGTON
COUNTY OF KING

Tc: +12083458740

Fal<: +12083458i40

•
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I, Roderick C. Bond, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in court, one of the

attorneys for the plaintiff in this matter, and make this Affidavit upon my personal knowledge.
2.

Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the transcript for the

deposition of Richard Riley taken on March 29, 2012. This is the first time Reed has ever been
permitted to depose Mr. Riley. As can be seen from this transcript, Mr. Riley was instructed by
Mr. LaRue or refused to answer numerous questions. For the first time, Mr. Riley testified as to

matters regarding the basis for his opinions in the Opinion Letter which were never disclosed to
me or Reed Taylor, which of course came long after the illegality issue had been laid to rest by
Judge Brudie and the Idaho Supreme Court.
3.

Attached as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the transcript for the

deposition of Richard Riley taken on March 30, 2012. This was the second day of Mr. Riley's
first deposition and he again testified as to matters regarding the basis for his opinions in the
Opinion Letter which were never disclosed to me or Reed Taylor, which of course came long
after the illegality issue had been laid to rest by Judge Brudie and the Idaho Supreme Court.
4.

Attached as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of Defendant Richard A. Riley's

Supplemental Objections, Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Requests for
Production of Documents, First Set of Interrogatories and First Set of Requests for Admission
dated February 22, 2012, which was Exhibit 3 to Mr. Riley's deposition. (See Exhibits A and B.)
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There are a number of positions taken by Mr. Riley in his discovery responses and at his
deposition that were never disclosed to me or Reed Taylor during or after the legality issue was
being litigated, including, without limitation, Mr. Riley's assertion that the redemption was legal
based upon his alleged "fair value" analysis or that AIA Services could not "disavow" its
obligations owed to Reed Taylor.
5.

Attached as Exhibit Dis a true and correct copy of Defendant Richard A. Riley's

Objections, Answers and Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Requests for Production of
Documents, First Set of Interrogatories and First Set of Requests for Admission dated January
13, 2010, which was Exhibit 2 to Mr. Riley's deposition transcripts.
6.

Attached as Exhibit Eis a true and correct copy of Defendant Eberle Berlin's

Supplemental Objections and Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Requests for Production of
Documents, First Set of Interrogatories and First Set of Requests for Admission dated May 11,
2012. This is the first answers provided to any interrogatories provided by Eberle Berlin in this
action, which of course came long after the illegality issue had been laid to rest by Judge Brudie
and the Idaho Supreme Court.
7.

Attached as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of the deposition transcript for

Stanley Tharp, IRCP 30(b)(6) deponent for Eberle Berlin, taken on March 28, 2012. This was the
firm time any attorney from Eberle Berlin provided any testimony relative to the Opinion Letter,

which of course came long after the illegality issue had been laid to rest by Judge Brudie and the
Idaho Supreme Court.
8.

Attached as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of Eberle Berlin and Turnbow's
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malpractice policy with ALPS, which was produced by Eberle Berlin's counsel in this action.
9.

Attached as Exhibit H is a true and correct copy of Riley's malpractice policy

with ALPS, which was produced by Riley's counsel in this action.
10.

Attached as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of the Marital Property Settlement

Agreement between Reed and Donna Taylor, which unequivocally proves that Riley and other
attorneys at Eberle Berlin joint1y represented Reed Taylor and AIA Services. This is identical to
Exhibit 13 to the deposition of Richard Riley, but I used a different version so that I could redact
social security numbers and related information that was contained in Exhibit 13.
11.

Attached as Exhibit J is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff Reed Taylor's

Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and the Joinders filed by the other defendants and in Support of Granting
Partial Summary Judgment in Favor of Reed Taylor dated April 9, 2009. In this Memo, Reed
Taylor asserted a number of arguments to enforce the Stock Redemption Agreement - one of
which was that AIA Services could not disavow the redemption or that the defendants and
company did not have standing and were not intended beneficiaries of l. C. § 30-1-6 - a position
that Riley later testified justified the legality of the redemption and the alleged accuracy of his
opinions. See La Voy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 127, 369 P.2d 45 (1962)("A
corporation itself cannot have a stock repurchase agreement declared illegal...") (See Ex. A-C.)
Of course, Mr. Riley never advised Judge Brodie or the Idaho Supreme Court of the reasons he
believed it was legal. At no time until Judge Brudie ruled the redemption was illegal, did I
believe that we had the facts to pursue negligence based claims against the defendants in this
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action on the Opinion Letter. In fact, there were numerous arguments that we asserted, which if
adopted by Judge Brudie, could have resulted in the Stock Redemption Agreement being legal
and enforceable. Had we had facts to pursue negligence based claims for the illegality of the
redemption based upon the Opinion Letter, such claims would have been asserted. If Reed had
prevailed on the illegality issue, he would have been entitled to seek reimbursement of his
attorneys' fees and costs from the defendants in Taylor v. AIA Services. Thus, I respectfully
believe that June 17, 2009 is the day Reed's negligence based claims accrued in this action.
12.

Attached as Exhibit K is a true and correct copy of my Affidavit dated February

11, 2009, which was filed in Taylor v. AIA Services. In Paragraphs 7(a)-(n), I set forth a number
of people who needed to be deposed, including, without limitation, Richard Riley and Robert
Turnbow to ascertain facts around the illegality issue and the redemption. They were never
deposed and Judge Brudie denied all requests to depose them. I also noted in Paragraph 7(u) the
need to ascertain the "fair market value" of AIA Services' assets at the time of the redemption.
Ironically, Mr. Riley asserted at his deposition and in discovery responses that "fair value"
supported the legality of the redemption, which were not produced until after Judge Brudie found
the Stock Redemption Agreement illegal and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed his decision.
13.

Attached as Exhibit Lare true and correct copies of communications between me

and various attorneys and other parties relative to this matter and Taylor v_ AlA Services. As
indicated in these communications, Reed was consistently seeking to depose Riley and get the
defendants in this matter to intervene and support their Opinion Letter. At no time until Judge
Brudie ruled did we have the facts to pursue negligence claims based upon the Opinion Letter
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until there was a finding of illegality. Notably, on Page 11 of Exhibit L, Jim LaRue asserts that
Richard Riley is "opposing counsel" and that he will not permit him to be deposed because we
cannot meet the "Shelton/Wood test." Jim LaRue was successful in preventing Mr. Riley's
deposition until this case, which again came long after the illegality issue was laid to rest.
14.

Attached as Exhibit Mis a true and correct copy of a redacted Billing Statement

dated January 22, 1996 from Caimcross & Hempelmann.

In that Statement, one of Reed's

attorneys billed time for advising Richard Riley that he had "a conflict and possible need to
withdraw from representing [Reed] in divorce proceeding."
15.

Neither I nor Reed Taylor had any knowledge of facts supporting the illegality of

the redemption of his shares during the time Taylor v. McNichols was being litigated before
Judge Brudie. In fact, I believed that Mr. Riley might divulge information never provided to us
when the illegality issue was being litigated. My assumption came to fruition when, after the
illegality issue was determined by Judge Brudie and his decision affirmed by the Idaho Supreme
Court, Riley testified as to reasons he believed that the redemption was legal and provided
similar reasons in his response to discovery. Prior to the recent disclosure of this information,
Mr. Riley never disclosed such facts or positions that he now asserts supported his Opinion
T.etter. If Reed or I had facts to support a negligence or malpractice claim in 2008, I assure the

Court that Reed would have pursued such claims at that time. In addition. we still believed that
Mr. Riley could produce additional shareholder resolutions or other information when he was
ultimately deposed. However, Mr. Riley refused to be deposed during Taylor v. AJA Services
with the help of Mr. LaRue.
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Attached as Exhibit N are true and correct copies of Mr. Riley's bio and

information, which I obtained from Hawley Troxell's website. Mr. Riley is clearly telling the
legal community and anyone who is looking at his information that his practice includes
..opinions."
17.

When the defendants first asserted the illegality defense in April 2008, it was not

based upon a violation of l.C. § 30-1-6 or the failure to obtain proper shareholder approval under
J.C. § 30-1-6. In fact, the defendants asserted that the redemption violated LC. § 30-1-46. When I

filed Reed's Preliminary Response, I asserted that the statute governing redemptions was LC. §
30-1-6. The defendants never responded further. In fact, several weeks later after I filed and
served Reed's Preliminary Response in Opposition to Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motion
for Summary Judgment and pointed out that LC. § 30-1-6 was the correct statute rather than 1.C.
§ 30-1-46, the defendants made a significant settlement offer, which is attached as Exhibit 0.

Although Reed rejected this settlement offer, no pleading was filed identifying any arguments or
violations of LC. § 30-1-6 until after both lawsuits had been dismissed in Taylor v. McNichols
and Taylor v. Hawley Troxell. That settlement offer is entirely inconsistent with any assertion
that everyone knew the facts regarding the alleged illegality. I reiterate that we did not have the
facts regarding the illegality at the time Reed pursued the above-referenced lawsuits.
18.

When Connie Taylor and James Beck served their Supplemental Memorandum in

Support of Summary Judgment on February 12, 2009 (8/10/12 Ashby Aff., Ex. G.), they asserted
for the first time that the redemption violated LC. § 30-1-6 and they did not assert a violation of
I.C. § 30-1-6 for the failure to obtain shareholder approval to utilize capital surplus. Neither I nor
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Reed Taylor had any concrete factual evidence that the Stock Redemption Agreement was
illegal. In fact, Mr. Riley's belated testimony proves this point.

Mr. Riley testified at this

deposition and through answers to interrogatories that he believed a "fair value" analysis
supported his opinions and the legality of the Stock Redemption Agreement and that AIA
Services could not "disavow" its obligations under the Stock Redemption Agreement pursuant to

La Vay Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 127, 369 P.2d 45 (1962) ("A corporation itself
cannot have a stock repurchase agreement declared illegal..."). Ironically, this is the same case
cited by Reed in his Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Summary Judgment (See Ex. J.) and
the same case Mr. Riley testified supported his opinions because of his belief that AJA Services
could not "disavow" its obligations to Reed. (See e.g. Ex. A-C.) Mr. Riley asserts that Reed and
I should have known it was illegal when he was sued the first time in his Motion for Summary
Judgment, but testified at his deposition and in his answers to discovery that he still believes
today that the Opinion Letter was correct based upon such theories as "fair value" and that the
corporation could not disavow its obligations to Reed.
19.

Attached as Exhibit P is a true and correct copy of pertinent pages of the

1995/1994 Audited Financial Statements for AIA Services. On Page 6 of these audited financial
statements, Reed's obligations of $7 ,124,534 are shown as a liability. There is no contingent or
off balance sheet implications for the redemption.

Rather, the funds owed to Reed for the

redemption obligations are clearly indicated as "Obligation to former majority stockholder."
20.

All of Reed Taylor's claims have been dismissed in Taylor v. A/A Services, and

the issue of illegality has been laid to rest in that case. In addition, Judge Brudie denied Reed's
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request to amend to assert unjust enrichment or other claims based upon the illegal contract
21.

The defendants have submitted a correct copy of the Complaint against Scott Bell,

Frank Taylor and Caimcross & Hempelmann. As indicated in that Complaint. Bob Gould signed
that Complaint on my behalf. Any reference in that Complaint to the defendants' failure to seek
and obtain a second opinion letter has no bearing on the claims in this action. In addition, Reed
Taylor has incurred millions of dollars in damages based upon the illegality of the redemption of
his shares. Neither the defendants nor any other prudent lawyer would believe that any client
would not pursue claims against all of the attorneys involved in the illegal redemption. Contrary
to the defendants' allegations, Reed is not seeking double recovery. He is simply asserting all
possible claims to recover all damages. Apparently, the defendants believe that Reed Taylor
should simply walk away from his millions of dollars in damages inflicted upon him.
22.

At the hearing on January 30. 2012, Jack Gjording stated in open court that Reed

had malpractice claims going to trial. Based upon Mr. Gjording's admissions that Reed had
malpractice claims going to trial, we relied upon his admissions by not opposing the dismissal of
the fraud claims. Mr. Gjording is now asserting that Reed's malpractice claim should be
dismissed. However, his clients should be judiciaUy estopped from taking contradictory positions
after obtaining dismissal of the fraud claims based upon Mr. Gjording's judicial admission. The
transcript for that hearing will be submitted after it has been transcribed.
DATED: This 30th day of August, 2012.

Roderic
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CERTJli'ICATE OP SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the date indicated below, I caused to be seryed trut: and ...
. correct copies of the foregoing document t.o the following parties:
Via:

Jack S. Gjording
· ·.Julianne S. Hall
·· · · ·. Gjording & Fouser, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
•Boise, ID 83701
Fax: (208) 336-9177

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
······ ·
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment) (By Agreement).

Via:

. James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
Elam & Burke, PA
P.O. Box 1539
. Boise, lD 83704

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
· ··
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(") Ema,il (pdfattachment) (By Agreement)

Fax: (208) 384-5844
S)gned this 30111 day of A1Jgust, 2012.

-~~~~~~------~~~~~~-

Roderick C. Bond
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH C/
By STE·PHAN/E V/DAK' erk
DEPUTY

RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, WA 98004
Tel: (425) 591-6903
Fax: (425) 321-0343
Email: rod@roderickbond.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868
Plaintiff,

v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Robert M.
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING,
TURNBOW & McKLVEEN, CHARTERED,
an Idaho corporation;

PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS
CUMMINGS AND EBERLE BERLIN'S
RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND JOINDER TO
DEFENDANT RILEY'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF REED TAYLOR'S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

Defendants.
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed") submits this Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Defendants Sharon Cummings, Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert Turnbow
("Cummings"), and

Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered ("Eberle
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Berlin")'s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and Joinder of Defendant Riley's Motion for
Summary Judgment and Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration:

1

I. INTRODUCTION
The defendants, without citing any applicable authority, are asking the Court to
reconsider its decision that "Riley and Turnbow had a duty to Taylor, a non-client, to draft the
opinion letter in a non-negligent fashion." Notably, Riley agrees with the Court's decision: "I
think that in Judge Greenwood's opinion he stated very well what the duties of an Opinion giver
are." (8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. A, p. 68-69.) Reed's expert witness agrees with Riley: "Mr. Riley
and Mr. Turnbow ... owed ... a duty of care to Reed ... to prepare ... the Opinion Letter in a nonnegligent manner." (8/29/12 McDermott Aff., ,-r22(f).) Next, the defendants assert that the 1996
restructure bars Reed's claims and the redemption was legal because it was subordinate to Donna
Taylor's redemption. However, I.C. § 30-1-6 does not authorize an illegal redemption through a
subordination and "[t]he relevant inquiry is whether ... the Opinion Letter [was] accurate when
the transaction to redeem Reed Taylor's shares was closed." (Id., at ,-r22(e).) Moreover, "an
illegal contract is against public policy ... as [is any] document in furtherance of the illegal
contract." Taylor v. AJA Services Corp., 151Idaho552, 570, 261 P.3d 829, 847 (2011).

II. RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS
Rather than repeat background facts here, Reed incorporates by reference herein Plaintiff
Reed J. Taylor's Statement of Facts in Opposition to Defendants Riley, Hawley Troxell,
Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's Motions for Summary Judgment and in Support of Cross Motions
for Summary Judgment dated February 12, 2010. While the appeal was pending in Taylor v. AJA

1

Because Reed filed a Motion to Enlarge Time based upon the defendants' refusal to permit him lo serve
his Memo on September 4, 2012, Reed served an initial Memo on August 30, 2012. If the Motion lo Enlarge Time is
granted, then this Memo supersedes and replaces the one served on August 30, 2012. If the Motion to Enlarge Time
is denied, then Reed requests that this be a Supplemental Memorandum.
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Services, the defendants moved to stay asserting, inter alias, that their opinions may be correct.

(Defendants' Memos in Support of Motion to Stay filed on May 19, 2010 and May 21, 2010.) On
September 7, 2011, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court in all respects. AJA
Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552. (12/3/09 Babbitt Aff., Ex. J-K.)

III. ARGUMENTS
When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party, the
court must liberally construe all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record will be drawn in favor of the nonmoving
party. IRCP 56(c); Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 307, 160 P.3d 743
(2007); McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 394, 64 P.3d 317 (2003). Summary judgment is
improper "if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences
from the evidence presented." McPheters, 138 Idaho at 394. The party asserting a defense bears
"the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of fact material to ... [the] defense."
Mason v. Tucker and Associates, 125 Idaho 429, 437, 871 P.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1994). The court

may grant summary judgment to a non-moving party, even if the party has not filed its own
motion. Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 677, 39 P.3d 612 (2001); IRCP 56(d).
A. The defendants owed Reed duties of care. assumed duties and fiduciary duties.
1. The Court correctly concluded that the defendants owed a duty of care to Reed.

Opinion givers are liable to the recipients for the negligent preparation of opinion letters:
[W]here, as here, the negligent acts, i.e., the creation of an opinion letter and the
transmission of that letter to a third party for the party's own use, were carried out by the
lawyer at the client's express direction, the ethical considerations ... are insufficient reason
to insulate attorneys from liability.
Prudential Ins. Co. ofAmerica v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer and Wood, 80 N.Y.2d 377,

382, 605 N.E. 2d 318 (1992); Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 128 Cal.Rptr. 901,
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905 (Cal. 1976) (attorney liable for incorrect opinion letter under the same balance-of-the-harms
test used in Harrigfeld); Crossland Sav. FSB v. Rockwood Ins. Co., 700 F.Supp. 1274, 1283
(S.D.N.Y 1988) ("When a lawyer. .. prepares an opinion letter. .. to [a] third party ... she engages
in a form of limited representation."); Jones v. Runft, Leroy, Coffin & Matthews, Chartered, 125
Idaho 607, 612-13, 873 P.2d 861, 866-67 (1994) (Attorney assumed "a voluntary duty to act in
[non-client's] best interests"); Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers§ 51 (2000).
Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin, at the direction of AIA Services, voluntarily provided
legal services to Reed through the Opinion Letter, which was approved by a committee at Eberle
Berlin. (8/2/12 Cummins Answer,

~~36,

39-41; 10/23/09 Eberle Berlin Answer,

~~7-8,

10;

10/29/09 Riley Answer, ~,110-11; 8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. A, p. 48-49, 60-61, 96-97, Ex. C, p. 64,
Ex. D, p. 6, Ex. F, p. 35; 2/2/10 Taylor Aff.,

~~2-11.)

In addition, the Stock Redemption

Agreement, negotiated by the defendants, included a provision requiring them to provide the
Opinion Letter to Reed as a condition of closing. (Id.; 8/14/12 2nd Supp. Riley Aff., Ex. 1, p. 4, §
2.50), Ex. 10.) Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin voluntarily assumed duties to provide those
legal services to Reed and to prepare and deliver the Opinion Letter to him in a non-negligent
manner. 2 In 1995, the defendants had privity with Reed (see also Section A(3)(c)), they prepared
the Opinion Letter for him, he relied upon it, and that it was incorrect:
Plaintiff relies heavily on an August 15, 1995 opinion letter. .. offer[ing] the
opinion that the stock redemption agreement 'did not violate ... law, rule or
regulation' without making specific reference to or discussing LC. § 30-1-6... By
this ruling today, the Court finds the attorney opinion incorrect.3
(12/3/09 Babbitt Aff., Ex. J, p. 12 n. 15; 2/2/10 Taylor Aff.,

~~2-11.)

Since the $6M Note and

Reed's security interests were illegal, he was proximately damaged. (8/29/12 McDermott Aff.,

2

As discussed below and as previously asserted, Reed does not concede that he was a non-client.
On many occasions, Reed requested that the defendants intervene and support their Opinion Letter, but
they refused to do so. (See e.g., 8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. A, p. 115; Ex. L, p. 80-83, 92-93.)
3
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~~22(f)-(g).)

Without citing any authority that opinion givers do not owe duties to non-clients or

that they are immune from liability, the defendants ask this Court to reconsider its decision:
A lawyer is generally not liable in negligence to a person who is not the lawyer's
client. Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005). There are, however,
exceptions to this rule. See Harrigfeld vs. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884
(2004) (holding that where, as a result of the attorney's negligence, and the estate
is not distributed in accordance with the testator's intent, the intended
beneficiaries may maintain an action against the attorney). Another narrow, but
widely recognized, exception to this general rule is the case of opinion letters
drafted and delivered to a non-client with the expectation that the non-client will
rely on it. See e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby,
Palmer and Wood, 80 N.Y.2d 377, 605 N.E. 2d 318 (1992). Although this precise
issue has not been addressed by Idaho courts, the holding of cases such as
Prudential, supra, are consistent with the reasoning of our Supreme Court in
Harrigfeld ... Riley and Turnbow had a duty to Taylor, a non-client,4 to draft the
opinion letter in a non-negligent fashion. That is, to exercise the ordinary care,
skill and prudence of a lawyer under the circumstances.
(5/10/10 Memorandum Decision.) Significantly, Riley (whose practice includes providing thirdparty opinion letters) agreed with the Court's decision that duties are owed to opinion recipients:
Q. (Mr. Gaffney):

(Mr. LaRue):
(Mr. Gaffney):
(Mr. LaRue ):
A. (Mr. Riley):
Q. (Mr. Gaffney):

A. (Mr. Riley):

Is there some kind of standard of care required of an attorney that
they have to comply with when they generate an Opinion Letter for
a third party?
Object to the form. There is no time parameters in the question.
Let's go back to 1995.
Thank you.
I think that in Judge Greenwood's opinion he stated very well what
the duties of an Opinion giver are.
And what is your understanding of that duty?
That they need to be prepared in a non-negligent manner with the
skill, care, and prudence of a lawyer in similar circumstances.

(8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. A, p. 68-69, Ex. N.) For his opinion practice, Riley looks to the TriBar:
Q. (Mr. Gaffney):

With regard to customary practice in the formulation of Opinion
Letters is that customary practice usage, is that something fairly
standard nationwide, that you are familiar with?

4

The defendants are estopped from asserting lack of privily or attorney-client relationship. Crossland
Savings Bank FSB, 700 F. Supp. 1274; Cohen v. Godfriend, 665 F.Supp. 152, 158 (E.D. N.Y. 1987); Finova Capital
Corporation v. Berger, 18 A.D.3d 256, 257 (N.Y. 2005); RTC Mortgage Trust 1994 N-1 v. Fidelity National Title
insurance Company, 58 F.Supp.2d 503, 521 (D. N.J. 1999).
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A. (Mr. Riley):

Q. (Mr. Gaffney):
A. (Mr. Riley):

There are, I think, accepted standards practiced by attorneys
around the country as set forth in various publications by
authoritative sources.
What would be some of those publications?
In particular the TriBar reports by the New York City - - I'm not
sure of the name of the bar associations in New York City.

(Id., Ex. A, p. 24.) Consequently, Reed retained an expert witness who is a twenty-two year

member of the TriBar Committee that publishes the Reports that Mr. Riley relies upon for his
opinion practice. (8/29/12 McDermott Aff., 118.) Richard McDermott, a thirty plus year business
attorney and Adjunct Professor of Law, is the co-author of Chapters 1 and 2 (Introduction and
Elements of Opinion Letters) and author of Chapter 3 (Legal Opinions on Corporate Matters) of
the treatise: Legal Opinion Letters: A Comprehensive Guide to Opinion Practice (Third Edition)
and the author of the law school text book: Legal Aspects of Corporate Finance (4th ed. 2006).
(Id., 11115-10.) Mr. McDermott agrees with Riley that the defendants owed a duty of care to Reed:

Mr. Riley and Mr. Turnbow, as the Opinion Letter preparers, and Eberle Berlin,
as the signatory of the Opinion Letter, owed and/or assumed a duty of care to
Reed Taylor to prepare and deliver the Opinion Letter in a non-negligent manner,
which was to prepare and deliver the Opinion Letter exercising the degree of care
and skill that a reasonably prudent opinion preparer would exercise under the
same or similar circumstances. Mr. Riley, Mr. Turnbow and Eberle Berlin
breached their duties owed to Reed Taylor when they failed to exercise that
required degree of care and skill thereby delivering to him an incorrect Opinion
Letter. There are no disclosures, assumptions, qualifications or exceptions in the
Opinion Letter that insulate Mr. Riley, Mr. Turnbow or Eberle Berlin from any of
the incorrect opinions or their failure to prepare and deliver the Opinion Letter in
a non-negligent manner.
(Id., 1122(t)-(g).) Notwithstanding the authority that a form of representation occurred or that

duties were assumed, the Court's decision is consistent with the balance-of-the-harms test:
That test involves the consideration of policy and the weighing of factors, which
include: [1] the foreseeability of the harm to the plaintiff; [2] the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; [3] the closeness of the connection
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered; [4] the moral blame
attached to the defendant's conduct; [5] the policy of preventing future harm; [6]
the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community in
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imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach; and [7] the
availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.

Harrigfeld v. J.D. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 138, 90 P.3d 884, 888 (2004). The defendants all
have $10 Million in malpractice insurance coverage for Reed's claims. (8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex.
A, p. 64. Ex. F, p. 11-13, Ex. G-H & L, p. 93.) They all held themselves out as emphasizing their
practice in corporate law and opinion letters. (Id., Ex. N; 12/30 Gjording Aff., Ex. A.) The
defendants voluntarily assumed duties to Reed to prepare and deliver the Opinion Letter to him
and they knew that the Opinion Letter was a condition precedent of closing the redemption
transaction. (8/2/12 Cummins Answer,
10/29/09 Riley Answer,

~~110-11;

~~36,

39-41; 10/23/09 Eberle Berlin Answer,

~U-8,

10;

8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. A, p. 48-49, 60-61, Ex. C, p. 64, Ex. D,

p. 6, Ex. F, p. 35.) The Opinion Letter was addressed to him, invited him to rely upon it and he
did rely upon it. (2/2/10 Taylor Aff., Ex. A, p. 1-5.) The defendants could foresee the harm to
Reed and controlled whether he would be harmed-they served as general counsel for AIA
Services and thereby controlled the accuracy of virtually all of their opinions and proximately
damaged Reed. (Id.; 8/29/12 McDermott Aff.,

~22(c)-(g).)

There is great need for policy of

preventing future harm to opinion letter recipients by providing relief for them and to provide
incentives to opinion givers to non-negligently prepare opinion letters. Moreover, if the
defendants had properly disclosed their analysis, Reed could have taken further action or refused
to sell his shares. (Id at

~22(f).)

Under these circumstances, all of the factors in the "balance-of-

the-harms test" are satisfied and liability should be imposed, irrespective of all of the authority
around the United States imposing liability on opinion givers. (Id. at ~22(a)-(h).) Harrigfeld, 140
Idaho at 138. Moreover, the moral blame and policy for imposing liability are further warranted
to maintain the public's trust in attorneys for the reasons set forth in Section A(3) herein,
including, the obligation to not prepare misleading opinions and to act fairly and honestly.
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2. Neither of the two cases cited by the defendants impacts the Court's decision.

The defendants assert that "they are not critical of the process this Court
followed ... [r]ather, now having the opportunity to review decisions our Supreme Court has
made since May 2010 ... it is appropriate to reconsider this legal issue." (See Memo, p. 12.) In
support of their argument, the defendants cite two cases-neither of which is applicable here.
In Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P.3d 642 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court
affirmed the dismissal of Reed's claims based upon the "litigation privilege" and asserted that
claims were not ripe. 5 Id. The only relevance that case has to issues before this court is that any
claims relating to actions taken by Riley and his firm to assert illegality in breach of Riley's duty
of loyalty to Reed in the underlying litigation are now ripe-assuming that Riley appeared as
counsel in that case. In addition, Reed is no longer a creditor or stock pledgee, but is now a
damaged plaintiff because of the defendants' tortious conduct. In Soignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho
322, 256 P.3d 730 (2011), the "pivotal issue ... [was] whether Fletcher breached his duty of care
to Soignier by drafting a will that leaves to her interests in trusts when the decedent had no such
interests." Id. at 325. In Soignier, it was undisputed that "[t]he unambiguous intent of the
testator, as it appears in the will, was to leave all beneficial interests in any trusts to Soigner if
any so exist." Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held that "[a]ttomeys do not have to postulate
whether a testator intended to do something other than what is expressed in the will" or "have no
ongoing duty to monitor the legal status of the property mentioned in a testamentary instrument."
Id. Contrary to the defendants' assertions, the Court held that Soignier could not assert claims

because of the clear language of the will. Neither McNichols nor Soignier apply to legal issues
here-which are claims based on the incorrect Opinion Letter the defendants prepared for Reed.
5

In those consolidated cases, Reed asserted that, as the stock pledgee, he was entitled to all rights of a
shareholder and secured creditor, including the right to pursue malpractice claims against the attorneys for acts that
damaged the corporations. (12/2/08 Babbitt Aff., Ex. N-T; 2/17/10 Bond Aff., Ex. 16-19.)
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•
3. The defendants owed fiduciary duties, assumed duties and other duties to Reed.
Since the defendants are asking the Court to reconsider its earlier decision, Reed requests
that the Court reconsider its decision regarding the following claims. 6

a. The defendants owed fiduciary duties to Reed.
A fiduciary duty "exists in cases where there has been a special confidence imposed in
another who, in equity and good conscience, is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to
the interest of the one reposing the confidence." Stearns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 288, 240 P.2d
833, 840-41 (1952); Bethlahmy v. Becktel, 91 Idaho 55, 62, 415 P.2d 698, 705 (1966)
("Defendant dealt from a position of superior knowledge. A confidential relationship arose
between the parties."); McGhee v. McGhee, 82 Idaho 367, 371, 353 P.2d 760, 762 (1960) ("such
relationship may ... exist whenever trust or confidence is reposed by one person in the integrity
and fidelity of another."); Lewis v. Rosenfeld, 138 F.Supp.2d 466, 480 (S.D. N.Y. 2001) ("An
attorney owes fiduciary duties ... when the attorney, at the client's request, issues an 'opinion
letter' which the attorney knew would be relied upon by a third party."); Taylor v. Maile, 142
Idaho 253, 259, 127 P.3d 156, 162 (2005) ("[A] person may sue an attorney for breach of
fiduciary duty even though there is no attorney-client relationship between them, if facts show
that the defendant assumed a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff."); Jones, 125 Idaho at 613 ("a
fiduciary duty may stem from informal actions and agreements between the parties.").
Here, Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin voluntarily assumed and owed fiduciary duties
to Reed. The defendants, at the direction of AIA Services and "pursuant to Section 2.5G) of the
Stock Redemption Agreement" provided advice to Reed through the Opinion Letter, which was
addressed to him and "furnished by [the defendants] solely for [Reed's] benefit for use in

6

Reed presumes that the Court may have considered "assumed duty" as one of the basis to support the
negligence claim on the Opinion Letter in its decision. See Section A(3)(b). If not, he asserts that authority now.
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connection with the [redemption]." (2/2/10 Taylor Aff., Ex. A, p. 1 & 5; Section A(l).) Reed
placed the utmost in trust and confidence in the defendants, regardless of any privity:
Had I known that I could not rely upon them or their Opinion Letter, I would have
retained new counsel for AIA Services for the redemption of my shares in
1995 ... I relied upon Mr. Riley, Mr. Turnbow and Eberle Berlin as both my
personal attorneys and the attorneys for AIA Services to ensure that all necessary
shareholder and board consents were obtained and that all laws were complied
with for the redemption .. .! had the utmost in trust and confidence in Mr. Riley,
Mr. Turnbow and Eberle Berlin pertaining to their legal services provided to me
and AIA Services in 1995. My trust and confidence with Mr. Riley, who had been
my long-term attorney, remained steadfast even after he left Eberle Berlin ... 7
(2/2/10 Taylor Aff., ,-r,-r5 & 10.) Reed's trust and confidence in the defendants further supports a
fiduciary relationship with the defendants based upon his long-standing attorney-client
relationship with them and his reliance on their superior knowledge, particularly since Turnbow
was on the committee that adopted l.C. § 30-1-6. (Id., ,-r,-r2-12 & 15; 8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. A, p.
117; See Section A(3)(c) below.) Thus, the legal advice and services provided to Reed through
the Opinion Letter, coupled with the defendants' superior knowledge and Reed's trust and
confidence in them, constitutes an actionable fiduciary or special relationship.
The defendants' fiduciary duties include the undivided duty of loyalty to not undertake
any adverse representation to the opinions in the Opinion Letter, which re-attached to Riley and
Hawley Troxell when they undertook adverse representation and asserted "the agreement to
redeem Reed Taylor's shares was illegal... in violation of former Idaho Code § 30-1-6"-after
his claims were dismissed in Taylor v. McNichols. (11/10/09 Bond Aff., Ex. C & E; 12/3/09
Babbitt Aff., Ex. J-K, Q; 8/10/12 Ashby Aff., Ex. G; 2/2/10 Taylor Aff., ,-r,-rlQ-11.)AIA Services

Corp., 151 Idaho 552 (affirming illegality and the dismissal of claims at the request of Riley's
firm Hawley Troxell). Moreover, Mr. LaRue prevented disclosure by asserting Riley was
7

In 2006, Hawley Troxell requested a conflict waiver from Reed to assist in drafting the loan documents to
refinance his airplane and Riley admitted to representing Reed on other matters, which further supports and
evidences Reed's trust and confidence in them. (2/2/10 Taylor Aff., '1115; 2/17 /10 Riley Aff., ~~24-25, Ex. 0.)
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"opposing counsel," when he had previously denied being opposing counsel to avoid
disqualification. (8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. K, p. 6, 7 & 10, Ex. L, p. 14-15; 11/10/09 Bond Aff.,
Ex. D.) Riley was "involved" and "communicated ... with other Hawley Troxell attorneys relative
to the AIA litigation." (8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. A, p. 171-72; 11/24/09 Riley Aff., 1110.) Riley
refused to answer any questions regarding his and Hawley Troxell's untenable positions: 8
Q. (Mr. Gaffney):

(Mr. LaRue):

(Mr.
Q. (Mr.
(Mr.
Q. (Mr.
(Mr.

Gaffney):
Gaffney):
LaRue):
Gaffney):
LaRue ):

Q. (Mr. Gaffney):

(Mr. LaRue ):

I assume that you were aware that Hawley Troxell on your behalf
had decided to use an illegality defense to defend against Mr.
Taylor's claims against you?
Object to the form. The question is not related to the negligent
preparation of the Opinion Letter. I instruct the witness not to
answer the question.
I'm sorry. It was these guys that were defending you. I'm sorry.
Hawley was using that defense in the AIA case.
Same instruction.
You were aware of that; right?
Same instruction. I have instructed him not to answer the question
for the reasons given.
Just as general proposition. As a lawyer is it your position that you
don't have any duty to a third party if you assert or opine that a
transaction is legal in an Opinion Letter and then later allow
arguments to be made by partners of yours that are completely
contrary to that opinion?
Object to the form. Instruct the witness not to answer the question
on the same basis as the last question.

(Id., Ex. A, p. 149, Ex. B, p. 199-200.) Mr. McDermott addressed their untenable positions:

I am not aware of any other instance in which an opinion giver's law firm has in
effect disavowed his previously rendered third-party opinions. This was done here
by Mr. Riley's law firm asserting in a judicial proceeding that the Stock
Redemption Agreement is unenforceable and illegal, notwithstanding the opinions
stating the direct opposite. Moreover, the opinion givers ignored requests to assist
the recipient of the opinion, Reed Taylor, in defending the Stock Redemption
Agreement against the charge of illegality and enforcing it...
(8/29/12 McDermott Aff., 1122(h).) The defendants breached their fiduciary duties to Reed when
8

Mr. LaRue improperly instructed Riley to limit or not answer over 15 questions at his deposition
regarding taking adverse positions to his opinions and other issues relating to his opinions and his analysis. (8/30/12
Bond Aff., Ex. A, p. 29-31, 64, 68, 98-99, 104, 111-113, 145, 148-150, 174 & Ex. B, p. 194, 199-200, 216, 220.)
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they undertook adverse representation in violation of their duties owed to Reed. See Damron v.
Herzog, 67 F.3d 211 (9th Cir. 1995); Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 652 P.2d 650 (1982).

In addition, the defendants, and in particular Riley, breached their fiduciary duties by
concealing facts and legal analysis relative to their opinions, which also resulted in the Opinion
Letter being misleading. (8/29/12 McDermott Aff., '1"'1"22(t) & (h).) Specifically, after a violation
of I.C. § 30-1-6 was first alleged in February 2009 (which was after the dismissal of Taylor v.
McNichols) and after the illegality was affirmed on appeal, the defendants, for the first time,

disclosed in 2012: (1) they deviated from the definitions under l.C. §§ 30-1-2 and 30-1-6 and
relied upon "fair value" or "net assets" to calculate earned surplus under l.C. § 30-1-6, even
though the plain meaning of "earned surplus" was defined under l.C. § 30-1-2 (Riley also
refused to answer questions regarding how "fair value" was calculated) (8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex.
A, p. 127-133 & 140, Ex. B, p. 186-196, 220-221, Ex. C, p. 41-44); (2) they based their opinions
upon their conclusion "that AIA could not later disavow its obligations to Reed Taylor" (Id., Ex.
A, p. 140, Ex C, p. 45); (3) they "did not know what the definition [of earned surplus under l.C.
§ 30-1-2] meant," but deviated from the definitions under l.C. § 30-1-2 (Id., Ex. A, p. 127, Ex. B,

p. 186-191 & 219, Ex. C, p. 41-42); and (4) although there is no provision in l.C. § 30-1-6
authorizing the redemption of shares through subordination, the defendants concluded the
redemption was legal "because payment of Reed's note was expressly subordinated to
redemption of Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred Stock, in turn payable only from legally
available funds" (Id., Ex. A, p. 138-141, Ex. C, p. 45-48, Ex. E, p. 5-6.) However, Riley admitted
that "[t]here is no discussion of the reasoning" for the above analysis in the Opinion Letter and
that he never advised Reed of his analysis. (Id., Ex. A, p. 138-140, Ex. B, p. 220.) Moreover, the
Opinion Letter did not contain any exceptions, qualifications or assumptions for addressing or
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disclosing the defendants' deviations from the plain meaning of LC. § 30-1-6 and l.C. § 30-1-2
to justify their opinions. (2/2/10 Taylor Aff., Ex. A; 8/29/12 McDermott Aff., ,-r,-r22(e)-(t).)
Notably, while Riley and his firm were maintaining that the redemption was illegal, the
defendants were concealing the facts and legal analysis supporting his opinions and that "[t]he
1995 Opinion Letter was and is believed ... to be correct ... " (8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. A, p. 97-98
& 114, Ex. C, p. 40, Ex. E, p. 5.) AIA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552. Significantly, despite the

above concealed facts and legal analysis, the defendants, with knowledge of their counsel in this
action, refused to support their opinions, even after repeated requests from Reed. (Id., Ex. A, p.
115, Ex. L, p. 24-25, 27-31, 33-34, 44-45, 48-52, 55, 59, 95-96; 8/29/12 McDermott Aff.,
,-r22(h).) Moreover, in Taylor v. AIA Services, Riley and his firm avoided disqualification by
asserting that he was not opposing counsel and later Mr. LaRue refused to permit Riley's
deposition: "I will not make ... Riley available for a deposition," in violation of duties to disclose
the facts and legal impediments concealed by the defendants. 9 (Id.; 8/30/12 Bond Aff., ,-r,-r2-4, 68, 13 & 15, Ex. L, p. 11, 15-15 & 63; 2/2/10 Taylor Aff., ,-r,-r10-l1; 11/10/09 Bond Aff., Ex. D.)
Thus, when the defendants provided Reed with the Opinion Letter, they concealed from Reed
that they had deviated from the definitions and plain meaning of LC. §§ 30-1-2 and 30-1-6.
A substantially similar, but less egregious, situation was faced by another court. In Davin

v. Daham, 746 A.2d 1034 (N.J. 2000), the non-clients asserted that the attorney "owed them a
duty" to disclose any factual or legal impediments based upon the attorney's knowledge of
certain facts that impacted the non-client's rights. Id. at 1045. In support of its holding that the

9

Mr. LaRue's untenable position is analogous to the attorney's position in Davin. With knowledge of the
facts and analysis known by Riley, he improperly prevented Riley's deposition and permitted his clients to assert the
redemption was illegal without requiring his clients to disclose the facts and legal analysis for the opinions to Reed
or the district court. See e.g., IRPC 3.3-3.4, 4.1 & 4.4. There is no way that Reed could have known the factual and
legal analysis utilized by the defendants without deposing Riley or properly receiving the required disclosures. The
same holds true for Mr. Gjording since he had knowledge through Turnbow and/or Riley, and he, like Mr. LaRue,
was formally representing his clients during the proceedings in Taylor v. AJA Services. (8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. L.)
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attorney owed a duty to the non-client, the Court stated "[t]he practice of law is a profession, not
a business. An attorney is not merely a hired gun, but, rather, a professional required to act with
candor and honesty." Id. The Court held that "the lawyer's duty of effective and vigorous
representation of his client is tempered by his corresponding duty to be fair, candid and
forthright." Id. at 1046. "When the fact to be disclosed goes to the very essence of the
transaction, the attorney should recommend disclosure ... [a ]t least if disclosure had been made,
the tenants would have had the opportunity to consider not entering into the [transaction]." Id.
Here, the defendants owed Reed the duties to properly disclose that they had deviated from the
plain meaning of LC. § 30-1-6 to support their opinions in the Opinion Letter. If the defendants
had properly disclosed these facts, Reed could have proceeded differently or not sold his shares:
Indeed, if the Opinion Letter had disclosed that it was based on the so-called "fair
value" test or some other analysis to which Mr. Riley has testified to justify the
compliance with LC. § 30-1-6 (1995), rather than the plain language of that
statute, a reasonable opinion recipient would have insisted on a shareholder vote
to permit the use of capital surplus and thus avoid any ambiguity or uncertainty
with respect to the legality of the Stock Redemption Agreement.
(8/29/12 McDermott Aff., 1122(f).) As general counsel for AIA Services, had at least four
different opportunities to authorize the redemption under LC. § 30-1-6. (Id., 111122(c)-(d) & (f).)
Thus, like in Davin, if the defendants had made the required disclosures to Reed in the Opinion
Letter or otherwise, he could have taken action to ensure the redemption complied with LC. §
30-1-6 by simply obtaining shareholder authorization for the redemption through the use of
capital surplus, through a shareholder resolution or amendment to the articles of incorporation.
LC. § 30-1-6; Taylor v. AJA Services Corp, 151 Idaho 552. The defendants breached their
fiduciary duties to Reed by preparing a misleading Opinion Letter that concealed that they had
deviated from the plain meaning of LC. § 30-1-6 and further breached those duties when they
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failed to disclose and took adverse positions to the Opinion Letter. 10 The defendants' have
breached their fiduciary duties owed to Reed, which are actionable malpractice claims.

11

b. The defenda,nts owed assumed duties to Reed.
For the same reasons set forth in Sections A(l) & A(3)(a), the defendants, at the direction
of AIA Services and through a contractual provision, assumed a duty to Reed to prepare the
Opinion Letter in a non-negligent fashion. Jones, 125 Idaho at 612-13. Thus, the defendants
assumed duties to Reed when they addressed and prepared the Opinion Letter to him for his
reliance. Id. They breached those assumed duties. (8/29/12 McDermott Aff., 1122(f)-(g).)

c. The defen®nts jointly represented Reed and AJA Services in 1995.
Whether an attorney jointly represents both the corporation and other individuals "must
be determined ... [by the] facts of each case." Bobbitt v. Victorian House, Inc., 545 F.Supp. 1124,
1126 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Wick v. Eisman, 122 Idaho 698, 700-01, 838 P.2d 301, 303-04 (1992)
(whether an attorney represented both a corporation and a shareholder is an issue of fact).
Reed trusted and relied upon the defendants to provide legal services for the corporate
governance for the redemption, e.g., obtaining proper shareholder approval. (2/2/10 Taylor Aff.,
11112-11 & 15.) The defendants jointly represented Reed and AIA Services in the past, including
to reorganize AIA Services for Reed's divorce. (8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. I, p. 1-2, 29-60.) Riley
confirmed the attorney-client relationship between Reed and the defendants. (Id., Ex. A, p. 31,
Ex. B, p. 207.) Riley even admitted that the letter agreements entered into between Reed, Donna
Taylor and AIA Services at the time of the redemption were "tangentially" related to Reed's

10

When asked why he did not simply obtain shareholder approval to use capital surplus to authorize the
redemption, Riley stated "we did not think it was necessary under the circumstances of our analysis and the other
factors that went into our Opinion." (8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. B, p. 198.) None of these facts were disclosed to Reed
until February 22, 2012 and May 11, 2012, respectively-which was long after Taylor v. McNichols had been
dismissed. (8/30/12 Bond Aff., ~~2-4, 6-7, 11-12, 15-18, Ex. C, p. 40-47, Ex. E, p. 5.)
11
Hawley Troxell is jointly and severally liable for the breaches of Riley's fiduciary duties that occurred
during Taylor v. AJA Services, including the failure to disclose and by taking adverse positions.
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divorce-which makes that representation "tangentially" related to the redemption since they
were intertwined. (Id., Ex. A, p. 51-53.) In response to a Request for Admission, Eberle Berlin
was not able to admit or deny that its attorney-client relationship with Reed had been terminated.
(1-12-10 Bond Aff., Ex. F, p. 8.) Riley admitted that the only business he reorganized in
connection with a divorce involved Reed and AIA Services, and he advertises that experience on
his website. (8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. A, p. 25-26; Ex. I, Ex. N, p. 1.) Eberle Berlin acknowledged
that it "enjoyed working with Mr. Taylor in the past." (Id., Ex. L, p. 59.) The defendants
provided Reed other legal services and Riley even requested a conflict waiver from Reed in
2006, although Riley and his firm never obtained a conflict waiver for taking adverse positions
several months later in Taylor v. AJA Services. (212110 Taylor Aff., 11114 & 15, Ex. A; 2/17/10
Riley Aff., 111124-25, Ex. 0.) In fact, the billing statement from Scott Bell's firm references the
conflict that Riley had in his position as Reed's attorney-a conflict that applied to Turnbow and
Eberle Berlin as well. (8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. M.) Thus, at a minimum, there is an issue of fact
as to whether the defendants were serving as attorneys for both Reed and AIA Services in 1995.

4. The defendants are judicially estopped from dismissing the malpractice claims.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes parties from taking inconsistent positions,
whether legal or factual. McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 155, 937 P.2d 1222 (1997).
The policies underlying judicial estoppel are general considerations of the orderly
administration of justice and regard for the dignity of judicial
proceedings ... Judicial estoppel is intended to protect against a litigant playing fast
and loose with the courts ... Because it is intended to protect the dignity of the
judicial process ...

Id., 130 Idaho at 152, (citations omitted)). 12 Here, Reed allowed his fraud claims to be dismissed

12
Moreover, the defendants are also judicially estopped from asserting the res judicata defense. Having
taken a position that Reed's claims in Taylor v. McNichols were based upon "litigation tactics" (the defendants were
awarded fees based upon their arguments) and that he had no right to sue opposing counsel, the defendants are
judicially estopped from asserting that Reed should have sued them in that case for the claims in this action.
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based upon Mr. Gjording's admission, as counsel for defendants, that Reed had a malpractice
claim that will go to trial. (8/30/12 Bond Aff.,

~22.)

Now Mr. Gjording is taking a different

position by asserting that Reed's malpractice claim should be dismissed. Having gained an
advantage for his clients to dismiss the fraud claim), Mr. Gjording's clients are judicially
estopped from seeking dismissal of the malpractice claim or preventing it from going to trial.

B. The 1996 restructuring is irrelevant. the 1995 Opinion Letter remains valid and
Reed was proximately damaged by the defendants.
The sole issue is whether the Opinion Letter was correct at the time of the redemption in
1995, not what transpired after the redemption occurred. (8/29/12 McDermott Aff., ~~22(e)-(f).)

1. The 1996 restructure was illegal because it grew out of the original redemption.
"[W]hen the consideration for a contract explicitly violates a statute, the contract is illegal
and unenforceable." Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 609, 200 P.3d 1153, 1158 (2009).
"[A]n illegal contract is against public policy ... as [is any] document in furtherance of the illegal
contract." AJA Services Corp., 151 Idaho at 570. 13
When parties to an illegal contract attempt to extend or renew it by entering into a
new agreement, the new contract, although not otherwise tainted by illegal
activity, is illegal and unenforceable. Where a contract grows immediately out of,
and is connected with, a prior illegal contract, the illegality of the prior contract
enters into the new contract and renders it illegal. A contract in consideration of a
prior illegal contract or in compromise of a dispute arising therefrom is illegal and
unenforceable ... It has been broadly stated that if the connection between the
original illegal contract and the new contract can be traced, and if the latter is
connected with, and grows out of, the former, no matter how many times and in
how many different forms it may be renewed, it cannot form the basis of a
recovery. Every new agreement in furtherance of, or for the purpose of carrying
into effect, any of the unexecuted provisions of a previous illegal agreement is
likewise illegal and void, as is a contract the performance of which depends on
the performance of an invalid contract ... No compromise by the parties of
differences with respect to an illegal contract can purge it of illegality and
produce a valid claim on which a recovery may be had. Moreover, where an
13

Reed was attempting to enforce the release and indemnification provision in the Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement. (8/14/12 2°d Supp. Riley Aff., Ex. 35, p. 6, §3.) This argument was flatly rejected by the
Idaho Supreme Court. For the same reason, the defendants' arguments fail as a matter of law.
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action is brought to enforce an illegal contract, a new promise to perform it, made
on a settlement of litigation, is illegal.
CJS Contracts§ 374 (Westlaw 2012) (internal foot notes omitted).
The defendants' arguments fail as a matter of law because the illegal 1995 Stock
Redemption Agreement could not be amended or restructured because "the Stock Redemption
Agreement [was] illegal and unenforceable under the 1995 version of LC. § 30-1-6, which
restricts a corporation to use only earned surplus and, under certain circumstances, capital
surplus when redeeming its shares." Taylor v. AJA Services Corp, 151 Idaho at 556. Specifically,
"the Stock Redemption Agreement violates the earned and capital surplus limitations in LC. §
30-1-6 and is illegal and unenforceable." 14 Id at 575. The Idaho Supreme Court's decision is
consistent with the above authorities and the long-standing Idaho case law refusing to enforce
illegal contracts. See McShane v. Quillin, 47 Idaho 542, 277 P. 554 (1929). Thus, the 1996 Stock
Redemption Restructure Agreement is irrelevant because it was illegal since it grew from, and is
directly traced to, the illegal 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. IRE 401-403. (8/14/12 2"d
Supp. Riley Aff., Ex. 1 & 35; 8/29/12 McDermott Aff., 1122(e).) Moreover, although the
defendants asserted in discovery answers that the basis for their arguments was that Reed had
"waived" his right to claims in this case based upon the 1996 restructure, they have failed to
present any evidence that Reed "relinquished a right or advantage" or that they acted in reliance
or "altered their positions." See Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 457, 259 P.3d 595,
603 (2011); (8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. C, p. 49, Ex. E, p. 7.) Reed has not waived anything nor
have the defendants changed their positions in any way. Their arguments lack merit.
Assuming that the Stock Redemption Agreement and Stock Redemption Restructure
Agreement were not derived from the same illegal transaction, the defendants' arguments would
14

In Taylor v. AJA Services Corp., the "Stock Redemption Agreement" was defined to include the "Stock
Redemption Restructure Agreement." 151 Idaho at 558.
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still fail because the restructured obligations do not withdraw, alter or include the Opinion Letter.
See McKay v. Boise Project Bd. of Control, 141Idaho463, 469, 111P.3d148, 154 (2005).

The stock Redemption Agreement, the Down Payment Note, the $6M Note, the
Security Agreement, the Stock Pledge Agreement, the Consulting Agreement and
the Noncompetition Agreement are collectively referred to herein as "Original
Documents." The Original Documents other than the $6M Note are collectively
referred to herein as the "Superseded Documents."
(8/14/12 2°d Supp. Riley Aff., Ex. 35, p. 1, §C (emphasis added).) The Opinion Letter was not
included as one of the "Original Documents" and the $6M Note was expressly excluded as one
of the "Superseded Documents." (Id.) The Opinion Letter remained valid and the $6M Note
remained unchanged, along with its attorney fee provision. (Id, Ex. 4 & 35.) While certain
provisions were revised regarding the security interests granted to Reed to secure the payment of
the $6M Note, those security interests remained unchanged, specifically "all commissions from
the sale of insurance or related services ... and any interest thereon" and "AIA Services agrees to
grant to [Reed] ... a security interest in all right and title to ... the Shares" (which included Reed's
irrevocable right to vote the shares or transfer them upon default). (Id., Ex. 1, Ex. 4, Ex. 5, Ex. 6,
Ex. 41, Ex. 43-45 & 46.) Thus, the indebtedness and pledged collateral are identical under the
Stock Redemption Agreement and the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement. (Id.) Reed's
damages are derived from the illegal $6M Note (plus interest), the value of collateral and other
damages that he incurred litigating enforceability and disposing of assets to fund that litigation.
The defendants' assert arguments pertaining to the restructuring of the redemption
obligations to Reed Taylor in 1996 ... These arguments are irrelevant. The relevant
inquiry is whether the opinions rendered in the Opinion Letter were accurate
when the transaction to redeem Reed Taylor's shares was closed. Since the
transaction was not carried out in compliance with LC. § 30-1-6 (1995), any
subsequent restructuring or modification of the agreements and any subordination
issues are irrelevant because the original transaction was illegal ... When the
Opinion Letter was delivered at the time of closing, the redemption of Reed
Taylor's shares was either legal or not. In addition, the 1996 restructure did not
affect the $6 Million Promissory Note or the security interests relating thereto
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(which were rendered unenforceable by Judge Brodie's ruling and as affirmed by
the Idaho Supreme Court).
(8/29/12 McDermott Aff., 1122(e).) In addition to lacking substance and merit, the defendants'
arguments are irrelevant to the illegality in 1995 and the claims in this lawsuit. IRE 401-403.

2. It is irrelevant that the defendants did not render a new opinion letter in 1996.
Although this argument fails as a matter of law (See Section B(l)), it is irrelevant that a
new opinion letter was not provided for the 1996 restructuring of the illegal 1995 redemption:
When the Opinion Letter was delivered at the time of closing, the redemption of
Reed Taylor's shares was either legal or not. In addition, the 1996 restructure did
not affect the $6 Million Promissory Note or the security interests relating thereto
(which were rendered unenforceable by Judge Brodie's ruling and as affirmed by
the Idaho Supreme Court). The Opinion Letter remains in full force and effect.
(8/29/12 McDermott Aff., 1122(e) (emphasis added).) The Opinion Letter was not included as one
of the "Original Documents" or as one of the "Superseded Documents" in the Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement. (8/14/12 2nd Supp. Riley Aff., Ex. 35, p. 1, §C.) In addition, there are no
documents in 1995 or 1996, executed by Reed, that withdraw or alter the Opinion Letter and it
does not contain any language permitting it to be withdrawn. (2/2/10 Taylor Aff., Ex. A.) In
addition, the defendants assert that Reed's assertions in his Complaint against Scott Bell that he
was negligent for failing to obtain a new opinion letter somehow support their position. This
argument also fails. The negligence associated with any failure to obtain a new opinion letter is
entirely different and unrelated to the negligent preparation of the Opinion Letter. 15
The obligations and duties owed by Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin to Reed
Taylor through the preparation and delivery of the Opinion Letter have nothing to
do with any alleged negligent acts of Scott Bell or any other attorney at his firm.
(8/29/12 McDermott Aff., 1122(f) n. 2.) Had Scott Bell required the defendants to issue a new
Opinion Letter, then obviously Reed would not have incurred any attorneys' fees addressing this
15

Neither Scott Bell nor any of the other attorneys in his firm are entitled to rely upon the Opinion Letter. It
was not addressed to them and was not provided for them to rely upon.
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argument. Even if a new opinion letter had been prepared, it would not have changed the relevant
inquiry-whether the Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal in 1995-the illegality of which
is the basis for Reed's claims against the defendants for the erroneous and deceptive 1995
Opinion Letter. CJS Contracts § 374 (Westlaw 2012); AJA Services Corp., 151 Idaho at 570; IRE
401-403. Thus, the defendants are not insulated from liability by not preparing an opinion letter
in 1996-the relevant inquiry is the illegality in 1995. Id. (8/29/12 McDermott Aff., ~~22(e)-(g).)
3. Reed was proximately damaged by the Opinion Letter.

Reed has conclusively proven proximate cause both factually and through expert
testimony. Reed testified: "I would have never agreed to sell my shares without being provided
the Opinion Letter by Mr. Riley, Mr. Turnbow and Eberle Berlin." (2/2/10 Taylor Aff.,

~7.)

Scott

Bell testified: "[i]f the opinion letter had not been provided to Reed Taylor, my firm would have
advised Reed not to close any transaction involving the redemption of his shares." (8/10/12
Ashby Aff., Ex. H, ~10.) Mr. Bell also testified that the "avoidance of [the illegality] argument is
precisely why opinion letters are obtained in this kind of transaction." (Id.,

~14.)

Reed Taylor has testified that he would not have permitted his shares to be
redeemed if the Opinion Letter had not been provided. Scott Bell testified that he
would have advised Reed Taylor not to sell his shares if the Opinion Letter had
not been provided. Both Reed Taylor and Scott Bell's testimony is consistent with
Section 2.S(j) of the Stock Redemption Agreement, which required the Opinion
Letter to be delivered to Reed Taylor as a condition of closing the redemption
transaction. As a result, Reed Taylor was proximately damaged when Judge
Brudie held that the Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal and unenforceable,
which rendered the $6 Million Promissory Note, plus accrued interest, and the
security interests granted to Reed Taylor as void and unenforceable obligations
(which opinion was affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court).
(8/29/12 McDermott Aff.,

~22(g).)

In addition, the attorneys' fees and costs Reed incurred

litigating with third-parties are recoverable damages in this lawsuit. See Roberts, 128 Cal.Rptr. at
907 (attorneys' fees incurred in litigation with third-parties are recoverable as damages from a
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negligent opinion letter); Rayl v. Shull Enterprises, Inc., 108 Idaho 524, 700 P.2d 567 (1984); 7
Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law § 226 ("Damages in a legal malpractice case are designed to make
the injured client whole; a plaintiff's damages may include litigation expenses ... "). Here, Reed
has incurred over $1,000,000 over a five-year period litigating with third-parties. (8/15/12 Hall
Aff., Ex. 4.) In addition to other damages, he is entitled to recover those attorneys' fees and costs
incurred litigating the enforceability of the redemption obligations as a portion of his damages.

16

Notwithstanding the illegality of the transaction and any subsequent restructuring (See
Section B(l)), the $6 Million Note is not included as one of the "Superseded Documents" in the
Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement. (8/14/12 2nd Supp. Riley Aff., Ex. 35, p. 1, §C.) In
fact, the $6 Million Note contained a stand-alone attorney fee provision. (Id., Ex. 4.) Moreover,
it was the collection of that $6 Million Note, plus accrued interest, along with the foreclosure of
the same security interests granted to him in 1995 that formed the basis of Reed's claims in

Taylor v. AJA Services and Taylor v. McNichols. (8/29/12 McDermott Aff.,

~22(e).)

C. The defendants' .Joinder to Riley's Motion for Summary .Judgment lacks merit.
Reed responds below, but also incorporates by reference herein both of his
Memorandums in Opposition to Riley's Motion for Summary Judgment. The defendants assert
that Reed's redemption was legal because it was subordinate to the payments made to another
shareholder, Donna Taylor. However, l.C. § 30-1-6 and l.C. § 30-1-2 do not authorize an illegal
redemption because a portion of the consideration was "subordinate" to an authorized
redemption. AIA Services' financial statement show its obligations to Reed as a debt-rather
than a "contingent" debt as the defendants assert. (8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. P, p. 6.) Simply put:
The defendants' assert arguments pertaining to the restructuring of the redemption
16

In addition, Reed is seeking damages for the non-payment of the principal and accrued interest for the
$6M Note, interest incurred on loans litigating matters, and the diminished value from being forced to sell assets.
Since the defendants only addressed attorneys' fees, Reed will not address these damage items at this time.
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obligations to Reed Taylor in 1996 and the alleged subordination of the payment
of the $6 Million Note to the redemption of Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred
Shares in AlA Services Corporation. These arguments are irrelevant. The relevant
inquiry is whether the opinions rendered in the Opinion Letter were accurate
when the transaction to redeem Reed Taylor's shares was closed. Since the
transaction was not carried out in compliance with LC. § 30-1-6 (1995), any
subsequent restructuring or modification of the agreements and any subordination
issues are irrelevant because the original transaction was illegal. In addition, the
defendants' assertions that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares was legal
because certain payments were subordinate to payments to Donna Taylor is not
supported by any provision in LC.§ 30-1-6 or I.C. § 30-1-2. 17 When the Opinion
Letter was delivered at the time of closing, the redemption of Reed Taylor's
shares was either legal or not. In addition, the 1996 restructure did not affect the
$6 Million Promissory Note or the security interests relating thereto (which were
rendered unenforceable by Judge Brudie's ruling and as affirmed by the Idaho
Supreme Court). The Opinion Letter remains in full force and effect.
(8/29/12 McDermott Aff.,

~22(e).)

While AlA Services' amended articles of incorporation

authorized the redemption of Donna Taylor's preferred shares pursuant to LC. § 30-1-6, there
was no such provision authorizing the redemption of Reed's shares, as confirmed by Riley. (Id.;
8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. A, p. 134-135.) Moreover, the defendants fail to address the $1.5M Note,
$1M in airplanes, furniture, CAP program, and other consideration-all of which was not
"subordinated" and rendered the entire redemption illegal. (8/14/12 2°d Supp. Riley Aff., Ex. 1,
p. 3, 9, 11-13.) For the reasons in Section B(l), the Subordination Agreement between Reed and
Donna Taylor in 2006 is illegal and void because it was connected to the illegal 1995 Stock
Redemption Agreement. 18 AJA Services Corp., 151 Idaho at 556; CJS Contracts§ 374 ("Where a

17

Under AIA Services Corporation's Articles of Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation filed on April
11, 1995 and August 3, 1995, respectively, AIA Services Corporation was authorized to redeem Donna Taylor's
shares using "legally available funds" and "only to the extent such redemption shall not violate the Idaho Business
Corporation Act restrictions on the corporation's redemption of its own shares." See Article Fourth, Section 4.2.3.
Donna Taylor's shares were only redeemed as payments were made to her, unlike Reed Taylor's redemption in
which his shares were canceled and payments, instruments and security interests were granted to him at the time of
the redemption. There are no provisions in AIA Services Corporation's [Articles] of Amendment to the Articles of
Incorporation authorizing the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares.
18
If Reed's redemption had been legal, Reed would have remained a creditor with the right to subordinate,
since, "[t]he only parties whose rights are affected by the subordination are Donna Taylor and Reed Taylor and as
such, it was within their legal right to enter into a new subordination agreement and to do so without the consent,
approval or participation of AIA." (8/10/12 Ashby Aff., Ex. D, p. 13; 8/14/12 2"d Supp. Riley Aff., Ex. 55.)
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contract grows ... out of, and is connected with, a prior illegal contract, the illegality of the prior
contract enters into the new contract and renders it illegal.")
The defendants' res judicata argument fails for the same reasons it fails for Riley. While
the defendants assert out of one side of their mouth that Reed had knowledge of the facts
supporting the malpractice claim in 2008, they testified under oath differently out of the other
side of their mouth that they belief that their opinions were and are correct, based upon facts and
analysis that was only recently disclosed to Reed. (See Section A(3)(a).) In 2012 (after illegality
was affirmed on appeal), the defendants first asserted, under oath, that "[t]he 1995 Opinion
Letter was and is believed ... to be correct..." (8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. C, p. 40, Ex. E, p. 5.) On
March 29, 2012, Riley steadfastly maintained, under oath, that his opinions were correct:
Q. (Mr. Gaffney):

A. (Mr. Riley):
Q. (Mr. Gaffney):

A. (Mr. Riley):

Did you ever communicate ... to ... Mr. Reed Taylor directly or his
attorney that the opinion -- that any of the opinions in the Opinion
Letter were incorrect later?
You are presuming that the opinions were incorrect. Which I
disagree with. There was no communication.
And then to move today, if I've heard you a couple of times, you
have indicated that you still believe that the Opinion Letter is
correct; right?
That's right. 19

(Id., Ex. A, p. 97-98 & 114.) Riley testified that his opinions were correct, in part, because "a
corporation can't challenge the redemption of shares of its shareholder." (Id., Ex. A, p. 140, Ex.
C, p. 45.) He also testified that "[w]e believed that those terms [under I.C. § 30-1-6] were
meaningless and unhelpful ... I mean it's not just earned surplus ... we determined that if the net
assets of the corporation ... based upon fair value, were sufficient, that that would satisfy ... pass
muster, under the Idaho Code." (Id., Ex. B, p. 188.) In other words, the defendants stand before
this Court asserting that res judicata should bar Reed's claims based upon the allegation that he
19

In violation of his ethical obligations, the defendants never disclosed these facts or others to Reed or the

court.
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had knowledge of the facts to assert the claims in this lawsuit in 2008, when they maintain, under
oath. that their opinions were and are correct, based upon several factual and legal analysis that
supported their opinions, which Reed had no knowledge of until now. (See Section A(3 )(a).) The
defendants' testimony ends the res judicata analysis. Interestingly, Reed asserted some of those
same arguments in an effort to enforce the Stock Redemption Agreement, without any assistance
from the defendants, and those arguments were rejected. AJA Services Corp., 151ldaho552.

IV. CONCLUSION
The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied and the Court should
dismiss the affirmative defenses asserted therein. In addition, the Court should permit Reed to
pursue a1ternative or additional claims of breach of fiduciary duty, assumed duty and negligence.
DATED this

4th

day of September, 2012.
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
RODERICK BOND L W OFFICE, PLLC

ey, ISB No. 3558
Roderick C. Bo i:I, ISB No. 8082
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868
Plaintiff,

v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Robert M.
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING,
TURNBOW & McKLVEEN, CHARTERED,
an Idaho corporation;

PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT RICHARD
A RILEY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Defendants.
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed") submits this Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Defendant Richard A. Riley ("Riley")'s Motion for Summary Judgment and Joinder of
Defendants Eberle Berlin and Cummings (Riley and them are collectively referred to herein as
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"defendants") and Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration:

1

I. INTRODUCTION
The Court's prior decision on res judicata was correct and the new evidence further
supports the negligence claims. Riley asserts that Reed had knowledge of the facts necessary to
pursue negligence claims in 2008, but his sworn testimony tells an entirely different story:
Q. (Mr. Gaffney):

A. (Mr. Riley):

And then to move today, if I've heard you a couple of times, you
have indicated that you still believe that the Opinion Letter is
correct; right?
That's right.

(8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. A, p. 114.) Mr. Riley also testified that he believed his opinions were
correct since, under La Voy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 369 P.2d 45 (1962), "a
corporation can't challenge the redemption of shares of its shareholder." (8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex.
A, p. 140, L. 11-16.) On April 9, 2009, Reed asserted that same argument. (Id., Ex. J, p. 23-32.)
Mr. Riley testified that "We believed the those terms [under LC. § 30-1-6 (1995)] were
meaningless and unhelpful ... I mean it's not just earned surplus ... we determined that if the net
assets of the corporation ... based upon fair value, were sufficient, that that would satisfy ... pass
muster, under the Idaho Code." (Id., Ex. B, p. 188.) On April 9, 2009, Reed asserted a "fair
value" argument. (Id., Ex. J, p. 11-15.) Judge Brodie and the Idaho Supreme Court rejected
Riley's "fair value" analysis, that AIA could not "challenge" the redemption and other arguments
Reed asserted to enforce the redemption obligations. (Id., K; 12/3/09 Babbitt Aff., Ex. J-K.)

1

Because Reed filed a Motion to Enlarge Time based upon the defendants refused to give him a few extra
days to serve his Memo on September 4, 2012, Reed served an initial Memo on August 30, 2012. If the Motion to
Enlarge Time is granted, then this Memo supersedes and replaces the one served on August 30, 2012. If the Motion
to Enlarge Time is denied, then Reed requests that this be a Supplemental Memorandum.
Reed also incorporates by reference herein: (1) Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Memorandum of Law in
Opposition to Defendant Riley and Hawley Troxell's Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment dated February 18, 2010; and (2) Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition
to Defendants Cummings and Eberle Berlin's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and Joinder to Defendants
Riley's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Reed Taylor's Motion for
Reconsideration dated September 4, 2012.
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Taylor v. AJA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552 261 P.3d 829 (2011). However, Riley admitted that
"[t]here is no discussion of the reasoning" for the above analysis in the Opinion Letter and that
he never advised Reed of his analysis. (8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. A, p. 138-140, Ex. B, p. 220.)
Thus, Riley disingenuously asserts that Reed should have had knowledge of facts to support a
negligence claim in 2008 based upon facts that the defendants concealed from Reed until 2012.
Reed's negligence claims in this case did not accrue until June 17, 2009-the date that
Judge Brudie ruled the Stock Redemption Agreement was both illegal and unenforceable-the
date that he lost "the right to recover." Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 590, 21 P.3d 908, 912
(2000). Res judicata does not apply. Riley's other arguments fail since "an illegal contract is
against public policy ... [so is any] document in furtherance of the illegal contract." AJA Services
Corp., 151 Idaho at 570. CJS Contracts § 374 ("if the connection between the original illegal
contract and the new contract can be traced ... it cannot form the basis of a recovery.") Thus, the
1996 restructuring and the 2006 Subordination Agreement between Reed and Donna Taylor all
stem from that same illegal transaction and those agreements are illegal. Id. Contrary to Riley's
assertions, there are no provisions under l.C. §§ 30-1-2 or 30-1-6 that authorize the redemption
of Reed's shares because the $6M Note was subordinate to payments on Donna Taylor's shares.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since this is Riley's Third Motion regarding res judicata, Reed incorporates by reference
herein his Statement of Facts in Opposition to Defendants Motions for Summary Judgment and
in Support of Cross Motions for Summary Judgment dated February 18, 2010 ("Facts").

III. ARGUMENTS
When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party, the
court must liberally construe all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party and all
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reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record will be drawn in favor of the nonmoving
party. IRCP 56(c); Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 307, 160 P.3d 743
(2007); McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 394, 64 P.3d 317 (2003). Summary judgment is
improper "if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences
from the evidence presented." McPheters, 138 Idaho at 394. The party asserting a defense bears
"the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of fact material to ... [the] defense."
Mason v. Tucker and Associates, 125 Idaho 429, 437, 871 P.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1994). The court

may grant summary judgment to a non-moving party, even if the party has not filed its own
motion. Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 677, 39 P.3d 612 (2001); IRCP 56(d).
A. Reed's negligence claims are not barred by res judicata.
"Res judicata is an affirmative defense and the party asserting it must prove all of

the ... elements." Ticor Title Company v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 122, 157 P.3d 613, 617 (2007).
A court must be careful, when dismissing a second suit between the same parties
as duplicative, not to be swayed by rough resemblance between the two suits
without assuring itself that beyond the resemblance already noted, the claims
asserted in both suits are the same. Here, they are not entirely duplicative.
Curtis v. Citibank, NA., 226 F.3d 133, 136 (2nd Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).

1. Taylor v. McNichols was based on a different factual grouping and transaction.
Idaho has adopted the transactional approach to determining res judicata. Ticor Title Co.
v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 126, 157 P.3d 613, 620 (2007).

Whether a factual grouping constitutes a transaction "is to be determined pragmatically,
giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space,
origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their
treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding ...
Id. at 126 (citation omitted) (in other words, the "operative underlying facts ... are the same"); see
Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 471 P.2d 254, 256 (Nev. 1970)("The authorities agree that when the
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same evidence supports both the present and the former cause of action, the two causes of action
are identical"); Mellor v. Chamberlain, 673 P.2d 610, 613 (WA 1983) ("Although both lawsuits
arose out of the same transaction ... their subject matter differed" and res judicata did not apply).
Here, the facts supporting Reed's negligence claims in this case are entirely different
from the facts supporting Taylor v. McNichols. (12/3/09 Babbitt Aff., Ex. N-U; 2/17/10 Bond
Aff., Ex. 16-19; see also Complaint.) In Taylor v. McNichols, the transaction and nucleus of facts
was the litigation conduct and torts committed against the AIA Entities-not the legality of the
redemption or accuracy of the opinions in the Opinion Letter provided to Reed in 1995. (Id.)
Riley submits an alleged factual timeline and Reed will supplement it as follows: April 16, 2008.
Connie Taylor and James Beck raise the illegality argument for the first time: "Therefore, the
Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal as in violation of Idaho Code § 30-1-46 ... AIA
Services did not have any capital surplus available to purchase Reed's common stock." (12/3/09
Babbitt Aff., Ex. H, p. 8 & 10.) That pleading did not mention l.C. § 30-1-6, "earned surplus" or
shareholder approval to invade "capital surplus" under l.C. § 30-1-6. (Id.) April 21, 2008. AIA,
through Hawley Troxell, moves to amend AIA's answer asserting that the redemption and
restructure violated l.C. § 30-1-46 because distributions to shareholders may only be made out of
"capital surplus" and that no such distributions may be made when the "corporation is
insolvent." 12/3/09 Babbitt Aff., Ex. I, p. 4.) There was no mention of l.C. § 30-1-6 or the
"earned surplus" or "capital surplus" provisions in that statute. (Id.) May 22. 2008. Hawley
Troxell, on behalf of the AIA Entities, files a Motion for Permissive Appeal to the Idaho
Supreme Court, which such Motion does not asserted illegality and was denied. (2/17/10 Bond
Aff., Ex. 14-15.) .June 13, 2008. The defendants in Taylor v. AJA Services makes a substantial
settlement offer to Reed-with no mention of illegality in that offer. (8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. 0.)
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Such an offer is inconsistent with the notion that Reed and everyone knew the redemption was
illegal. August 18, 2008. Reed also filed separate lawsuits against Clements Brown and certain
of its attorneys. (12/3/09 Babbitt Aff., Ex. N-Q.) Both lawsuits were dismissed based upon
"litigation privilege" and were consolidated on appeal. (Id.) October 16. 2008. The hearing was
held on Clements Brown and Hawley Troxell's Motion to Dismiss. The hearing transcript
reveals the claims and defenses were based upon litigation conduct and torts against the AIA
Entities and claims related to Reed's collateral and him being a creditor. (2117/10 Bond Aff., Ex.
18.) October 17. 2008. Reed moved to amend to add derivative malpractice claims and other
claims against the Hawley Troxell firm and Clements Brown based upon claims improperly
representing the AIA Entities. (12/3/09 Babbitt Aff., Ex. P.) While in foot note 4 Riley quotes a
portion of allegations, the operative portion of that sentence states: "are inappropriately and
fraudulently asserting that Reed Taylor has no rights because his redemption was allegedly
illegal (which Reed Taylor denies and the applicable law does not support) in an attempt to avoid
the causes of action ... being pursued against them." (Id., Ex. P, p. 5-6, 1116.) December 20. 2008.
Although Reed's claims were dismissed in both of the lawsuits in Taylor v. McNichols, the
defendants had still never asserted a violation of LC. § 30-1-6 in any pleading or paper, and did
not do so until February 12, 2009. (8/10/12 Ashby Aff., Ex. G; 12/3/09 Babbitt Aff., Ex. Q-R.)
.January 20, 2009. Reed's counsel advises counsel for the defendants in Taylor v. AJA Services

that "we believe that Reed Taylor will defeat the motion for partial summary judgment... [and]
we need to depose Richard Riley as soon as possible for obvious reasons. We also need the
complete corporation legal files made available asap through 1996 ... " (8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. L,
p. 13.) February 11. 2009. Reed's counsel details numerous individuals that need to be deposed
regarding the alleged illegality, including Riley and Turnbow. (8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. K.)
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February 12, 2009. For the first time, defendants assert a violation of the "earned surplus"
provision of LC. § 30-1-6, but still no evidence or argument asserted that "capital surplus" had
not been authorized by shareholder vote. (8/10/12 Ashby Aff., Ex. G.) April 7, 2009. Reed's
counsel requests assistance from Eberle Berlin and he stated "we have been unable to ascertain
whether shareholder approval was obtained for the redemption ... any documents and testimony
to support this would be extremely beneficial." (8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. L, p. 81.) April 9, 2009.
Reed files his Memorandum of Law opposing summary judgment on the violation of LC. § 30-16, which included arguments to enforce the Stock Redemption Agreement irrespective of any
illegality, i.e., AIA could not disavow its obligations (like the defendants believed) and that Reed
was more innocent because, inter alias, he was not an attorney and received the Opinion Letter.
(8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. A, p. 140, Ex. C, p. 45, Ex. J.) April 14, 2009. Mr. Gjording, as counsel
for Eberle Berlin and Turnbow, advises Reed's counsel that his clients will not intervene to
support the Opinion Letter or offer any assistance. (8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. L, p. 59.) April 15.
2009. Mr. LaRue states that he will not make Riley available for a deposition without a court
order. (8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. L, p. 63.) June 1, 2009. Judge Brudie awards fees against Reed
and acknowledges: "Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants were based solely on Defendants'
representation of AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. in a lawsuit brought against
the corporations by the Plaintiff Reed Taylor," but the court only awarded $20,000 in fees.
(12/3/09 Babbitt Aff., Ex. T, p. 4 & 8, Ex. U, p. 8.) June 17, 2009. In addition to finding the
Stock Redemption Agreement illegal, Judge Brodie rejected a number of arguments Reed
asserted to enforce the Agreement--even if it was illegal and violated LC.§ 30-1-6--and he also
denies Reed's Rule 56(f) Motion. (12/3/09 Babbitt Aff., Ex. J; 8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. J.) Judge
Brudie also finds that Reed relied "heavily" upon the Opinion letter and that it was "incorrect."
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(12/3/09 Babbitt Aff., Ex. J, p. 12, n. 15.) August 6, 2009. Mr. Gjording again confirms that his
clients will not assist Reed, threatens Reed that he is "ill-advised" to file suit, but acknowledges
Reed's burden regarding the duty of care for the negligence relevant to this case. (8/30/12 Bond
Aff., Ex. L, p. 92-93.) October 23, 2009. Eberle Berlin files its Answer and asserts "Plaintiff's
cause of action is not ripe for controversy ... " (11/23/09 Eberle Berlin Answer, p. 19.) May 10,
2010. This Court rules that the defendants owed duties of care to Reed and lifts the stay in
discovery. (5/10/10 Memorandum Decision; 5/10/10 Order re: Discovery.) May 19, 2010. Riley
moves to stay this case: "[i]n the event the Idaho Supreme Court reverses Judge Brodie's
decision, then ... the current case will cease to exist and this case will become moot ... it makes
sense to stay proceedings... until a ... ruling is obtained whether the 1995 redemption agreement is
or is not illegal and, therefore, whether the 1995 opinion letter which is the subject of the present
case was or was not correct."2 (5/19/10 Riley Memo, p. 2-3.) May 21. 2010. Turnbow and Eberle
Berlin move to stay this case: "the ultimate illegality for the 1995 Stock Redemption
Agreement ... [is] central to Plaintiff's cause of action for professional negligence ... the ... Court's
ultimate ruling on whether the [Agreements] ... are illegal and/or enforceable directly impacts
whether Defendants' actions potentially breached a duty owed to Mr. Taylor ... depending on
the ... [appeal's] outcome ... the present lawsuit could be moot." (5/21/10 Memo, p. 3-4.)
September 3, 2010. The holding of Taylor v. McNichols is summarized as follows:
While the lawsuit was still pending, Reed attempted to exercise management
authority over the AIA Entities ... Reed filed the present actions against
McNichols ... CBM ... Babbitt ... Ashby ... Riley and HTEH ... on its representation
of the AIA Entities ... Reed asserted claims against Respondents for: (1) aiding
and abetting or assisting others in the commission of tortious acts in the
Underlying Case; (2) conversion and misappropriation of the AIA Entities'
corporate assets; (3) violations of Idaho's Consumer Protection Act... and (4)
professional negligence and/or breach of fiduciary duties ... The district judge's
2

This is precisely Reed's point in Section A(2). Reed's claims could not accrue until Judge Brudie ruled
that the Stock Redemption Agreement was both illegal and unenforceable.
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Opinions-granting Respondents' motions to dismiss and denying Reed's
motions for leave to amend his complaints-relied strongly on the litigation
privilege ... Bottom line, Reed ... contends he is the only person with authority to
determine who should serve as counsel for the corporations he is suing ... In this
case Reed sued Respondents while the Underlying Case was ongoing, and yet
many of his arguments rely upon his presumption that the Underlying Case will
be decided in his favor ... the causes of action cannot arise until damages are
incurred, and the attorney's conduct can be reviewed under the totality of the
case ... Until the Underlying Case is resolved a court cannot determine whether
any tortious act was committed ... As for Reed's argument. .. that he is the only one
authorized to hire counsel for the AIA Entities ... Reed's complaints are largely
focused on the argument that Respondents ... breached their fiduciary duty towards
the AIA Entities, and these claims are dependent upon Respondents being
retained as counsel for the AIA Entities, and holding fiduciary duties towards
them ... It is clear that Reed, in his complaints, has failed to alleged that he is in an
attorney-client relationship with Respondents, and therefore lacks the privity
necessary to sue Respondents for malpractice ... Reed offers no compelling
reasoned analysis in Harrigfeld, it is incredulous that Reed would attempt to
assert that attorneys hired by the AIA Entities, to fight off Reed's litigation
against those entities, were being retained for Reed's benefit... Reed's complaints
allege that he has been harmed as a result of Respondents not acting in the best
interests of the AIA Entities ... However, in its reasoning the district court applied
the litigation privilege which, having never been addressed or applied previously
by Idaho courts, is an issues of first impression ... the claims brought by Reed
against Respondents were: (1) barred by the litigation privilege; (2) supported by
insufficiently pled facts; (3) insufficient as a matter of law; or (4) are not ripe for
litigation.

Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 831-49, 243 P.3d 642, 647-65 (2010). Simply put, that
decision does not even mention the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement or its enforceability.
Reed's present claims are based upon "the operative underlying facts" pertaining to the illegality
of the redemption in 1995 and the negligence preparation of the Opinion Letter for that illegal
transaction. Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 126. September 7, 2011. With the assistance of Riley
and Hawley Troxell, the Idaho Supreme Court affirms the illegality of the Stock Redemption
Agreement and refused to enforce it based upon a number of arguments. Taylor v. AJA Services

Corp., 151 Idaho 552, 261 P.3d 829 (2011). 2012. The defendants finally disclosed a number of
reasons why they assert the Opinion Letter was and is correct-including based upon "fair
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value," that AIA could not "disavow" its obligations, and that Reed's illegal redemption was
made legal by making the payment of the principal of the $6M Note subordinate to the legal and
authorized redemption of Dona Taylor's shares-all of which were deviating from the
definitions in LC. § 30-1-2 and 30-1-6. (8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. A, p. 127-133, 138-141, Ex. B,
p. 186-196, 220-221, Ex. C, p. 41-48, Ex. E, p. 5-6.) While Riley asserts that Reed had
knowledge of all of the facts to sue him in 2008, his sworn testimony tells a different story:
Q. (Mr. Gaffney):

(Mr. Riley):

... if I've heard you a couple of times, you have indicated that you
still believe that the Opinion Letter is correct; right?
That's right.

(Id., Ex. A, p. 114.) There is not a shred of proof that Reed or his counsel had sufficient
knowledge of the facts to assert a negligence claim in 2008. (Id., 11112-4, 6-7, 11-13, 15, 17-18;
2/2/10 Taylor Aff., 11112-11.) Even if Reed had knowledge of the defendants' concealed facts, the
accrual of the action and proximate cause of damages are required to exist before filing suit.

2. Reed's claims did not accrue until June 17, 2009-when Judge Brodie ruled that
the Stock Redemption Agreement was both illegal and unenforceable.
A cause of action against an attorney does not accrue until the plaintiff is proximately
damaged by the attorney's negligence and incurs "some damage." LC. § 5-219; City of McCall v.

Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 661, 201 P.3d 629, 634 (2006) (holding "there must be objective proof
that would support the existence of some actual damage" and "objective proof did not occur until
there was a court decision adverse to the client ... "); Mack Financial Corporation v. Smith, 111
Idaho 8, 720 P.2d 191 (1986); Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 621 A.2d 459 (N.J. 1993) ("Mere
knowledge of an attorney's negligence does not cause a legal malpractice claim to accrue ... ").
"[T]he plaintiff [must] show that the attorney's negligence proximately caused the plaintiff to
lose the right to recover." Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 590, 21 P.3d 908, 912 (2000).
Although Reed appreciates and respects the Court's prior decision that Reed's
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malpractice claims accrued when he incurred attorneys' fees on the illegality issue in April 2008,
Reed asserts that the claims could not have accrued until Judge Brudie ruled that the Stock
Redemption Agreement was both illegal and unenforceable on June 17, 2009. (12/3/09 Babbitt
Aff., Ex. K.) Until that ruling, Reed had not incurred "some damage"-he would have been
entitled to recover all attorneys' fees and costs from the defendants in Taylor v. AJA Services.
(8/14/12 2°d Supp. Riley Aff., Ex. 4.) See Buxton, 146 Idaho at 661 ("a client simply incurring
attorney fees ... in particular litigation will not by itself be objective proof ... of some damage
suffered ... "); Jordan, 135 Idaho at 590 (proximate cause is when the plaintiff "lost the right to
recover."). However, "Reed Taylor was proximately damaged when Judge Brudie held that the
Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal and unenforceable." (8/29/12 McDermott Aff., ~22(g);

see also 212/10 Taylor Aff., ~~6-7.) In Mack Financial Corp., this precise issue was addressed:
[W]e hold that the date [that the action accrued] was the "spring of 1983" when
the ... Bankruptcy Court in Idaho resolved Mack Financial's claim against the
bankruptcy trustees of Shoemaker; it was not until then that it then became
apparent that Mack Financial would not be able to fully recompense from the
bankruptcy estate the amount which it had loaned Shoemaker ... Up until that time,
Mack Financial had no chargeable knowledge that it would be unable to recover.
If the law were such that Mack Financial was required to initiate court action
without knowing that it had been damaged, then it would have done so only to
later ascertain that a full recovery was obtained in the two bankrupt estates ...
Were we to hold otherwise today, such would foment future litigation initiated on
sheer surmise of potential damages in order to avoid the likely consequences of
seeing actions barred by limitations. Such a holding would require potential
plaintiffs to sue various categories of professional persons who fall within the
ambit of 1.C. § 5-219(4), even though those plaintiffs were unaware that they had
been damaged. This would result in expensive and time-consuming litigation
which could glut the judicial system and at the same time serve no purpose ...

Mack Financial Corp., 111 Idaho at 11-12. The holding in Mack Financial Corp. is consistent
with the McNichols: "the statute of limitations for a legal malpractice claim does not begin to run
until the litigation forming the basis of that claim has concluded." McNichols, 149 Idaho at 843
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(citing Buxton, 146 Idaho at 661). Until the Stock Redemption Agreement was declared both
illegal and unenforceable, Reed had not "lost his right to recover" and his negligence claims in
this case were "not ripe for litigation." Jordan, 135 Idaho at 590; McNichols, 149 Idaho at 850.
In fact, Reed asserted numerous arguments to enforce the Stock Redemption Agreementarguments that included ones the defendants assert support the Opinion Letter being correct to
this day, e.g., that AIA Services could not disavow its obligations and "fair value" could be used
to comply with I.C. § 30-1-6. (See Section A(l) above.) AJA Services Corp., 151Idaho552.
Until June 17, 2009, Reed's remedy for the non-payment of the $6M Note and related
security interests was to pursue recovery against the defendants in Taylor v. AJA Services. If the
Court were to hold otherwise, it would result in every plaintiff or defendant in every lawsuit
being required to anticipate an adverse ruling and file suit against their attorneys in order to
prevent statute of limitations or res judicata defenses--a proposition that flies in the face of the
McNichols decision. McNichols, 149 Idaho at 843 ("Until the underlying case is resolved a court
cannot determine whether any tortious act was committed"). However, the illegality of the Stock
Redemption Agreement has been laid to rest and Reed's claims have all been dismissed in
Taylor v. AJA Services. (8/30/12 Bond Aff.,

~20.)

AJA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552. Since the

negligence based claims accrued on June 17, 2009 (when Judge Brodie found the Stock
Redemption Agreement both illegal and unenforceable), this ends the analysis under res judicata
because Reed's claims were not ripe until this lawsuit. Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 104 Idaho
751, 663 P.2d 287 (1983) (matters raised in the second suit were not ripe in the prior action).
3. Reed did not have knowledge of the facts for his claims until Judge Brodie ruled
the Stock Redemption Agreement was both illegal and unenforceable.
Even if based upon the same transaction, res judicata does not bar a subsequent action
when the party was diligently attempting to ascertain the facts to support additional claims.
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Durant v. Quality First Marketing, Inc., 127 Idaho 558, 560, 903 P.2d 147, 149 (1995). The
defendants have failed to submit any concrete evidence that Reed was aware of the facts to
support his malpractice claim in 2008. To oppose illegality, Reed's counsel argued that "Eberle
Berlin's opinion letter represented to Reed Taylor that the transaction was legal, that the
redemption agreements were enforceable by their terms ... [t]hese issues alone create genuine
issues of material fact that preclude granting partial summary judgment." (8/30/12 Bond Aff.,
Ex. J, p. 75.) On February 8, 2009-months after Taylor v. McNichols had been dismissedReed's counsel submitted a lengthy Affidavit detailing the required discovery, including: that
[t]here are certain shareholder meeting minutes that cannot be found, or, of such meetings were
not conducted, he needs to be questioned why" and that "documents relied upon for the opinion
letter are not privileged." (Id., Ex. J, p. 6-7.) Reed's counsel detailed a number of other
individuals who needed to be deposed and other required discovery. (Id., p. 6-15.) In fact, Riley
still believes the Opinion Letter is correct. (8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. A, p. 114.) Mr. Riley also
testified that, under La Voy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 369 P.2d 45 (1962), "a
corporation can't challenge the redemption of shares of its shareholder." (8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex.
A, p. 140, L. 11-16.) In addition, Mr. Riley testified that "We believed the those terms [under
l.C. § 30-1-6 (1995)] were meaningless and unhelpful... I mean it's not just earned surplus ... we
determined that if the net assets of the corporation ... based upon fair value, were sufficient, that
that would satisfy ... pass muster, under the Idaho Code." (Id., Ex. B, p. 188.) In other words, the
defendants stand before this Court asserting that res judicata should bar Reed's claims asserting
Reed had knowledge of the facts to sue them, when they maintain under oath that they still
believe their opinions in the Opinion Letter were and are correct, based upon factual and legal
analysis never disclosed to Reed. The defendants' testimony alone ends the res judicata
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analysis.3 There were no facts in existence to sue any of the defendants for the negligence until
Judge Brodie ruled the Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal and unenforceable.

4. Reed's claims against the defendants arose out of a different transaction-he is
no longer a creditor, but is instead a party injured by the tortfeasor defendants.
The defendants mistakenly rely upon Brunacini v. Cavanaugh, 869 P.2d 821 (N.M. 1994)
for the proposition that the holding in that case bars Reed's claims. In that case, the plaintiff
brought a malpractice claim against the law firm after the parties had already settled an earlier
suit that the law firm had brought over fees. Id. at 823-25. The Court held that the plaintiff was
required to assert those claims in the first lawsuit because they were compulsory counterclaims.
Id. Riley has never asserted any counterclaims against Reed in a prior action relating to the

Opinion Letter or legal services provided for that Opinion Letter. Moreover, Reed's breach of
fiduciary duty claims regarding Riley's litigation conduct have now accrued since the illegality
issue has conclusively decided (in his favor in the underlying case), but which now results in him
being subject to claims for those breach duties. McNichols, 149 Idaho at 843.

5. The claims in this action could not have been litigated in Taylor v. McNichols.
The defendants cite Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146 (1990) and assert
that Reed should be barred from litigating the Opinion Letter because he did not make it the
primary focus of his claims in Taylor v. McNichols. That lawsuit did not have a shred of
evidence in any of the Complaints to indicate that the Opinion Letter was incorrect. (12/3/09
Babbitt Aff., Ex. N-P.) While Reed did assert that Riley was inappropriately taking positions
against the Opinion Letter, there was nothing in the Complaints to suggest or infer that there was
any evidence to support a claim for the negligent preparation of the Opinion Letter in 1995. In

3

Riley also testified that he "found no Idaho cases addressing the statutory restrictions on distributions to
shareholders" and noted that Judge Brudie ruled it was an issue of first impression. (See e.g., 8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex.
C, p. 42.) Apparently, Riley believes that Reed, a non-attorney, should have equal or superior knowledge to him.

REED TAYLOR'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT RILEY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 14

002482

fact, as set forth in Section A(3) of Reed's 9/4/12 Memo in Opposition to Eberle Beilin and
Cummings' Motion for Summary Judgment, the defendants still believe that their opinions are
correct today and did not disclose the basis for those opinions until 2012. In foot note 10, Riley
asserts that Reed "acknowledged the possibility that the Opinion Letter was erroneous," but the
mere possibility of negligence does not give rise to a negligence claim. Moreover, as set forth in
Section A(2), there was no finding of illegal and Reed asserted claims to enforce the redemption.
6. Reed could not have pied the negligence claims in Taylor v. McNichols.
Although the defendants cite numerous cases for his argument that Reed was required to
plead all theories, he fails to point any facts that support their untenable position that Reed knew
or should have known the facts to sue them in 2008. Res judicata requires proof of facts.
Moreover, for the reasons set forth in Sections A(l)-(3), Reed was not and could not have been
required to pursue the negligence claims in this lawsuit in Taylor v. McNichols. Contrary to the
defendants' assertions, Reed has never asserted any claims regarding the inaccuracy of the
Opinion Letter in any action, other than to assert on reconsideration in Taylor v. AIA Services
that the Stock Redemption Agreement should have been enforced based upon the fraud in the
Opinion Letter. Obviously, it was impossible for Reed to pursue negligence claims against the
defendants in Taylor v. AJA Services. As set forth in Section A(l), Reed exerted all efforts to
ascertain the facts relative to the Opinion Letter, but Riley and his attorneys' refused to come
forward as required under the Rules of Professional Conduct and fiduciary duties to disclose.
Reed could not have easily discovered anything until (1) the defendants disclosed to him the
facts and legal analysis utilized to render their opinion and (2) the Stock Redemption Agreement
was declared illegal and unenforceable. (See Section A(3) of Reed's 9/4/12 Memo in Opposition
to Eberle Berlin and Cummings' Motion for Summary Judgment.)
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7. Reed was required to wait until Judge Brodie's decision to tile this action.
As also noted in Section A(2), Reed's claims had not accrued until Judge Brudie ruled the
Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal and unenforceable.
The defendants mistakenly rely upon Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho
73, 278 P.3d 943 (2012) ("Taylor l/I''). 4 In Taylor III, the Idaho Supreme Court "the central issue
underlying all of their claims is the interpretation of the Disclaimer and its effect on the Taylors'
beneficial status."5 Taylor III, 278 P.3d at 952. The Supreme Court held that "the Mailes had the
Disclaimer in their possession in 2004" (while Taylor I was pending) and "that the Taylors,
through the Disclaimer, divested themselves of their status as beneficiaries" but the Court
"expressly interpreted the Disclaimer in Taylor II and held that was not the case-the Taylors
retained beneficial status by reserving a right to their lawsuit against the Mailes." Id. In other
words, the Mailes had two opportunities to litigate the Disclaimer in Taylor I and Taylor II and
that, since the Disclaimer was conclusively litigated in those two cases, the Mailes were barred
from re-litigating the Disclaimer in Taylor Ill. Thus, Taylor I, Taylor II, and Taylor III have no
application to the negligence claims asserted by Reed--claims that he never previously asserted
nor could have been asserted in McNichols. (See Section A(l).) McNichols, 149, Idaho 826.

8. The defendants are barred asserting resjudicata as a defense.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes parties from taking inconsistent positions,
whether legal or factual. McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 155, 937 P.2d 1222 (1997). Here, Mr.
LaRue, Riley's present counsel, was also defense counsel in Taylor v. McNichols. His firm
successfully asserted that Reed was pursuing claims against the defendants as a "litigation tactic"
4

Reed was not a party to Taylor III. Id. at 949.
Defendants erroneously quote the holding by asserting "the central issue underlying all their claims is the
interpretation of the Opinion Letter and its effect on the Taylors' beneficial status." (Memo, p. 13.) Whether it was
intentional or not, "Disclaimer" should be substituted in place of "Opinion Letter." The case did not involve an
opinion letter. Taylor IJJ, 278 P.3d 952.
5
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and that the case "presented the unusual question of whether one party may sue another party's
attorney for decisions made during the court of litigation ... [and] for malpractice or wrongful
actions arising out of the defense of their clients in the Underlying Litigation ... " (2/17 /10 Bond
Aff., Ex. 16, p. 2-3; see also Id., Ex. 16-20; 12/3/09 Babbitt Aff., Ex. N-U; Facts, p. 14-19.) Mr.
LaRue is now asserting that Reed should have sued Riley and others for the negligence on the
Opinion Letter. Having obtained a benefit in that lawsuit by asserting that Reed had no right to
sue opposing counsel and obtaining an award of attorneys' fees against Reed based upon those
arguments, Riley cannot shift positions now and assert that Reed should have sued him in Taylor
v. McNichols. Likewise, having obtained an advantage through the stay, they cannot now take

the position that Reed should have known the Opinion Letter was incorrect in 2008.
The doctrine of unclean hands can bar a defendant from asserting a defense. Seller
Agency Council, Inc. v. Kennedy Center For Real Estate Education, Inc., 621 F.3d 981, 986 (9th

Cir. 2010). While both Taylor v. McNichols and Taylor v. A/A Services were being litigated,
Riley concealed facts and legal analysis from Reed relative to the transaction and the Opinion
Letter dating back to 1995--even that he believed the Opinion Letter was correct. Riley and
counsel for all of the defendants were fully aware that Reed was seeking to depose Riley and
Turnbow and acquire the facts and information necessary to fully and fairly litigate the illegality
issue and seek enforcement of the Stock Redemption Agreement, but they intentionally refused
to disclose the facts. Riley, in particular, has taken positions against his opinions in the Opinion
Letter and he and his firm are separately barred. (Facts, p. 14-19; Section A(3) of Reed's 9/4/12
Memo in Opposition to Eberle Berlin and Cummings' Motion for Summary Judgment.)

9. The use of resjudicata in this case would defeat its intended purpose.
Res judicata serves three fundamental purposes. Ticor Title Company, 144 Idaho at 123.
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Here, none of those fundamental purposes would be served based upon the circumstances of this
case, the fact that Taylor v. McNichols was dismissed pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(6) based upon the
litigation privilege and the circumstances in Taylor v. AJA Services (including that illegality was
not found until after the dismissal of Taylor v. McNichols, the concealment of facts relative to the
Opinion Letter and the adverse positions taken by Riley}-Reed never had an opportunity or the
facts to litigate the negligent preparation of the Opinion Letter. (Facts, p. 14-19; Section A(l).)

B. Reed did not waive his right to sue on the Opinion Letter because of the 1996
restructuring of the Stock Redemption Agreement.
"[W]hen the consideration for a contract explicitly violates a statute, the contract is illegal
and unenforceable." Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 609, 200 P.3d 1153, 1158 (2009).
"[A]n illegal contract is against public policy ... as [is any] document in furtherance of the illegal
contract." AJA Services Corp., 151 Idaho at 570. 6
When parties to an illegal contract attempt to extend or renew it by entering into a
new agreement, the new contract, although not otherwise tainted by illegal
activity, is illegal and unenforceable. Where a contract grows immediately out of,
and is connected with, a prior illegal contract, the illegality of the prior contract
enters into the new contract and renders it illegal. A contract in consideration of a
prior illegal contract or in compromise of a dispute arising therefrom is illegal and
unenforceable ... It has been broadly stated that if the connection between the
original illegal contract and the new contract can be traced, and if the latter is
connected with, and grows out of, the former, no matter how many times and in
how many different forms it may be renewed, it cannot form the basis of a
recovery. Every new agreement in furtherance of, or for the purpose of carrying
into effect, any of the unexecuted provisions of a previous illegal agreement is
likewise illegal and void, as is a contract the performance of which depends on
the performance of an invalid contract ... No compromise by the parties of
differences with respect to an illegal contract can purge it of illegality and
produce a valid claim on which a recovery may be had. Moreover, where an
action is brought to enforce an illegal contract, a new promise to perform it, made
on a settlement of litigation, is illegal.
CJS Contracts§ 374 (Westlaw 2012) (internal foot notes omitted).
6

Reed was attempting to enforce the release and indemnification provision in the Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement. (8/14/12 2nd Supp. Riley Aff., Ex. 35, p. 6, §3.) This argument was flatly rejected by the
Idaho Supreme Court. For the same reason, the defendants' arguments fail as a matter of law.
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The defendants' arguments fail as a matter of law because the 1995 Stock Redemption
Agreement could not be amended or restructured because "the Stock Redemption Agreement
[was] illegal and unenforceable under the 1995 version of LC. § 30-1-6, which restricts a
corporation to use only earned surplus and, under certain circumstances, capital surplus when
redeeming its shares." Taylor v. AJA Services Corp, 151 Idaho at 556. Specifically, "the Stock
Redemption Agreement violates the earned and capital surplus limitations in LC. § 30-1-6 and is
illegal and unenforceable." 7 Id at 575. The Idaho Supreme Court's decision is consistent with the
above authorities and the long-standing Idaho case law refusing to enforce illegal contracts. See

McShane v. Quillin, 47 Idaho 542, 277 P. 554 (1929). Thus, the 1996 Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement is irrelevant because it was illegal since it grew from, and is directly
traced to, the illegal 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. IRE 401-403. (8/14/12 2"d Supp. Riley
Aff., Ex. 1 & 35; 8/29/12 McDermott Aff., 'U22(e).) Moreover, although the defendants asserted
in discovery answers that the basis for their arguments was that Reed had "waived" his right to
claims in this case based upon the 1996 restructure, they have failed to present any evidence that
Reed "relinquished a right or advantage" or that they acted in reliance or "altered their
positions." See Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 457, 259 P.3d 595, 603 (2011);
(8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. C, p. 49, Ex. E, p. 7.) Reed has not waived anything nor have the
defendants changed their positions in any way. Their arguments lack merit.
Riley ignores the illegality doctrine and cites Isaak v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, 119 Idaho
988 (1990) for the proposition that "the holder of the note was bound by the modification and
had waived the right to sue." Assuming that the Stock Redemption Agreement and Stock
Redemption Restructure Agreement were not derived from the same illegal transaction, Isaak

7

In Taylor v. AJA Services Corp., the "Stock Redemption Agreement" was defined to include the "Stock
Redemption Restructure Agreement." 151 Idaho at 558.
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does not save the defendants' arguments because the restructured obligations do not withdraw,
alter or include the Opinion Letter, affect the $6M Note or security interests granted to Reed. See
McKay v. Boise Project Bd. of Control, 141Idaho463, 469, 111P.3d148, 154 (2005).
The stock Redemption Agreement, the Down Payment Note, the $6M Note, the
Security Agreement, the Stock Pledge Agreement, the Consulting Agreement and
the Noncompetition Agreement are collectively referred to herein as "Original
Documents." The Original Documents other than the $6M Note are collectively
referred to herein as the "Superseded Documents."
(8/14/12 2"d Supp. Riley Aff., Ex. 35, p. 1, §C (emphasis added).) The Opinion Letter was not
included as one of the "Original Documents" and the $6M Note was expressly excluded as one
of the "Superseded Documents." (Id.) The Opinion Letter remained valid and the $6M Note
remained unchanged, along with its attorney fee provision. (Id, Ex. 4 & 35.) While certain
provisions were revised regarding the security interests granted to Reed to secure the payment of
the $6M Note, those security interests remained unchanged, specifically "all commissions from
the sale of insurance or related services ... and any interest thereon" and "AIA Services agrees to
grant to [Reed] ... a security interest in all right and title to ... the Shares" (which included Reed's
irrevocable right to vote the shares or transfer them upon default). (Id., Ex. 1, Ex. 4, Ex. 5, Ex. 6,
Ex. 41, Ex. 43-45 & 46.) Thus, the indebtedness and pledged collateral are identical under the
Stock Redemption Agreement and the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement. (Id.) Reed's
damages are derived from the illegal $6M Note (plus interest), the value of collateral and other
damages that he incurred litigating enforceability and disposing of assets to fund that litigation.
The defendants' assert arguments pertaining to the restructuring of the redemption
obligations to Reed Taylor in 1996 ... These arguments are irrelevant. The relevant
inquiry is whether the opinions rendered in the Opinion Letter were accurate
when the transaction to redeem Reed Taylor's shares was closed. Since the
transaction was not carried out in compliance with LC. § 30-1-6 (1995), any
subsequent restructuring or modification of the agreements and any subordination
issues are irrelevant because the original transaction was illegal ... When the
Opinion Letter was delivered at the time of closing, the redemption of Reed
REED TAYLOR'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
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Taylor's shares was either legal or not. In addition, the 1996 restructure did not
affect the $6 Million Promissory Note or the security interests relating thereto
(which were rendered unenforceable by Judge Brudie's ruling and as affirmed by
the Idaho Supreme Court).
~22(e).)

(8/29/12 McDermott Aff.,

In addition to lacking authority, the defendants' arguments

are irrelevant to the illegality in 1995 and the claims in this lawsuit. IRE 401-403. Since the
redemption was illegal in 1995, it is irrelevant that a new opinion was not provided in 1996:
When the Opinion Letter was delivered at the time of closing, the redemption of
Reed Taylor's shares was either legal or not. In addition, the 1996 restructure did
not affect the $6 Million Promissory Note or the security interests relating thereto
(which were rendered unenforceable by Judge Brudie's ruling and as affirmed by
the Idaho Supreme Court). The Opinion Letter remains in full force and effect.
(8/29/12 McDermott Aff.,

~22(e)

(emphasis added).) The Opinion Letter was not included as one

of the "Original Documents" or as one of the "Superseded Documents" in the Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement. (8/14/12 2°d Supp. Riley Aff., Ex. 35, p. 1, §C.) In addition, there are no
documents in 1995 or 1996, executed by Reed, that withdraw or alter the Opinion Letter and it
does not contain any language permitting it to be withdrawn. (2/2/10 Taylor Aff., Ex. A.) In
addition, the defendants assert that Reed's assertions in his Complaint against Scott Bell that he
was negligent for failing to obtain a new opinion letter somehow support their position. This
argument also fails. The negligence associated with any failure to obtain a new opinion letter is
entirely different and unrelated to the negligent preparation of the Opinion Letter. 8
The obligations and duties owed by Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin to Reed
Taylor through the preparation and delivery of the Opinion Letter have nothing to
do with any alleged negligent acts of Scott Bell or any other attorney at his firm.
(8/29/12 McDermott Aff.,

~22(f)

n. 2.) Had Scott Bell required the defendants to issue a new

Opinion Letter, then obviously Reed would not have incurred any attorneys' fees addressing this
argument. Even if a new opinion letter had been prepared, it would not have changed the relevant
8

Neither Scott Bell nor any of the other attorneys in his firm are entitled to rely upon the Opinion Letter. It
was not addressed to them and was not provided for them to rely upon.
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inquiry-whether the Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal in 1995-the illegality of which
is the basis for Reed's claims against the defendants for the erroneous and deceptive 1995
Opinion Letter. CJS Contracts§ 374 (Westlaw 2012); AJA Services Corp., 151 Idaho at 570; IRE
401-403. Thus, the defendants are not insulated from liability by not preparing an opinion letter
in 1996---the relevant inquiry is the illegality in 1995. Id. (8/29/12 McDermott Aff., ~~22(e)-(g).)
C. Reed did not cause any unenforceability of the Stock Redemption Agreement.

I.C. § 30-1-6 and I.C. § 30-1-2 do not authorize an illegal redemption because a portion,
let alone any, of the consideration was "subordinate" to an authorized redemption of another
shareholder. There are no provisions in I.C. § 30-1-6 or I.C. § 30-1-2 that authorize or imply that
an illegal corporate stock redemption for one shareholder, Reed, can "piggy back" on the
shoulders of another shareholder, Donna Taylor, to make it legal. In addition, there is nothing in
the Opinion Letter or the transaction documents that suggest or imply that Reed's redemption
was authorized under I.C. § 30-1-6 because the payment of his $6M Note was subordinated to
payments to Donna Taylor. (2/2/10 Taylor Aff., Ex. A; 8/29/12 McDermott Aff., ~22(e))-(f).) In
fact, Donna Taylor's written consent was required because she had payment priority and no
common shares could be redeemed without her consent. (8/14/12 Riley Aff., Ex. 51-53; 8/2/12
Ipsen Aff., Ex. C; 9/4/12 Supp. Bond Aff., Ex. Q.) I.C. § 28-9-339; 68 Am.Jur.2d §§ 792 & 794.
While AIA Services' articles of incorporation authorized the redemption of Donna
Taylor's shares, there were no such provisions authorizing the redemption of Reed's shares, as
confirmed by Riley. (Id.; 8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. A, p. 134-135.) Moreover, the defendants fail to
address the $1.5M Note, $1M in airplanes, furniture, CAP program, and other consideration-all
of which was not "subordinated" and rendered the entire redemption illegal. (8/14/12 2nd Supp.
Riley Aff., Ex. 1, p. 3, 9, 11-13.) For the reasons in Section B, the Subordination Agreement
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between Reed and Donna Taylor in 2006 is illegal and void because it was connected to the
illegal 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement.9 AJA Services Corp., 151 Idaho at 556; CJS
Contracts § 374 ("Where a contract grows ... out of, and is connected with, a prior illegal
contract, the illegality of the prior contract enters into the new contract and renders it illegal.")
The defendants' assert arguments pertaining to the restructuring of the redemption
obligations to Reed Taylor in 1996 and the alleged subordination of the payment
of the $6 Million Note to the redemption of Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred
Shares in AIA Services Corporation. These arguments are irrelevant. The relevant
inquiry is whether the opinions rendered in the Opinion Letter were accurate
when the transaction to redeem Reed Taylor's shares was closed. Since the
transaction was not carried out in compliance with LC. § 30-1-6 (1995), any
subsequent restructuring or modification of the agreements and any subordination
issues are irrelevant because the original transaction was illegal. In addition, the
defendants' assertions that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares was legal
because certain payments were subordinate to payments to Donna Taylor is not
supported by any provision in LC.§ 30-1-6 or LC.§ 30-1-2. 10 When the Opinion
Letter was delivered at the time of closing, the redemption of Reed Taylor's
shares was either legal or not. In addition, the 1996 restructure did not affect the
$6 Million Promissory Note or the security interests relating thereto (which were
rendered unenforceable by Judge Brudie's ruling and as affirmed by the Idaho
Supreme Court). The Opinion Letter remains in full force and effect.
(8/29/12 McDermott Aff., 1122(e).) Interestingly, Judge Brudie rejected the same arguments when
they were asserted by the defendants in Taylor v. AJA Services, with Riley's assistance:
AIA directs the Court to Section 4.9 of its Articles of Incorporation and asserts it
was a party to the 1995 subordination agreement because its duty to limit its
assumption of debt so long as there are outstanding Series A shares. AIA then
extends the argument to assert there could be no change in the subordination
agreement without its consent. The Court is not persuaded. Section 4.9 of the
9

If Reed's redemption had been legal, Reed would have remained a creditor with the right to subordinate,
since, "[t]he only parties whose rights are affected by the subordination are Donna Taylor and Reed Taylor and as
such, it was within their legal right to enter into a new subordination agreement and to do so without the consent,
approval or participation of AIA." (8/10/12 Ashby Aff., Ex. D, p. 13; 8/14/12 2nd Supp. Riley Aff., Ex. 55.)
10
Under AIA Services Corporation's Articles of Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation filed on April
11, 1995 and August 3, 1995, respectively, AIA Services Corporation was authorized to redeem Donna Taylor's
shares using "legally available funds" and "only to the extent such redemption shall not violate the Idaho Business
Corporation Act restrictions on the corporation's redemption of its own shares." See Article Fourth, Section 4.2.3.
Donna Taylor's shares were only redeemed as payments were made to her, unlike Reed Taylor's redemption in
which his shares were canceled and payments, instruments and security interests were granted to him at the time of
the redemption. There are no provisions in AIA Services Corporation's [Articles] of Amendment to the Articles of
Incorporation authorizing the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares.
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Articles of Incorporation protects the Stated Value Preferred Shareholders, i.e.,
Donna Taylor as the sole Series A Shareholder, by requiring AIA to obtain Donna
Taylor's consent before it incurs certain debt. AIA met its obligation by obtaining
Donna Taylor's consent to incur its debt to Reed Taylor, as evidenced by her
signature on the agreement documents. Nothing within the language of AIA's
Articles of Incorporation makes it a party to agreements reached between
creditors regarding their rights as creditors.
8/10/12 Ashby Aff., Ex. D, p. 13, n. 16.) Judge Brudie concluded: [u]nder the theory asserted by
the Defendant, AIA, could prevent Reed Taylor from ever having a legal remedy for nonpayment of the $6 million Note by leaving as little as one cent unpaid on the debt owed to Donna
Taylor. Such an interpretation would result in a legal absurdity." (Id.)
D. Reed agrees that Harrifeld is good law and it further supports the Court's decision.

The defendants have failed to provide any basis for the Court to reconsider its ruling that
"the holding of cases such as Prudential, supra, are consistent with the reasoning of our Supreme
Court in Harrigfeld." (5/10/10 Memorandum Decision, p. 8.) Riley agrees with the Court:
A. (Mr. Riley):
Q. (Mr. Gaffney):

A. (Mr. Riley):

I think that in Judge Greenwood's opinion he stated very well what
the duties of an Opinion giver are.
And what is your understanding of that duty?
That they need to be prepared in a non-negligent manner with the
skill, care, and prudence of a lawyer in similar circumstances.

(8/30/12 Bond Aff., Ex. A, p. 68-69.) Mr. McDermott agrees with Riley's testimony that an
opinion letter giver owes the recipient "a duty of care." (8/29/12 McDermott Aff., U2(f); see
also U2(g).) Thus, all parties agree that an opinion giver owes an opinion recipient a duty of

care. For all of the reasons set forth in Section A of Reed's Memorandums of Law in Opposition
to Defendants Eberle Berlin and Cummings Motion for Summary Judgment dated August 30,
2012 and September 4, 2012, Reed's claims are properly before this Court. Regardless, the
balance-of-the-harms test is clearly met in this case. Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 90
P.3d 884 (2004); see also McNichols, 149 Idaho at 845 (refusing to extend Harrigfeld in that
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··case because "it is incredulous that Reed would attempt to assert that attorneys hired by the AIA
•.Entities, to fight off Reed's litigation against those entities, were being retained for Reed's
benefit"). In this case, the defendants, as opinion givers, who are in privity with Reed pursuant to
· .a contractual provision, owed a duty of care to Reed, the opinion recipient. Thus, there are n,o
. issl1es of fact or issues of law.regardingthat duty~ven the defendants agree a duty is owed_

IV. CONCLUSION
The Defondants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied and the Court should
. dismiss tbe affirmative defenses asserted therein. In addition, the Court should reconsider its
• earlier decision and find that Reed's claims accrued on June 17, 2009--the date that Judge
. Brud_ie ruled that the Stock Redemption Agreement

was both illegal and unenforceable.

DATED this41h day of September, 2012.

By: _ _ _..,,~~
.. Michael D. G
ey, ISB No. 3558
Roderick C. Bond, lSB No. 8082
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor·
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.Jack S. Gjording
Juliallile S. Hall
Gjording & Fouser, PLLC
509 W. Hays St.
8oise, ID 83701

James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
·. Elam & Burke, PA
· 251 East Front St.
·Boise, ID· 8370
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Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
Tel: (208) 557-5203
Fax: (208) 529-9732
Email: gafthey@beardstclair.com

DEPUTY

's~~~· Clerk

RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, WA 98004
Tel: (425) 591-6903
Fax: (425) 321-0343
Email: rod@roderickbond.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, JN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868
Plaintiff,
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF
RODERICK C. BOND

v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Robert M.
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING,
TURNBOW & McKL VEEN, CHARTERED,
an Idaho corporation;
Defendants.
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From:

Rod~rick Bond

. ···.Fax: (425) 321-0343

e

STATE OF W ASHINGTQN

COUNTY OF KING

To: +12083458740

Fa~: +120S345ai40

. •age 3 of4 9/4/2012 10:30.

)
) ss:
)

•. I, Roderick C. Bond, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen years, competent

to

testify .in court,_ one of the .

attorneys for the plaintiff in this matter, and make this Affidavit upon my personal knowledge.
2.

Attached as Exhibit Q is a true and correct copy of the Articles of Amendment to

the Articles of Incorporation of AIA Services Corporation filed on August 3, 1995. I obtained
·_. Exhibit Q from the Idaho Secretary of State website and have seen the same version produced in

·. ·. discovery in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al. It appears to me that Mr. Ipsen meant to attach Exhibit
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From: Roderick Bond

Fax: (425) 321-0343

e

To: +12083458740

Fax: +12083458740
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 4th day of September, 2012, I caused to be
served, pursuant to agreement of the parties, true and correct copies of the foregoing document to
the following parties via email and U.S. Mail, postage prepaid:

Jack S. Gjording
Julianne S. Hall
Gjording & Fouser, PLLC
509 W. Hays St
Boise, ID 83701

James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
Elam & Burke, PA
251 East Front St.
Boise, ID 83704
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ORIGINAL
ADC 3 3 16 PK '95

ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT
TP THE ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION
SECRETARY OF STA
. T
OF
STATE Of IDAHO
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION

Pursuant to the provisions of §30-1-58, §30-1-59 and §30-1-61 of the Idaho Business
Corporation Act, the undersigned corporation adopts the following Articles of Amendment to
its Articles oflncorporation, as filed on December 20, 1983 and previously amended on October
14, 1986, December 29, 1987 and April 11, 1995.
FIRST: The name of the corporation is AJA SERVICES CORPORATION.
SECOND: On July 18, 1995, the shareholders of the corporation adopted and approved
the following Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation of AIA Services Corporation,
pursuant to which Article Fourth was amended by replacing it in its entirety.
"AMENDED AND ~TATED ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION
OF
AIA SERVIC~ CORPORATION
Except for the amendment of Article Fourth by replacing it in its entirety, these Amended
and Restated Articles of Incorporation of AJA Services Corporation correctly set forth without
change the corresponding provisions of the original Articles of Incorporation as hereinbefore
filed on December 20, 1983 and amended on October 14, 1986, December 29, 1987 and April
11, 1995; and these Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation, including the amended
Article Fourth supersede the original Articles of Amendment and all previous amendments
thereto.

FIRST
The name of the corporation is AIA SERVICES CORPORATION.

SECOND
The period of its duration is perpetual.
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CHRISTO~HER D. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE VIDAK
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendants, Richard A. Riley
and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
I

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
j
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

I

Case No. CV-OC-0918868,

i

v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; SHARON
CUMMINGS, Personal Representative of the
Estate of Robert M. Turnbow; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

REPLY BRIEF OF RICHARD A. RILEY
IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

I

Defendants.

I

Although Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant
i

Richard A. Riley's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supplemental Memorahdum in Support of
Motion for Reconsideration was not timely filed, defendant Riley responds theleto as follows:

i
I

REPLY BRIEF OF RICHARD A. RILEY IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF
LAW IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
j
G:\Client\7082\0013\HTEH #2\Pleadings\2012.09.06 Riley's Reply Briefre Motion for Sunurtary Judgment.wpd
I

I
i
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I.

RES JUD/CATA

The issue in this case regarding res judicata is straightforward. May a

·

piI

who is on notice

of a claim against the defendant and who unsuccessfully sued that defendant now relitigate his claim
by changing his theory of recovery? Although Reed Taylor seeks to obfuscate be critical facts, it
has been absolutely and undeniably established that other defendants raised the Lenforceability of

1

.

and AIA Services in April 2008 repudiated its contract for the redemption of Reed Taylor's stock
I
'

on the ground that the contract was illegal and unenforceable. Mr. Taylor thereafter filed suit against
Mr. Riley, who had participated in preparing an opinion letter (the "1995 Opiniol Letter"), opining
I

~ansaction was legal and enforceable. In the same lawsuit, Mr. TaylJr sued the Hawley

that the

l

Troxell law firm, which on behalf of AIA had raised the illegality defense in th~ "AIA Case," Case

II

No. CV 07-00208 in the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the

~tate

of Idaho, Nez

i
Perce County (See, Taylor v. AJA Services, Inc., 151 Idaho 552, 261 P.3d 829 (2011))

Reed

Taylor's counsel made it abundantly clear that he and his client were cognizLt of the illegality

I

issue. 1 In any event they cannot claim ignorance of the issue because the illegality defense was pled

I
1

Mr. Taylor's attorney flied an affidavit dated August 28, 2008, in the AIA case which stated, "Because of
Richard Riley's opinion letter provided to Reed Taylor by his old firm (the letter specifically r~ferences Richard
I
Riley), Richard Riley is a witness in this action as well. In other words, Richard Riley is a witness against his clients
that his opinion
and has diverging interests against his clients. On one hand, Richard Riley could provide testimony
I
letter was correct. In this example, he would testifying against his clients AIA Services and AIA Insurance because
Hawley Troxell is now arguing that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares should be ruled illegal some 13 years
after the fact. This would also result in Reed Taylor having claims accruing against Richard Riley, which creates
another conflict of interest On the other hand, Richard Riley could testify that his opinion letter was wrong. In this
example, Mr. Riley is still testifying against his client AIA Services and the corporate officers because AIA Services
executed a separate document over 1 month after Reed Taylor sold his shares in which it agree d to indemnify him,
hold him harmless and was a release of all known and unknown claims, all causes of action, etc. (Emphasis added)
(Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Disqualification, ~ 57, in the AIA case, and as Exhibit F to the
Affidavit of John Ashby in Taylor v. Riley, et al, Ada County Case No. CV-OC-2009-18868. j
1

IREPLY BRIEF OF RICHARD A. RILEY IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF
LAW IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
l
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very clearly by AIA and other defendants in the AIA Case. As a matter of litigation strategy, Reed
Taylor took the position in his first lawsuit against Mr. Riley and Hawley Trolell2 that the stock

I

redemption was legal and it was improper for Hawley Troxell to plead illegality, contrary to the

II

terms of Mr. Riley's 1995 Opinion Letter. Mr. Taylor ~as unsuccessful in hisjfirst action against

Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell. He now wishes to change gears and sue on the theory that the 1995

i

Opinion Letter was incorrect, ergo negligently prepared. Res judicata bars precisely the sort of

. . l'.
. t hat Mr . Tay1or now attempts to pursue.
repetitive
itigation
1.

.

II

Contrary to Mr. Taylor's ar2ument, ·Hawley Troxel; No. l:was based on the
same factual 2rouping and transaction.

I

Mr. Taylor argues that the facts supporting his claims in the present case are "entirely
I

different" than the facts supporting his claims in Hawley Troxell No. 1. 3
be

How~ver, nothing could

furthe~ from the truth. The predicate facts on which both cases were based arl identical, and with
.

I

the exception of adding Mr. Turnbow and the Eberle Berlin law firm as defendants, the parties are

I

also identical. Nothing has changed in either case, except for Mr. Taylor's litigation strategy. In
j

.

Hawley Troxell No. 1, he elected to proceed on the theory that the 1995 Opinion Letter was correct
I

'

I

and, therefore, it was wrongful for Hawley Troxell at the behest of corporate management to defend
I
I

2

I

Taylor v. Babbitt, et al., Case No. CV 08-01765 in the District Court of the Second Judicial District of
the State ofldaho, Nez Perce County (hereinafter "Hawley Troxell No. l "). The district court's dismissal of Reed
Taylor's complaint and denial of his motion to amend his complaint was affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court sub
·
.
·nom Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P.3d 642 (2010).
3

l

'

Mr. Taylor refers to Hawley Troxell No. 1 by the name of the appellate decision, Taylor v. McNichols.
;'

l

i
REPLY BRIEF OF RICHARD A. RILEY IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF
LAW IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
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its client on the theory of illegality and for Mr. Riley to fail to come to the assistance of Mr. Taylor. 4

(Mr. Taylor refers to the.se actions in his memorandum opposing the present rAotion for summary

I

judgement as "the litigation conduct and torts committed against the AIA entities, ...." (Reed

Taylor's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Riley's Motion/or SummaiJudgment, p. 5.) 5
Having

.

~een unsuccessful in Hawley Troxell No. 1, Mr. Taylor now seeks to t~vise
l hls theory of

recovery and to plead that Mr. Riley's opinion was incorrect and, therefore,

1'1r· Riley must have
i

. I

been negligent. Nothing prevented Mr. Taylor from putting forth this alternate theory ofrecovery

I
in Hawley Troxell No. 1. Under the doctrine of res judicata, which has yet td be fully addressed
in the present case, he does not possess the luxury of litigating his theories of rlcovery piecemeal.

.

2.

I

Reed Taylor's claims against Mr. Riley for professional liability accrued in
April 2008.
j

I
Contrary to the Court's ruling in the present case, Reed Taylor argues that his cause of action

II

.

for professional negligence against Mr. Riley did not accrue until June 17, 2009, which is when

I

Judge Brudie ruled in the AIA case that the stock redemption agreement ~as unenforceable.

4

In his earlier complaint against Hawley Troxell, Taylor alleged in part "defendants 'were responsible for
' and warranties.
issuing opinion letters relating to the transaction, which include various applicable representations
Defendants are now asserting arguments contrary to the representations made in the opinion letter drafted by
defendants by and through defendant Richard A. Riley." (Complaint, Taylor v. Babbitt, Nez Perce County Case No.
CV08-01765.) In his motion to amend the complaint in that action Taylor alleged "Defendant Riley owes Reed
Taylor special duties by and through an opinion letter." Riley breached his duties when he asserted that the
transaction was illegal." (199, Proposed First Amended Complaint in Taylor v. Babbit, Nez Perce County Case No.
CV08-01765. (Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgroent, Taylor v. Riley,
Ada County Case No. CV-OC-2009-18868, filed May 10, 2010.)
I
I

I

5

Mr. Taylor took great umbrage in Hawley Troxell No. 1 that the Hawley Troxell firm re.cognized
corporate management rather that himself as the proper parties to direct AIA' s actions, including its litigation tactics.
I

!
I

REPLY BRIEF OF RICHARD A. RILEY IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF
I
LAW IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4
G:\Client\7082\0013\HTEH #2\Pleadings\2012.09.06 Riley's Reply Briefre Motion for Summary Judgment.wpd
'

1

002519

.

.

Therefore, Mr. Taylor reasons that he could not have sued Mr. Riley for negligence in Hawley
,
I
I

Troxell No. I becatlse that case was dismissed prior to Judge Brudie's decisiori in June 17, 2009.

l

In the case at bar, this Court ruled that Mr. Taylor's cause of action against Mr. Riley for

.

.I

professional negligence accrued and the statute of limitation began to ~ in April 2008:

.

i

In this case, the alleged negligent acts took place in 1995. The damages '.occurred in
April 2008 when one of the Defendants in the AJA lawsuit raised the issue of the
legality of the redemption agreement. Taylor was required to incur attorney fees to
counter the attack on his right to recover under the note. At that point, he had
suffered damage that could be proven in court and for which a court may enter
judgment.

l
t

!

~

Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judg~ent, Case No. CVOC-2009-18868 (May 10, 2010).
Since Mr. T~ylor's cause of action again~t Mr. Riley for professional ne~ligence accrued in
April 2008, it necessarily follows that when Mr. Taylor filed the complaint in Jtawley Troxell No .
. i
I

1 on August 18, 2008, the doctrine of res judicata obliged him. to bring all claimsI he had against Mr.
I
t

Riley for professional negligence at that time, including hls claim arising out bf preparation and

delivery of the Opinion Letter. .

.

·

t

.

Reed Taylor-'s differing concept of when a cause of action accrues is 16gically flawed.and
I

.

j

would lead to absurd results. He apparently contends that he did not possess a ri.egligence cause of

I
action against Mr. Riley until a definitive ruling was entered by a court regarding the legality and

.

I
I

enforceability of the stock redemption. If this were the case, then in the absence of a court ruling,

.

II

a cause of action for negligence would never accrue against a professional and the statue of

.

I

limitation would never begin to run until a definitive court ruling was made. For example, if an

REPLY BRIEF OF RICHARD A. RILEY IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF
LAw IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5
.

I
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.·

attorney failed to file a complaint in a timely manner, then under Mr. Taylor's reasoning the

.

I

aggrieved party would not have a cause of action until a court ruled that indeed the complaint was
I

.

•

I

not timely filed. This interpretation is contrary to Idaho law.. A cause of actfon for professional
.
:·
;
'

malpractice accrues upon the convergence of two events: (1) the "time of th~ occurrence, act or
omission complained of," and (2) when the plaintiff has incurred

"so~e dlage."
.

Lapham v..

;

i
Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 51P.3d396 (2002). See also, Stephen v. Sallaz &Gatewood, Chtd., 150
l
I

Idaho 521, 248 P.3d 1256 (2011); City ofMcCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009);
!

I
I

Conway v. Sonntag, 141 Idaho 174, 106 P.3d 470 (2005); Elliott v. Parsons, 128 Idaho 723, 918

.

l

.

P.2d 592 (1996); Rice v. Litster, 132 Idaho 897, 980 P.2d 561 (1995); Chicoine Vi Bignall, 122 Idaho
'

'

I

482, 835 P.2d 1293 (1992); Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 508 P.2d 876 (1991); Stephens v.
I
I

Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 (1984); Streib v. Veigel, 109 Idaho 174, 706 P.2d 63 (1985);
i

Martin v. Clements, 98 Idaho 906, 575 P.2d 895 (1978).

In the case at bai-, these two events
I

occurred not later than April 2008 when (1) the allegedly erroneous and negligent Opinion Letter had
f.
'

been issued many years earlier, and (2) in response to AIA raising the illegality defense, Reed Taylor
•

-.t

:

'

began sustaining monetary damages by incurring legal fees to counter AIA's position.. It is not
j

I

necessary that the plaintiff have actual notice of the allegedly wrongful conduct. See, for example,·

j
Owyhee County v. Rife, 100 Idaho 91, 593 P.2d 995 (1979) (holding that a cause of action against
I
.I

an auditor for failure to detect an embezzlement occurred at the time of the defalcations, not when

.

,

I

I

.

.

the county later discovered the loss). The total amount of damages does not need to accrue before
!
!

.

the cause of action accrues; it is sufficient ifthere is "some damage." Fairway Development Co. v.
I

I
I

Peterson, Moss, Olsen, Meacham & Carr, 124 Idaho 866, 865 P.2d 957 (1993).
•

I

I

• I
REPLY BRIEF OF RICHARD A. RILEY IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF
LAW IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6
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I

I.
Reed Taylor's position regarding the accrual of his cause of action against Mr. Riley is
simply contrary to established Idaho law.

3.

.

Reed Taylor was on notice of the operative facts giving rise to his claim against
Mr. Riley in April 2008.
I
I

I
Reed Taylor then shades his argument a bit by asserting that, although he may have been put
i

on notice of the claim the stock redemption transaction_ was illegal, he did not h~ve ''knowledge" of
'

i
'

the fact of illegality until the date of Judge Brodie's decision. Evidently, by the term "knowledge,"
I

I

Mr. Taylor means "absolute knowledge beyond doubt," since he contends he needed to take
{

depositions and engage in other discovery to determine all the facts that might illuminate the
illegality issue. Mr. Taylor then cites to positions taken and reasons relied oh by Mr. Riley for

i

formulating his opinion, as indicated in Mr. Riley's deposition in the present case, to

~olster

the

I
...
argument that Mr. Taylor needed to gather more facts to completely investigate the factual and legal
!
I

.

considerations
that might support his claim. However, a complete exploration
of all the legal
.
I
f

nuances of the positions of various parties was not necessary to determine whether he possessed a
.

.

i

cause of action against Mr. Riley which he could and should have asserted in 11awley Tro?Cell No.
i

1.

Indeed, all facts and bits of evidence are seldom, if ever, known in co~plete detaii at the
I

beginning of a lawsuit. Pretrial discovery is necessary to flesh out a pictuie of the evidence.
I
I

I

However, this does not mean that a party is unaware that he possesses a cause of action until pretrial
I

discovery has been completed. A reasonable person in Reed Taylor's position cJuld not have failed

.

I

· to realize that he had a potential cause of action against Mr. Riley when Hawley Troxell No. 1 was
I

l

pending. As revealed by the rather thorough discussion by Mr. Taylor's counsel bfthe permutations

REPLY BRIEF OF RICHARD A. RILEY IN'RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF
LAW IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 7
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that might result depending on whether the 1995 Opinion Letter was deemed correct, Mr. Taylor's
I
I

counsel did, in fact, have a good grasp of the claim against Mr. Riley. (See fn.l supra.)

.

I
I

Sure and absolute knowledge that one possesses a cause of action is J?-Ot the appropriate

!

criteria for determining whether res judicata bars a claim. Rather, res judicata applies when "[T]he

I

supportive facts for these transactionally related claims were in existence and known (or at least

I
I

readily discoverable) at the time the earlier suit was ongoing...." Role Models America, Inc. v.
Penmar Dev. Corp. , 394 F.Supp.2d 121, 135 (D.D.C. 2005).

I

Reed Taylor's position appears to

be that before he was able to discern whether he possessed a cause of action aJainst Mr. Riley for
I
professional negligence, he needed to know the precise statute that measured· the legality of the

I

transaction. (See discussion on p. 5 of Reed Taylor's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant

I
i

Riley's Motion for Summary Judgment regarding whether Idaho Code § 30-1-6 or § 30-1-46 was the
•

I

l

governing statute.) This is putting rather too fine point on it. The precise governing statute which
I

j

controlled the legality of a corporation's ability to redeem its majority shareholder's stock in 1995
I

I

was an issue of interpretation open to all parties and a matter for analysis by the lawyers. Surely,
I

Mr. Taylor's lawyers were or reasonably should have been capable of lookin~ into the illegality
j
defense and coming to a conclusion whether Mr. Taylor possessed a cause of.action against Mr.
I

i

Riley. Mr. Taylor's position that a reasonable person would not be aware of his p6tential negligence
i
1

claim against Mr. Riley until the date of Judge Brodie's ruling is simply not credible, since the
illegality defense had been raised approximately four months previously.

REPLY BRIEF OF RICHARD A. RILEY IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF
LAW IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 8
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5.

The claims of Mr. Taylor against Mr. Riley could have and should have been
litigated in Hawley Troxell No. 1.

I

When Mr. Taylor asserts that there "was not a shred of evidence" at the time Hawley Troxell
'

1

No. 1 was pending that the Opinion Letter was incorrect, he is overlooking sJme rather obvious

I

facts. Roughly four months earlier AIA had raised the illegality defense and tile issue was on the

l

table. While it is true that Judge Brudie had not yet entered a decision in AIA's favor, this does not

change the fact that there was very good evidence that illegality was being assked as a defense.

I

Again, the issue comes back to whether it was necessary to obtain a decision from Judge Brudie
'

i

before a reasonable person in Reed Taylor's position was required by the doctrine of res judicata to

I

plead all his theories of recovery against Mr. Riley in Hawley Troxell No. 1. Plaintiff has cited no
authority and none has been found which enunciates this as the test of whether r1s judicata applies.
The test is whether "[T]he supportive facts for these transactionally related claijs were in existence

Ii

and known (or at least readily discoverable) at the time the earlier suit was

o~going .... "

Role

I

I

Models America, Inc. v. Penmar Dev. Corp., 394 F.Supp.2d 121, 135 (D.D.C. 2005). Under the

I

proper test it should be held that at the time Hawley Troxell No. 1 was pending, .Mr. Taylor was on
I

notice of facts which gave rise to his claim. Nothing prohibited him in Hawley!Troxell No. I from
pleading the claim, even if it were pied as an alternative theory of recovery, which he now seeks to
I

I

assert.

6.

II
Mr. Riley is not judicially estopped from pleading res judic~ta as a bar to the
plaintiff's complaint.

I

Hawley Troxell and Richard Riley vigorously defended the complaint filed against them in

I

Hawley Troxell No: 1. No defense raised by them or factual or legal position taken in that litigation

I

REPLY BRIEF OF RICHARD A. RILEY IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF
J
LAW IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 9
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was contrary to the defense of res judicata now asserted by Mr. Riley.

Mr. Taylor is merely

grasping at straws when he argues that Mr. Riley should be judicially estopped from pointing out that
Mr. Taylor had a prior opportunity to litigate his claim. Rather, the very purpose of the doctrine of

res judicata is to prevent the sort of repetitive and piecemeal litigation that the plaintiff wishes to
pursue in the present case.
· II.

THE 1996 RESTRUCTURE AGREEMENT

Mr. Taylor misses the point when he argues that the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement was
not salvaged or made legal by the 1996 Restructure Agreement. The issue is not whether the 1996
Restructure Agreement somehow converted the redemption of Reed Taylor's stock into a legal and
enforceable obligation. The point is that Mr. Riley expressed an opinion only as the 1995 Stock
Redemption Agreement, a contract that was superseded and replaced in 1996. Mr. Riley did not
provide an opinion regarding the 1996 Redemption Agreement, and cannot b~ subject to liability for
a loss allegedly sustained by Mr. Taylor for entering into the 1996 Restructure Agreement.
In the AIA case, Mr. Taylor sued for a an alleged breach of the 1996 Restructure Agreement,
not the 1995 Redemption Agreement. His Fifth Amended Complaint in the AIA Case (which was
the last amendment allowed by the trial court and, therefore, the operative pleading) alleged that,
"AJA

Se~ices,

AIA Insurance and Reed agreed to modify the Stock Redemption Agreement and

executed the Stock Redemption Restructure

Agreement."(~

2.15)

"On or about December 12,

2006, Reed provided AJA Services with written notice of default under the various provisions of the
Restructure Agreement, ... "

(~

2.26) "Despite Reed's demands, AIA Services and AJA Insurance

failed to cure the numerous defaults under the terms of the Promissory Note, Restructure

REPLY BRIEF OF RICHARD A. RILEY IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF
LAW IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 10
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Agreement," etc. (if 2.32) "The Defendants owed Reed obligations and/or continuing contractual
obligations to timely pay him and comply with specific terms, conditions, covenants, warranties and
the like required by the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security
Agreement, and Restructure Agreement." (if 3.2) "[F]ailure to pay Reed the amounts owed and
comply with the continuing contractual obligations under the Promissory Note, Amended Stock
Redemption Agreement, Amended Security Agreement and Restructure Agreement constitute a
breach.... " (if 3.3) "Under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security Agreement,
and Restructure Agreement, Reed is entitled to vote the pledged shares of AJA Insurance.... " (if
. 10.2) "Despite Reed's demands for the Defendants to comply with the provisions in the Promissory
Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amen4ed Security Agreement

~d

Restructure

Agreement, ... the Defendants have refused to comply." (if 10.3) "There is an implied obligation
>

•

of good faith and fair dealing between the parties in the performance of the terms and conditions of
th~

Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security Agreement and

Restructure Agreement." (if 12.2)

' the
The prayer for relief sought by Reed Taylor pursuant

Fifth Amended Complaint was that he was entitled to such relief as he "[M]ay request before or at
trial to enforce his rights under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security
Agreement, and/or Restructure Agreement. ... " (if 14.16). All references are to the paragraphs of
Reed Taylor's Fifth Amended Complaint in the AJA Case. (2d Supp. Riley Aff., Ex. 56)
Reed Taylor is now suing his lawyers in Seattle, Washington, for failing to obtain an opinion
in connection with the 1996 Restructure Agreement. See, Reed Taylor v. Scott Bell, et al. Case No.
12-2-10803 SEA, in the Superior Court of the State of Washington, in and for the County ofKing.

REPLY BRIEF OF RICHARD A. RILEY IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF
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(Affidavit ofLoren C. Ipsen, Ex. A). By entering into the 19?6 Restructure Agree1?1ent, Reed Taylor
entered ii;ito a new transaction and waived all rights under the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement.
The question is whether he may now sue Mr. Riley based on a opinion that relates to a superseded
and inoperative agreement. This question must be answered in the negative. He may not sue Mr.
Riley relating to an opinion that which does not relate to the contract pursuant to which Mr. Taylor
sold his stock.

III.

THEREVERSALOFREEDTAYLOR'SSUBORDINATIONTODONNA TAYLOR
By his own actions, Reed Taylor changed the predicate on which the 1995 Opinion Letter

was based. When preparing his opinion Mr. Riley relied on the fact that AIA's obligation to pay
Reed Taylor was subordinate to its obligation to pay Donna Taylor for the redemption of her stock.
Under the terms ofthe Subordination Agreement, that order ~f priority could not be changed without
AIA' s express written consent. AIA was obligated to make payments to Donna Taylor, and therefore
to Reed Taylor, only "from legally available funds" and " ... only to the extent such redemption
shall not violate the Idaho Business Corporation Act restrictions on the corporation's redemption of
its own share." (Affidavit ofLoren C. Ipsen, Ex B) By convincing his former spouse to reverse the
"
order of subordination without AIA' s consent, Reed Taylor changed the facts on which the Opinion
·'

Letter ~as b~sed. He has no cause of action against Mr. Riley relating to a set of facts which are
materially different from the facts on which the Opinion Letter was based and which Reed Taylor
.·

himself brought about.

REPLY BRIEF OF RICHARD A. RILEY IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF
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IV.

THE HARRIGFELD CASE

Idaho law is unique in that Idaho recognizes only one exception to the rule that privity is
required to hold an attorney liable for negligence in the performance of legal services. Harrigfeld
v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004). In Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 845, 243
P.3d 642, 661 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court declined to depart from its "carefully reasoned
analysis in Harrigfeld." Mr. Taylor asserts that Harrigfeld should be expanded, but if such
expansion is to be made, it is the province of the Idaho Supreme Court to do so.

CONCLUSION
The arguments advanced by Mr. Taylor lack merit. Summary judgment should be granted
dismissing his complaint against Mr. Riley.
D.ATED this

b

day of September, 2012.

ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By:~
es:LaRl;e~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _b_ day of September, 2012, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner indicated
below:
Roderick C. Bond

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(425) 321-0343

RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC

800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, Washington 98004

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 529-9732

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-9177

Jack S. Gj ording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

J . LaRUe
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From: Roderick Bond

Fax: (425) 321-0343

To: +12083458740

Fax: + 12083458740

e
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NO.•Uo
P.M._..
A.M.----

MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY, ISB No. 3558
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado St.
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
Tel: (208) 557-5203
Fax: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com
RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, WA 98004
Tel: (425) 591-6903
Fax: (425) 321-0343
Email: rod@roderickbond.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868
Plaintiff,
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
OF RODERICK C. BOND

v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Robert M.
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING,
TURNBOW & McKLVEEN, CHARTERED,
an Idaho corporation;
Defendants.
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i: Roderick Bond

Fax: (425) 321-0343

STATE OF WASHINGTON
COUNTY OF KING

To: +12083458740

Fax: +12083458740

e
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)
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I, Roderick C. Bond, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in court, one of the

attorneys for the plaintiff in this matter, and make this Affidavit upon my personal knowledge.
2.

Attached as Exhibit R is a true and co1Tect copy of an email that I sent to Jack

Gjording and Jim LaRue on May 26, 2010. This email was sent after the finding of illegality and
after the defendants moved to stay this lawsuit afler this Court's May 10, 2010 decision finding
that they owed a duty to Reed Taylor. I never received a response by email or otherwise from
Mr. Gjording or Mr. LaRue regarding Exhibit R. At that time, we still did not know whether all
documents had been produced in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al. or whether Mr. Riley or Mr.
Turnbow would reveal some other basis for their opinions or whether they would produce
shareholder resolutions or other documents at their depositions. It was not until that Mr. Riley
was deposed in March of 2012 that we first learned the basis for his opinions and that we fust
definitively learned shareholder approval had not been obtained to invade capital surplus. Prior
to that deposition, we did not conclusively know what the shareholders voted on at the meetings
held at Mr. Riley's offices for the redemption.
3.

Attached as Exhibit S is a true and correct copy of an email dated September 10,

2011 that I sent to Mr. Gjording and Mr. LaRue after the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the
finding of illegality-I was again requesting that documents be produced if they had them in

their possession. This email also contained discussions of settlement, which I have redacted. Of
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From: Roderick Bond

Fax: (425) 321-0343

To: +12083458740

Fax: +12083458740
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5 of 5 9/1112012 12:07

course, even to this response, neither of them revealed any of the factual or legal analysis
purportedly conducted by Mr. Riley to support the opinions-the same "fair value" and other
analysis that he and his firm never disclosed to Reed Taylor prior to when they were first
disclosed to us at his deposition in March 2012 (including during Taylor v. AJA Services). Even
as of that date, Reed Taylor and I still believed that Riley could be holding back documents or
facts. As described above and in our Memorandums in Opposition to the Defendants' Motions
for Summary Judgment, Mr. Riley and the other defendants were holding back and concealing
factual and legal analysis relating to the legality of the redemption. We always believed that
documents and information were being withheld. We were correct. In addition, until Judge
Brodie held that the Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal on June 17, 2009, we had no facts
to support the proximate cause element of negligence to pursue that claim until that decision was
rendered by Judge Brudie. Until Judge Brudie determined that the Stock Redemption Agreement
was both illegal and unenforceable, we could not pursue claims of negligence. This is consistent
with the Memorandums filed by both Mr. Riley and Eberle Berlin in 2010 in support of their
Motions to Stay wherein they assert that the issue of whether the redemption was legal or not
was undecided and therefore whether the opinions in the Opinion Letter were correct or not was
also undecided. If the defendants' arguments applied on appeal, they should apply even more
before Judge Brudie ruled the redemption was illegal on June 17, 2009.
4.

Attached as Exhibit Tis a true and correct copy of the January 30, 2012 hearing

transcript for the hearing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. This is the hearing at
which Jack Gjording stated that Reed Taylor had malpractice claims going to trial. In addition,

2nd
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Fronr. Roderlck
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·....•. F11X:(425) 321-0343

To: +12083458740

Mr. LaRue did not object

Fax: +12083458740 ·.

e
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or speak against Mr. Gjording's statements that Reed Taylor hll.<i

malpractice claims going to trial. On page 57, Mr. Gjording stated "I think under the
gateskeeping responsibility that you have, you're certainly within your rights and within the law·

·t9 simply take that one cause of action against them. The negligence case stay." These transcripts
contain the statements that Mike Gaffney and I relied upon. In fact, on page 4 7, Mr. LaRue even
sta1ed that "a negligence case is probably never going to be

,.,...

... .!\'''"\\\\\11111..,,,,,,
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before you again~"
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 11th day of September, 2012, I caused to be
served, pursuant to agreement of the parties, true and correct copies of the foregoing documentto
the following parties via email and U.S. Mail, postage prepaid:
.
· ··
.
Jack S. Gjording
Julianne S. Hall
Gjording & Fouser, PLLC
509 W. Hays St.
Boise, ID 83701

2nd

James D. LaRue
I ,oren C. Ipsen
Elam & Burke, PA
·251 East Front St.
Boise, ID 83704
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•
Roderick Bond
Roderick C. Bond [rbond@cbklawyers.com]
Wednesday, May 26, 2010 3:20 PM
'James D. LaRue'; 'Jack Gjording'
Taylor v. Riley, et al.

From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:

Jim and Jack:
I am cognizant of the fact of Judge Greenwood's ruling for Hawley Troxell and the dismissal of
certain other claims. I am going to revise the proposed amended complaint to reflect the
ruling, although it may not be until Tuesday at the latest that I can get it filed. Please do not
waste anyone's time and money responding to those claims as I will get the revised proposed
complaint filed to reflect Judge Greenwood's recent ruling. I would also agree to extend the
time for your response should the revised proposed amended complaint not be filed by
Tuesday. If this arrangement is not acceptable to you both, please let me know.
Also, this email confirms that you both refused to have a discovery conference. Therefore, I
will be moving to compel depositions, responses to written discovery, and general discovery.
will also be asking for sanctions.
Finally, since both of your positions are that this action should be stayed, which we
vehemently disagree (particularly since Reed Taylor has incurred substantial damages which
are distinct to your clients), I would appreciate seeing an affidavit from Riley, Turnbow and
Eberle Berlin's agent stating exactly what their position is with respect to the legality of the
redemption. Also, it appears that Reed has a buyer for his airplane, and unfortunately Reed
will be selling his airplane for less than its fair value based him needing to sell I and this will
result in additional damages to your clients. I anticipate the additional damages to be in the
neighborhood of $600,000 +/-(and of course this is but one of many damage components).
Roderick C. Bond

CIK I LAWYIRS
c.11MPBELL. tls~•ii. &

1¢1~,,. 1 v1.1.c

7 S. Howard Street, Ste. 416
Spokane, WA 99201
P. 509.455.7100
F. 509.455.7U J
WWW .CBKLA WYERS.COM
This email and any attachments may be allorncy-client privileged, protected as attorney work product, amlior suhjct·t to any other
applicable privileges. The unauthorized viewing or dissimination of any email or attachment is prohibited. In any event, hy reviewing
andior receiving this email nnd any attat•hmcnts, you irrevocably consent to he bound by a chrn-hm·k agreement to protect this email and
any attad1ed files wherein )'OU agree to not to disscminak any of this inform:1tio11, to keep all information t·onfidcntial, and to return all
email and attachments to the above sender if you are not an intended rcdpicnL
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Roderick Bond
From:
Sent:
To:

Roderick C. Bond [rbond@campbell-bissell.com]
Saturday, September 10, 2011 2:35 PM
'James LaRue'; 'Jack Gjording'

Jim and Jack:
Also, if any of your clients have documents in his/its possession that were never produced in
the underlying litigation (as I had requested long before the summary judgment hearing
finding the illegality), then it goes without saying that you should voluntarily produce those
documents (i.e., any shareholder resolutions, etc.) as we could still attempt to change the
outcome by seeking relief from the judgment.

Roderick C. Bond

Cll LAWYER,S
CAMf'IH:lt. ft,

~ISSfll

I PU.C

P. 509.455.7100
.F. 509.455. 7111
WWW.CAMPllELL-BISSELL.COM

This email and any allachments may he attorn{·y-client prh'ileged, protected as attorney work product, and!or subjed lo any other
applicable privileges. The unauthorized viewing or dissemination of any email or attachment is prohibited. In any event, by reviewing
and/or receiving this email and any attal'hmcnts, you itTC\·Ol'ably consent to be bound by a claw-hal'k agreement to protect this email and
any attached files wherein you agree to not to dissl'minate any of this information, to keep all information confidential, and Lo return all
emu ii and attachments to the above sender if you are not an intended redpienl.

Exhibit - S - Page 002535
-1

3
BOISE, IDAHO

2

DIS'l'RICT COtrRT Oi' '1'BE l'OtrRTB JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND l'OR THE COON'TY Oi' ADA
Case No.

CVOC-2009-18868

4

REED J. TAYLOR,

9
1O

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. GAFFNEY:

6

MR. GJORDING:

7

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an
Idaho li..rai ted liability partnership;
ROBERT N. TURNBOW, an individual ; and :
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, 'l'tJRHBOW '
MeKLVEEH, CHARTERED , an Idaho
corpora ti on

THE COURT:

Good afternoon, Your Honor.
Good afternoon, Judge.

Let's start -- we're here on

8

Taylor versus Riley.

9

roll for the benefit of the record.

10
11

Good afternoon, everyone.

individual,

Plaintit't',

7

Monday, January 30, 2012, 3:02 p.m.

3

Let's start by taking the

Mr. Gjordlng, do you want to start off?

Det'endanta.

11

12
13
14

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF BEARING MONDAY, JANUARY 30, 2012

15

Yes.

Jack Gjording for the

12

defendant, Robert M. Turnbow, and Eberle, Berlin,

13

Kading, Turnbow & MCKiveen, Chartered.

14

Bet'ore Th8 Honorable Richard D. Greel'\wood
District Court JUdqe

16

MR. GJORDING:

MR. LaRUE:

Jim LaRue for Mr. Riley.

15

MR. GAFFNEY:

16

THE COURT:

Mike Gaffney for Reed Taylor.

17

18

17

19

Welcome to my courtroom,

Mr. Gaffney.

20

18

MR. GAFFNEY:

21

19

MR. BOND:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. BOND:

22

bported by
i'rancea J. Norris
CSR No. 696

23
24

22

25

23

COPY

24

Thanks, Judge.

And Roderick Bond.
Mr. Bond, welcome back.
Thank you, Your Honor. Good to

see you.
THE COURT:

Do you have a particular order

in which you wish to argue these motions?

25

Mr. La Rue, you want to start off?

2

4

FOR PLAINTIFF TAYLOR

2

3
4
5
6

7
8

9
10

And as a preliminary matter, let me say

MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495
Phone: (208) 557-5203
Fax: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclalr.com
-andRODERICK C. BOND
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, Washington 98004
Phone: (425) 591-6903
Fax: (425) 462-5638
Email: rod@roderickbond.com

2

that the -- one of the questions that I have for

3

counsel today, not necessarily Mr. LaRue, how is

4

it with these two motions the two parties, two

5

defendants, are set up differently situated

6

legally?

7
8

9
10

MR. La RUE:

I want to make sure I understand

the question.
THE COURT:

They are both partners in the

same firm being sued for the same thing.

11

11
12

12

13
14
15

16

JACKS. GJORDING
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
PO Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Phone: (208) 336-9777
Fax: (208) 336-9177
E-Mail Address: jgjording@fida ho law .com

17
FOR DEFENDANT RILEY

18

19

20
21

MR. LaRUE:

Yes.

FOR DEFENDANTS TURNBOW & EBERLE BERLIN LAW FIRM

JAMES D. LARUE
ELAM & BURKE, PA
PO Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Phone: (208) 343-5454
Fax: (208) 384-5844
E-Mail Address: jdl@elamburke.com

THE COURT:

So how are their circumstances

13

differently -- how do I rule differently on a

14

motion for Mr. Taylor -- I'm sorry.

Not

15

Mr. Taylor -- but for Mr. Riley and not do the

16

equivalent on a motion for Mr. Turnbow and vice

17

versa other than Mr. Turnbow I understand is now

18

deceased.

19

changed.

20

But the legal positions have not

MR. LaRUE:

I would guess I would start

21

by -- I think I understand your question.

22

22

grant the summary judgment on the basis that

If you

23

23

Mr. Riley has sought the summary judgment on, I

24

24

think the equivalent ruling would apply to

25

1 of 20 sheets
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7

5
1 Mr. Gjording's clients.
"2
Likewise I think if you grant the
3 summary judgment presented by Eberle, it would
4 equally apply to Mr. Riley.
THE COURT: I'll hear you, Mr. LaRue, on
5
6 your motion.
MR. LaRLIE: Thank you.
7
8
May it please the court, on behalf of
9 Mr. Riley we are seeking a motion or a partial
10 summary judgment on the claim of fraud and
11 constructive fraud only. As I read the court's
12 last opinion, a negligence claim remains and is
13 not the subject of this motion.
14
Since we last gathered and discussed
15 this case in September 2010, the Idaho Supreme
16 Court issued its decision in Taylor versus Hawley
17 and Riley and affirmed the 12(b)(6) dismissal by
18 Judge Brudie of all claims against Riley.
19
In September 2011 the Idaho Supreme
20 Court entered its decision affirming Judge
21 Brudie's decision in Taylor versus AIA not only
22 that the 1995 or the stock redemption agreement
23 was unenforceable, but also affirmed Judge
24 Brudie's ruling that the related claim to
25 Mr. Riley was fraudulently induced to enter into

1
2
3
4
5

6 was legal.
7
And he also appealed from the finding
8 of the district court that the opinion letter did
9 not prevent -- excuse me -- did not provide
10 factual misrepresentation for mixed questions of
11 law and fact.
On the first of those two issues that
12
13 he was justifiably ignorant, the Supreme Court
14 stated, "Nothing suggests that Taylor, as
15 CEO/chairman of the board and majority shareholder
16 was justifiably ignorant as to the circumstances
17 causing the illegality of the insufficient earned
18 surplus in absence of shareholder vote explicitly
19 authorizing use of capital surplus."
20
They then quoted from Judge Brudie with
21 regard to his considerations that Mr. Taylor was
22 uninformed as to the financial condition, couldn't
23 possibly have understood that earned surplus was
24 inadequate and then agreed that Mr. Tay -- with
25

the agreement by virtue of the 1995 opinion
letter. It was also dismissed by the Supreme
Court, or Judge Brudie's decision was affirmed.
I am here on two related but kind of
separate parts of the same motion. The first
deals with AIA, Taylor versus AIA. In that case I
believe the collateral estoppel prevents the
re-litigation of the issues which were actually
litigated in that case between Mr. Taylor, AIA,
and AIA's agent, Mr. Riley.
Second I believe that res judicata
prevents the continuation of the fraud and
constructive fraud claims based on application of
res judicata on the Supreme Court's affirmation of
the dismissal of the Taylor versus Riley claim.
A small amount of background: In
Taylor versus AIA, the claims made by Mr. Taylor
included a couple that I think are important here.
First he claims that he was justifiably ignorant
and an innocent party and/or not in pari delicto
and consequently the illegality should not be
enforced against him.
Second he claimed that the fraud
exception to illegality applied because he was
fraudulently induced to participate into or

09/11/2012 12:02:49 PM

the judge, with District Judge Brudie, that

8

6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

entered into the redemption agreement based upon a
1995 opinion letter authored by Eberle which
Mr. Riley was then a part of the firm when Eberle
and Mr. Riley were acting as general counsel for
AIA and offered the opinion that the redemption

1 Mr. Taylor was not ignorant of the circumstances
2 of the basis for the finding of illegality. And I
3 think the importance of that finding goes to, if
4 we get to the elements of fraud, element 6 and 7,
5 that "here is ignorance" and the "here is
6 reliance."
7
The second issue that Mr. Taylor raised
8 before the Supreme Court was addressed by the
9 Idaho Supreme Court. They acknowledged that
10 establishing fraud requires a false statement of
11 fact. They acknowledge there may be exceptions
12 where the person making the statement has reason
13 to know that it's false. They then quoted from
14 Judge Brudie where he found that the opinion
15 letter was that; it was an opinion letter, it was
16 not a representation or a misrepresentation of
17 fact and affirmed the district judge's dismissal
18 of the fraud argument.
19
The restatement of judgments deals with
20 the situation where one party occupies a
21 relationship where one is vicariously liable for
22 acts of the other. Wherein actions brought
23 against one of them, the judgment in that action
24
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9
1
·, 2

11

transaction or series of transactions; that is a
judgment against Mr. Taylor for the alleged fraud

1
2

by Mr. Taylor in the argument which included that
he was fraudulently induced by the 1995 opinion

3

letter.

3

of AIA, that is the principal as a preclusive

4
5

effect from the same person bringing a fraud
action against AIA's agent or Mr. Riley.

6
7
8
9

An unsuccessful suit against the
principal bars a subsequent action against the
agent on the same transaction or series of
transactions. Here AIA could not have

10
11
12

fraudulently induced Mr. Taylor to do anything
except through the acts of its agents. Vicarious
liability for fraud may be imposed on the agent

13
14
15

only through -- excuse me -- the principal only
through the acts or omissions that followed that
principal's agents. And as a matter of law an

16
17
18
19

agent cannot be sued for fraud where the
principal -- or it has been established that the
principal did not commit fraud in the same
transaction.

20
21

So I believe that collateral estoppel
prevents the assertion that the -- or the

22
23

continuation of the fraud or constructive fraud
claim with the existence of the Supreme Court

24

decision in Taylor versus AIA. All five elements

25

of collateral estoppel are established.

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

They also affirmed Judge Brudie's
findings that nothing in the opinion letter was a
misrepresentation or even a statement of fact.
They agreed that Mr. Taylor was not uninformed and
was not justifiably ignorant of the facts of the
basis for the finding of illegality, and they
found that Mr. Taylor, though he may have alleged,
failed to prove fraud on behalf of anyone.
Another argument raised by Mr. Taylor
is that Mr. Riley is really not the agent of AIA
when he prepared the 1995 opinion letter which is
an issue I find rather interesting. The argument
is that while Taylor and Turnbow were agents of
Eberle and Eberle was the principal of Riley and
Turnbow. But they failed to take the next step,
well, if that's the case, who is Eberle's
principal? They have alleged that this opinion
letter was drafted by general counsel of AIA. As
a matter of law the agent and a relationship
between an agent and a client is one of agency -excuse me -- a lawyer and a client is one of
agency.

12

10
1
2
3
4

Mr. Taylor had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the claimed fraudulent inducement to
enter into the transaction based on the 1995
opinion letter. The alleged fraud predicated on

1
2
3
4
5
6

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

the opinion letter as the same issue as presented
here. The fraud issue was decided adversely to
Taylor. There is a final judgment on the merits
in AIA on the issue of fraud and the relationship
of the 1995 opinion. And Riley, one of AIA's
counsel and agent, when participating in the
creation of the 1995 opinion, was in privity with
AIA.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

In response to this, Mr. Taylor has
raised a few arguments. He starts by saying
nothing has changed. Mr. Riley really should have
moved for reconsideration. And there has been no
new basis for a finding or for the application of
collateral estoppel to the decision of the Idaho
Supreme Court. I believe that's entirely too
narrow of the reading of what the Idaho Supreme
Court did. It's true that in the decision they

22

did address and affirm the finding of Judge Brudie

23
24
25

that the redemption agreement was unenforceable,
but they went much further and addressed the other
issues raised by Mr. Riley -- excuse me -- raised

3 of 20 sheets

7
8
9
10

Riley was clearly acting on behalf of
AIA when he participated in the creation of the
redemption agreement documents and when he did his
part of the 1995 opinion letter.
They next argue that while Mr. Riley
had a limited representation with Mr. Taylor, he

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

was Mr. Taylor's lawyer. I think this court has
taken that issue off the table in its last
decision where it found there was no attorney
relationship between Riley and Taylor.
They next argue that, well, Taylor's
fraud claims in the AIA litigation are different
than his fraud claims here because there he was
only using fraud as a defense to the operation of
the finding of illegality. And here we are using
fraud as a element or a tool to seek damages.
Taylor has made the same allegations of

18
19
20
21

fraud in both cases. He's claimed that he was
fraudulently induced to enter into an agreement
based upon the 1995 opinion letter. That is a
common allegation. The Supreme Court has issued a

22
23
24
25

final decision that there was no fraudulent
inducement based upon the 1995 opinion. And the
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lity argument nd a
age9L11/

2 12:02:49 PM

002538

15

13
1
·, 2

sw?rd or as a tool to recover damages I believe is
a distinction without a difference.

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

The fraud claims here and the fraud
claims in AIA are all based on the same
allegation, are all based on the same transaction
or series of transactions. There is an allegation
in this case that Mr. Riley owes Mr. Taylor
damages because Mr. Taylor seeks them based on
fraud. Well, fraud has nine elements whether it's
used as shield or a sword. The fraud focus is on
the 1995 opinion letter. So I really think -THE COURT: What do you make of the claim
that there are nine or 12 -- I think it's 12 -separate factual statements that are erroneous in
the opinion letter that can be the basis of fraud?
MR. LaRUE: A couple of -- a couple of
responses to that, Your Honor. If Mr. Taylor were
to sue either AIA as the principal claiming that
any one of the 12 were fraudulent or was to sue
the author of the letter claiming damages that any
one of the 12 were fraud, I think res judicata
prevents 12 subsequent sequential lawsuits. I
think if you're going to tee it up, you tee it up.
It's like if I get involved in an
automobile accident, then I happen to notice that
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is correct. And I think that goes back to the
question you framed earlier; I guess I didn't pick
up on it. I apologize. With regard to this
argument -- this part of the argument, the res
judicata, it would apply I believe to Riley only
because of the defendants in this lawsuit, only
Mr. -- the remaining defendants in this lawsuit,
only Mr. Riley was a defendant there. There may
be some arguments that flow from a dismissal of
the fraud claim based on res judicata stemming
from the first lawsuit available to Eberle. I am
really not much in a position to address that.
THE COURT: Not your job.
MR. LaRUE: Yeah.
THE COURT: I am sorry to interrupt you. Go
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ahead.
MR. LaRUE: No. Thank you. The doctrine of
res judicata bars not only subsequent
re-litigation claims that were originally
litigated, or more importantly those that could
have been litigated.
In applying res judicata the Idaho
Supreme Court has used the transaction approach.
In this case the 1995 redemption agreement and the
1995 opinion letter are part of the same
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transaction. They are inseparable. The inquiry
for application for res judicata is whether the
claim made in the second action involved a right
arising out of the same transaction or series that
gave rise to the claims in the first place.
So we look to what was available to
Mr. Taylor when he filed Hawley Troxell No. 1.
What was he aware of? Was the claim available on
the 1995 opinion letter then that is being
asserted now?
The Hawley Troxell 1 lawsuit was filed
in August of 2008. Before that, in April of 2008,
Mr. Taylor became aware that Connie Taylor and
James Beck were challenging the enforceability of
the redemption agreement. Mr. Taylor also became
aware in April of 2008 that AIA had moved to amend
its answer to assert illegality.
In July of 2008 Mr. Taylor had his
attorneys write a derivative demand letter to the
boards of AIA Services and AIA Insurance
complaining about the actions of the attorneys who
were defending the defendants in the suit that he
had brought, but he included in that a complaint
that Mr. Riley had, in fact, provided an opinion

16

14
1 the person who ran into me ran a red light and was
2 speeding and texting, I can't sue him for running
3 the red light, lose that, and then sue him for
4 texting, lose that, and then finally sue him for
5 going too fast. I have to sue him for all the
6 claims that I have.
7
The next argument is that Taylor's
8 fraud claims here won't destroy or adversely
9 impact the judgements of the Supreme Court in
10 Taylor versus Hawley and Taylor versus AIA. And I
11 think allowing Taylor to re-litigate fraud or
12 constructive fraud would be at the very least
13 completely inconsistent with what the Supreme
14 Court said in Taylor versus AIA.
15
The second basis for summary judgment
16 is the application of res judicata to the
17 dismissal of the original suit against Mr. Riley.
18 There Mr. Taylor sued Mr. Riley for many things,
19 but at least one of the claims asserted in the
20 first amended complaint was for fraud and
21 constructive fraud.
22
THE COURT: Now, that was one place where he
23 and Mr. Turnbow differ. I don't think Mr. Turnbow
24 was sued in the initial litigation.
25
MR. LaRUE: He may not have been. I -- that
09/11/2012 12:02:49 PM
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positions being taken in April of 2008.
And in August of 2008, Mr. Taylor's
counsel e-mailed or wrote an e-mail to Hawley
Troxell which we have in the record threatening
suit irrespective of the finding of illegality.
The claims of fraud and constructive fraud that
are asserted here arose from the 1995 redemption
transaction or series of transactions which
include the 1995 opinion letter. And Taylor was
obligated to assert all legal theories he then had
against Riley in that suit where they are barred.
There are three elements that I believe
are filled for the application of res judicata.
The first element is the identity of parties,
while Mr. Riley is the same Mr. Riley in the first
and second lawsuit.
The second is the identity of subject
matter. In Hawley Troxell No. 1 it included the
redemption in the opinion letter. Paragraph 53 it
was alleged that Riley represented AIA and issued
an opinion letter as its agent and was now
asserting arguments counter to those stated in the
opinion letter. And in the first amended
complaint at paragraph 92, it specifically alleged
fraud against Riley relating to the -- his
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participation in the 1995 opinion letter.
So we have an identity of subject
matter or it's the same transaction or series of
transactions that are the subject of the fraud
claim in the first and now in this case.
And the only other element is finality
of judgment. And the Idaho Supreme Court noted
that Mr. Taylor had claimed in his complaints in
the underlying case to have sued Riley for both
fraud and constructive fraud. Consequently I
think the doctrine of res judicata bars not
only -- it bars the claims for fraud and
constructive fraud that are alleged here that were
or could have been alleged there.
Now, in response to this part of the
motion, the plaintiff has raised a few issues that
I would like to address. First they say Taylor's
fraud claims were based on different grounds in
Hawley Troxell No. 1. They say that the claim
against Riley for fraud was not right and that the
real focus of Hawley Troxell No. 1 was in the
2006, 2008 timeframe. And now we are looking
backward at 1995, so that's different.
Well, at that level of analysis, I
suppose it is different. But the point is, the

3
4

18
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1995 letter was the subject or could have been the
subject of a claim against Riley in the first
3 case. Taylor was aware that there was a claim of
4 illegality. Taylor was aware that AIA was
5 claiming illegality. Taylor was aware. In fact,
6 he -7
THE COURT: Well, could that have been a
8 compulsory claim back then? Is it something that
9 could have been permissibly joined? Wasn't Taylor
10 versus Hawley 1 really a complaint that, "You're
11 involved, representing" -- you know, "You used to
12 represent me, your firm did, Riley specifically,
13 and therefore you cannot represent this new party
14 against me"? Is that the same as claiming fraud
15 on the letter -16
MR. LaRUE: Well -17
THE COURT: -- or fraud arising out of the
18 letter?
19
MR. LaRUE: If -- if the letter is the
20 transaction or series of transactions, and you're
21 complaining about the representation of Hawley or
22 its attorneys of its clients relating to a 1995
23 redemption agreement, and you're claiming that you
24 signed that agreement because you were
25 fraudulently induced to do so by relying on a 1995
20
1 opinion letter that was part of the package, and
2 you know that someone is claiming illegality of
3 that document before you sue the lawyer. Res
4 judicata in its application says you have to not
5 only -- you can sue for whatever you want to sue
6 Riley for, but you have to join all claims then
7 available arising out of the same transaction.
THE COURT: You're saying this did,
8
9 basically?
MR. LaRUE: I can -- I cannot -- while the
10
11 centerpiece of the first case may have focused in
12 large part on the representation of AIA, the
13 transaction that is the subject is the redemption
14 agreement, how the redemption agreement was being
15 defended. And a part of the redemption agreement
16 was the opinion letter. It's inescapable that
17 they are the same transaction. It's been going
18 since 1995. 17 years this has been going on.
19 That doesn't make it separate transactions because
20 of the length of time or the passage of time.
21 What was available to Mr. Taylor and what res
22 judicata says, he has to bring or is barred from
23 later asserting all claims that are arise out of
24
That
s my question: Was the
25
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21
1 tra!1saction actually -- the transaction, meaning
2 the purchase of the stock and everything that went
3 into that, or was the transaction the subsequent
4 lawsuit where Hawley Troxell shows up adversely to
5 him admittedly related to that transaction? But
6 the transactions he was complaining about was
7 Hawley's and Riley's representation of the adverse
8 party in the lawsuit in '90 -9
MR. LaRUE: 2006.
10
THE COURT: -- 2006.
11
MR. LaRUE: What he was complaining of was
12 only a piece of res judicata.
13
THE COURT: Right. But then we are back to,
14 then, was that so much the same transaction that
15 you had to bring those claims at that time?
16
MR. LaRUE: Well, if he could have brought
17 the claims he has to bring them. If they are
18 related to the same -19
THE COURT: If they are related
20 transactions, you can bring any claim you have
21 against anyone in the same lawsuit even if they
22 are totally unrelated. But -23
MR. LaRUE: I disagree.
24
THE COURT: -- which is a different issue.
25 The issue here is, are they really so intertwined

23
1
MR. LaRUE: Taylor?
2
THE COURT: -- Taylor was raising in the
3 first lawsuit -- we'll call it the Hawley lawsuit
4 for ease of reference with all of these multitude
5 of lawsuits -- was that Taylor is suing his former
6 company and a number of the officials over the
7 note in 2006. And in the course of that he goes
8 in and attempts some self-help or something. And
9 I forget who sued who first.
10
MR. LaRUE: Taylor.
11
THE COURT: Taylor sued. And then Riley and
12 his firm -- new firm Hawley show up in that same
13 lawsuit -14
MR. LaRUE: Defending AIA.
15
THE COURT: -- defending AIA. What Riley is
16 complaining about is not necessarily the
17 transaction that was -- that led to the first
18 lawsuit between the party -- between those parties
19 to that contract, but the conduct in 2006 which is
20 incidentally relating to the drafting the opinion
21 letter, but it could have been a lawsuit about
22 anything.
23
MR. LaRUE: But I guess the point is that it
24 wasn't. It was a lawsuit filed by Taylor against
25 Hawley, Troxell, Riley, Babbitt, Ashby, McNichols

24

22
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

that they are required -- that they are covered.
MR. LaRUE: I think they were, yes. I don't
know how one can separate out the defense of a
1995 agreement when that agreement requires as one
of its parts the issuance and delivery of an
opinion letter and say that the opinion letter is
not related. The opinion letter is a part of the
transaction.
Have I answered your question, Your
9
10 Honor?
11
THE COURT: Well, yeah, I think so. I'm not
12 sure I am convinced, but I think so. Because I am
13 looking at it in terms of, I guess, the
14 transaction being the act of stepping in and
15 starting a lawsuit against a former client -16
MR. LaRUE: Well, we have -17
THE COURT: -- or defending a lawsuit.
18
MR. LaRUE: Okay. We have -- we have -- I
19 think we have determined that Riley was not
20 involved in a lawsuit with another client. Riley
21 didn't initiate it. Riley was a defendant.
22
THE COURT: I understand that. But the
23 transaction being -- the lawsuit was -- the
24 complaint that I understood Riley was raising in
25 the first -09/11/2012 12:02:49 PM

1 and the Brown McNichols firm complaining about how
2 those different attorneys were representing their
3 clients on the 1995 redemption agreement -4
THE COURT: Right.
MR. LaRUE: -- part of which is the 1995
5
6 opinion letter.
THE COURT: Well, the determination of the
7
8 lawsuit, to the extent it revolved around the
9 issue of the legality of that contract in the
10 separate proceeding.
11
MR. LaRUE: And in the first -- the amended
12 complaint at paragraph 92, Mr. Riley alleged that
13 Riley -- excuse me -- Mr. Taylor alleged that
14 Riley owed a special duty through the opinion
15 letter which invoked personal liability of Riley
16 because he authored the opinion letter and that
17 Taylor relied on the opinion letter and that Riley
18 breached duties and his actions constitute fraud.
19
THE COURT: That's the one Judge Brudie
20 declined.
21
MR. LaRUE: Pardon me?
THE COURT: That's the one -- that's the
22
23 amendment that Judge Brudie -24
MR. LaRUE: That is the first amended -25
ompl
t that Judge Br die
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denied -THE COURT: Denied.
MR. LaRUE: -- and the Supreme Court
affirmed the denial. And we have already supplied
the court what we began with, the case that res
judicata reaches to those claims -THE COURT: Right.
MR. LaRUE: -- as pied also.
THE COURT: I understand that.
MR. LaRUE: So the fraud claim either has
been pied or should have been pied. Either way
it's barred here.
THE COURT: I am going to cut you off so I
can give the other side -- unless you've got
something you really need to -MR. LaRUE: I can address some of the other
arguments after they are made.
THE COURT: Mr. Gaffney, Mr. Bond, who would
like to go first?
MR. GAFFNEY: I will, Your Honor. Thanks,
Your Honor.
The more I get into this case, the more
we are going to dub this in East Idaho the
not-enough-Boise-lawyers-to-go-around.
I'll try to --

1 fraud really wasn't even raised in that lawsuit.
2 That lawsuit had to do with -- it had to do
3 with -- the Supreme Court talked about the claims
4 in the 12(b)(6) affirming the 12(b)(6) dismissal
5 it was aiding and abetting the commission of a
6 tortious acts, conversion of corporate assets, a
7 violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act,
8 negligence, breach of fiduciary, but no fraud.
9
And I guess the point I am trying to
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

make is, No. 1, it was a 12(b)(6) denial -dismissal which was based upon the complaint as
written. There was a pending complaint to be
amended, but the judge denied that.
And so from my perspective, when the
Supreme Court looked at this and decided that the
dismissal on 12(b)(6) grounds was appropriate,
they concluded that the dismissal was appropriate
because it was barred by litigation privilege,
this idea that you can't sue a lawyer for an
adverse party, that they are basically immune.
There are insufficient facts relating to aiding
and abetting. The complaint was insufficient as a
matter of law, and most importantly, I believe,
the Supreme Court said that the claims were not

25

ripe.
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Now, I'm not sure how you can
adjudicate a claim that's not ripe. If it's not
ripe, it gets dismissed. It has to wait until the
claim, in fact, is ripe.
THE COURT: Which opinion are you reading
from?
MR. GAFFNEY: That would be -- that's the -that's the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion.
THE COURT: Right. In which -MR. GAFFNEY: Let me find the cite for you.
THE COURT: Taylor versus AIA or Taylor
versus -MR. GAFFNEY: No, that's Taylor versus
McNichols, Babbitt, et al.
So the point I'm trying to make here,
Your Honor, these guys are basically trying to
argue that that complaint against Mr. Riley was a
fraud claim which arose out of the opinion letter.
But that's not what the gist of that lawsuit was.
THE COURT: Well, okay. Here is a more
difficult issue for me is the first argument that
they make, and that is that the liability of the

28
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THE COURT: We have lots of them here.
MR. GAFFNEY: -- quickly go thro1,1gh our
perspective on this.
One of the things that strikes me as a
little bit odd regarding the Taylor versus
McNichols/Hawley case is, it would seem to me that
the negligence -- professional negligence claim
and the fraud claim are pretty much the same, but
yet the negligence claim in this case is still
alive related to the opinion letter.
THE COURT: That's because negligence and
fraud aren't the same thing. One of the things
that I thought I said in my first opinion, that
maybe I wasn't clear on, was that this is
liability that arises in negligence. But the
negligence doesn't arise from an attorney/client
relationship; it arises from a unique set of
circumstances that's developed in the legal world
with these opinions from the other guy's lawyer.
MR. GAFFNEY: Okay. What I meant by that,
Your Honor, is, in terms of -- there was a
professional negligence claim in the first
lawsuit, but it went to the relationship, not the
opinion letter. That's the point I'm trying to
make. So why isn't that res judicata because
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ab~olving

AIA of any fraud claim?
MR. GAFFNEY: Well, that's a good question
because -THE COURT: And if it does absolve AIA of
the fraud claim, as another way I read it, then I
don't see how you maintain a separate fraud claim
against the lawyer acting on behalf of his client.
MR. GAFFNEY: That's a good question. And
if you read the opinion, on page 18 they say, "We
affirm the district court" -THE COURT: Which headnote? And it's in
AIA?
MR. GAFFNEY: This is AIA. I am sorry.
I've got the slip opinion here.
THE COURT: And I've got a printout from
West, so I'd say you don't have the headnote
either.
MR. GAFFNEY: Yeah, it would be like 18.
MR. BOND: It's 18. Headnote 18 starting,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.
MR. GAFFNEY: The Supreme Court says, "We
affirm the district court in dismissing Reed
Taylor's fraud argument."
It doesn't say claim; it says argument.
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That's one point.
On appeal Reed Taylor merely states the
general proposition that an opinion can form the
basis for fraud when there is intent to mislead,
but he does not actually argue that anyone
intended to mislead him in the case and points to
nothing in the record suggesting that anyone had
such intent.
Now, at this point in time, of course,
we don't know if the Supreme Court is going to
uphold the illegality of this agreement. If you
go a few pages beyond that in the opinion -- it's
on page 28 of the slip opinion, it's Subsection
H -- the court says, "Upon finding the stock
redemption agreement to be illegal, the district
court issued a judgment dismissing six of Reed
Taylor's causes of action: Breach of contract,
misrepresentation/fraud, conversion, constructive
trust, specific performance, breach of implied
covenants of good faith and fair dealing.
"Taylor asserts that the motion for
partial summary judgment pertain only to the
finding of illegality and claims that the district
court abused its discretion in entering judgment
dismissing six of its causes of action without

09/11/2012 12:02:49 PM
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another hearing or motion. Taylor provides no
argument on this issue, cites no authority;
therefore, we will not consider this issue."
So here they are talking about an
affirmative fraud claim, and they are not
addressing it. So what we have got here is not
any affirmative claims for fraud. The Supreme
Court is saying, "We're not going to make any
decision whatsoever." But what we have got in the
decision is this affirmance of rejecting the
affirmative defense argument.
So I understand -THE COURT: So do you still have -- does
Taylor still have a viable fraud claim against
AIA?
MR. GAFFNEY: The way I read this, the
Supreme Court hasn't ruled on that.
THE COURT: Can Taylor go back and file -in your opinion, can he go back and file and
revive a lawsuit against AIA on the grounds of
fraud? That's the real issue.
MR. GAFFNEY: And I would say based upon
this decision, yes, because -THE COURT: Okay. But that's where I'm
having trouble seeing it.

MR. GAFFNEY: And I understand -1
2
THE COURT: I am not sure -- in fact, I'm
3 pretty sure the Supreme Court didn't read the
4 record in that case the way I read what part of
5 the record I had in the earlier decision. But
6 they are the Supreme Court, and so, you know,
7 reliance on my statement that there were factual
8 issues in the earlier case is probably
9 problematical at this point, it seems to me,
10 because the Supreme Court seems to say they
11 weren't.
That's towards another question that I
12
13 had written down for you -14
MR. GAFFNEY: There was another -15
THE COURT: -- that's sort of related, and
16 that is, the Supreme Court seems to be treating
17 that letter as one whole as a part -- as opposed
18 to parts.
19
MR. GAFFNEY: Right. And that's the next
20 point I wanted to make. And I understand your
21 conundrum because it does -- it is somewhat
22 conflicting. But the other thing is, they seem to
23
24
25
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1 it's a real generic statement and -,2
THE COURT: It would have been nice if they
3 had had our case in mind, this, my case that I
4 have in mind when they wrote this opinion so they
5 could have been a little more clear on some of the
6 points. I will give that you part.
7
MR. GAFFNEY: Okay. And so at least I think
8 you understand that situation.
9
The next question is, is a lawyer that
10 does an opinion letter where the last paragraph of
11 the opinion letter states, "This opinion is
12 furnished by us solely for your benefit for use in
13 connection with the transaction documents in the
14 transaction contemplated thereby." That language
15 is directed towards Mr. Taylor, not towards AIA.
16 And so what you have got here is, whose agent are
17 they in this deal, at least for the opinion
18 letter. Are they acting as agent for AIA? Are
19 they acting as an agent for Mr. Taylor? What's
20 going on here? What they are trying to say
21 basically is they're akin to in-house general
22 counsel. They are an employee. And since, "You
23 can't sue us, once you find the employee not
24 negligent in the car wreck, you can't sue us, the
25 employer."
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couldn't be held liability under res judicata.
And the Ninth Circuit without any analysis just
basically said, "We affirm the district court's
holding that they could not be held liable under
those facts." They don't say precisely what the
relationship with the law firm was in this
so-called collusion.
So the point I'm trying to make here
is, what we have got is a kind of weird special
case of opinion letters because they expressly say
in that letter, "We are providing this solely for
your basis, Mr. Taylor." So who are they really
acting for? So there is that issue.
And, you know, I guess one of the
things I am curious -- and I understand your
position, and one of the first things I was going
to point out is, I'm not sure there was an
adjudication on fraud by the Supreme Court. I
know that the language says what it says, but it
just doesn't smack of an adjudication.
The other thing, going to the argument
that Taylor versus Hawley case acts as res
judicata, in that case I clearly don't think there
was any kind of adjudication of fraud as to the
opinion letter.

36

34
1
THE COURT: Right.
MR. GAFFNEY: And in an attorney/client
2
3 situation, they go through all of these cases only
4 one of which actually talks about the
5 attorney/client relationship kind of similar to
6 this. And that was the Ninth Circuit case, if I
7 can find it in my notes.
THE COURT: Talking about the brief on -8
9
MR. GAFFNEY: Yeah, it's cited in their
10 brief. Where was that case. I apologize.
11
THE COURT: Well, regardless of -12
MR. GAFFNEY: Anyway, there is only -- there
13 is only one case that they cite that, from my
14 perspective, really touches on that issue. And it
15 was a Ninth Circuit case. But all these other
16 cases deal with -- I don't want to use the term
17 garden variety employer/employee relationships
18 Here what you have got is an attorney.
19
Yeah, it's the Davis Wright (phonetic)
20 case where Davis Wright supposedly colluded with
21 one of their clients to lie on an insurance
22 application for the corporation. And that one
23 went to a verdict. And the court found that the
24 corporation was not liable for fraud. Davis
25 Wright moved for a declaratory judgment that they
9 of 20 sheets

THE COURT: What he's saying there is,
1
2 whether it was or wasn't, you should have raised
3 it. That's the other side. That's the issue,
4 preclusion as opposed to fact preclusion.
MR. GAFFNEY: That goes back to the Supreme
5
6 Court's observation that the claims in the
7 complaint that was filed were not ripe. I don't
8 think the fraud or negligence claims, based upon
9 this opinion letter -- that's where I'm getting at
10 the similarity between negligence and fraud in
11 this case -- neither of those cases were ripe
12 because the underlying facts supporting those
13 cases, i.e., the determination of illegality in
14 the Taylor case had not happened yet. There were
15 no damages. We didn't even know at that point in
16 time that Mr. Riley had committed malpractice or
17 had made misstatements in the letter because that
18 letter -- the significance of the letter was still
19 up in the air, so to speak.
20
So I think that's what the Supreme
21 Court is getting at in that case, that we have got
22 these two claims that are this case today.
23
24
25
ing this up, the real
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37
1 issue to me, looking at the collateral estoppel
·2 iss'ue with regard to the AIA case, is whether
3 Riley was, in fact, an agent in the sense of
4 vicarious liability vis-a-vis AIA. I think that's
5 what you're struggling with.
6
THE COURT: That's the -- well, that's the
7 issue.
8
MR. GAFFNEY: Yeah. And our position is,
9 because of the way this particular case lays out
10 with this opinion letter where they are actually
11 giving this letter to Mr. Taylor for his sole
12 benefit, and knowing that he's going to rely on
13 it, what exactly is that relationship?
14
So -- oh, and there was one other
15 point.
16
THE COURT: I'm not sure what it is, but I
17 know what I have decided what it is not; it is not
18 an attorney/client relationship -19
MR. GAFFNEY: Yeah, that's what you decided.
20
THE COURT: -- anymore than the beneficiary
21 to the will is the lawyer's client. They are not.
22 Under certain circumstances I believe they can
23 make a claim.
24
MR. GAFFNEY: There is one more point I'd
25 like to make on this issue, and then I'll sit

38
1 down. If you go back to the restatement Second of
2 Judgment, Section 26, there is an interesting
3 comment to that section that's called Consent To
4 or Acquiescence in Splitting. And the comment
5 says this: "Where the plaintiff is simultaneously
6 maintaining separate actions based upon parts of
7 the same claim and in neither action does the
8 defendant make the objection that another action
9 is pending based upon the same claim, judgment in
10 one of the actions does not preclude the plaintiff
11 from proceeding and obtaining judgment in the
12 other. The failure of the defendant to object to
13 the splitting the plaintiff's claim is effective
14 as an acquiescence in the splitting of the claim."
15
We have got Taylor versus the lawyers.
16 We have got Taylor versus AIA. They are arguing,
17 if I hear what they're arguing, is that Mr. Taylor
18 in Taylor versus the lawyers should have raised
19 this fraud issue as some kind of counter-claim,
20 compulsory or other. The point is, when we didn't
21 do it, they sat silent, and under this comment to
22 the restatement, that's an acquiescence. So they
23 can't then turn back and say, "Oh, now you're
24 barred by res judicata."
25
THE COURT: I'm not quite following you.
09/11/2012 12:02:49 PM
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You need to draw the lines a little closer, or
something. They have got a case pending with
Taylor versus AIA to which the lawyers are not
parties. But the lawyers are in privy with the
parties; and that's part of one argument, that
they are being in privy. Being the lawyers for
the parties, they are entitled to the benefit of
rulings on liability on the same issues. That's
the whole -- well, anyway, the respondeat superior
sort of thing you were talking about, the legation
of privilege. But the fact that the lawyers are
identified with their client, that's one issue.
But how are they acquiescing because when they do
get sued -MR. GAFFNEY: Because if I heard Mr. LaRue
correctly, what he was saying, if I understood him
correctly, in Taylor versus McNichols and Hawley,
we were aware that we had these potential fraud
claims based on this letter. We should have
brought them in that lawsuit. But they never
raised that as an issue in that lawsuit.
THE COURT: I don't think -- how do they
have to?
MR. GAFFNEY: Well, the comment of the
restatement says they have to in some fashion.

40
1
THE COURT: Well, they're squawking about it
2 in this lawsuit.
MR. GAFFNEY: Well, but that's too late
3
4 because they should have -5
THE COURT: Why is it too late? Where does
6 it happen that we've got -- we have got to have
7 the two lawsuits over the same issue pending
8 first. This was the second one on the same issue
9 is the way that I understand it.
10
Maybe I'm missing something. Was there
11 another lawsuit out there that I'm not -- to which
12 these parties -- where the lawyers were parties?
13
MR. GAFFNEY: No, but it's this language
14 where you've got in essence -- well, I guess
15 you've got three lawsuits. You've got the AIA
16 lawsuit, you've got the McNichols lawsuit, and
17 you've got the Hawley lawsuit. In none of those
18 lawsuits did they suggest that we needed to raise
19 this compulsory or other counterclaim for fraud.
20 And the way I read this comment is, since they
21 didn't do that, they didn't object, there is an
22 acquiescence there. I mean, if they think we
23 should have raised fraud as a compulsory
24
where are the supposed to
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object? In the Hawley case before this case is
brought? That doesn't make logical sense to me.
If I get sued and somebody has got a number of
potential claims against me and decide to pick a
couple of them and not the others for whatever
reason, and that lawsuit is going or terminated
and I win, then they go pick a different issue out
of the same transaction and decide to sue, I can't
then complain in the second lawsuit because I
didn't forcibly bring that other claim in the
first lawsuit? That's sort of the argument I'm
hearing from you.
MR. GAFFNEY: That's the way I read the
comment because -THE COURT: Well, then I don't agree with
the comment because that doesn't make logical
sense to me.
MR. GAFFNEY: I think as far as the Taylor
versus Hawley case goes, the real point I want to
make here, Your Honor, is this issue of no
adjudication of fraud related to the opinion
letter. That was never even an issue in the case.
And because there was no adjudication, I'm not
sure how that case -THE COURT: You're saying it was not an

43
MR. LaRUE: I will limit my comments to
response.
If I understand the argument, in the
4 AIA litigation, because there were remaining
5 claims not addressed by the Supreme Court, there
6 may still be claims available, was a discourse
7 that you and counsel had. The claims that were
8 raised in Hawley Troxell -- excuse me -- in Riley
9 versus AIA were the subject of the judge's 54(b)
10 certificate. The Idaho Supreme Court doesn't like
11 to give advisory opinions. The remaining claims,
12 I understand, after it went back to Judge Brudie
13 had been dismissed.
14
THE COURT: I don't know. Not in my record.
15
MR. LaRUE: I don't have that. If it's
16 important to the court's ruling on this motion, I
17 will -- I will supplement the record with it. I
18 am just advising that, as I understand, Mr. Taylor
19 cannot now sue AIA for fraud -- it's over. It's
20 done -- relating to being induced to enter into
21 the redemption agreement for -- because of the
22 fraudulent opinion -- claim of the fraudulent
23 opinion letter. If he can't sue AIA, he can't sue
24 Riley.
25
THE COURT: Right. I understand the point.
1
2
3
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issue in that case.
MR. GAFFNEY: Right.
THE COURT: It was not arising from the same
transaction. Again, it's very easy to confuse.
And I get confused all the time between claim
preclusion and issue preclusion.
MR. GAFFNEY: It's historically very remote
if it is related because they are being sued for
conduct in '06, some of which arises way back.
THE COURT: So was AIA being sued for
conduct in '06, failure to pay? And yet it all
goes back to '95 as well. So the remoteness in
time alone is an issue that's part of the same
transaction.
But I get your point. I mean, it was
the same one -- I think it was the same point that
I was quizzing Mr. LaRue about.
MR. GAFFNEY: Yeah, I mean, I think this is
a fairly discrete transaction. We are providing
an opinion letter attendant to a sale here.
THE COURT: I want to give Mr. LaRue, if we
can, five minutes to respond.
MR. GAFFNEY: Sure.
THE COURT: And then we will move to
Mr. Gjording's motion.

44
I'm not unclear on this.
MR. LaRUE: On the res judicata issue -- now
I am dealing with Riley versus Hawley Troxell -just a couple of quick comments. It's been -counsel read from the Idaho Supreme Court case on
the ripeness issue. In the ripeness issue in
Hawley Troxell 1, as I read it, deals with the
discrete issue of when can you sue your
9 adversary's lawyers for how they are representing
10 your adversary. That's what the ripeness issue
11 is.
12
In this case in their opposition to the
13 motions for summary judgment, they raised
14 ripeness. They said that Taylor's fraud claims
15 relating to the opinion letter didn't accrue until
16 after the dismissal. They say that Taylor had no
17 damages, so he -- the claim was not ripe. They
18 also argued that the fraud claims weren't ripe
19 because they were premature.
20
This court has already answered some of
21 those questions.
22
THE COURT: On the statute of limitations
23 decision.
24
MR. LaRUE: You decided that the -- one of
1
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cause of action for fraud to when does the statute
ot'limitations begin. They started by saying, "We
didn't know what statute would render the
redemption illegal until after we heard from Judge
Brudie."
Interestingly on July 17, 2008, a month
before Hawley Troxell was sued, counsel for Riley
filed a memo for Judge Brudie pointing out the
right statute.
Also, this court has said there was -the statute of limitations for fraud began in
April 2008 because there was damage; this claim
was not unripe. This claim was ripe.
THE COURT: That was in the context of
those -- to some extent almost impenetrable
decisions on statute of limitations and when does
damage occur.
MR. LaRUE: Yes.
THE COURT: But the same issue, I guess, is,
when is it ripe.
MR. LaRUE: I am just suggesting that this
court's decision in May has resolved many of the
issues raised by Mr. Bond in opposition to this
motion.
Thank you, Your Honor.

1 defendant in this case, my client, is a law firm,
2 as Mike would say, a Boise law firm, and a Boise
3 lawyer who is dead.
4
The case -- the case that I am asking
5 you to address today, the fraud case, revolves
6 around actions and perhaps failure to act that
7 took place over 16 years ago. This action here
8 today comes before you, and this action caused my
9 clients to become a defendant in this action after
10 this plaintiff pursued the people who owed him the
11 millions of dollars. And he isn't doing too well
12 or perhaps he's not doing too well. And I'm not
13 suggesting that this is an afterthought, but I'm
14 saying that this is context.
15
He comes to Boise; he sues my client,
16 he sues Mr. LaRue's client. He does so with a
17 more or less shotgun approach which I think is
18 perfectly fine. Some of the -- some of the causes
19 of action you have already taken care of. And
20 some of the actions are going to be -- perhaps
21 they are going to -- a negligence case is probably
22 never going to be addressed before you again.
23
And so I am here to address only this
24 fraud and constructive fraud case and the other
25 piece of context that I want to mention to you, as
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1
THE COURT: Mr. Gjording, it's your turn.
2
MR. GJORDING: I'll try to be brief, Your
3 Honor, because I think probably the issue on my
4 motion is a little more straightforward or it's a
5 little easier to follow than Mr. LaRue's or his
6 client Mr. Riley.
7
I want to say, first of all, Your
8 Honor, that I come here -- of course the issue is
9 academic in the sense that we are asking you to
10 determine the law and make a decision based on the
11 law. But I also want to provide to you the
12 context that I am coming here as a lawyer who has
13 defended lawyers in jury trials before, and I'm
14 looking down the road and picturing myself in
15 front of a jury with a law firm client. And so
16 there is a great deal of practical importance in
17 this motion as far as I am concerned as well.
18
I'm not going to go through the history
19 of this because I think you know the history.
20 Mr. LaRue has reminded you of the history that I
21 think is important. But in the interest of
22 providing you with context for the points that I
23 hope to make with you, I want to note that the
24 plaintiff in this case is an elderly man who
25 apparently has lost a lot of money. And the
09/11/2012 12:02:49 PM
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I said, is that I am looking at this issue here
today, this motion, with an eye on one of the
courtrooms in this building where I come in and
address the ladies and gentlemen of the jury on
behalf of a lawyer, a firm of lawyers.
Further context, Your Honor: I guess
the -- one of the things that impresses me about
having done this so long is, it's kind of like the
constitution. Our process really works quite
well. It's amazing how well it works, especially
when you take into consideration, Your Honor, that
our process involves allowing the parties to be
judged by their peers, which, you know, if you
didn't have a really good process, you could have
absolute chaos. And the reason we don't have
chaos is, if you boil it down to certain essential
elements, is that we keep very close tabs on what
we learn, the wisdom that we learn, apply logic to
the wisdom that we have learned, and we use
precedent and experience that we have gained in
the hundreds of years that we have been doing this
that allows us to adjudicate issues between human
beings in an orderly fashion. It never ceases to

12 of 20 sheets

002547

51

49
1
·2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

features of this process is you as a gatekeeper.
And I'm talking not only, Your Honor, about the
job that you've got to do on the fly when you're
asked under Rule 403 to balance and make a
decision as to what that jury gets to hear and
what they don't get to hear, and you do that with
all this wisdom and logic that you've learned
because you're trained.
Well, but what I am saying is that this
is part of this process that makes this work.
While I'm here asking you as a gatekeeper in a
different balancing context, and that is not only
do you decide what the jury is going to get to
hear in terms of evidence supporting the
plaintiff's case, but you as the gatekeeper get to
decide what kind of story gets to be told to the
jury.
And now I'm talking about causes of
actions and now I'm talking about fraud.
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. GJORDING: Okay? I want to address two
other -- two other aspects of our process that I
think are pretty good evidence of the
effectiveness of our system, and that is, not only
do we exercise and utilize wisdom and logic, there
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is some common sense. One of the common sense
concepts that we have in this process that the
plaintiff, of course, is interested in, is that
summary judgements are not favored. And we all
know about that. I think it's certainly an
appropriate attitude, if you will, if not law,
because if you -- if you toss a plaintiff out on a
motion for summary judgment under our law -- res
judicata, et cetera -- they are done. And so when
you're talking about a summary judgment, you have
to give the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt,
and I think that's a good concept.
On the other side of the scales that
you're being asked to balance, Your Honor, is that
it's one thing for a plaintiff to say -- point to
a defendant and say, "Mr. Defendant, you have made
a mistake, and I want to -- I want the jury to -I'm going to ask the jury to compensate me for the
damage that you have caused to me because of your
mistake in this case of professional negligence."
It's totally another thing, Your Honor,
for a plaintiff to come before a jury and say, "I
want you folks to compensate me for the mistake
that that defendant makes, and, oh, by the way, I
want you to compensate me because that defendant
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was fraudulent."
THE COURT: Lied to me.
MR. GJORDING: Right. And this is where I
get back to the idea of representing a lawyer in
front of a jury. I think it's kind of
coincidental and maybe ironic that Mr. Ellis is in
the courtroom today because -THE COURT: I'm not sure why he's here
because I don't have anything else in my calendar,
if he's waiting for a motion.
MR. GJORDING: Well, it's a busman's
holiday, Judge.
MR. ELLIS: I have no tie, Judge.
MR. GJORDING: One of the -- one of the
things that causes me to stand up here and talk to
you about this is a case I had with Mr. Ellis.
And I thought I had a lawyer who could double as
reverend at Sunday. That ain't the way the jury
looked at it.
Anyway, Your Honor, getting back to it,
just like there is an attitude towards being
careful in not tossing a plaintiff out without
giving them the benefit of the doubt, our law,
through its wisdom and logic, says, look, it's one
thing to accuse this defendant of a mistake, but
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it's totally another thing to say not only was he
mistaken, but he was guilty of fraud. And -THE COURT: For one thing that's why we put
a higher burden and tell the jury it's a higher
burden.
MR. GJORDING: Exactly. And that's totally
my point. Throughout -- and I think we have cited
cases that are almost a hundred years old -throughout the history of the law in this state,
unlike perhaps Illinois, it has always been that,
if you want to pursue this fraud idea in front of
a jury, you have to hit these elements. And the
element that I am here to address today is the one
that says that the plaintiff has to make a showing
to you here today that my clients were aware of
the falsity of the representations they are
making. I'm not even going to talk about whether
or not they were false or all of that. All I am
focusing on -THE COURT: I understand you're talking
about the knowledge.
MR. GJORDING: Yes, I am. And, Your Honor,
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1 benefit of the doubt on the summary judgment, but
, 2 it is likewise important and significantly logical
3 that you give the person who is being called a
4 liar the benefit of this long-standing law -- and
5 I'm pointing to this element of awareness of the
6 falsity.
7
8
9

THE COURT: Are you suggesting that the only
way that that could be proven is from the lips of
the accused?
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MR. GJORDING: No, I am not. No, I'm not.
But there has to be a showing. Counsel -plaintiffs have suggested to you through this Hoke
(phonetic) case out of Illinois that you can -you can do it by circumstantial evidence.
In Idaho I don't think you can do it by
showing circumstantial evidence unless you have
evidence, Your Honor. Not arguments, not
allegations.
THE COURT: Here is the problem I have got
Mr. Gjording, just to cut to the chase.
MR. GJORDING: Okay.
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THE COURT: At your request of Mr. Eberle in
this case, I prohibited any further discovery -MR. GJORDING: Right.
THE COURT: -- including the taking of your

55
1 is going to say, "Oh, yeah, I knew it was false
2 all along." I mean, the presumption is, if you
3 want to talk about presumption, is that they were
4 not going to get it from my client.
5
The other thing is, Your Honor, I am
6 hampered by your same ruling because now, if we go
7 to trial on fraud and I want to hang my hat on the
8 idea that they can't prove that my client was
9 aware that he was speaking falsely -10
THE COURT: But you joined in the request
11 that I stop discovery.
12
MR. GJORDING: I know that. And both of us,
13 I think, both the plaintiff and Mr. Turnbow and
14 his firm, Eberle, must rely on the law. And
15 that's what I am asking you to do as the
16 gatekeeper. I can -- I can understand how perhaps
17 you feel even a little guilty that you -18
THE COURT: Well, I don't feel guilty so
19 much as I feel that they ought to have an
20 opportunity to develop whatever evidence is
21 available, and I don't know what that is at this
22 stage.
23
MR. GJORDING: Okay, Your Honor. If
24 that's -25
THE COURT: And I am suggesting that perhaps
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client's deposition. Now your client is deceased.
MR. GJORDING: Right.
THE COURT: And now you're asking me to rule
on a record that does not include whatever
discovery they wanted to know, and I didn't
inquire too deeply into that at the time. I
looked at some of it. But you're asking me to
rule that they have no evidence and can't possibly
get any evidence while they are still to some
extent hampered by my earlier ruling.
So I'm going to tell you you have got a
hard -- at this juncture a pretty good mountain to
climb to get me to throw it out on lack of
evidence where I was the one that -- in part at
least, was responsible for them not out gathering
evidence.
I don't know whether the evidence is
there or not.
MR. GJORDING: Yeah. Well -THE COURT: That's my difficulty. And,
again, it's back to the sense of fairness you've
been arguing about.
MR. GJORDING: I understand that, Your
Honor. Of course plaintiffs point out that -- in
their brief that no reasonably intelligent lawyer
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your motion on these grounds is a little premature
at this point.
MR. GJORDING: Okay. And to that -THE COURT: I want to give you the
opportunity to respond to that.
MR. GJORDING: And I have a response to
that, Your Honor. I am entitled under the rules
to have the plaintiff come here today, either
through a 56(f) or at least in their brief say,
"Judge, we want to go to location A and B and C
because we think we can develop this and this and
this." And they didn't do one thing at all to
suggest to you that they have a shred, even, of an
idea. And so from my point of view they are kind
of flagging their nose a little bit at the law
because they have those -- they have those
opportunities to address this unfairness. And I
don't think I should be penalized because they
have chosen not to do it.
THE COURT: That they chose not to -MR. GJORDING: My point is, Your Honor, I
think the law is clear, and I think the state of
the record is clear.
The last thing I want to say is, I
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this plaintiff out of court against my
clients. I am simply asking Your Honor to take
away the cause of action that allows them to get
up in their opening statement and tell them, the
jury, that my people are fraudulent. I don't
think they are entitled to do that. I think under
the gatekeeping responsibility that you have,
you're certainly within your rights and within the
law to simply take that one cause of action
against them. The negligence case stays.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Mr. Bond or Mr. Gaffney?
MR. GAFFNEY: Thank you, Your Honor. I will
be really, really brief.
I do want to lodge an objection for the
record to the -- both the reply brief and the
argument of counsel for following reason:
It's my understanding under State
versus Rubbermaid the objection has to be made
now. As I read their brief, the argument was
because Mr. Turnbow is dead we can't prove element
4 of fraud, i.e., knowledge of falsity. It wasn't
that we haven't brought forward evidence at this
juncture of fraud; it's just simply that we
couldn't find that evidence because one of the
ki~k
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defendants was dead.
That obviously doesn't address the
other defendant, Mr. Riley. And I think the court
gets the idea that it's kind of difficult to come
forward with evidence when you haven't even done
the requisite discovery.
We have got the time set for the
depositions in this case for later this month.
Obviously if we don't meet our burden on fraud, we
don't go to a jury. But we at least need to get
there.
THE COURT: What's your objection to the
brief? You lost me there somewhere.
MR. GAFFNEY: Oh, that. The original brief
basically, as I read Section 1 was, because
Mr. Turnbow has died, these guys can't prove
element 4 of the fraud, i.e., his state of mind,
in essence. But now what he's arguing today is,
we haven't brought forward to you evidence of
fraud. Those are two completely different
arguments. And I want to make that distinction
because we didn't get the benefit of the second
argument until we read the reply brief.
So my only point is that obviously we
are in a conundrum here. And you hit the nail on

15 of 20 sheets

the head because we haven't been able to take
depos.
THE COURT: Why didn't you make a 16(f)
motion? Why didn't you just ask me for more time
today?
MR. GAFFNEY: To respond to this motion?
THE COURT: Right.
MR. GAFFNEY: Quite frankly, since we
haven't done any discovery, I thought the motion
was premature. And I assumed that, without -well, first of all, the argument that was made as
to Mr. Turnbow, his death, that would do no good
whatsoever. And that's -- that was the focus of
their brief, and that's what I am trying to say at
this point, Your Honor, is that it wasn't that we
haven't brought the evidence; it was that we
cannot bring the evidence. That's kind of a
what-if argument that I don't think we need to get
an enlargement of time for; it's simply, well, if
discovery proceeds, we may, we may not get that
evidence. That's the point I want to make.
The other thing they raised, and it was
very brief, that we can't -- there is not the
requisite relationship for us to pursue a
constructive fraud claim because there is no
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fiduciary relationship between Eberle Berlin and
Mr. Taylor. And counsel stated in their brief in
the constructive fraud section that in Idaho an
action for construction fraud only exists where
there is a fiduciary relationship. That's not the
law in Idaho. Sowards versus Rathbun which is a
2000 case demonstrates -- has three ways that you
can prove constructive fraud, one of which is, if
there is a fiduciary or similar relationship
between the parties and there is a non-disclosure
of a material fact.
In this particular case Mr. Riley was
Mr. Taylor's lawyer for four years prior to this
transaction, personal lawyer. He filed all the
UCC filings pursuant to this transaction. He had
him sign conflict of -- conflict waivers in order
to represent adverse parties in this. There was
clearly some kind of relationship there that could
be characterized as a quasi-fiduciary situation.
But I think at this point the real
point I want to make is, it's one thing to come to
court to argue motion A, i.e., they will never get
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Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Mr. Gjording?
MR. GJORDING: Well, Your Honor, again I
don't have to remind you I'm not seeking to throw
them out of court.
THE COURT: I understand that, but I will
tell you there is something to what he says
because I read your motion the first time, and I
looked at it and said, "The only way we can prove
this is if we get it from the lips of the
plaintiff -- the defendant. That why I asked you
that question, because when I read your initial
brief, I did not see it as challenging the
existence of evidence more as to the fact that in
Mr. Turnbow's absence that we wouldn't be able to
either develop the evidence or go forward with it.
So I may have misunderstood your brief,
but I had the same misunderstanding that the
plaintiff did.
MR. GJORDING: Well, Your Honor, perhaps
that was an unfortunate reference or perhaps too
much emphasis was put on the fact that Mr. Turnbow
had died. And I'll have to go back and read our
briefs again, Your Honor. But I thought we were

1
2

3 contemplates.
4
Lawyers on the other hand, and it's
5 perfectly legitimate in my view, use summary
6 judgment to do things like smoke out additional
7 evidence that they think might be there that isn't
8 showing up. They use it maybe to -- which also
9 serves the court as well, but to narrow the issues
10 or maybe make someone get more focused or even
11 just to get the attention of the opposing client
12 if they have got concerns about whether or not
13 everything is being passed on through the lawyer,
14 "We'll throw out a summary judgment motion and
15 hope he at least let's his client read briefs so
16 he hears what our side has."
So there are reasons for it that don't
17
18 necessarily get us to a decision on the merits.
So I'm not suggesting that the motion
19
20 is illegitimate. When I read this motion it kind
21 of says, you know, with the absence of Mr. Turnbow
22 they are not going to be able to meet their
23 burden. And it's sort the flavor I get through
24 the whole thing. It doesn't -- it says with
25 Mr. Turnbow's death, we now cannot do this or
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1 basing our motion on the Parker case and the
2 Johnson case which were decided in 1917. I
3 thought we were basing our motion on -- because I
4 think we said so -- Rule 56 which includes Rule
5 56(f) and indeed Rule 11. Everyone knows that
6 they are going to have to come forward and either
7 ask you for some time, which they could have done
8 a week ago. It isn't -- they aren't stuck in
9 place just because they got my reply.
10
11
12
13
14

I feel like I am a little bit -- it is
the situation because for the first time I
mentioned 56(f) in my reply, which I served on
them a week ago, that means that I am stuck with
it?
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THE COURT: I am just looking at this brief
that you read and what I took from it. And I will
tell you, people make summary judgment motions -I even issued a small opinion on this when I was
irritated as a lawyer about the legitimate reasons
for doing the summary judgment and the ones that I
perceive weren't.
From a judge's standpoint, now that I
have that perspective, a legitimate reason for
summary judgment is everybody has agreed we don't
have any dispute about what happened. They all
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know what happened; they just want the legal
effect of it. That's what -- that's what the rule
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cannot to that. We file an affidavit putting the
fact of his death into the record.
So I have some sympathy for them,
Mr. Gjording.
MR. GJORDING: Well, and I understand that,
Your Honor. And what I was trying to do in
telling you about this practical aspect that I
had -THE COURT: I'm not saying I'm prepared to
throw you out either at this point.
MR. GJORDING: Well, I was going to say, I
hope that -- would I have the opportunity to
refile this if they go ahead and do all the
discovery in the world because I don't think there
is any -THE COURT: That's kind of where I'm heading
if we get there because I have got some other
issues that I want to address, and that is,
frankly, the initial point in Mr. Riley's brief
that I think applies equally to both defendants -and I'm going to let plaintiff respond to this -I think that you -- whether we like it or you like
it or not -- now, I don't care one way or another,
but whether you like it or not the Supreme Court
d claim against AIA.
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1 W~ether they should have done that, whether they
· 2 meant to do that, maybe they didn't, but it's
3 certainly what I take from the opinions that they
4 issued in this case between the two -- that the
5 fraud claim against AIA is gone. And I'm of the
6 view that legally that means the fraud claim
7 against the lawyers representing AIA in the entire
8 transaction, notwithstanding they issued an
9 opinion letter to or for the benefit of the
10 opposing -- not the opposing -- the other side to
11 the transaction. I mean, that's -- that's a fact
12 of life in the commercial world that those things
13 get written. So that whether you want to label it
14 constructive fraud, actual fraud, the Supreme
15 Court said there was none. Or if there was, it
16 wasn't presented at a point where you would be
17 able to continue to present it. And that, to my
18 mind, works to the benefit of the lawyers because
19 they were clearly the lawyers for AIA in that
20 transaction. And if that's the case, that's why I
21 asked is there a distinction between Mr. Riley's
22 position and Mr. Turnbow's position because they
23 are both lawyers working on behalf of the same
24 client, the same transaction, signing the same
25 opinion letter that forms the basis of the claim.

1 The point is, I don't disagree with you there, but
2 the point is that argument didn't carry the day in
3 the Supreme Court.
4
MR. BOND: Right. But -5
THE COURT: They say -- and I agree with
6 Mr. LaRue's characterization, as much as it pains
7 me sometimes to agree with Mr. LaRue, but that
8 it's a -- now I forget what I was going to say.
9 But the Supreme Court has said it was not a -10 that the fraud was not proven, it should have
11 been -- I mean, that was raised and is gone.
12
MR. BOND: Okay, Your Honor.
13
THE COURT: And what I was going to say, you
14 did not have a fraud exception that let you out
15 from under the pari delicto rule that says that
16 you can enforce -- you have some rights left over
17 notwithstanding the illegality of the contract.
18 The fraud was used as a shield, was attempted to
19 be used as a shield in the AIA case that was
20 unsuccessful. But that shield turns into a sword
21 in the lawsuit against the lawyers, but it's the
22 same ...
23
MR. BOND: And this is what I want to assert
24 having been the lawyer that litigated that. And
25 believe me, I know what happened down there. It
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1
Response?
MR. BOND: Your Honor, first of all, you
2
3 have to look at the fifth amended complaint in the
4 AIA case. That was a fraud claim based upon the
5 transfer of assets out -6
THE COURT: I am past that. I am looking at
7 the Supreme Court opinion is what I am telling
8 you. And you may not agree with my interpretation
9 of it, but that's my interpretation.
10
MR. BOND: No, and I can't -- I am just
11 trying to give you the backdrop, okay? So then
12 fast forward, the illegality is determined. Okay.
13 At that point in time, yeah, we have this opinion
14 letter.
15
Now, the sole issue was, could we try
16 to persuade the Supreme Court to enforce that
17 opinion letter -- to use the opinion letter to
18 enforce the redemption. And first of all I would
19 argue that, if we didn't make that argument,
20 they'd be over here crying, "You didn't mitigate
21 damages. You could have got it enforced by our
22 fraud."
23
THE COURT: Well, regardless -24
MR. BOND: We had to try that argument.
25
THE COURT: You had to try that argument.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

was a claim asserted solely to enforce the
redemption. We could not have asserted, nor -- I
can tell you, nor was there ever any discussion to
sue AIA on an opinion letter that was drafted by
the attorneys.
THE COURT: I'm not suggesting there was.
MR. BOND: We couldn't have done that. We
couldn't have carried that claim. And -THE COURT: Well, I don't know about -- I
don't know if you couldn't, but I understand that
you did not sue AIA on the basis of fraud in the
opinion letter.
MR. BOND: And I would add, Your Honor -and I cite authority in our brief -- that when the
suit was filed, that's what you have to focus on,
Your Honor. He was a creditor. He was owed
eight-and-a-half, $9 million, okay?
Fast forward, the illegality comes in.
There is no duty -- there is no duty to amend a
complaint on an action that is already going to
bring in some new alternative form of relief. And
that's what they -- and I would just argue -THE COURT: That's the other side of
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I ~on't get there. That's the one that's more
difficult for me is that argument that it would
take you more time to sort out.
MR. BOND: Your Honor, to me this is -dealing with the collateral estoppel issue,
quickly, in order for Mr. LaRue's argument to be
correct, we would need Mr. Riley to put forth an
affidavit that says, "The scope of my
representation was to defraud Reed Taylor. My
client asked me to defraud Reed Taylor."
THE COURT: I disagree with you on the law
on that.
MR. BOND: Well, under the authority that we
cited, the Idaho cases and the Idaho statute talks
about the liability anyway. We couldn't -THE COURT: I guess to simplify this -- and
I may be over simplifying it. I will confess I'm
not the brightest bulb on the tree, but I do view
it just as simple and straightforward as the issue
on the driver of the car of the cab, that you get
to sue if you have got essentially the vicarious
liability because Riley and Turnbow were not in
this transaction on their own behalf. They are
only there because somebody is paying them for
them to be lawyers. If they are committing fraud,
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1 they are doing it on somebody else's behalf, not
2 their own. They've got nothing to gain out of if.
3 That's -- that's my point.
4
Mr. Gaffney, do you want to say
5 something? I will let you tag team.
6
MR. GAFFNEY: No, I don't want to be tag
7 teaming. The only thing I would note
8 procedurally, because sometimes I read the rules
9 mostly, but I don't know if there has been joinder
10 in the motion.
11
THE COURT: There hasn't. I will give
12 you -- and that's why I said I am raising this.
13 So if you want more time to address it, I will let
14 you have it, let you file a supplemental brief,
15 hopefully not 50 pages. But they did not join.
16 And that's one of the reasons I raise it early so
17 you can be thinking about it. And I will give you
18 the opportunity before I would make that ruling
19 binding on both parties.
20
But as far as I am concerned,
21 Mr. LaRue's client is correct. And if they are
22 similarly situated, how do I in good conscience
23 rule for one, not the other whether or not they
24 joined in it. For that issue -- and that's why
25 I'm saying, you've got time to look at it. And
09/11/2012 12:02:49 PM
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from my perspective, that issue looks like it's
identical for the two lawyers.
MR. GAFFNEY: Okay. Well -THE COURT: They are not the same issue when
it comes to the second part of -- the claim
preclusion because Mr. Riley was not a defendant
in this suit, the lawsuit.
MR. GAFFNEY: As long as you understand the
procedural nicety.
THE COURT: I understand the procedural
nicety. And I'll give you the opportunity to
distinguish them and convince me that I am wrong.
I guess if you want to throw in some substantive
law that says I'm wrong too, I will listen to that
as well.
MR. GAFFNEY: All right. Thanks.
THE COURT: You're entitled to argue against
both lawyers, not just one of them.
That's where I am on this motion. So
long as that remains my ruling, I'm just simply
not going to rule on the other collateral issue
rule. I don't need to. And second, I have to go
back and pull all that stuff out and look at the
record and read it again. And if I don't have to,
I don't want to. It's that simple. It's -- I
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1 remember how much fun it was the first time I went
2 through the collateral issues, estoppel issues in
3 this case. And I'm not deciding the way I am just
4 to avoid that war. I will do it if I have do, but
5 there is no point in doing something that doesn't
6 matter.
How long do you need to supplement?
7
MR. GAFFNEY: Ten days assuming they can -8
9
THE COURT: Well, it's your -- I mean, it's
10 your opportunity to reply to something brand new.
11
MR. GAFFNEY: Right.
12
THE COURT: I'm not suggesting that we have
13 all kinds of new briefs. And then if you -- as
14 I'm thinking about it, I may call for further
15 argument or I may not. I will see what the brief
16 says.
17
MR. GAFFNEY: And that would have been my
18 suggestion, ten days from whenever they file
19 joinder. If they never file the joinder -20
THE COURT: If they never file a joinder, do
21 you really think we're going to go to trial on it?
22 I mean, I understand the procedural niceties, but
23 there is practicality in me too. I've practiced
24
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•
So I assume, Mr. Gjording, it's not
going to take you long to file a joinder -MR. GJORDING: Sure.
THE COURT: -- is what I'm thinking. And
I'd appreciate it, Counsel, you've been sandbagged
to some extent here by the court, and it was not
my intention to do that. But I will give you the
chance to respond fairly.
MR. GAFFNEY: Ten days is fine.
THE COURT: All right. Anything further?
MR. GJORDING: No, sir.
MR. GAFFNEY: I do.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. GAFFNEY: We have never had a status
conference.
THE COURT: We need to get this set for -- I
thought we had one scheduled for -- didn't we?
Maybe not -- to pick a trial date. If we haven't,
we need to. The good news is that at least for
the moment I can get you to trial in six months,
probably, if you guys are available.
I am not going to do it today. I need
lawyers with their calendars, and I need my
calendar.
MR. LaRUE: Just a point of clarification,

75
1 of your ruling to the Eberle joinder.
2
THE COURT: Right. I made the ruling in
3 your case.
4
MR. LaRUE: Thank you.
5
THE COURT: But it's an interlocutory
6 ruling. If I come to the conclusion I am wrong on
7 the law on that one too, I have changed my mind
8 before. But that's where I am.
9
Anything further? And we will send out
10 a notice of the status conference. I typically do
11 those by telephone to pick a trial date. And
12 with -- are we going to have four lawyers involved
13 in that conversations? Who has got the telephone
14 equipment they can set a status conference? Whose
15 turn is it? Have we had one in this case yet? I
16 don't remember if we had one, but it -17
MR. BOND: We set one, but it was -18
THE COURT: It got vacated because of the
19 other stuff that was going on. So this will be
20 the defendant's turn to do one.
21
MR. GJORDING: Okay. So I will volunteer.
22
THE COURT: And if you would do that,
23 Mr. Gjording. And in this case I'd appreciate if
24 we'd go through a conference operator so we can
25 have everybody there including Mr. Gaffney,
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1 Your Honor.
2
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. LaRUE: I understand that Mr. Gjording
3
4 is going to be joining, and Mr. Gaffney or
5 Mr. Bond is going to be given ten days to respond.
6 Are you going to issue a written opinion or -7
THE COURT: Yes, unless for some reason I
8 want further argument on it.
MR. LaRUE: Thank you.
9
10
THE COURT: I think I understand the issue.
11
MR. LaRUE: Thank you. That's all I need.
12
THE COURT: Then if Mr. Gaffney succeeds in
13 muddying it, well -- and then -- no, upon his
14 brief I will consider it because I don't feel it
15 is fair for me make a ruling like that without
16 giving them an opportunity respond. And maybe
17 that gives them two bites of the same apple, but
18 that's the way it goes.
19
MR. LaRUE: But that's -- the joinder, as I
20 understand it, is somewhat limited to the
21 application -22
THE COURT: It is limited to the -23
MR. LaRUE: -- to Eberle.
24
THE COURT: It is -- pardon?
25
MR. LaRUE: It is limited to the application
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Mr. Bond. We'll do it by telephone. It's not on
the record. It's strictly to pick a trial date.
And that's my practice. I don't do anything
substantive. I don't do motions.
MR. GAFFNEY: I did have one more question.
In terms of appearing telephonically, are there
certain types of hearings that you want us here
physically versus -THE COURT: Telephonic hearings are a bit of
a problem in my court because, when they are on
the record, we have to do them in the courtroom,
and the phone doesn't ring into the courtroom.
But I do not like dispositive motions over the
phone. Summary judgment motions I like live
lawyers.
I have bent that rule or altered that
rule where I had someone who was, I don't know,
somewhere back east. Their wife was in the
hospital kind of thing. But for the most part, if
it's important enough to be a dispositive motion,
it ought to be important enough to demand the
presence of the lawyers.
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1 it.by phone. If I don't have to make more than
' ·2 one phone call out of the courthouse, because it
3 is a problem for me conferencing from my phone
4 here. That's why I'll make Mr. Gjording make the
5 phone call.
6
MR. GJORDING: And you're going to give -7
THE COURT: That's the help you can give to
8 me. I mean, it's not a hard and fast rule; it's
9 just that I prefer dispositive motions to be live.
10 And pro se's are always live.
11
MR. GJORDING: Are you going to give me
12 date, Your Honor?
13
THE CLERK: Do you want me to give it to
14 them now?
15
THE COURT: Has everybody got their
16 calendars with them?
17
Let's do a tentative date. Then if it
18 doesn't work, we will change it. This is just for
19 the scheduling conference.
20
MR. GJORDING: Okay. We'll get this date
21 and then -22
THE COURT: Then if it doesn't work,
23 somebody let my clerk know. We will give you a
24 new date.
25
MR. GJORDING: Yeah. If Mike and Rod and
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Jim would tell me right away if the date you're
going to give me isn't going work, then -MR. LaRUE: I will call you tomorrow as soon
as I know the date.
MR. GJORDING: Okay. Well, I think we are
going to get one.
(Discussion between clerk and court.)
THE COURT: Go ahead. March 5 at 4 o'clock.
MR. GAFFNEY: Your Honor, I am going to be
in Hawaii.
THE COURT: Well, that won't work, then.
MR. GJORDING: So we will all have to go
with him.
MR. LaRUE: Let's do it over there.
MR. GAFFNEY: I could probably do it
telephonically, but it would be like 4 o'clock in
the morning.
THE COURT: You can't get up at 4 o'clock in
the morning?
MR. GAFFNEY: I did this morning. It's not
the best day.
THE COURT: Pardon?
MR. GAFFNEY: The 5th is not the best day.
(Discussion between clerk and court.)
THE COURT: When are you going to be back?
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OCT 2 4 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

1

By MERSIHA TAYLOR

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT e;F

2

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

3
4

5
6

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

7

8

vs.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
RECONSIDERATION AND
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

9

10
11

12
13
14
15

Case No. CV-OC-2009-18868

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS &
HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership; ROBERT M. TURNBOW,
an individual; and EBERLE, BERLIN,
KADING, TURNBOW & McKLVEEN,
CHARTERED, an Idaho corporation,

16

Defendants.
17
18

I. BACKGROUNG AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
19

Before the Court is Defendant Richard Riley's ("Riley") Motion for Summary Judgment,
20

which Defendant Cummings (Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert M. Turnbow) and
21

Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered (hereinafter collectively "Eberle
22

Berlin") partially joined; Defendant Eberle Berlin's Third Motion for Summary Judgment;
23

Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, and Plaintiff's Motion to Pursue Alternative or
24

Additional Claims. The background of this case is set out in this Court's earlier decision dated
25

26

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND RECONSIDERATION AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION - PAGE.1
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1

May 7, 2010 (filed May 10, 2010) on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment this case an

2

abbreviated version of the facts follows. This case has its origins in 1995 in a Stock Redemption

3

Agreement between Reed Taylor ("Taylor") and AIA Services ("AIA") as where AIA agreed to

4

purchase all of Taylor's shares in the company for a $1.5 million down payment promissory

5

note, a $6 million promissory note due in 10 years, and other consideration. In the course of that

6

transaction Defendants Riley, Robert Turnbow ("Turnbow"), and their firm Eberle Berlin

7

represented AIA. Taylor was represented by separate counsel. Eberle Berlin is a party because it

a

was Riley and Turnbow' s firm at the time. There is no suggestion that the firm Eberle Berlin is

9

liable to Taylor for any reason apart from the acts of Riley and Turnbow. Defendants Riley and

10

Turnbow 1 signed an opinion letter issued on Eberle Berlin letterhead and addressed to Taylor.

11

The letter opines, in essence, that the transaction was legal and the documents constituted a valid,

12

binding obligation of AIA. The transaction closed in August 1995. AIA defaulted almost

13

immediately. Taylor and AIA entered into negotiations which resulted in a Stock Redemption

14

Restructure Agreement dated July 1, 1996. By its terms the restructure agreement superseded the

15

Stock Redemption Agreement. Under the restructure agreement the $6,000,000 note continued

16

in force. The Note matured on August 1, 2005. When the Note was not paid, Taylor filed suit in

17

Nez Perce County in January 2007 against AIA, its subsidiary AIA Insurance, and several

1a

officers, directors, and employees of AIA, together with their spouses. In the course of that

19

lawsuit, the stock redemption agreement was found by the trial court to be illegal. The ruling

20

was upheld on appeal. Taylor v. AJA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 52, 261 P.3d 829 (2011).

21

Meanwhile, Taylor sued Defendant Riley and his new firm, Hawley Troxell, along with

22

others, in Nez Perce County for activities undertaken by them in representing defendants in the

23
24

25
26

1

Defendant Turnbow is recently deceased and his estate is represented by Sharon
Cummings.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND RECONSIDERATION AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
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1

AIA case. That case was dismissed by the trial court and tlpheld on appeal. Taylor v. McNichols,

2

149 Idaho 826, 243 P.2d 642 (2010). In the present case, filed in October 2009, Taylor sued

3

Riley, Turnbow, Eberle Berlin, and Hawley Troxell. This Court issued partial summary

4

judgments in favor of defendants in May of 2010 and April 2012 which dismissed some of

5

Taylor's claims but allowed his negligence claim to remain.

6

On August 15, 2012 Riley filed the current motion for summary judgment based on the

7

arguments that plaintiff's negligence claim is barred by res judicata; plaintiff waived the current

8

claim when he signed the 1996 restructure agreement; plaintiff caused the current harm to

9

himself because he changed the facts on which the Opinion Letter was based when monies owed

10

to his former spouse were subordinated to the note; and under Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 2 Reed

11

Taylor lacks standing to sue Riley. Defendants Cummings and Eberle Berlin joined in this

12

motion and filed their own motion for summary judgment based on many of the same arguments.

13

Defendants also filed for reconsideration of this court's earlier decision that plaintiff was owed a

14

duty of due care by defendants when they authored the opinion letter. This motion is based on

15

the argument that subsequent cases citing Harrigfeld, stand for the proposition that outside the

16

estate context a lawyer owes no duty to one not a client. Consequently Defendants owed no duty

17

to Mr. Taylor. Defendants Cummings and Eberle Berlin also filed a third motion for summary

18

judgment based on the argument that the 1996 redemption restructure agreement supersedes the

19

1995 Agreement. They joined Riley's summary judgment motion based on res judicata and the

20

subordination between the plaintiff and his former spouse. In response to the Defendants'

21

motions, Mr. Taylor filed his opposition, motion to reconsider the decision on the accrual date of

22

his cause of action, and a motion to permit him to pursue alternative and/or additional claims

23

24

2

140 Idaho 134, (2004),

25
26
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1·

1

against the defendants. The hearing for all of these motions was held on September 13, 2012.

2

Taylor's motion to allow pursuit of alternative and/or additional claims was withdrawn at the

3

hearing. The theories and arguments of the defendant's motions overlap in many respects so

4

they will be treated together.

5

I. DISCUSSION
6

Any party may move for full or partial summary judgment during the pendency of the
7

case, with or without supporting affidavits. l.R.C.P. 56(a), (b). A party opposing summary
8

judgment may, but is not required to, file affidavits in opposition to summary judgment.
9

Supporting and opposing affidavits are to be made "on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
10

facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
11

competent to testify to the matters stated therein." l.R.C.P. 56(e).
12

Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
13

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
14

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." l.R.C.P 56(c). Disputed facts
15

should be construed in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be
16

drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Armstrong v. Farmers
17

Ins. Co. of Idaho, 147 Idaho 67, 69, 205 P.3d 1203. When a party moves for summary judgment
18

on an affirmative defense, the party asserting the defense bears the "burden of demonstrating the
19

absence of a genuine issue of fact material to ... [the] defense." Mason v. Tucker and Associates,
20

125 Idaho 429, 437, 871 P. 2d 846 (Ct. App. 1994).
21

22
23

24
25
26

1. Motions for Summary Judgment
a) Res Judicata
The doctrine of res judicata covers both claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue
preclusion (collateral estoppel). Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002).
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1

Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim or upon

2

claims "relating to the same cause of action ... which might have been made." Id. Issue.

3

preclusion protects litigants from litigating an identical issue with the same party or its privy.

4

Rodriguez v. Dep't of Corr., 136 Idaho 90, 92, 29 P.3d 401, 403 (2001). Riley urges that

s

Taylor's malpractice claim3 is barred under true res judicata - claim preclusion.

6

Claim preclusion entails three requirements to bar a subsequent action: (1) same parties

7

or their privies; (2) same claim; and (3) final judgment. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho

s

119, 124, 157 P.3d 613, 618 (2007); Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 804 P.2d

g

319 (1990). Same claim includes not only "the matters offered and received to defeat the claim,

10

but also as to 'every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit."' Ticor

11

Title Co. v. Stanion, at 126, 157 P.3d at 620 (citing Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch,

12

123 Idaho 434, 437, 849 P.2d 107, 110 (1993) (Magic Valley III). Thus, "when a valid, final

13

~. judgment is rendered in a proceeding, it extinguishes all claims arising out of the same

14

transaction or series of transactions out of which the cause of action arose." The transactional

1s

concept of a claim is broad and claim preclusion may apply even where there is not a substantial

16

overlap between the theories advanced in support of a claim, or in the evidence relating to those

17

theories .. "Whether a factual grouping constitutes a transaction is to be determined

10

pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time,

19

space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their

20

21

22
23
24

3

This Court and the parties refer, somewhat loosely, to the negligence claim that survives
as the "malpractice claim." Strictly speaking, the elements of attorney malpractice as outlined by
our Supreme Court require that the claimant prove the existence of an attorney-client relationship
in addition to the elements of an ordinary negligence action. Compare Jones v. Starnes, 150
Idaho 257, 245 P.3d 1009 (2011) with Lamb v. Manweiler, 129 Idaho 269, 923 P.2d 976 (1996).
In the present case this Court held the attorneys have a duty to plaintiff notwithstanding the lack
of attorney client relationship.

25
26
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1

treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage."

2

Section 24, Restatement (Second) of Torts as quoted in Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc. 119

3

Idaho 146, 150, 804 P.2d 319, 323 (1990).
In the current case, Defendants assert that the malpractice claim should have, and could

4
5

have, been brought in August of 2008 when Mr. Riley brought suit against Richard Riley and

6

others in Taylor v. Babbitt, et. al, CV-2008-01765. Eberle Berlin and Turnbow were not

1

previous parties in Taylor v. Babbitt case but nonetheless claim the benefit of res judicata to

s

defeat Taylor's claim. They state, without discussion or citation to authority that "to the extent

9

that Taylor's claim is barred against Defendant Riley, it is similarly barred against Defendants
Turnbow and Eberle Berlin.

10

Babbitt arose out of Richard Riley's and others' defense in the trial court of AIA in

11

Taylor v. AJA, 261 P. 3d 829 (2011) and the contemporaneous defense of AIA and John Taylor.

12
13

:

Judge Brodie put it best when he wrote, "the gravamen of [Reed Taylor's] Complaint is that

14

Defendants aided and abetted John Taylor and others in committing torts against Reed Taylor

15

and acted to deprive Reed Taylor of money and property to which he is entitled" in 2007. At

16

this point, Reed Taylor believed that his stock redemption agreement was legal and fully

11

enforceable.

1s

Riley maintains that since Babbitt was related to the stock redemption agreement, Taylor

19

should be barred from asserting the current suit, since it is also relates to the stock redemption

20

agreement through the 1995 opinion letter. Riley emphasizes statements made in Taylor's

21

complaint and attempted amended complaint in Babbitt that referred to the opinion letter. The

22

factual grouping that con~titutes a transaction in Babbitt, is the thwarted efforts of Reed Taylor to

23

gain control of AIA and collect the money due on the note. Reed Taylor was suing Riley and the

24

other attorneys for their behavior in representing John Taylor and AIA in that action. His

25
26
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1

references to the opinion letter were in the context of his unsuccessful effort to convince Judge

2

Brudie that he had a tort cause of action for the lawyer conduct in Babbitt. He was claiming that

3

Riley's new firm, Hawley Troxell, and its lawyers owed a duty to not represent AJA or John

4

Taylor because Riley earlier represented Reed Taylor in authoring the opinion letter. While the

5

opinion letter played a role in the AJA suit and in Babbitt, the issuance of the opinion letter arose

6

from an entirely separate set of facts and circumstances.

7

In this case, factual grouping that constitutes the transaction is the issuance of the opinion

a

letter and events surrounding its issuance. This is 10 years remote in time from the events that

9

led to the Babbitt case. The claim originates in Tumbow's and Riley's alleged malpractice in

10

drafting the 1995 opinion letter. This is wholly unrelated to the alleged conduct in Babbitt. The

11

two cases do not form a convenient trial unit. While they may have overlapping witnesses, the

12

testimony in Babbitt, had it gone to trial, would focus on the events in 2007 and 2008 regarding

13

Taylor's suit against AJA and the steps AJA took to defend that suit. The testimony in this case,

14

if it goes to trial, will be focused on the events surrounding the negotiation of the stock

15

redemption and issuance of the opinion letter. The events that led to the filing of the AJA

16

litigation and the outcome of the AJA litigation will certainly figure in the present case, but the

17

conduct of the attorneys as such in the AJA litigation is not relevant to the present action. The

1s

opinion letter was not central, or even important, in the outcome in Babbitt. What Mr. Riley did,

19

or did not do, while drafting the 1995 opinion letter has nothing to do with him helping John

20

Taylor and AJA commit torts in 2007. Although, this current case and Babbitt have a common

21

tie in the 1995 stock redemption agreements, the two cases deal with wholly separate

22

transactions.

23

In summary, the Babbitt case and current case are not sufficiently related in time, space,

24

origin, motivation or trial evidence to arise from the same transaction. Because the two cases do

25
26
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1

not arise out of the same transaction or related transaction, Taylor's claim against Riley is not

2

barred by res judicata (claim preclusion).

3

b) 1996Agreementas Waiver
4

Riley, Eberle Berlin, and Turnbow all argue that Taylor waived any claim to sue the
5

defendants based on the 1995 opinion letter when he entered into the 1996 Stock Restructure
6

Agreement ("1996 agreement"). The 1996 agreement superseded the 1995 agreement. By its
7

terms the 1996 agreement provides that it supersedes and replaces the 1995 agreement. When
8

Taylor sued AJA he sued on the 1996 restructure agreement, not the 1995 agreement. The 1996
9

agreement contains provisions expressly waiving certain claims arising out of AJA's default on
10

the 1995 agreement. See Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement <]{4.3. The parties to the
11

1996 agreement were AIA Services Corporation, Reed Taylor, and Donna Taylor. Riley,
12

Turnbow and Eberle Berlin were not parties to the contract and not mentioned in the contracts
13

waiver provision. Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor's waived claims against AJA, not claims
14

against the defendants in the current suit. Reed Taylor's express waiver in the 1996 agreement
15

did not waive attorney malpractice claims against Riley, Turnbow, and Eberle Berlin because
16

they were not the parties to that agreement. The case cited by defendants, Isaak v. Idaho First
17

Nat. Bank 119 Idaho 988, 812 P.2d 295 (Ct. App.1990), simply does not apply.
18

Defendants argue the 1995 opinion letter ceased to apply because there was nothing to
19

which it could apply after restructure of the agreement in 1996. Defendants overlook the
20

promissory note. When Judge Brudie found the redemption illegal, this necessarily included a
21

finding that the promissory note was illegal. The 1995 letter opines, among other things, that the
22

transaction documents, including the promissory note, are enforceable according to their terms.
23

The promissory note was not superseded or replaced, but continued in effect. Just as there is no
24

opinion letter addressed to the 1996 transaction, there is nothing withdrawing the opinion as it
25
26
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relates to the promissory note. In Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, 151Idaho552, 261 P. 3d

2

829 (2011) the Idaho Supreme Court upheld Judge Brodie's determination that the stock

3

redemption was illegal. The Supreme Court characterized the 1996 agreement as only a

4

restructure of the payment of the 1995 agreement because the 1996 agreement did not itself

5

provide for repurchasing shares. Id., 151Idaho552, 559, 261P.3d829, 836 (2011). At the time

6

of the 1996 agreement the shares had already been redeemed. The claimant this case is that the

7

plaintiff tendered his shares for redemption based upon the 1995 opinion letter. The 1996

a

agreement did not attempt to undo that transaction. This argument by defendants is actually a

9

disguised argument that the opinion letter did not cause plaintiffs damage. Causation is

10
11

discussed more fully below.
Finally, the 1996 agreement, which included the wavier, grew out of the illegal 1995

12

agreement. The 1996 agreement is void as a document in furtherance of the illegal 1995

13

agreement. To give effect to the 1996 agreement would be to give effect to the 1995 agreement.

14

In other words, the 1996 agreement is carrying out the illegal redemption of Reed Taylor's stock.

15

If the stock redemption is illegal, and the Idaho Supreme Court said it is, then the 1996

16

agreement is illegal. The 1996 agreement cannot effectively waive any causes of action. Even if

17

the waiver was in reference to the defendants and the current malpractice claim, it would not be

1a

effective, because it is void.

19

The defendants also argue that since Taylor signed the 1996 agreement, and the

20

defendants did not write an opinion letter for the 1996 agreement, that the 1996 agreement was

21

the agreement that caused Taylor's injury. In a legal malpractice action, one of the key elements

22

that a plaintiff must prove is the attorney's action was a "proximate cause of the injuries suffered

23

by the client." Marias v. Marano, 120 Idaho 11, 13, 813 P. 2d 350, 352. "Proximate cause

24

consists of two factors, cause in fact and legal responsibility." Id. Proximate cause is a cause

25
26
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1

which, "in natural and probable sequence, produced the complained injury, loss or damage, and

2

but for that cause the damage would not have occurred .. .It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor

3

in bringing about the injury, loss or damage." Id.
In this case, the Taylor's signing the 1996 agreement did not relieve the defendants from

4

5

being the proximate cause of his injuries as a matter of law. A jury could certainly find that if

6

Taylor had not entered into the 1995 agreement, then he would have entered into the 1996

7

agreement. In fact, had Taylor not entered into the 1995 agreement there could not be a 1996

8

agreement because the 1996 agreement presupposes the stock redemption that occurred in 1995.

9

Taylor claims he relied on the defendants' advice in entering into the 1995 agreement. When

10
11

AIA couldn't pay on the 1995 agreement a jury could certainly conclude restructuring the
payment under the 1996 agreement was part of the "natural and probable sequence," of events

12

arising from issuance of the opinion letter. Merely because the defendants did not write an
'13

opinion letter for the 1996 agreement, does not insulate them from being found to be the
14

15
16

, 17

proximate cause of Taylor's injuries.

c) Agreement Subordinating Payment for Preferred Stock As in
Eliminating Negligence Claim
In 2006 Reed Taylor entered into an agreement with his ex-wife subordinating payment

18

of her preferred stock to payment of his promissory note. This reversed what had been the

19

circumstance before the agreement. Defendants argue that this fundamentally changed the

20

underlying facts upon which the opinion letter was based. Defendants argue that the result of

21

this agreement was to cause Reed Taylor's note become due and payable where it otherwise

22

would not have been. According to defendants this stripped the 1995 agreement of the protection

23
24
25
26

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND RECONSIDERATION AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION-PAGE 10

002565

..

1

of the "fail-safe clause." The unenforceability of the 1995 stock redemption agreement was

2

caused, according to defendants, by the loss of this protection.4

3

The subordination agreement between Donna Taylor and Reed Taylor is irrelevant.

4

Judge Brudie determined that the stock redemption agreement was illegal because AJA Services

5

had no earned surplus at the time the 1995 agreement was signed. The agreement was already in

6

violation of Idaho Law, despite any later subordination agreement. See Taylor v. AJA, 151 Idaho

7

552, 559-560. Idaho Code § 30-1-6, as in force at the time, provided that a corporation can only

8

repurchase its shares with "earned surplus;" with "capital surplus" if allowed by the articles of

9

incorporation; or with a shareholder vote specifically addressing use of capital surplus to redeem

10

stock. Since none of these conditions were met at the time the parties signed the 1995 repurchase

11

agreement, at the moment the agreement was signed, it violated LC. §30-1-6. The Supreme

12

Court in its opinion affirming Judge Brudie makes the point that the existence of the qualifying

13

condition is determined at the time of the agreement to redeem the stock.

14

15
16

Nothing in LC. § 30-1-6 suggests that the timing of payment has any bearing on
the statute's applicability, and given the statute's purpose, it would be an absurd
result to allow a corporation to get around these restrictions by simply paying on a
later date.
Taylor v. AJA Services Corp. 151Idaho552, 563, 261P.3d829, 840 2011)

17
18

Simply put, the agreement made between Reed Taylor and his ex-wife in 2006 had

19

nothing to do with the finding that the redemption agreement was illegal. The 2006

20

subordination agreement could not relieve the defendants of any liability they have for issuance

21

of the. 1995 opinion letter.

22
23
4

24
25
26

Defendants overlooked that portion of Judge Brodie's decision that notes the preferred
stock was to have been retired within 10 years from 1995. This calls into question the underlying
assumption of this argument that Reed Taylor's note was not otherwise due.
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1

d) Harrigfeld Revisited

2

This Court previously ruled, in its Memorandum Decision of May 10, 2010, that although there

3

was no attorney client-relationship between the defendants and the plaintiff, the defendants,

4

nevertheless, owed the plaintiff a duty in tort. Defendants now ask the Court to revisit its earlier

5

determination based on the two cases that have been decided since that ruling. The defendants

6

argue that Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P. 3d 642 (2010) and Soignier v. Fletcher,

7

151 Idaho 322, 256 P. 3d 730 (2011) strongly reaffirm prior holdings of the Supreme Court that

8

an attorney owes no duty to one not the attorneys client. The sole exception previously

9

recognized has been that "an attorney preparing testamentary instruments owes a duty to the

10

beneficiaries named or identified therein to prepare such instruments, and if requested by the

11

testator to have them properly executed, so as to effectuate the testator's intent as expressed in the

12

testamentary instruments." Harrigfeld v. Hancock 140 Idaho 134, 138, 90 P.3d 884, 888 (2004).

13

If the only exception to the rule that an attorney is not liable to anyone not the attorneys client is

14

as stated in Harrigfeld, then Reed Taylor has no claim against these defendants because Reed

15

Taylor was not their client.

16

Defendants make the argument that no cases since the decision in Harrigfeld have

17

recognized any other exception, therefore no exception should be recognized here. They suggest

18

that the Supreme Court in Taylor v. McNichols5 expressly declined an invitation by Reed Taylor

19

to expand the universe of persons entitled to sue a lawyer beyond the lawyer's clients. In that

20

case Reed Taylor was attempting to sue the attorneys for the opposing party in his lawsuit on the

21

theory that he was a third party beneficiary of the attorney-client contract. " .... it is incredulous

22

that Reed would attempt to assert that attorneys hired by the AIA Entities, to fight off Reed's

23
24
25
26

5

Defendants note in passing that Taylor v. McNichols cites Taylor v. Maile 142 Idaho
253, 127P. 3d 156 (2005) is reaffirming the doctrine in Harrigfeld.
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1

litigation against those entities, were being retained for Reed's benefit " Taylor v. McNichols,

2

149 Idaho 826, 845, 243 P.3d 642, 661 (2010). While this is a reaffirmation of Harrigfeld, it is

3

hardly a statement that there can be no other circumstance leading to attorney liability for

4

negligence.

5

Whether a duty was owed to a non-client plaintiff was not a contested issue in Soignier.

6

While the Court did discuss Harrigfeld, it was in the context of whether or not there was a breach

7

of the attorney's duty. 6 The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary

a

judgment based on its finding that there was no breach of the attorney's duty, not that there was

9

no duty. Soignier does not impact this Court's earlier finding that the defendants owed a duty to

10

plaintiff. Again, it is hardly a statement that there can be no other circumstance leading to

11

attorney liability for negligence.

12

Defendants strenuously argue that if any court is going to change existing case law in this

13

state, then it is up to the Idaho Supreme Court not the trial courts. This Court does not disagree.

14

The difference is in the framing of the question presented. As this Court discussed in its earlier

15

opinion, the Court views this not as a change in Idaho law, but an issue of first impression not

16

previously decided by our appellate courts. When that circumstance presents itself it is up to the

17

trial court to determine as best it can how the Idaho Supreme Court would rule based on existing

18

cases and reasoning. The general rule of no liability to a non-client as announced in Harrigfeld

19

is based in large part on the notion that the scope of the duty owed by the attorney is defined by

2o

the contract between attorney and client as to what is being undertaken. This is bolstered by the

21

22
23
24

25
26

6

"There are four elements to a legal-malpractice claim: (1) there is an attorney-client
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant; (2) the defendant lawyer owed a duty of care to
the plaintiff; (3) the lawyer breached the duty; and (4) the lawyer's negligence was a proximate
cause of the client's damage. Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 706, 652 P.2d 650, 654 (1982).
Here, the parties do not dispute that the first two elements are present in this case." Soignier v.
Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, 324, 256 P.3d 730, 732 (Idaho,2011) (emphasis added).
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1

strong policy that the attorney should be free to give advice and perform work, including the

2

drafting of documents, to the client without fear of liability to a third party. This, in tum, is

3

grounded in the strong policy in Idaho that the attorney's loyalty should be to the client and no

4

one else.7 Another underlying principle limiting third party liability is a concern that there could

5

be a large, unpredictable class of persons purporting to rely on advice rendered by the lawyer.

6

This could lead to virtually unlimited liability.

1

In the case of an opinion letter, such as we have here, those concerns do not prevail. The

a

lawyer issuing the letter is specifically aware of the reliance by the non-client. The universe of

9

potential injured parties is limited to those to whom the letter is addressed. The rule proposed by

10
11

12

defendants is tantamount to a grant of immunity to the attorney.
This Court continues to adhere to the earlier decision. The motion for summary judgment
is denied.

13

2. Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider:
14

Plaintiff requests this Court to reconsider its determination on the commencement of the
15

running of the statute of limitations. In an earlier opinion denying Defendants' motion for
16

summary judgment, this court decided the statute commenced running when the issue of the
17

legality of the 1995 transaction was first questioned. This reconsideration is requested to support
18

some of the arguments made by Plaintiff in his opposition to the current motion for summary
19

judgment. The request by plaintiff is probably better characterized as a motion to reconsider the
20

Court's reasoning rather than the decision itself. The court declines to do so and adheres to the
21

earlier decision.
22
23
7

24

"The attorney's duty to his or her client must remain paramount." Harrigfeld v.
Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 139, 90 P.3d 884, 889 (200~).

25

26
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1

2
3

3. Plaintifrs Motion to Pursue Alternative And/or Additional Claims.
As stated above this motion was withdrawn at the hearing.

III. CONCLUSION

4

5
6

Defendants' motions for summary judgment are denied. Defendant's motion for
reconsideration is denied. Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration is denied.

7

IT IS SO ORDERED.

8

Dated this_;)}/__ day of October, 2012.

9
10
11

reenwood
District Judge

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
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2

3
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4
5
6
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RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
800 BELLEVUE WAY NEW, SUITE 400
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7

8
9
10
11

12

MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY
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13
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.
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James D. LaRue ISB #1780
Loren C. Ipsen ISB #1767
Jeffrey A. Thomson ISB #3380
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844

OCT 3 0 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By KATHY BIEHL
DeiJU11

Attorneys for Defendant Richard A. Riley

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH WDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HA WLE
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; SHARON
CUMMINGS, Personal Representative of the
Estate of Robert M. Turnbow; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKL VEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

Case No. CV-OC-0918868
DEFENDANT RICHARD A. RILEY'S
MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RE:
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND RECONSIDERATION

Defendants.
Defendant Richard A. Riley ("Riley"), by and through his counsel of record, Elam &
Burke, P.A., respectfully moves this Court, pursuant to Rule 12 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, for

DEFENDANT RICHARD A. RILEY'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL MEMORANDUM
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G:\CLIENT\7082\0013\HTEH - #2\Pleadings - HTEH #2\2012.10.29 Permission to Appeal - STATE - Motn.wpd

002572

e:..\v

an order granting permission to appeal the Memorandum Opinion and Order Re: Defendants'
Motions for Summary Judgment and Reconsideration.
This Motion is based upon the records, files, and pleadings in this action, together with
the Memorandum in Support of Defendant Richard A. Riley's Motion for Permission to Appeal
Memorandum Opinion and Order Re: Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and
Reconsideration.
DATEDthis

SO

dayofOctober,2012.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

e A. homson, of the firm
rneys for Richard A. Riley
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RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC

800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, Washington 98004

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(425) 321-0343
E-mail

-/U.S. Mail
·Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 529-9732
E-mail

_v_

Jack S. Gj ording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
P;O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

U.S. Mail
~Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-9177
E-mail
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Deputy

Attorneys for Defendant Richard A. Riley

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-OC-0918868

v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HA WLE
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; SHARON
CUMMINGS, Personal Representative of the
Estate of Robert M. Turnbow; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT RICHARD A. RILEY'S
MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
RECONSIDERATION

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Richard A. Riley ("Riley") seeks permission to appeal from the Court's
Memorandum Opinion and Order Re: Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT RICHARD A. RILEY'S MOTION FOR
PERMISSION TO APPEAL MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS'
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Reconsideration entered on October 24, 2012 ("Opinion and Order"). A permissive appeal is
allowed from an interlocutory opinion or order if it involves a controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion, further defined as, a substantial legal
issue of great public interest or a legal question of first impression, and in which an immediate
appeal may materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation. (I.A.R., Rule 12(a).)
With respect to the general rule of no liability to a non-client by an attorney, this Court
expressly recognized the following strong public policies: (1) that ~ttorneys should be free to
give advice to and perform work for a client without fear of liability to a third party; (2) that an
attorney's loyalty should be to the client and no one else; and (3) that floodgates could be opened
for lawsuits against attorneys by third parties who claim to have relied on the attorney's advice.
(Opinion and Order, pp. 13-14.)
This Court also expressly recognized that the duty owed to third parties beyond
beneficiaries of testamentary instruments as established in Harrigfeld is an issue of first
impression not previously decided by Idaho appellate courts. (Id. at p. 13.) With issues of first
impression, the Court assessed its role as determining as best it can how the Idaho Supreme
Court would rule based on existing cases and reasoning. (Id.) A Rule 12 permissive appeal
would provide the Court and the parties with the Idaho Supreme Court's answer to this issue of
first impression.
Finally, this Court noted that if Harrigfeld established the only exception to the general
rule of no liability to anyone not the attorney's client, then Taylor has no claim against Riley
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because Taylor was not his client. (Id. at p. 12.) This satisfies the ~ule 12 requirement that an
immediate appeal would materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation.
Riley requests the Court grant him permission to appeal from the Opinion and Order
because it involves legal issues of public interest and of first impression and an immediate appeal
will materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation by resolving it against Riley on
legal grounds and avoiding the expenses of further discovery and trial. 1

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
An order denying a motion for summary judgment is not an appealable order itself.

Aardema v. US. Dairy Sys., 147 Idaho 785, 789, 215 P.3d 505, 509 (2009) (quoting Grover v.
Wadsworth, 147 Idaho 60, 66, 205 P.3d 1196, 1202 (2009) (quoting Hunter v. Dep 't of Corr.,
138 Idaho 44, 46, 57 P.3d 755, 757 (2002)). But, an order denying summary judgment can be
appealed by permission because the rules allow for an appeal from an interlocutory order "which
is not otherwise appealable under these rules ... ". (I.A.R., Rule 12(a).) Rule 12 allows an
interlocutory order to be appealed by permission if it involves a controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an immediate appeal
from the order may materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation. (I.A. R., Rule
12(a).) A controlling question oflaw has been defined as one involving substantial legal issues

1

0ne of the other remaining parties to this litigation is Eberle, Berlin, Kading & Turnbow,
Chtd. This Court has previously noted that Eberle Berlin has no independent liability to Taylor.
As a result, should a permissive appeal result in the dismissal of Riley, Eberle Berlin would also
be dismissed. In addition, a finding that Riley has no duty as an attorney to Taylor, would apply
equally to Defendant Turnbow leading to his dismissal.
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of great public interest or legal questions of first impression. Aardema v. US. Dairy Sys., 147
Idaho 785, 789, 215 P.3d 505, 509 (2009). As to the orderly resolution of the litigation, factors
to be considered are the impact of an immediate appeal upon the parties, the effect of the delay of
the proceedings in the district court pending the appeal, the likelihood or possibility of a second
appeal after judgment is finally entered by the district court, and the case workload of the
appellate courts. Rudell v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2, 4, 665 P.2d 701, 703 (1983).
A Rule 12 motion for permission to appeal does not seek to change or reconsider this
Court's rulings and is not an appeal in and of itself. The only relief sought at this stage is
permission to appeal and the only issue is whether the Rule 12 criteria exist.

III. ANALYSIS
The Opinion and Order denied Defendants' request that the Court revisit its prior ruling
that although there was no attorney/client relationship between Riley and Taylor, Riley
nevertheless owed Taylor a duty in tort. The Court's Opinion and Order also ruled on three other
issues raised by Riley's Motion for Summary Judgment: (1) Taylor's negligence/legal
malpractice claim is not barred by res judicata; (2) Taylor did not waive his claims against Riley
when he entered into the 1996 Stock Restructure Agreement; and (3) Taylor's agreement with his
ex-wife to subordinate payment of her preferred stock to payment of his promissory note did not
sufficiently change the facts on which the opinion letter was based to sever liability. The
Opinion and Order involves controlling questions of law as to which there is substantial grounds
for difference of opinion and in which an immediate appeal would materially advance the orderly
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resolution of the litigation. For the reasons that follow, permission should be granted to appeal
the Opinion and Order.

A.

No Liability to a Non-Client Rule.

1.

Controlling Questions of Law.

The invitation to expand an attorney's duty beyond his or her client has been accepted
only once. InHarrigfeldv. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004), the Idaho Supreme
Court carved out the sole exception to the rule that an attorney is not liable to anyone not the
attorney's client- beneficiaries of testamentary instruments drafted by an attorney. Harrigfeld,
140 Idaho at 138, 90 P.3d at 888. The Supreme Court has rejected every other attempt to expand
an attorney's duty to a third party and has done so in the strongest of language. See Taylor v.

Babbitt, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P.3d 642 (2010). Nevertheless, this Court recognized a new
exception to the rule that an attorney is not liable to anyone not the attorney's client, holding for
the first time that an attorney owes the recipient of an opinion letter a duty of care in tort. (May
10, 2010 Memorandum Decision.) Because this ruling involves substantial legal issues of public
interest and is an issue of first impression - it is a controlling question of law.
a.

Substantial Legal Issues of Public Interest

The scope of the duty owed by an attorney touches on issues of great public interest. As
this Court stated in its Opinion and Order:
... The general rule of no liability to a non-client as announced in
Harrigfeld is based in large part on the notion that the scope of the
duty owed by the attorney is defined by the contract between
attorney and client as to what is being undertaken. This is
bolstered by the strong policy that the attorney should be free to
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT RICHARD A. RILEY'S MOTION FOR
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give advice and perform work, including the drafting of
documents, to the client without fear of liability to a third party.
This, in turn, is grounded in the strong policy in Idaho that the
attorney's loyalty should be to the client and no one else. (footnote
omitted.) Another underlying principle limiting third party liability
is a concern that there could be a large, unpredictable class of
persons purporting to rely on advice rendered by the lawyer, This
could lead to virtually unlimited liability.
(Opinion and Order, pp. 13-14.) (Emphasis added.) The Idaho Supreme Court agrees that issues
regarding an attorney's liability to third parties involve substantial legal issues of public interest.
In Taylor v. Babbitt, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P.3d 642 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court recognized
"public policies of: (1) protecting attorneys from the threat of retaliatory litigation, in order to
ensure that they may zealously advocate for their client without fear of reprisal; and (2)
protecting judicial economy ...." Babbitt, 149 Idaho at 842, 243
b.

~.3d

at 658.

Legal Questions of First Impression.

This Court has expressly recognized that expanding an attorney's liability to a new class
of third parties is an issue of first impression. (Order and Opinion, p. 13.)
. . . As this Court discussed in its earlier opinion, the Court views
this not as a change in Idaho law, but an issue of first impression
not previously decided by our appellate courts. When that
circumstance presents itself it is up to the trial court to determine
as best it can how the Idaho Supreme Court would rule based on
existing cases and reasoning.
(Opinion and Order, p. 13.)
c.

Substantial Grounds for Difference of Opinion.

Not only is the issue one of first impression and one that to\lches upon substantial legal
issues of great public interest, it also brings with it a substantial difference of opinion. Riley
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brought to the Court's attention two new Idaho Supreme Court decisions, both of which postdated the Court's original decision that Riley owed a duty to Taylor even without an
attorney/client relationship. The Court distinguished these cases because neither was a statement
that there can be no other circumstance leading to attorney liability·for negligence to third parties.
(Opinion and Order, p. 13.) While it is true that the specific relationship at issue in this case was
not addressed in those cases, the Idaho Supreme Court's strong statements against expanding
liability of attorneys to any new third parties creates a reasonable and substantial difference of
opm1on.
For example, the Supreme Court recently addressed Taylor's other efforts to expand an
attorney's duty to include him:

It is clear that Reed, in his complaints, has failed to allege
that he is in an attorney-client relationship with Respondents, and
therefore lacks the privity necessary to sue Respondents for legal
malpractice. Harrigfeld is the only case in which this Court has
found an exception to this requirement; specifically this Court
found that the intended beneficiary of a testamentary instrument
would have standing to bring a malpractice claim against an
attorney who drafted said instrument. Id. at 138, 90 P.3d at 888.
This Court went on to conclude that, "[a] direct attorney-client
relationship is required to exist between the plaintiff and the
attorney-defendant in a legal malpractice action except in this very
narrow circumstance." Id. at 139, 90 P.3d at 889. This principle
was reaffirmed in a case to which Reed was a party-Taylor v.
Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005). Reed cites to law
from other jurisdictions, ignoring the well-established Idaho
precedent, in arguing that third-party beneficiaries to an attorneyclient relationship may have standing to pursue malpractice claims
against an attorney. . ..
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Babbitt, 149 Idaho at 845, 243 P .3d at 661. (Emphasis added.) This Court has ruled that there is
no attorney/client relationship between Riley and Taylor and Taylor clearly does not fall within
the one exception recognized in Harrigfeld and subsequent Idaho cases. The fact that the Idaho
Supreme Court has continuously harkened back to its own well established precedent and
rejected the expansion to any other third party of standing to pursue negligence claims against an·
attorney creates reasonable grounds for a difference of opinion whether that Court would also
reject the expansion to third party recipients of opinion letters. Id. ·

2.

Material Advancement of Orderly Resolution of Litigation.

A? immediate appeal would· materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation.
As the Court noted:

If the only exception to the rule that an attorney is not liable to
anyone not the attorneys [sic] client is as stated in Harrigfeld, then
Reed Taylor has no claim against these defendants because Reed
Taylor was not their client.
(Opinion and Order, p. 12.) Ending-the litigation against Riley (and the other Defendants) is the
ultimate advancement in the orderly resolution of this litigation.
An immediate appeal also satisfies the other factors to be considered. If the Idaho
Supreme Court accepts this permissive appeal but does not ultimately recognize this new
exception an immediate appeal will benefit all of the parties in that it will save time and the
expense of discovery and litigating this case through a trial. In addition, an appeal could save
judicial resources by not tying up a judge, a courtroom and a jury for eight (8) days. If the
Supreme Court agrees with this new exception, an immediate appeal will still benefit the Court
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and parties with clarification and guidance on the issue and allow the parties to reassess positions
and react accordingly. With that clarification and guidance, the likelihood of a second appeal
would also be substantially decreased.
This Court has already found that the Rule 12 criteria exist as to this issue. It is a
substantial issue of public interest and a legal question of first impression. An immediate appeal
could resolve the litigation. Permission to appeal should be granted.

B.

Application of Res Judicata.
1.

Controlling Question of Law.

The application of res judicata involves a controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial grounds for differences of opinion. Case law is replete yvith struggles by the courts
and parties with applying the criteria of claim preclusion (res judicata) to the particular situation
presented. This is especially true of the struggle to apply the "same claim" factor and the tests
created to determine what is a "same claim."
One of these tests - the transaction approach - has been the focus of substantial legal
scrutiny. Under this test, a claim is considered the same if it arises out of the same transaction or
series of transactions. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 126, 157 P.3d 613, 620 (2007).
The application of that transaction approach in this case is a controlling question of law.
a.

Substantial Legal Issues of Public Interest

The present case involves the question of whether another claim for negligence/
malpractice arising out of the relationship between Riley and Taylor may be brought. "The
policy considerations underlying the doctrine of res judicata are aimed at discouraging the
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT RICHARD A. RILEY'S MOTION FOR
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splintering of actions, at precluding repetitive actions based on the same transaction." Kawai
Farms, Inc. v. Longstreet, 121Idaho610, 613, 826 P.2d 1322, 1325 (1992). The policies that
support application of res judicata include protecting against the expense and vexation attending
multiple lawsuits and conserves judicial resources. Silver Eagle Mining Co. v. State ofIdaho,
153 Idaho 176, 280 P.3d 679, 685 (2012). Similarly, the doctrine ofresjudicata serves three
important purposes:
First, it "[preserves] the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution
against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same
matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results." Second, it
serves the public interest in protecting the courts against the
burdens of repetitious litigation; and third, it advances the private
interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims.
Walker v. State of Idaho, 146 Idaho 234, 239, 192 P3d 1058, 1063 (2008). The application of res
judicata and the underlying policies apply with special significance to this case, which is one of
the many lawsuits filed by Taylor that have some connection to his relationship with the AIA
entities and their attorneys.
b.

Legal Questions of First Impression.

It cannot be said that the application of res judicata raises legal questions of first
impression. However, Rule 12(a) does not require both policy issues and legal questions of first
impression. The lack of a legal question of first impression relating to res judicata does not
preclude a permissive appeal on this issue. 2

2

1n addition, if a permissive appeal is granted as to one issue, considerations of judicial
economy would dictate a permissive appeal as to all issues decided by the Court in the Opinion
and Order. See Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856, 863, 252 P.3d 1274, 1281 (2011) (A
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c.

Substantial Grounds for Difference of Opinion.

The application of the transaction approach to determine whether a second claim can be

.

brought cannot be so narrow as to eviscerate the underlying concept that a valid final judgment
rendered in an action involving the same parties "extinguishes all claims arising out of the same
transaction or series of transactions out of which the cause of action arose." Ticor, ·144 Idaho at
126, 157 P.3d at 620. (Emphasis added.) While this Court recognized the breadth of the
transaction approach, it nevertheless found that negligence claims that would not exist but for the
1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and promissory note did not arise out of the same transaction
or, perhaps more importantly, series of transactions. (Opinion and Order, p. 5.) There are
certainly grounds for differences of opinion regarding whether the negligence claims arise out of
the "same claim".
For instance, the gravamen of the complaints is generally not the test used to determine
whether a subsequent action involves the same claim. (Opinion and Order, p. 6.) The test for
determining whether it is the same claim is not what was actually alleged in the prior lawsuit
compared to what was actually alleged in the subsequent lawsuit, it also includes "every matter
that might and should have been litigated in the first suit." Ticor, 144 Idaho at 126, 157 P.3d at
620. This Court has previously determined that any malpractice claims against Riley accrued in
April 2008, long before the prior action was dismissed. (See May 10, 2010 Memorandum
Decision and Order.) No other barrier exists to bringing the current malpractice claims in the

permissive appeal can be taken from the issues framed by the motion and answered by the district
court).
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prior lawsuit. There was nothing to prevent the current malpractice claim from being raised in
Taylor v. Babbitt, so it "might" have been brought in that lawsuit.
Moreover, it "should" have been brought in that action. Parties are allowed to bring
entirely disparate and different causes of action with entirely separate and distinct prima facie
cases in the same litigation. In fact, the parties are required to do so as a compulsory
counterclaim if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim. (I.R.C.P., Rule 13(a).) The same is true for a cross-claim. (See I.R.C.P.,
Rule 13(g).) In addition, a party gets to relate back a claim or defense (even ifthe claim or
defense is entirely disparate and different) as long as it arises out of the conduct, transaction or
occurrence set forth in the original pleading. (I.R.C.P., Rule 15(c)) For instance, where the tort
theory with regard to which certain plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint relied upon the
same conduct being tortious as is asserted for the breach of contract claim, it was the underlying
conduct, transaction, or occurrence of refusing to deliver the escrow documents which comprised
the factual grouping of both the contract claim and the asserted tort claim thereby allowing the
amended cause of action to relate back to the original complaint. See Suitts v. First Security
Banko/Idaho, NA., 110 Idaho 15, 713 P.3d 1374 (1985).
Here, the two negligence/malpractice claims are not even entirely different causes of
action with entirely different prima facie cases. Nor is one a contract claim and the other a tort
claim. Both claims sound in tort. Both claims have the same prima facie elements. Like a
compulsory counterclaim, the current malpractice claim should have been brought in Taylor v.
Babbitt.
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There was no barrier to bringing the current malpractice claim in the prior malpractice
action. Given the allegations in the Babbitt complaint, a motion to amend may not have been
necessary. The common theme throughout Rule 13 and 15 and resjudicata is to get all causes of
action between the same parties in one litigation. At the very least,. the current claims by Taylor
against Riley "might" have been brought in Babbitt and likely "should" have been brought there.

Nor does the gravamen of the complaints establish whether the claims arose out of the
same transaction or series of transactions. While the gravamen of Taylor v. Babbitt may not have
been a claim for legal malpractice specifically based on the opinion letter, there are grounds for
reasonable differences of opinion whether the claims in Taylor v. Babbitt arose out of the same
or, at the very least, series of transactions as the claims raised in this litigation. The same
transaction, the absence of which would extinguish all claims, was the 1995 Stock Redemption
Agreement, promissory note and related documents, including the opinion letter. This is the
transaction out of which all of the causes of action arose as pleaded in Taylor v. Babbitt and in
the present lawsuit. To the extent that we look beyond the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement
and begin discussing the 1996 Restructure Agreement, the subsequent attempts to collect on the
promissory note, and the later hiring of Hawley Troxell (Riley's then new firm) to defend against
claims of breach of contract and breach of various duties arising out of these documents, it could
easily be viewed as a series of transactions, still meeting the definition of the "same claim."
This Court acknowledged that the opinion letter played a role in the Taylor v. AJA lawsuit
and in Taylor v. Babbitt and is, of course, central to this lawsuit. Nevertheless, it held that the
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issuance of the opinion letter arose from an entirely separate "set of facts and circumstances"
from those in these prior cases. (Opinion and Order, p. 7.) If we look only at the actions taken at
the time of the issuance of the opinion letter and compare those facts to the actions taken in
defending AIA, one can see distinctions and differences in focus. But the transaction approach is
to be viewed broadly. There are grounds for differences of opinion about: (1) whether there
should be a more macro approach to applying this test by looking only at the theories pleaded in
both cases -- negligence/malpractice -- for commonality; or (2) whether the entire history
between Riley and Taylor reveals a series of transaction from which both causes of action arose;
or even (3) whether the malpractice claims against Riley in Taylor v. Babbitt and the present
matter did, in fact, arise out of a single transaction -- the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement,
promissory note, and related documents which included the opinion letter.

2.

Material Advancement of Orderly Resolution of Litigation.

Like the issue relating to whether an attorney has a duty to an opinion letter recipient, an
immediate appeal from the res judicata ruling would satisfy the factors considered in determining
whether to grant permission to appeal. It could resolve the litigation in its entirety.

C.

Waiver and Substantial Change of Facts Upon Which Opinion Letter was Based.
These issues are case specific. They do not raise substantial issues of public interest nor

issues of first impression. Nevertheless, the issues were raised and this Court's Opinion and
Order addressed them. As such, if other issues meet the criteria for a permissive appeal, these
issues can be appealed from as well. See Miller, 150 Idaho at 863, 252 P.3d at 1281. Moreover,
an immediate appeal on these two issues, if addressed by the Supreme Court, could decide the
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negligence/malpractice claims against Riley. If a permissive appeal is granted, these issues
should be included.

III. CONCLUSION
Some of the issues decided in this Court's Opinion and Order involve controlling
questions of law as to which there is substantial grounds for differences of opinion, which are in
tum substantial legal issues of public interest and/or legal questions of first impression on which
an immediate appeal would materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation. This
Court should grant permission to appeal from the Opinion and Order.
DATED this __3_Q_ day of October, 2012.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

. Thomson, of the firm
s for Richard A. Riley
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

3o

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of October, 2012, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the
manner indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC

~

800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, Washington 98004

Michael D. Gaffney

ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495
BEARD

Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837

Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(425) 321-0343
E-mail

U.S. Mail
?"Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 529-9732
E-mail
_ ./(::T.S. Mail
_/_ Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-9177
E-mail
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•
Jack S. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
Julianne S. Hall, ISB No. 8076
GJORDING FOUSER, PLLC

Plaza One Twenty One
121North9th Street, Suite 600
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177

OCT 3 1 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE VIDAK
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendants Sharon Cummings,
Personal Representative of the Estate ofRobert
M Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, Kading,
Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,
Plaintiff,

vs.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
SHARON CUMMINGS AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF
ROBERT M. TURNBOW and EBERLE,
&
TURNBOW
BERLIN,
KADING,
MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation,

Case No. CV OC 0918868
MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO
APPEAL FROM THE COURT'S
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER

Defendants.

COME NOW, Defendants Sharon Cummings, Personal Representative of the Estate of
Robert M. Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chtd., by and through
their counsel of record, Gjording Fouser, PLLC, and hereby move this Court, pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule 12, for permission to appeal the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order Re:

MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM THE COURT'S INTERLOCUTORY ORDER - 1

002591

Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and Reconsideration entered by the Court on

October 24, 2012.
The legal issues for which Defendants seek permission to appeal constitute controlling
questions of law in this litigation as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion, substantial legal issues of great public interest and legal questions of first impression.
Accordingly, the Court should enter an order authorizing an appeal of the same. Immediate
appeal from the Court's Memorandum Opinion will materially advance the orderly resolution of
this litigation as set forth in Defendants' memorandum in support of this motion, which is filed
concurrently herewith.
This motion is supported by the pleadings on file with this Court and Defendants'
Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Permission to Appeal from Interlocutory Order.

Oral argument is requested.

GJORDING FOUSER,

PLLC

, Of
Firm
ttorneys r. Defendants Sharon Cummings,
Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert
M Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, Kading,
Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered
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Roderick C. Bond
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
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2105 Coronado St.
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121North9th Street, Suite 600
P.O. Box 2837
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Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Attorneys for Defendants Sharon Cummings,
Personal Representative of the Estate ofRobert
M Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, Kading,
Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
SHARON CUMMINGS AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF
ROBERT M. TURNBOW and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation,

Case No. CV OC 0918868

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION
FOR PERMISSION TO APPE~ FROM
THE COURT'S INTERLOCUTORY
ORDER

Defendants.

COME NOW, Defendants Sharon Cummings, Personal Representative of

the Estate of

Robert M. Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chtd. (hereafter
"Defendants," "Turnbow" and/or "Eberle Berlin"), by and through their counsel· of record,
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Gjording Fouser, PLLC, and hereby file their Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for
Permission to Appeal From an Interlocutory Order and respectfully request permission, pursuant
to Idaho Appellate Rule 12, to appeal the Court's Memorandum Decision on Defendants' Third
Motion for Summary Judgment.

BACKGROUND
1)

Taylor v. AJA
As means of a brief background to this complex litigation, Plaintiff Reed Taylor

(hereafter "Taylor" or "Reed Taylor"), founded AIA Insurance (hereafter "AIA") and owned the
majority of AIA's common stock until 1995. In 1995 several individuals involved with AIA
desired to change the direction of the company and make it public. Taylor, who at the time was
president of AIA and cha.irman of the board of directors, disagreed with the "new direction" and
decided to redeem his stock. AIA and Taylor entered a stock redemption agreement pursuant to
which AIA agreed to purchase all of Taylor's shares of stock in the company. Taylor retained
attorneys Scott Bell and Frank Taylor and their law firm Caimcross & Hempelmann, P.S. to
assist him in negotiating AIA's agreement to purchase Taylor's stock.
On or about July 22, 1995, Taylor signed a Stock Redemption

Agreemen~

and other

ancillary agreements to redeem his shares of AIA stock. Bell conditioned the redemption of
Taylor's stock on AIA obtaining all necessary approvals and consents from all shareholders and
on AIA's outside counsel, Richard Riley and Robert Turnbow of Eberle Berlin, providing an
Opinion Letter addressing the legality and enforceability of the 1995 agreement.
Eberle Berlin provided Scott Bell with the requested Opinion Letter on or about August
15, 1995. Taylor thereafter moved forward with the "closing" of the 1995 Stock Redemption
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Agreement on or about August 15, 1995. After Taylor "closed" on the 1995 Stock Redemption
Agreement, he became upset with AIA's contractual performance. On April 18, 1996 he wrote a
letter to R. John Taylor who, at the time, was AIA's Chairman and demanded payment of monies
allegedly owed. In the letter, he also gave notice of default based on the terms of the 1995 Stock
Redemption Agreement. At this point in time, Taylor had several choices. He could have
declared the entire unpaid balance due and payable and proceeded to judicially enforce the
Agreement buy suing on the amount due. He could have repossessed the pledged stock and sold
the stock in a commercially reasonable manner. l_-Ie could have entered into a new ·contractual
agreement to resolve the dispute. Mr. Taylor chose to enter into a new agreement with AIA
which, according to its terms, replaced the Stock Redemption Agreement. Taylor and AIA
entered negotiations to address AIA's alleged defaults under the 1995 Agreement. Pursuant to
these negotiations, Taylor and AIA entered a whole new contract on about July 1, 1996 entitled
the "Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement" in an effort to resolve their disputes. Eberle
Berlin was not requested to and did not provide Taylor with an Opinion Letter regarding any
aspect of the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement (hereafter "Restructure
Agreement").

The 1996 Restructure Agreement specifically provided that the 1995 agreement

was "of no further force and effect."
Taylor became unhappy with AIA's contractual performance pursuant to the 1996
Restructure agreement in 2007 and filed suit against AIA alleging a variety of causes of action
including breach of contract.

The defense filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that

the Stock Redemption Agreement between Taylor and AIA was unenforceable on April 16,
2008, which the court granted. Taylor appealed the decision. In 2009, while his lawsuit against

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL
FROM THE COURT'S INTERLOCUTORY ORDER - 3
002596

AIA for breach of contract arising out of the 1996 Restructure Agreement was pending on
appeal, Taylor filed suit against Defendants Richard Riley, Robert Turnbow, and Eberle Berlin
for professional malpractice based on their representation in the August 15, 1995 Opinion Letter.

2)

Defendants Riley, Turnbow, and Eberle Berlin's First Motion for Summary
Judgment
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of malpractice given the

lack of attorney-client relationship between Taylor and the Defendants in which the defense
argued that no attorney-client relationship existed and, accordingly, Defendants had no duty to
Taylor.

At the time the defense filed its initial motion for summary judgment, the Idaho

Supreme Court had already addressed the issue of whether an attorney's duty can extend to nonclients in Harrigfeld v. Hancock. See Harrigfield, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004). In

Harrigfield, the Supreme Court held that an attorney who prepared a testamentary instrument
owed a duty to the beneficiaries named in the instrument to ensure the instrument was properly
executed as explicitly stated by the testator in the instrument so as to effectuate tlie testator's
expressed intent in the testamentary instrument. Id.

The Court's holding in Harrigfield is the

first and only exception to the general rule that an attorney-client relationship must exist for the
attorney to be held liable for professional malpractice in Idaho.
In its opinion denying Defendants' first motion for summary judgment in this case, the
Court cited to the New York case of Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Dewey, Ballantine,

Bushby, Palmer and Wood, in holding that, although it had not been recognized by the Idaho
Supreme Court, in addition to Harrigfield another "narrow, but widely recognized exception" to
the general rule that an attorney is not liable in negligence to a person who is not his or her client
existed where the attorney drafted and delivered an opinion letter to a non-client with the
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expectation that the non-client would rely on the letter. See Dewey, 80 N.Y. 2d 377, 605 N.E. 2d
318 (1992). The Court went on to hold that the supreme court's holding Harrigfield was
consistent with the Court's finding that Riley and Turnbow had a duty to exercise ordinary care,
skill and prudence in drafting the opinion letter. In doing so, this Court expanded on the
exception to the general rule of attorney-client relationship that the supreme. court had
established in Harrigfield.

3)

Idaho Supreme Court Cases Post-Dating the Court's Memorandum Opinion on
Defendants' First Motion for Summary Judgment
Following the Court's denial of Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Idaho

Supreme Court heard two additional cases, one of which involved the Plaintiff herein, in which
plaintiff asked the supreme court to further expand its finding in Harrigfield. These. cases were
Taylor v. McNichols and Soignier v. Fletcher.

McNichols began when, while his suit against

AIA was pending, Reed Taylor, the Plaintiff here, sued AIA's attorneys alleging that, among
other things, they had engaged in malpractice by assisting AIA in allegedly misappropriating
funds resulting in AIA defaulting on a promissory note issued to Taylor. McNichols, 149 Idaho
at 831, 243 P.3d at 647. He went on to argue that, as a third-party beneficiary to the attorneyclient relationship that existed between the attorneys and AIA, he had standing to pursue
malpractice claims against the attorneys. Id. The supreme court first noted that it had considered
a legal-malpractice claim in Harrigfield v. Hancock and briefly set forth its findings in that case.
It went on to hold:
It is clear that Reed [Taylor], in his complaints has failed to allege that he is in an
attorney-client relationship with respondents, and therefore lacks the privity
necessary to sue Respondents for legal malpractice. Harrigfield is the only ca~e in
which this Court has found an exception to this requirement . . . [Therein, the
Court concluded that] a direct attorney-client relationship is required to existent
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL
FROM THE COURT'S INTERLOCUTORY ORDER - 5
002598

between the plaintiff and the attorney-defendant in a legal malpractice action
except in this very narrow circumstance.
McNichols, 149 Idaho at 845, 243 P.3d at 661.
In Soignier v. Fletcher, the Supreme Court reviewed a district court's granting of
summary judgment in favor of an attorney on a beneficiary's claim against the attorney for legal
malpractice. See Soignier, 151 Idaho 322, 256 P.3d 730, 734 (2011). Soignier resulted when a
beneficiary appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant attorney. The
beneficiary argued that the attorney had negligently failed to ensure that a will he prepared
conveyed to her proceeds of a trust of which the decedent was a beneficiary, but that he had
elected to dispose of shortly before his death.
The supreme court again turned to Harrigfield in assessing the beneficiary's claim. It
found that the only exception that Harrigfield carved out of the attorney-client privilege was the
extension of an attorney's duty to beneficiaries to ensure that the testator's intent as expressed in
the testamentary instruments was properly effectuated. It refused to stretch that exception further
to cover a beneficiary alleging that an attorney negligently failed to ensure that a testator had not
disposed of interests he granted to beneficiaries prior to his death. Again, the Court maintained
its previous holding limiting an attorney's duty to a non-client to the narrow circumstances
described in Harrigfield.

4)

The Third Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Reconsideration
Defendants filed their third motion for summary judgment and motion for reconsideration

in this case on August 15, 2012. 1 Therein, Defendants asked the Court to dismiss the Plaintiffs

1
The second motion for summary judgment was filed on February 4, 2012, and dealt with the issue of fraud not
relevant to this motion.
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case on two grounds relevant to this Motion. The first related to an attorney's duty to a nonclient and the second to the doctrine of res judicata.
a)

Defendants Ask the Court to Reconsider its Previous Holding Considering the
Additional Case Law Reinforcing an Attorney's Limited Duty to a Non-Client

First, the Defendants asked that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's case as the Idaho Supreme
Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to expand the legal obligation an attorney might
have to those individuals with whom the attorney does not have a traditional attorney-client
relationship beyond the exceptions set forth in Harrigfield. The defense explicitly addressed the
Supreme Court's findings in both McNichols and Soignier in arguing that as the Court had
agreed in the first motion for summary judgment, no attorney-client relationship existed between
Taylor and the defense. The defense went on to argue that, because the Supreme. Court had
consistently refused to expand that duty to non-clients with the exception of the narrow
circumstances set forth in Harrigfield, Taylor's claim against the defendants should be
summarily dismissed.
b)

Consideration of the Res judicata Argument:

Second, the Defendants asked the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's case on summary judgment
under the doctrine of res judicata.

Defendants asserted that Plaintiffs malpractice claim should

have and could have been brought in 2008 when Taylor brought suit against Riley in Taylor v.
Babbit for professional negligence. The doctrine of res judicata obliged Plaintiff to bring all

claims he had against Mr. Riley and his firm Eberle Berlin for professional negligence at once,
including any claims based on the Opinion Letter, as facts relating to Riley's alleged negligence
in preparing the Opinion Letter were known to Taylor at the time he brought. the initial
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malpractice lawsuit against Riley. See Role Models America, Inc. v. Penamr Dev. Corp., 394
F.Supp.2d 121, 135 (D.D.C. 2005).
c)

The Court's Findings:

On October 24, 2012, the Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order Re:

Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and Reconsideration and Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration (hereafter "Memorandum Opinion"). In its written order, the Court denied
Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

It held that the cases cited by the defense,

McNichols and Soignier, do not stand for the proposition that there are no circumstances beyond
0

those set forth in Harrigfield pursuant to which an attorney can be held liable fo r negligence to a
non-client. The Court went on to hold that the issue of whether an attorney can be held liable for
malpractice for opinions set forth in an Opinion Letter to a non-client is an issue of first
impression not previously decided by Idaho appellate courts as opposed to a change in
preexisting Idaho law.
Relating to the defense's res judicata argument, the Court held that the factual grouping
that constituted the transaction eventually leading to Taylor filing lawsuits in Babbitt and the
present case were "not sufficiently related in time, space, origin, motivation or trial evidence to
arise from the same transaction" and that the present case was, accordingly, not barred by the
doctrine of res judicata.
ARGUMENT
The defense requests that this Court grant it permission to appeal from the Court's

Memorandum Opinion pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12 (l.A.R. 12). Under l.A.R. 12, a
party to an action in district court may seek permission to appeal from an interlocutory order
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which is not otherwise appealable as a matter of right under I.A.R. 11. Specifically, I.A.R. 12(a)
provides:
Permission may be granted by the Supreme Court to appeal from an interlocutory
order or judgment ... which is not otherwise appealable under these rules, but
which involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
grounds for differences of opinion and in which an immediate appeal from the
order or decree may materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation.
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained that the intent of I.A.R. 12 is to provide an
immediate appeal from an interlocutory order in which substantial legal issues of great public
interest or legal questions of first impression are involved. Rudell v. Todd, 105 Idaho ~. 665 P .2d
701 (1983). Further, the Supreme Court has held that a district court should consider additional
factors in determining whether to grant permission for the appeal including the impact of an
immediate appeal upon the parties, the effect of the delay of the proceedings in the district court
pending the appeal, the likelihoo'd or possibility of a second appeal after judgment is finally
entered by the district court, and the case workload of the appellate courts. Id at 32, P.2d at 703.

1)

Legal Questions of First Impression and Substantial Questions of Law
First, an immediate appeal from the Court's interlocutory order is appropriate because

this case involves legal questions of first impression as well as controlling questions of law as to
which there are substantial grounds for differences of opinion.

a)

Harrigfield

According to this Court, whether Plaintiff has a cause of action for

malpracti~e

based on

the information provided in the Opinion Letter is an issue of first impression in Idaho. Of note,
the defense argues that the issue is not an issue of first impression to the extent that the Idaho
Supreme has already held on more than one occasion that "a direct attorney-client relationship is
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required to exist between the plaintiff and the attorney-defendant in a legal malpractice action
except for the very narrow circumstance where the intended beneficiary of a testamentary
instrument brings a malpractice claim against the attorney who drafted said instrument."
McNichols, 149 Idaho at 845, 243 P.3d at 661 (citing Harrigfield, 140 Idaho at 139, 90 P.3d at

889). However, the Court is correct that the extent to which an attorney can be held liable for
malpractice based on information provided in an opinion letter to a non-client has never
specifically been addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court. To that end, whether the defense can
be held liable for malpractice in this case is an issue of first impression and, pursuant to l.A.R.
12(a), the Court should grant Defendants' permissive appeal. Further, relating to issues of first
impression, this Court has already made clear that it assesses its role as determining the Idaho
Supreme Court's likely ruling on particular matters to the best of its abilities given jhe Court's
previous holdings and reasoning. (Memorandum Opinion, p. 13). A Rule 12 appeal would
provide the Court and parties hereto with the Idaho Supreme Court's actual ruling on the issue
and thus the appeal should be granted.
The extent to which an attorney can be held liable for malpractice for information
provided in Opinion Letters to non-clients is a substantial legal issue of great public interest.
Whether or not the Idaho Supreme Court determines that it is appropriate to expand its view of
the attorney-client relationship beyond the narrow circumstance set forth in Harrigfield could
have a significant impact on the legal field and on the extent to which attorneys are willing to
opine as to the potential outcome of future dealings for non-clients. It is important for attorney
and non-client alike to know and understand the expectations that can attach to and the possible
ramifications that can result from such a relationship. This Court has expressly recognized that
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an attorneys liability to non-clients should be considered in light of policy considerations relating
to attorneys freedom to give advice and perform work for a client without fear of liability to a
third party, where an attorney's loyalty must lie, and the extent to which attorneys should be held
liable to third parties who claim to have relied on the attorney's advice. For these reasons, the
expansion of Harrigfield to cases where attorneys draft opinion letters for non-clients is a
substantial legal issue of great public interest.
b)

Res judicata

Eberle Berlin is a remaining party in this litigation pursuant to the doctrine of vicarious
liability. Riley, currently an attorney at Hawley Troxell, and Turnbow were both employed as
attorneys at Eberle Berlin at the time they drafted the opinion letter. The Court in this matter has
previously noted that, as a defendant under the doctrine of vicarious liability, Eberle Berlin has
no independent liability to Taylor. Accordingly, the doctrine of res judicata applies to Eberle
Berlin to the same extent as to Riley.
The res judicata issue is a substantial legal issue of great public interest. The law of res
judicata "reflects the expectation that parties who are given the capacity to present their entire

controversies shall in fact do so." Diamond v. Farmers Group, 199 Idaho 146, 148, 7804 P.2d
319, 322 (1990) (internal quotations omitted). "The sameness of a cause of action for purposes
of application of the doctrine of res judicata is determined by examining the operative facts
underlying the two lawsuits." Id. citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 61, Comment a
(Tent.Draft No. 1 1973). The res judicata analysis in this case must begin with the opinion letter
that the Defendants provided Taylor on or about August 15, 1995.

Taylor's purpose in

requesting the letter was so that he could assess the enforceability of the 1995

Agre~ment.

The
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letter focused on exactly that-the enforceability of the agreement. Nearly 13 years later, Taylor
filed suit against AIA, as discussed above, and the defendants successfully defended the suit by
arguing that Stock Redemption Agreement between Mr. Taylor and AIA was .illegal and
unenforceable.

The AIA defendants filed ·a motion for summary judgment asserting the

unenforceability defense on April 16, 2008.

Taylor brought suit against Riley, one of the

attorneys who drafted the opinion letter and his new firm, Hawley Troxell on August 18, 2008
for professional malpractice.

At the time that Taylor filed the complaint against Riley and

Hawley Troxell he was aware (1) that Riley, while an attorney at Eberle Berlin, worked with
Turnbow to draft an opinion letter indicating that the 1995 Redemption Agreement was
enforceable and (2) that the defendants had presented an argument nearly four months earlier that
the agreement was in fact neither enforceable or legal. However, Taylor elected not to allege
malpractice based on the opinions set forth in the letter in arguing that Mr. Riley should be held
liable for malpractice relating to his role in the AIA stock redemption. At the time Taylor filed
the 2008 suit against Riley and Hawley Troxell for malpractice he had the capacity to present a
malpractice claim relating to the information provided in the opinion letter.
In denying Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Court here found that Taylor
was suing Riley and his firm for malpractice for "other behavior" they engaged in' relating to
Taylor's separation from AIA and the litigation resulting therefrom. The Court further held that
the "opinion letter was not central, or even important, in the outcome in Babbitt." However, the
"sameness" of the cause of action for the purposes of application of the doctrine of res judicata
is determined not by the outcome of the first suit, but on the "operative facts" underlying both
lawsuits. Diamond, 199 Idaho at 148, 7804 P.2d at 322. Here, the lawsuits both stemmed from
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Taylor's dissatisfaction with AIA's performance relating to the Stock Redemption Agreement
and Riley's alleged malpractice relating thereto. Further, Taylor was aware that the opinion
letter was allegedly flawed at the time he brought the first suit. See Memorandum in Support of

Defendants Richard Riley and Hawley Troxell 's First Motion for Summary Judgment, 11 n.14
(2010). Accordingly, although the litigation path in this case is complex and convoluted, the
basic facts known to Taylor at the time he brought the initial suit against Taylor and Hawley
Troxell are related and, accordingly, Taylor's current suit should be barred by the doctrine of res

judicata.
Clarifying the rules of res judicata in cases of long drawn-out litigation is a substantial
legal issue in which there should be great public interest. The legal community, especially, is
likely very interested in the Supreme Court's impression of whether malpractice

cla~ms

against

the same attorney stemming from the same facts can be split and not barred by the doctrine of res

judicata in complex cases.
2)

Consideration of the Budell Factors

The Budell factors, most notably, the potential for appeal following the trial of this matter
are also relevant to this case. In Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg 'l Med. Ctr., the Supreme Court
granted an appeal of a district court's order granting Defendants' protective order and denying
plaintiff's motion to compel relating to whether Idaho Code § 39-1392(b) protects medical peer
review records from being discovered in all types of cases, not just medical malpractice cases.

See Verska, 151 Idaho 880, 802, 265 P.3d 502, 506.

In explaining its grant of the appeal, the

Verska Court noted that not only was this a matter of first impression, but also that an
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"immediate appeal would advance the orderly resolution of the litigation, and would decreased
the likelihood of a second appeal." Id
The same is true in the case at hand. The progeny of cases that have stemmed from the
AIA and Taylor's failed negotiation and Taylor's belief that he was not adequately compensated
for his shares of AIA stock have been ongoing for several years and even now, resolution of the
case is unlikely following the upcoming trial in this matter without direction from an appellate
court as to the Supreme Court's willingness to expand on Harrigfield. While the resolution
Taylor's claims have not necessarily been "orderly" in the opinion of many, resolving the issues
herein, particularly the applicability of Harrigfield to this case will advance the orderly and
sound progression of the case.
Allowing the defense to immediately appeal the issues addressed herein will also serve to
materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation. This involves consideration of judicial
economy and potential waste of judicial resources. As the Court noted in its Memorandum
Opinion, "if the only exception to the rule that an attorney is not liable to anyone [who is] not the
attorneys [sic] client as stated in Harrigfield, then Reed Taylor has no claim against these
defendants because Reed Taylor was not their client." (Memorandum Opinion, p. 12). If the
litigation in this matter was to ultimately end as a result of the immediate appeal, which is a very
significant possibility given the supreme court's continued refusal to expand the attorney liability
to a non-client beyond the narrow circumstances established in Harrigfield, this

lit~gation

will

have ended in the most orderly resolution possible at this point.
Regardless of whether this Court's opinion dismissing Defendants' motion for summary
judgment is erroneous or correct, the parties will end up effectively trying this case; which has
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been drawn out and litigated piece by piece in multiple matters, twice. It would be advantageous
for the parties and the Court to receive appellate guidance on the issues set forth herein prior to
the trial of this matter. It is preferable to having the issue determined as a result of a lengthy and
expensive trial, which once concluded, will almost certainly be followed by an appeal. The
consequences· and time considerations that attach to potentially having to try this case twice
warrant granting the defense's motion for a permissive appeal at this time.
CONCLUSION
The defense has demonstrated that the requisite elements of I.A.R. 12 exist and that other
factors, including the likelihood of future appeal, exist and warrant the permissive appeal of the
Court's Memorandum Opinion, which was entered on October 24, 2012. Accordingly, the
defense respectfully requests that the Court grant this Motion for Permissive Appeal from an

Interlocutory Order.
DATED this

gr

s'day of October, 2012.

GJORDING FOUSER, PLLC
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Defendants.
The plaintiff: Reed J. Taylor (Taylor), through his attorneys of record,
respectfully submits this Memorandum in Opposition to:
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1. Defendant Richard A. Riley's Motion for Pennission to Appeal Memorandum
Opinion and Order Re: Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and
Reconsideration; and
2. Motion for Permission to Appeal from the Court's Interlocutory Order (filed by
Sharon Cummings (Cummings), Personal Representative of the Estate of
Robert M. Turnbow, and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen,
Chartered (Eberle Berlin)).
INTRODUCTION
Richard A. Riley (Riley) requests leave of the Court to appeal its denial of his
motion for summary judgment notwithstanding bis candid admission that "[a]n order
denying a motion for summary judgment is not an appealable order itself." Defendant's
Memo, p. 3 (citation omitted). Eberle Berlin and Cummings have filed what might best
be characterized as a "me too" motion joining in the arguments advanced by Riley. Riley
characterizes his motion, and by implication that of the other defendants, as a motion that
"will materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation" by resolving a legal issue
"of public interest and of first impression" on which there is "substantial grounds for
difference of opinion." Id. In reality, the motions are merely another attempt to delay an
already protracted proceeding to the detriment of their aging 76 year old victim. As the
defendants undertake great efforts to prolong a resolution on the merits, the maxim
'justice delayed is justice denied" is quickly becoming Taylor's reality.
Contrary to the defendants' contention, the issues the defendants seek to present
on appeal do not give rise to substantial grounds for difference of opinion. Whether an
attorney has a duty to those to whom he/she tenders an opinion letter is not even a close
legal question. It is one that must be answered in the affirmative. Any contrary
conclusion would eviscerate several decades ofjurisprudence and render the entire legal
concept of legal opinions void. To so hold would be to state that untold sums in legal fees
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incurred for opinion letters were literally wasted on a colossal legal confidence scheme.
The other issues, res judicata and waiver, simiJarly do not give rise to substantial grounds
for difference of opinion.
Perhaps more critically, rather than advance the orderly resolution of this
litigation, presenting those questions to the Supreme Court at this time hinders the orderly
resolution of this case. The defendants may dispute the correctness of the Court's
decisions, but Taylor respectfuUy talces exception to other issues decided by the Court. If
he is not successful, he will most assuredly appeal those issues. Judicial economy and
orderly resolution demands that this case proceed to trial as scheduled and that the parties
be allowed to sort out their appellate issues in a single appellate proceeding.
ARGUMENT

Riley's request should be denied for multiple reasons. First, as Riley has
acknowledged, a denial of summary judgment is not an appea.lable decision. Second,
Riley's reliance upon Rule 12 of the Idaho Appellate Rules is misplaced because the
proposed appeal will not "materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigationL]"
because the questions presented do not involve substantial grounds for difference of
opinion, and because the motion is futile and need not be resolved at this time. And
finally, the proposed appeal is not timely.
I.

A Denial of Summary Judgment is not Appealable.

The defendants' motion for leave to appeal this Court's denial of their motions
seeking summary judgment should be denied because the denial of a summary judgment
motion is not appeaJable. The Idaho Supreme Court has held, "[A]n order denying a
motion for summary judgment is not a final order and a direct appeal cannot be taken
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from it." Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 743, 9 P.3d 1204, 1209
(2000).
The rationale for this rule is welJ stated in Evans v. Jensen, 103 Idaho 937, 655
P.2d 454 (1982). The Court reasoned, "[B]y entering an order denying summary
judgment, the trial court merely indicates that the matter should proceed to trial on its
merits ... The final judgment in a case can be tested upon the record made at trial, not
the record made at the time summary judgment was denied." Evans, 103 Idaho at 942,
655 P.2d at 459 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court further noted that allowing an
appeal of a denial of summary judgment is inconsistent with the general admonition to
proceed with caution when granting summary judgment "if any doubt exists as to the
right of a party to a trial." Id. (quoting Vincen v. Lazarus, 93 Idaho 145, 152, 456 P.2d
789, 796 (1969)).
Notwithstanding this general prohibition against appeals from denial of summary
judgment, the defendants seek leave to appeal pursuant to Rule 12 of the Idaho Appellate
Rules. Beyond not qualifying their requested appeals pursuant to the requirements of
Rule 12, as discussed further below, the defendants' motions should be denied because
the Court has already correctly ruled that the matter should proceed to trial. In close
cases, trial is the preferred course. If: after trial, the defendants still believe an appeal is
necessary, they can appeal as a matter of right from the final judgment and obtain the
preferable resolution of having the case "tested upon the record made at trial[.r Evans,

supra.
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II.
Rule 12 of the Idaho Appellate Rule does not Support the Defendants'
Motions.

The defendants, acknowledging that the denial of their summary judgment
motions is not appealable, seek leave to appeal by permission pursuant to RuJe 12 of the
Idaho Appellate Rules. That appeal should be denied because the requested appeal is by
no means exceptional and the defendants have not met and cannot meet the requirements
for a permissive appeal.
I.A.R. 12(a) identifies two threshold questions that must be answered
affirmatively before permission to appeal may be granted. Permission to appeal an
otherwise non-appealable interlocutory order may be granted if it "involves a controlling
question of Jaw as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in
which an immediate appeal from the order or decree may materially advance the orderly
resolution of the litigation." The use of the inclusive conjunction "and" demands that a
movant be able to show both:
1. "A controlling question oflaw as to which there is substantial grounds for
difference of opinion[;]" and

2. That the appeal would "materially advance the orderly resolution of the
litigation."
The defendants cannot show either and there motions should be denied.
Furthermore, even if these threshold questions are answered affirmatively, permissive
appeal is not automatic and there are a number of other factors to be considered by the
Court in addressing a Rule 12 motion. The Idaho Supreme Court has identified the
following factors, all of which weigh against the defendants' motions, including: ''the
impact of an immediate appeal upon the parties, the effect of the delay of the proceedings
in the district court pending appeal, the likelihood or possibility of a second appeal after
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judgment is finally entered by the disbict court, and the case workload of the appellate
courts." Bude// v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2, 4, 665 P.2d 701, 703 (1983). The Supreme Court
added, "[T]he Court intends by Rule 12 to create an appeal in the exceptional case and
does not intend by the rule to broaden the appeals which may be taken as a matter of right
under I.A.R. 11.0 Id. Each of the factors articulated in Bude/I weighs against the
defendants' requested appeals.
In addition to the foregoing, the motions should also be denied as untimely.

A.

Riley's proposed appeals will not "materially advance the orderly

resolution of the litigation."

The defendants propose appealing three issues: (1) whether the defendants owed
Taylor, a non-client, a professional duty; (2) whether Taylor's claims are barred by the
doctrine of res judicata; and (3) whether Taylor waived his claims or they are otherwise
barred by a change of facts. 1 As to the first two, the defendants advance the same
argument to contend that an appeal now would "materially advance the orderly resolution
of the litigatioo."2 It is the defendants' contention that "[a]n immediate appeal could
resolve the litigation[,]" or as stated regarding the res judicata argument, "It could resolve
the litigation in its entirety." Defendant's Memo, pp. 9 and 14. To the contrary, an
immediate appeal can only serve to delay this case another two years, not end it. The case
has already been delayed over two years at the request of the defendants.
1
As to the third issue, whether Taylor waived his claims or they are barred by a change of facts, the
defendants make no attempt to show that an appeal of this issue meets the requirements ofRuJe 12. Indeed,
Riley candidly acknowledges that it does not. Instead, Riley attempts to bootstrap a pennissive appeal of
this issue relying on Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, lSO Idaho 856 252 P.3d 1274 (2011} for the proposition
that if other issues meet the criteria for pennissive appeal, all issues can be appealed from as well. This
contention is exactly opposite the hol.ding from Miller, which states, "Because a pennlssive appeal under
I.A.R. 12 from a denial ofa motion for summary judgment leads to such an unusual procedural posture,
[the Supreme Court] must 'rule narrowly and address only the precise question that was framed by the
motion and answered by the trial court." Miller, 150 Idaho at 863, 252 P.3d at 1281 (quotingAardemav.
U.S. Dairy System, Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 789, 215 P.3d SOS, 509 (2009} (emphasis added}.
2
Because the defendants make no effort to show that the third issue meets the requirements ofl.A.R. 12,
this memorandum will focus on the first two issues.
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The defendants' arguments on this issue are simply wrong. Two outcomes are
possible from an appeal of the issues proposed by the defendants at this time. One
outcome is that the defendants prevail on all issues and the matter is remanded back to
this Court for entry of judgment. The other outcome is that Taylor prevails on one or
more issues, in which case the matter is remanded back to this Court for a new trial
setting. Setting aside the fact that the defendants' argument is supported by nothing more
than specuJation about appellate outcomes. there is nothing to support their contention
that an appeal now would end the litigation.
Under the latter scenario, a remand for trial, the litigants will find themselves
back where they are today, awaiting trial, but they will have wasted untold months, likely
at Jeast a year and a half on the appeaJ, and will be further delayed because by then the
Court's trial calendar will be occupied likely for several months out.
Under the former scenario, a remand for entry of judgment, the litigants wi11 be no
closer to the end of the litigation because the now 76-year-old Taylor will, at that point,
undoubtedly file an appeal as a matter of right on various other issues-if he is alive.
Issues which Taylor may present on appeal include, but are not limited to:
1. Whether the Court erred in dismissing his negligent misrepresentation claim, an
issue ripe for appeal based upon the adoption of the cause of action against
attorneys by non-client beneficiaries in various jurisdictions. See, e.g., Roberts
v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 128 Cal.Rptr. 901, 905 (Cal. 1976)
(attorney liable for negligent misrepresentations in an opinion letter under the
same ba1ance-of-the-harms test adopted in Harrigfeld'); Greycas, Inc. v. Pro~d,
826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987); McCamish v. F. E. Appling Interests, 991
S.W.2d 787 (Texas 1999); Homeowners' Assistance Corp. v. Merrimack
Mortgage Co., Inc., 2000 Me. Super. LEXIS 13 (Maine 2000); Allen v. Steele,
252 P.3d 476 (Colo. 2011); Sanders v. Bressler, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8352
(E.D.N. Y. 2006).3
3

Taylor's damages would be the same under common law negligence or negligent misrepresentations.
Thus, after trial and if an appeal follows, the Idaho Supreme Court could hold that negligent
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2. Whether the Court erred in concluding as a matter of law that there was not an
attomeyMclient relationship between Taylor and the defendants in light of the
Idaho Supreme Court's recent declaration that "[w]hether an attorney-client
relationship exists is a question of fact[,]'9 and that "There are also
circumstances in which the existence of an attorney-client relationship can exist
based upon the attorney's failure to clarify whom the attorney is representing
where, under the circumstances, one of the parties could reasonably believe that
the attorney is representing that person's interests. Berry v. McFarland, 278
P.3d 407, 411 (2012). This same issue would be appealed as to whether Taylor
and AIA Services were jointly represented by the defendants-which is also an
issue of fact. Wick v. Eisman, 122 Idaho 698, 838 P.2d 30 I (1992).
3. Whether Taylor's claims accrued when Judge Brodie ruled that the Stock
Redemption Agreement was both illegal and unenforceable on June 17, 2009at which time Taylor was actually damaged because the $6 Million
consideration for his shares would not be paid or collected. City ofMcCall v.
Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 661, 201P.3d629, 634 (2006) (holding "there must be
objective proof that would support the existence of some actual damage" and
"objective proof did not occur until there was a court decision adverse to the
client. .."); Mack Financial Corporation v. Smith, 111 Idaho 8, 720 P.2d 191
(1986). lfthe Idaho Supreme Court agrees, then the defendants' res judicata
arguments are rendered moot, assuming they had merit in the first place.
4. Whether Taylor had an actionable relationship of trust or fiduciary relationship
with the defendants based upon their long-standing positions as the joint
attorneys for Taylor and AJA Services and whether they assumed a duty to
Taylor when they agreed to prepare and deliver the opinion letter to him. Jones
v. Run.ft, Leroy, Coffin & Matthews, Chartered, 125 Idaho 607, 612-13, 873
P.2d 861, 866-67 (1994); Stearns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 288, 240 P.2d 833,
840-41 (1952); Bethlahmyv. Beckie/, 91Idaho55, 62, 415 P.2d 698, 705
(1966); McGhee v. McGhee, 82 Idaho 367, 371, 353 P.2d 760, 762 (1960);
Lewis v. Rosenfeld, 138 F.Supp.2d 466, 480 (S.D. N.Y. 2001).
Because Taylor has indisputably been injured, if the proposed appeals were
accepted and the defendwits were successful, he would be left with no choice to appeal
the final judgment entered on remand in order to address these and other decisions.
Allowing the defendants to "cherry pick" their issues on appeal now, prior to resolution
at trial, would potentially force the parties to go through the appeals process twice.

misrepresentation claims are valid in Idaho against attorneys and reverse as to a common law negligence
claim, but still affirm in all respects because proof and damages are identical.
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Indeed, even if the defendants only prevailed in part, the possibility of duplicate appeals
remains. Such a procedure is the exact antitheses of an orderly resolution.
Rather than "materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation, the
defendants proposed appeal will hinder an orderly resolution and significantly increase
both the time and expense associated with resolving this case. The more efficient and
judicially preferred procedure is to alJow the issues to go to trial and then, if the parties
deem it necessary, allow alJ appealable issues to be presented to the appellate court as
either an appeal or cross appeal. Because the defendants' requested appeal will hinder the
"orderly resolution of the litigation~J" the defendants Rule 12 motion for permission to
appeal should be denied.

B.

The defendants' proposed appeals do not raise "a controlling

question oflaw as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of

opinion[.]"
Even if we were to assume that the defendants' proposed appeals would advance
the resolution of the litigation, the defendants cannot establish the other threshold
requirement to a pennissive appeal. In addition to showing that the appeal will "advance
the orderly resolution of the litigation[,)" the defendants must show that the appeal
"involves a controJiing question of law as to which there is substantial grounds for
difference of opinion." 1.A.R. 12(a). "[J]ust because a court is the first to rule on a
particular question ... does not mean that there is such a substantial difference of opinion
as will support an interlocutory appeal." 2 Fed. Proc., L. Ed§ 3:212. Likewise, "a mere
claim that the district court's ruling was incorrect does not demonstrate the required
substantial ground for difference of opinion." Id. The defendants cannot meet this burden
with respect to either question presented. WbiJe the issues may present controlling
questions of law as to certain issues, the defendants completely ignore the other
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Permissive Appeal
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controlling questions of law that would not be included on a permissive appeal. However,
there are not substantial grounds for difference of opinion as to either controlling
questions of law asserted by the defendants. This Court has correctly ruled on both issues
and the defendants arguments to the contrary rely upon a disregard for and/or
mischaracterization of the controlling authority on the questions presented. The fact that
negligence claims against an opinion giver has never been adjudicated by en Idaho or that
the defendants do not agree with the Court's decisions do not create a substantial grounds
for difference of opinion. The Court correctly concluded that the defendants did owe
Taylor a duty and that his claims arising from that duty are not barred by the doctrine of
res judicata.4
1.

An attorney owes a duty to opinion letter recipients.

The defendants' motion for permission to appeal this Court's conclusion that the
defendants owed Taylor a duty in drafting their opinion letter should be rejected because
the issue is not a close call and the Court correctly applied the law of this state in making
its decision. The defendants argument is rooted in a mischaracterization of Ha"igfeld v.
Hancock, 140, Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004), and it shocks the conscience, frankJy, that

the defendants contend an attorney owes no duty to the recipient of an opinion letter upon
which the attorney deliberately intends to have that recipient rely. Significantly, the
defendants have failed to cite a single case that holds en attorney is not liable to a nonclient for preparing and delivering an incorrect opinion letter. Thus, in reality, there is no
difference in opinion because the defendants have failed to cite any authority.

4

The Court also correctJy concluded that the 1996 restructure, alleged ''fail-safe" clause argument, and the
later subordination between Taylor and Donna Taylor do not bar Taylor's claims for negligence, Again,
the defendants cannot manufacture a substantial difference in opinion simply because they do not agree
with the Court's decision.
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This Court correctly applied the rules articulated in Harrigfeld, and reached a
correct conclusion. The defendants maintain that Ha"igfeld "carved out the sole
exception to the rule that an attorney is not liable to anyone no the attorney's client[.]"
Defendant's Memo, p. 5. The effective Harrigfeld is two-fold. First, it identities one
specific exception to the general rule on attorney liability, namely the exception that was
before the court in that case, attorney liability to third-party beneficiaries identified in
testamentary instruments prepared by the attorney. Harrigfeld, 140 Idaho at 139, 90 P.3d
at 889. More importantly, Ha"igfeld clearly articulates the balance-of-the-banns test to
be applied in deciding whether to recognize a new duty or extend a duty beyond that
previously imposed.5 Application of that test clearly demonstrates that an attorney does
owe a duty to the recipient of an opinion letter drafted by the attorney. Similarly, those
jurisdictions that have considered the question have unanimously found that such a duty
does exist under some form of negligence. Indeed, the defendants have failed to identify a
single jurisdiction wherein a court has held that attorney's can draft opinion letters with
impunity. And finally, so fundamental is the principal that an attorney is liable to the
recipient of an opinion Jetter that it has been clearly recognized in the Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAwGOVERNING LA WYERS
§51(2).
Harrigfeld identifies the balance-of-the-banns test, which "involves the

consideration of policy and the weighing of factors, which include:"
1. Foreseeability of hann to plaintiff;
2. Degree of certainty that plaintiff was injured;
5

In Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 128 Cal.Rptr. 901, 905 (Cal. 1976), the California
Court of Appeals held, under the same balance-of-the-banns analysis adopted by Herrigfeld, that an
attorney was liable for negligent misrepresentations for delivering an incorrect opinion letter.
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3. Closeness of connection between the defendant's conduct and the harm;
4. Mora.I blame attached to the defendant's conduct;
5.Policy of preventing future harm;

6. Extent of the burden on defendant;
7. Consequences to the community of imposing a duty of care; and
8. The availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.

Id. at 138, 888.

As set forth in Taylor's Memo in Opposition to Eberle Berlin's Renewed Motion
for Summary Judgment (which is incorporated by reference herein), all of the balance-ofthe-harms test factors are met and applying them to the present case establishes a clear
case of attorney liability. One of the primary purposes of an attorney opinion letter is to
provide the recipient with assurances of the validity of a transaction based upon the legal
.

opinion of the other side's counsel. "When all a lender or investor is receiving from a
company is promises and a piece of paper purporting to be a promissory note or stock, it
wants counsel for the company to tell it that it is getting what it thinks it is getting from a
legal standpoint and that the transaction will not create any major legal problems."
DONALD

w. GLAZER, Scorr FITZGIBBON & STEVEN 0. WEISE, GLAZER AND FITZGIBBON

ON LEGAL OPINIONS: DRAFTING, INTERPRETING AND SUPPORTING CLOSING OPINIONS IN

BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 2 (2008); see also 'I'RIBAR OPINION COMMITIEE, THIRD-PAR1Y
"CLOSING" OPINIONS, 53 Bus. Law. 591 (1998). The harm to recipients of such letters is
clearly foreseeable and the harm suffered by Taylor was clearly foreseeable. When, as a
result of attorney negligence, the transaction is not what it was intended and represented
to be, there is a high degree of certainty the recipient will be harmed. In this case, Taylor
was banned, indisputably. In such a circumstance, including the present case, the
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connection between the defendant's conduct and the harm suffered is direct. But for
defendants' conduct, Taylor would not have suffered the hann he suffered. He testified
that he relied upon the opinion letter completely because he is not an attorney or
accountant and does not know anything about transactional documents and that he based
his acceptance of the transactional documents on the opinion letter. Taylor Dep., p. 114, 1.
16-p. 115, l. 18. There is sufficient moraJ blame attached to the defendants' negligent
preparation of the opinion letter to impose liability because the defendants wrote the
letter specifically to induce Taylor's reliance. Imposing liability in this context will
prevent future harm by creating an incentive to prepare such instruments carefully and
not in a misleading fashion. On the other hand, not imposing liability would cause harm
to countless existing transactions and the legal profession generaJly. It would also
jeopardize future commercial transactions in Idaho because parties would not enter into
those transactions without an opinion letter addressing the impact, if any, of particular
Idaho laws on a transaction. Attorneys have been. for decades, preparing and billing for
the preparation of opinion letters. They have also been purchasing malpractice insurance
to cover claims for such opinion letters. Holding now that those attorneys are not
responsible for the things stated in those letters would reduce the opinion letter
component of the legal industry to a giant confidence scheme with attorneys duping
clients into paying exorbitant fees for meaningless opinion letters. Imposing the duty
would not unduly increase the burden upon attorneys because any honest practitioner
operating in the opinion letter area will candidly acknowledge that he or she is already
exercising the utmost care in the drafting of opinion letters and malpractice insurance is
readily available to cover the risk of error. It is, to be straightforward, inconceivable that
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the Idaho Supreme Court would absolve attorneys from responsibility for the
representations they make to third parties in opinion letters.
Other courts addressing the issue have consistently found a duty owed by the
opinion writer to the recipient. See, e.g.• Prudential Ins. Co. v. Dewey, Ballantine,
Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 605 N.E.2d 318, 322 (N.Y. 1992) ("bond" between opinion

giver and third-party recipient "sufficiently close to establish a duty of care running from
the former to the latter'' when cJosing opinion was addressed and sent direct1y to the
opinion recipient and was relied on by the recipient); Dean Foods Co. v. Pappathanasi,
18 Mass. L. Rep. 598 (Mas. Super. Ct. 2004) (holding opinion giver liable to opinion
recipient for negligent misrepresentation, while acknowledging that the claim was also
grounded in common law negligence). Indeed, some courts have gone a step further and
held that non-addressees relying on the opinion may hold the drafter liable. See, e.g.•
Crossland &wings FSB v. Rockwood Ins. Co., 700 F. Supp. 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)

(holding that under New York law assignee of notes has standing to sue for errors in a
closing opinion that was not addressed to it but that expressly contemplated reliance by
assignees). The defendants, in drafting their opinion letter to Taylor, specifically
represented that he could rely upon their opinions. They should not now be allowed to
further delay this proceeding with a specious argument that he cannot so rely.
The doctrine that an opinion letter writer is responsible for its content and owes a
duty to its recipient is perhaps most clearly spelled out in the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers.
A lawyer owes a duty to use care within the meaning of§ 52 in each of the
following circumstances: ... (2) to a nonclient when and to the extent
that: (a) the lawyer or (with the lawyer's acquiescence) the lawyer's client
invites the nonclient to rely on the lawyer's opinion or provision of other
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legal services, and the nonclient so relies; and (b) the nonclient is not,
under applicable tort law, too remote from the lawyer to be entitled to
protection[.]
6

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LA w GOVERNING LA WYERS §51(2). A lawyer's duty in

such circumstances is to "exercise the competence and diligence normally exercised by
lawyers in similar circumstances." Id., §52(1).
That the defendants owed a duty to Taylor is not reasonably subject to dispute and
this Court should reject all arguments to the contnuy in considering their motion for
permission to appeal. The issue presented is not one on which there is any legitimate
grounds for difference of opinion, much less "substantial grounds." The defendants have
failed to meet their burden and their motions should be denied.

2.

Application of Res Judicata

As with their arguments on the issue of duty, the defendants' arguments on the
issue ofresjudicata are rooted in a mischaracterization of the law. Resjudicata is settled
law in Idaho and the defendants rely upon their mischaracterized definition of a
"transaction" in res judicata. See Ticor Title Co. v Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 157 P.3d 613
(2007) (explaining the definition of"transaction" for purposes ofresjudicata).
In Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 157 P.3d 613 (2007), the definition of what

factors constituted a ''transaction" was clearly articulated:
Whether a factual grouping constitutes a transaction "is to be determined
pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts
are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a
convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the
parties' expectations or business understanding ...

6

This is consistent with Comment 3 to IRPC 2.3, which states "[w]hen the evaluation is intended for the
information or use of a third person, a legal duty to that person may or may not arise. That legal question is
beyond the scope of this Rule."
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Id. at 126 (citation omitted). The defendants disagree with the factual grouping, but that
does not make it a controlling issue of law. The defendants ignore the fact that claims

Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P.3d 642 (2010) (referred to by the parties and
the Court as nray/or v. Babbitt'') were based entirely on litigation conduct and other torts
occurring long after the Stock Redemption Agreement was executed in 1996. In fact, the
claims were based in part upon the later executed Stock Redemption Restructure
Agreement The Opinon Letter was provided on August 16, 1995 and the sole issue in
this case is whether that Opinion Letter was correct on that date. The Court correctly

determined the transaction at issue in this case was not the same as in Babbitt:
The factual grouping that constitutes a transaction in Babbitt, is the
thwarted efforts of Reed Taylor to gain control of AJA and colJect the
money due on the note. Reed Taylor was suing Riley and the other
attorneys for their behavior in representing John Taylor and AJA in that
action. His references to the opinion letter were in the context of his
uncessful effort to convince Judge Brudie that he had a tort cause of action
for the lawyer conduct in Babbitt. He was claiming that RiJey's new finn,
Hawley Troxell, and its lawyers owed a duty to not represent AJA or John
Taylor because Riley earlier represented Reed Taylor in authoring the
opinion letter. WhiJe the opinion letter played a role in the AJA suit and in
Babbitt, the issuance of the opinion letter arose from an entirely separate
set of facts and circumstances.
(11/24/12 Memorandum Opinion. p. 6-7.) Moreover, the defendants ignore the fact that
Taylor's Complaints asserted against Clements Brown and Hawley Troxell were virtually
identical-a fact that the defendants have obvious reasons for not addressing.
The doctrine of res judicata provides, "a valid final judgment rendered on the merits by
a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the
same parties upon the same claim." Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803,
805 (2002) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). This more complete statement of the
holding captures the elements of the doctrine as articulated in Ticor, but also clarifies the
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critical points that res judicata requires the existence of a judgment on the merits, not a
mere dismissal for failure to state a claim-a claim that could not have been asserted
because, as the defendants conceded when they moved to stay this case during Taylor's
appeal of the underlying action, Taylor's claims could not accrue in this action until there

was a ruling that the Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal, at which time he would
be damaged end it would be ascertainable that the opinion letter was incorrect.

The defendants' reliance on resjudicata is misplaced because there has never
been a judgment on the merits on the questions presented in this litigation. In fact, under
the holding of Taylor v. Babbitt, Taylor's claims in this case, even if they had been
asserted, would not have been ripe based upon the litigation privilege. Id, 149 Idaho at
850. Thus, the opinion letter claims in this case are not subject to res judicata. Duthie v.

Lewiston Gun Club, 104 Idaho 751, 663 P.2d 287 (1983) (matters raised in the second
suit were not ripe in the prior action). The defendants agree that Taylor's claims were not
ripe when they sought to stay this action. On May 19, 20 I0, Riley asserted: "[i]n the
event the Idaho Supreme Court reverses Judge Brodie's decision, then ... the current case
will cease to exist and this case wiIJ become moot. . .it makes sense to stay
proceedings...until a... ruling is obtained whether the 1995 redemption agreement is or is
not illegal and, therefore, whether the 1995 opinion letter which is the subject of the
present case was or was not correct."7 (5/19/10 Riley Memo, p. 2-3.) On May 21, 2010,
Turnbow and Eberle Berlin asserted: "the ultimate illegality for the 1995 Stock
Redemption Agreement. .. [is] central to Plaintiff's cause of action for professional
negligence ...the ...Court's ultimate ruling on whether the [Agreements] ... are illegal
7

This is precisely Reed's point in Section A(2). Reed's claims could not accrue until Judge Brudie ruled
that the Stock Redemption Agreement was both illegal and unenforceable.
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and/or enforceable directly impacts whether Defendants' actions potentially breached a
duty owed to Mr. Taylor... depending on the ... [appeal's] outcome •.. the present lawsuit
could be moot." (5/21/10 Memo in Support of Motion to Stay, p. 3-4.) If the defendants
believed that a stay was warranted for the Idaho Supreme Court to conclusively
detennine the legality of the Stock Redemption Agreement, their argument applied even
more before Judge Brudie ruled the Agreement was illegal-which is precisely Taylor's
point that his claims in this action could not have accrued until that point in time on June
17. 2009-long after the claims in Taylor v. Babbitt had been dismissed. Simply put, the
defendants have been caught yet again mking inconsistent positions.
This Court has correctly recognized that there is a critical distinction between this
case and Taylor v. Babbitt, such that the claims here do not arise out of the same
transaction. But even assuming, arguendo, that the claims alleged in this litigation were
tied to the same transaction as those addressed in Taylor v. Babbitt, the defendants'
proposed appeal does not present "substantial grounds for difference of opinion" because

Taylor v. Babbitt did not involve adjudication on the merits. Taylor v. Babbitt was
resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and Taylor asserted and believed that the redemption

was legal at that time. The IdaJio Supreme Court has recognized and acknowledged that a
Rule 12(b)(6) dismiss is not adjudication on the merits holding that such dismissals are
disfavored "because the primary objective of the law is to obtain a determination on the
merits of the claim." Ga"en v. Butigan, 95 Idaho 355, 359, 509 P2d 340, 344 (1973).
Without adjudication on the merits, the doctrine of res judicata simply has no application
in this case.
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The same can be said for collateral estoppel. the companion doctrine to res
judicata. "Five factors are required in order for [collateral estoppel] to bar the relitigation
of an issue determined in a prior proceeding: (I) the party against whom the earlier
decision was asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the
earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue
presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided
in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation;
and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party
to the litigation." Ticor, 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P3d at 618 (citing Rodriguez v. Dep 't of
Corr., 136 Idaho 90, 93, 29 P.3d 401, 404 (2001)). The issue of liability for the incorrect

opinion letter has never been litigated end is not subject to colJateral estoppel.
As with res judicata, for the doctrine to apply the defendants must establish the
existence of a final judgment on the merits or that the issue was conclusively decided.
The defendants have not attempted to do so end cannot do so. The only issue
conclusively decided was when Judge Brodie ruled that the Opinion Letter was incorrect
on June 17, 2009. which simply supports a finding of that the defendants are liable to
Taylor as a matter of law. 8 The companion doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel are not applicable in this case. The defendants' proposition that there are
substantial grounds for difference of opinion is without merit and must be rejected. The
transaction at issue in this case end Babbitt are ten years apart. The defendants have
failed to present any evidence of a prior adjudication of Taylor's claims on the merits.

1

Riley and his firm could have argued that the Stock Redemption Agreement was legal based upon "fair
value" or other reasons he belatedly asserted supported his opinion in the Opinion Letter, but he
intentionaUy asserted that the Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal. Riley is the cause of his present

dilemma.
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The Court must, therefore, reject the defendants' motions for pennission to appeal, reset
this matter for trial, and beginning the process of moving the parties towards trial and the
primary objective of the Jaw, a determination on the merits of the claim.
C.
The 1996 restructure and suborination issues have already been
determined.

As to the defendants' arguments that the also-il1egal 1996 Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement or the "fail-safe clause" are appropriate for a pennissive appeal,
those issues are not even supported by any applicable authority and have been decided by
the Idaho Supreme Court.
In Taylor v. AJA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552, 261P.3d829 (2011), the Idaho

Supreme Court defined '~Stock Redemption Agreement" to include that agreement and
the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement and held that they were both illegal
contracts. Id., 558, 560-70. This Court correctly concluded that "the 1996 agreement,
which included the waiver, grew out of the illegal 1995 agreement. The 1996 agreement
is void as a document in futhereance of the illegal 1995 agreement." (11124/12
Memorandum Opinion and Order, p. 9.)
As discussed by the Court on page 11 ofits Memorandum Opinion and Order, the
Idaho Supreme Court rejected any notation that the alleged "fail-safe clause" saved the
redemption: "[w]e hold that LC. § 30-1-6 allows redeeming stock on credit, but the
earned and capital surplus restrictions still apply...Nothing in l.C. § 30-1-6 suggests that
the timing of payment has any bearing on the statutes applicability, and given the
statute's purpose, it would be an absurd result to allow a corporation to get around these
restrictions by simply paying at a later date." Id. at 563. Notably, if the defendants had
drafted and presented to the shareholders the proper shareholder resolution authorizing
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the use of capital surplus, the redemption would have been legal and the later
subordination agreement entered into between Taylor and Donna Taylor would also have
been legal, as correctly determined by Judge Brudie when held the "fail-safe clause"
would result in a "legal absurdity." See also l.C. § 30-1-640(6).
D.

The Bude/I factors weight against the defendants' motions.

The defendants have failed to meet their burden of showing either of the two
mandatory threshold requirements of a permissive appeal. Even if they could meet that
burden, however, the additional factors to be considered as articulated by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Bude/I weigh against granting permission to appeal. The Court in
Bude/I stated, "The Court also considers such factors as the impact of an immediate
appeal upon the parties, the effect of the delay of the proceedings in the district court
pending appeal, the likelihood or possibility ofa second appeal after judgment is finally
entered by the district court, and the case workload of the appellate courts." Bude/I, 105
at 4, 665 P.2d at 703. Each of these factors weighs heavily against a permissive appeal.
Many of these issues have been addressed above in other contexts. For example,
the proposed pennissive appeal would operate to the substantial burden of the parties, the
defendants included. The proposed appeal is unlikely to succeed, end may even be
characterized as futile. Its impact on the parties, even if successful is significant, because,
as noted above, there are a number of issues upon which Taylor will have to appeal
should the matter be remanded from e pennissive appeal with instructions for entry of
judgment. This means that the parties will be subject to multiple appeals, the first of
which is wholly unnecessary. The parties will expend time and money in the pursuit of an
appeal that will almost certainly be followed by another appeal, regardless of the
defendants' success on the requested pennissive appeal. The likelihood of a second
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Pennissive Appeal
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appeal is nJmost certain and the impact of the proposed immediate appeal is high and
cannot be justified.
Similarly, the effect of the delay cannot be justified. This case is already over
three years old and it has already been stayed for a considerable period already, at the
request of the defendants. Indeed, they could have sought a permissive appeal after the
Court's ruling in 2010, rather than delay two years until they are facingjudgment day.
Taylor is 76-years-old and has already been denied access to justice for a considerable
period. He has been financially devastated and the last six years of this life bas taken a
tremendous toll upon him. The effect of the delay is not insignificant Any further delays
would be entirely prejudicial to him. If this case was appealed at this time, Taylor would
likely be well over 80-yeers-old before he could expect any finality. Indeed, it is clear
that delay is the only real purpose for the defendants' motions. As noted above, the
likelihood of success on the motions is very low and the defendants have failed to cite
any authority holding that an opinion giver is immune from liability for claims asserted
by the opinion recipient. It is equally clear that the defendants are hoping that further
delays will result in Taylor passing away Qike Turnbow) or giving up altogether. The
defendants have not and cannot demonstrate the existence of an issue on which there are
"substantial grounds for difference of opinion," nor have they shown that an immediate
appeal will "materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation[.]" In fact, the
defendants have failed to exert any efforts to resolve this case, but have expended every
possible effort to delay it. To grant a permissive appeal at this point in the litigation
would be to unduly and unreasonably burden the appellate courts. The appellate courts
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have sufficient work before them managing appeals as a matter of right and need not be
burdened with a permissive appeal in this matter.
Because the factors outlined by the Idaho Supreme Court weigh against granting
permission to appeal, this Court should reject the motions before it
E.

The request for leave to appeal has not been timely filed.

The defendants' motions for leave to appeal by pennission have not been timely
filed. Indeed, the lengthy delay between when the Court decided the duty issue and
denied summary judgment on that claim based upon resjudicata. The filing of the
defendants' motions expose the motions for what they are: another attempt to delay the
proceedings and deny Taylor access to justice. Rule 12 states, "A motion for permission
to appeal from an interlocutory order or judgment ... shall be filed with the district court
... within fourteen (14) days from date of entry of the order or judgment" WhiJe the
requests for leave to appeal were filed within 14 days of the Court's most recent decision
on summary judgment, they were, in fact, tiled long after the Court decided the duty issue
and denied the motions for summary judgment. The motions for summary judgment upon
which they are based were merely a rehashing of an issue already decided at a much
earlier date by this Court. The defendants, if they wished to appeal that issue, should have
requested leave when it was first decided. At that time, they had two choices: (I) move
for permissive appeal while the Taylor v. AJA Services case was on appeal; or (2) move to
stay this case to delay it. The defendants chose the latter. When that two-year delay did
not end this case, the defendants resuscitated the issues by bringing redundant motions
addressing issues that had previously been resolved and then sought leave to appeal on
nearly the eve oftrial in an attempt to delay and draw the proceedings out indefinitely.
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This Court addressed the issue of whether the defendants owed Taylor a duty of
care as a non-client of their law practices over two years ago. In its Memorandum
Decision and Order re: Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dated May 7, 2010,
the Court opined, "Riley and Turnbow had a duty to Taylor, a non-client, to draft the
opinion letter in a no-negligent (sic) fashion. That is, to exercise the ordinary care, skill
and prudence of a lawyer under the circumstances." Memorandum Decision, p. 8. The
Court also denied their motions for summary judgment on res judicata at that time as to
the remaining claim in this case. lfthe determination of that question did not present
"substantial legal issues of great public interest or legal questions of first impression"
sufficient to justify a Rule 12 appeal at that time, it certainly does not do so now in the
proverbiaJ eleventh hour. The defendants' could have and should have raised the issue at
that time, but declined to do so. They waived their known right to seek a permissive
appeal in 2010 on the identical issues they are now requesting to appeal some two years
later. See McKay v. Boise Project Bd. ofControl, 141 Idaho 463, 469, 111 P.3d 148, 154
(2005).
Having ignored the issue for well over two years, the defendants should not now
be pennitted to delay these proceedings, yet again, to seek the exceptional remedy of a
Rule 12 appeal. Taylor has prepared for trial and the Court has correctly ruled that the
matter should proceed to trial. Should Taylor prevail, the defendants can, if they wish,
take their appeal as a matter of right at that time. At that time, Taylor could also pursue
any issues that he wished to appeal. Resolving all issues on appeal at the same time
promotes judicial economy and prevents further prejudicial delays to this already over
three-year old case. On the other hand, if the defendants are given leave to appeal at this
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time, Taylor's opportunity to take the case to trial and secure a determination on the
merits could be delayed, quite literally, for years and would be severely prejudicial to
Taylor. He has earned and deserves his day in court. He has already waited over three
years for that day and the Court should endeavor to grant him his day in court as
expeditiously as possible.
CONCLUSION
''Rule 12 appeals are only accepted in the most exceptional cases with the intent
to resolve 'substantial legal issues of great public interest or legal questions of first
impression[.]'" Aardema, 147 Idaho at 789, 215 P.3d at 509 (quoting Budell, 105 Idaho

at 4, 665 P.2d at 703). The present case is not exceptional. It is quite ordinary and the
issues presented to the Court on summary judgment should not be presented to a jury.
"[J]ust because a court is the first to rule on a particular question ...does not mean that
there is such a substantial difference of opinion as will support an interlocutory appeal." 2
Fed. Proc., L. Ed§ 3:212. Indeed, it is a stretch to argue that either issue presented is a
legal question of first impression. The issue of res judicata has been addressed myriad
times by the courts of this state and the test for determining an attorney's duty to a nonM
client is clearly stated in Harrigfeld. For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motions
for permission to appeal should be denied.
DATED: November:$'2012

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Permissive Appeal

25
002634

26/27

208-523-5069

BEARD ST.CLAIR G -

BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY

. .14p.m.

11-07-201l

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the ::f-~ day of November, ~012, I caused
to be served true and correct copies of the foregoing document to the followmg parties:
Via:
Jack S. Gjording
Julianne S. HalJ
Gjording & Fouser, PLLC
509 W. Hays St
Boise, ID 83701
Fax: (208) 336-9177

( ) U.S. MaiJ, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand DeJivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( )facsimile
}1Email (pdf attachment)
Via:

James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
Elam & Burke, PA
251 East Front St.
Boise, ID 83704
Fax:(208)384-5844

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) FacsirnHe
j1Email (pdf attachment)
Via:

Roderick C. Bond
Roderick Bond Law Offices
800 Bellevue Way NE, Ste 400
Bellevue, WA 98004
Fax: (Fax: (425) 462-5638

( ) U.S. MaiJ
( ) Hand DeJivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
}1Email (pdf attachment)
Via:

Ada County Courthouse
200 West Front Street
Boise, ID 83702
Fax: (208) 287-6919

( ) U.S. Mail
0'Hand Delivered 1!>"-1 Cli«--= ~
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Email (pelf attachment)

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Permissive Appeal

26
002635

27/27

qo:Z

James D. LaRue ISB #1780
Loren C. Ipsen ISB #1767
Jeffrey A. Thomson ISB #3380
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844

NO.
A.M. _

-

FIL~·~·

----

NOV 1 3 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By DAYSHA OSBORN
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendant Richard A. Riley

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
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Case No. CV-OC-0918868

v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; SHARON
CUMMINGS, Personal Representative of the
Estate of Robert M. Turnbow; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

DEFENDANT RJLEY'S REPLY TO
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
PERMISSION TO APPEAL

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs opposition is based primarily on: (1) the perception that the motion seeking
pe.rmission to appeal is merely a delay tactic; (2) that the outcome of any permissive appeal is
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preordained in favor of his position; and (3) there will be another appeal regardless of the
outcome of this one.
Plaintiffs delay argument is based on the potential delay in getting to trial. The focus for
purposes of the Motion for Permission to Appeal, however, is getting to a final resolution. With
that focus in mind, a permissive appeal could get to a final resolution sooner than Plaintiffs
proposed timeline of delay. Should the Idaho Supreme Court determine that Defendants owed no
duty to Reed Taylor or that res judicata applies or he waived his claims, the litigation will be
fully and finally resolved without the need for a lengthy and expensive trial. This may not be the
final resolution sought by Plaintiff but it could be a much quicker resolution than a trial followed
by the inevitable appeal regardless of the outcome at trial.
Plaintiff argues that the duty issue does not give rise to substantial grounds for differences
of opinion because any opinion different than his would eviscerate several decades of
jurisprudence. This argument is, of course, directly controverted by this Court's observation that
the duty issue raises a legal question of first impression. By definition, an issue of first
impression means there is no prior jurisprudence to eviscerate. This argument also ignores the
Idaho Supreme Court's definition of a substantial legal issue of public interest which includes
one of first impression.
Regardless, even if the Supreme Court's decision on the issue of duty is preordained,
there is no clarification of the scope of the expanded duty (if it does indeed exist). Is it simple
negligence? Does it require reliance? Does it extend beyond the recipient to anyone who claims
to have relied on it? Does it ext~nd to the recipient if the opinion letter was a mere formality and
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was not relied on by him? Is the attorney a guarantor of the accuracy of the opinion letter? Is the
extension of an attorney's duty to a third party on the basis of a subsequently determined
inaccurate opinion letter merely a disguised negligent misrepresentation cause of action, which
has been limited only to accountants? Plaintiffs position also ignores the Idaho Supreme
Court's historical reticence to expand an attorney's duty to any third party beyond the extremely
limited circumstances found in Harrigfeld.
This permissive appeal raises questions of law for which there are substantial grounds for
difference of opinion if for no other reason than it is an issue of first impression and there exists
no guidance on its scope and application.
As to res judicata, the application of the "same transaction or series of transactions" test
could be determinative of the outcome of this case. If the issue of an extended duty is deemed
worthy of a permissive appeal, this and the wavier issue was framed by the motions and
addressed in the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order. They will also be ripe for review by
the Idaho Supreme Court.
As to Plaintiffs threat that he too has appealable issues which would disrupt the orderly
resolution of this litigation, he assumes that the Idaho Supreme Court will agree with his position
on all of the issues and the case will be remanded for trial. He ignores the equally possible
outcome that the Court will reverse on one or more of the three issues on appeal. As this Court
recognized, if there is no duty owed to Plaintiff he has no claims.· Indeed, if res judicata applies
or Plaintiff has waived his right to sue Riley, Plaintiffs claims against Riley would be barred.
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,,~

Should the Court reverse on any of these issues, Plaintiff would have no second appeal because
•'

the litigation will have been fully and finally resolved.

II. ANALYSIS

A.

A Denial of a Summary Judgment is Appealable in this Case.

·l
~ I
1

The general rule is, indeed, that an order denying a motion for summary judgment cannot
be directly appealed under Idaho Appellate Rule 1. Idaho Appellate Rule 12, .,however, expressly
overrides the general rule to provide a specific exception when the rule's criteria are met. If the
criteria are met, the denial of a motion for summary judgment is appealable.
Plaintiffs argument that the general rule against direct appeals of orders denying
summary judgment is, in and of itself, grounds to deny the motion for permissive appeal is
baseless and contrary to the rules and Idaho case law. Plaintiff in fact acknow,ledges this
argument's lack of merit in his next argument.
Permission to appeal an otherwise non-appealable interlocutory
order may be granted if it 'involves a controlling question of law as
to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and
in which an immediate appeal from the order or decree may
materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation.'

.

(Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Permissive Appeal ("Opposition"), p. 5.)
(Emphasis added.) The need to make such a baseless and inconsistent argum~nt is telling as to
'i

Plaintiffs concern of a review of these issues.

B.

Idaho Appellate Rule 12 Supports the Motion for Permission to Appeal.
Plaintiff accurately sets forth the criteria and factors to be reviewed to: determine whether

.,

'

a permissive appeal is appropriate. Plaintiff does not, however, review the criteria and factors in
,,
'

I
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:i
I

the correct light, choosing instead to reargue the merits of the issues and claitii that his are the
i~
'i

only possible positions on the issues.
1.

f:
!

Permissive Appeal Will Materially Advance the Orderly R~solution of the
Litigation.
.,

Plaintiffs position is that an appeal, no matter the outcome, will not r~'solve the litigation.
.,·I

Plaintiff posits two scenarios: (1) Defendants win all issues; or (2) Plaintiff wins any one of the
issues. He claims that under either scenario, the case will not be fully resolved. Plaintiff ignores,
,,. '

however, a third scenario and misunderstands the actual outcomes of his scenarios.
:1

·I

The missing scenario is that Defendants prevail on any one of the issues and the
misunderstanding is that the litigation will proceed to trial ifhe wins on just q¥e issue.
: I

Defendants do not need to prevail on all three issues to resolve the litigation. ,~ether
Il

Defendants prevail on only one or prevail on all three issues, the litigation will be fully resolved
-

.

and Plaintiff will not have any right to proceed to trial or pursue his own app~~l.
I'

If Defendants prevail on the duty issue, the Supreme Court will have decided that they
I

'.1

owed no duty to Plaintiff. Without a duty, Plaintiff has no appeal, including no appeal from
·i

issues (1), (2) and (4), as identified in his Opposition. (See Opposition, pp. 7"."8.) Each of these
t

:I

ii

issues require a duty and without a duty they are not appealable issues. Issue :No. 3 also fails·
If

''

since the issues of accrual, damages and application ofres judicata never ripeJ ifthere is no duty.
'

.

This is consistent with the Court's determination that if there is no duty Plain~iffhas no claims
against Defendants. All claims would be fully resolved. Consequently, if Defendants prevail on
.'

the duty issue there can be no second appeal.
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The same is true with respect to res judicata. If the Idaho Supreme Court
determines that
1,
11
the present lawsuit arises from the "same transaction or series of transactions" involved in Taylor
'i

v. Babbitt, it has determined, as a matter of law, that all claims that were or could have been
raised in that action are barred as a matter of law. That would include those claims
. which are the
basis for the so-called appealable issues, (1) through (4).

2.

The Proposed Issues for Appeal Raise a Controlling Question of Law as to
Which There is Substantial Grounds for Difference of Opinion.
'

Plaintiff relies on non-Idaho law for the proposition that issues of first impression do not
create a substantial difference of opinion. (Opposition, p. 9 .) The applicable. and persuasive law
!1

i:

in Idaho expressly states the contrary. Idaho has defined a controlling question oflaw as to
•'

which there are substantial grounds for difference of opinion as either: (1) a substantial legal
, I

I

issue of great public interest; or (2) a legal question of first impression. (l.A.R., Rule 12(a).)
Defendants have previously identified the substantial legal issues of public importance involved
in extending an attorney's duty to a non-client, including that an attorney should be free to give
'

.

advice and perform work, including the drafting of documents, to the client w~thout fear of
liability to a third party and that an attorney's loyalty should be to the client a.Q.d no one else in
'

order to be protected from a large, unpredictable class of persons purporting to
rely on advice
;.
rendered by the attorney. (Memorandum in Support of Motion for Permission to Appeal, pp. 5-

6.)
,,·,

This Court expressly recognized that expanding an attorney's liability. to a new class of
;!

~ourt's

third parties is an issue of first impression. (Order and Opinion, p. 13.) This

holding and

'
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Defendant's prior briefing clearly establishes a reasonable, supportable, legitimate and
substantial difference of opinion as to substantial legal issues as defined by Rule 12.
The Defendants are not grounding their request for permissive appeal solely on the
grounds that they feel this Court is incorrect. Defendants disagree with the ruling, but the request
is also based on the legitimate ground that the parties and the Courts are exploring new territory
and a map from the Idaho Supreme Court would be beneficial to all and could either establish
that the new territory is off limits or clarify its boundaries.
a.

Plaintiff Reargues that an Attorney Owes a Duty to Opinion Letter
Recipients.

It is not helpful and fails to advance Plaintiffs position on this motion to simply reargue
the merits of this legal issue and conclude that their position is the only possible position.
Whether an attorney owes a duty to the recipient of an opinion letter is an issue of first
impression. Until the Idaho Supreme Court speaks to the issue, it is an open question.
Defendants have not taken a frivolous or unsupportable position that no such duty will be
recognized in Idaho. If so, Plaintiff would have moved for sanctions. Moreover, it is
disingenuous to argue that Defendants have failed to cite a single case holding the attorney is not
liable to a non-client for issuing an opinion letter. There are no Idaho cases to cite to on this
proposition - that is why it is an issue of first impression. Defendants have, however, cited to
Idaho law that could reasonably stand for the proposition that the duty will not be expanded to
include any new third parties.
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In order to avoid the legal standard, and in direct contravention this Court's holding,
Plaintiff argues that there is no issue of first impression because this Court merely applied the
balance-of-the-harm's test established in Harrigfeld. This Court did not use this test to find a
new duty.
Plaintiff has been caught in a further inconsistency in that his rehash of his side of the
duty argument reveals that it is indeed a controlling question of law in that it is an issue of
substantial public impof!ance.
Imposing liability in this context will prevent future harm by
creating an incentive to prepare such instruments carefully and not
in a misleading fashion. On the other hand, not imposing liability
would cause harm to countless existing transactions and the legal
profession generally. It would also jeopardize future commercial
transactions in Idaho because parties would not enter into those
transactions without an opinion letter addressing the impact, if any,
of particular Idaho laws on a transaction. . . . Holding now that
those attorneys are not responsible for the things stated in those
letters would reduce the opinion letter component of the legal
industry to a giant confidence scheme with attorneys duping clients
into paying exorbitant fees for meaningless opinions letters.
(Opposition, p. 13.) While Plaintiff exaggerates the impact of not extending an attorney's duty to
a new class of third parties, the sheer intensity of this exaggeration shows that this is a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinions.
What is equally telling on the issue of whether there should be a permissive appeal is
Plaintiffs position that the duty created by this Court has little in the way of boundaries or limits.
Plaintiff relies extensively on the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers for the position that a
lawyer owes a duty to nearly any non-client who may rely on the lawyer's opinions. (Opposition,
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pp. 14-15.) The Idaho Supreme Court has not adopted the Restatement (and rarely does). At a
minimum, the scope of any such extended duty needs to be addressed by the Idaho Supreme
Court as a controlling question of law.
Regardless, a re-argument of the merits, as viewed by Plaintiff, is irrelevant to the issues
pending before this Court. This Court does not need to decide whether it ruled correctly. It need
only decide whether the Rule 12 criteria and factors have been met. An appeal of the issue of
whether an attorney's duty should be extended to a new group of third parties will materially
advance the orderly resolution of this litigation and involves a controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion. The criteria have been met.
b.

The Application of Res Judicata is an Appealable Issue.

Arguing whether the application ofresjudicata in this case separately meets the Rule 12
criteria is of little relevance. If the Idaho Supreme Court grants permission to appeal, all issues
framed by the Motions for Summary Judgment and for Reconsideration and ultimately decided
by this Court are reviewable on appeal. See Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856, 863,
252 P.3d 1274, 1281 (2001). Consequently, if the duty issue above meets the Rule 12 criteria,
this issue can be permissively appealed as well.
In addition, this is a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial grounds
for differences of opinion (at least as to this case) and resolution of this issue could materially
advance the orderly resolution of the litigation. If it is detemiined that res judicata applies, the
entire litigation would be resolved since any and all claims held by Plaintiff against the
Defendants would be barred.
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Clearly, there is a legitimate difference of opinion whether the opinion letter was part of a
series of !elated transactions given the relationship between the 1995 Stock Redemption
Agreement, the opinion letter, the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement, the alleged
breach of those agreements, attempts to collect on those agreements, the determination that the
initial transaction was illegal, that determination's effect on Plaintiffs ability to sue Riley, the
filing of Taylor v. AJA, the filing of Taylor v. Babbitt and the filing of the present lawsuit. The
fact that this series of transactions and lawsuits took many years to complete is not determinative
in and of itself. All of these transactions and lawsuits created a series of factual groupings, each
of which was interrelated by the same individuals and entities and each of which was based on
the same related agreements. Said another way, without the original agreements, nothing that
followed would have occurred.
Plaintiffs argument that a dismissal for failure to state a claim is not a final judgment on
the merits is not an issue decided by this Court in its Order and Opinion and therefore not a
reviewable issue on permissive appeal.
Plaintiffs argument that his claims were not yet ripe and therefore could not have been
brought in the underlying action is another issue that was not decided by this Court in its
Memorandum Opinion and Order. It is therefore not an issue that would be decided on appeal
and is therefore not an issue that can be used to decide against allowing a permissive appeal.
Regardless, this Court determined that Plaintiffs claims ripened when Taylor v. Babbitt was still
pending and before the present lawsuit was filed. Consequently, his claims against Riley could
have been brought in that action.
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Defendant's prior position regarding a stay of proceedings is entirely consistent with his
current position regarding a permissive appe.al of the resjudicata issue. Ifin fact Judge Brodie's
determination that the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal had been reversed by the
Idaho Supreme Court, Judge Brodie's dicta that the opinion letter was erroneous would also have
been reversed. The.accuracy of the opinion letter would have been moot and there would have
been no claims against Riley. The prior stay was appropriate given this potential outcome. The
Supreme Court, however, upheld the illegality of the agreement and that, coupled with this
Court's ruling that Plaintiffs claims against Riley ripened in 2008, thereby requiring him to
bring tho.se claims in Taylor v. Babbitt. A permissive appeal from a contrary holding is perfectly
consistent with prior positions. Plaintiffs use of this alleged inconsistent position is simply more
evidence of the inter-relatedness of all of the transactions and lawsuits and strengthens the
application of res judicata.

3.

Waiver.

Plaintiff relies on the Supreme Court's definition that the Stock Redemption Agreement
and the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement (and apparently the Subordination Agreement)
are all related and their legality (or lack thereof) have already been decided. This is not a cogent
argument against a permissive appeal on the waiver issue, but is instead an argument in favor of
applying res judicata. The argument demqnstrates that all of the agreements and issues arising
from them are a series of related transactions.
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Regardless, as described above, if the Idaho Supreme Court grants a permissive appeal,
all issues framed by the motion and decided by this Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order are
reviewable by that Court.

4.

The Rudell Factors do Not Weigh Against a Permissive Appeal.

The impact of an immediate appeal upon the parties does indeed exist but not in the
manner agreed by Plaintiff. If an immediate appeal is taken, the parties and the Court will get
guidance from the Idaho Supreme Court that could either result in the end of the litigation or give
clear parameters for application of these issues should the matter proceed to trial. Pursuing an
appeal at this time could eliminate the need for extensive discovery, a trial and the possibility of
, a second appeal. 1
The delay issue also assumes an unsuccessful appeal (a matter of conjecture only). The
litigation could in fact be ended sooner with a permissive appeal than without. As Plaintiff has
already indicated, without a permissive appeal now there will be one after trial which would in
fact extend the final resolution of this litigation much longer than a permissive appeal now.
Playing the "age card" is also based on speculation and conjecture. It assumes that a
permissive appeal will be unsuccessful. It assumes that the permissive appeal process will take
more time than letting it go to trial followed by the inevitable appeal. It assumes that 76 years

1

Plaintiffs theory of a second appeal regardless of the outcome of the permissive appeal
is flawed. Plaintiff suggests that a second appeal is inevitable and therefore the first appeal
would simply delay matters. Plaintiff fails to account for the elimination of any further appeal
should the Idaho Supreme Court determine that Defendants owed no duty to Plaintiff or that res
judicata or waiver apply.
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old is so old that it should be considered a special factor in determining the most efficient path of
justice. It assumes that the purpose of a permissive appeal is to sufficiently delay the outcome
until after Plaintiffs death. It further assumes that Defendants are uninterested in a final
resolution. There are far too many assumptions to allow age to be a serious consideration in
deciding'whether the Rule 12 permissive appeal criteria have been met.

5.

The Request for Leave to Appeal is Not Untimely.

Plaintiff argues thafthe request for permissive appeal on the duty and res judicata issues
is untimely because this Court decided these issues more than fourteen (14) days before the
present motion was filed. It is undisputed that the Motion for Permission to Appeal was filed
within fourteen (14) days of the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order from which they are
seeking an appeal. It is undisputed that the motions that led to the Memorandum Decision and
Order framed the very issues from which a permissive appeal is sought. It is undisputed that the
Court addressed each of those motions. It is undisputed that this Memorandum Decision and
Order ruled on both the duty and res judicata issues. It is also undisputed that the Court did not
decide these issues on the grounds that it had previously ruled on them. It is therefore undisputed
that the present motion was a timely request for permission to appeal from this Court's
Memorandum Decision and Order .
The fact that this Court previously ruled on these issues does not preclude a request for
permissive appeal from the Court's latest rulings. A party is allowed to seek a permissive appeal
from any interlocutory order that meets the requirements of Rule 12. There is no requirement
that the issue be new to the case or that the issue has never been addressed before. The fact that
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these are not requirements is consistent with.Rule 1 l(a)(2)(A) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure that allows for successive motions for summary judgment if brought before the same
judge and before a final judgment. It is also consistent with Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure which allows for a motion for reconsideration at any time before entry of final
judgment regardless of when the original ruling was made as long as the motion for
reconsideration is brought within fourteen (14) days of the final judgment. The Motion for
Permission to Appeal was timely filed.

III. CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully requests that the Motion for Permission to Appeal be granted.
DATED this

/2...

day of November, 2012.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Ji.,

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of November, 2012, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the
manner indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC

800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, Washington 98004

/

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
/(425) 321-0343
/
E-mail
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 529-9732
E-mail

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495

Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

./

. /
V

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-9177
E-mail
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Jeffrey A. Thomson ISB #3380
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By CHELSIE PINKSTON
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant Richard A. Riley

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-OC-0918868

v.
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; SHARON
CUMMINGS, Personal Representative of the
Estate of Robert M. Turnbow; and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation;

DEFENDANT RICHARD A. RILEY'S NOTICE
OF APPEAL

Defendants.
TO:

The above named Respondent Reed J. Taylor and his attorneys of record, Roderick C.
Bond and Michael D. Gaffney, and to the Clerk of the above entitled Court:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named Appellant, Richard A. Riley, appeals against the above named

Respondent, Reed J. Taylor, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Opinion and
Order Re: Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and Reconsideration, entered in the
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G:\CLIENT\7082\0013\HTEH - #2\Appeal ofHTEH #2\Pleadings\2013.01.28 Notice of Appeal.wpd

002651

above entitled action on the 24th day of October, 2012, Honorable Judge Richard D. Greenwood
presiding.
2.

That the Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

Opinion and Order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to
Rule 12 of the Idaho Appellate Rules and the Supreme Court's Order Granting Richard A.
Riley's Motion for Permission to Appeal dated January 17, 2013.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, as currently identified and which

the Appellant intends to assert are:
(a)

Did the District Court err in finding that Taylor's claims against Riley

were not barred by res judicata;
(b)

Did the District Court err in finding that Riley owed a duty to Taylor, a

(c)

Did the District Court err in finding that Taylor did not waive his claims

non-client;

against Riley; and
(d)

Did the District Court err in finding that changed c_ircumstances were not

the proximate cause of Taylor's alleged damages?
4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5(a).

Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes.

5(b).

The Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's

transcript via: [ ] hard copy, [ ] electronic copy, [ X] both:
(a)
(b)

Motion Hearing held on March 26, 2010; and
Motion Hearing held on September 13, 2012.

DEFENDANT RICHARD A. RILEY'S NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
G:ICLIENl\708210013\HTEH - #2\Appeal ofHTEH #2\Pleadings\2013.01.28 Notice of Appeal.wpd

002652

6.

The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's

Record in addition to those automatically included pursuant to Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate
Rules:
(a)

Defendants Richard A. Riley and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP's
Motion for Summary Judgment filed December 7, 2009;

(b)

Memorandum in Support of Defendants Richard A. Riley's and Hawley
Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP's Motion for Summary Judgment filed
January 15, 2010;

(c)

Affidavit of Richard A. Riley in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment filed January 15, 2010;

(d)

Affidavit of Gary D. Babbitt in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
filed January 15, 2010;

(e)

Affidavit of Reed J. Taylor in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment filed February 3, 2010;

(f)

Defendants Richard A. Riley's and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley
LLP's Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment filed February 17, 2010;

(g)

Affidavit of Richard A. Riley in Opposition to Reed J. Taylor's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment filed February 17, 2010;

(h)

Memorandum of Defendants Richard A. Riley and Hawley Troxell Ennis
& Hawley, LLP in Opposition to Plaintiffs Amended Cross-Motions for
Summary Judgment filed March 12, 2010;

(i)

Affidavit of James D. LaRue filed March 12, 2010;

G)

Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants Richard A. Riley's and
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP's Motion for Summary Judgment
filed March 19, 2010;

(k)

Affidavit of Loren C. Ipsen filed March 19, 2010;

(I)

Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment, in Support of Reed Taylor's Cross Motions for
Summary Judgment, and in Support of Reed Taylor's IRCP 56(f)
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Continuance on the Issues of Fraudulent Concealment and Equitable
Estoppel filed March 22, 2010;
(m)

Affidavit of James D. LaRue filed March 24, 2010;

(n)

Supplemental Affidavit of James D. LaRue in Support of Defendant
Richard A. Riley's Motion for Stay filed May 19, 2010;

(o)

Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond filed June 1, 2010;

(p)

Richard A. Riley's Motion for Summary Judgment filed August 15, 2012;

(q)

Memorandum in Support of Richard A. Riley's Motion for Summary
Judgment filed August 15, 2012;

(r)

Affidavit of Loren C. Ipsen filed August 15, 2012;

(s)

Second Supplemental Affidavit of Richard A. Riley in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment filed August 15, 2012;

(t)

Affidavit ofD. John Ashby in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
filed August 15, 2012;

(u)

Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, Third Motion for
Summary Judgment and Joinder in Defendant Riley's Motion for
Summary Judgment on Res Judicata filed August 15, 2012;

(v)

Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment, Third Motion for Summary Judgment, and Joinder in
Defendant Riley's Motion for Summary Judgment filed August 15, 2012;

(w)

Reply Brief of Richard A. Riley in Response to Plaintiff's Memorandum
of Law in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed September
6, 2012;

(x)

Defendant Richard A. Riley's Motion for Permission to Appeal
Memorandum Opinion and Order Re: Defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment and Reconsideration filed October 30, 2012;

(y)

Memorandum in Support of Defendant Richard A. Riley's Motion for
Permission to Appeal Memorandum Opinion and Order Re: Defendants'
Motions for Summary Judgment and Reconsideration filed October 30,
2012;
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7.

(z)

Defendant Riley's Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion for
Permission to Appeal filed November 13, 2012; and

(aa)

Defendant Riley's Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion for Permission to
Appeal filed November 13, 2012.

The Appellant requests the following documents, charts or pictures offered or

admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court:
NIA.

8.

I certify that:
(a)

A copy ofthis Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of whom
a transcript has been requested as named below at the address said below:

(b)

Reporter:
Address:

Fran Morris
11981 La Pan Drive
Boise, ID 83709

Reporter:
Address:

Leslie Anderson
829 E. Blue Heron Street
Meridian, ID 83646

The clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the reporter's transcript;

(c)

The estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's Record has been paid;

(d)

The appellate filing fee has been paid; and

(e)

Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20.
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DATED this

w

day of February, 2013.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

re~ A. Thomson, of the firm
omeys for Defendant Richard A. Riley

CERTIFICATE 0

SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the -1:?__ day of February, 2013, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond

/

RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC

800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400
WA 98004

B~llevue,

t/
Michael D. Gaffney

V

BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA

2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495

/
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837

Boise, ID 83701-2837

/

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(425) 321-0343
E-mail
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 529-9732
E-mail

/U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-9177
E-mail
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CHRJSTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By JERI HEATON
DEPUTY

Jack S. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
jgording@gfidaholaw.com
Julianne S. Hall, ISB No. 8076
Jaren N. Wieland, ISB No. 8265
GJORDING FOUSER, PLLC

Plaza One Twenty One
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Attorneys for Attorney for Appellants Sharon Cummings,
Personal Representative of the Estate ofRobert
M Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, Kading,
Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

Case No. CV OC 0918868

NOTICE OF APPEAL

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
SHARON CUMMINGS AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF
ROBERT M. TURNBOW and EBERLE,
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation,
Defendants-Appellants.

TO:

The ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, Reed J. Taylor, AND THE PARTY'S
ATTORNEYS, Roderick Bond Law Office, PLLC, 800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400,
Bellevue, Washington, 98004, and Beard St. Clair Gaffney, PA, 2105 Coronado St.,
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named appellants, Sharon Cummings, Personal Representative of the

Estate of
Robert M. Turnbow, and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered
appeal against the above named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the interlocutory
Memorandum Opinion and Order Re:

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and

Reconsideration, entered in the above entitled action on the 24th day of October, 2012,
Honorable Judge Richard D. Greenwood presiding.
2.

That the above-named parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court,

and the order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to l.A.R.
12 and the Supreme Court's Order Granting Defendants Eberle Berlin and Sharron Lynne
Cummings Motion for Permission to Appeal dated January 17, 2013.
3.

Reserving the right to assert other issues on appeal, Appellants make the

following preliminary statement of issues on appeal:
a.

The district court erred in holding that Attorney Appellants owed Taylor a

duty even though no attorney-client relationship existed between them. The district court
further erred in creating a never-before recognized opinion-letter exception to the
requirement that an attorney-client relationship must exist for there to be legal
malpractice.
b.

Even assuming a duty in tort can be based on an opinion letter, the opinion

letter here ceased to have any legal effect when the subsequent agreement superseded the
agreement for which the opinion letter was written.
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c.

The district court erred in finding that Taylor's claim against the Attorney

Appellants was not barred by res judicata.
4.

No relevant portions of the requested record have been sealed.

5.

A reporter's transcript is requested. Appellants request the preparation of the

reporter's transcript via both hard and electronic copy.

6.

a.

Motion Hearing Transcript of March 26, 2010.

b.

Motion Hearing Transcript of September 13, 2012.

The Appellants request the following documents to be included in the Clerk's

Record in addition to those automatically included pursuant to Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate:
a.

Eberle Berlin Motion for Summary Judgment filed January 15, 2010;

b.

Affidavit of Stanley J. Tharp filed February 4, 2010;

c.

Memorandum in Support of Defendants Eberle Berlin's Motion for

Summary Judgment filed February 4, 2010;
d.

Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant Eberle Berlin's Motion for

Summary Judgment filed March 19, 2010;
e.

Defendant Eberle Berlin's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment Third

Motion for Summary Judgment and Joinder of Defendant Riley's

M~tion

for Summary

Judgment on Res Judicata filed August 15, 2012;
f.

Defendant Eberle Berlin's Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion

for Summary Judgment Third Motion for Summary Judgment and Joinder of Defendant
Riley's Motion for Summary Judgment on Res Judicata filed August 15, 2012;
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g.

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants Eberle Berlin's

Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment Third Motion for
Summary Judgment and Joinder of Defendant Riley's Motion for Summary Judgment
filed August 15, 2012;
h.

Defendant Eberle Berlin's Motion or Permission to Appeal from the

Court's Interlocutory Order filed October 31, 2012; and,
1.

Defendant Eberle Berlin's Memorandum m Support of Motion for

Permission to Appeal from the Court's Interlocutory Order filed October 31, 2012.
7.

Appellant does not request any documents, charts, or pictures offered or admitted

as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court.
8.

I certify:
a.

That a copy of the notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of

' whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Fran Morris
Court Reporter
c/o Honorable Richard D. Greenwood
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Leslie Anderson
829 East Blue Heron Street
Meridian, Idaho 83646
b.

That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for

preparation of the reporter's transcript;
c.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid;

d.

That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and,
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e.

That service has been made on all parties required to be served pursuant to

I.AR. 20.
DATED this

lo 0.-

day of February, 2013.
GJORDING FOUSER, PLLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the b-u..aay of February, 2013, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Roderick C. Bond
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
800 Bellvue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, WA 98004

~
D
D
D

;gJ
Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado St.
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495

James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
ELAM BURKE
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701-1539
Fran Morris
Court Reporter
c/o Honorable Richard D. Greenwood
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Leslie Anderson
829 East Blue Heron Street
Meridian, Idaho 83646

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 6

~
D
D

~
~
D
D

)gt
~
D
D
D
D

xD
D
D
D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
Via Email
Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
Via Email
Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
Via Email

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
Via Email

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
Via Email
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com
javondet@beardstclair.com

NO·-----::::-=:-----FILeo
<t:oo
A.M·----1P.M. __
--.;.--.-..__

FEB 2 6 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By BRADLEY J. THIES
DEPUTY

Roderick C. Bond, ISB No. 8082
Roderick Bond Law Office, PLLC
800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, Washington 98004
Telephone: (425) 591-6903
Facsimilie: (425) 321-0343
Email: rod@roderickbond.com
Attorneys for the Plaintiff, Reed J. Taylor

In the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, County of Ada

Reed J. Taylor, an individual,
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868
Plaintiff/Respondent/CrossAppellant,

Plaintiffs Notice of Cross Appeal

vs.
Richard A. Riley, an individual; Hawley
Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; Sharon
Cummings, Personal Representative of the
Estate of Robert M. Turnbow: and Eberle,
Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen,
Chartered, an Idaho corporation,
Defendants/Appellants/CrossRespondents.

Plaintiffs Notice of Cross Appeal
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'

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANT/CROSS-RESPONDENTS, RICHARD A.
RILEY, SHARON CUMMINGS, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE
OF ROBERT M. TURNBOW,-AND EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED, AND THE PARTIES' ATTORNEYS, JAMES D. LARUE
& JEFFREY A. THOMSON, 251 EAST FRONT STREET, SUITE 300, BOISE, IDAHO
83701, AND JACKS. GJORDING, PO BOX 2837, BOISE IDAHO, 83701-2837, AND THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above named cross-appellant, Reed J. Taylor, cross appeals against the above named

cross-respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Opinion and Order
Re: Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and Reconsideration, entere·d in the above
entitled action on October 24, 2012, Honorable Richard D. Greenwood, presiding.
2. The cross-appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Supreme
Court has previously granted the appellant's Motion for Permission to appeal, dated January
17, 2013 and the issues raised by the cross-appellant are necessary to resolve the question of
whether a duty is owed to cross-appellant.
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on cross-appeal, as currently identified and which the
cross-appellant intends to assert include, without limitation:
a.

Whether the Idaho Supreme Court should extend the rule in Duffin v. Idaho
Crop Improvement Association, 126 Idaho 1002, 895 P.2d 1195 (1995) to
include attorneys who prepare and deliver opinion letters for third parties to
rely upon as the class of persons plaintiffs may pursue negligent
misrepresentation claims against.

b.

Whether there is a duty owed by attorneys to third-party recipients of
opinion letters based on the assumed duty doctrine.

Plaintiffs Notice of Cross Appeal 2
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c.

Whether attorneys owe fiduciary duties or duties of trust and confidence to·
the recipient of the opinion letter.

4. · Is additional transcript requested? Yes.
a.

Any additional transcript is to be provided in [ ] hard copy [ ] electronic
format [X] both.

b.

The cross-appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the
report's transcript:
(i.) Motion Hearing held on June 7, 2010 (Leslie Anderson).

5. The cross-appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, l.A.R. and those designated by the
appellant in the initial notice of appeal:
a.

Affidavit of James D. La.Rue in Support of Protective order, filed on
October 30, 2009;

b.

Affidavit of Gary D. Babbitt in Support of Motion for Protective Order,
filed on November 2, 2009;

c.

Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Opposition to Riley and Hawley Troxell's
Motion for Protective Order and Eberle Berlin's Joinder and in Support of
Reed Taylor's Request to Compel Depositions and Discovery and Request
for Award of Pees, filed on November 12, 2009;

d.

Affidavit of Richard Riley in Support of Motion for Protective Order, filed
on November 13, 2009;

e.

Affidavit of John Ashby in Support of Motion for Protective Order, filed on
November 13, 2009;
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f.

Affidavit of Reed Taylor in Opposition to Riley and Hawley Troxell's
Second Motion for Protective Order and Eberle Berlin's Joinder and in
Support of Reed Taylor's Request to Compel Riley's Deposition and
Request for Award ofFe~s, filed on December 14, 2009;

g.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendants Riley, Hawley Troxell,
Turnbow, and Eberle Bedin, filed on February 3, 2010;

h.

Affidavit of Roderick B~nd in Opposition to Defendants Riley, Hawley
Troxell, Turnbow, Eberle Berlin's Motions for Summary Judgment and in
i

Support of Reed Taylor's Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, filed on
'

February 18, 2010;
i.

I

Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Cross Motions for Summary Judgment Against
Defendants Riley, Turnbow, Eberle Berline & Hawley Troxell, filed on
February 19, 2010;

J.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Statement of Facts in Opposition to Defendants
Riley, Hawley Troxell, Turnhow and Eberle Berlin's Motions for Summary
Judgment and in Support of Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, :ijled on
February 19, 2010;

k.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell's Motion for Summary Judgment and
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on February 19, 2010;

1.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Defendants Turnbow, Riley and Eberle Berlin's Motion for Summary
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Judgment and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on February 19,
2010;
m.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's (1) Reply in Support of his Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment Against Defendants; and (2) Supplemental Response in
Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, filed on
February24, 2010;

n.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Amended Cross Motions for Summary Judgment
Against Defendants Riley, Turnbow, Eberle Berlin and Hawley Troxell,
filed on February 26, 2010;

o.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition tQ
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and in Support of Cross
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, filed on March 12, 2010;

p.

Memorandum in. Opposition to Plaintiffs Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed on March 16, 2010;

q.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's (1) Objections; (2) Withdraw of Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment on the Issues of Fraudulent Concealment and Equitable
Estoppel, Clarification & Request for Leave to Amend; (3) Reply in
Support of Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; and (4)
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment and in Sµpport of Cross Motions for Partial Summary
Judgment, filed on March 22, 2010;
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r.

Order Denying Plaintiffs Motions for Partial Summary Judgment Against
Defendants Riley, Hawley Troxell, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin, filed on
March 25, 2010;

s.

Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed on
April 21, 2010;

t.

Order Granting Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment on the First &
Third Causes of Action of Plaintiffs Complaint and Denying Reed J.
Taylor's Cross Motions for Summary Judgment on the First & Third Causes
of Action of Plaintiffs Complaint, filed on April 21, 2010;

u.

Order Terminating Stay of Discovery, filed on May 10, 2010;

v.

Defendant Richard A. Riley's ~otion for Stay, filed on May 29, 2010;

w.

Supplemental Affidavit of Gary D. Babbitt in Support of Defendant Richard
Riley's Motion for Stay, filed on May 19, 2010;

x.

Memorandum in Support of Defendant Richard Riley's Motion for Stay,
filed on May 19, 201.0;

y.

Defendants Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's Motion for Stay, filed on May 21,
2010;

z.

Affidavit of Jack S. Gjording in Support of Defendants Turnbow and Eberle
Berlin's Motion for Stay, filed on May 21, 2010;

aa.

Defendants Turnbow & Eberle Berlin's Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Stay, filed on May 21, 2010;

bb.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Response in Opposition to Defendants Riley,
Turnbow, and Eberle Berlin's Motions to Stay, filed on June 1, 2010;
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cc.

Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant Richard A. Riley's Motion to
Stay, filed on June 2, 2010;

dd.

Affidavit of Loren C. Ispen in Support of Defendant Richard A. Riley's
Motion to Stay, filed on June 2, 2010;

ee.

Defendants Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's Reply in Support of Motion to
Stay, filed on June 2, 2010;

ff.

Second Affidavit of Jack S. Gjording in Support of Defendants Turnbow
and Eberle Berlin's Motion to Stay, filed on June 2, 2010;
2010~

gg.

Affidavit of James D. LaRue, filed on June 3,

hh.

Memorandum and Order on Various Motions, filed on June 10, 2010;

11.

Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Decision
Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Hawley Troxell and Judgment
Dismissing Hawley Troxell, filed on June 17, 2010;

JJ.

Affidavit of Roderick Bond in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of the
Court's Decisions Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Hawley Troxell
and Judgment Dismissing Hawley Troxell, filed on June 17, 2010;

kk.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court's Decisions Granting Summary Judgment in
Favor of Hawley Troxell and Judgment Dismissing Hawley Troxell, filed
on June 17, 2010;

11.

Order Amending Previous Memorandum and Order on Various Motions,
filed on June 18, 2010;
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mm. Affidavit of Roderick Bond in Support of Motion to Disallow Hawley
Troxell's Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs and in Support of Reed
Taylor's Motion for Reconsideration, filed on June 30, 2010;
nn.

Memorandum in Support of Defendant Richard Riley's Motion for
Protective Order, filed on November 21, 2011;

oo. ' Notice of Association of Counsel (Michael Gaffney for Plaintiff), filed on
November 28, 2011;
pp.

Order Re: Motion to Lift Stay, filed on December 12, 2011;

qq.

Affidavit of Jack Gjording in Support of Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, filed on December 30, 2011;

rr.

Supplemental Affidavit of Richard A. Riley in Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, filed on January 23, 2012;

ss.

Order Substituting Defendant Robert M. Turnbow, filed on July 12, 2012;

tt.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Reconsideration, filed on August 30, 2012;

uu.

Expert Witness Affidavit of Richard T. McDermott, filed on August 30,
2012;

vv.

Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Opposition to Defendants' Motions of
Summary Judgment and in Support of Reed's Motion for Reconsideration,
filed on August 31, 2012;

ww. Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Defendants Cummings and Eberle Berlin's Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment and Joinder to Defendant Riley's Motion for Summary Judgment
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and Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Reed Taylor's Motion for
Reconsideration, filed on September 4, 2012;
xx.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant
Richard A. Riley's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supplement
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, filed on
September 5, 2012;

yy.

Supplemental Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond, filed on September 5, 2012;

z:z..

Hawley Troxell's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Reconsideration, filed on September 6, 2012;

aaa. Second Supplemental Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond, filed on September 11,
2012;
bbb. Motion for Stay of Proceedings During Processing of Motion for
Permission to Appeal, filed on October 30, 2012;
ccc. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Stay of Proceedings During
Processing of Motion for Permission to Appeal, filed on October 30, 2012;
ddd. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Permissive Appeal,
filed on November 7, 2012.
6. The cross-appellant request the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or admitted
as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court in addition to those requested in the
·original notice of appeal:
7. I certify:
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a.

That a copy of this notice of cross-appeal and any request for additional
transcript have been served on each reporter of whom an additional
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Leslie Anderson
829 E. Blue Heron Street
Meridian, ID 83646

b.

That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the reporter's transcript and any additional documents
requested in the cross-appeal.

c.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant

. AiI/,Y
Mic el~·
Of Beard S . Clair Gaffney PA

Attorney for the Plaintifli'Resp7 Cross-Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 26th day of February, 2013, I caused to be
served true and correct copies of the foregoing document to the following parties: .·

Via:
Jack S. Gjording
Julianne S. Hall
Gjording & Fouser, PLLC
509 W. Hays St.
Boise, ID 83701
Fax: (208) 336-9177

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Q.vefnight Mail
~)<Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
Elam & Burke, PA
251 East Front St.
Boise, ID 83704
Fax: (208) 384-5844

Leslie Anderson
829 E. Blue Heron Street
Meridian, ID 83646

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) <Jy,eriilght Mail
/YEmail (pdf attachment)

~~

~~~--1~ail, Postage Prepaid

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
Ada County Courthouse
200 West Front Street
Boise, ID 83702
Fax: (208) 287 ,'9

~ ~lVfail, Postage Prepaid

A ( ) Email
n~~~:;nght Mail
(pdf attachment)

.
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)
)
)

v.

ORDER

)
)

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited partnership; SHARON
CUMMINGS, Personal Representative of the
ESTATE OF ROBERT M. TURNBOW; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho
corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court Docket Nos. 40595-2012
(40599-2013)
Ada County Nos. 2009-18868
(2009-18868)
Ref. No. 13-186

On April 24, 2013, this Court issued an ORDER wherein Defendant-AppelJant Riley's
MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF CROSS APPEAL was GRANTED and the
permissive appeal was limited to the issues raised and decided in the Memorandum Opinion and
Order Re: Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment and Reconsideration filed on October 24,
2012. The dismissal is without prejudice as to issues from any appeal that may result from a final
judgment in this case.

Thereafter, it was determined that DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS

SHARON CUMMINGS, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF ROBERT M.
TURNBOW AND EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW & MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED
MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF CROSS-APPEAL WITH PREJUDICE and
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT filed with this Court on April 5, 2013, was inadvertently not
addressed in this Court's Order dated April 24, 2013.
Therefore, good cause appearing,

I

ORDER-Docket Nos. 40595-2012 (40599-2013)
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IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that DEFENDANT/APPELLANT RILEY'S MOTION FOR
INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF CROSS APPEAL and DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS
SHARON CUMMINGS, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF ROBERT M.
TURNBOW AND EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW & MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED,
MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF CROSS APPEAL be, and hereby are,
GRANTED.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the pennissive appeal shall be limited to the issues raised
and decided in the Memorandwn Opinion and Order Re: Defendants' Motions for Swnmary
Judgment and Reconsideration filed on October 24, 2012. The dismissal shall be WITHOUT

PREJUDICE as to issues ~many appeal that may result from a final judgment in this case.
DATEDthis

1.;..-- dayofMay,2013.

By Order of he Supreme Court

Karel A. Lehnnan, C ief Deputy Clerk for
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
cc:

Counsel of Record

ORDER- Docket Nos. 40595-2012 (40599-2013)
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JUN 14 2013

Fax: 334-2616

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By BRADLEY J. THIES

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

REED J. TAYLOR. an individual,

)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant.
vs.

DEPUTY

SC Docket No. 40595-2013

)

SHARON CUMMINGS. Personal Representative of the)
ESTATE OF ROBERT M. TURNBOW: and EBERLE.)
BERLIN, KADINC. TURNBOW & MCKLVEEN
)
CHARTERED. an Idaho corporation,
)
)
Defendants-Appellants-Cross Respondents,
)
)

And

)
)

RICHARD A. RILEY. an individual. and HAWLEY
)
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited)
liability partnership,
)
Defendants.
)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

Notice of Transcript Lodged

Notice is hereby given that on April 2, 2013,
I lodged one (1) original and three (3) copies of transcripts 81 pages in length,
as listed below, for the above referenced appeal with
the District Court Clerk of Ada County, Fourth Judicial District.

I

.·
,

.·']

1

/I

)

.1

/

/ /.

<' '// / , /.//~ ,/'' ,-.·
·' Gl-// { ~ , I / ·. K
Frances J. Morris, RPR/, CSR -r'iPo. 696
TRANSCRIPTS LODGED
9/13/12 Hearing
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To:

Clerk otlthe Court
Idaho Supreme Court
Boise, Idaho
83720

NO·-r;-:-:---~n----Q'
FILED

A.M.

U'

00

··-----

P.M

JUN 14 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By BRADLEY J. THIES
DEPUTY

Docket No. 40595-2012
(Res)

REED TAYLOR

vs.
(App)

SHARON CUMMINGS, et al.

NOTICE OF REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT LODGED:
Hearings held 3/26/2010 and 6/7/10
Notice is hereby given that on April 16, 2013,

I

lodged a transcript of 165 pages in length for the
above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of
the County of Ada in the Fourth Judicial District.

829 E. Blue Heron Street
Meridian, Idaho 83646
(208) 371-2006
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Supreme Court Case No. 40595
40599

vs.
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual, SHARON
CUMMINGS, Personal Representative of the
ESTATE OF ROBERT M. TURNBOW; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
MCKLVEEN CHARTERED, an Idaho corporation,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an
Idaho limited liability partnership;
Defendants.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 26th day of June, 2013.

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,

PI ai ntiff-Respondent,

Supreme Court Case No. 40595
40599

VS.

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual, SHARON
CUMMINGS, Personal Representative of the ESTATE
OF ROBERT M. TURNBOW; and EBERLE, BERLIN,
KADING, TURNBOW & MCKLVEEN CHARTERED,
an Idaho corporation,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Defendants-A ppe 11 ants,
and
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an
Idaho limited liability partnership;
Defendants.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
JEFFREY A. THOMSON,

MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY

JACK S. GJORDING

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

Date of Service:

JUN 2 6 2013
~~~~~~~~-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Supreme Court Case No. 40595
40599

vs.
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual, SHARON
CUMMINGS, Personal Representative of the
ESTATE OF ROBERT M. TURNBOW; and
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
MCKLVEEN CHARTERED, an Idaho corporation,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
HAWLEY TROXELL El\Jl'JIS & HAWLEY LLP, an
Idaho limited liability partnership;
Defendants.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
6th day of February, 2013.

'
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

002680

JUL 24 2013
James D. LaRue ISB #1780
Loren C. Ipsen ISB #1767
Jeffrey A. Thomson ISB #3380
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844

CHFUSTOPHf!Ft C. FUOH, Clerk
By ANNAMAAIE Ml!Vl!R
D!PUTV

Attorneys for Defendant Richard A. Riley
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-OC-0918868

v.

STIPULATION FOR ADDITIONAL
CLERK'S RECORD

RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership;
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Robert M.
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING,
TURNBOW & McKL VEEN, CHARTERED,
an Idaho corporation;
Defendants.
The parties, by and through their respective counsel of record, hereby stipulate and agree
to the addition of the following documents to the Clerk's Record:
A.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendants Riley, Hawley Troxell,
Turnbow, and Eberle Berlin filed February 3, 2010;

B.

Affidavit of Roderick Bond in Opposition to Defendants Riley, Hawley
Troxell, Turnbow, Eberle Berlin's Motions for Summary Judgment and in
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Support of Reed Taylor's Cross Motions for Summary Judgment filed
February 18, 2010;
C.

Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Cross Motions for Summary Judgment Against
Defendants Riley, Turnbow, Eberle Berlin & Hawley Troxell filed
February 19, 2010;

D.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Statement of Facts I Opposition to Defendants
Riley, Hawley Troxell, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Support of Cross Motions for Summary Judgment filed
February 19, 2010;

E.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell's Motion for Summary Judgment
and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment filed February 19, 201 O;

F.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Defendants Turnbow, Riley and Eberle Berlin's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment filed February 19,
2010;

G.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's (1) Reply in Support of his Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment Against Defendants; and (2) Supplemental Response
in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment filed
February 24, 2010;

H.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and in Support of Cross
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment filed March 12, 2010;

I.

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment filed March 16, 201 O;

J.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's (1) Objections; (2) Withdraw of Cross Motion
for Summary Judgment on the Issues of Fraudulent Concealment and
Equitable Estoppel, Clarification & Request for Leave to Amend; (3)
Reply in Support of Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; and (4)
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment and in Support of Cross Motions for Partial Summary
Judgment filed March 22, 20 l O;

K.

Order Denying Plaintiff's Motions for Partial Summary Judgment Against
Defendants Riley, Hawley Troxell, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin filed
March 25, 2010;
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L.

Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed
April 21, 2010;

M.

Order Granting Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment on the First
and Third Causes of Action of Plaintiff's Complaint and Denying Reed J.
Taylor's Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment on the First and Third
Causes of Action of Plaintiff's Complaint filed April 21, 201 O;

N.

Memorandum in Support of Defendant Richard Riley's Motion for Stay
filed May 19,2010.

0.

Defendants Turnbow & Eberle Berlin's Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Stay filed May 21, 20 IO;

P.

Memorandum and Order on Various Motions filed June I 0, 20 IO;

Q.

Notice of Association of Counsel (Michael Gaffney for Plaintiff) filed
November 28, 20 I I;

R.

Affidavit of Jack Gjording in Support of Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment filed December 30, 2011;

S.

Supplemental Affidavit of Richard A. Riley in Support of Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment filed January 23, 2012;

T.

Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant Riley's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment filed April 5, 2012;

U.

Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed
April 30, 2012;

V.

Order Substituting Defendant Robert M. Turnbow filed July 12, 2012;

W.

Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment and in Support of Reed's Motion for Reconsideration
filed August 31, 2012;

X.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Defendants Cummings and Eberle Berlin's Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment and Joinder to Defendant Riley's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Reed Taylor's
Motion for Reconsideration filed September 4, 2012;
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1.

Y.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Defendant Richard A. Riley's Motion for Summary Judgment and
Supplement Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration filed
September 5, 2012;

Z.

Supplemental Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond filed September 5, 2012;

AA.

Second Supplemental Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond filed September 11,
2012;and

BB.

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Permissive Appeal
filed November 7, 2012.

The parties agree that signing this Stipulation is not, and is not intended to be, a

waiver of any argument or position regarding the scope of the appeal or denial of the cross
appeal.
2.

The parties certify that a copy of this request was served upon the Clerk of the

District Court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20.
DATED this

..i}jj_day of July, 2013.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By:_r+--+---'-t+-7_ _ __
e A. Tfiomson, of the firm
omeys for Defendant Richard A. Riley
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DATED this ~,0. day of July, 2013.

GJORDJNG & FOUSER, PLLC

Jack S. Gjordhig, of the finn

Attorneys for f>efendant Sharon Cummings,
Personal Representative of the Estate of

Robert M. Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin,
Kading, Turnbow & Mc.Klvcen. Chartered

DATED this ............................ day of July, 2013.

RODE.RICK 80ND LAW OFFICE, PLLC

By: --·-..·-·-·--·-·------

·----·--

Roderlck C. Bond, of the tlnn
Attorneys for Pla.lntlff
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DATED this _ _ day of July, 2013.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

Jack S. Gjording, of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant Sharon Cummings,
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Robert M. Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin,
Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered

Jl-

DATED

this~ day of July, 2013.
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC

n

By: ~~+;-::...L-~~~~~~~~~~~
R rick . Bond, of the firm
Attorneys or Plaintiff
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'

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

:Ji.(

day of July, 2013, I caused a true and correct
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:
Roderick C. Bond
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, Washington 98004

---

V
--

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495

- - U.S. Mail
- - Hand Delivery

Federal Express

~ Facsimile Transmission
--

Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(425) 321-0343
E-mail

---

__

7
--

(208) 529-9732
E-mail
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 336-9177
E-mail
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